individualism and individuality

8/11/2019 Individualism and Individuality

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Dr Peter Critchley Individualism and Individuality

INDIVIDUALISM AND INDIVIDUALITY

1997

Dr Peter Critchley

(FromBeyond Modernity and Postmodernity vol 2 Active Materialismby Peter

Critchley).

Critchley, P., 1997. Individualism and Individuality. [eboo!" #vailable throu$h% #cademia &ebsite

'htt%mmu.academia.eduPeterCritchleyPaers

Critchley, P., 1997. Individualism and Individuality. In % P. Critchley, Beyond Modernity and

Postmodernity: *ol + Active Materialism. [eboo!" #vailable throu$h% #cademia &ebsite

'htt%mmu.academia.eduPeterCritchleyoo!s

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr Peter Critchley is !hil"s"!her# $riter %& t't"rwith a first degree in the field of theSocial Sciences (History, Economics, Politics and Sociology) and a PhD in the field ofPhilosophy, Ethics and Politics. Peter works in the tradition of Rational Freedom, a traditionwhich sees freedom as a common endeavour in which the freedom of each individual isconceived to e co!e"istent with the freedom of all. #n elaorating this concept, Peter haswritten e"tensively on a numer of the key thinkers in this $rational% tradition (Plato, &ristotle,&'uinas, Dante, Spinoa, ousseau, *ant, Hegel, +ar", Haermas). Peter is currently

engaged in an amitious interdisciplinary research proect entitled Being and Place. -hecentral theme of this research concerns the connection of place and identity through thecreation of forms of life which enale human and planetary flourishing in unison. Peter tutorsacross the humanities and social sciences, from & level to postgraduate research. Peterparticularly welcomes interest from those not engaged in formal education, ut who wish topursue a course of studies out of intellectual curiosity. Peter is committed to ringingphilosophy ack to its Socratic roots in ethos, in the way of life of people. #n this conception,philosophy as self!knowledge is something that human eings do as a condition of living thee"amined life. &s we think, so shall we live. iving up to this philosophical commitment, Peteroffers tutoring services oth to those in and out of formal education.

-he suect range that Peter offers in his tutoring activities, as well as contact details, can eseen athttp/00petercritchley!e!akademeia.yolasite.com

-he range of Peter%s research activity can e seen athttp/00mmu.academia.edu0Peter1ritchley

Peter sees his e!akademeia proect as part of a gloal grassroots learning e"perience andencourages students and learners to get in touch, whatever their learning need and level.

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http://petercritchley-e-akademeia.yolasite.com/http://petercritchley-e-akademeia.yolasite.com/http://petercritchley-e-akademeia.yolasite.com/http://mmu.academia.edu/PeterCritchleyhttp://mmu.academia.edu/PeterCritchleyhttp://petercritchley-e-akademeia.yolasite.com/http://mmu.academia.edu/PeterCritchley


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THE INDIVIDUAL AND INDIVIDUALITY

-he conception of the individual in +ar"2s writings is much richer than the

dominant understanding of the individual. +ar" enales us to distinguish

etween individuality on the one hand as the full realisation of human

powers and individualism on the other as egoistic, monadic and as making

the individual 2the plaything of alien powers2.

Perhaps mar"ism generally has historically neglected the individual as

such. Even worse, the concentration upon attacking 2the individual2 of

ourgeois society and politics has given the impression that mar"ism is

anti!individual, a point which lierals have een 'uite happy to repeat.

+ar", 3emia argues, denies the moral and ontological ultimacy of the

individual (3emia 4556). +ar" does indeed deny that the individual is some

sovereign, self!contained entity cut off from others. +ar"2s criticism derives

from his argument that the individual is no astraction outside of society

ut is the ensemle of social relations (Theses on Feuerbach). 3emia

interprets this as a social determinism that denies the individual whereas,

in truth, +ar" was attempting to reach the real individual, in a social

conte"t, as opposed to some fictional eing e"isting outside of history and

society (4556). 3emia2s 2ultimacy%, pressed to its logical conclusion,

consumes the real individual in a pure egoism that not even Stirner ! his

provocative assertions to the contrary ! argued.

7hat needs to e argued is that there is no opposition for +ar" etween

the individual and society and the fact that 2society% could indeed ecome

an astraction opposed to the individual (+ar" E7 EP+ 4589/69:)

indicates how the instrumental relationships of ourgeois society, with

individuals having to use each other as means to private ends, have cut

human eings off from the society of others.

;evertheless, the feeling that mar"ism has neglected or, even, denigrated

the individual has provoked some theorists working within the mar"ist

tradition to egin to install the individual as the asic unit of analysis. -his

is most evident in the methodological individualism of those who have

imported into mar"ism ideas drawn from 2rational choice2 or games theory.

-hus, Elster spends the opening section of his attempt to 2make sense% of

+


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+ar" searching for evidence of +ar"2s methodological individualism and

using this to criticise his methodological collectivism (Elster 45


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+ar" thus looks to go eyond the individualism of ourgeois as a denial of

individual freedom, of true individuality. -he personal independence from

feudal ties that ourgeois relations have achieved have een replaced y

the oective dependence of all upon capital. +ar" looks further than this

oective dependency (+ar" 4586/4A60=) towards a society of freedom

ased upon new, free individuals living in a true e'uality (3ores

455:/44=).

MAR()S COMMUNIST INDIVIDUALITY

-he recovery of the individual from within the mar"ist tradition is long

overdue. 3or +ar" upholds a conception of individuality which takes the

individual much further than the individualism of ourgeois society and

which rests upon the free and full development of each individual (Capital

#). +ar"2s materialist premise, as stated in The German Ideology, pertained

to the e"istence and activity and relations of 2real individuals2. #n truth, for

+ar" there is no antithesis etween the individual and society. #t is

ourgeois relationships and the individualism that these entail that creates

this antithesis, separating the individual from other individuals, from

society, from their own human powers (3ores 455:/44A 448 44< 445

4450B:).

7hat is noticeale in +ar"2s works, especially The German Ideologyand

Grundrisse, is the e"tent to which +ar" does indeed refer to and proceed

from 2real individuals2. 1lass, as such, enters the critical analysis as a

designation imposed y social relations, a designation that constrains the

development of individuality and which is to e aolished for that very

reason (+ar" and Engels 4555).

7ith the domination of a narrow conception of the individual in the 45


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#ndividuals producing in society .. is of course the point of departure.

-he individual and isolated hunter and fisherman, with whom Smith and

icardo egin, elongs among the unimaginative conceits of the

eighteenth century oinsonades.. #t is .. the anticipation of 2civil

society%. #n this society of free competition, the individual appears

detached from the natural onds etc. which in earlier historical periods

make him the accessory of a definite and limited human conglomerate.

Smith and icardo still stand with oth feet on the shoulders of the

eighteenth century prophets, in whose imaginations this eighteenth

century individual ! the product on one side of the dissolution of the

feudal forms of society, on the other side of the new forces of

production developed since the si"teenth century ! appears as an ideal,

whose e"istence they proect into the past.. &s the ;atural #ndividual

appropriate to their notion of human nature, not arising historically, ut

posited y nature. -his illusion has een common to each new epoch

to this day.

-he more deeply we go ack into history, the more does the individual,

and hence also the producing individual, appear as dependent, as

elonging to a greater whole ... Cnly in the eighteenth century, in 2civil

society2, do the various forms of social connectedness confront the

individual as a mere means towards his private purposes, as e"ternal

necessity. ?ut the epoch which produces this standpoint, that of the

isolated individual, is also precisely that of the hitherto most developed

social (from this standpoint, general) relations. -he human eing is in

the most literal sense a zoon politikon, not merely a gregarious animal,

ut an animal which can individuate itself only in the midst of society.

Production y an isolated individual outside of society .. is as much an

asurdity as is the development of language without individuals living

together and talking to each other. -here is no point dwelling on this

any longer. -he point could go entirely unmentioned if this twaddle . .

had not een earnestly pulled ack into the centre of the most modern

economics..

/


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+ar" rundrisse 4586/


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politics and ideas on its chosen ground, that of the individual and individual

freedom. +ar" does not denigrate the idea of the individual or the process

of individual emancipation ! he radicalises it (+iller 45


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individual freedom, +ar" therefore demands the destruction of social

institutions which restrict and deny true individuality.

+ar" effectively forces the lieral to choose etween lieral institutions !

private property and the constitutional state ! and the main lieral value !

autonomy. -he realisation that autonomy is not fostered to the e"tent

claimed y lieral social theory forces those who affirm this value to

consider an alternative social order. How many lierals are inclined to

consider that the asymmetrical relations of power and resources are class

structured and are effective locks to the development of the universal

citienship and to autonomyF -his is the 'uestion that +ar" is forcing upon

the lierals. #t may e a 'uestion that lierals prefer not to answer. indley

considers that, ultimately, rather than aandon the lieral institutions which

preserve class ine'ualities, lierals would come to 'uestion the value of

autonomy itself.

+any lierals are strongly anti!socialist. Suppose it turned out that

autonomy could e est promoted under socialism. Such a lieral

would face a dilemma. Cne way out would e to aandon the elief

that autonomy is a fundamental vital interest. -his would e a

desperate strategy for a lieral, ecause it amounts to a reection of

lieralism.

indley 45


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Human eings, individuals, are to consciously control the social forms.

-his, the realm of freedom, overthrows the 2oective dependency2 of

individuals upon capital and thus completes the process of individual

emancipation egun under ourgeois civil society.

-he liertarian and emancipatory character of +ar"2s argument, in short,

puts the accent upon real individuals. &nd it needs to e set in the conte"t

of +ar"2s criti'ue of alienation. Cne needs to e clear that alienation entails

the loss of the humanity of each individual. -he aolition of alienation is

thus the recovery of one%s humanity.

?ut all these kinds of forms of alienation are in the last analysis one/

they are only different forms or aspects of man2s self!alienation,

different forms of the alienation of man from his human 2essence2 or

2nature2, from his humanity. -he self!alienated man is a man who really

is not a man, a man who does not realise his historically created

human possiilities. & non!alienated man, on the contrary, would e a

man who really is a man, a man who fulfils himself as a free, creative

eing of pra"is.

Petrovic ar! in the id"T#entieth Century45A8/46

individualism and individuality

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