4.3 - bucan, silviu - romania's revolution and its prospects (en)

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Romania's Revolution and Its Prospects

Romania's Revolution and Its Prospects

by Silviu Brucan

Source:

PRAXIS International (PRAXIS International), issue: 3+4 / 1990, pages: 319-323, on www.ceeol.com.
http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.dibido.eu/bookdetails.aspx?bookID=31132ed2-cee0-4ddb-9e51-11fc25f75341http://www.ceeol.com/


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ROMANIA'S REVOLUTIONAND ITS PROSPECTS

Silviu Brucan

The rapid fall of dominoes in Eastern Europe took world public opinion bysurprise, and analysts everywhere are still arguing about the causes andconsequences of that unusual historical development. I propose to present inthis paper my own assessment.To begin with, I recall that three years ago, in an article in TheInternational Herald Tribune (3 September 1987) I rebuked those who wereemphasizing the stubborn resistance of Eastern European nations to thedrive for change initiated in Moscow by Mikhail Gorbachev, and, on thebasis of a different appraisal of the situation, I concluded with a propheticsentence: "By 1990 a new political generation will be in command all overEastern Europe."It all started in June 1989 with Solidarity's victory in the Polish electionswhich brought the first non-communist prime minister to power. Very soon,

the upheaval in East Germany toppled Erich Honecker and replaced himwith successive leaders; in Czechoslovakia Vaclav Havel became president,and in Bulgaria Todor Jivkov was replaced by Petar Mladenov. As we wereapproaching the end of 1989, in Romania, I began to fear that my predictionwould fall short of fulfillment. But on 22 December, only 9 days before thedeadline, a popular explosion in Bucharest forced the dictator Ceausescu torun away, and the National Salvation Front led by Ion Iliescu took overpower. At last, we did it in time.Central to my prediction is the logic of the regional structure of powerbased on a common set of political and ideological values. In both Westernand Eastern Europe, that logic makes nations adjust their behaviour to thevalues prevailing in their respective regions in order to cement the unity ofthe power structure. Institutionally, the urge to adjust and conform isbuttressed by NATO and the E.E.C. in the West, and by the Warsaw Pactand Comecon in the East.The logic of the Western democratic values compelled Spain, Portugal,

and Greece to renounce military dictatorship and adopt a multiparty system.The logic of the East, however, has passed through two stages: (1) In thepostwar period, the Stalinist-Brezhnev values led to the crushing of the 1968Prague Spring, while in 1980 Martial Law in Poland against the Solidarityanti-systemicmovement made a Soviet intervention unnecessary; and (2) Asa new political generation led by Mikhail Gorbachev came to power inMoscow, the new Soviet values - perestroika, glasnost, and demokratizatsiaPraxis International 10: 3/4 October 1990& January 1991 0260-8448$2.00


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Praxis International 319- began to pervade the whole region. The power structure based on the oldvalues broke down, and since Gorbachev rejected the Brezhnev doctrine andproclaimed the policy of non-interference, the two institutions of the region(The Warsaw Treaty and Comecon) have been struck by erosion. Thisopened up a new page in Eastern European history, with national politicalforces asserting themselves in new directions.There are, nevertheless, some common features that have characterizedrecent developments in Eastern Europe - political, economic, and social. Ipropose to examine them one at a time, and eventually see where the nations

of the region are heading, with particular emphasis on Romania.The dissolution of the communist parties

Two political phenomena today dominate political life in East Europe:pluralism and the dissolution of the communist party. To be sure, the two areinterrelated dialectically.Columnists in the West have dealt with this dual issue, emphasizing thetotalitarian or dictatorial nature of the one-party system and its visiblemanifestations: repression, corruption, nepotism, etc. Here, I intend toplace the issue in a historical and sociological perspective.To start with, political pluralism did not come out of the blue. It is thenecessary outcome in the political sphere of a process of social differentiation.The official communist claim up to now was that, because of industrialization, an ever-increasing working class would take shape in the postrevolutionary epoch, a class sufficiently integrated to share a commonideological consciousness and a common set of material and culturalinterests.As for the communist party, it was initially conceived as the party of theproletariat, and, of course, as the party of the future; it was supposed to leada class that embodied the most advanced productive forces.The scientific-technological revolution has invalidated all of theseassumptions one by one. Instead of homogenization, we witness a process of

social differentiation to be widened by current reforms. The sociooccupational groups that emerge range from unskilled and skilled manualworkers, to engineers and specialists, white-collar functionaires and stateadministrative personnel, creative intellectual professionals, private artisansand repairmen, cooperative workers and entrepeneurs, etc. In brief, thetechnological revolution has virtually destroyed the notion of the workingclass as a large compact sociological unity.Therefore, the question waswhether the communist partywould be able toreshape its conception and organization to accommodate the variousinterests and views of the emerging social groups, particularly those of the

intellectuals. I think not. The issue was discussed candidly at a seminar inMay 1989 in the Soviet city of Novosibirsk entitled: Perestroika: Who is infavour and who against? Examining the results of a six-year inquiry led by thesociologist Tatiana Zaslavskaya, the seminar concluded: manual workers are

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320 Praxis Internationalagainst; skilled workers support democratization but not economic change;intellectuals and political leaders are in favour of both; bureaucrats and theadministrative apparatus oppose radical reform; managers support economicchange but not political reform. Now, where and how are these major socialgroups going to express their views?In a socially differentiated society, political pluralism is a must if violentsocial eruptions and clashes are to be avoided. In recent times, Gorbachevhas often mentioned "socialist pluralism". But what exactly is it?There are theoretically only two possible types: a multi-party system orpluralism within a one-party system. However , party pluralism meansrenouncing the monolithic conception that has made the communist partyintolerant, repressive, and bureaucratic. This means the acceptance andlegalization of groups and factions within the party, the onlyway ofmaking itdemocratic and representative. In fact, factions did exist andwill always exist

in a society with a one-party system. Even after the tenth Congress of theBolshevik Party in 1921 which, at Lenin's proposal, adopted the resolutionforbidding them, factions continued to exist, with leftist and rightistplatforms clashing in the party and in public. Subsequently, one faction Stalin's, Khrushchev's, Brezhnev's and now Gorbachev's - has invariablyrun the party by eliminating the other. It is monolithism, that is, the denial ofthe right of various social groups to be represented, that has made thecommunist party repressive within and without.The fact is that if the constituent parts of society do not and cannot defendtheir interests and express their views in the only party that exists, then theemergence of alternative political parties is not only inevitable but perfectlylegitimate. That is exactly what happened all over Eastern Europe.Moreover, the principal social effect of the technological revolution haspushed the intellectuals to the forefront of society. We are thus dealing with asocial stratum that cannot possibly come to terms with an intolerant andrepressive political machinery.In addition, the ideal social base of the communist party, the manualworkers of peasant origin, is a dwindling social group, diminishing both innUIllbers and social status. The underlying social reason for Brezhnev's

period of "stagnation" was his refusal to sacrifice the preeminence of theindustrial worker on the altar of the technological revolution. In the age ofcomputers and the information society, the manual worker can hardly bedescribed as the embodiment of the most advanced productive forces.Hence, a legitimate question arises: How can the communist party play aleading role in society when the class it represents in losing ground socially,and is related to obsolete productive forces economically? That is why thecommunist parties in Eastern Europe are doomed to extinction. Even in theUSSR, the Soviet Communist Party is apparently unable to play thevanguard role required by Gorbachev's revolutionary breakthrough.The revolution in Romania, because of its violence and radical nature, hasrevealed more clearly and obviously than in any other Eastern Europeancountry the social and historical anachronism of the communist party, as atype of political organization in modern times. It is the only revolution in


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Praxis International 321which the communist party did not participate as such, the revolution thatturned from the very beginning against the communist party. Ceausescu'sdictatorship was not only brutal but also very effective. Therefore,Romanians identify the party with Ceausescu's crimes and abuses ofpower.Strategic options in Eastern EuropeThe balance sheet of four decades of communist dictatorship in Eastern

Europe is tragic. We are 1D-15 years behindWestern Europe and three timespoorer. The question is how are we going to integrate into a Europe that ishalf rich and half poor.The new international division of labour now taking shape complicates thequestion. In the West societies are becoming computerized and informa

tional, while labour-intensive industries with high consumption of rawmaterials and energy are being built or shifted to the South. In this context,what should be the development strategy of East European nations?One must start by recognizing that a modern economy cannot functionwithout the impetus ofmarket forces. Second, political pluralism is no longeran option; it is a must if social peace is to be ensured.Following these premises, there are two basic options: a quick adoption ofa market economy, the so-called Shock Therapy, or a gradual, and as muchas possible controlled, transition to a market economy.Hungary and Poland have adopted the advice of ultraliberal economistssuch as Paul Craig Roberts and Sir Allan WaIters, respectively advisers toRonald Reagan and Margeret Thatcher, who, according to Le Monde,"precipitated themselves in the East to sell the pure and perfect market".These men were followed by Maurice Allais, Nobel prize winner, who isleading a group of advisers in Hungary, and Jeffrey Sachs, a HarvardProfessor hired by the Polish government. Commenting on the advice givenby such economists, American economist John Kenneth Galbraith had thisto say: "Never mind that we are urging on Eastern Europe a kind ofcapitalism that we in the West would not care to risk". And he argues that

capitalism did survive because that welfare state mitigated many of thehardships and the cruelties of pristine capitalism, and in general provided forthe government a large, indispensible mellowing and stabilizing role.(Harper's Magazine, April 1990.)In fact, both Hungary and Poland have opened their gates wide to Westerncorporations which, under the aegis of privatization, show a taste for labourintensive factories with high consumption of raw materials and energy. Theinvestors inject the latest technologies, keep the low-cost labour force, andthus produce cheap goods for Western markets.Before Poland, Prof. Sachs tested his method of moving toward free

enterprise in one sharp go in Bolivia. Had the Poles checked up on his work,they might have sent a mission to La Paz to find that there had been therefood riots and the minimum wage was $22 a month, not even a tenth of theaverage worker's food and rent costs. (Recently, the Polish government


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322 Praxis Internationalrejected Mr. Sachs' idea of pegging the zloty to the dollar and freezingwages.)AnotherWestern friendly gesture came from the Polish-born heiress of theJohnson & Johnson millions who promised Lech Walesa to buy the Lenin

Shipyard and thus keep alive Solidarity's historic birthplace. She was praisedfor her generosity, wined and dined in Walesa's house and feted in Gdansk asa saviour. But when Barbara spelled out her conditions, the shower was verycold: half the workers would be dismissed, wages reduced to 40 cents anhour, and there must be a no-strike pledge for five years.In Hungary, meanwhile, a recession is in its third year, inflation is runningat about 30 percent and unemployment is rising. Economists there say thingswill be worse before they get better. The point is that both Poland andHungary have a huge foreign debt, subjecting them to the crippling burden ofbillions of dollars in annual payments for services, which is eating up half oftheir exports in hard currency. Does not this look like the Latin Americanway?Given all this, is there a different development strategy that EastEuropean nations could follow in order to avoid becoming virtual semicolonies of the West?The "four tigers" of the Pacific Rim - South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kongand Singapore - have achieved the highest rates of growth during thetechnological revolution on the basis of a capitalist method of development.This, in my opinion, should be the basic model of development we shouldstudy in Romania. And as a European nation, Romania should combine theeconomic policy of South Korea with the social policy of Austria.Typical ofSouth Korean strategy is to be quite open to Western investmentand joint ventures while keeping in place a strong state sector and controlover the direction of development. While in the first stage, the American andJapanese investments focused on light industries (shoes and textiles), in thefive-year plans of the 1970s the emphasis shifted to high technology. Twomain features are characteristic of that second stage: (1) the rapid formation

of a large corps of engineers, specialists, and scientists, and (2) a massive andwell-financed program for technological and scientific research of its own.In 1988, the total number of pupils and high school students was 8 timeshigher than in 1945, while the number of college and university studentsincreased 120 times, reaching almost one million. About $3 billion was spentby the government and private industry on research. As a result, SouthKorea is a player in the high-tech international contest.Romania should heed this lesson. While it should privatize some of itssmokestack industries, it should also launch an all-out drive to attract foreigncapital for building a strong base in high technology, starting withmicroelectronics and computers. Such a strategy is not utopian, because wealready possess a strong corps of technologists, specialists, and scientists, that

could bewell broadened numerically and brought up to date scientifically in arapid tempo.As for the social model, Austria offers an example of balance, one in whichproduction is regulated by the market, while the distribution of the national


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Praxis International 323wealth is controlled by the state. This helps avoid some of the more glaringdiscrepancies between the rich and the poor.The main points about the future social structure of East Europeancountries must be considered. First, the scientific-technological revolution

has elevated the intellectuals to a strategic position in society. Indeed, thetechnical and creative intelligentsia is the only social stratum that can masterthe revolution in computers, information technologies and communications.Second, the market economy will generate and require the formation of alarge middle class in those societies. Both social realignments must find aproper expression in the power structure of society. The present leadershipalready reflects this (from Gorbachev to Vaclav Havel, Tadeus Mazowieckiand Gieremek, Lothar de Maiziere, Iliescu and Roman, Joseph Antall andLukanov).Finally, a shift of emphasis from the state to the citizen is underway. Withthe computer revolution, it is the individual - with creative power, initiativeand talent - who becomes the engine of progress. Thus, the elevation ofintellectuals to a dominant position, coupled with the formation of a middleclass, is inextricably linked with democracy and a market economy, makingthe whole process irreversible.

NOTE* Paper prepared for the International Congress on "Socialist Experiments and FutureProspects". Seoul, Korea, June 7-9 , 1990.

4.3 - bucan, silviu - romania's revolution and its prospects (en)

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