33700000 post soviet georgian nationalism social memory cultural trauma
TRANSCRIPT
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Post-Soviet Georgian Nationalism in the Context of
Social Memory and Collective Trauma Theories
Shota Khinchagashvili
September 5, 2008
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Introduction
The dissertation is a moderate attempt to envisage the phenomenon of nationalism in
post-soviet Georgia from the perspective of social memory concept and the theory of cultural
trauma. The main research question can be formulated in following way: how are the basic
elements of historical narrative reflected in modern collective memory of Georgians? This a
priori necessitates a brief overview and characterisation of traditional Georgian historical
narrative. Preliminary analysis suggests that contemporary Georgian national narratives
revolve around two main categories: (a) traumatic events evolving around the concepts like
pain, loss, acts of injustice, and etc. and (b) pro-western (anti-Russian) orientation as a
cultural paradigm. The first category can be better understood in the light of the theory of
cultural trauma. Moreover, the latter is also applicable to the contemporary political discourse
that reinterprets recent past the same way; hence it might be named as a cross-generational,
constant model in Georgias collective memory.
The study of contemporary nationalism in Georgia is still a relatively virgin field of
academic enquiry. Prior to the 1990s the main attention and interest to Georgian context
from outside world was largely of linguistic, literal and historical character (including several
historical studies I heavily rely on throughout my discussion). After the declaration of
independence and the entrance in the community of sovereign states (United Nations), part of
the international scholarship became preoccupied mainly with regional studies in the prism of
international relations (security and economic issues)1, especially on the background of inter-
ethnic tensions and armed conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions (Cornell 2001:
chapter 4, esp. 163-174). The South Caucasus region (comprised by new sovereign republics
of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia), together with North Caucasus, became the second
Balkans where the question of conflictual ethnic and national identities, collective memories
and historical narratives is yet to be studied.
Despite the growing number of informative academic literature, the systematic,
monographic works on Georgian collective identity and its social dynamics as well as its
morphology are scarce. Hence, this thesis represents a moderate effort to approach thequestion of post-soviet Georgian national identity from barely applied theoretical perspective
which goes beyond the observable traits of troubled inter-ethnic interaction (the process) and
drastic political and economic changes of recent past.
However, the shift in socio-political realm of the society does not explain by itself more
fundamental questions regarding the possible underlying reasons that triggered the
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deterioration of inter-communal relationships in South Caucasus and, specifically in our case,
Georgia. Moreover, I generally base my discussion on Brubakers negation (1998: 285-288)
of the traditional misconceptionrepressed paradigm in the discussion of nationalisms
which in this case would erroneously surmise federal, multinational state system of USSR as
the political organism reducing, conserving and only delaying previously existing
nationalisms with its supranational discourse and political structure. However, my central
scope is rather different than reiterating the critique of mentioned myth: to provide this
problematic research question with different, not necessarily substitute theoretical vision of
socio-cultural developments. In this way, the main spirit of study is to diversify concepts and
approaches in the study of modern Georgian collective perceptions and to go further than
seeing institutional rearrangements as a universal answer. Interesting is to reveal the character
of contemporary Georgian societys national identity and collective memory in the process of
transformation and mediation and to locate them in the realm of collective memory concept.
The main part of discussion on Georgians social perception regarding collective
memory and national history concentrates on post-soviet period. The notion of Georgians
henceforth will be deliberately reduced to the understanding of politically and culturally
dominant ethnic group of fractured and unconsolidated political community - Georgian state.
Concentration on the dominant group as a main social unit (social group) for study in no way
presupposes the analytical indifference to other ethnic minorities residing in Georgia.
Moreover, as we shall see later, development and the very discourse of ethnic Georgians
collective identity and historical memory is inextricably intertwined with the content of other
ethnic communities national discourses. Highly variable level of legitimacy of national, state
borders (and their contested character) in those discourses methodologically suggests not to
be restricted by them throughout the analysis as cross-border identities and the question of
inter-ethnic relations can not be disassociated from the main topic. The issue of collective
narratives of ethnic minorities (residing in Georgia and having historical homelands as well
as those groups that are perceived by any party to have no home) will be seen in the
conceptual framework of counter-narratives.
The study is meant to avoid a traditional mono-paradigmatic enquiry and tries to
combine different theoretical approaches to the subject. As an umbrella theoretical
perspective, I employ highly interdisciplinary heritage of nationalism studies. Specifically, I
rely on the loose vision of so called modernist approach with its general theoretical
understanding ofnation-state and ethnic/national identity.
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The key-words for this study are sociological notions as collective identity, social
memory2, ethno-historical narrative and national discourse. They will be clarified and
defined later, during the specific discussion on respective theoretical approaches.
Structure of the thesis
The plan of the thesis starts out with an initial chapter covering most relevant existing
literature in the field. Proceeding from this point, larger space will be devoted to the
examination of Georgian historical narrative and national discourse. Identifying and outlining
narrative markers of collective national perception of what makes up the past of the nation
and its present aspiration, how the both interact and determine each other would hopefully lay
a good ground for future studies on their vitality and underlying reasons. The main strategy
shall imply identification of basic collective identity markers and the analysis of the
transformation of social memory of Georgians in order to reveal the reasons for their
appreciation, idealisation and collective memorialisation.
It should be noted that the role of history is frequently named as the central
phenomenon in emerging national movements in post-soviet South Caucasian space.
However, paradoxically enough, the analytical category of social memory and respective
theoretical approach is surprisingly overlooked and neglected. While following the
instrumentalist vision of politics of memory which places dominant groups as the virtual
authors or manipulators of basic social perceptions on national idea and its challenges, and
although I will frequently address political discourse, there is no intention to concentrate
fundamentally on major actors in process as it calls for a separate in-depth analysis. Instead,
the paper is a mere try to see a general picture and enrich theoretical discussion with
introspective notions of collective memory and its post-soviet dynamics for the first time. As
it regards cultural trauma, it might reveal interesting aspects of general working of collective
memory and, at the same time, could link the research question to more specific cases of
trauma and its direct relation to dominant groups.
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Theories of Social Memory and Cultural Trauma
The rise and fall of totalitarian regimes and concomitant ideologies3
in the 20th
century
have given rise to different attempts to understand various social phenomena of contemporary
industrial and post-industrial societies. Among them one of the central objects of interest is
national identity and collective/social memory.
Basic terms and operative concepts
The main interpretative tools and analytical notions of the thesis come from
methodological and theoretical tradition of social constructionism. It is a set of various
theories of sociology of knowledge and social epistemology, aspiring to analyze different
aspects of collective life of humans and socio-cultural system, its functioning, dynamics and
interrelation of its constituent elements, and etc. Its main objective is to reveal sociallydetermined and constructed nature of collective life, practices and ideas, notions, values and
cultural elements, those that are traditionally perceived of as a priori given, unquestioned
and natural (Rousseau 2002: 236). In following chapters the notion of social memory will be
viewed as an ever-changing category that emanates from symbolic interaction (not to be
confused with the established micro-sociological perspective known as symbolic
interactionism), stressing on the process of communication, actors, agents involved, process
of interpretation, mediation and distribution of collectively appreciated public perceptions,
distributed through symbolizedand abstracted meanings. Hence, the basic understanding is
that social constructions, be they identity or collective memory (described below), are never
static - they are constantly in change, frequently negotiated, contested, - dynamic and
ambiguous elements to observe, especially in case of a society undergoing fundamental and
rapid reorganization of social and political life that (rather indirectly) generates redefinition
of social constructs.
Social identity is a central notion for the thesis. It can be defined as the cognitive
phenomenon derived from ones feelings and knowledge of self (internal dimension - self-
identification) referred to group membership, the one that is shared with others and also
represents a mechanism for self-categorization (external dimension) (Jenkins 1996: 23, 83;
Rosenberg 1979; Turner et al. 1987; Tajfel 1979: 94-109). It is a social aspect of personal
self, individual perception which determines the notion of us internalized group
membership.
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Belonging (self-categorization) inevitably produces in-group and out-group dimensions
in social perception, where the strength of (belonging to) the former leads member of one
group to reveal and display in-group favouritism. It comes from basic psychological drive to
attain positive image and esteem of the self(self-concept) (Tajfel & Turner 1986), typically
via comparing ones group with others and stressing positive bias toward a group one
belongs to (positive distinction and comparison). Michael Ignatieff interestingly described
(1999: 91-102) paradoxical process similar to this (which he called the narcissism of minor
difference, borrowing from Freud) in context of inter-ethnic conflict - on the case of Serbo-
Croation confrontation in Yugoslavia: each conflicting party, sharing a number of common
traits and sociocultural elements, imaginedand reiterated exaggerated differences used as a
legitimatization of enmity discourse. As author remarked, nationalism is the transformation
of identity into narcissism. It is a language game that takes the facts of difference and turns
them into a narrative justifying political self-determination (ibid, 96).
It is important here to define other several terms relevant for the discussion. I deal with a
Georgian society - large social group representing (the core unit of a) political community
(Georgia), consolidated by collectively perceived sameness and shared values. Hence, the
notions ofnation, national identity and ethno-historical narrative are central here.
There are numerous accurately formulated, classical (sometimes mutually exclusive)
definitions of a nation. Most of them seem to agree in seeing nation as an imagined
collectivity sharing several basic elements such as territory, language and/or culture (Gellner
1983: 6-7; Anderson 1991: 6; Kymlicka 1995:11). This imagination is attainable through the
transmission and distribution of common culture (process of homogenization), generating
shared national identity (identity understood as a sense of belonging, self-identity,
reciprocally recognised by members of collectivity in social interaction). The functionality of
this type of identity takes us back to a concept of a nation, redefining it primarily as a
community of memory, mnemonic community (Misztal 2003b:15-17). Performance and
durability of such collectivity across time and space depends on the successfully agreed,
distributed and consumed products of interpretation of past which is typically related, at the
same time, to the vision of possible and desirable future. Hence, a memory seems to be a
social glue for a nation, helping it in achieving certain degree of cohesion and stability by
legitimizing its mere existence.
National identity itself is a complex phenomenon with a number of social dimensions,
among which collective mnemonic aspect is central for us. Specifically, the most important is
to emphasize that national identity not only stresses the in-group similarities vis--vis the
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other group (differentiation); it also needs a sense of sharing [collective] fate (a discourse)
where a specific ethno-historical narrative plays a crucial role. As Bhabha (2000 [1990]: 19)
notes,
The nation, like the individual, is the culmination of a long past of
endeavours, sacrifice, and devotion. Of all cults, that of the ancestors is the
most legitimate, for the ancestors have made us what we are. A heroic past,
great men, glory [...], this is the social capital upon which one bases a
national idea.
As a sociological and anthropological concept, narrative is understood as a textual,
rhetorical resource, cultural tool for representing past realm with its events and actors and
provide the structured and meaningful interpretation of it. As Lyotard demonstrated on the
example of Cashinahua Indians of South America, the narrative is actively employed to
identify the status, roles, rights, responsibilities and expected behaviour of self and other
members of collectivity as well as the rules of interrelation among them (cited in Connor
1997:24). It represents a socio-cultural construct which is internalized by the members of a
society and, by the same token, legitimizes existing (positively or naturally) perceived
practice, social organization and the way of life, primarily the statuses of individuals and
sub-groups. As Alasdair MacIntyre once noted, human being is a storytelling animal, he/she
inherently need a stories (narrative) to understand themselves and also attain a coherent
picture of the world one inhabits (1981: 216). In general sense, the suggestion that what we
all do is shaped and determined by the narratives and we define who we are by the fact of
what we are part of is a narrative paradigm, which understands human being as homo narrans
(Fisher 1999: 270-272).
Sociological analysis of a narrative has a direct implication on the study of
national/ethnic dimension of collective identity and memory. It gained its strength during the
20th
century and is indebted from general spirit of deconstructionist paradigm of
(methodological) postmodernism and poststructuralism; the latter, on its part, borrowing
methodology from literal and linguistic studies and semiotics. Deconstructionist strategy
(which could be seen as a methodological premise for postmodernist theory and philosophy
dealing with the epistemology) approached existing social perceptions imprinted into socio-
cultural systems by deconstructing them and attacking (questioning) universalising,
foundational meta-narratives, scrutinizing and demonstrating complex, deep-seated aspects of
power-relations. Heuristic methodological approach of deconstructionism and the major
inquiries by Foucault, Derrida and others into the realm of power relations, language games,
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theories of knowledge and forms of representations provided the field with good
instrumentarium for the study of nationalist social practices, including politics of memory
and identity; it remains one of the central strategies in attempts to deconstruct discourses,
their language as well as commemorative discourses of social practices that lie at the very
basis of nationalism.
Hence, it could be said that the deconstructionist approach would interpret nationalism as
another manifestation of foundational, identitarian discourse (Walker 2001: 615-630).
Initial steps in this direction in the realm of cultural analysis are present in seminal works of
critical post-colonial studies (F. Fanon (1965), G. C. Spivak (1988) and others). Most
influential works were made by E. Said (1978) and Bhabha (1994) who, by introducing the
notion ofinternalisation in the context of post-coloniality, not only shed a theoretical light on
post-colonial developments and nationalist movements since 1950s-1960s but also
interestingly explored the universal binary ofdominantand marginal discourses. The latter
dichotomy is indeed important. Equally significant seems a historical aspect - post-colonial
period of the 20th
century which saw a relatively new wave of historical (historiographical)
reproduction where a narrative provides a progressive discourse on national emancipation
vis--vis the oppressive Other (here - colonizer), offering, at the same time, legitimacy for the
idea of (the need for) homogenization (as a return to the natural state of affairs disrupted by a
foreign rule and alien culture). The ever evolving tendency for homogeneity, dream of any
nation-sate, naturally was on non-reconciliatory terms with ethno-linguistic heterogeneity
of most of the emerging post-colonial states.
I would argue that the theoretical perspective on the described trend of national
emancipation and state-building should not be strictly historically isolated as the period
central for this thesis, which could be conditionally baptized as a third wave of
decolonization following the end of the Second World War and culminating by the
dissolution of Soviet Union, shares certain similar trends with it. This especially concerns the
liberal dilemma of nation-building and concomitant homogenization process (McLeod
2000: 104)
Social/Collective Memory
The first major effort to engage with the collective/social dimension of memory was
made by French sociologist and philosopher Maurice Halbwachs. He borrowed ([1926]
1950) the notion of memory from individual psychological realm and transplanted it into
sociological analysis where it represented strictly socio-cultural phenomenon - counterpart of
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individual memory - shared and distributed among individuals of collectivity, but individuals
wereunderstood strictly as members of certain social group.
Thus, social memory is mediated and socially/culturally transmissible across time and
place (generations), though never static. It is an intangible socio-cultural heritage, although
its manifestations and materializations are common practice in modern societies. This aspect
- bodily practices, corporeal manifestations, ceremonies and rituals in the process of
memorialisation and commemoration was aptly explored by Paul Connerton in his prominent
workHow Societies Remember (1989). Around the same period Pierre Nora (1989; 1996)
stressed the topographical aspect of collective remembering and contributed enormously to
the field of study. He, having concentrated on spatial aspect of remembrance and
commemoration, at the same time emphasized the essential importance of differentiating the
notions of history and memory.
Difference between history and memory. Why it matters?
Nora specified the meaning of memory as individual experience and tradition, that is,
what is witnessed and remembered by an individual, while history is just a version of past
(1996: 4). Therefore, history is an indirect memory - mediated, stored, where past is a social
construction mostly formed by present context, its needs and various factors. Social memory
is distanced and consequently abstracted from the first-hand empirical knowledge (which
might be even absent or questioned to be real). Thus, collective memory can be conditionally
characterised as a memory having no direct and immediate contact to an event, - a fragment
of past that usually cannot be observed and memorized in direct way but is still mediated and
shaped by textual, visual and other forms (Wertsch 2002: 5). To rephrase Peter Novick (1999:
3,4), collective memory is disinterested or/and unable to understand the original context of
historical event, it simplifies and explains things in less sophisticated and intellectual way.
Narrative text here should be understood as not just the chronicle of events but the intrinsic
impulse for moralising the content (White 1978: 12-13), and giving legitimacy to existing
socio-political order.
Although differentiation ofcollective memory and history is undoubtedly possible, one
aspect of the interrelation between the two should be noted for future discussion, as it has a
direct and crucial implication on national narrative and discourse. Traditional understanding
is that history represents a craft of historians, the practise of scientific historical enquiry, an
endeavour for critical, impersonal study of the past while collective memory is a personal
(hereperson - individual who is inevitably a member and sharer of the heritage of collective
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social knowledge and tradition) perception in which past is chaotic, not necessary linear or
organized, that is, somewhat timeless (Halbwachs [1926] 1950: 78). Unlike memory, history
is critical, self-conscious, in the hands of professionalised intellectual class - academic
practitioners (Nora 1989, 8, 9). Indeed, collective memory is somehow ahistorical (Lyotard
1984: 21) and mythological, but so is national history in its purest. Hence, the central point of
interest is not the ideal incompatibility of the two in terms of categories, but their
interweaving similarity in the practice, in terms of social agency and cultural production: in
order to understand the nature of historical narrative, one should take into account a generic
character of memory industry operating on the level of nation (as a cultural or political
community). The latter represents a specific form of modernised political project where
urbanisation and the development of the culture of citizenship brings about the necessity to
respond to the challenge of cultural uprootedness and social anomy with the production of
collective, shared identity. In this very enterprise of homogenization the biggest part of
professional historians and intellectuals are those who establish the national historical
narrative and hence collective, public memory according to national discourse and identity
(Potter 1962: 924-950; see also Berger et.al. 1999). As national historical narrative is
influenced by collective (nationalist) aspirations and identity (and vice versa), ideal
distinction between emotional, imaginative past/memory and intellectual, critical history
seems to be blurred. The latter is frequently compromised by the discursive historicism of
collective ideological aspirations, especially when the institutionalization (or major
reformation) of national history is under way.
The understanding of memory/collective history (past) is close to Smiths (2003: 169)
notion ofethnohistory. The very central model of a Golden Age (aptly described by same
Smith (ibid. 190-217), predominant in most of the nationalist narrative templates which I
shall discuss in the next chapter, is usually nothing but the product of academic work.
Organized, written and distributed national histories with their structured narratives (instead
of free-floating popular folk and oral accounts) reflect the basic national discourse in a
given society and facilitate a social cohesion via elaborated and shared national identity.
Collective memory understood in the process of distribution, contestation... and selection
The taxonomy of social dimension of memory is very rich. Most of them evolve around
historical discourse sustained, promoted and mastered by dominant, hegemonic or sometimes
marginalized social groups that claim to possess objective knowledge of the past. I shall try to
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single out those that are important and operative for my future discussion.
Specifically, I concentrate on the dichotomy ofofficial memory and counter-memory.
Official memory is the result of a discourse endorsed and promoted by existing dominant
institutions and actors in a certain society/political community (Wright 1985: 5). It stands
close to Andersons description (2006: 159) of official nationalism and relevant ideology:
emanating from the state, and serving the interests of the state first and foremost. However,
in terms of nationalism and nationalist discourse, naturally state apparatus is not the only
dimension involved in its distribution and the term for this case, I would argue, should be
understood in far more flexible way, including thus intellectual elite (established academic
circles) of a society equally sharing and further promoting a discourse in public sphere.
Counter-memory and respective counter-narrative, in contrast, bears a discourse which
challenges official history and its interpretation, tries to reform and redefine its content or
elements (Assman 1997: 12) which leads to eventual contestation and counter-reaction from
master-narrative dominant in public sphere (Preston 1997: 63).
The dichotomy between the two will be applied to the discussion of Georgian society in
post-totalitarian period which brought about the disappearance of restricting official ideology
and stagnant academic mono-methodology.
As we deal with a case of specific social transformation, it seems plausible to outline the
notion ofmnemonic socialization -acentral aspect of social remembering understood as an
incessant course of negotiation and mediation (Zarubavel 1997, 87). It represents a process of
nurturing adolescent recruits of social group (here - ethnic group or nation) with major
ethno-historical narrative, explaining various aspects of social present, past and future
through the agents like education system, family, public cultural groups, historical museums,
mass-media and etc.
Mnemonic socialization implies the process of selective remembering, that is, how
certain event should be remembered (interpreted), and the tendency of omitting other facts.
In this aspect, it resembles to Ernest Renans observation on the nations ability of selective
forgetting and repression of historical errors for the sake of unity and successful nation-
building ([1882] 1990:11). Billig (1995: 38) introduced the notion of collective amnesia,
which is sometimes strategically mediated, organized and politically orchestrated as in the
cases of authoritative Marxist regimes.
Hence, what we have here is an intrinsic incompatibility of (a) the positivist utopian ideal
for disinterested historical enquiry and (b) paradigm of national mythologized narrative
which serves as a basis of national discourse, explaining the collectives destiny and other
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aspects of social life. Consequently, it is not that history is just doomed to be subjectively,
selectively constructed: every blind historiographic enterprise of telling everything that
happened would undermine and neglect the sanctity of national discourse which fashions its
homogeneity, density, superiority across time exclusively by its selective approach to past
events.
Certainly, I do not intend to discuss in depth the role of professional historians, historical
narrative production and its relation to ethno-national discourse. I shall rather attempt to show
this problem in the light of specific, Georgian post-soviet experience. From the theoretical
point of view, in this case it would be enough to underpin the assumption of socio-political,
institutional and ideological determinism of academic scholarship. The process of
professionalization of historical science (18th
and especially 19th
centuries) went in parallel of
industrialisation and the flourishing era of nation-states (White 1990:32). Academisation of
historiography was generally important trend in the history of science but, ironically, it
ultimately did not save historians from its traditional sociocultural function - representing a
class of cultural priests producing national (popular) histories (Funkenstein 1993: 20),
conversely, it did standardise this practice with more vigour and necessity. Here I would
argue again that the hope of positivists that past could be studied without any prejudice from
present circumstances and conjuncture was utopian; same scrutinized academic works done
in Rankean spirit could not help but satiate excessive public interest by engaging with
predominantly political history, producing thus, although with far better scientific
methodology, a certain narrative for national discourse (Kramer & Maza 2006: 169).
Collective (national) identity inevitably provides (influences) professional historians with
narrative vision, irretrievably affecting ones critical abilities (which could be called
analytical sobriety), giving accents in order to know (paradoxically, knowing here does not
necessarily imply the conscious ideological loyalty, choice or calculation) how and which
events, occurrences and artefacts of the past are to be interpreted (Halbwachs [1926] 1950:
44), are worthy of discussion and noting.
Examining determinist and instrumentalist vision on collective memory
Theoretical edifices erected by Gellner (1983), Anderson (1983), Hobsbawm (1983)and
others, as well as sociological study of collective memory initiated by Halbwachs,
successfully abstracted from Emile Durkheims thesis (1925) that traditional, preindustrial
societies are inclined and need to elaborate the sense of historical continuity and belonging in
order to keep political community functional and working, securing in this way collectives
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stability (Misztal 2003a). Gellner (1983: 29-37) applied this thesis to modern nation-states,
insisting that fundamental changes brought by industrialization were a catalyst for the need of
newer forms of social bonding and cementing. As noted above, Hobsbawm and Ranger
(1983) went even further with politics of memory, taking most instrumentalist approach.
Authors tried to conceptualize the fabricated character of collective perceptions which
guaranteed loyalty to the state - the practice of inventing such symbols as flags, national
anthems, collective official rituals, uniforms and etc (1983: 1-8). This approach heavily relied
on revised vision of Marxist theory of dominant ideology where apart from class; attention is
paid to the means of media, education system and academia. This instrumentalist,
functionalist approach is thought to be somewhat limited as it supposedly disregards the
following question - why certain memories work while others do not? However, I would
argue that the instrumentalist dealing with the past inherently denies the problematic
character of this question owing to the truism that not all known and documented historical
events (resource) would fit and follow the logic of nationalist discourse, - as the collective
national discourse is always imaginative and mythological, national historical narrative is
always selective and can tolerate empiricism only as far as it helps. More important for this
case seems to avoid artificial reductionism and, as noted elsewhere, not to omit the class of
cultural practitioners as in post-Soviet South Caucasus the principal axis of the
development of collective identities went in contestation with each other, endorsed by the
conflicting historical narratives where discourse on past (in)justice(s) and inflicted human
and territorial losses, as we shall see, took central function of collective claim-making. That
is what takes us to the concept of cultural trauma.
Cultural trauma theory
This theoretical perspective might help to characterise historical narratives that played
major role in shaping post-soviet collective identities and inter-ethnic relations with
minorities and neighbouring ethno-national groups.
The central element of the concept of cultural trauma is the act of commemoration, -
social cognitive re-experiencing of the past event and its value. This especially makes sense
in case of tragedy, loss, which could develop into a collective, cultural trauma. Cultural
trauma can be defined in most concise way as the signification of the fact (past or ongoing
event); it is a place where past and the masses meet in practice. In other words,
Cultural trauma occurs when members of a collectivity feel they have been
subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group
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consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their future
identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways (Alexander 2004: 1).
Experiencing trauma directly affects the status quo of socio-cultural identity and
collective memory, and the latter is continuously re-visited and re-constructed. The main
essence of the theory is to study the relation between the original event and its meaning
(trauma), accentuating primarily on value and epistemological nature of the latter rather than
on its ontology; ontological aspect is present in and claimed by same discourse ethics of
collective trauma narrative, while the meaning and interpretation, social perception of the
object of memory is scrutinized, not the past event itself. Specifically, it falls within the realm
of social memory studies, not historical research. It is not about establishing the truthfulness
(or falsity) of a past event but rather revealing reasons that determine the nature of its
construction in a given manner and that make it durable on the surface of certain discourse
(Alexander 2004: 9).
Methodological-scientific basis of cultural trauma theory comes from the tradition of
psychoanalysis. The notion of trauma is borrowed from medicine and psychiatry, but
reinterpreted in absolutely different, social dimension (Sztompka 2004:167). The original
(individual) meaning of trauma is an effect of abrupt and painful event and traumatic
response of the individual affected by it. An event produces unconscious emotional fears
which leads one to repress the experience (which is a type of psychological defence), as it is
too painful and traumatic to be fully acknowledged and accepted. However, the memory
about certain event and experience is only repressed, not gone and entirely absent; moreover,
it is sometimes back and reinterpreted (this concept was initially developed by Freud in his
1896 work "On the etiology of hysteria"). Classical (individual) psychoanalysis is more
concerned with objective and true reconstruction of the past in its purest and most real ways.
In social dimension the situation is radically dissimilar: the solution, if ever sought for, is
never dependant on absolute objectivity and the key is not its full acknowledgment and
extraction from unconscious into the conscious (Alaxander, ibid, 8).
Alexander also rightly rejects rational, naturalist interpretation of trauma which is
characteristic for enlightenment thinking, claiming that the trauma is socially mediated
phenomenon, independent and not immanently ensuing from the object of interpretation as
the event, cause of trauma, might be even non-present, sometimes anticipated before or even
imagined, non-actual (loose social equivalent of individualfalse memory). Hence, there is an
attempt to distance from the theory that claims the axiology of the event itself, which could
be (ethically, morally) answered, overcome or challenged. Alexander borrows the term
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imagined from Andersons theoretical framework (1983). However, as same Anderson
noted (ibid, 6), imagined here shouldnt be equated with falsity; deliberativeness appears
to be problematic category to measure, especially as we deal with phenomenons that are not
observable and examinable through laboratory experiments. However, with regard to trauma,
it would be sufficient here to reiterate that it is the result of interpretation and representation
of event, not the direct and natural result of pain. On the other hand, not all painful and
drastic social crises are traumas in the sense of collective (social) memory (there will be an
attempt to stress on such occurrences); social crises must become cultural crises (Alexander
2004: 10), only then they became a value-point of social remembering and interpretation. The
process can be outlined in following manner:
EVENT TRAUMA PROCESS REPRESENTATION
The question of agency is important and plays crucial role as they broadcast meanings
and representations. Societies, as broad as they are, never define trauma process, they only
accept, fail to accept or reject it. As Thompson noted (1998: 21), what is interpreted,
broadcasted and represented is always connected with the ongoing social reality and present,
in a form of the need for moral/ethical and socio-political action modelled e.g. as a
responsibility to act. There could be named a number of instruments of rhetorical and
moral character that are usually stressed and collectivised; they vary from case to case:
cost/consequence of the loss, degradation of certain values, negative effect of status quo (e.g.
threat of assimilation), a need for specific action (reparation, policy, doing justice, grass-root
political mobilization), and etc.
In the realm of nationalism studies the trauma process (traumatisation; interpretation and
representation of past event) and Weberian notion of carrier groups (1868: 468-517) and
their meaning making in public sphere (Alexander 2003: 94) sheds more light on the issue
of agency. In following chapter this aspect is reiterated on the example of academic society:
class of literati and urban intelligentsia have always been one of the founders of national
movements where collective discontent and the painful events from the past become the main
tool to interpret and collectivise a new socio-cultural vision on past. This theoretical
perspective is occasionally applied in the study of the development of nationalisms in South-
Caucasian societies (Suny 1993: 53, 54) as well as in soviet (Martin 2001: 15-20) and post-
soviet politics (Beissinger 2002: 9-10); it promises interesting grounding for future studies.
Carrier groups are identified in this case with cultural nationalists, public intellectuals
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engaged in the process of trauma creation: they try to outline the nature of the pain and
victimize own collectivity in a way that the perception (pain, feeling of injustice) is
conveyed, distributed and shared by a large number of individuals. In this process the past
events are regularly interpreted and reinterpreted. The last but not least element is defining
antagonist - attributing and projecting the burden of responsibility of trauma to others
(Alexander ibid: 12-15). The later stage implies the gradual pacification of collective
mobilization of claims which enters the realm of official policy and cultural production and
practice (Alexander 2004: 22-23, Smesler 2004: 52).
As preliminary analysis suggests, recent historical narrative of Georgian nationalist
discourse are based mostly on traumatic events with relevant perceived actors and their (as
well as own) collective claims to legitimacy. The next chapter will try to elaborate more on
this matter.
.
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Georgian historical narrative and nationalist discourse
Hereby is offered the analysis of post-soviet Georgian collective memory by describing a
general template of ethno-historical narrative as well as an overview of post-independence
political discourse and its transitional character. Central is the aspect of negotiation and
reinterpretation which is especially important in the case of counter-memories of ethnic
minorities that challenge dominating national idea with its contradictory narratives and make
political discourse more disposed to legitimise itself with historical concepts. In reference to
historical narrative, several fundamental constants shall be outlined in order to demonstrate
how they have been readdressed and reformulated.
The content of the chapter is organized in several subtopics discussing different aspects
of perceived important events observed through the prism of process of signification. In some
instances I shall briefly note the paradoxical cases so characteristic for collective memory
that memorizing inherently implies parallel forgetting, unconcern, negation or fundamental
reinterpretation.
I mostly rely on works about the history of Georgia by R.G. Suny (1983; 1988), S.F.
Jones (1996) and other authors in an attempt to revisit Georgian nationalism studies from the
perspective of cultural trauma and more general concept oftraumatization. A big attention is
devoted to the contemporary political discourse in Georgia reflected in statements, speeches
and other sources.
Identifying oppressor in early Georgian national discourse
Abolition of Georgian monarchy (Lang 1957: 247) by the end of 18th century and full
annexation of the modern-day Georgian territories in the first half of following century is
generally remembered as the loss of national independence. In the narrative of Soviet
Georgian historiography these developments are offered as a mere manifestation of imperial
Tsarist policy while the latter was implicitly juxtaposed to the ideal of social revolution and
emancipation of masses (proletariat) from oppressing powers (Marxist-Leninist paradigm)
(Dumbadze 1974). Despite differences, the nationalist discourse on the abolition of the
Georgian monarchy is interpreted as an act of undermining Georgian sovereignty. After the
declaration of Georgian independence in 19914
the annexation of Georgian domains on the
verge of 18th
-19th
centuries was further articulated, in this case as a routine Russian political
behaviour, in close connection with prior violations of bilateral agreements and following
uprisings. Heavily stressed is also a failure of Russian forces in 1795 to provide necessary
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military protection to Georgian ally when Tbilisi became a victim of intervention of Agha
Mohammed Khan, Shah of Iran (Suny 1994 [1988]: 59). The event is usually presented as a
first major example of unreliability of northern Christian neighbour. On the other hand, the
role of Russia during Russo-Turkish war (1877-1878) in returning South-Eastern and
Western territories that Georgians remembered as historically Georgian lands (Lang 1962:
203) never entered public discourse.
Such a selective character of collective memory correlates with the logic of cultural
trauma theory: Russias rigid representation as the villain was unlikely to be questioned,
therefore her crucial role in regaining old Georgian territories during 1877-88 war (which
makes her an ally) is apparently less stressed, if not forgotten (in popular realm of memory),
as the moments like the mentioned case would ambiguate a traditional historical role (image)
of Russia. The character of the latter was shaped and, with a strong accent on the concept of
victimhood, was collectivised in social memory of Georgians through the public activities of
the second half of 19th
century (a period which some scholars with modernist approach
(Anderson 1983; Gillis 1994) would mark as the time of birth of Georgian nationalism and
(re-)emergence of Georgian national identity, a vision which I would generally share).
This period saw the unprecedented activism of Georgians educated in secular and
western fashion and full of progressive ideas that flourished in Russian educational centres by
that time. One of the representatives of cohort of reformism and modernity was prominent
publicist, social critic and lawyer Ilia Chavchavadze, who is considered as the founding
father of modern Georgian nation (Wheatley 2005: 215). Chavchavadze and his like-minded
companions, cultural nationalists and social reformers, promoted the development of
public institutions and local education system (Rayfield 2000: 173-174), fostering at the same
time the all-Georgian, national identity under the trinity formula fatherland, language, faith
(Darchiashvili 2002: 127;) which would transgress different socio-economic classes of ethnic
Georgians (King 2008: 148-149). However, eventually these circles failed to enter active
political arena and consolidate its forces; they ultimately lost to the generation of 1890s,
returnees from Russian and European centres inspired by radical social-democratic doctrines
(Suny 1988: 147-164).
While the mentioned failure could be explained by the feeble character of Georgian
middle class (Suny 1988: 115), here important is another question: aspiration of 19th
century
nationalists for uniting Georgians as a nation with shared identity was accompanied by the
recognition of main oppressors and groups that impeded nations ideals. They were fiercely
confronted by traditionalist Georgian gentry, military careerists working as state servants
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in Russian bureaucracy and also by emerging generation of popular Marxists. Nevertheless,
Russian hegemony was identified as a central victimizer of Georgians, while in some
instances the severe competition with Armenian urban middle class was also reflected in their
works, reinterpreted as cultural enmity (Suny 1983: 111-12; 132). In 1899 popular Georgian
newspaper Iveria publishes Chavchavadzes polemical essay Scientists of Armenians and
the Laments of the Stones where he, although mostly in politically correct manner, fiercely
criticized Armenian historical scholarship accusing them of attempting to falsify the artefacts
and monuments of Georgian cultural heritage by presenting them as Armenians. The very
first part starts with the victimization of Georgian nation and concludes with the call for
defending national prestige against offenders (Jones 2005: 87). In his autobiographical
Travelers' Diaries (1861) Chavchavadze (1861) highlighted the stagnation of Russian social
life while at the same time let a native Georgian ordinary mountaineer speak about his
feelings that rejected the Russian rule.
Hence, it is apparent that at its very initial development modern Georgian nationalist
movement employed the traumatic discourse and the image of victimizer concerned
minorities too: apart from the dream for independence, expressed in contemporary literature
which presents Russia as unreformed and disappointingly pseudo-European political space
where Georgian nation is oppressed, Armenians are equally externalized while being
identified as a main cultural contenders threatening traditional Georgian cultural heritage and
historical past.
Soviet period
The first half of the 20th century saw the dominance of popular right-wing branch of
socialist ideology in South Caucasian societies. They were confronted by Russia-based
revolutionary socialists who prevailed throughout the territory of former Tsarist Russia. This
is important to note in order to emphasize the gap between Georgian national movement of
late 19th
century and the creation of first Georgian sovereign state: Chavchavadzes ideal for
the national self-rule was mostly dormant or at least out of political discourse until the
Bolshevik revolution of 1917 headed by Lenin. This shift dictated Georgian social-democrats
(Mensheviks) to ally with their ideological counterparts of South Caucasus region and later
follow individual route of nation-building and independence since 1918 (Lang 1962: 204-
208). In 1921 Georgia was occupied by Bolshevist Russias Red Army (Conquest 1968) and
we shall see later how this even was reflected in social memory of Georgians.
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The phase encompassing 70 years of Soviet rule should be overviewed in a few detail.
Most importantly, Soviet system only reformed political organization of pre-existing
Democratic Republic of Georgia (1918-1921). After the uprisings and unsuccessful acts of
defiance (most notable 1924 uprising, (Suny 1988: 418) and the World War II the nature of
Georgian nationalism seems ambivalent and needs further study. However, from the 9th
of
March, 1956 Tbilisi demonstrations, when Georgians protested against Khrushchevs
criticism of ethnic Georgian Stalin (as it was interpreted as an insult on whole nation
(Minahan 1998: 120), one could speculate about Georgian nationalisms re-directed
character at that time instead of long-forgotten independence as a reference point revolved
around victimhood, the latter notion (paradigm) was dropped in favour of banal national pride
embodied in the cult of Stalin. However, later collective ethno-national conservatism became
more sensitive on the background of Russification trends in language policy of Soviet
Kremlin: 1978 events, when Georgians opposed to the removal of the status of Georgian as
official language from Georgian SSR constitution, became the first popular political
resistance against the centre (Moscow) which achieved success (Grenoble 2003: 118-119).
Hence, it could be said that the triumphal victory (although claiming many lives) in
World War II and the successive strengthening of the cult of the leader (if not leaders,
provided we also add the influential security chief of USSR L. Beria to the list) of Georgian
origin could somehow quell the collective feeling of oppression and perception of national
subjugation. However, since the beginning of destalinization process and incessant practice
of revision of Soviet heroes, leaders and, generally, of the whole recent Soviet past (aptly
observed by Wertsch 2002: 76-82) did not substantially delegitimise communist ideology at
once but surely provided a more appropriate ground for national discontent in Georgia.
Moreover, relative liberalization of public and intellectual life in post-authoritative
totalitarian super-state produced further opportunities: Khrushchevs policy ofKorenizatsiya
(indigenization, nativisation), which aimed at developing new generation of
nomenclature (nomenklatura) and apt local elites, effectively ethno-territorialized political
space of USSR (Goldenberg 1994: 41; Jones & Parsons 1996: 296). Subsequently,
introduction of local languages in administration and educational system invigorated the
development of intellectual elites concentrated in writers unions and universities (Strayer
1998: 72-73; Sakwa 1999: 144-145). They were engaged with reproduction of historical
national narratives of localities that were later widely distributed and entered the realm of
collective memories of minorities.
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By the decline of Soviet Union these semi-institutionalized (partially penetrated in still
highly centralized education system) national narratives became anti-Soviet counter-
narratives (although criticism of soviet rule varies from case to case and is selective), hence,
responsible and the oppressor later was easily transformed and generalized to include
Soviet rule. Furthermore, counter here implies not the exclusively bilateral soviet vs. anti-
soviet dichotomy; it rather followed inherited Matrioshka-style soviet federal system
hierarchy of institutionalized nationalities, where conflictual memories, revolving around the
notion and image of victim and oppressor, assigned same significations according to
mentioned hierarchy in such a manner that e.g. self-victimizing Georgian ethnicity vis--vis
Russian political dominance was at the same time an equal aggressor in the counter-memory
of ethnic minorities in Georgia. While the cases related to the latter category will be
addressed later, here it could be stated that national narratives of minorities, collectivised and
entered in local political discourses, also relied on the concept of traumatization and
oppression.
Period of transition
Nationalist circles emerged during the perestroika and glansnost (Gorbachevs liberal
policy in economical and political life) based their demands for national independence on the
existence of sovereign state Democratic Republic of Georgia (1918-1921). However, this
was mainly a legal argument. Certainly it entered popular discourse and served as a
legitimating element in Georgian public. Nevertheless, on the level of popular ideology and
collective memory, Chavchavadzes heritage seemed to dominate the space. One of the
influential dissident organizations by the end of 1980s was named after Chavchavadze
(Wheatley 2005: 42). Moreover, the national Church of Georgia (Georgian Apostolic
Autocephalous Orthodox Church), which was repressed during (early) Soviet times and had
close ties with nationalist dissident movement, canonized secularist Chavchavadze in 1987
(Szajkowski 1994: 44). The socialist government of 1918-1921 independent Georgia enjoyed
quite ambivalent and moderate collective fascination, apparently outshined by far more
appreciated anti-Bolshevik uprisings that followed the Russian occupation. It is also obvious
that Anti-soviet resistance was in some way personified with the name of Kakutsa
Cholokashivli, leader of Georgian guerrilla resistance of the 1920s.
Georgian nationalist circles ofperestroika period were human rights activists as much as
nationalists. Apart from the demand for political freedom, they were heavily concerned with
group (national) rights, predominantly with basic political demands: protection of national
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language and preservation of material cultural heritage (Jones 1993: 304). By the end of
1980s these public figures became popular political leaders of Georgian society that led
country to independence (restoration of independence based on the constitution of 1921) on
9th
of April 1991 and Gamsakhurdias presidency.
The choice of the date of 9 April was not random; it represents an example of politics of
memory as that day was an anniversary of crackdown and violent dispersion of anti-soviet
civil disobedience in 1989 in Tbilisi, resulting in 19 civilian deaths (Cornell 2001:161). Since
then, the site of the tragedy is a place of annual commemoration, accompanied with silent
march, bringing flowers, lighting candles and chanting.
9 April demonstration initially was a response to the separatist demand formulated in so
called Declaration of Likhni of previous month, when Abkhazians (local political elite,
intelligentsia and mobilized supporters) collectively addressed Moscow with the demand for
separation of the region from Georgia (Beissinger 2002: 301). Already by that time the
discourse of rising Abkhazian nationalism was constructed upon the collective counter-
memory with the main emphasis on Georgianization policy promoted by Beria, aiming at
demographic and cultural assimilation of Abkhazians (Slider 1985: 58). Accordingly, it
defined Georgian political centre (in alliance of mentioned ethnic Georgian leaders of
Kremlin) as the main victimizer, oppressor and persisting threat to Abkhazian national
identity.
Inter-ethnic tensions was further aggravated by-then still dissident Gamsakhurdias
exclusivist nationalist discourse which partially developed from his wider pan-Caucasian
concept, implying messianic vision on Georgian nation (spiritual mission of the latter was
to uphold its allegedly historical status of being a place of East-West cultural-spiritual
synthesis). Moreover, his main theses (Gamsakhurdia 1991), interpreting the hypothesis of
Humboldt and also Japhetic concept of Marr, presented Georgian nation as the part of the
descendants of Caucasian race concentrated in contemporary times in the region of Caucasus
(Smith 1998: 178-179). The racial-cultural entity was juxtaposed to Indo-European peoples,
newcomers, suggesting the references to Armenians, Azeris and other ethnic groups.
Gamsakhurdia did not relax his tone to ethnic minorities after he came in power (Barrington
2006: 256-258).
As it regards to the annexation of 1921, it was rediscovered as collective trauma and the
idea of being deprived of sovereignty was collectivised only by the dissolution of USSR.
However, minorities in the interpretation of this event are represented not as co-sharers of
this political tragedy but quite contrary as the integral part of the force that inflicted it on
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Georgian nation. Hence, they are equally externalized from the notion of Georgian nation.
Unlike the annexation itself, the very paradigm concerning minorities living in Georgia was
latently present and conserved throughout the Soviet period.
In mutually exclusive narratives pre-soviet and soviet-time developments became the
main resources for contestation. Scholars (Goldenberg 1994: 10; Nodia 1998: 20-23)
rightfully observe that the ethno-territorial disputes of the 1990s in Georgia in fact were
preceded by academic contestation on historical past, with collective memory wars
concerning both Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali region. Contestation concerned
historical figures, toponymy and most importantly, the concept of autochthonism and
historical ownership of the territory (Toria 2006: 27-28).
In Georgian ethno-historical discourse the most radical interpretation of Abkhazian
history (presenting contemporary Abkhazians as non-indigenous population of Abkhazia)
developed by P. Ingorokva enjoyed immense popularity (Smith 1998: 55). The contradiction
is obvious also in case of Ossetians: for instance, their 1919 uprising in northern Georgia,
supported by Russians, is traditionally seen by Georgians as Bolksheviks subversive
activities and a prelude to 1921 Soviet intervention, giving the image of Ossetians as
migrated people who became a reliable force of foreign aggressors. In official soviet
historiography it was interpreted as a popular revolt against the oppressions and injustices of
the Menshevik government of Tbilisi. The Ossetian national narrative sees the named events
as an attempt to conduct genocide against Ossetian nation (Jones 1993: 290-295).
Thus, the verge of the 1980-90s saw the radical ethnicization of contending political
discourses where the idea of national guilt of the otherand historical (in)justice is the central
element. This general paradigm of development in Georgia led not only to the ethno-
territorial disputes, but, on very basic level, to the very ambiguous and ambivalent
perspective on the patria. Specifically, Georgians collective, popular identification highly
miscorrelates the civic/state borders as the former rather runs along the ethno-demographic
vision. Group solidarity, as well as the perception of traumatic events, is vastly defined by
historical wrongs in retrospective and the most vivid expression of this is cross-border
relations with kin groups outside of Georgian state.
Same kind of affiliation and solidarities define which massive event is developed into
traumatic one, which becomes the object of collective pain and burden. To be more specific,
national narratives and collective memories apparently determine present perceptions on
existing national threats and the latter, on its part, influence the process of identifying some
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events and a vision on results of certain historical developments in traumatic (or,
contrariwise, amnesiac that is, inclination to disregard and ignore) way.
Remembering and forgetting; sharing or neglecting a collective pain
Before proceeding with the discussion on ambiguous character of Georgian social
memory, I think it is necessary to revisit the interrelation of social change and the processes
of (its) interpretation.
Naturally, contemporary Georgian national historical discourse should be considered in
the light of post-communist transformation. Any kind of institutional, legal or cultural
transformation, naturally, implies important social changes. Yet here I would like to re-
emphasize Sztompkas reminder that trauma is only an indirect product of change; social life
is nothing but an incessant change (2004:158), while trauma is a logical product of
traumatisation, trauma process - giving meaning and interpreting only a part of given events.
While fundamental technological and institutional transformation, the rapid change in socio-
economic life of a society usually begets important changes in socio-cultural sphere, their
nature can never be predicted and defined in advance - collective meanings and the dynamics
of their change stimulated by the process on the background of social disorientation is
unpredictable and does not comply to any sociological paradigm of change. Social memory is
always selective and the images of the past are frequently conjured up to the service of
present needs and challenges. Georgian case is no exception. Hereby, I shall try to have a
closer look at this kind of phenomenon on several other examples.
De-facto shrinking of jurisdiction over South Ossetia/Tskhinvali region and Abkhazia in
the first half of 1990s overshadowed collective interest towards territories that had been lost
in previous centuries, when the disintegration of feudal Georgian state led to the final loss
(Shaw & Shaw 1976: 181) of south-western territories (Tao-Klarjeti, contemporary Turkish
regions of Ardahan, Artvin, Kars, Erzurum); those are perceived as a birthplace and
geographic origin of Georgian statehood (Berdzenishvili et.al. 1962: 129). However, the
interest never faded away entirely, especially as there is an ethnic kin living on the
historical lands of Georgia. Laz people, ethnic group populated in coastal zone of the
mentioned Turkish area, are linguistically connected with one of the constituent groups of
Georgian nation, namely Mingrelians (western Georgia) that share common Georgian
national identity (Cornell 2001: 49). Consequently, both factors (territorial identification with
the past and ethnic brethren) determine a vivid curiosity of Georgian public to this Turkish
region, expressed in recent past with the intensification of intercultural ties, especially
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through folk music festivals (Information for the Press, 2006) and academic/tourist
expeditions aiming at visiting old Georgian architectural monuments. The history and
contemporary life of Laz community was also depicted in highly-televised Georgian
documentaries like Gelino, Mystic Colchis (Kalandia 2007) and others. A major tragic
event stressed in Georgian historiography is also the mass exile of Georgians of Kakheti
region (Eastern Georgia) to Iran by Shah Abbas about 400 years ago (Suny 1994 [1988]: 50-
51). Nowadays their descendents represent a semi-assimilated community concentrated in
Western part of Isfahan province (Oberling 1963: 128-33).
This homogenously shared fascination for historical relatives of a nation can be
juxtaposed to a case which generates asymmetrically developed collective feelings,
characterized by a high degree of ambivalence producing mutually exclusive attitudes and
discourse. The issue of Meskhetian Turks is such a case.
Meskhetian Turks represent a Muslim population (or second and third generation of that
population) of Southwest Georgia banished to Central Asian republics by the order of Stalin
in 1944. A part of these communities strive for re-immigration back to their initial habitat.
The gross violation of human rights and the tragic events that followed their life in exile
never developed into what has been previously defined as cultural trauma in the domain of
Georgian public life. The question of their repatriation, although declared to be a
responsibility of Georgian government with the support and supervision of Council of Europe
(Opinion No. 209, 1999), is met with suspicion (Burjanadze meets, 2007). Fiercer was
initial reaction in 1991, when President Gamsakhurdia, previously an avid supporter of their
repatriation (Cornell 1994: 183), sternly opposed Meskhetians campaign for the return
(Khazanov 1995: 208). Among the arguments of those that are resisting to the initiative are
the allegations based on historical reasoning, namely a memory of pan-Turkish policy and,
more commonly, speculation on their non-Georgian identity, presenting them as others
(Szporluk 1994: 249; Khurbanov & Khurbanov 1995: 237). Efforts of different groups and
individuals5
in Georgia to defend and lobby the interests of Muslim Meskhetian makes a
typical case of (unsuccessful) attempt to collectivise immigrants trauma in Georgian society
proper. The prevailing idea that while facing the loss of jurisdiction over certain regions any
initiative that bears potential of further instability should be avoided prevented (Cornell 2001:
183) trauma process to homogenize public opinion, disabling agents in mediation to
collectivise their tragedy. Collective trauma occurs when the concept of loss and injustice is
shared by a number of people seeing themselves in similar condition or at least having an
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equal feeling of being victimized and facing common obligation (Sztompka 2004:160).
Instead, this instance makes massive rather than cultural trauma.
Perhaps the recent documentary of Chagelishvili, Meskhetians (2008) can be seen as
a continuing attempt to enter the debate. The documentary offers tragic narrative partially
told by same displaced Meskhetian respondents (predominantly residing in Central Asian
countries), most of them still preserving some of the basic cultural traits (limited knowledge
of Georgian language, poetry, recollections on original region of residence and etc.) and
hesitantly or otherwise identifying themselves as Georgians. There are shown also the
examples of a number of successful re-emigration in small numbers while stressing on the
safe character of the initiative of repatriation. Safety here relates to the general, popular
political (and collectivised) thesis (mentioned recently) of state securitization in post-
socialist countries where there is a primacy of state security and territorial integrity over the
rights of minority groups. It is determined by specific geopolitical situation or, more
interestingly, by collective perceptions on it, social sentiments and perceived fears (Kymlicka
2002: 20). Consequently, there is a possibility to speculate that this might be an example
when the perceived threats inherently dictates to the formation of specific collective attitude
which would forget, ignore and disregard, even deny and reinterpret the traumatic
discourse that, in similar other cases, are accepted and shared as a common cultural trauma.
Analogous, although less radical case would be also a tragedy of mukhadzhirstvo a
case in the history of Abkhazians and other groups of Caucasus region massive immigration
of Muslim population after the establishment of Russian military dominance in 1964 in the
region. It is commemorated but not reinterpreted for present realities as the post-Soviet
secessionism inherently implies cultural and political orientation towards Russian space and
this (hinting at the negative historical role of Russian in Abkhazians past) would explicitly
come in contradiction to a contemporary political discourse and ideology. Contrarily, their
ethno-linguistically close neighbours in southern Russia Adighe people, together with
Middle Eastern and European immigrants, have massively mobilized their efforts since
1990s with the demand to recognize the event as an act of Genocide (Globe, 2005).
Complexities of transformation of contemporary Georgian political discourse on past
The disproportionalities among the interpretations of the past and its selective nature is
also interesting to view on the high level of politics of Georgia, where the initiatives to re-
shift collective perceptions are obvious. At the same time, as we shall see, the paradigm of
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cultural trauma and victimhood, the notions of inflicted pain and historical injustices remains
to be the central elements of public discourse on past and present.
The main promoter of specific post-Shevardnadze national idea is the head of state,
President Micheil Saakashvili. In fact, there is a two-fold tendency (of different and
overlapping categories) can be observed here: (a) immense application of historical parallels,
heavy historicism and persistence of cultural trauma in legitimization of present national
goals and (b) challenge to the mono-ethnic exclusivist collective memory.
Saakashvili tries to desacralize ethnicity and employ civic multiculturalist discourse6.
However, sacral stays a vision on national history which plays one of the central roles in the
process of legitimization of pro-European political discourse. This is interesting as much as
the latter inherently implies the preservation of anti-Soviet/anti-Russian paradigm in the
politics of memory. The reburial of the remains of Cholokashvili from French Leuville
Cemetery of Georgian political immigrants to national pantheon in Tbilisi should be seen in
this prism. The current government of Georgia, having decided to give a final rest to national
hero in the homeland which he fled, organized a ceremony of burial unprecedented with its
massive theatricalised character and official participation7, accompanied with anti-Soviet
commemorative speeches8.
Another vivid example of the politics of memory and the agency in the trauma process is
the Museum of Soviet Occupation opened on the Day of Independence in 2006. The museum
offers a rich archive of documents, photo and video material depicting the repressing decades
of soviet politics with an opportunity to hear a public lecture on recent Georgian history
(Kaylan 2007). It also provides a user-friendly web-site with a rich online database
(http://archive.security.gov.ge/okupaciis.html): family members of repressed (imprisoned,
exiled or killed, or all three) individuals have a possibility to look up for a specific
information and also get a general picture of the process amid the dramatic visual records and
documentaries. The mass consumption of opened archival data, addressing traumatic events
of the Soviet years, fosters anti-Soviet (if not anti-Russian) popular memory and facilitates
the political and mnemonic socialization of young Georgian internet-users.
Naturally, art industry is also actively involved in the process of production of collective
memory. In fact, it always was from the very foundation years of Georgian nationalist
movement of 19th
century. This reality is testified with the case of the popular act the Jeans
Generation an account based on a true story of a terrorist act in 1983 dramatic criminal
case of several politically motivated young Georgians who attempted to hijack airplane and
escape abroad but ended up being assaulted by special forces that claimed a number of
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civilian lives (Kvanchilashvili, 2008). The story became reinterpreted as the anti-communist
saga where naive and free-spirited, desperate individuals became a victim and at the same
time, unintentionally, victimizers in their doomed attempt to break away from oppressing
political regime in a hope to reach the free world (the West). The same story is also
provided on mentioned archive hosted on the site Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs
(Plain highjackers).
Paradoxically, the anti-Russian discourse is still equated with the anti-soviet paradigm, it
did not undergo any substantial redefinition. This discourse, specifically in this case of the
1921 annexation and its alleged lingering endeavour to repeat the act continued to be a
central symbolic reference in political discourse during the 2008 Russian military
intervention which followed the renewed armed conflict between separatist Ossetian and
Tbilisi armed forces in South Ossetia/Tskhinvali region. Most of the presidential speeches
commenting on ongoing crisis included the reference to Soviet annexation of 1921, making
his point for international community with relatively internationally known cases of soviet
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 [...] soviet tanks moved into Prague in 1968 and into
Budapest in 1956 or Stalins advance to Finland in 1939 (President of Georgia met, 2008)
As for the namely Georgia-Ossetian relationships, there is a high probability that the
recent developments will leave even fewer resources for reconciliation between contesting
Georgian and Ossetian historical narratives and collective memories in the nearest future. A
heavy artillery assault by official Tbilisi on separatist forces during the mentioned 2008
conflict and alleged mass casualties returned a concept of genocide back in the Ossetian
political discourse with more vigour. While for my present purposes such a claim (South
Ossetia seeks, 2008), as well as its refutation (Osborn & Whalen, 2008) does not need to be
considered more than a part of information war, one could speculate that this interpretation
(official Tbilisis will to exterminate the whole Ossetian nation) will remain in the domain of
ethno-national Ossetian discourse and the concept of cultural trauma constructed on the
alleged attempts of Genocide with be further collectivise in social memory of ethnic
Ossetians. Much more promising seems Tbilisis undertakings in other cases, like Armenian-
Georgian relationships.
During and after the conflict, as the Bagramian battalion of local Armenians fought on
the side of secessionists in Abkhazia (Kukhianidze 1998: 115), pejorative image of
Armenians were reinforced. Although this episode did not remain for long in official Georgia
political discourse, it still firmly stays in the domain of popular memory of Georgians.
Georgian-Armenian relations as well make the case of conflicting memories that also implies
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territorial claims. Moreover, a dispute over Christian churches and cultural architectural
monuments, a theme initially emerged as early as in 19th
century, is still a common concern.
Inter-ethnic contestation is reflected in contradictory historical narratives too. For instance,
predominantly Armenian-populated southern Georgian region of Javakheti is considered as
historical part of the nation in popular memories of both groups (Nodia 2002: 34). During the
presidency of Shevardnadze local schools were supplied with textbooks from Armenia which
supposedly strengthened popular Armenian counter-narrative. A new Georgian government
came into power in 2003 obviously realized that, as Gellner puts it (2006 [1983]: 34),
monopoly on education was no less important than the monopoly on legitimate violence.
Ministry of Education and Science of Georgia has set an objective to homogenize the national
curricula, and the policy also implies stimulating representatives of the minority group to
acquire basic knowledge of official language (Texbook Tavtgavi, 2008). More
interestingly, although Georgian government is reluctant to institutionalize de facto
dominance of minority language in the region, its official policy also addressed the problem
of ethnocentric, exclusivist vision of Georgian history teaching which predisposes youth to
acquire structured emotional (negative) images of other ethnic groups. Currently such
hidden language of biases and stereotypes in school programs of history, geography and
civic education are actively studied. For instance, the analysis (Sarjveladze et. al., 2006) of
narratives of school textbooks of history circulating on 8th
and 9th
levels reveal two major
categories of we and them, including in the latter Ossetians, Abkhazians, Armenians and
others, to whom a lot of negative verbs and adjectives are applied (like resettled [in
Georgia], strangers [pejorative synonym],primitive, traitors, and etc).
---
The observation on post-communist developments and characteristics of Georgian social
memory indicates the enrichment and diversification of cultural tools in more technological
sense of the notion. Documentaries, reproducing the images on the screen with artistic
narration and moral/ethnical memory work represent cultural novelty that has a potential to
reinforce or redefine certain elements of collective memory of Georgians. As we have seen,
museum is also transgress the limits of tourism industry and, in case of Soviet Occupation
Museum, became another agent in trauma process. In overall, there is an impression that
historians are losing their monopoly on the right to narrate national history while the
historical narration itself is still certainly an undisputed, though not the unique source for
social memory.
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Conclusion
Proceeding from the discussion, it could be stated that the Georgian collective memory is
fundamentally shaped by the idea of independence and fight against Russian oppression,
aggression or threat, a discourse that entered Georgian historical narrative through literal
works and publications since Chavchavadzes generation and from its very initial period was
based on the paradigm of victimhood. After the fall of USSR this discourse re-emerged and
was strengthened by constructed vision on the loss of independence (1921), national
resistance (especially 1924 upheaval headed by Cholokashvili), political repressions (by the
agency like museums and archives) and ruthless, inhuman aggression (9th
of April, 1989).
It is also obvious that the pro-western discourse a central paradigm of cultural and
political orientation of Georgians is reinforced with heavy application of historical parallels
of the same kind that are embedded in the matrix of social memory. However, there is a
possibility to view pro-western/pro-European discourse as a by-product of anti-soviet/anti-
Russian collective sentiment, the one which has not undergone substantial changes and has
not bee revised. Moreover, it is being further fostered and collectivised by different agents,
among them by the current Georgian government in the first place.
The analysis of some of the points among listed constructed and narrated moments of
victimisation in modern history of Georgia, especially 9 April tragedy suggests that the
theory of cultural trauma seems applicable and promising conceptual framework and offers
interesting opportunities for further studies of contemporary Georgian (an not only Georgian)
nationalism. At this stage the main objective was to observe more general trends in
nationalist discourse based on historical narratives and the main conclusion is that it seems to
follow the paradigm of collective moral attribution of responsibility for oppression and
ungratefulness. It is apparent that victimisation is a basic and most general narrative
template and premise of Georgian nationalist discourse; the blame-work encompasses not
only the big Other (Russia) but also various ethnic communities of Georgia. The latter
aspect was discussed in brief, in the context of contestation. Consequently, a tendency similar
to that of Georgian nationalist discourse on past was revealed in counter-narratives of ethnicminorities. Although this demands a further study and more in-depth analysis, the general
character of nationalist discourses of Abkhazians and Ossetians equally revolve around the
traumatic events (e.g. Georgianization or genocide(s), respectively).
Hence, Georgian historical narrative is frequently challenged by ethnic minority
narratives and this makes academic works distinctively polemical, reinforcing radical
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nationalist interpretations and providing political elites and general public with a specific
discourse on collective traumas. This multiplicity of histories (read: memories) and
mnemonic battles seem to remain a prevailing paradigm in troubled inter-ethnic relations.
The character of representation of ethnic minorities in Georgian social memory is
predominantly negative and, as we have seen, it might had been originated in milder forms
during the 19th
century intellectual activism, but was mainly shaped during the soviet times,
on the background of ethno-territorial institutionalisation and the emergence of national-
cultural elites and academia.
While addressing the question of contestation and mnemonic wars, I have also touched
upon the aspect of forgetting in parallel with collective remembering is apparently a complex
and frequent occurrence. The concept of collective amnesia seems to make sense in cases like
Mukhadzirstwo or Meskhetian Turks when important social changes are neglected and
disregarded.
Although here the attempts are only