a publication of biosecurity new zealand...

biosecurityA PUBLICATION OF BIOSECURITY NEW ZEALAND

Off-shore container management reduces risk

Aquatic animal diseases and risk analysis

Plant Health and Environment

Laboratory

ISSUE 70, 15 SEPTEMBER 2006

PRE-CLEARANCE

contents

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2 | BIOSECURITY NEW ZEALAND | ISSUE 70

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Biosecurity magazine

Biosecurity is published six-weekly by Biosecurity New Zealand, with regular input from the Department of Conservation, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Fisheries and regional councils. It is of special interest to all those with a stake in the protection of New Zealand’s economic, environmental and social assets from the dangers posed by pests and diseases. Animal welfare issues are also covered. The articles in this magazine do not necessarily reflect government policy.

For enquiries about specific articles, refer to the contact listed at the end of each article.

General enquiries (e.g. circulation requests or information about Biosecurity New Zealand):

Biosecurity Magazine, Biosecurity New Zealand, PO Box 2526, Pastoral House, 25 The Terrace, Wellington, New Zealand.

Phone: 04 819 0100

Fax: 04 474 4257

Email: [email protected]

Internet: www.biosecurity.govt.nz

Editorial enquiries:

Editor: Phil Stewart

Phone: 04 384 4688

Email: [email protected]

ISSN 1174 – 4618

Biosecurity New Zealand fax contacts:

Policy and Business: 04 819 0731

Animal Welfare: 04 819 0728

Pre-clearance: 04 819 0733

Post-clearance: 04 819 0736

Compliance and Enforcement: 09 300 1021

Investigation & Diagnostic Centres: 04 526 5601

EDITORIAL

Ensuring safer and freer trade no easy task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 FRONTLINE NEWSPacific off-shore container management programme . . . . . . 4Export of dogs and cats to the United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . 7Aquatic animal diseases and risk analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8What’s in our coastal waters? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10National Centre for Biosecurity and Infectious Disease – Wallaceville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Antarctica under biosecurity threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14Hot dip for taro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

PEOPLEKevin Corrin: Moving on to explore new landscapes . . . . . . 17

BIOSECURITY SCIENCEPlant Health and Environment Laboratory: Protecting our natural advantage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18Lessons from painted apple moth campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 BIOSECURITY SYSTEMSNew Structure for Post-clearance Directorate . . . . . . . . . . . 22Biosecurity (Costs) Regulations 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

BIOSECURITY INTERFACEOIE Animal Welfare Working Group meets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26UK animal welfare assessment expert visits . . . . . . . . . . . . 26Farm Animal Welfare Council Chairman visits New Zealand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

UPDATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28Plant import health standards: Consultation; New IHSs; IHSs re-issued . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28New animal and animal product import health standards . 28Seminars – import health standard work programme . . . . . 28Reissued animal import health standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29Animals risk analyses in progress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29Import risk analysis – Cooked duck meat from Australia . . . 30Codes of ethical conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30Codes of welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 DIRECTORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

editorial

Ensuring safer and freer trade no easy task

ISSUE 70 | BIOSECURITY NEW ZEALAND | 3

Ensuring safer and freer trade: this is a challenging task and one that requires balance across a diverse range of factors. Biosecurity has a crucial part to play in

achieving this goal. However, as traditional tariff barriers to trade are being removed, the focus of some countries is turning to using non-tariff barriers as a means to restrict trade movement. In some countries this change has turned biosecurity decisions into a point-scoring game for politicians and the media. Let’s hope this trend doesn’t find favour here in New Zealand.

Keeping exotic pests and diseases from establishing in New Zealand is the focus of many dedicated people throughout the country. For some it is virtually all they think about every working day! Meeting this challenge requires a blend of scientific, communication and decision-making skills.

For commodities that have been identified as risk goods, a robust management regime is in place. Experts analyse the biosecurity risks that are associated with the commodity using the latest scientific information to determine what measures, if any, are required before the commodity can be safely imported. Stakeholder involvement is critical to ensure there is a shared understanding of the issues, and of the impacts and practicality of any proposed measures.

Bringing closure in a timely manner is also important. It is neither possible, nor practical, to wait until we have scientifically proven answers to all possible avenues of enquiry. There will always be areas of scientific uncertainty. What is important is that we have the critical information required to make a robust and informed decision, and that any assumptions are transparent.

Of course, our decisions will not always be popular. Not surprisingly, different stakeholder groups are often at odds about biosecurity decisions. There are a number of different agendas and different value drivers at play.

Importantly, our decisions will always comply with World Trade Organization regulations. New Zealand is a small country that relies heavily on primary produce exports. International compliance to rules-based trade is essential

to our economy. So it is paramount that we fight hard in the international arena to promote fair rules for trade, and equally imperative that we follow those rules when we are assessing product for import. Trade is a two-way street – we need to apply the same rules to our imports as we expect

others to apply to our exports.

Yet keeping trade safe is not just about protecting New Zealand from exotic organisms that are associated with the commodities being imported. The container that

the product is stored in, or the ship that the product arrives in, are also sources of risk. Pests find their way into the nooks and crannies of ships and containers and then ‘hitchhike’ their way to New Zealand. With the increasing volume of trade, managing the risk from hitchhiking pests becomes an ever-increasing challenge.

The New Zealand system for managing biosecurity risk on the container pathway is the most comprehensive in the world. Risk profiling is used to ensure we apply our most stringent measures to the containers that pose the greatest risk. A unique feature of the system here in New Zealand is that even low-risk containers are checked inside and out for contamination.

Industry participation is the key to making this system work, and personnel are trained and accredited to detect biosecurity risks in containers. With 500,000 containers entering New Zealand annually, there is a veritable army of accredited persons (or ‘APs’) out there. These valuable people check for biosecurity pests as the container is being unloaded, creating a crucial line of defence against biosecurity incursions.

It’s a salient reminder that effective management of biosecurity requires vigilance from every one of us. If we are to be successful, we must all play a part in safeguarding New Zealand’s economy and environment, our health, our plants and animals and Maori taonga.

■ Debbie Pearson Director Pre-clearance Biosecurity New Zealand

Deb

bie

Pea

rson

“There will always be areas of scientific uncertainty “

Cover: The disease risk from imported live exotic fish for the ornamental trade is one of the issues being considered by the Pre-clearance Directorate’s Risk Analysis (Animals) team (see page 8). Other articles focusing on Biosecurity New Zealand’s Pre-clearance work can be found in the Editorial (page 3), on page 4 (Pacific off-shore container management programme) and on page 16 (Hot dip for taro). And to emphasise that managing risk is a two-way street, we also advise people how to avoid their pets spending a lengthy stay in quarantine if they’re taking their cat or dog with them to the UK (page 7).


FRONTLINE NEWS

PACIFIC OFF-SHORE CONTAINER MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME REDUCES BIOSECURITY RISKS AND INDUSTRY COMPLIANCE COSTS

Preventing invasive pests establishing in New Zealand is one of the principal aims of Biosecurity New Zealand (BNZ) in order to protect the economy, environment and human health.

The best way to achieve this, and protect New Zealand from invasive pests such as ants, is to focus on

effective off-shore risk management programmes and auditing on arrival, rather than relying on costly post-border surveillance systems and incursion responses.

Around 65 percent of invasive ants detected at the New Zealand border arrive on or in sea containers or goods from the Pacific Islands. Empty containers are mostly brought into New Zealand from the Pacific Islands and Australia to ensure New Zealand’s export trade is serviced appropriately.

Containers from designated high-risk countries undergo full external and internal inspections by the MAF

Quarantine Service (MAF QS) on arrival in New Zealand. However, these inspections are time consuming and costly for importers and involve many hours of MAF QS inspection time.

A high percentage of empty containers from Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands are infested with invasive ants. Several post-border incursions appear to be directly linked to containers imported by one of the major importers, Chief Container Services (Figures 4 and 5).

To effectively prevent entry of invasive ants via the container pathway, the establishment of an off-shore container management programme for container decontamination and audit is desirable. A cooperative programme between MAF and industry to reduce contamination with invasive ants, other pests and contaminants to acceptable levels will reduce costs and time delays borne by importers, and cut down the need for intensive MAF QS inspections, freeing up resources for use on other pathways.

Off-shore container management programme trial designIn early 2006, Chief Container Services cooperated with MAF to run a three-month off-shore container management programme trial at the ports of Lae and Port Moresby (Papua New Guinea) and Honiara (Solomon Islands) for containers imported into Napier and Tauranga. Chief Container Services contracted a specialist contractor (Anti-Ants) to provide technical advice at the off-shore ports on ant management measures. Each of the off-shore ports included in the trial implemented a consistent management programme for containers, considered by MAF to be ‘equivalent’ to inspections and decontamination practices on arrival in New Zealand at transitional facilities.

The programme was designed primarily for empty containers. However, containers with full loads of cargo received an external wash and insecticidal spray as for the empty containers. In general, empty container management is

Figure 1. Invasive ants (Crazy Ants – Paratrechina longicornis) detected on board a vessel carrying containers to New Zealand.

By Dave Nendick, Biosecurity Standards Group, Biosecurity New Zealand, Pre-clearance Directorate and Megan Sarty, Post-clearance Directorate; with Simon O’Connor, Secretariat of the Pacific Community; Gerhard Rechenberg and Roy Skucek, Chief Container Services; Cas Vanderwoude, Anti-Ants; and Grant Weston, Tauranga Area Manager, MAF Quarantine Service.


as follows:

• The containers selected for shipping to New Zealand are stored on designated ‘hard-stand’ areas where re-contamination with soil and other contaminants after external cleaning is unlikely.

• Storage areas are kept clean with toxic ant baiting, snail baiting (targeting giant African snails), weed control and debris removal to deny refuge to ants, snails and other pests.

• The containers are decontaminated using a combination of interior sweeping and internal and external high pressure washing.

• Re-infestation is prevented by the application of a residual insecticide to exterior sufaces, especially around entry points (door seals, air vents and other hiding places) and subsequent storage in designated contaminant-free storage areas.

Containers included in the off-shore container management programme are segregated on board vessels from containers originating in other ports, to ensure cross-contamination is minimised. Once the containers arrive at the New Zealand border they are inspected by MAF QS, where cleanliness is verified.

All empty containers are then processed through decontamination (transitional) facilities in New Zealand after arrival. All of the containers receive an additional inspection during processing at the decontamination facility by an Accredited Person. A clear benefit for Chief Container Services is that they are now paying for fewer container washes at these facilities because the containers that are included in the programme are much cleaner.

Results of three-month trial Before the three-month trial of the off-shore container management programme, up to 17 percent of containers imported by Chief Container Services were found to be contaminated with ants, and

around 50 percent were found with other contaminants. The containers were often grossly contaminated with soil and grain residues and the frequency of insects, including invasive ants, was high.

Under agreement with Chief Container Services, MAF set target contamination thresholds of 0.16 and 5 percent respectively for ants and general contamination. The MAF QS inspection results were monitored for the three-month trial period in relation to the target thresholds and regularly reported to MAF Biosecurity New Zealand and Chief Container Services.

The results of the trial showed that levels of contaminants (invasive ants) decreased significantly. There was also an associated decrease in post-border detections of invasive ants at the storage, repair and decontamination transitional facility used by Chief Container Services (Figure 5 and Table 1).

In addition, the amount of contamination (soil or grain) per container has decreased in volume. Most importantly, the incidence of invasive ants has substantially decreased from 17% to 0% for both Port Moresby and Honiara, while only three out of 2338 (0.13%) empty containers were contaminated with invasive ants from Lae (Table 1).

It is anticipated that, with refinements to the off-shore container management programme, general contamination will continue to decrease over time. This could be achieved by targeting particular problem areas, for example, interior container contamination with grain (Honiara) and exterior soil contamination (Port Moresby).

Finalisation of off-shore container management programme Due to the programme’s great success, Chief Container Services has agreed to continue running it in partnership with MAF. Under agreement, Chief Container Services has ensured that chemical baiting for ants, and application of barrier sprays to cleaned containers continues, and that a constant supply of the controlling chemicals is available in all three ports. Chief Container Services intends to run internal audits and report to MAF monthly, while the local Quarantine Services (MAF equivalent in Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands) will also audit the programme and report to MAF.

A final audit of the programme by representatives from MAF Biosecurity New Zealand and MAF QS is required for completion and is planned for late September or early October 2006. Following the final audit and approval, it is anticipated that empty container inspections conducted by MAF QS (on arrival in New Zealand) will drop progressively to an appropriate audit regime.

Where thresholds for ant contamination are not being exceeded, empty container inspections will initially drop to 50 percent for containers from Port Moresby and Lae, while inspections for containers from Honiara will initially drop to 20 percent. MAF QS will continue to collect contamination data and pass this on to Biosecurity New Zealand’s Biosecurity Monitoring Group and Post-clearance Directorate for further assessment and analysis. Contamination rates will be re-assessed every three months, at which time inspection levels will be reviewed and, if compliant, audit regimes will be reduced further.

There are substantial benefits to Chief Container Services and the port companies of Napier and Tauranga with

Figure 3. Tropical fire ant (Solenopsis geminata) nests and weeds adjacent to clean container storage areas. Areas subsequently received herbicide treatment and toxic baiting for ant management.

Contaminant Lae Port Moresby Honiara

Ants 0.13 0.00 0.00

Spiders 0.21 0.41 0.12

Cockroach 0.73 1.24 0.12

Grain 2.01 1.45 3.45

Soil 1.92 2.90 0.12

Other 1.03 0.41 0.23

Total 6.03 6.42 4.03

Table 1. Final percentage contamination rates for containers imported by Chief Container Services from Lae and Port Moresby (PNG) and Honiara (Solomon Islands) with total numbers of containers 2338, 966 and 869 respectively. Data obtained from MAF QS during border inspections.

Figure 2. Container cleaning on “hard stand” areas in Lae, PNG.

FRONTLINE NEWS


the reduced inspection requirements on arrival in New Zealand. Apart from direct cost savings from reduced MAF QS inspections, there will be less congestion at the ports and fewer container ‘moves’ directed by MAF QS, all which contribute to cost savings for the importer and free up machinery for other port company purposes.

SummaryThe success of the off-shore container management programme has demonstrated how hitch-hiking pests such as invasive ants can be effectively managed before arriving at the New Zealand border (Figures 5 and 6, and Table 1).

Another important consideration is the associated cost savings and reduced time delays for Chief Container Services and the reduced demands upon port company services and infrastructure.

In addition, several biosecurity strategic objectives have been achieved by:

• developing a targeted programme to move risk mitigation measures off-shore

• MAF contributing to reduce threats to New Zealand’s biodiversity by targeting significant hitch-hiker pathways for pests and contaminants through agreements with our Pacific neighbours; and

• helping neighbouring countries to enhance their regional biosecurity by reducing threats throughout the Pacific islands, and possibly applying similar container treatments to intra-Pacific trade routes.

This type of programme could be a model for other Pacific-based importers of empty containers or containers bringing cargo into New Zealand, in order to further manage biosecurity risks in an effective manner.

MAF intends to engage widely with industry, other importers of containers and associated stakeholders in the last quarter of 2006 to further progress the adoption of similar off-shore-based risk mitigation programmes.■ Dave Nendick, Biosecurity Standards Group,

Pre-clearance Directorate, Biosecurity New Zealand, [email protected]

■ Megan Sarty, Post-clearance Directorate, Biosecurity New Zealand, [email protected]

Figure 6. Cumulative total container contamination rate throughout the three-month trial. The trial ran from 10 April to 10 July 2006 with total numbers of containers 2338, 966 and 869 for Lae, Port Moresby and Honiara respectively. Data obtained from MAF QS during border inspections. Note: Not all vessels carried containers from Honiara.

Figure 5. Number of incursions of ants associated with empty containers from Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. Data is from visual monitoring conducted at Container Repair and Storage (transitional facility), Mount Maunganui, where Chief Container Services containers are cleaned before further use in New Zealand.

Figure 4. Number of interceptions of invasive ants from empty containers at the New Zealand border recorded from 1988 to April 2006.

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Last year, 266 of the 3804 dogs and cats exported from New Zealand were destined for the

UK. Sending your cat or dog from New Zealand to the UK involves fairly complicated export protocols. Failure to meet these requirements could mean up to six months in quarantine for the animal when it gets there, so a clear understanding of the protocol is advisable before you start making arrangements.

The Pet Travel Scheme (PETS) began in January 2001. It allows dogs and cats to enter the UK from New Zealand without the period of quarantine that was previously required. Stringent conditions must be met, however.

To travel to the UK from New Zealand under the PETS scheme, the pet must:

• be fitted with a microchip (by a local veterinarian)

• be vaccinated against rabies (by a local veterianarian)

• be blood-tested to show a satisfactory level of protection against rabies (sample taken by a local veterinarian and sent to an approved laboratory)

• be treated against ticks and a type of tapeworm (by a local veterinarian)

• be issued with an official MAF export certificate (by an official veterinarian)

• be issued with an Animal Welfare Export Certificate (by an offical veterinarian).

The whole process will take at least seven months, as the blood test for rabies must be taken at least six months prior to entry into the UK. Dogs or cats that do not have the full six-month period after the antibody titre has been determined may still be imported into the UK, but will spend the balance of their six-month wait in quarantine.

It is easiest for owners to use the services of a registered pet transporter who can attend to all the travel arrangements and certification.

The airline and route must be approved by DEFRA in the UK. If dogs and cats travel on an airline or route that is not approved, but otherwise meet the PETS requirements, they can go into quarantine for early release.

Mistakes to avoid• Rabies vaccination is given prior to

the microchip being implanted. The vaccination and blood test will need to be repeated. The six-month period after determination of the antibody titre is still applicable.

• Rabies booster vaccination is overdue (in cases where dogs and cats have been previously vaccinated against rabies and blood tested). The rabies vaccination and blood-test will need to be repeated. The six-month period after determination of the antibody titre is still applicable.

• Microchip is unable to be read. If the microchip cannot be located, another will need to be fitted, and the vaccination and blood test repeated. The six-month period after

determination of the antibody titre is still applicable.

• Incorrect microchip number on supporting documentation. If the error is made by the testing laboratory, the test results are to be reissued, otherwise the local veterinarian is to provide confirmation of the correct microchip number to the Biosecurity New Zealand Exports Group.

• Insufficient preparation time. The dog or cat is to remain in New Zealand until eligible for export OR be exported to the UK and spend the remainder of its six-month wait in quarantine.

DEFRA website:

■ www.defra.govt.uk/animal/quarantine/index.htm

For more specific details on the export of dogs and cats to the UK:

■ www.biosecurity.govt.nz/exports/animals/uk-pets-scheme.htm

For further information about the export of live animals and animal germplasm:

■ Wendy Newsham, phone 04 894 0513, [email protected]

Start making arrangements at least seven months ahead of time, and seriously consider using a pet transport company. Those two pieces of advice should help avoid problems for people exporting cats or dogs to the United Kingdom.

Export of dogs and cats to the United Kingdom

FRONTLINE NEWS


We need to recognise and manage any risks associated with imports such as these. Obviously we want to keep out diseases that are exotic to New Zealand and

which could pose a threat to our native aquatic animals. Entry of disease to their populations could threaten food chains and biodiversity.

New Zealand also has thriving aquaculture and fisheries industries which need protecting as valuable economic resources. As well as protecting the marine environment and marine-based industries, BNZ manages risks from the entry of marine pest species or diseases that might affect human health.

More trade, more to protectGlobally, there is increasing demand for seafood as part of a healthy diet. With this increasing demand comes increasing volumes of trade, both into and out of the country.

The New Zealand aquaculture industry is likely to grow on the back of this increased local and international demand. An expanding industry needs protection from pests and diseases

that might hinder its sustainable development. This is where BNZ comes in.

As our knowledge about aquatic animal diseases grows, we objectively assess more risk pathways and are better placed to recognise, assess and manage risks to New Zealand’s environment and economy.

It’s important that we get it right. From the spread of the parasite Gyrodactylus salaris on wild salmonid populations in Scandinavia, to the devastation of the European flat oyster industry in the 1970s by the protozoan Bonamia, and the movement of the deadly White Spot Syndrome Virus in prawns around Asia, history provides many compelling examples to show why biosecurity is so important to the aquatic environment and food industries.

A host of hostsProtecting aquatic biosecurity effectively means BNZ needs to think about a very wide range of potential sources of risk – for example:

Fishy businessAquatic animal diseases and risk analysisAs well as protecting the terrestrial animals we are familiar with, Biosecurity New Zealand (BNZ) also protects the health of animals in our aquatic environment. Aquatic animals or their products might be imported to be used for anything from bait, fish food or pets for display, to providing the basis for a diversified aquaculture industry.


• live exotic fish for display

• live animals and genetic material for farming

• harvested seafood for bait, feed or for human consumption.

For seafood alone, there’s a huge range of potential imports, from simple frozen fillets to highly processed products. And with the increasing popularity of ready-made meals and similar convenience products, we can expect the volume of processed seafood imports to keep growing.

What’s on our plate right now?BNZ is assessing:

• Live fish imports for the ornamental trade. A disease risk analysis has been carried out and submissions are currently being reviewed. The list of fish that may be imported is also under review.

• The import of live freshwater prawns from Hawaii. The risk analysis process is complete, submissions have been reviewed and an import health standard is in production.

• Oyster sperm, bait fish and fish food imports. These are in the early stages of the risk analysis process and will be released for public consultation in due course.

Focus on freshwaterNew Zealand’s fresh waters are national treasures, pivotal to Maori culture and used recreationally by 79 percent of New Zealanders as well as many international visitors. We also use it for drinking water, irrigation and to generate electricity. The diversity of native freshwater plants and animals, including our rarest species, such as the black stilt, rely on this fragile environment.

Watch out for an upcoming article in Biosecurity by Paul Champion (NIWA) discussing freshwater biosecurity and why it needs to be managed differently to marine waters. (See also feature articles in Biosecurity issue 65, 1 February 2006.)

How you can helpMake yourself aware of the whole risk analysis process (see weblink below), then participate if you have pertinent information. Understand the risks and use the aquatic environment responsibly. A few simple pointers are:

• Don’t release unwanted ornamental fish or aquarium plants into the New Zealand environment. Instead, either return unwanted fish to the pet shop or humanely kill them and dispose of them in the bin, along with any aquarium plants.

• If you fish, keep your kit clean and dry between trips to avoid spreading any pests or diseases.

• Do not move captured bait between fishing areas and avoid using seafood from the supermarket as bait.

• Aquaculture operators should observe good biosecurity processes on their farms and promptly investigate disease outbreaks

To report a suspected exotic pest or disease:

■ 0800 80 99 66

For information about risk analysis generally:

■ www.biosecurity.govt.nz/consultation.htm

For copies of specific risk analyses:

■ [email protected]

■ Dr Colin Johnston, Senior Adviser Risk Analysis (Animals), Pre-clearance, phone 04 894 0689, fax 04 894 0733, [email protected]

PEOPLEIN BIOSECURITY

Andrew Bell joined the Pre-clearance Directorate of Biosecurity New Zealand (BNZ) as Technical Adviser, Risk Analysis (Marine) in July. He will be involved in vector and pathway profiling for invasive marine species as well as the New Zealand-wide value mapping project.

Andrew has a PhD in Biological Sciences from the University of Auckland, completing his thesis on the feeding ecology and aquaculture of the Pacific oyster. He has worked with regional and local government, consultants and universities on environmental monitoring and impact assessment, predominantly in the marine environment. He also has experience in GPS/GIS mapping in both marine and terrestrial environments.

Susan Cooper has joined the Pre-clearance Directorate of BNZ as Team Manager of the Plant Imports Team. Susan comes from Australia where she spent 11 years with the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) in Canberra in a variety of positions. Most recently she

worked in the International Division of DAFF providing advice on technical market access for Australian horticulture and grains exports. Susan has also worked for the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS) and in other areas of the department on issues ranging from natural resource management to live animal exports to the management of Australia’s wheat export single desk. Susan now manages one of the three teams in the Biosecurity Standards Group.

Sydney Fernando has joined the Pre-clearance Directorate’s Risk Analysis (Plants) Team as science adviser, where he will be working on import risk analysis for seeds for processing and conducting specific risk analyses for importation of Phaselous spp.

from Australia, Canada and the United States. Sydney was formerly with the Investigation and Diagnostic Centres, Tamaki, where he worked as an incursion investigator. His assignments included acting as incident controller for the red imported fire ant incursion in Napier, and as operations coordinator for the national invasive ants survey programme, and post border ant investigations. Prior to that he was a scientist with the Department of Agriculture, Sri Lanka. Sydney has a PhD in Crop Science from the Oregon State University, United States, and a Post-Graduate Diploma in Agriculture from Queens University, United Kingdom.

FRONTLINE NEWS


Marine biosecurity issues have been recognised internationally as one of the four major threats to the world’s oceans, up there with pollution, habitat destruction and the over-exploitation of living marine resources.

What’s in our coastal waters? Biosecurity New Zealand investigates

Once marine pests invade a marine environment outside their own natural habitat, they are

extremely difficult and costly to control. This is particularly the case here in New Zealand, given the length of our coastline and the sheer number of vessel movements into and around it.

This difficulty was well illustrated with the discovery last year of the exotic invasive sea squirt Styela clava, which can impact on the marine environment and marine farming, and which is not feasible to eradicate.

Recognising the urgent need for effective marine biosecurity protection, Biosecurity New Zealand (BNZ) has embarked on a number of initiatives to build capability in this young branch of science.

Senior Marine Adviser Brendan Gould says the first step is forming a comprehensive picture of what’s out there.

“Our whole system needs to be underpinned by thorough baseline information about what species currently exist at our busiest, and therefore most high-risk, entry ports and marinas.

“This snapshot of what’s there also provides a benchmark against which we can measure the effectiveness of border control and other management practices. We can’t determine what’s a new

incursion (the arrival of an unwanted organism), or if an existing pest has spread, until we have a picture of the current status,” Brendan Gould explains.

“It’s the most comprehensive biodiversity survey that’s ever been done in our ports, and possibly even around the entire coastline.”

The initial baseline surveys looked at 13 commercial ports and three marinas that are entry points to New Zealand. These were (from north to south): Opua, Whangarei (port and marina), Gulf Harbour, Auckland (Waitemata), Tauranga, Gisborne, New Plymouth, Napier, Wellington, Picton, Nelson, Lyttelton, Timaru, Otago and Bluff. Brendan says the results of those surveys were fascinating.

“The examination of those locations and investigation of the 27,000 specimens collected revealed some 1,300 species in those areas. Of those 1,300, about 125 were either known to be, or suspected to be introduced, and about 100 species were new to science.”

While a good number of the finds may be new to New Zealand, BNZ has not enacted any emergency responses.

“We have to bear in mind that this is baseline work. It has never been done in New Zealand before. While we expected to find previously unrecorded

native and introduced species, we were very surprised at the number of species detected that were completely new to science.”

Brendan says this highlights just how little is known about the marine environment.

“With no previous baseline work, it is extremely difficult to determine how long many of these newly detected introduced species have been present and how well they have established in New Zealand’s marine environment. Some of these organisms may have been here for decades and we can’t respond to everything. There are also a limited number of tools available for controlling or eradicating species in the marine environment,” he says.

These surveys will now provide baseline information to support and inform future biosecurity responses and activities.

“New finds or introductions are being assessed on the basis of potential risk. Factors such as how invasive or aggressive they are, the possibility of their spread, and the suitability of the New Zealand environment will be taken into account,” says Brendan.

The second phase of information gathering – resurveying the baseline locations to see how things have changed – is currently underway.


“Re-surveying the locations using the same methods as the initial baseline work will tell us if there have been any new incursions, provide a measure of the rate of invasion of any organisms, and measure the success of border controls and pest management actions.”

The National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research (NIWA) was contracted to undertake the initial round of New Zealand’s baseline surveys, and the subsequent re-surveys.

The ability to identify specimens collected in these surveys is critical to determining their status. For this task, BNZ has set up a Marine Invasives Taxonomic Service, based at NIWA.

The identification and analysis work is underway for the recent round of re- surveys.

“Identifying the sheer volume of specimens generated by these surveys is a considerable challenge in itself, and it will likely be several months before the identification process will be completed,” Brendan explains.

In addition to the 13 original locations, a further eight have recently been added to the list of high-value or high-risk locations to examine, and are in the process of having baseline work undertaken. These include: Kaipara Harbour, Manukau Harbour, the Taharoa

iron-sands terminal (off the Waikato west coast), Tarakohe Harbour in Golden Bay, Kaikoura/Port Underwood, Milford Sound, Stewart Island and the Chathams.

BNZ has contracted three organisations to undertake these additional baseline surveys.

NIWA has just completed the field survey components of Milford Sound and the Taharoa Terminal, and is due to undertake surveys on Kaipara Harbour and Kaikoura/Port Underwood in the near future.

A joint effort by Kingett Mitchell Ltd and the Cawthron Institute, has seen the field component of the Manukau Harbour completed, and surveys at Stewart Island, Golden Bay and the Chatham Islands are due.

As well as its port and marina surveying, BNZ also runs an ongoing targeted surveillance programme looking for eight specific unwanted marine organisms. Their unwanted status is based on their history of invasiveness overseas, a high likelihood of arrival, their potential for significant spread, and the suitability of our environment for them to establish here.

“Two of the organisms we’re on the lookout for are already in New Zealand. They are the sea squirt Styela clava and the seaweed Undaria pinnatifida. With both of these, we are keen to keep tabs

on where they are and if any spread is occurring,” Brendan says.

The others on the hit list are: Chinese mitten crab, Eriocheir sinensis; Mediterranean fanworm, Sabella spallanzanii; Northern Pacific seastar, Asterias amurensis; European shore crab, Carcinus maenas; Asian clam, Potamocorbula amurensis; and Caulerpa taxifolia (a marine aquarium weed) (see next page).

Brendan says we have one of the most extensive marine biosecurity monitoring programmes in the world.

“But BNZ can only do so much. Marine users, particularly those boating around New Zealand, can help prevent the spread of marine pests by simply keeping their hulls free of fouling and by applying anti-fouling paints regularly.

“The eyes of the wider community are vital in preventing the establishment of exotic species here. If we can find new arrivals at an early stage before they become widely established, eradication may still be possible.

“If you find something unusual out there that you think may be an exotic introduction, call the Biosecurity hot line 0800 80 99 66.”

■ Brendan Gould, Senior Adviser Marine Surveillance, Post-clearance Directorate, Biosecurity New Zealand, phone 04 894 0548, 029 894 0548, [email protected]

Diver checking Lyttelton harbour for infestations of the invasive sea

squirt, Styela clava.

Chinese mitten crab, Eriocheir sinensis

The Chinese mitten crab could pose a serious threat to both our marine biological communities and the stability of our river

banks. It is native to the rivers and estuaries of China and Korea along the Yellow Sea. It burrows into river banks and causes accelerated erosion and slumping. It can also carry a lung fluke that can infect humans. Photo: California Fish and Game.

Mediterranean fanworm, Sabella spallanzanii

This worm is not yet found in New Zealand although it is found on the south and south-west coasts of Australia, and in Tasmania. It lives in the open seas at depths of 1-30 metres.

It has a rapid growth rate and can form high-density beds, displacing other species and fouling boats and other marine structures. The fanworm could threaten our marine ecosystem and cause problems for marine farmers and boaties. Photo: CSIRO Marine.

Northern Pacific seastar, Asterias amurensis

If this seastar arrives in New Zealand it could have a serious impact on our aquaculture industry and our marine environment generally. It is currently found in huge numbers in southern parts of

Australia. It is a voracious predator, feeding on wild and farmed shellfish and a wide variety of other marine animals. It is generally found on muddy, sandy or pebbly surfaces and doesn’t tend to settle in areas with high wave action. Photo: Haaga.

Undaria pinnatifida (a Japanese seaweed)

This seaweed is now well established throughout mainland New Zealand and pest management programmes for the species are under development.

European shore crab (or green crab), Carcinus maenas

If this predator came to New Zealand it could reduce the number of different organisms we see in our inter-tidal environment. It has been implicated in the decline of native shellfish species in locations where it has invaded. It is likely to compete with many native species that live in the same habitats. Photo: Marmach.

Asian clam, Potamocorbula amurensis

This clam could reduce the number of different clam and bivalve species in our marine environment. It can inhabit a wide variety of environments and has spread from its native range of China, Japan and Korea to the west coast of the United States. Photo: USGS.

Caulerpa taxifolia (a marine aquarium weed)

This species readily invades new locations and is now found on the northern coast of Australia. If it arrived here it could cause serious problems to our marine ecosystem. It smothers other plant life and reduces the habitat available for fish and other animals.

The clubbed tunicate, Styela clava (sea-squirt)

This invasive organism is present in New Zealand. It is widespread throughout the Hauraki Gulf and has been found in small numbers in Lyttelton Harbour, at Tutukaka in Northland and on the hulls of two vessels in Nelson Port. It poses a threat to aquaculture, competing for space and food and blanketing equipment and lines. Photo: Cawthron Institute.

FRONTLINE NEWS


Chinese mitten crab, Eriocheir sinensis

The Chinese mitten crab could pose a serious threat to both our marine biological communities and the stability of our river

banks. It is native to the rivers and estuaries of China and Korea along the Yellow Sea. It burrows into river banks and causes accelerated erosion and slumping. It can also carry a lung fluke that can infect humans. Photo: California Fish and Game.

Mediterranean fanworm, Sabella spallanzanii

This worm is not yet found in New Zealand although it is found on the south and south-west coasts of Australia, and in Tasmania. It lives in the open seas at depths of 1-30 metres.

It has a rapid growth rate and can form high-density beds, displacing other species and fouling boats and other marine structures. The fanworm could threaten our marine ecosystem and cause problems for marine farmers and boaties. Photo: CSIRO Marine.

Northern Pacific seastar, Asterias amurensis

If this seastar arrives in New Zealand it could have a serious impact on our aquaculture industry and our marine environment generally. It is currently found in huge numbers in southern parts of

Australia. It is a voracious predator, feeding on wild and farmed shellfish and a wide variety of other marine animals. It is generally found on muddy, sandy or pebbly surfaces and doesn’t tend to settle in areas with high wave action. Photo: Haaga.

Undaria pinnatifida (a Japanese seaweed)

This seaweed is now well established throughout mainland New Zealand and pest management programmes for the species are under development.

European shore crab (or green crab), Carcinus maenas

If this predator came to New Zealand it could reduce the number of different organisms we see in our inter-tidal environment. It has been implicated in the decline of native shellfish species in locations where it has invaded. It is likely to compete with many native species that live in the same habitats. Photo: Marmach.

Asian clam, Potamocorbula amurensis

This clam could reduce the number of different clam and bivalve species in our marine environment. It can inhabit a wide variety of environments and has spread from its native range of China, Japan and Korea to the west coast of the United States. Photo: USGS.

Caulerpa taxifolia (a marine aquarium weed)

This species readily invades new locations and is now found on the northern coast of Australia. If it arrived here it could cause serious problems to our marine ecosystem. It smothers other plant life and reduces the habitat available for fish and other animals.

The clubbed tunicate, Styela clava (sea-squirt)

This invasive organism is present in New Zealand. It is widespread throughout the Hauraki Gulf and has been found in small numbers in Lyttelton Harbour, at Tutukaka in Northland and on the hulls of two vessels in Nelson Port. It poses a threat to aquaculture, competing for space and food and blanketing equipment and lines. Photo: Cawthron Institute.


Rimutaka MP Paul Swain, Upper Hutt Mayor Wayne Guppy and Biosecurity New Zealand’s Hugh Davies joined forces recently to celebrate the start of work on the National Centre for Biosecurity and Infectious Disease – Wallaceville.

The trio turned the first sod for a new access roadway and fencing for the Centre at Wallaceville, Upper Hutt, last month. A few days later, MAF Director-General Murray

Sherwin was at Wallaceville to watch representatives of the Wellington Tenths Trust perform a karakia on the site before the felling of some totara trees to make way for the road and buildings.

Biosecurity New Zealand’s (BNZ’s) Director of Investigation and Diagnostic Centres, Hugh Davies, said the two ceremonies were the first tangible signs of the establishment of the new Centre, which was launched at Parliament in August 2005.

MAF has been located at the Wallaceville campus since 1905, with MAF and AgResearch sharing the site since 1992. Cabinet agreed to allow MAF to re-purchase a 3.5-hectare subdivision of the campus following AgResearch’s decision to move most of its research activities off the site by 2008. The land sale was finalised at the end of June, paving the way for construction of the new infrastructure and buildings.

“The National Centre for Biosecurity and Infectious Disease will significantly increase New Zealand’s capability to safeguard human and animal health and to protect the economy,” Hugh Davies said.

“It is designed to enhance national capabilities and services in the investigation and diagnosis of new and emerging animal diseases; biosecurity; human diseases such as meningococcal and influenza epidemics; and monitoring and responding to new and emerging human and animal health disease threats such as SARS and avian influenza. The exotic disease response centre on the site provides a national centre for the technical management of animal disease outbreaks.”

The Centre will link on a single site the existing BNZ Investigation and Diagnostic Centre (previously referred to as MAF’s National Centre for Disease Investigation); new Environmental Science and Research (ESR) laboratories and staff; AgriQuality facilities currently at Wallaceville, and AgResearch’s infectious disease diagnostic team. Significantly, it will cluster the largest concentration of bacteriologists, virologists and epidemiologists specialising in animal and human health in New Zealand.

“This is a unique opportunity to have staff from a Government Ministry (MAF), Crown Research Institutes (ESR and AgResearch) and a State-Owned Enterprise (AgriQuality) working collaboratively on one site,” Hugh Davies said.

“It represents a continuum, from blue-sky research through validation and optimisation of methods for field use to manufacture and commercialisation.”

Most of the important emerging diseases that threaten humans are zoonoses. These are diseases which transfer from animals to

humans, for example BSE, avian flu and SARS. The skills and equipment required for the laboratory diagnosis of infectious diseases of animals and humans are similar.

“Recent world events such as the avian influenza outbreaks in Asia have highlighted the benefit of locating human and animal health diagnostic capabilities together,” Hugh Davies said.

There are already collaborative projects under way on projects such as avian influenza and insect-borne disease. “This centre offers a fantastic opportunity to learn from each other and provide back-up in emergencies, as well as share specialist knowledge, skills and equipment.”

Overseas research recommends clustering core competencies at national centres, with integrated laboratory response networks, Hugh Davies said.

“The Centre will also mirror overseas trends where organisations are taking a national operational role in identifying and responding to aberrant events. For example, The Health Protection Agency in the United Kingdom; The Centre for Disease Coordination in the United States; The Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health; and The Centre for Health Protection in Hong Kong.”

The roadway and fencing for the new Centre should be completed by the end of 2006, while the first phase of construction – the ESR building and a new cafeteria and seminar room – is likely to be finished by 2008.

■ Hugh Davies, Director Investigation and Diagnostic Centres, Biosecurity New Zealand, phone 04 894 0354, [email protected]

Turning the first sod, from left: BNZ’s Director Investigation and Diagnostic Centres Hugh Davies, Rimutaka MP Paul Swain and Upper Hutt Mayor Wayne Guppy.

National Centre for Biosecurity and Infectious Disease – Wallaceville New hub of expertise and knowledge

FRONTLINE NEWS


With its inhospitable climate

and remote location, you could

be forgiven for thinking that

Antarctica would be safe from

the threat of invasion from non-

native species.

However, an increase in the number of visitors to the continent, including over 28,000 tourists a year as well as a steady stream of scientists and explorers, has meant Antarctica’s unique ecosystems, animals and landscapes are now in need of protection.

Dr Neil Gilbert, Antarctica New Zealand’s environmental manager, says with a total of around 35,000 visitors annually, it’s difficult to single out tourism as the main culprit.

“The sorts of species that are transferred do not distinguish between the vectors by which they come into Antarctica, and in New Zealand we’re currently looking into all transport mechanisms,” he says.

“The reason tourists are of concern is that vessels used to transport them to Antarctica are often used all over the world, travelling to Antarctica in the summer months, but the same applies to national programme vessels. There are many ships arriving in Antarctica, and all maritime transport is a primary concern.”

Dr Gilbert says ships are a great way of moving pests between continents, via sea chests (recesses in ships’ hulls housing water intake pipes) and ballast water, but

most commonly by hull fouling.

“We believe that here in New Zealand the majority of introduced non-native marine species were introduced through hull fouling,” he says.

Enterprising pests are also making use of other transport mechanisms, with the increase in air traffic to Antarctica presenting new problems. Quicker travel times mean organisms have greater chances of en route survival.

But visitors to Antarctica aren’t shouldering the blame on their own. Climate change is also making things easier for unwanted visitors. This is particularly evident on the Antarctic Peninsula.

“The climate in Antarctica is becoming more benign with temperatures increasing by 2.5 degrees in the last 50 years,” Dr Gilbert says. “Because of this glaciers are retreating, which provides an increase in ice-free area and a more hospitable environment.”

New species found so far include a grass, Poa annua, on King George Island and both a male and a female North Atlantic spider crab (Hyas araneus) found in the marine environment.

White sea anemone, red starfish in top left background. (c) Rod Budd, Antarctica NZ Pictorial Collection: K081 01/02_2


To the editor

About eight years ago I arrived at our Kaitaia Office at about 8.30am to find two of my staff in the middle of the main street of Kaitaia. They were jumping into the air and grasping at some seemingly invisible object, something you could only do in Kaitaia. On closer inspection, I found that they were trying to catch some very fine filaments that were only barely visible in the morning light. The filament was produced by the golden orb spider, or was it the garden orbweb spider (Eriphora pustulosa) listed as an example of probable migrants in the article? [Biosecurity 69:14, 1 August 2006] Apparently the juvenile spiders hang-glide across the Tasman on these very fine threads and the species is now established in the Far North. The spider produces a web strong enough to catch small birds, although I still doubt the stories of children going missing and bicycles being found in the web.

Bob Cathcart Northland Regional Council

AgResearch’s Cor Vink, who co-wrote the article in Biosecurity issue 69 replies:

Hi Bob

The spiders you mention could be golden orb web spiders (Nephila edulis), which are very competent at ballooning and have been occasionally reported in the North Island but it’s unlikely they’ll survive our winters. They are common in Australia and build large webs, up to two meters in diameter. If they are indeed established in the Far North, I’d be grateful if you could capture an adult specimen and send it down to me so I can verify its identity – there are a few other large orb web spiders also found in Northland, such as Neoscona orientalis and Eriophora heroine. There’s a good image of Nephila edulis at www.usq.edu.au/spider/find/spiders/116.htm

Regards, Cor Vink

“These crabs may be one-offs; we don’t yet know whether they are established and breeding,” Dr Gilbert says. “We don’t know too much about what species there are in the marine environment and we need more research to find out what is native and what is not.”

More extensive research has been undertaken on sub-Antarctic islands, with over 200 known non-native species having been discovered to date. Dr Gilbert believes this is a good indicator of the extent to which Antarctica could be affected.

Earlier this year a number of New Zealand’s biosecurity and Antarctica experts came together to host an international Non-Native Species in Antarctica workshop to look at current risks, future management and policy advice.

“Biosecurity New Zealand were fantastic in identifying the risks and suggesting mechanisms to put in place to protect Antarctica’s unique environment,” Dr Gilbert says.

New Zealand’s biosecurity expertise has a vital role to play in safeguarding the future of Antarctica, confirms Assistant Director General Biosecurity New Zealand, Barry O’Neil.

“New Zealand has the most advanced biosecurity system in the world, and our approach to biosecurity has direct relevance to protecting Antarctica from alien species,” he says.

“Many good measures have already been taken to limit the possibility of invasive species arriving and establishing in the Antarctic, but these need to be constantly reviewed and strengthened. Over-reliance on Antarctica’s extreme climatic conditions to stop invasive species establishing would be a risky and dangerous strategy.”

The Non-Native Species in Antarctica workshop resulted in the production of a paper which was tabled at the Antarctic Treaty’s Committee for Environmental Protection in Edinburgh in June this year. Included in the paper was a code of conduct for land-based activities – a set of minimum standards that all visitors would have to follow – which received the Committee’s backing.

To protect the marine environment, the meeting adopted new practical guidelines for ballast water exchange. Vessels will need to exchange ballast water before arriving in Antarctic waters and record ballast water operations.

■ www.antarcticanz.govt.nz

Coastal golden orb weaver (Nephila plumipes), a close relative of the golden orb web spider (Nephila edulis). It is found on the

east coast of Australia from southern Queensland to the Victorian border. Photo: Ron Atkinson, University of Southern Queensland.

International agreements affecting Antarctica

Aussie high flyers make landfall in Kaitaia

Adelie penguins massing at ice edge to enter the water. (c) Wei-Hang Chua, Antarctica NZ Pictorial Collection:

K030 03/04_1639

The Antarctic Treaty 1961

In the early 1900s, several countries made territorial claims on Antarctica and during the Cold War there were concerns the continent could be used for military purposes. The Antarctic Treaty was signed by 12 countries (including New Zealand, Australia, UK, United States, Russia and France) in 1959 and ratified two years later. A unique international agreement, the Treaty was proposed following a successful year of international scientific collaboration, to continue the cooperative spirit and peaceful use of Antarctica as a giant scientific laboratory.

Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS) 1972

Adopted by Treaty parties out of concern for the vulnerability of Antarctic seals, should commercial sealing recommence.

Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) 1982

Introduced to prevent heavy exploitation and overfishing, CCAMLR is based on the ecosystem approach which looks at the implications of commercial fishing on all links in the food chain.

Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 1991

The Protocol came into force internationally in 1998 and promotes the protection of the Antarctic environment and ecosystems. By designating Antarctica a “natural reserve devoted to peace and science” the original conservation concepts of the Antarctic Treaty are preserved.

FRONTLINE NEWS


A dip in hot water not only has potential as an alternative quarantine treatment for taro

imported into New Zealand, but also appears to improve quality, trials have shown. Taro is currently fumigated with methyl bromide when regulated pests are found.

Biosecurity New Zealand commissioned Crop and Food Research to test the thermal tolerance of taro to a hot water dip as a potential replacement for fumigation. Taro is regularly fumigated with methyl bromide, which is known to reduce quality and shelf-life. Its normal storage life is up to 8 weeks at 11-13oC and 2-4 weeks at 20oC.

A range of pests, mainly mites and nematodes, are intercepted on taro. Little work on alternative quarantine treatments on taro has been carried out in the past but a literature search revealed that hot water has been successful with other

corms and bulbs for control of nematodes and mites. Hot water treatments have also been used for fungal pathogen control.

High temperature forced air systems are used very successfully in the Pacific for control of fruit fly in papaya and other tropical fruits and vegetables. Hot water is a more efficient heat transfer mechanism than hot air, however, and could be more suited for heat-treating a large corm such as taro.

In the Crop and Food Research trials, various time/temperature combinations were tried on imported taro, ranging from 45oC for 40 minutes to 55oC for 90 minutes. The taro was then assessed for flesh discolouration and development of rot. (Because the tested taro was imported, it was probably already treated with methyl bromide and this could have affected results, however.)

The hot-water treated corms generally

maintained better quality than the control (untreated) corms, with one of the hot water treatments giving the highest quality rating. Another observation was that the pink colour of the lobes at the base of the cut leaves was lost during heat treatment.

None of the hot water dipping treatments decreased taro quality: indeed, the results suggest that the dipping treatments were improving quality. The hot water may have reduced the rate of decay. The results suggest that taro are tolerant of hot water dips at 45oC (for up to 60 minutes), 50oC (for up to 60 minutes) and 55oC (for up to 30 minutes).

It is recommended that more detailed trials be carried out close to where the taro are grown to assess the tolerance of taro to hot water dipping and to assess efficacy against pests associated with the corm.

■ Ken Glassey, Senior Adviser, Operational Standards, Biosecurity New Zealand, phone 04 894 0484, 029 894 0484, fax 04 894 0733

Taro flesh colour rating scale from 1 (far left) to 5 (far right).

Hot dip for taro

Dr Abi Loughnan has joined the Post-clearance Directorate of Biosecurity New Zealand (BNZ) as a Marine Adviser within the newly formed Environmental and

Marine Team, Biosecurity Response Group. In this role, she will be contributing to marine incursion responses, developing and managing marine response programmes and research to develop response tools, and providing advice across the marine programme. Abi has previously worked within BNZ’s Pre-clearance Directorate in the Risk Analysis (Plants) team. She has a BSc (Hons) in ecology and a PhD in marine botany that focused on the ecology and physiology of algae.

Ivan Veljkovic has been appointed as Senior Adviser, Biosecurity Response. Before he started with BNZ (then the MAF Biosecurity Authority) in December 2002,

Ivan worked as a researcher in the Plant Diseases Department of the Institute for Plant Protection and Environment in Belgrade, Serbia. Since then, he has worked on a number of responses including major responses such as Asian gypsy moth in Hamilton and fall webworm in Auckland, but has spent most of his time managing the Dutch elm disease response programme in Auckland. Ivan will continue to manage Dutch elm disease and other investigations and responses to unwanted organisms in

the newly formed Biosecurity Response Plants Team.

Paul Stevens recently joined the Post-clearance Directorate of BNZ as Senior Adviser within the newly formed Biosecurity Surveillance Group. During his 25 years in the New Zealand forest industry he has worked for a number of major forestry companies and has been intensively involved in a number of pest management and forest health research projects. Paul has extensive experience in forest health surveillance, economic evaluation, operational research and project management. He will be focused on plant surveillance issues.


PEOPLE

Kevin retired on September 8 after joining the organisation – then the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries – in October 1975. MAF appealed to his interest in veterinary science, and was a welcome change after the stress of being a senior vet in a mixed practice in Marlborough for 10 years. The novelty of midnight and weekend call-outs to look after sick or injured animals had well and truly worn off, he adds.

Kevin’s first job at MAF was as a Quarantine Vet in the former Animal Health Division. The two significant issues for the division then were brucellosis and bovine tuberculosis – a stark contrast to the work of MAF and Biosecurity New Zealand (BNZ) today.

“It is now so focused on biosecurity … previously it wasn’t, so that’s a major change,” he says.

Managing various quarantine facilities around Wellington provided plenty of variety, and he remembers vividly the sad case of several thousand sheep having to be slaughtered during the late 1970s.

“The sheep were imported from the UK and were supposed to be in quarantine on Mana Island for five years, but unfortunately scrapie was found in the flock.”

Kevin also had a stint in the Palmerston North regional office, as well as the Epidemiology Unit (led by John Hellström). He later managed a research programme investigating Tb tests for deer.

When he joined the Animals Import-Export team, he wrote standards for quarantine and had input in to the operational side. During this time – before the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 and establishment of ERMA New Zealand – Kevin managed the technical assessment and consultation process for importing new organisms. At this time he started working on a long project

involving the importation of genetically modified sheep semen from the UK. The sheep were brought in to New Zealand to develop a pharmaceutical to treat people with pulmonary emphysema.

“A lot of farmers were opposed to importing sheep from the UK because of the risk of scrapie,” Kevin says. “It was quite a job reassuring them that this was okay.”

The project was terminated in 2004 for commercial reasons, and all the sheep were destroyed.

From the mid-1980s there was a lot of activity around importing new breeds of sheep into New Zealand and, later, ostriches, goats, llamas and alpacas – hence Kevin’s lengthy trip to South America. He was asked to escort the first import by air of llamas and alpacas from Chile, and decided to combine the job with a sight-seeing trip around South America with his wife. But, due to difficulties getting air transport home, he was delayed and as a bonus got to see even more of the continent than he expected.

“All the planes that they had lined up ended up falling through – they had electrical problems or their wings fell off – things like that. It ended up taking six weeks, and finally we flew back with the Chilean Air Force!”

Another memorable project for Kevin was drafting the Chief Veterinary Officer’s report to then MAF Deputy Director-General Peter O’Hara, which was based on the outcome of the consultation and assessment process for the introduction of RCD (rabbit calicivirus disease) into the country. (Although MAF declined the proposal to import, farmers smuggled the virus in shortly after the decision was made.)

The RCD issue also reinforced a valuable lesson Kevin learned during his time at MAF: the importance of consultation. “You have to be really open with people, and

everything has to be ‘out there’. Otherwise there’s a perception that you’re hiding things.”

After the establishment of BNZ in 2004, Kevin was appointed Team Manager, Operational Standards in the Pre-clearance Directorate. With 10 staff to manage it’s been a busy two years, and Kevin is now looking forward to more time to indulge his passion for black-and-white photography. He hopes to travel around New Zealand exploring the landscape, as well as playing golf and gardening. And animals will feature in his new lifestyle: he intends to help out now and then on his daughter and son-in-law’s King Country farm.

Profile: Kevin CorrinMoving on to explore new landscapesA stop-over in South America while waiting to accompany a herd of alpacas and llamas back to New Zealand was one of the many highlights in Kevin Corrin’s 31 years with MAF.


Kevin Corrin: Imports of new species for farming added interesting challenges during

three-decade career with MAF.


Stephen Butcher has been appointed Manager of the Operational Standards Team (Pre-clearance) replacing Kevin Corrin who is retiring in September. Stephen has

been a senior adviser in this team for the past twelve months, working in a range of areas including zoos and circuses, the new plant quarantine and general facility standards, and operator training. Stephen previously held management positions at McCain Foods, Agriculture New Zealand and MAF Technology. His management skills are being honed on managing three children, one in his twenties and two teenagers, with the assistance of his wife Gail.

BIOSECURITY SCIENCE


“We can’t have a viable primary sector trading with the modern world without the vital work MAF does in everything from surveillance to research, to advice and assistance,” he said.

MAF’s Investigation and Diagnostic Centres (IDC) play an important role in enhancing New Zealand’s natural advantage, protecting not only our primary industries, but also our health and our natural environment from exotic diseases and pests.

The Plant Health and Environment Laboratory (PHEL) has specific responsibility for identifying and validating all suspected exotic, new and emerging diseases and pests of plants affecting the environment and human health.

PHEL is located at Tamaki in the University of Auckland’s Tamaki campus, sharing a building with Landcare Research, and at Lincoln. PHEL Manager Veronica Herrera says this collocation provides IDC with access to very useful resources.

“Landcare holds the national insect and arthropod collection and an international collection of micro organisms from plants,” she says. “They also provide a good resource of scientists which creates opportunities for collaboration. The skills we have here are not abundant in the world, so working together is crucial.”

With lab specialists in mycology, bacteriology, virology and entomology, IDC Tamaki is a veritable United Nations of scientists. Staff come from Australia, Argentina, Venezuela, the UK, France, Sri Lanka, India, China, and Canada as well as from New Zealand.

Veronica says most are lured to New Zealand by the promise of a better lifestyle. “They come here because we have a beautiful unique environment, and it is a peaceful place to bring up a family,” she says.

The Plant Health and Environment Laboratory is made up of three teams:

Protecting our natural advantage In his speech at the opening of MAF’s new offices in Pastoral House recently, Biosecurity Minister Jim Anderton reiterated the importance of enhancing New Zealand’s natural advantage.

Curation preparation: Specimens of fruit piercing moth on a setting board.

Plant Health and Environment Laboratory:


• Entomology

• Virology, Mycology and Bacteriology

• Post-Entry Quarantine (High Value Crops)

Within IDC, the Plant Health and Environment Laboratory works in close collaboration with other IDC groups, in particular with the Incursion Investigation and the Investigation and Laboratory Support group.

For the last 12 months, PHEL has been putting a lot of effort into an International Accreditation New Zealand (IANZ) assessment for ISO 17025 accreditation (requirements for testing and calibrating laboratories). The assessment of documented procedures and staff competencies was conducted by IANZ and four external technical assessors on 15 – 16 August.

IANZ has made recommendation for accreditation of the laboratory with some minor conditions which are expected to

clear within the next few weeks.

“Not many plant labs in the world are accredited to the ISO 17025 standard,” Veronica Herrera says, “so there will be a huge celebration when we get the certificate.”

EntomologyThe Entomology team, led by Alan Flynn, consists of 13 staff based at Tamaki and at Lincoln, near Christchurch. Their role is to provide coordinated insect and invertebrate diagnostics and technical advice for Biosecurity New Zealand. The team also provides diagnostics for surveillance, including programmes for biting midges of the genus Culicoides (vectors for the animal virus, blue tongue), honey bee exotic pests and fruit fly surveillance (see sidebar article).

The team coordinates the validation of new to New Zealand, new host and distribution records for a range of other programmes, including the national

invasive ants programme, high risk site surveillance and export pre-clearance.

Most surveillance field operations are contracted out, with samples sent to the Tamaki or Lincoln laboratories for the team to validate any suspect exotic pests.

Diagnostics work is carried out on invertebrates intercepted at the border, usually by quarantine officers who send them on to the Entomology team. Until a few days ago, there were also a number of casual staff at Lincoln and Tamaki assisting with the South Island Varroa destructor response. The team is also busy planning for spring and summer monitoring work associated with the recent red imported fire ant detection near Napier.

IDC’s entomologists take insect and spider-related calls directed through the MAF 0800 80 99 66 exotic disease and pest emergency hotline from members of the public reporting suspected exotic invertebrates, and carry out identification work on public submissions. They also provide technical advice to the Incursion Investigation Team, where possible accompanying the investigators in the field and working with them on the final incursion investigation report.

Tamaki and Lincoln’s incursion investigators work with other IDC teams to identify organisms, find out how they have been imported, check importation documents and arrange treatment for post-border incursions.

Virology, Mycology and Bacteriology Diagnosing exotic, naturalised and indigenous plant pests and diseases is the job of the Virology, Mycology, Bacteriology and Nematology Team (this service is contracted out of MAF). The team is made up of five virologists, four mycologists/bacteriologists, a specimen receptionist/quality assurance assistant and team manager Brett Alexander.

Their work involves investigating disease symptoms on plants and plant products at the border and post-entry quarantine, and conducting general surveillance using a range of diagnostic techniques. Fungi are identified using morphological and molecular techniques, while biochemical and molecular techniques are used for bacteriology diagnosis. Virology identification is carried out using a number of different techniques including mechanical inoculations, electron microscopy and serological and molecular methods. Positive controls for virology are carried out using PHEL’s own freeze-dried collection.

Auger beetles drill their way into New Zealand

An Auger beetle found boring into the handle of imported slingshots.

Slingshot handle showing damage caused by South African Auger beetles.

Last year, live auger beetles (Xyloperthodes castaneipennis) made their way from Africa to New Zealand via the wooden handles of slingshots.

Auger beetles and their larvae feed on dead, unseasoned sap wood, making tunnels which are tightly packed with floury dust. Adult beetles are 6–8mm long with a black or dark brown, cylindrical body.

The beetle’s arrival in New Zealand was discovered by a customer who bought the slingshot for nostalgic reasons and, after keeping it in a drawer for a few months, found it covered in dust. The customer called the Biosecurity New Zealand exotic disease and pest emergency hotline and was referred to the IDC Incursion Investigation Plants and Environment Team.

An investigator directed the customer to contain the item (in this case

they had sealed it in a glass jar) and a pick up was done the next day. IDC’s Entomology team identified the beetles and confirmed they were not established in New Zealand.

The slingshots were then traced to imported consignments and the importer contacted and asked to treat all unsold slingshots in stock. A leaflet was also produced and distributed at shops where the slingshot was sold, advising customers who had bought a slingshot within the last year to wrap the item in a clean plastic bag and store it in a deep freeze for at least five days – which should be long enough to kill any beetles in the wooden handles.

“We’ve had great cooperation from the public,” says Incursion Investigator Kerry Paice. “The importer was actually really upset [about the incursion] and is now freezing the slingshots before importing them.”

BIOSECURITY SCIENCE


The establishment of a widespread fruit fly population in New Zealand could devastate many of our export markets. BNZ oversees an active biosecurity surveillance programme to help prevent this from happening.

“If we didn’t have a surveillance programme, we’d know far too late that fruit fly had entered the country,” says Entomology Team Manager Alan Flynn. “It may mean that, by the time we’ve realised, it’s too late to eradicate. The cost would be enormous, in terms of ongoing management and control. In the short term, whole export markets would stop accepting our produce.”

Fruit flies are true flies belonging to the family Tephritidae. New Zealand is unique in having no native or established pest species. They attack ripening fruit and vegetables, leaving the product unmarketable. Any vegetable or fruit with seeds inside is a potential target, so the list of possible hosts is enormous.

The female fruit fly lays her eggs a few millimetres below the skin of the fruit or vegetable. Within a day or two these eggs hatch into maggots which eat the inside of the fruit or vegetable, moving towards the centre, and destroying it in the process.

In addition to detecting new populations before they become too widespread for eradication, surveillance also gives our trading partners assurance that New Zealand is free from fruit fly.

The surveillance programme involves regular monitoring of about 7,500 traps over 3,500 sites. Lynfield lure traps, which are non-sticky pot traps, contain one of three male para-pheromone lures. The traps are placed on well-foliated, fruit-bearing host plants.

Monitoring is carried out by AgriQuality and any trapped flies are sent to IDC Tamaki or Lincoln for screening. During

an average trapping season, over 7,200 trap clearance samples are examined. Specimens are examined under a microscope and, if required, checked with reference material held in the invertebrate collections at both IDC Tamaki and Lincoln. Alan says the programme is working well.

“From the laboratory side, I think it’s going exceptionally well,” he says. “The coordinators screening samples at each site have a very busy workload through the spring and summer seasons and they manage to get through it all, as well as their other responsibilities. They deliver an excellent service.”

Fruit fly surveillance provides essential early warning

Male Mediterranean fruit fly (Ceratitis capitata) Photo: Scott Bauer, USDA

An important function of the team is the development of diagnostic protocols for high impact exotic tests such as citrus canker.

“We need to ensure that if these organisms do arrive in New Zealand we have protocols in place to deal with them quickly,” says Brett.

Post-Entry Quarantine (High Value Crops)New Zealand’s primary industries are highly dependent on introduced agricultural and horticultural plants. To ensure importations of such plants are free from pests and diseases, most material must undergo measures such as inspection and testing in post-entry quarantine (PEQ). Private industry is providing PEQ for some high value crops (e.g. grapevines) but there are gaps in services for other crops.

MAF has obtained Growth and Innovation Framework funding to facilitate importation of new germplasm, and in March 2006 the PEQ team was established to assist the development and provision of the testing services required in PEQ. The team consists of five people and is currently developing testing manuals (describing the tests required in PEQ) for crops such as kiwifruit and

blueberry. Wherever possible, the team is working with private industry to produce PEQ testing manuals. The team is also responsible for providing a cost-recovered PEQ testing service where this is not being delivered by private suppliers.

Team Manager, Gerard Clover believes that one way to facilitate the importation of new plant material is communication. “Until recently, there has been a lack of readily available information for importers of these crops,” he says. “We’re working to rectify this. Our website [see weblink below] explains how importers can access the import health requirements, lists PEQ providers and sources of high-health material and explains the work of the team.”

The team also publishes regular stakeholder updates, detailing the PEQ team’s activities and any other information relevant to importation.

For information on importing plant material for high-value crops:

■ www.biosecurity.govt.nz/imports/plants/standards/high-value-crops

■ Veronica Herrera, Investigation and Diagnostic Centre, Plant Health & Environment Manager, Biosecurity New Zealand, phone 09 574 4190, [email protected]


Brian Quinn recently joined the Investigation and Diagnostic Centre (IDC), Tamaki as Glasshouse Supervisor responsible for the Level 3 Plant Transitional Facility. Appointed within the Post-Entry

Quarantine (PEQ) team, he is responsible for the operation of the glasshouse facility, supporting research and diagnostic teams and assisting with the development of diagnostic methods for pests and diseases of high-value crops in PEQ. He has broad experience in glasshouse management and plant husbandry. Before joining Biosecurity New Zealand, he worked as a Research Associate at HortResearch, Mt Albert, researching plant architecture and branching, and before that he was responsible for the development and phenotyping of plant transgenics and for managing the PC2 level Transgenics Facility at Genesis Research and Development.


Earlier this year, MAF declared that painted apple moth

had successfully been eradicated in the Auckland area.

Biosecurity Minister Jim Anderton acknowledged that

groundbreaking scientific advances were achieved during the

course of the eradication programme, which will contribute

significantly to New Zealand’s future biosecurity response

capabilities.

Ensis Forest Biosecurity and Protection (FBP) has recently completed a report for Biosecurity New Zealand that identifies key factors to be considered when planning future insect pest eradication operations. Ensis FBP General Manager, Dr Brian Richardson says that planning a spray operation for the purpose of eradication is very complex, particularly when spraying over sensitive urban areas.

“When you factor in the environmental and social pressures that require us to minimise pesticide rates and public disruption from frequent spray applications, there is significant onus on operational managers to make optimum spray decisions. These decisions include what rates of pesticide to apply, how often, and when to spray for maximum effect,” he says. Brian points out that there are layers of issues underlying every one of these decisions.

“On the face of it, defining the appropriate Btk (Bacillus thuringiensis var kurstaski) application rate sounds like a simple problem – when we have an insect pest, laboratory studies can easily tell us the dose of spray that is required to kill it. However, closer examination reveals surprising complexity, which cannot be ignored. In an eradication campaign, you have to kill every last insect – there is no margin for error.”

Host plant effectOne example of this complexity is that the effect of Btk on an insect is significantly influenced by the host plant on which it is feeding. When larvae are chewing on their preferred host species they exhibit higher resilience, so a larger dose is required to kill it.

“This information has relevance to the methods we use to define recommended Btk application rates for eradication programmes. Great care is therefore needed to determine how we choose host plants for such tests or we could end up using a completely inappropriate application rate,” Brian says.

Their research also highlights the importance of screening potential host plants for their effect on larval growth rates as the first step in the process of undertaking bioassays to determine Btk application rates, he adds.

Effects on spray potency“Another factor to take into account is how long the Btk remains effective after it has been sprayed. We now have excellent information on degradation of Btk potency in the environment, and how this is influenced by rainfall and UV radiation. This information will allow us to predict efficacy from individual sprays according to the actual weather conditions following spraying. With this knowledge, we can adjust future spray schedules to ensure we stay on track for optimal eradication.”

New modelling systemEnsis FBP has pulled its data into a decision-making framework which forms the basis of a new modelling system called PAMDX. It integrates key factors that determine variability in spray efficacy with a model of insect population dynamics. As such, PAMDX is a powerful tool for optimising decisions on the rates, timing and frequency of spray applications.

“We don’t get the opportunity to practise eradication very often, which is fortunate. However, if we ever need to do it again, we will have a much more refined process for making those key operational decisions,” Brian says.


Lessons from painted apple moth campaign

Janet Greenwood has joined the Policy Directorate of Biosecurity New Zealand (BNZ) as a Policy Analyst. Janet will be working on a range of policy issues including export cost recovery,

surveillance and incursion response policy and ruminant animal protein regulations. Before joining us, Janet enjoyed a successful career in retail management. She holds a first class honours degree in Geography from the

University of Otago. A lover of the outdoors, Janet enjoys everything from cycling, multi-sports and whitewater kayaking to tramping, horse-riding and red wine.

Trish Hepburn has joined the Biosecurity Strategic Unit as Executive Coordinator and Appointments Officer for Statutory Appointments. Before joining MAF, Trish worked for a number

of government and Crown agencies in the areas of strategic planning and policy. She also spent several years in Parliament with the Select Committee Office reporting on Bills and submissions and providing ministerial and administrative support to Members of Parliament. Trish is currently working on improvements to procedures for appointments under the Biosecurity Act 1993, Animal Products Act 1999, and Animal Welfare Act 1999. Trish has two teenage children and actively supports from the sideline their sporting interests and hobbies.


Painted apple moth larva (Teia anartoides): planning its eradication is a surprisingly complex task. Photo: Alan Flynn, MAF Plant Health and Environment Laboratory, Tamaki.

BIOSECURITY SYSTEMS


Post-clearance Directorate: 18 August 2006

Note:

New Structure for Post-clearance Directorate Peter Thomson, Director Post-clearance has announced the new structure of Biosecurity New Zealand’s Post-clearance Directorate. Work on the new structure started in April.

DirectorPost-clearancePeter Thomson

Executive CoordinatorSally Lees

ManagerBiosecurity Surveillance

Vacant

ManagerBiosecurity Response

David Hayes

ManagerSystems Design

Clifton King

ManagerPest ManagementAndrew Harrison

Advisers/Senior Advisers:Animals x 3

Environmental x 1Marine x 1Plants x 2

Team Support Officer

Team ManagerAnimals

Advisers/SeniorAdvisers x 5


Team ManagerEnvironmental &

Marine

Advisers/Senior Advisers:Environmental x 2

Marine x 2


Team ManagerPlants



IncursionManagers x 2

Human HealthSenior Adviser x 1

Executive Coordinator

Training ProgrammeManager

Training KnowledgeCoordinator


Project Managers x 2

Business SupportOfficers x 2

Team ManagerNational Coordination



Team ManagerPests & Pathways



• Until the Surveillance Group Manager is appointed members of the group will report into the relevant Biosecurity Response Group Team Manager or acting Team Manager and the Principal Adviser Surveillance will report to the Biosecurity Response Group Manager.

• Incursion responses, current and new, will continue to be managed

under the existing arrangements until Incursion Manager positions are filled.

• Project Managers in the System Design Group have direct line reporting into the Biosecurity New Zealand Programme Office within the Business & Planning Directorate but are physically located with the Post-clearance Directorate.


Key drivers for the structural change have included:

• 2006 Budget increases in pest management and emergency response preparedness funding

• team sizes and scope of accountabilities that had become too large for team managers to lead effectively

• the need to support clarification of accountabilities horizontally and vertically

• the need to support the use of a single

best-practice model for incursion response management and to ensure lessons from one response are captured for future responses

• the need to ensure system improvement and response preparedness work continues while responses are managed.

The structure has been developed with significant input from Biosecurity New Zealand staff and stakeholders. Thank you for the contribution many of you have made to this process. I am

confident the new structure will position us to more effectively deliver on our purpose.

The accompanying chart illustrates the new structure and location of current staff. Most vacancies will be filled as soon as possible; others are delayed until the second year of new initiative funding starts. The official date for transition to the new structure was Friday 18 August 2006.

■ Peter Thomson Director Post-clearance [email protected]

Biosecurity Surveillance

• Lead and manage BNZ surveillance programmes.

• Support and advise industry and other agencies in surveillance activities.

• Lead system-wide coordination and integration of surveillance activity.

• Gather, assess, and report surveillance-based information across the biosecurity system.

• Lead assessments of pest & disease freedom status.

Biosecurity Response

• Develop generic and specific response strategies and plans.

• Establish arrangements with other agencies and industry to execute strategies and plans, e.g. carcass disposal, access to response roleholders.

• Lead all responses to post-border pests, diseases and risk goods.

• Deliver on readiness aspects of emergency response budget bid commitments.

• Identify and work with Systems Design Group to develop and implement system improvements.

Pest Management

• Lead pest management coordination and integration across stakeholders.

• Assess needs and priorities for pathway and vector and national pest programmes.

• Lead and manage pathway and vector and national pest programmes across multiple stakeholders.

• Assist transitions to long-term management.

• Deliver on pest management aspects of pest management budget bid commitments.

• Identify and work with Systems Design Group to develop and implement system improvements.

Systems Design

• Support Director to ensure systems for delivery are in place.

• Manage major directorate systems improvement initiatives.

• Ensure alignment and linkages with other emergency management groups inside and outside MAF.

• Support management delivery of directorate business processes, e.g. audits, contracts, forecasting, etc.

BIOSECURITY SYSTEMS


Category of activity Summary of new charges (GST incl.) effective from 7 September 2006

Inspection of the following goods:

• unaccompanied baggage or effects

• nursery stock and fresh cut flowers;

• seeds

• other plant material

• fresh fruit and vegetables

• forest produce

• stored produce

• non-complying shipping containers

• fishmeal

• fresh produce

• goods at the International Mail Centre other than those imported for personal use.

$100 per hour for each general inspector involved

Offshore inspection of ships$100 per hour plus actual and reasonable cost of travel to and from ship

Surveillance of discharge of goods$100 per hour for each general inspector involved

Administering the import health standard for sea containers

A levy of $16 per full container

A levy of $7 per empty container.

Inspection and each re-inspection after treatment of used vehicles and machinery

Used motorcycle/moped: $15.00

Used motor vehicle not exceeding 3,500 kg: $25.00

Used motor vehicle exceeding 3,500 kg: $50.00

Machinery & equipment, vehicle parts: $100.00 per hour for each general inspector involved

Inspection of an animal that is intended to be cleared or directed to a transitional or containment facility on arrival

$28.70 per animal

Inspection and monitoring of animals held in a transitional or containment facility

$100 per hour for each general inspector involved; and

$96.10 per hour for each veterinary inspector involved.

Inspection of an animal on board a craft within NZ territory and not intended to be cleared



Monitoring controls on new organisms in a containment facility



Inspection of a consignment of animal material; trade samples

Inspection of biological products, veterinary medicines and agricultural compounds

$28.70

$57.40

Inspection and monitoring of plants held in a transitional or containment facility.

$100 per hour for each general inspector involved

Under the Biosecurity Act 1993 and the Biosecurity (Costs) Regulations 2003, MAF charges for the following biosecurity-related cargo clearance services:• inspections and biosecurity clearances of

goods, including clearances of containers, used vehicles and machinery

• organism identification

• offshore inspection of ships

• approval of permits issued under import health standards

• approval, inspection and audit of transitional (i.e., places where containers are opened and unloaded), and containment facilities (e.g., laboratories).

The regulations have recently been reviewed and updated to:

• ensure that changes in practice at the border are adequately cost recovered

• ensure the charges remain fair and equitable

• reduce compliance costs to importers

• avoid under- and over-recovery of costs over time.

Key changes• a simpler, streamlined charging regime

for used vehicles, forest produce and unaccompanied baggage or effects

• increases to the MAF hourly rate inspection charges and to certain other charges, e.g., organism identification at the border, MAF travel costs

• a new method of charging (biosecurity risk screening levy) to recover costs relating to the primary screening of all import documentation for goods that attract Customs’ Import Entry Transaction Fee (to be collected by Customs)

• a new method of charging (shipping container levy) for sea container clearance costs

• introduction of memorandum accounting for key services: used vehicles, sea containers and biosecurity risk screening.

Listed below is a summary of the new major categories of charges for the Biosecurity (Costs) Regulations 2006, the Shipping Container Levy and the Biosecurity Risk Screening Levy. The Biosecurity (Costs) Regulations and the Shipping Container Levy came into force on 7 September 2006. The biosecurity risk screening levy comes into effect on 1 October 2006. The new fees and levies replace the charges in the Biosecurity (Costs) Regulations 2003.

Biosecurity (Costs) Regulations 2006Shipping Container Levy 2006 and Biosecurity Risk Screening Levy 2006


Category of activity Summary of new charges (GST incl.) effective from 7 September 2006

Biosecurity risk screening of import documentation.

A levy of $3.38 on all import consignments that attract a New Zealand Customs Service import entry transaction fee will be imposed from 1 October 2006. From 7 September 2006 until 1 October 2006, a fee of $28.70 will apply to inspected import documentation, as per Regulation 7 of the 2003 Regulations.

Treatment of risk goods imported with a person’s baggage, through the mail or with personal effects

Actual and reasonable costs of treatment payable prior to treatment; and any costs of packaging, storing, forwarding and returning the goods before and after treatment

Treatment of other risk goodsActual and reasonable costs of treatment; and any costs of packaging, storing, forwarding and returning the goods before and after treatment

Destruction, transportation, reshipment or other disposal of risk goods

$100 per hour plus actual and reasonable costs

Supervising or advising on destruction, transportation, reshipment or other disposal of risk goods

$100 per hour for each general inspector involved; and $96.10 per hour for each veterinary inspector involved

Permits processed under import health standards and amendments to permits

$105 per permit processed or amended

Approval and auditing of transitional and containment facilities and facility operators



Travel costs

Zone travel charge:

0 to 10 km: $45

11 to 25 km: $70

26 to 50 km: $140

51 to 75 km: $200

Over 75km based on the hourly rate of the inspector or veterinary inspector for the time that the inspector has spent away from base, plus actual and reasonable costs.

Call outs where inspection work is needed outside normal times


$96.10 per hour for each veterinary inspector involved. These costs are additional to inspection costs.

Waiting time


$96.10 per hour for each veterinary inspector involved

Laboratory identification of organisms

Fees for the identification of organisms provided by a MAF IDC laboratory or a MAF-approved external laboratory are not set by the Biosecurity (Costs) Regulations 2006 and are contestable and subject to competitive market forces.

If an organism identification is carried out at a MAF IDC laboratory, costs would be payable as specific amounts as follows:

• $370 for the identification per submission (single or multiple identifications or negative test results) of terrestrial invertebrates; or nematodes; or fungi and bacteria

• $490 for the identification per submission (single or multiple identifications or negative test results) of viruses

• examinations, testing and treatments for L3 crops (including audit testing of crops imported through offshore accredited facilities) will be charged on a case by case fee for services.

Organism identification carried out by MAF Quarantine Service

$100 per hour for identification carried out by MAF Quarantine Service

■ www.maf.govt.nz/quarantine/cargo

■ Cyril Evans, MAF Quarantine Service, phone 04 894 4206, [email protected]


Lauren Dunn has joined the Policy Directorate of Biosecurity New Zealand (BNZ) as a policy analyst. She has a twelve-month contract to assist the Ministerial Officer and to undertake

other policy projects. Lauren graduated in early 2006 from the University of New South Wales with a Master of Conservation Biology. Before joining BNZ she worked at the Wellington Regional Council undertaking risk assessments for contaminated sites.

Larissa Banks has joined the Policy Directorate of BNZ as an Executive Coordinator. She has spent the last three and a half years in the jewellery trade as an administrator and performing a variety of

technical manufacturing tasks. She is looking forward to supporting the Policy Directorate in her administrative role, as well as working on other business-wide systems.

Natalie Nesbitt has joined the Policy Directorate of BNZ as Policy Analyst in the Policy Team. She comes from Christchurch, where she recently completed her

postgraduate certificate in Resource Studies at Lincoln University. Prior to this, Natalie graduated from the University of Canterbury with a Bachelor of Arts with first class Honours. Natalie will be working on animal welfare issues in a role that has recently moved from MAF Policy to BNZ Policy. A keen pursuer of trails, Natalie enjoys mountain biking and hiking.

Clare van Bysterveldt has joined the Policy Directorate of BNZ as an analyst and will be working in the Biosecurity Strategic Unit. Clare graduated from Victoria University in 2005

with a Bachelor of Science with Honours in Physical Geography. Before joining BNZ, Clare completed a short-term contract with the Greater Wellington Regional Council in Resource Consents Compliance. Prior to university, she spent a year living and studying in Argentina and travelling around South America.

INTERFACE


OIE Animal Welfare Working Group meetsThe OIE Animal Welfare Working Group held its Fifth Meeting from 4-6 July 2006, and was attended and chaired by David Bayvel, Director Animal Welfare, MAF Biosecurity New Zealand.

The working group had the opportunity to discuss a number of issues face to face with the Director General of the OIE, Dr Bernard Vallat, who commented very positively on the group’s achievements and future direction. In relation to working group structure, he reiterated his preference to have a single individual on the working group, who can contribute an “agricultural industry” perspective. For the second time, this annual meeting was attended by representatives of International Meat Secretariat (IMS), International Dairy Federation (IDF) and International Federation of Agricultural Producers (IFAP).

The working group reviewed the four sets of guidelines adopted at the May 2005 OIE General Session, taking into account outstanding submissions received. These revisions will be available for member country consultation prior to the 2007 General Session.

The meeting also covered:

• Housing and production standards: Animal protection, rather than animal welfare promotion, is the strategic priority for many of the developing or transition OIE member countries. The Director General noted that extensive farming, without housing, is the norm in many of these countries for the most economically important species.

• The stray dog control ad hoc group will review and amend its report. Group membership will be revised to include veterinary services management experience and perspective. With about 50,000 people dying worldwide each year from dog-transmitted rabies, this work and associated liaison with, and input from, WHO was of the highest priority.

• The European Commission Slaughter workshop is due to take place in Bristol from 26-29 September and a potential weblink with the OIE was envisaged.

• Development of guidelines on aquatic animal welfare and discussion on draft guidelines for slaughter of crustaceans

for human consumption and humane killing of crustaceans for disease control purposes.

• October 2006 OIE meeting with the International Council for Laboratory Animal Science (ICLAS) and key international stakeholders.

The European Commission has proposed a follow-up to the 2004 Global Conference on Animal Welfare. With support from the Director General, it was recommended that the conference be held in a developing country in 2008.

For more information on the OIE:

■ www.oie.int

■ A C David Bayvel, Director Animal Welfare, phone 04 894 0368, [email protected]

Members of OIE Animal Welfare Working Group during their July 2006 meeting.

British Veterinary Association Animal Welfare Foundation Lecturer in Animal Welfare at

the University of Bristol, Dr David Main, visited New Zealand recently to present at the Dairy Cattle Veterinarians’ Annual Conference in Napier. While here he also took the opportunity to visit other groups interested in animal welfare at AgResearch Ruakura, Massey University and Biosecurity New Zealand in Wellington.

In Wellington he gave a seminar on the role of welfare-based outcomes in welfare assessment. He outlined his research into applied welfare assessment which aims to promote valid, feasible and repeatable welfare assessment into the management systems of animal units and certification.

These assessment protocols can be used as a management tool for animal carers wishing to improve welfare and to assess compliance with welfare legislation and certification scheme standards.

Dr Main also gave examples of how these animal-based outcome measures have been incorporated into farm health planning and farm assurance schemes. Welfare assessment protocols are now well developed in the UK for dairy and beef cattle, pigs and laying hens, and form a key component of a large EU-funded welfare quality project.

A Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons-recognised specialist in animal welfare science, ethics and law, Dr Main was able to share some of this teaching experience at the Australian College of Veterinary

Scientists’ College Science Week, held on the Gold Coast, on his way home.

■ Cheryl O’Connor, Programme Manager, Animal Welfare, phone 04 894 0371, cheryl.o’[email protected]

UK animal welfare assessment expert visits

David Main.


Professor Wathes is Professor of Animal Welfare at the Royal Veterinary College, University of London and was appointed Chairman of the Farm Animal Welfare

Council in 2005. He is a bio-physicist, whose research concerns the environmental biology and management of farm animals. He was awarded the 2002 Research Medal of the Royal Agricultural Society of England for his research on environmental management of livestock and is an elected Fellow of the Institution of Agricultural Engineers.

As part of his stay in New Zealand, Professor Wathes was able to meet with key staff in the Institute of Veterinary, Animal and Biomedical Sciences (IVABS) and the Institute of Food, Nutrition and Human Health (IFNHH) at Massey University, as well as visiting AgResearch and taking part in farm visits in Hamilton.

Professor Wathes presented a seminar entitled The UK Farm Animal Welfare Council – Relevance and future challenges in the global environment. He was able to touch on challenges to the Five Freedoms concept, its continued relevance within the EU, perceptions on the challenges faced by FAWC in an

increasingly global welfare environment and, in particular, a vision of animal welfare in the EU in 10 years’ time.

During his discussions with stakeholders, industry representatives and the National Animal Welfare Advisory Committee (NAWAC), he covered topics such as labelling, religious slaughter and live animal exports, all of which are of direct relevance to animal welfare in New Zealand. He shared FAWC’s desire for livestock products to be labelled according to their welfare provenance, from birth through to slaughter, and touched on the most recent FAWC labelling report.

As a result of this visit, a number of important ongoing collaborative activities were agreed. These will consolidate, and further develop, the relationship between NAWAC/MAF in New Zealand and FAWC/DEFRA in the United Kingdom.

For a copy of the seminar presentation or for more information contact:

■ Michelle Clark, Team Assistant, Animal Welfare Group, phone 04 894 0374, [email protected]

Farm Animal Welfare Council Chairman visits New ZealandDuring his recent visit to New Zealand, Professor Christopher Wathes was hosted by the MAF Animal Welfare Group from 10-17 August, 2006.

New Zealander appointed to WSPA executiveRoyal New Zealand SPCA national president Peter Mason has been appointed to the executive committee of the World Society for the Protection of Animals (WSPA). Peter joined WSPA’s international board of directors in 2004. WSPA is the world’s largest federation of animal protection organisations, with more than 650 member societies in over 142 countries worldwide, and has UN consultative status. Headquartered in London, the society has offices in a number of countries, including New Zealand.

Peter says he is looking forward to increasing his role with WSPA at a time when, with new member societies joining every week, the society is rapidly expanding its reach around the globe. A new office will be officially opened in Bangkok later this year, and planning has begun for an office in China.

■ www.wspa.org.uk

Peter signs the Animals Matter to Me petition at its launch in London during WSPA’s 25th anniversary celebrations in June. The petition aims to gather 10 million signatures from around the globe to present to the United Nations in support of a Universal Declaration on Animal Welfare.

4th New Zealand BiosecuritySummit

“Thinking Globally - Acting Locally”

7 - 8 November 2006Duxton Hotel, Wellington

Day 1

• Managing outbreaks • eg How would NZ deal with avian infl uenza?

• Health & the environment • eg Will climate change increase the risk from dangerous mosquitoes?

• Managing Incursion impacts • eg What are we learning from responding to pests like didymo and sea squirt?

Day 2

• Borders & pathways • eg What actually happens at the border?

• Balance in biosecurity & trade • eg How does NZ balance its interests in trade and protection?

• Science directions in Biosecurity • eg How can science contribute to biosecurity?

To register your interest and to receive further information please contact:

[email protected] or 04 894 0364

Professor Christopher Wathes (left) during his visit to the MAF Animal Welfare Group last month, with Cheryl O’Connor, Programme Manager, Animal Welfare, and David Bayvel (right) Director Animal Welfare.

UPDATES


Biosecurity New Zealand is holding seminars to provide information about the import health standard work programme. Anyone with an interest in the programme is invited to attend.

The seminar will cover:

• why Biosecurity New Zealand has adopted this process

• how the process works

• who is involved

• how you can get the most from engaging in the process

• important deadlines and milestones

• questions/feedback from prior rounds.

The seminars will be held at the following times and places:

Auckland: Tuesday 26 September at Mecure Hotel Auckland (10.00am – 12.30pm)

Wellington: Thursday 28 September at Copthorne Hotel (10.00am – 12.30pm)

Christchurch: Tuesday 3 October at Rydges Christchurch (10.00am – 12.30pm)

If you would like to attend a seminar, please email Emma Tyshing and indicate which session you will be attending:

[email protected].

For further information, please call Emma on:

04 894 0263.

SEMINARS - Import health standard work programme

Plant import health standard – consultationImportation into New Zealand of processed animal feeds of plant origin – Biosecurity New Zealand Standard (BNZ-PAFP-IMPRT)This standard will amalgamate the existing standard, Importation of oil seed meals for animal feed into New Zealand (PIT-MEAL-IMPRT) with other products which have been previously imported and managed under permit. There are effectively no changes to the import requirements of the oil seed meals. The standard is under consultation until 9 October 2006.

For the draft standard and discussion notes:

■ www.biosecurity.govt.nz/strategy/draft-bnz-pafp-imprt.htm

■ www.biosecurity.govt.nz/strategy/draftnotes-bnz-pafp-imprt.htm

Comments can be sent to:


New plant import health standardsImportation into New Zealand of stored plant products intended for human consumption (BNZ-NPP-HUMAN)The following import health standard now dated 6 JULY 2006 has been amended and is available from the MAF website at:

■ www.biosecurity.govt.nz/imports/plants/plant-products.htm

Amendments have been made to these sections of the standard:

• 9.1 (Cooked or preserved canned foods of plant origin) and

• Section 9.5.2 (Dried fruit and vegetables): NZFSA requirements removed for dates, canned tomatoes and mushrooms

• 9.3 (Dried cereals, cereal products and seeds): Wild rice brands added; kibbled rice combined with whole seed; heat treatment option clause repeated; millet flakes added.

• 9.4 (Dried herbs, spices, roots and beverages, etc.): Pepper, pink (Schinus tereninthifolia) dried fruits prohibited; other peppers further defined as black, white and green; addition of dried lotus (Nelumbo nucifera) leaves; addition of juniper (Juniperus communis) berries; addition of angelica (Angelica gigas) dried root; entry for cardamom further defined by the addition of “green or black”; amendment of the requirement for caraway seeds from no certification or inspection requirements to inspection.

• 9.6 (Dried fungi): Addition of the restriction of any dried species of truffle (Tuber spp.): Heat treatment option clause repeated.

• 9.7 (Legumes): Addition of split soybeans.

• 9.10 (Plant extracts manufactured into capsules, pills and powders):

Reference to “powdered Ganoderma” amended to read “powdered Ganoderma in capsules”; Ganoderma capsule brands added.

• 9.13 (Starters): Section added to include Koji rice, Miso and Tempeh starter; reference added to the standard that lists yeasts and yeast starters.

Plant import health standards re-issuedImportation of nursery stock into New ZealandThe following import health standard, now dated 9 August 2006, has been amended and is available from the MAF website at:

■ www.biosecurity.govt.nz/imports/plants/standards/155-02-06.pdf

This amendment makes minor administrative and technical amendments to the schedules for:

• Actinidia

• Hippeastrum

• Prunus.

■ Plant Imports Team, Biosecurity New Zealand, PO Box 2526, Wellington, New Zealand, [email protected]

New animal and animal product import health standardsZoo antelopes from Singapore (ZOOANTIC.SIN)This is a new import health standard developed from the May 2000 import risk analysis, Diseases of Antelope: Risks of Introducing live Antelope into Zoological Gardens and the subsequent current import health standards for antelope from Australia, Canada, South Africa and the United States.

The standard is dated 24 May 2006.

Imported bee products from Australia (BEEPROIC.AUS)The import health standard for the importation into New Zealand of specified bee products from Australia provides new market access. The standard is based on the import risk analysis, Honey Bee Products completed in December 2004 and the review of submissions on this risk analysis completed in November 2005. These documents are available on the MAF website at:

■ www.biosecurity.govt.nz/files/pests-diseases/animals/risk/ira-bee-products.pdf and

■ www.biosecurity.govt.nz/files/pests-diseases/surveillance-review/honey-bee-product-subs.pdf

On 2 August 2006, a minor amendment was made to clause 1.1.1 of the veterinary certificate. The standard is now dated 2 August 2006.


Bovine semen from Switzerland (BOVSEMIC.SWI)The import health standard (IHS) for the importation into New Zealand of bovine semen from Switzerland is based on the import conditions for bovine semen from the European Union as Switzerland is a member of the European Free Trade Association and trades under EU legislation for the export of bovine semen. Semen collection and testing requirements are based on the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code, EU Directive 88/407 as last amended and the EU/NZ Veterinary Agreement. This IHS was notified for public consultation in March 2006.

The standard is dated 11 July 2006.

Reissued animal import health standardsDogs and cats from South Africa (DOMANIIC.SAF)

Dogs and cats from specified countries and territories recognised as countries or territories in which canine rabies is absent or well controlled (DOMANIIC.SPE)

Dogs and cats from Peninsular Malaysia (DOMANIIC.MAL)The following clarifications and amendments have been made to the above IHSs for the importation into New Zealand of dogs and cats that require rabies vaccination and serology:

• The New Zealand Government requires dogs to be registered. A new requirement of registration is that the dog must have a microchip implanted that complies with the following standards: NZS/ISO 11784:2001 or NZS/ISO 11785:2001.

• Dogs re-entering New Zealand after a visit of less than 6 months require a copy of the export certification, in addition to other requirements.

• Minor amendments have been made to existing requirements, including the timing of rabies testing, and testing methods.

• Poland has been included in the IHS for the importation of dogs and cats from specified countries and territories recognised as countries or territories in which canine rabies is absent or well controlled; and Cyprus has been replaced with Republic of Cyprus in this IHS.

The standards are all now dated 23 May 2006 and replace those dated 8 December 2005.

Copies of all the above IHSs are available from the MAF website at:

■ www.biosecurity.govt.nz/imports/ihs-search.htm

■ Animal Imports Team, Biosecurity New Zealand, PO Box 2526, Wellington, New Zealand, [email protected]

Importation of zoo felidae into New Zealand (ZOOFELIC.ALL)The following IHS has been amended with an additional clause following amendment of the equivalent Australian import health conditions upon which the New Zealand IHS is based. The amendment is subsequent to evidence that zoo felidae can be infected with avian influenza by inhalation as well as ingestion and can spread the virus to in-contact cats.

Clause 2.1.4 of the veterinary certificate has been added: “The premises of origin has remained free of diagnosed cases of highly pathogenic avian influenza in felids for the 3 months prior to certification.”

This standard is now dated 17 July 2006 and replaces the standard dated 14 December 2005, and is available from the MAF website at:


Dairy products and products containing dairy ingredients from specified countries (DAIEDIIC.SPE)

Dairy products and products containing dairy ingredients from Australia (DAIEDIIC.AUS)The following changes have been made to the above import health standards:

• Removal of the clauses in the both standards stating that the products do not contain honey. A clause has been added to Section 7: Documentation accompanying the consignment’ to cover this requirement.

• Removal of the Swiss certificate required to accompany consignments of Gruyere, Sbrinz or Emmental cheese from Switzerland from the manufacturer’s declaration in DAIEDIIC.SPE. Documentation required to accompany these consignments has been clarified in Section 7: “Documentation accompanying the consignment”.

• The words “milk and cream” have been replaced by “dairy ingredient” in Clause 1 of the manufacturer’s declaration of DAIEDIIC.SPE.

• Removal of 6.4 from DAIEDIIC.AUS as the requirements are already covered in clause 6.1.2.

• Minor amendments to clarify existing conditions of trade.

The standards are now dated 1 August 2006, and is available from the MAF website at:


■ Animal Imports Team, Biosecurity New Zealand, PO Box 2526, Wellington, New Zealand, [email protected]

Animals risk analyses in progressIn addition to the aquatic animals risk analyses that are discussed separately in this issue of Biosecurity, a number of animals risk analyses are underway.

Ruminants and ruminant productsThe review of submissions on the risk analysis on sheep and goat genetic material was completed in June 2006, and import health standards are being drafted.

A risk analysis of hides and skins of cattle and sheep was started a number of years ago, but was put on hold until recently due to reprioritisation of workplans. However, this risk analysis has resumed, and is about to go out for external technical review. We hope to have the final document ready for public consultation by November 2006.

A risk analysis on bovine germplasm is in the final stages of external technical review, and we hope to have this document ready for public consultation by November 2006.

The risk analysis on live cattle is following on from the bovine germplasm work. It is likely that this will be ready for public consultation in December 2006.

Cats and dogs: blood parasites and rabiesBlood parasites in dogs and cats pose a number of risk analysis challenges as there is a wide range of not always well-researched organisms involved and there are no agreed international standards for risk management. Nevertheless, this work is progressing well, and it is hoped to have a document ready for peer review by the end of 2006.

On the other hand, there is a huge amount of information on rabies in cats and dogs, and over the past decade many countries have instituted national control programmes based on vaccination. The efficacy of vaccination under different situations is, therefore, key to the acceptability of risk in this case.

Poultry: egg powders and hatching eggsThe risks associated with importing pasteurised egg powders into New Zealand from all countries is being revisited for whole-egg, egg albumen and egg-yolk powders. These are mainly used in the food industry although some will be marketed directly to the public, targeting the camping/sailing market. Manufacturing involves several stages. Eggs are washed, sanitised, scanned, broken and filtered. Then yolk and whole-egg products are pasteurised. Spray drying takes place at temperatures reaching 175oC. After this, powders may also undergo hot room treatment before storage and shipping. Albumen powders are pasteurised by a prolonged final hot room treatment. The risk analysis will consider all agents causing poultry disease which are known (or are likely) to be present in eggs. Key to decision-making is the likelihood of these organisms being present in the finished products.

A revised risk analysis on chicken hatching eggs from the EU, Canada, the United States and Australia is nearing completion. A number of viruses and bacteria are of potential concern in hatching eggs, and sanitary measures will be recommended to manage these risks. These include requirements for disease freedom in breeding establishments and hatcheries and for the hatching of imported eggs and quarantine of chickens in a MAF-approved transitional facility until specific diagnostic tests are completed and a biosecurity clearance given. This risk analysis is currently at the stage of external technical review, and it is expected that it will be ready for public consultation in the third quarter of 2006.

UPDATES

Zoo animals: lizardsAlso underway is a risk analysis for lizards of the order Squamata from Australia. A number of species in this group are sought by Auckland zoo, including the lace monitor, water dragon, shingleback, frilled lizard and bearded dragon. Also considered are eggs of some of these species; this is not possible for all, however, as some are live bearers and there are also practical issues with soft-shelled eggs. This is a major challenge, but it is hoped that a risk analysis can be ready for public consultation by the first quarter of 2007.

■ Martin Van Ginkel, MAF Biosecurity New Zealand, PO Box 2526, Wellington, fax 04 894 0733, [email protected]

Import risk analysis – Cooked duck meat from AustraliaA risk analysis has been completed for a range of cooked duck meat products produced by the Australian company Luv-A-Duck. This company has been producing duck meat products both for the Australian market and for export since the 1950s. See website at:

■ www.luvaduck.com.au/

The products considered in the risk analysis are plain and flavoured confit, roast duck breast, and roast half duck. The ducks from which product for export to New Zealand would be derived are raised on a single farm, which is subjected to a fully audited management system. Batches of ducks are raised in an all-in, all-out system. During manufacture, all the duck meat products are heated to a core temperature of 60oC for at least 30 minutes and reach a core temperature of 80oC for at least 10 minutes.

Infectious bursal disease virusThe risk analysis considered the risks posed by the disease organisms that are known to infect ducks and that are present in Australia but not present in New Zealand. The risk analysis concluded that, of the organisms identified, only one – infectious bursal disease virus (IBDV) – is capable of surviving the cooking process involved in the production of these commodities. IBDV is recognised as being unusually heat-stable.

Although infections with this virus have been recorded on rare occasions in poultry other than chickens, the disease is only seen in chickens. The limited serological evidence of infections in other bird species (gulls, raptors, passerines, penguins) is of doubtful significance due to limitations of the tests available. Therefore there are no potential effects on humans or wildlife.

Non-negligible riskThe risk analysis concluded that the likelihood of IBDV being present in the source ducks is very low, as infection of ducks with IBDV is rare. The Luv-A-Duck source farm has been tested several times for IBDV and no evidence has been found that it has ever been present. Despite this, the risk analysis concluded that the introduction of the virus to the farm at some time in the future cannot be ruled out, and therefore that the likelihood of release in the commodities has to be considered non-negligible.

For any organism present in the imported commodities, exposure to susceptible species in New Zealand would require the feeding of scraps to backyard chickens. The risk analysis considered that the likelihood of generation of scraps from these relatively expensive, highly processed duck meat commodities to be very low, but not negligible. As the consequences of introduction of IBDV into New Zealand are considered to be significant, the risk estimate is non-negligible, and therefore risk management measures are justified.

Risk management measures recommendedThe risk management measures recommended in the risk analysis include the farm management system, the processing system, and testing each batch of birds at slaughter to ensure they are free from IBDV. The risk analysis was carried out according to standard MAF procedures and processes. The draft risk analysis was written by an external consultant, and was subjected to internal peer review by a number of MAF risk analysts and external peer review by two experts. There are no food safety issues associated with these commodities, as they are produced under joint Australian and New Zealand food safety standards. The completed risk analysis has been released for public consultation.

The full risk analysis is available on:

■ www.biosecurity.govt.nz/strategy-and-consultation/consultation/risk-analysis

Public submissions are invited, and must be made in writing to:

■ Martin Van Ginkel, MAF Biosecurity New Zealand, PO Box 2526, Wellington, fax 04 894 0733, [email protected]

Submissions close on 30 November 2006.

Codes of ethical conduct – approvals, notifications and revocations since the last issue of BiosecurityAll organisations involved in the use of live animals for research, testing or teaching are required to adhere to an approved code of ethical conduct.

Codes of ethical conduct approved: Nil

Transfers of code of ethical conduct approved: Nil

Code holder name changes: Nil

Amendments to codes of ethical conduct approved: Nil

Notifications to MAF of minor amendments to codes of ethical conduct: • Ancare New Zealand Ltd

Notifications to MAF of arrangements to use an existing code of ethical conduct:• Cawthron Institute (to use Nelson Marlborough Institute of Technology’s

code)

• Fonterra/ViaLactia BioSciences (to use AgResearch Ltd’s code and Ruakura AEC)

• Geneco Ltd (to use Ambreed NZ Ltd’s code)

• IVP International New Zealand Ltd (to use Ambreed NZ Ltd’s code)

• Johnson & Johnson (New Zealand) Ltd (to use the University of Auckland’s code)

• KODE Biotech Ltd (to use the University of Auckland’s code)

• Lakeland Vets Ltd (to use AgResearch’s code and Ruakura AEC)

Codes of ethical conduct revoked or expired or arrangements terminated or lapsed: • Animal Reproductive Technologies Ltd

• Kiwi Ingenuity Ltd

Approvals by the Director-General of MAF for the use of non-human hominids: Nil

Approvals by the Minister of Agriculture of research or testing in the national interest: Nil

■ Linda Carsons, Senior Policy Adviser, Animal Welfare, phone 04 8940370, fax 04 8940747, [email protected]

Codes of welfare – update on development, issue and consultation since the last issue of BiosecurityCodes of welfare issued: Nil

Consultation on codes of welfare:• Deer code: final code presented to Minister of Agriculture in July 2006

• Companion cats code: final code presented to Minister of Agriculture in July 2006

• Commercial slaughter code: submissions being reviewed by NAWAC

Codes of welfare under development:• Dogs

• Dairy cattle

• Transport of animals by land

■ Cheryl O’Connor, Programme Manager Animal Welfare, phone 04 894 0371, fax 04 894 0747, cheryl.o’[email protected]

UPDATES



Pest watch: 19/06/2006 – 04/08/2006Biosecurity is about managing risks – protecting the New Zealand environment and economy from exotic pests and diseases. Biosecurity New Zealand devotes much of its time to ensuring that new organism records come to its attention, to follow up as appropriate. The tables below list new organisms that have become established, new hosts for existing pests and extension to distribution for existing pests. The information was collated during 19/06/2006 – 04/08/2006, and held in the Plant Pest Information Network (PPIN) database. Wherever possible, common names have been included.

ANIMAL KINGDOM RECORDS 19/06/2006 – 04/08/2006

Validated new to New Zealand reports

Organism Host Location Submitted by CommentDiomus nr. subclarus(ladybird beetle)

Phormium tenax(New Zealand flax, harakeke)

Auckland IDC (general surveillance)

Thought to be well established in Auckland. No further action planned.

Robshelfordia circumducta(cockroach)

Bedroom wall Hawke’s Bay IDC (general surveillance)

No further action planned. This species was discovered last year and is not thought to be a nuisance species. No feasible survey or eradication options are available.

New host reports

Organism Host Location Submitted by CommentNo new host records during this period.

Extension to distribution reports

Organism Host Location Submitted by CommentVarroa destructor(Varroa mite)

Beehive Nelson IDC (bee mite surveillance)

Varroa detected in South Island by routine surveillance. Extensive delimiting surveillance located 43 infested apiaries in Nelson region.

■ Nasser Ahmed, Adviser – Response (Animal), Biosecurity New Zealand, ph 04 894 0550, [email protected]

PLANT KINGDOM RECORDS 19/06/2006 – 04/08/2006Validated new to New Zealand reports

Organism Host Location Submitted by

Mycoleptodiscus terrestris(no common name)

Ceratophyllum demersum(hornwort)

WaikatoNational Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research (NIWA)

Curvularia inaequalis(no common name)

Hordeum vulgare(barley)

Mid CanterburyIDC (general surveillance)

Bemisia tabaci biotype Q(white fly)

Capsicum sp.(capsicum, pepper)

AucklandIDC (general surveillance)

Bactericera cockerelli(tomato or potato psyllid)

Lycopersicon esculentum(tomato)

AucklandIDC (general surveillance)

Significant find reports


Teia anartoides(painted apple moth)

Bait trap (PAM trap PPT2K34-H7)

AucklandIDC (painted apple moth surveillance programme)

New host reports


Fusarium proliferatum (brown spot, dry crown rot) Corynocarpus laevigatus

(karaka)Auckland IDC

(general surveillance)Botryosphaeria parva(Botryosphaeria rot)

Pestalotiopsis sp.(no common name)

Podocarpus hallii(Hall’s totara)

WestlandIDC (general surveillance)

Nectria radicicola(Cylindrocarpon root rot)

Armoracia rusticana (horseradish)

Mid CanterburyIDC (general surveillance)

Botryosphaeria dothidea (Botryosphaeria rot, botryosphaeria stem blight, white rot)

Hoheria sp.(houhere)

NelsonIDC (general surveillance)

Botryosphaeria parva (Botryosphaeria rot) Pittosporum tenuifolium

(kohuhu)Auckland

IDC (general surveillance)Fusarium sambucinum

(no common name)

Kalotermes brouni(New Zealand drywood termite)

Pinus patula(patula pine, spreading-leaved pine, weeping pine)

GisborneEnsis (exotic forest survey)

New host reports


Sphaeropsis sapinea(Black rot)

Pinus heldreichii(Bosnian pine)

NelsonEnsis (high risk site surveillance)

Dicranosterna semipunctata(Leaf beetle)

Pinus radiata(Monterey pine, pine, radiata pine)

CoromandelEnsis (exotic forest survey)

Melampsora ricini(Rust of castor oil plant)

Ricinus communis(Castor oil plant)

GisborneEnsis (ad hoc collection)

■ Eleanor Morrison, Technical Support Officer, Biosecurity New Zealand, phone 04 894 0551, [email protected]

Exotic disease and pest emergency hotline: 0800 809 966

Animal welfare complaint hotline: 0800 327 027

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