n compensation" becausem which it may be said a;icipated." In the coursefact that many losses thatrd of claimant's exclusion,rges, the compensabilityere foreseen as of the date]refore, in that sense wereI the statute had in facte accrual of compensablems would, of course, havel, however, there appearsbute as written. If thatat had an economic value,was acquired, and if the

'al consequence of elaim-gardless of when the lossry equivalent, if any, ofI to the claimant in satis-ver, that which was lostfits or earnings that hadd or earned, the Act for-rsofar as it seeks compen-n the requirement that a,ve been a reasonable ands evacuation or exclusion,the Act or its legislativer intent to establish a cut-.osses, and the absence ofcertainty in the meaning

rns given in the adjudica-rber 8, 1954, appear fullylaim ordered therein, thermissal be set aside, musb

361

CLAIMS OF HIROTOSHI J. ODA; SHINA ODA; ANDJACK H. ODA, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ES-TATE OF TETSU ODA, DECEASED

lNo. 146-AF-16597. Decicletl November 5, 19541

FINDINGS OF FACT

I r t l t

NEASONS FOR DECISION

l f r s *

A question arises in this c&se as to whether or not theloss sustained by claimant, Ilirotoshi J. Oda, who was amember of our Armed Forces at the time of the evacuationof his parents, was "a reasonable and natural consequenceof the evacuation or exclusion of such person by the appro-priate military commander from a military area in * * *

California" within the meaning of those words asused in Section 1 of the Act. Since the exclusion ordersissued pursuant to Executive Order No. 9066 applied topersons of Japanese ancestry who were in the fumedForces, as well as to those who were not, the only problemhere consists in the possibility that, due to his militaryduties, this claimant could not have returned to the areain an event, so that the losses could not be said actuallyto have resulted from an exclusion order. Investigationhas disclosed, however, that military leave was deniedsuch persons in the Armed Forces, who wished to returnto evacuation area,s to look after their property interests,because the granting of such leave would have been futile.'We

do not know whether the instant claimant actuallyapplied for such leave or whether it would have beenfeasible for him to have done so even if he could have ob-tained special permission to return to his home; but wethink that such information should not control the out-

, l

362

come of this case. As pointed out in the adjudication of

the ciaim of Sina Katsuma,, ante,p. L86, compensability of

such a loss does not depend upon tracing its cause to Ex-

ecutive Order No. 9066. It is enough that the lossresulted. from the "exclusion of such person by the appropriate

military commander from a military area in " * * Cali-

fornia." There can be no doubt, therefore, that claimant'sloss is expressly covered by the language of the Statute.

The claimant's situation, moreover, was within the cir-

cumstances deemed by the Congress to give rise to the

moral obligation that the Act was designed to satisfy.

Paraphrasing a passage from the adjudication of Fumt'yo

Kojima, ante,p.209, it can be as truly said of this case

as of that:

Tf this clai.mant hacl merely been called into militaryservice, the losses here involved need not have occurredbecause hi's T,arents could have remained at home to takecare of the property. Ifere, however, both he and' theywere called upon to evacuate their home in the interestof national defense. I{ence, the property was lost.

The losses here involved are thus clearly distinguishablefrom those uormally sustained by members of the ArmedForces by reason of their service. We hold, accordingly,that persons of Japanese iineage who were members of

the Armed Forces and sustained losses in such circum-

stanees are as much entitled to compensation under theAct as if they had been evacuated to assembly and re-location centers with the other members of their families.