against emergent individualism - rob...
TRANSCRIPT
1
AgainstEmergentIndividualism
RobertC.Koons1
UniversityofTexasatAustin
1.Introduction
Inaseriesofatleasttenbooksandarticlesoverthelasttwenty-twoyears,Timothy
O’Connorandhiscollaboratorshavedevelopedoneofthemostrigorous,subtle,and
influentialaccountsoftherelationbetweenmindandbody,whichforpresent
purposeswecancall‘emergentindividualism’.Myownworkhasbeenshapedand
enrichedbythisbodyofwork.Consequently,thecritiqueIofferhereisadecidedly
friendly,intendedtoadvanceourunderstandingofthemindwhilebuildingonthe
contributionsofO’Connorandhisco-authors(Wong,Churchill,Theiner,andJacobs).
Inrecentyears,Ihavebeenworkingonthearticulationanddefenseofaversionof
thehylomorphismofAristotleandThomasAquinas(seeKoons2014).Thereis
muchcommongroundbetweensuchaThomisticversionofhylomorphismand
emergentindividualism.Boththeoriesincludearejectionofphysicalism,inbothits
reductiveandnon-reductiveversions,basedonphysicalism’sfailuretoaccount
adequatelyforqualia,intentionality,normativity,andmentalcausation.Both
embraceanincompatibilistversionoffreewillandbothadoptthemodelofagent
causation(infact,hylomorphistswouldextendthismodeltocoverallcausal
interactions,treatingtheearlymodernmodelofeventcausationascapturinga
derivativelevelofmetaphysicalreality).Bothcountmentalcausationasrealand
irreducible.Bothincorporatecausalpowersasafundamentalelementofontology,
andbothendorseasparseontologyofproperties.Bothrejectnominalismand
1 Iwouldliketoacknowledgethesupportduringthe2014-15academicyearoftheJamesMadisonPrograminAmericanIdealsandInstitutionsatPrincetonUniversity(foraVisitingFellowship)andtheUniversityofTexasatAustin(forafacultyresearchgrant).
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conceptualism,includingsomeformofrealismaboutproperties,eitherintheform
ofimmanentuniversals(thatareliterallypartsoftheirinstances)ortrope-like
abstractparticulars(individualforms).
Where,then,dothedifferenceslie?Thisquestionwilltakeupsection2ofthispaper,
inwhichIwilllocateeachoffouranti-reductionistpositionsonaconceptualmap,
namely:non-reductivephysicalism,Cartesiandualism,Thomistichylomorphism,
andemergentindividualism.Insections3,4,and5,Iwillargueforthesuperiorityof
hylomorphismoveremergentindividualismoneachofthreeissues:thenatureof
thecausesoftheexistenceofpersons(section3),thepossibilityofdisembodied
personalsurvival(section4),andthenatureoftheinfluenceofmindonbody
(section5).Imakesomeconcludingremarksinsection6.
2.AConceptualMapforthePhilosophyofMind
Tobeginwith,let’sexcludethetwomostextremeviews:reductivephysicalism(in
whichonlythephysicalreal)andidealism(inwhichonlythementalisreal).That
leavesfourmoderatepositions:non-reductivephysicalism,Thomistic
hylomorphism,emergentindividualism,andCartesiandualism.2
Howdoreductiveandnon-reductiveversionsofphysicalismdiffer?Wecan
distinguishthetwoverysimply,ifourbackgroundtheoryincludesarelationof
metaphysicalgrounding(seeFine1999and2012,Schaffer2009,andRosen2010)
andasparseontologyofpropertiesandstatesofaffairs.Forreductivephysicalists,
therearenon-physicalconceptswithnon-emptyextensions,andtruepropositions
2Thereareotherwaysofdividingupthelogicalspace,whichwouldgenerateotherpositions,includingneutralmonism,dual-aspecttheory,orpanpsychism.Forpresentpurposes,eachofthesecouldbeseeneitherasavariantofoneofthefourpositions(forexample,dual-aspecttheoryseemstobeaversionofnonreductivematerialism)orasintroducingorthogonalissues(forexample,thequestionofhowmanythingshaveminds–aquestiontowhichpanpsychismprovidesananswer).
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withnon-physicalcontent,buttheonlypropertieswithinstancesandtheonly
actualstatesofaffairs(orfacts)areentirelyphysicalinnature.Non-reductive
physicalists,incontrast,arecommittedtotherealexistenceofnon-physical
propertiesandfacts.Theycountasphysicalistsbecausetheyholdthatallnon-
physicalfactsarewhollygroundedinthephysicalfactsalone.Consequently,the
classofthetruth-valuesofnon-physicalpropositionsstronglysupervenesonthe
classofthetruth-valuesofthepropositionsofphysics.
Theotherthreepositionsdenyphysicalismaltogetherbydenyingthatthenon-
physicalfactsarewhollygroundedbythephysicalfacts.Fornon-physicalists,there
arefundamentalnon-physicalpropertiesandfacts(includingmentalpropertiesand
facts).Thisdoesnotnecessarilyentailadenialofmental-on-physicalsupervenience,
sincesupervenienceisanecessarybutnotasufficientconditionforphysicalism.
However,mostanti-physicalists(including,Ithink,allCartesiandualists)doinfact
denyeventheweak,globalsupervenienceofthementalonthephysical.
Itismuchhardertomaintainthestrong,localizedsupervenienceofthementalon
thephysical,intheabsenceofthecompletegroundingofthementalbythephysical.
Forthisreason,strong,localizedsupervenienceis(asfarasIknow)amaterially
adequatedefinitionofnon-reductivephysicalism,althoughIthinkthedefinitionin
termsofgroundingdoesabetterjobofgettingtotheheartofthematter.
HowcanwedistinguishCartesiandualism,Thomistichylomorphism,andemergent
individualismfromoneanother?Therearetworelativelysuperficialteststhatseem
todoanadequatejobofsortinganti-physicalisttheoriesintooneofthethreebins.
First,isitpossibleforahumanbeing(oranotherentitywithmentalproperties)to
begintoexistwithouthavinganyphysicalproperties(inanimmaterialor
matterlesscondition)?IfYes,thenwehaveaversionofCartesiandualism.IfNo,
theneitherThomistichylomorphismoremergentindividualism.Second,isit
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possibleforahumanbeingtoreachaconditionofimmateriality?IfYes,then
Thomistichylomorphism.IfNo,thenemergentindividualism.3
Althoughthesequestionsdogiveusthreemutuallyexclusivecategoriesthatare
jointlyexhaustiveofnon-idealisticanti-physicalism,theyarenotveryilluminating
aboutwhatreasonscanbegivenforthesethreesetsofanswers.Wehaveabetter
chanceofgainingsuchilluminationifwelookatrelationsofontologicaldependency
betweenthemindandthebody.Metaphysicalgroundingisonespeciesof
ontologicaldependency,butitisnottheonlyspeciesofthisgenus.Itispossiblefor
onemetaphysicallyfundamental(ungrounded)entitytobeontologicallydependent
onanother(Fine1994).Forexample,ifweacceptoriginsessentialism,each
organismisontologicallydependentonthepriorexistenceofitsparents,butthat
doesnotmeanthatthechild’sexistence(now)isgroundedbytheparents’existence
(then).Here’sanotherexample:wemightthinkthatextendedthingsare
ontologicallydependentontheexistenceofspacewithoutsupposingthatthe
existenceoftheextendedthingispartlygroundedbytheexistenceofspace.
Ontologicaldependencecanbeeithersynchronicordiachronic.IfAis
synchronicallydependentonB,thenA’sexistenceateachmomenttdependsonB’s
existenceatthatmoment.Diachronicdependenceisweaker:ifA’sexistenceis
diachronicallydependentonB,thentheexistenceofAateachmomenttdependson
B’sexistenceatsometimet*(typicallyatimenolaterthant).
Cantherebysynchronicontologicaldependencywithoutgrounding?Ithinkso.I
supposethatmetaphysicalgroundingisanecessitatingrelation:whenfactFwholly
3Itisobvious,Ithink,thatnoonewillwanttodefendthepositionaccordingto
whichisitpossibleforahumanbeingtobeimmaterialatthefirstmomentofits
existencebutimpossibletobeimmaterialatlatermoments.So,threecategoriesof
anti-physicalismseemsufficient.
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groundsfactG,itisimpossibleforFtoexistwithoutG’sexisting.Incontrast,
ontologicaldependencyrunsintheoppositedirection,modallyspeaking:ifobjectO
isontologicallydependentonobjectP,itisimpossibleforOtoexistwithoutP’s
existence.Thus,synchronicontologicaldependencyofoneobjectOonPis
incompatiblewiththecompletegroundingofthefactofP’sexistencebyO’s
existence,eventhoughineachcase,theexistenceofthefactthatOexistsentailsthe
existenceofthefactthatPexists.Metaphysicianshaveattimesspokenasifthe
impossibilityofF’sexistencewithoutG’sexistencewereakindof“dependency”ofF
onG(evenAristotlespokethiswayabout“priority”4),butthissortofmodal
“dependency”shouldbesharplydistinguishedfromtrue,metaphysicaldependency,
whichisanasymmetricrelationbetweenentities,andnotmerelyafactabout
covariationacrossworlds.
Wecannowask:Arehumanbeings(andothermental-propertybearingentities)in
arelationofsynchronicontologicaldependencetophysicalthings?Iftheansweris
Yes,thenwehaveeithernon-reductivephysicalismoremergentindividualism.If
theanswerisNo,thenwehaveeitherThomistichylomorphismorCartesiandualism.
TodistinguishhylomorphismfromCartesiandualism,wecanaskthefollow-up
question:Arehumanbodiesinarelationofsynchronicontologicaldependenceto
humansouls?IfYes,thenThomistichylomorphism.IfNo,thenCartesiandualism.
Howthenshallwedistinguishnon-reductivephysicalismfromemergent
individualism?Wecouldtrytodistinguishthembytheiranswerstothesame
follow-upquestion:Isthereasynchronicontologicaldependencyofhumanbodies
onhumansouls?However,itislikelythatbothnon-reductivephysicalistsand
emergentindividualistswillanswerNotothisquestion,onthegroundsthatthere
arenoentities(onthoseviews)thatcanreasonablybeidentifiedwiththeterm
humansouls.Wecouldtryaslightlydifferentformofthequestion:Istherea
4MetaphysicsDelta,1019a.
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synchronicontologicaldependencyofhumanbodiesonhumanpersons(or
individuals)?EmergentindividualistsshouldanswerYestothisquestion,onthe
groundthatitisonlytheemergenthumanpersonthatsuppliestheperseunityto
thematerialsthatmakeupthebody.Withouttheemergenthumanbeing,thematter
thatcomposesthehumanbeingwouldnotcomposeanyonethingatall,andso
nothingthatdeservesthelabelof‘body’wouldexist.However,itisnotcleartome
thatthenon-reductivephysicalistscouldn’talsogiveaYesanswerforthesame
reason.
Inordertodistinguishnon-reductivephysicalismfromemergentindividualism,we
havetoaskadifferentquestion,namely:Arethereinstancesofirreduciblemental-
to-physicalcausation?TheemergentindividualistsmustanswerYes,andthenon-
reductivephysicalistsshouldanswerNo.Itistruethatsomenon-reductive
physicalistshaveattemptedtoanswerYestothisquestion,despiteKim’sfamous
causalexclusionargument,butIagreewithO’ConnorandChurchillthatsuch
attemptsultimatelyfail(O’ConnorandChurchill2010).Thisconclusionfollows
fromoursharedcommitmenttobothcausalpowersasfundamentalandtoasparse
ontologyofpropertiesandfacts.Ifmentalfactsarewhollygroundedinthephysical
facts,thentherelationbetweenthementalandthephysicalisessentiallynon-causal
innature,andallgenuinecausalrelationstiephysicalfactsandeventstoother
physicalfactsandevents.
WhatpositionsdoThomistichylomorphistsandCartesiandualiststakeonthe
questionofmentaltophysicalcausation?ItisclearthatCartesiandualistsmustbe
interactionists:theymustpositdirectandfundamentalcausaltiesrunningfromthe
mindtothebodyandthebodytothemind.Otherwise,theywouldbeforcedto
embraceidealism(norealcausalpowerinthephysicalworld),epiphenomenalism
(norealcausalpowerinthementalworld),orLeibnizianpre-establishedharmony
(norealcausalpowerofthemindoverthebodyorviceversa).Thesearenot
attractiveoptions.
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SincebothemergentindividualistsandCartesiandualistsbelieveindirectand
fundamentalcausationfrommentalfactstophysicalfacts,andsinceboththinkthat
boththementalandtherelevantmicrophysicalfacts(i.e.,factsaboutthelocations
andtrajectoriesofthemicro-particles)aremetaphysicallyfundamental,both
groupsoftheoristsmustpositthatmentalfactscanmakearealdifferencetothe
behaviorofphysicalentities,adifferencethatcannotbeaccountedforintermsof
thecausalpowersofthosemicrophysicalentitiesalone,includingthepowers
associatedwiththefourfundamentalphysicalforces(gravitation,electromagnetism,
weakandstrongnuclearforces).Therefore,theymusteitherpositafifth
fundamentalforce(amentalorpersonalforce)orpositatleastlocalandtemporary
violationsofmass-energyconservation.5
TheissueismorecomplicatedwhenweturntoThomistichylomorphists.For
hylomorphists,manycausalpowersofthebodyanditsparts(evenitsultimate,
microscopicparts)areatleastpartlygroundedintheessentialandaccidental
propertiesofthesoul(orform).Theformalcausationthatrunsfromsoulto
corporealorgansisaspeciesofmetaphysicalgroundingandnotofcausationproper
(whatAristoteliansrefertoasefficientcausation).Thus,thesoulactsuponothers
onlyindirectly,usingcorporealorgansasinstruments.Thereneedbenodirect
causationfrommindtobody.Consequently,thereneedbeneitherafifth
fundamentalforcenoranyviolationofconservationlaws.Thenomological
completenessofmicro-physicsisnothreattotherealandirreduciblepowerofthe
macroscopicorganism,becausethehylomorphistnolongersupposesthe
microphysicalfactstobefundamentalandungrounded.Itisthesoul(form)thatis
5Cartesiandualistsandemergentistsmightarguethatquantumcollapsephenomenaprovidesanavenueforrealdownwardcausationwithoutnewfundamentalforcesorviolationsofconservation.Infact,Iwilldefendsuchapositionmyself,butIarguethatsuchdownwardinfluenceisbestunderstoodasinvolving,atleastinpart,theAristoteliannotionofformalcausation,ratherthanbeingunderstoodintermsofstandardevent-eventcausation.
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responsible(inpart)fortherelativelocationsandtrajectoriesofthemicrophysical
parts:themicrophysicallawssimplytakeasinputswhatis(already)partly
groundedinthenatureofthewhole,livingandrationalperson.
Hereistheresultingconceptualmap:
Figure1.
Iwanttomakeonemoreattemptataconceptualmapoftheterritory,thistimein
termsofmetaphysicalgrounding.Cartesiandualiststakeboththemindandthe
bodytobecompleteandindependentsubstances.Forsuchdualists,thefactsabout
themindarenotevenpartlygroundedbythefactsofthebody,norarethefacts
aboutthebodypartlygroundedbythefactsaboutthemindorsoul.Incontrast,
Thomistichylomorphistsdotakemanyfactsaboutthebody(evenaboutitsultimate
orsimpleconstituents,ifthereareany)tobeatleastpartlygroundedinfactsabout
thehumansoul(astheAristotelianformofthebody).Emergentindividualistsmay
alsotakecertainmereologicalfactsaboutthebodyanditsparts(e.g.,thefactthat
Isthemindontologicallydependent(synchronically)onthe
body?
YesIstherementaltophysicalcausation?
Yes:EmergentIndividualism
No:Non-reductivePhysicalism
NoIsthebodyontologicallydependentonthesoul?
Yes:Thomistic
Hylomorphism
No:CartesianDualism
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thesematerialentitiesdocomposeasinglething)tobeatleastpartlygroundedin
factsabouttheemergenthumanindividual.
Non-reductivephysicalistsdenythatthebodyisevenpartlygroundedbythesoul,
buttheyinsistthatthesoulisatleastpartly(and,infact,wholly)groundedbythe
body.Thus,wehavesofardistinguishedbothCartesiandualismandnon-reductive
physicalismfromeachotherandfromtheremainingtwocategories,butwehave
notyetdistinguishedbetweenThomistichylomorphismandemergent
individualism.
ThedifferencebetweenThomistichylomorphismandemergentindividualism
seemstolieintherealmofcausation.Thomistsagreewithemergentistsinthinking
thatitismetaphysicallyimpossibleforahumanbeingtobegintoexistwithoutthe
synchronicparticipationofcertainphysicalentities(suchasthehumanovum).
Moreover,itispartoftheveryessenceofhumanbeingsthatwehavesucha
beginning.However,oncewehumanbeingshavebeguntoexist,wearecapableof
continuingtoexistwithoutthecooperationofanyphysicalentitywhatsoever.For
emergentindividualists,incontrast,theexistenceofahumanbeingdependsateach
momentonthecooperationofthephysicalpartsthatmakeupthehumanbody,and
thiscausaldependencyisitselfessentialtothepersistence(andnotjustthe
origination)ofahumanbeing.
ThisschemewouldseemtoleaveuswithtwopossibleversionsofCartesian
dualism:thosewhoagreewithThomistsinthinkingthatthereisanessentialcausal
dependencyofthesoulonthebodyatitsfirstmomentofexistence,andthosewho
denyanysuchessentialcausaldependency.Infact,thefirstsortofCartesian
dualismseemsveryhardtojustify.Hylomorphistshaveanexplanationforthe
essentialcausaldependencyofthesoulonthebodyatitsorigin:namely,thethesis
thatthenaturalstateofthehumanbeingisthatofasinglesubstancewithboth
mentalandphysicalpowers.Inrationalanimalslikeus,ourintellectualpowersare
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essentiallydependentoncertainofourcorporealpowers,namely,oursensory
powers.Allofouruniversalsandallofouruniversalknowledgearederived(by
abstraction)fromtheinformationreceivedthroughoursenses.ForAristotelians
(bothancientandmodern),sensorypowersareessentiallytiedtothesensitivities
ofcorporealsenseorgans.Thecorporealsenseorganhasamongitsessentialand
fundamentalpassivecausalpowerssystematicsensitivitiestothepresenceofreal
qualitiesintheenvironment.Ahumanbeingcannottakeinsuchsensory
informationwithoutabody,andwecannotexerciseourintellectualpowerswithout
suchsensoryinformation.
Thephysicalcomponentsofthebodydonothavethesesensorypowers,either
individuallyorcollectively,exceptasthelivingbodyofanensouledhumanbeing.If
ahumanbeingweretobegininadisembodiedcondition,heorshewouldutterly
lackthesesensorypowersandwouldlackthecapacitytogainthem(barring
miracles).Therewouldbenosoul-lesshumanbodieswiththemissingpowerswith
whichthedisembodiedhumanbeingcouldbeunified.Abeinginsuchacondition
couldnothavethehumanpowersofintellectatallandsocouldnotbeahuman
being.Sincehumanityisessentialtous,nohumanbeingcanbegintoexistexceptas
ahumanbeing.Thus,humanbeingscannotbegintoexistinadisembodiedstate.
Onceahumanbeinghasbeguntoexistandoncehisorherintellectualpowersbegin
tobeexercisedinsustainedactivitiesofcontemplationofuniversaltruth,that
humanbeingcanpersistinexistencewithoutthecooperationofeitherthesense
organsortherestofthebody.
TheCartesiandualist,incontrast,hasnosuchstorytotell.IfaCartesianhumansoul
weretobeginwithoutabody,itwouldhaveallthepowersthatareessentialto
beinghuman:itwouldsimplyneedtobe“hookedup”intherightwaytotoasoul-
lesshumanbody,whichwouldnolongerbeametaphysicalimpossibility.
Therefore,weobtainthefollowingmap:
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Figure2.
Thismapprovidesuswithasecondwayofdistinguishingemergentindividualism
fromThomistichylomorphism,namely,whetherthisisanessentialcausal
dependenceofthehumanpersononthehumanbodyateachmomentofthe
person’sexistence.Wehaveseenwhythehylomorphistdeniesthepossibilityofa
disembodiedexistenceofapersonatthebeginningofhisexistence,butwehavenot
yetfoundwhytheemergentindividualistwantstoextendthisimpossibility
throughouttheperson’slife.Wemustseekafurtherfactorthatexplainswhythe
emergentindividualistwantstomakethisextensionandtheThomistdoesnot.
Isthemindwhollygroundedbythe
physical?
Yes:Non-reductivePhysicalism
No:Isthebodypartly
groundedbythesoul/emergentself?
Yes:Isthesoul/self
essentiallycausallydependentonthebodyateverymoment?
Yes:EmergentIndividualism
No:Thomistic
Hylomorphism
No:CartesianDualism
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Thisfurtherfactorwouldseemtoconsistintheemergentindividualist’sassuming
thatthephysicalrealmhasacertainkindofcausalpriorityoverthepersonaland
mental.Thissubtlepriorityfindsitsexpressionintheterm‘emergence’:the
emergentindividualistassumesthatthepersonalormentalemergesfromthe
physical,whichpresupposesthatitisthephysical(andperhapsonlythephysical)
thathasthecausalpowertoproduceaninstanceofpersonality.Giventhispicture,it
isnotsurprisingthattheemergentindividualistsupposesthatthereisacausal
dependenceofthementalonthephysicalateachmomentofamentalorpersonal
thing’sexistence.Hylomorphists,incontrast,makenosuchassumptionaboutthe
causalpriorityofthephysical.Theyaremorelikelytothinkthatthepersonalorthe
super-personalhasthecausalpowertogenerateaperson,justaslivingentities
havethepowertogeneratenewlivingthings,inwhichcaseitwouldbe
unsurprisingforthemtosupposethatathingwithintellectual(non-material)
powersmighthavethepowertosustainitselfinexistence,withoutthecooperation
ofphysicalentities.
Wehavethenidentifiedthreecriticalissuesthatdivideemergentindividualists
fromThomistichylomorphists:
(i)Isthepowertocreateandsustainpersonspossessedbyandonlybymicro-
physicalentities?
(ii)Aredisembodiedhumanpersonspossible?
(iii)Howdoesthemindaffectthebody:byformalcausation(aspeciesof
metaphysicalgrounding)orbydirectcausalaction?
Iwilltakeupeachoftheseissuesinthefollowingthreesections.
3.Bottom-Up,Top-Down,orOn-a-Level:WhatCausesHumanBeings?
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EmergentindividualistsowemuchtotheBritishEmergentists,especiallySamuel
Alexander(Alexander1920).Alexander’scentralthemewastheunityofnature,
understooddiachronically.Heembracedanevolutionarypictureoftheworld,with
nocausaldiscontinuitiesinnature.O’ConnorandChurchill(2010,278)echothese
themes:
“Itisenoughthatateveryjunctureintroducingsomenewkindofcausally
discontinuousbehavior,thereisacausalsourceforthatdiscontinuityinthe
networkofdispositionsthatunderlieit.Inshort:unityintheorderofthe
unfoldingnaturalworldneednotinvolvecausalcontinuityofbehavior,only
continuityofdispositionalstructure.”
Asatheist(andnotadeist),Idon’tfindsuchacommitmenttoabsolutecausal
continuityofnaturetobeobligatory.Iwouldn’truleouttheoccasionaloccurrence
ofdirectdivineinterventions–actsofspecialcreation.Myopennesstosuch
discontinuityisespeciallyclearattwocrucialpoints:theoriginoflife,andtheorigin
ofhumanity.
Nonetheless,evenifIwerecommittedtonaturalcontinuitythroughtime,Iwouldn’t
bepersuadedthatitisthemicro-particlesthatmustpossessthecausalpower
neededtoexplaintheoriginoflivingorganismsandconscioushumanbeings.Why
notattributethispowertocompositesubstancesthatarenon-living?Inparticular,
therearethreegenuinepossibilities:thecosmos,orplanetsorplanetarysystems,or
complexinorganicsystemswithholisticchemicalandthermodynamicalproperties.
Foremergentists,cosmichistoryisoneofgradualontologicalaggregation:tobegin
with,therewereonlyelementaryparticles,then(perhaps)substantialatoms,then
molecules,thenlargersystemswithvariousthermodynamic,convective,and/or
crystallinestructure,andthenfinallylivingthings(includingconsciousandfree
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persons).Ateachstage,thesmallerentitiesexerciseatsomepointtheirlatent
powerstocombineandformnewsubstances.
Thereis,however,analternativestorythatcouldbetold,onethathasprominent
metaphysicaladvantages.Thisalternativecosmichistoryisoneofgradual
disaggregationandsplintering.Inthebeginning,therewasasinglesubstance,the
cosmos,whicheventuallybrokeupintoproto-clusters,thengalaxies,thenstarsand
planetarysystems,thenproto-ecologicalsystemswithinherentfeaturesofa
convectiveandthermalnature,thenbioticsystemsconsistingofpopulationsof
identicalone-celledorganisms,andfinallyindividualmulti-cellularorganisms.At
eachstage,existingsubstancesgiverisetonewsubstancesbydivision,not
aggregation.
TheBigBangmodelsuggeststhattheworldconsistsofasinglesubstanceinthe
immediateaftermathofthesingularity.Althoughitistruethatphotons,leptons,and
quarkssoonappear,itisfarfromobviousthattheyconstitutecompletesubstances
atthatpoint.Thephenomenaofwidespreadquantumentanglements,carryingas
theydoimplicationsofontologicalholismornon-separability,tellsintheopposite
direction.Icallthisnarrative‘de-escalation’.
De-escalationhasaclearadvantageoveremergence:itrequiresateachstageonlya
singleagentofefficientcausation,anentitywithanactivecausalpowerwhose
exerciseresultsinamultiplicityofnewsubstance.Emergence,incontrast,depends
onthecollaborationofalargenumberofindependentagents,jointlyexercisingaset
ofcomplementarycausalpowers.Emergencerequiresalarge-scaleconspiracyof
mutuallyagreeingcausalpowerspossessedbythelargenumberofsmallerentities
thatspontaneouslyjointogetherinforminganewsubstance.De-escalation,in
contrast,involvesatmosttwoentities,anagentandpatient,thefirstcausingthe
secondtoundergodisintegrationintoalargepluralityofnewentities.
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Thisisnotperhapsadecisivefact,butweshould,otherthingsbeingequal,prefer
accountsthatavoidbruteconspiraciesamonglargenumbersofindependentagents.
Emergencewouldrequireaveryimprobableandadhocpre-establishedharmony
amongthepowersofthemanymutuallyunifyingparts--acoordinateddistribution
ofmutuallyexercisablepowers.Thisproblemramifiesasthenumberof
componentstobeunifiedincreases.Itbecomesquiteuntenablewhenbillionsof
componentsmustunitewitheachother.
De-escalationcoheresnicelywithhylomorphism,whichinturnoffersa
correspondinglysimpleaccountofsubstantialpersistence:hylomorphismlocates
thesourceofthepersistentunityofeachsubstanceinasingleagent,thesubstantial
form.Thepresenceofthemanymaterialpartsservesmerelyasthepatientofthe
formalaction,asenablingconditionsfortheexerciseoftheform’sformalpowers.
Theseenablingconditionsarebuiltintotheformitself,requiringnopriormutual
agreement.Incontrast,emergencerequiresthatthesamekindofcollaborative
conspiracyofindependentpowersneededtobringthecompositesubstanceinto
existencepersistthroughoutthesubstance’spersistence.
Howexactlydoessuchde-escalationwork?Answeringthisquestionwouldinvolve
somesubtleinteractionbetweenmetaphysicsandempiricalscience.Mycurrent
proposalisthatsubatomicparticlesdidnotconstituteAristoteliansubstancesinthe
earlyhistoryoftheuniversebutdidsoonlymuchlater,asthecosmoscooledand
separated.Notallparticlesseparatedfromtheoriginalcosmicsubstanceasdistinct
substancesintheirownright:somebecameinsteadnon-substantial,integralparts
ofothersub-cosmicsubstances,suchasgalaxiesandsolarsystems.Stillothers
eventuallyendedupaspartsofprebioticproto-ecosystems,andfinallyas
constitutingsubstantialpopulationsofunicellularorganisms.Thefirstsubstantial
organismsmayhavebeenmulticellularinconstitution,asdiscreteandcooperating
populationsmicro-organismsachievedjointreproduction.Ateachstage,the
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substantialformofthelargersubstancecontainedwithinitthepotentialof
generatingnewsubstancesatasmallerscale.
Howdoesallthisspeculativenaturalhistoryrelatetoourpresent-dayconditions?
Wenowfindsubstancesatmultiplelevelsofscale,includingperhaps:galaxiesand
solarsystems,ecosystems,unicellularcolonies,multicellularorganisms,thermal
substances,subatomicparticles.Thesubstantialformsofcompositesubstances
(thatisallformsexceptthoseoffundamentalparticles)havethepowertotakeand
toexpelsmallerentities,whichexistassubstanceswhenseparatedfromthelarger
composite.Ifasystemisdestroyedorsuffersamputation,newsubstancesata
smallerscalearecreated.De-escalationtheoryfromemergentismbyrefusingto
locatetheultimateexplanationofallthesetransformationsintheformsofthe
ultimateparticlesalone.
4.TheIntermediateState:WhynotDisembodiedPersons?
Fromahylomorphicperspective,thepersistenceofhumanbeingsbeyondthedeath
ofthebodyisnotimpossible.Ifhumanbeingsarenotcausedtobegintoexistbythe
jointactionofmicro-particles,whyassumethattheyarecausedtopersistin
existencebysuchactionofmicro-particles?Whycan’tthehumanbeingpersistin
existence(andpersistinengaginginintellectualactivities,likethecontemplationof
abstracttruths)despitethedestructionofthebody?
CriticsofThomisticHylomorphism(includingO’ConnorandJacobs2013)offertwo
principalobjectionstothedisembodiedpersistenceofhumanpersons(theso-called
intermediatestatebetweendeathandresurrection):theCheshireCatobjection
(formswithoutmatterareimpossibleinthewaythatsmileswithoutfacesare
impossible)andtheDion/Theonobjection(thepersoncannotbecomeidentical
withoneofhisownproperparts).
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TheCheshireCatobjection.
CriticsofThomismoftenarguethatmatter-lessformisasinconceivableasthesmile
ofLewisCarroll’sCheshireCat,whichsurvivesaftertherestofthecathas
disappeared.Theobjectionassumesthattherecan’tbeformwithoutmattertobe
formed.
WeshouldfirstnotethatthisisanobjectionnotjusttoSt.Thomasbutalsoto
Aristotle.Aristotleproposedthatthehumansoulistheformofthebody,andyet
thereexistcelestialintelligences(alsocapableofintellectualactivity)thatare
completelydevoidofmatter.DefendersoftheCheshireCatobjectionmustsuppose
thatAristotlewasdeeplyconfusedabouthisownnotionofformanditsrelationto
theintellect.
TheCheshireCatobjectionispredicatedontheassumptionthatformsare
structures,andthatstructuresaresetsofpropertiesorfacts,factsaboutthe
intrinsicnaturesofathing’smaterialpartsandabouttherelationsamongthose
parts.Athingwithoutmaterialpartscouldhavenostructure,andthereforenoform.
However,Aristotelianformsarenotstructures.Theyareinsteadthemetaphysical
groundsofstructure.So,itisnotimpossibleforthosegroundstoexistinthe
absenceofwhatisgrounded.Tobeprecise,formsarepartialgroundsofstructure:
structureisalsopartlygroundedintheexistenceofsuitablematter.Thehumansoul
canexistwithoutbeingtheactualgroundofcorporealstructuresolongasitisstill
thegroundofsomeactivity.Inthecaseofhumanbeings,thesoulcanbetheground
ofpureintellectualactivity,whichdoesnotessentiallydependontheexistenceofa
body.Asoulthatisengagedinsuchactivitycansurvivethedestructionofitsbody.6
6Arethesoulsofhumanbeingswhohavenotyetreachedtheageofreasonnot
naturallyimmortal?Ifso,itwouldstillbepossibleforGodtoenable
18
TheDion/Theonobjection
Howcanthehumanbeingbecomposedofbothbodyandsoulatonepointintime
andthenbeidenticaltothesoulaloneatalaterpointintime?Thatis,howcana
wholebecomeidenticaltooneofitsproperparts?Thiswouldentaileitherrelative
identity(thesoulisidenticaltothepersonatthelatertimebutnotidenticaltoit
attheearliertime)orthedenialoftheirreflexivityofproperparthood(the
personisalwaysidenticaltothesoulandsoisaproperpartofitselfpriortodeath),
orthedenialofWeakSupplementation(thedisembodiedpersonafterdeath
wouldhavehissoulasaproperpart,withouthavinganyotherpartthatdoesnot
overlapwithit).
TheStoicphilosopherChrysippus(c280BC-c206BC)exploitedthisdilemma(in
hisDion-Theonparadox)asaproblemforanyaccountinwhichasubstancecanlose
oneofitsproperparts.SupposethattheunfortunateDionloseshisleftfootto
amputation.Let’scallthepost-amputationperson‘Theon’.IfwesupposethatTheon
isidenticaltoDion,wefaceaproblem.ConsiderDion-Minus:theproperpartofDion
(priortoamputation)thatincludeseverythingbuthisleftfoot.ItseemsthatDion-
MinusisidenticaltoTheon:thetwoconsistoftheverysamematerialthings
arrangedinthesameway.So,ifDionisidenticaltoTheon,heis(oratleast
becomes)identicaltooneofhisownproperparts(Dion-Minus).YetDionandDion-
Minusaresurelydistinctentities.
(supernaturally)anysuchhumanbeingtobegintoexercisesuchintellectualpowers
prematurallyandtherebytosurvivedeath.Alternatively,itmightbethatoncethe
humanbeingexists,withthenaturalcapacityforabstractthought,thehumansoul
canpersistastheenduringgroundforthatcapacity.
19
PetervanInwagen(1981,123-5)correctlyidentifiedthebestsolutiontotheDion-
Theonparadox:simplytodenytheexistence(priortotheamputation)ofDion-
Minus,bydenyingthedoctrineofthearbitraryfusionofundetachedparts.The
partsofDioncomposesomething(namely,Dion),butpropersubsetsofthoseparts
(suchasthepartsofDionexcepthisleftfoor)composenothingwhatsoever.Hence,
DiondoesbecomeTheonwithoutbecomingidenticaltoanyofhisproperparts.
AsO’ConnorandJacobspointout(O’ConnorandJacobs2013),Thomistic
hylomorphistsfaceaprimafaciedifficultyinapplyingvanInwagen’ssolution:they
cannotdenythatthesoulexistspriortodeath,andtheyseemtobecommittedto
thesoul’sbeing(priortodeath)aproperpartofthehumanbeing.Therefore,when
ahumanbeingisreducedatdeathtoasoulwithoutabody,itwouldbecome
identicaltosomethingthathadexistedasoneofitsownproperparts.
Itiscrucialtodistinguishbetweentwosensesof‘part’:abroadandanarrowsense.
Inthenarrowsense,thesoulisneverpartofthehumanbeing(itisnotoneofthe
humanbeing’sintegralparts,touseThomas’slanguage).Thesoulgroundsthe
existenceofthehumanbeingateachmomentintime,whetherthehumanbeingis
composite(beforedeath)ormereologicallysimple(afterdeath).
Inthebroadsense,thesoulispartofthepersonateachmomentofhisorher
existence,bywayofbeingoneofthemetaphysicalcomponentsoftheperson,butso
toaretheperson’saccidents(includinghisorherintellectualactionsandactivities).
Beforedeath,thepersonisconstitutedbysoul,body,andaccidents;afterdeath,by
soulandaccidentsalone.Bydenyingthedoctrineofarbitraryfusions,the
hylomorphistcandenythatthereisanythingconstitutedbyjustthesouland
accidentspriortodeath,thusavoidingtheDion/Theonparadox,justasvanInwagen
does.
5.FromtheMindtotheBody:FormalCausationorFundamentalForce?
20
EmergentindividualistsandThomistichylomorphistsagreethatinsomesensethe
bodyispartlygroundedinfactsaboutthewholeperson.Foremergent
individualists,itisholisticfeaturesoftheperson(includingthewholeperson’s
causalinteractionswiththepartsofthebody)thatprovidethebodywithitsperse
unity.Itisbyvirtueoftheseemergentfactsthatthepartsofthebodycomposea
singlething.However,O’Connorandhiscollaboratorsseemtoassumethatthese
mereologicalorcompositionalfactsaboutthebodyaretheonlyonesgroundedin
theemergentself.Likephysicalists,emergentindividualistsassumethatallnon-
mereologicalfactsabouttheindividualmicroscopicparticlesorfields(e.g.,facts
concerningtheircausalpowersandspatialandspatiotemporalrelations)are
metaphysicallyindependentandfundamental.Incontrast,hylomorphiststakeall
suchfactsaboutmicroscopicpartstobeatleastpartlygroundedinholisticfacts
aboutthecompositesubstancestowhichtheybelong.
Consequently,emergentindividualistsandhylomorphistshavefundamentally
differentconceptionsaboutthewayinwhichthemicrophysicalpartsofthebody
areaffectedbytheemergentselforAristotelianform.Foremergentists,this
influenceisprimarilycausal(inthenarrowsenseofdirectefficientcausation):the
selfmovestheparticlesbyexertingonthemsomethinglikeafundamentalphysical
force.Forhylomorphists,incontrast,thesoulisaformalcause,notjustofthebody
asawhole,butalsoofeachofthebody’smicroscopicparts.Thesoulisthe
metaphysicalgroundofthecausalpowersofthemicroscopicparts,andthesoulacts
uponthephysicalworldindirectly,throughthepartsofthebodyasinstruments.
Thereissomesimilaritybetweenthehylomorphicconceptionofthecausalroleof
thesoulandthemodelofstrongemergencedevelopedbyCarlGillett(Gillett2002,
2003,2006).Inbothcases,themicroscopicparticlesandfieldshavethecausal
powerstheydobecauseoftheirinclusioninawholeofacertainkind.Inneither
caseisthewholeassigneditsowncausalpowertomoveitsconstituentparticles.
21
However,therearetwokeydifferencesbetweenhylomorphismandGillett’sstrong
emergence.First,Gillettissilentonanyrelationofmetaphysicaldependency
betweenthepartsandthewhole.Thisleavesopenthepossibilitythatthepowersof
eachmicroscopicpartareaffected,notbyitsinclusioninawholeofacertainkind,
butsimplybythepresenceinitsenvironmentofalargenumberofother
microscopicentities,suitablyarranged.Suchapossibilityisexcludedby
hylomorphism,sincethelocationandarrangementoftheothermicroparticlesis
ultimatelygroundedinthenatureofthewhole,andnotviceversa.
Second,Gillettimplicitlyexcludesthepossibilitythatthewholecouldinstantiate
anystateorengageinanyactivitythatisnotwhollyconstitutedbythearrangement
andmovementofitsconstituentparticles.Consequently,hedoesnotattributetothe
wholeanyimmanentcausalpowers—anypower,thatis,toengageinanintrinsic
activitythatisnotstronglyandlocallysupervenientonthesuccessivestatesand
movementsofitsmicro-particles.Incontrast,Thomistichylomorphiststakethe
humanbeingtobecapableofintellectualactivitiesthatarenotdependentonany
corporealorganandsoneednotsuperveneonthestateofthebody.
Hylomorphistscaneasilyaccommodatethesynchronicdependenceofmuch
intellectualactivityonthestateofthebrain.Activitiessuchasabstraction,inference,
classification,recognition,deliberation,anddecisionallrequiretheuseofinternal
imaginativerepresentations(St.Thomas’sphantasms),whichessentiallyinvolve
essentiallycorporealstates.Theonlyhumanactivitiesthatcanoccurindependently
ofthebodyareactsofpurecontemplationofabstract,whollygeneralfactsand
possibilities.7
7Godcanenhancetheintellectualactivitiesofdisembodiedsoulsbyprovidingthem
(miraculously)withtherequiredphantasms.However,therewouldbenosubsisting
soulsotoenhanceiftherewerenotsomething(purecontemplation)thatthe
disembodiedsoulcoulddonaturally.
22
O’ConnorandChurchill(O’ConnorandChurchill2010,276)objectthatGillett’s
modelofmind-to-bodycausationistoolimitedinitsscope:
“[A]llwewouldhaveembracedarementalpropertiesthatplayakindof
structuringroleintheworld’sdynamics.Theydonodistinctivecausal
work—providenoextracausaloomph.Thereis,indeed,astronganalogy
heretotheroleplayedbyspatialandtemporalrelationsinNewtonian
mechanics,asconstruedbyacausalpowerstheorist.Suchrelations,one
mightsay,provideanecessaryframeworkfortheinterplayofdispositional
entities,whilethemselveshavingnodispositionalnature.Surelyour
nonreductionistphysicalistwantsmorethanthisbywayofthecausal
relevanceofthemental.Morethanbeinglocal,nondispositionalconstraints
onthewayfundamentalphysicalcausesoperate,ourbeliefs,desires,and
intentionsthemselvesdirectlycontributetotheunfoldingdynamicsofour
behavior.”
Thisoverlooksthepossibilityofactionthroughinstrumentalintermediaries.Evenif
themindcannotactdirectlyonthebody,itcanactindirectly(throughthebody)on
otherphysicalobjects.Thewholesubstancehasrealcausalpowersofitsown:the
causalpowersofitspartsaremetaphysicallygrounded(atleastinpart)onthose
holisticpowers,makingtheactionofthemicroscopicpartsmerelyinstrumentalin
nature(seeKoons2014formoredetails).Inaddition,onthehylomorphicaccount,
thesoulhasthepowertoengageinrationalactivities(resolvingitelfupona
decision,forexample),therebysynchronicallyaltering(viaformalcausation)the
intrinsicfeaturesandrelationsofitsmicroscopicparts.
Won’tthisalterationofthemicroscopicpartsinvolvetheintroductionofnew
fundamentalforcesorviolationsofmass-energyconversion,whetherwecallthis
‘formal’or‘efficient’causation?No,thiswouldfollowonlyifweassumedthatthe
23
micro-particleshave,independentlyoftheexerciseofhumancausalpowers,precise
locationsandtrajectoriesinacommonspatiotemporaldomain.Thequantum
revolutionofthelastonehundredyearsunderminestheDemocriteanmetaphysical
assumptionsharedbyphysicalists,Cartesiandualists,andemergentindividualists.
IntheCopenhageninterpretation(developedbyBohrandhiscollaborators),the
microphysicalfactsconsistmerelyintheattributiontomicroscopicentitiesof
certainpotentialities,andthesepotentialitiesessentiallyincludecausalrelationsto
macroscopicsystems.Aquantumdoesn’ttypicallyhaveanypositionormomentum
atall(notevenavagueorfuzzyone):ithasmerelythepotentialtointeractwith
macroscopicsystemsasifithadsomedefinitepositionormomentum(orother
observablefeature)atthemomentoftheinteraction.Thus,thequantumworld(so
understood)canbeneithermetaphysicallyfundamentalnoracompletebasisfor
themacroscopicworld.
Ofcourse,thissituationgivesriseimmediatelytoapuzzle:what,then,isthe
relationshipbetweenthemacroscopicandquantumworlds?Presumably,
macroscopicphysicalobjectsarewhollycomposedofquanta.How,then,canthe
quantafailtobemetaphysicallyfundamentalandcompletebasisforthe
macroscopicworld?
Hylomorphismoffersareadyanswertothispuzzle.Themicroscopicconstituentsof
macroscopicobjectshave(atthelevelofactuality)onlyanindirectrelationtospace
andtime:theyarelocated(roughly)somewhereatatimeonlyquaconstituentsof
somefundamental,macro-ormesoscopicsubstance(intheAristoteliansense).Such
microscopicobjectsarenotmetaphysicallyfundamentalintheirentirety,andtheir
metaphysicallyfundamentalfeaturesdonotprovideacompletebasisforthe
featuresofthesubstantialwholestheycompose.
24
AlthoughtheCopenhageninterpretation,withitssomewhatsimplisticdualismof
quantumandclassicalworlds,hasfallenoutoffavorinrecentyears,Nancy
Cartwrighthasdefendedamorepluralisticversion:thedappledworldpicture
(Cartwright1999).Onthisview,theworldconsistsofavarietyofdomains,eachat
adifferentlevelofscale.Mostofthesedomainsarefullyclassical,consistingof
entitieswithmutuallycompatibleorcommutativeproperties.Atmostonedomainis
accuratelydescribedbyquantummechanics.Sincelocationdoesnot(forquantum
objects)“commute”withotherobservables,likemomentum,thequantumobjects
areonlyintermittentlylocatedinordinary,three-dimensionalspace,althoughthey
alwaysretainaprobabilityofinteractingwithclassicalobjectsatadefinitelocation.
Interactionbetweenquantumpropertiesandclassicalproperties(includingthoseof
experimentersandtheirinstruments)precipitatesanobjectivecollapseofthe
quantumobject’swavefunction,asaresultofthejointexerciseoftherelevant
causalpowersoftheobjectandtheinstruments,andnotbecauseoftheinvolvement
ofhumanconsciousnessandchoice.
ThemaindrawbackofCartwright’smodelisthatitdeniestheintelligibilityof
speakingofacosmicwavefunctionembracingallofreality,anapproachthathas
becomepopularinrecentyears.AlexanderPruss’straveling-formsmodel(Pruss
2014)offersaninterpretationofquantummechanicsthatisbothfriendlyto
hylomorphismandconsistentwithacosmicwavefunction.OnPruss’spicture,there
isasinglequantumwavefunctionwhichdescribesthestateofthewholeof
microphysicalrealityandwhichevolvesaccordingtoaunified,deterministiclaw
(basedonSchrödinger’sequation).However,thisquantumrealmisnotthewholeof
reality,nordoesthemacroscopicworldsuperveneuponit.
Thisquantumwavefunctioncanbetakenasascribingpotentialpositionstoeachof
theworld’squantumparticles.Someofthepotentialpositionsofsomeparticlesare
stronglycorrelatedwiththoseofotherparticles,asaresultoftheprocessknownas
decoherence.Thisdecoherencecanbethoughtofasdelimitingaverylargesetof
25
alternativeconsistenthistoriesoftheworld’sparticles.OnPruss’sview,justoneof
thesehistorieshasametaphysicallyprivilegedstatus,formingthebasisforthereal
compositionofmaterialbodies,includinglivingorganisms.Eventhoughthishistory
isnotmicrophysicallyprivileged,actingsimplyonaparwithallotherconsistent
historiesintheuniformevolutionofthequantumworld,itisontologically
distinguishedbythefactthatit,anditalone,correspondstoaworldofreal
compositeobjects.Prussineffectusesfactsaboutthe“specialquestionof
composition”(tousePetervanInwagen’sphraseinvanInwagen1995)tosingleout
onemicro-historyasthematerialbasisforaworldofmacroscopicobjects.
AlthoughPruss’sworldismicroscopicallydeterministic,themacroscopicworldis
dynamicallyindeterministic,sincetheconsistenthistorythatunderliesthat
macroscopicworldatonetimecanlater“branch”intoseveral,disjointhistories.The
substantialformsofmacroscopicobjectstraveltogetherdownjustoneofthose
branches,inawaythatisnotdeterminedatthequantumlevel,andwhichmaybe
indeterministicatthemacrolevelaswell,althoughmacroscopicagency(including
actsoffreewill)maycontributetodeterminingthedirectionof“travel”.
Inneithermodel(Cartwright’sorPruss’s)istherelationbetweenmacroscopic
actionsandmicroscopicrealityoneofefficientcausation.Inbothcases,microscopic
bodiesacquireapproximatepositionsandtrajectoriesbywayofmetaphysical
groundinginirreducibleandfundamentalmacroscopicfacts.Sucharelationof
groundingcouldevenbeusedtomakesenseofBohm’sinterpretationofquantum
mechanics,inwhichthemicroscopicworldisbothcompleteanddeterministic(but
radicallynon-localinitsinteractions).Wecouldtaketheinseparablyandradically
holisticfour-dimensionalworldofBohm’smechanicstobeametaphysically
dependentprojectionofanunderlyingfundamentalrealitythatconsistsof
macroscopicAristoteliansubstancesthatinteractlocallyandindeterministically.
ThiswouldbeanaloguoustothewaythatKantsavedhumanfreedombytakingthe
deterministicworldofNewtonianmechanicstodescribeaphenomenalrealm
26
ultimatelygroundedinanoumenalrealmoffreedom.Onceagain,therelation
betweenmacroscopicsubstancesandtheirmicroscopicpartswouldbeoneof
formalandnotefficientcausation.
6.Conclusion
Emergentindividualistsconcedetoomuchtothemicro-physicalist.First,they
concedethatallofrealityistobeexplainedultimatelyintermsofthecausalactivity
ofthemereologicallyfundamental(simple)particlesandfields.Thegenerationand
persistenceofnon-micro-physicalentities(the“emergent”entities)arealwaystobe
explainedintermsofthecausalpowersofthemicroscopicentities.Themicroscopic
domainiscausallyresponsiblefortheexistenceandpersistenceofallexceptionsto
itscausalcompleteness.Thepictureisoneofaworldthatwasoriginallyexclusively
microscopicincharacter(aworldofmereologicalorcompositionalnihilism)from
whichcompositesubstancesaregenerated,withoutappealtoanyagencyexcept
thatofthesimpleparticles.Wehavenoreasontoembracesuchapicture,inlightof
quantumholism.Thecosmoswastherefromthebeginning,anditneverconsisted
ofisolatedandunrelatedparticles.Macroscopicsubstanceshavebeentherefrom
theverybeginning.
Second,emergentindividualists(likeCartesiandualistsandphysicalists)accepta
Democriteanassumptionaboutthemetaphysicalnatureofthemicrophysical
domain:namely,thatthemicrophysicalfactsaremetaphysicallyfundamentaland
ungrounded.Thisimpliesthatifnon-microscopicentities(whethermacroscopicor
immaterial)aretomakeadifferencetheymustdosobyactinguponmicro-particles
throughtheexertionofforce.Incontrast,hylomorphistsdenythatthereisa
metaphysicallyindependentmicrophysicaldomaininthefirstplace,openingthe
possibilityofformalcausationfromwholestoparts.Modernquantumtheoryhas
alteredtheimaginativelandscapeinsuchawayastorevivetheplausibilityofthe
hylomorphicstory.
27
Canthesetwoelementsofemergentindividualismcomeapart?Itwouldseemtobe
impossibletorejectthesecondassumption(themetaphysicalfundamentalityofthe
microphysical)whilemaintainingthefirst(theultimatecausalsufficiencyofthe
microphysical).Itwouldbeimpossibleforthemicrophysicaltobeultimately
responsibleforcausingthemacroscopicdomainsifmicrophysicalfactsarepartly
groundedbythosedomains.
Whatabouttheotherwayaround?Whatifweweretoaffirmthemetaphysical
fundamentalityofthemicroscopicrealmwhiledenyingthatthereisanessential
synchroniccausaldependencyofthemindonthebody?There’saseriousproblem
forthiscombinationofviews:aversionofJaegwonKim’spairingproblem.Ifboth
themicroscopicentitiesandtheemergentselvesaremetaphysicallyfundamental,
thentheonlyrelationstyingthemtogetherarerelationsofcausaldependency.Why
isthismindtiedtothesemicroparticles?Clearly,themicroparticlesarenot
continouslycausallydependentonthemind,soitseemsthatwemustsupposethat
themindiscontinuouslycausallydependentonfactsabouttheseparticular
particles.
TheThomistichylomorphist,incontrast,hasadifferentandultimatelymore
satisfyingsolutiontothepairingproblem:themicroscopicpartsaremetaphysically
dependentonthewhole,andthesoulisthegroundofthatmetaphysicalunity.
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