THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH

TITLE: Nationalism and Democratization:The Case of Ethnic Russians inNewly Independent Latvia

AUTHOR: Mary I. Dakin

CONTRACTOR: Indiana University

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Darrell Hammer

COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER: 806-07

DATE: May, 1992

The work leading to this report was supported by contract funds provided by the National Council for Soviet andEast European Research. The analysis and interpretations contained in the report are those of the author.

COPYRIGHT INFORMATION

Individual researchers retain the copyright on work products derived from research funded by Council Contract.The Council and the U. S. Government have the right to duplicate written reports and other materials submittedunder Council Contract and to distribute such copies within the Council and U.S. Government for their own use,and to draw upon such reports and materials for their own studies; but the Council and U.S. Government do nothave the right to distribute, or make such reports and materials available, outside the Council or U.S.Government without the written consent of the authors, except as may be required under the provisions of theFreedom of Information Act 5 U.S.C. 552, or other applicable law.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

This paper was written as part of an ongoing research project at Indiana University on theRussian minorities in the former Soviet republics. The project is supported by the National Councilon Soviet and East European Research (Contract No. 806-07). The conclusions presented in thepaper are the author's own, and do not necessarily reflect the position either of the Project Directoror of the National Council. Mary Dakin is a doctoral student in political science at Indiana Universi-ty, and research assistant in the Russian minorities project. Comments or criticisms of the paperwould be welcomed, and they can be sent either to me or to the author at the Department of PoliticalScience, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405.

Darrell P. HammerProfessor of Political ScienceProject Director

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A number of individuals have been helpful with suggestions and comments in the process offorming and revising this paper, including John T. Aney, Richard Blum, Professor Rasma Karklins,Diane B. Kraft, Professor James Lutz, and especially Professor Darrell P. Hammer. I would like toexpress my appreciation for their insights; nevertheless all opinions and conclusions expressed in thispaper are the responsibility of the author alone.

Mary I. Dakin, May 1992

CONTENTS

Executive Summary i

Introduction 1Democratic Standards and Nationalism Defined 4

Ethnic Conflict and Democratization in Latvia 6Demographic Background 7

Political Activities of the Russian-Speaking Opposition 11Events Surrounding the Violence in the Baltic in January 1991 14March Referendum and Plebescite in Latvia 16Elections 17The August Putsch and Beyond 19

Possible Areas of Violation of Rights of Non-Latvians 22Language Rights 23Soviet Military Presence 26Voting and Citizenship Rights 28

Summary 34

Bibliography 37

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Is Latvia implementing a policy of "apartheid" in dealing with the Russian-speaking

peoples who remain in the republic in the wake of Latvia's achievement of independence?

The charge was made recently by Sergei Stankevich, a leading political advisor to President

Yeltsin. "Apartheid" is strong language, perhaps too strong to describe the current state of

interethnic relations in Latvia. Nevertheless, recent legislation regarding citizenship

requirements, language, and other rights of non-Latvians in the Republic of Latvia will

directly violate a number of United Nations Human Rights conventions if implemented.

The development and subsequent success of nationalist movements in the Baltic

republics now evokes a number of pressing questions regarding constitutional, cultural,

language and ethnic rights. The position of Russians and Russian-speaking nationals outside

the Russian Republic has begun to attract attention, and political movements have arisen in

response to indigenous nationalist movements to represent the interests of Russian-speaking

and other minority populations. In Latvia, where the eponymous nationality comprises

slightly over half the population, the situation is particularly tense.

This study is a discussion of the potential consequences of nationalist movements for

the processes of democratization of the states of the former Soviet empire. Recent develop-

ments in Latvia are used as a case study: ethnic conflict between the titular population and

the non-indigenous "Russian-speaking" population is traced, with specific focus on alleged

violations of human rights. I look at the circumstances leading to the rise of the Latvian

nationalist movement and the Russian backlash, and conclude that the rights of non-Latvians

would be violated if the new legislation is enforced.

INTRODUCTION

More than sixty years ago, Carlton Hayes asked what had led to the "great vogue" of

nationalism. In recent years nationalism seems once again resurging worldwide as a force in

regime changes and revolutions. While the waves of nationalism may never have completely

receded, the events of recent years in Eastern and Central Europe again call world attention

to this phenomenon. Ideological preconceptions often lead, however, to assumptions which

divide between "good" and "bad" nationalism. "Good" nationalist movements claim

democracy as the goal, whereas "bad" nationalisms are sympathetic to or promote Commu-

nist, Islamic, or other potentially authoritarian or undemocratic regime types.

In Polyarchy, Dahl defines five processes by which polyarchies can be inaugurated.

He describes the fifth such potential process as polyarchy inaugurated "by a national

independence struggle," wherein "... the ideology of democracy was reinforced by the

ideology of nationalism: to attack representative democracy was to attack the nation. The

success of the movement for national independence largely liquidates the principal contenders

for the legitimacy of the old regime."1 As examples of this fifth process, where democrati-

zation emerges in tandem with the formation or reformation of a nation-state, he cites

Finland, Ireland, Israel, and the United States. Dahl asserts that this fifth process is

unlikely to succeed in the promotion of developing democracy in the future, for two basic

reasons. The first is that although leaders of nationalist movements might pronounce

democracy the primary goal of independence, these leaders may find, once independence is

achieved, that the opportunities afforded to opposition forces by democracy are a threat.

"Nationalism does not so much encourage tolerance of dissent and opposition as it provides a

1 Robert Dahl, Polyarchy, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1971, 42.

provides a ready and acceptable justification for intolerance and repression."2 Dahl's second

proposed limitation on this fifth process was the fact that it was obsolete in a world which consists

mainly of sovereign states, asserting that the disappearance of colonial empires had diminished the

opportunities for movements of national independence.

Although Polyarchy was written more than twenty years ago, and neither Dahl nor anyone

else would at that time have predicted the collapse of the Soviet empire, Dahl's second limitation

was not an accurate representation of a world in which equivalents to "colonial empires" persisted,

particularly in Eastern Europe and in Africa. Although the characterization of this form of

emerging democracy as obsolete was premature, Dahl's contention that nationalism may present

a conflicting force in the development of a democratic system merits examination. Is there

evidence of the restrictive potential of nationalism to democratization?

It is the contention in this paper that despite the legitimacy of the sovereignty demands of

many of the most recent nationalist movements in Central Europe, any assumption that the success

of these movements will lead to democratic systems is premature. Cases illustrating the many

difficulties of the transition from authoritarianism abound in the countries of the former Soviet

empire. In many of these countries the very nationalist sentiments which mobilized the population

against the old regime may interfere with the legitimate transformation to truly representative

democratic institutions. One such case is Latvia.

Latvia's situation illustrates a number of the conditions under which the countries of the

former Soviet Union find themselves struggling to create new governmental forms. For decades

the political structure was subject to central approval or control. The centralized economy has left

it highly dependent on the central distributive apparatus, and industrial development was carried

2Dahl, p. 44.

- 2 -

the former Soviet Union find themselves struggling to create new governmental forms. For

decades the political structure was subject to central approval or control. The centralized

economy has left it highly dependent on the central distributive apparatus, and industrial

development was carried out in accord with the needs of that apparatus. The major cleavage

among the population is by nationality, due mostly to the migration of ethnic Russians to the

republic. Although Latvia did have an interwar period of independence, like the other

former republics it does not have a strong tradition of representative democratic government.

Like the other Baltic countries, Latvia's incorporation into the Soviet Union has

always been viewed by the world community as illegal; subsequently, the achievement of

independence was celebrated worldwide. Possibly as a result of these celebratory goodwill

sentiments, the developing political structure has not been scrutinized in the same manner

that, for example, the developing structures in Central Asian republics have been watched for

human rights violations. Yet, as elsewhere in the "C.I.S.," interethnic conflict and even

violence continue.

In this paper I assess the effect of nationalism and interethnic conflict on the progress

in democratization in Latvia. Using accepted standards for what comprises a representative

democracy (or a "polyarchy," as Dahl puts it), I look at Latvia's progress in implementing

institutions that meet those standards. To date, the governing structure in Latvia violates a

number of these standards, and the underlying cause is discrimination against ethnic Russians

and Russian-speaking non-Latvians residing in the republic. The non-Latvian population in

Latvia is not a homogeneous group of pro-Communist militant colonizers. Nevertheless

legislation in Latvia regarding language, citizenship, representation, and voting rights will

treat them as a single group. The laws impose limitations on the political and economic

rights of non-Latvians, limitations which contradict accepted definitions of democratic

practice.

Democratic Standards and Nationalism Defined

Hayes defined nationalism as "the paramount devotion of human beings to fairly large

nationalities and the conscious founding of a political 'nation' on linguistic and cultural

nationality ... patriotism fused with the consciousness of nationality."3 He dismisses the

contention that humans are instinctively nationalist, citing "natural" human loyalties to a

number of group types that are not necessarily nationalist. Hayes maintains that while

economic developments have "made for" nationalism, they have not caused its develop-

ment.4 I also will treat nationalism not as an epi-phenomenon, but as a separate identity

cleavage, distinct from other cleavages such as economic groupings or even religious

affiliation in that it is far more difficult to abandon. Rejecting collective action or cultural

definitions of nationalism, Alexander Motyl defines nationalism as a belief type or an ideal:

"Nationalism ... is a political ideal that views statehood as the optimal form of political

organization for each nation."5 Nationalism thus may lead to collective action but is not

collective action in and of itself. In this paper I agree with Motyl's placement of nationalism

3Carlton Hayes, The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism, New York, Richard R.Smith, Inc., 1968, 6.

4Ibid., 292, 296.

5 Alexander Motyl, Sovietology, Rationality, Nationality, New York, Columbia UniversityPress, 1991, 53.

in the semantic field of "belief; I do not include Motyl's assertion that once a nation attains

statehood, behaviors are no longer nationalist. I will also consider attempts to preserve the

state established by the nationalist movement to be nationalist behavior.

Dahl has outlined a series of standards for what comprises a polyarchy. These

standards have often been summarized; Lijphart defines a "reasonably responsive democra-

cy" by the presence of eight institutional guarantees:

1) Freedom to form and join organizations2) Freedom of expression3) Right to vote4) Eligibility for public office.5) Right of political leaders to compete for support and votes6) Alternative sources of information7) Free and fair elections8) Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other

expressions of preference.6

Although the eighth institution here seems well on its way to implementation in

Latvia, the Russian-speaking population argues that, for non-Latvians, many of the other

standards are not only absent but expressly violated by legislation. If true, this assertion

essentially negates the "democratic" legitimacy of institutions already established. Herbert

Kitschelt explains democratic institutions as defined by three problems: 1) Citizenship rights,

or which players are allowed to participate; 2) Procedures - "the rules of the game"; and 3)

Allocation of resources to the "players. "7 While the procedural element is one of the critical

6 Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government inTwenty-One Countries, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1984.

7 Herbert Kitschelt, "The Formation of Party Systems in Eastern Europe," Paper for the1991 APSA Meeting in Washington, D.C.; 6-10.

areas, the most critical in Latvia currently is the citizenship "problem" - those denied

citizenship are excluded from procedures and resources from the outset.

Ethnic Conflict and Democratization in Latvia

The development of nationalist movements for independence in the non-Russian Soviet

republics instigated rising interethnic pressure. Members of nationalities not indigenous to

republics, particularly ethnic Russians, raised questions involving legal and constitutional

issues, cultural and language rights, questions of economic debts and realities both past and

future, and ethnic rights, in the event of secession by those republics. The successful

secession of the Baltic republics and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union itself have not

yet led to answers to those questions.

According to 1989 census figures, more than twenty-five million or 17.4 percent of

Russians in the USSR lived outside the RSFSR.8 The position of Russian and Russian-

speaking nationals outside the Russian republic, and their rights within the context of the new

"Commonwealth" structure, however it evolves, remains unclear. This lack of clarity is

especially problematic in the Baltic states. The Russian-speaking populations responded to

the nationalist independence movements of the late eighties by organizing opposition

movements, especially in Estonia and Latvia, where the indigenous populations hold very

tenuous majorities. The most contentious interethnic issues remaining in the aftermath of

independence include language rights, voting rights and questions of fair representation,

8 Lev Gudkov, "Social Barometer: Russians in the Republics," Moscow News, EnglishEdition, October 21-28, 1990, 7.

citizenship laws, and the Soviet military presence in Latvia.

Demographic Background

Interethnic tension is directly related to the demographic composition of the LaSSR

and its changes over the last forty years. According to results of the 1989 census, the

current population of the LaSSR stood at 2,667,000.9 Ethnic Latvians comprise 52 percent

of the total population, while 33.8 percent of the population is ethnic Russian and 7.9 percent

Belorussian and Ukrainian (see Table I).10 Most non-Latvians reside in urban areas. More

than half of Latvia's Russian speakers now live in Riga, a city which, with only a 38 percent

Latvian population, is more Russian than Latvian.

TABLE 1

Population of Latvia, by Nationality, 198911

Nationality

LatvianRussian,

Belorussian &Ukrainian

PolishOthers

Percent ofTotal

52.0

41.92.33.8

9 "Chislennost' postaiannogo naseleniia soiuznykh respublik," Vestnik statistiki, No. 3,1990, 79.

10 P. Zvidrins, "Our Demographic Pluses and Minuses," Cina, March 8, 1990, p. 3;"Census Statistics for Latvia Examined," JPRS Report on the Soviet Union - Political Affairs,June 12, 1990, 82-83.

11 M.N. Rutkevich, "O dvukh aspektakh mezhnatsional'nykh otnoshenii," Sotsialisticheskieissledovaniia. 3/91, 11.

Ethnic Latvians have maintained their majority status, but the Latvian population in

proportion to the total population of the republic has dropped steadily since incorporation into

the USSR in 1940, at which point at least 70 percent of residents were Latvian. During the

forties Latvians suffered substantial losses resulting from both the war and mass deportations,

especially in 1941 and 1949.12 The Latvian portion of the population stood at 62 percent in

1959, and has declined steadily. This is accounted for by both a decreasing rate of natural

increase in the republic and a very high mechanical growth rate (around 60 percent of total

growth between 1959 and 1989).13 The ethnic Latvian sector saw a relative decline - not

surprising, given that most of those immigrating to Latvia are not ethnic Latvians.

In a 1989 the LaSSR Council of Ministers cited a real mechanical growth figure of

almost double the natural population growth between 1971 and 1988, giving Latvia the

highest mechanical growth rate of all Union republics.14 This is largely a product of the

migration of workers of other ethnic backgrounds into the Baltic republics which expanded as

a result of a labor shortage in the region. With the development of large-scale Soviet

industrial projects came the need for more workers and specialists than the local population

could provide. The titular populations of the Baits originally were, on average, much more

highly educated than those of other Soviet republics, and were less inclined toward blue-

12 Romuald J. Misiunas and Rein Taagepera, The Baltic States: Years of Dependence, 1940-1980, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983, 204-208.

13 Rybakovskii, L.L. and Trasova, N.V., "Migratsionnye protsessy v SSSR: novyeiavlenniia," Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, No. 7, 1990, 34.

14 "Postanovlenie No. 46: O merakh po prekraschenniiu neobosnovannogo mekhanicheskogoprirosta naselenniia i regulirovanniiu protsessov migratsii v LaSSR," Sovetskaia Latviia,February 18, 1989, 2.

8

collar work.15 The result is that today ethnic Russian workers dominate several typically

blue-collar fields. In 1987, only 27 percent of all industrial workers were ethnic Latvians,

and Latvians comprised only 7 percent of transport and communication workers and 9

percent of construction workers.16

Although Russian-speaking workers were brought to the Baltic to compensate for an

undersupply of labor, most Latvians believe that this mass immigration has become dispro-

portionate to actual industrial need in recent years. The traditional state of enterprise

management in the Soviet Union might support this claim. Worker "shortages" in the

individual enterprise were largely a function of management decisions, in that management

found it easier at times to increase the labor portion of inputs than to make capital or policy

adjustments to the production process. Many Latvians, particularly members of the Latvian

Citizens Committees and some factions of the Popular Front of Latvia, believe that the in-

migration of Russian-speakers was "artificially created," claiming that enterprises needing

workers frequently recruited only outside of Latvia, ignoring an existing pool of labor. In

February 1989, the Latvia Council of Ministers and the Trade Unions Council passed a

resolution to control the republic's mechanical growth. The resolution was structured to

curtail the importation of workers from outside the republic by a system of per worker

"mandatory differentiated charges" levied against the offending enterprise. By late 1990 the

15 Maris I. Graudins, "The Rationale and Implementation of the 1984 Soviet School Reformin Latvia," Journal of Baltic Studies, Vol. XIX, No. 1 (Spring 1988), 22-23.

16 Trud v SSSR, Moskva, Finansy i statistika, 1989, 24-25.

9

new regulations were considered successful in severely reducing mechanical growth.17

Nevertheless, rhetoric advocating the "repatriation" of ethnic Russians is still common.

The demographic situation in Latvia is generally referred to in the Latvian press as

the demographic "problem." The more anti-Russian factions of the PFL called for the

outmigration of the "colonizers" from the very beginning of the nationalist movements. By

1991, serious parliamentary discussion had surfaced in Latvia regarding the "voluntary"

emigration of Russian speaking residents of Latvia to Russia, coupled with the immigration

of Latvians to Latvia. Computations of costs of this "repatriation" to the Russian speakers'

"historic" homeland appeared.18 Supporters of such a project consider it a fair and realistic

solution to the demographic "problem" in Latvia.19 Members of that Russian-speaking

population look at it differently; in an era of political and economic unknowns, the move to

an uncertain fate in a different republic where the emigre may not have lived for years, if

ever, can hardly be appealing. Even the term "Russian-speaking" is contentious as a

descriptor of the non-Latvian residents; one publicist asserts that the term is used to disguise

both the multinational composition of the population, and a "legalized war against Russia and

the Russian people. "20

17 "O merakh po prekrashchenniiu neobosnovannogo mekhanicheskogo prirosta naseleniiai regulirovanniiu protsessov migratsii v LaSSR," Sovetskaia Latviia, February 18, 1989, 2-3.

18 Bondarenko, A. and Makarov, K., "Emotsii i realnost'", Sovetskaia Latviia, 23 April1991, 3.

19 Ibid..

20Eduard Volodin, "Russkoiazychnye: tochka zreniia obozrevatelia," Sovetskaia Rossiia,13 November 1991.

10

POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF THE RUSSIAN-SPEAKING OPPOSITION

In Latvia the most visible non-Latvian opposition group prior to the August putsch

was the International Front of Workers of the Latvian SSR or "Interfront" movement,

affiliated with the union-wide Intermovement, which resisted the breakup of the Union,

supported the Communist party, and claimed that violations of human rights were being

carried out against ethnic Russians. Although Interfront addressed some of the issues most

sensitive and critical to the rights of non-Latvians in Latvia, the movement failed to mobilize

a significant portion of the Russian-speaking population, despite the demographic makeup of

the republic.

The Popular Front of Latvia (hereafter PFL) was founded in October, 1988 as an

umbrella group for Latvian nationalist parties and movements. In response, the more pro-

Communist elements of the Russian-speaking population formed their own party, Interfront,

which held its founding congress January of 1989. A charter, accompanied by declarations

and resolutions, was produced in that first Congress. The positions articulated at this time

remained consistent up to the attainment of Latvian independence in September, 1991. The

group advocated economic reform within the framework of the USSR, promoted the leading

role of the Communist party, the establishment of two state languages and the guarantee of

educational instruction in both languages, and protested both the establishment of separate

LaSSR citizenship and the exclusion of many Russian speakers from eligibility for citizen-

ship. A number of the measures passed in the legislature in Latvia during the struggle to

assert republic sovereignty vis-a-vis the center were resisted by both pro-Communist and

Russian-speaking forces. Establishment, for example, of a Latvian procuracy with jurisdic-

11

tion superior to the union-established procuracy caused a great furor among conservatives.

Declaration of alternative military service for ethnic Latvians, reinstatement of old Latvian

symbols as official state symbols, a Latvian customs service, and even the announcement of

the impending implementation of Latvian currency, all rulings made before 1991, invoked

resistance from pro-Center "hard-liners."

One piece of legislation cited as particularly discriminatory was an amendment of the

Latvian Constitution with respect to quorum. It was decided that for a law to be adopted in

Latvia, a simple majority of participants in the vote would be sufficient provided that not less

than one third of the ethnic Latvian deputies vote in support. Russian-speaking deputies

called this decision yet another attempt to cut dissenters off from decision-making.21

Interfront's pro-Communist and subsequently pro-Union approach to reform and the

stridency of the party's approach appear to have had limited appeal for many more moderate

non-Latvians, many of whom were not opposed to or actively supported the prospect of

Latvian secession from the USSR. Polls published in 1990 and 1991 indicated only minimal

support for Interfront and related coalitions among the Russian population, and election

performances were also poor. A group of 1,000 ethnic Russians met February 3, 1991 at a

meeting called by the Russian Cultural Society of Latvia, and adopted a resolution supporting

the Latvian government and the Supreme Council. This group came to form its own

organization, because it did not want to be represented by Interfront or the Communist Party.

A statement was issued by the participants to the effect that there is no discrimination against

21Irina Litvinova, "Amendments Made to Constitution," Izvestiia, 25 October 1990, 2; FBIS-SOV-90-212, 1 November 1990, 73.

12

the non-Latvian population in Latvia.22

In a poll conducted by the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion, 41

percent of Russians in the Baltic approved of secession.23 Results in Latvia were not

published separately; however, a poll conducted by the Latvia Sociological Association in

February 1990 found that 45 percent of non-Latvians favored "an independent Latvia," and

52 percent favored a "federation." 68 percent said they would remain in Latvia if the

republic became independent, while 13 percent said they would move to the USSR and 2

percent to different countries. 62 percent of non-Latvians polled said they approved of

legislation granting Republic of Latvia citizenship immediately to all current inhabitants who

request it.24

In a continuation of that same poll, ethnic Russians gave Interfront ratings of -12 in

February, 1991, -22 in June, -18 in September, and -17 in November, on a scale of +100

"like very much, support fully" to -100 "do not like at all, am opposed." The most popular

political parties among Russians were the Environmental Protection Club, the National

Cultural Societies, the Balto-Slavic Societies, and the Union of Latvian Workers, none of

which received ratings over +50. Most ratings by ethnic Russians fluctuated between 10

and 20 points of 0, the point of neutrality on this scale.25 These survey results were present-

22 Report on the USSR, February 15, 1991, 27.

23 Lev Gudkov, 7.

24 Irina Litvinova, "Sociologists' Predictions," Izvestiia, April 30, 1990, p. 4; CurrentDigest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XLII, No. 17, (1990).

25 "Public Opinion in Latvia Today," Atmoda, 22 January 1991, 2; JPRS-UPA-91-012, 4March 1991, 23-25.

13

ed with no accompanying information either about the methodology used or the organization

conducting the poll so the accuracy of the surveys is questionable; they do serve as an

indicator that part of the non-Latvian population is not as conservative and pro-Soviet as

Interfront is perceived to be.

Events Surrounding the Violence in the Baltic in January, 1991

In November 1990 the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights, the Soviet and

Latvian Constitutions, a pro-Communist organization with a high proportion of ethnic

Russians, held its second congress. Alfred Rubiks, a member of the Politburo and first

secretary of the Latvian CP Central Committee, was chairman of the committee. The 2,200

delegates representing cities and regions, labor collectives and Army units adopted resolu-

tions in support of Gorbachev, conclusion of a union treaty, and protection of servicemen in

Latvia. The Committee claimed to have collected 400,000 signatures on a petition for a

referendum to define the future status of Latvia.26

The decision was also taken to form the All-Latvia Committee for Public Salvation,

headed by Rubiks and Alberts Kauls, in response to violations of civil rights, especially

connected with the Soviet military. This Committee was later declared unlawful by the

Latvian Supreme Council, and the names of its other members kept secret. The Committee

for Public Salvation reported at the Third Interfront congress in 1991 more than 4,000

appeals claiming violation of civil rights had been made to the Committee since its formation

26 Valerii Zaitsev, TASS, Moscow 1450 GMT, 25 November 1990; "Congress on CivilRights Held in Riga," FB1S Report on the Soviet Union, 30 November 1990, 71.

14

in November 1990.27 The Third Interfront congress was marred by several explosions that

week, including one in front of the building where the congress was held, at the Lenin

monument, the CP building in Maskavas, and the military commandant's headquarters.28

Resentment over the military presence grew with the independence movement, and the

conflict with Soviet military troops began to heat up in November 1990. Citing incidents of

brutality by troops, the Latvian Supreme Council adopted a decision November 14 to end all

social and material support of servicemen and their families. Food supplies were cut off,

and children of servicemen were denied school places.29 In response, Gorbachev threatened

imposition of presidential rule; following negotiations, the central government agreed not to

send in air troops and the portion of the November 14 decision suspending supplies to the

Union troops was rescinded.30

When violence broke out in Lithuania in January 1991, a group of OMON (Black

Berets) attacked the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Riga (January 20), killing four and seizing

and detaining five volunteer guards. The captives reportedly were taken to the Black Beret

camp, beaten, forced to sign false confessions, and then detained in KGB cells.31 An attack

27 TASS, Moscow, 1904 GMT 15 December 1990; "Latvian Interfront Holds ThirdCongress in Riga," FBIS-SOV-90-242, 17 December 1990, 71.

28 V. Dubrovskii, "For a Bloc of Leftist Forces," Sovetskaia Latviia, 18 December 1990,1-2; JPRS-UPA-91-012, 4 March 1991, 16-18.

29 Irina Litvinova, "How they Celebrated the Festival," Izvestiia, 20 November 1990, 2;FBIS-SOV-90-235, 6 December 1990, 63.

30 Riga International Service in English, 1830 GMT 27 November 1990; "Latvia Imposes'Economic Blockade' on Soviet Army" FBIS-SOV 90-231, 30 November 1990, 72.

31 Report on the USSR, February 8, 1991, 33.

15

on a car containing three members of the Black Berets and TV journalist Aleksandr Nev-

zorov was reported February 3; no one was injured. Nevzorev had produced a film, "18

hours in Riga," glorifying the OMON actions during the January 1991 conflict. 32

March Referendum and Plebiscite in Latvia

On March 6, the Latvian Supreme Council ruled that the March 17 all-union

referendum on maintaining the Soviet Union as a federation had no legal effect in Latvia, and

that election committees were not to cooperate. Instead, a plebiscite had been held in Latvia

on March 3 asking the question: "Are you for a democratic and independent Republic of

Latvia?" According to a Radio Liberty analyst, 87.6 percent of eligible voters participated

throughout Latvia, and of those 73.7 percent voted for independence and 24.7 voted against,

meaning that a total of 64.5 percent of all registered voters voted for independence. The

implication is that a good number of Russian-speaking residents supported Latvia's bid for

independence.33

The Communist Party urged a "no" vote in response to the poll, while Interfront and

related movements urged voters to vote both "yes" and "no" to invalidate the ballots in

protest of the poll. Only 0.6 percent of ballots were invalid, however.34 Committees of 17

organizations (such as the Party, Interfront, the Council of Labor Collectives, and deputies

belonging to Soiuz, for example) chose to participate in the Union referendum anyway. It

32 Report on the USSR, February 15, 1991, 27.

33 Dzintra Bungs, "Poll Shows Majority in Latvia Endorses Independence," Report on theUSSR, March 15, 1991, 22.

34 Ibid., 24.

16

was reported that 65 percent of eligible voters participated, and of those 95 percent voted

"yes."35 However, Helsinki Commission staff who visited polling places reported extensive

irregularities:

Many polling places had no voter list at all, and those that did accepted allcomers . . . the only requirement to vote was some piece of identification showingSoviet citizenship . . . In order to test the system, one newspaper reporter cast fiveballots in the space of one hour and even used an Estonian [i.e. local internal]passport with someone else's picture . . . a situation which begs for abuse.36

If these reports are accurate, then the results reported by the conservative organizations that

ran the polls cannot be considered meaningful.

Elections

In March 26, 1989 elections for USSR People's Deputies, seven deputies from

Latvia were considered "conservative" (although only two were Interfront members), and

fifteen of the winners were associated with the Popular Front.37 Interfront made claims that

these elections were not "democratic" or representative, charging that gerrymandering had

skewed the results. The claim may be justified: analysis by Soviet geographers shows that

the population was not accurately represented in the drawing of electoral district boundaries.

Berezkin et al find that "very strong deviations in the number of voters, and gross violations

35 "Ob itogakh referenduma SSSR, sostaiavshegosia 14 marta 1991 goda," Izvestiia, 27March 1991, 3.

36 Referendum in the Soviet Union: A Compendium of Reports on the March 17, 1991Referendum on the Future of the USSR, Commission of Security and Cooperation in Europe,April, 1991, 20.

37 Dzintra Bungs, "A Victory for Reformers in Estonia and Latvia," Report on the USSR,April 28, 1989, pp. 15-17.

17

of the 'one man-one vote' principle have been permitted."38 In Latvia specifically,

. . . considerable discrepancies exist between the number of voters in rural and urbanelectoral districts. One of the sparsely populated rural national-territorial districtsconsists of 28,000 voters, whereas in the largest of the urban national territorialdistricts this number can increase to 137,000. Since^Latvian majority exists in rurallocalities, and Russian-speaking inhabitants of the republic are concentrated mainly incities, these differences have acquired particularly great political significance.39

In other words, the voter from a district with a drastically smaller population will be,

so to speak, over-represented, relative to the voter from a district with four times the

population. This problem was raised at the first USSR Congress of People's Deputies by

V.I. Alksnis. Kolosov finds an anti-city tendency in the drawing of electoral boundaries, an

"inclination to assign extra seats to the periphery at the expense of the center."40 According

to Kolosov, six of Riga's seven national-territorial districts were under-represented. In 13 of

the union republics the titular nationalities were represented "normally," that is, in proportion

to the total population. The Latvian SSR delegation, one of the two exceptions, had 26

percent more ethnic Latvians than in the population of Latvia.41

In the elections to local councils held in January 1990, Interfront candidates had little

success. At the local level Interfront candidates won .51 percent of seats, the PFL 42.4

38 A.V. Berezkin, V.A. Kolosov, M.E. Pavlovskaya, N.V. Petrov and L.V. Smirnyagin,"The Geography of the 1989 Elections of People's Deputies of the USSR," Soviet Geography,Vol. 30 No. 10, October 1989, 613.

39 Ibid..

40 V.A. Kolosov, "The Geography of Elections of USSR People's Deputies by National-Territorial Districts and the Nationalities Issue," Soviet Geography, Vol. 31, No. 12, December1990, 755.

41 Ibid., 763.

18

percent, and the agrarian Farmers Union 23 percent.42 Results of the March 18, 1990

elections to the republic Supreme Council were similar. Only 8 percent of those elected

were Interfront members, and Interfront did not succeed in its goal of preventing the Popular

Front from gaining the two-thirds majority. Not surprisingly, Popular Front candidates did

well in rural areas and Interfront candidates were more successful in urban areas heavily

populated by Russian speakers.43

The percentage of ethnic Russians elected to the Latvian Supreme Council was 21.1,

compared to 69.8 ethnic Latvians. Russians comprised 11.4 percent of all deputies, Latvians

82.6 percent - 30 percent higher than their percentage of the population.44 The perception

of ties between Interfront and related organizations, the Communist Party, and military and

OMON activities has been persistent. This reputation could well have been detrimental to

Interfront's popularity among less "conservative" Russian speakers, and a factor in the poor

election performance of more conservative Russian candidates. However, if election

districting was actually inaccurate, the principle of "free and fair elections" may have been

violated, as many Russian-speaking political groups maintain.

The August Putsch and Beyond

As soon as the "State Committee for the Emergency Situation" announced its

42 A. Sheinin, "Let's Count Up the Percentages: Preliminary Election Results," SovetskaiaMolodezh', February 10, 1990, p. 1; JPRS Report on the Soviet Union - Political Affairs,March28, 1990, 53-54.

43 Ibid., 51.

44 Valerii Tishkov, "Ethnicity and Power in the Republics of the USSR," Journal of SovietNationalities, Fall 1990, Vol. 1, No. 3, 57.

19

formation, the leadership of the PFL declared the coup invalid and urged non-cooperation; a

thousand supporters reportedly rushed to barricade the parliament building. The PFL

headquarters was taken over by OMON troops, and the Baltic Military District immediately

declared its support of the committee.45 Alfred Rubiks called for imposition of martial law,

recommended formation of a new government headed by the Committee for National

Salvation, and the disbanding of all political parties except the Communist party. In an

interview, Rubiks declared his "joy" and "pride" at the course of events.46 On August 21

the Supreme Council of Latvia adopted a Law on the State Status of the Republic of Latvia,

reaffirming Latvian Independence from the Union. When the fact that the coup was falling

apart was announced, orders came from Moscow confining all OMON units and soldiers to

base. Despite these orders, OMON troops reportedly continued to make their presence

known in Riga for the next few days. 47

Immediately after the coup fizzled, the Supreme Council of Latvia began passing

legislation to eliminate Soviet institutions and organizations. August 23, 1991 the Commu-

nist Party was declared illegal in Latvia, and a proposal to bring criminal charges against

Alfred Rubiks was endorsed. A committee took over the CP Central Committee headquar-

ters, and Rubiks, who had just resigned as First Secretary, was arrested on charges of

attempting to overthrow the democratically established government of Latvia. The activities

of Interfront, the Council of Work Collectives, the Council of War and War Veterans, and

45 Sovetskaia Latviia, 23 August 1991, 2.

46 Dzingtras Bungs, "Latvia Reaffirms Its Independence," Report on the USSR, September6, 1991, 55.

47 Ibid., 55-56.

20

the Komsomol were all suspended, and the liquidation of the KGB in Latvia announced.48

The successful secession and restoration of the Republic of Latvia has not erased the

controversies and problems that existed before August 21. If anything, tensions have grown,

and the interethnic conflict has become more immediate than ever. Following the August 23

arrest of Rubiks, Ravnopravie ("Equal Rights") legislators began protesting his incarceration,

labeling him a political prisoner. Rubiks, arrested for treason under Article 59 of the legal

code of the LaSSR, began a hunger strike August 24, a protest he did not abandon for

several weeks.49

Once Latvia was officially recognized by the Soviet government, Ravnopravie, the

Interfront-affiliated faction of representatives in the Supreme Council of Latvia, asserted that

as a People's Deputy of the USSR, Rubiks could not be arrested on the territory of another

state, and the arrest was a violation of international law.50 In October Latvian law enforce-

ment officers traveled into Russia to arrest an OMON officer, Sergei Parfenov, and returned

with him to Latvia. This action was declared a violation of International Law by Ravno-

pravie, by the RSFSR Ministry of Justice, and by the Chief Representative of the Office of

the Procuracy of the RSFSR, but no official stance was taken by the RSFSR government in

opposition to the arrest.51 Protests were held by Russian speakers on behalf of the arrested,

2.

48 Ibid., 57.

49 V. Kozhemiako, "Rubiks golodaet, deputaty protestuiut," Pravda, 10 September 1991,

50 BALTFAX in English, 2025 GMT, 30 October 1991; "Opposition on Existence ofPolitical Prisoners," FBIS-SOV-91-211, 31 October 1991, 41.

51 Sergei Kornilov, "Vydan Latvii nezakonno," Rossiiskaia gazeta, 21 November 1991.

21

including one three-day picket of the parliament building and press conferences.52 To this

day protests continue regularly on behalf of Parfenov, who is considered by many Russians

to be a political prisoner, denied standard civil rights in connection with incarceration and

indictment.

Newspaper articles in recent months in the Russian-language press indicate a growing

dissatisfaction with the conditions of non-Latvians in Latvia who did support secession from

the USSR. Migranian reported on a February conference of "Russians of the Baltic" held in

Riga, the fourth such conference within the last year. According to Migranian, many of the

delegates from the three Baltic republics were people who worked "shoulder to shoulder" in

the "struggle against the communist center," and the majority of Russian speakers supported

the Popular Fronts on independence.53 These people now feel betrayed and threatened,

especially on the question of citizenship, which will deny them not only the right to vote, but

also economic rights, the right to own property, rights to housing, and social support in an

age of impending unemployment. According to Migranian, many feel that they were used as

a propagandists picture of an illusory interethnic harmony in the Baltic.

POSSIBLE AREAS OF VIOLATION OF RIGHTS OF NON-LATVIANS

Although Interfront and its related movements were not successful in the polls relative

to the demographic distribution of nationalities, the movements called attention to some

issues which continue to be relevant to the Russian-speaking population. The ethnic situation

52 Ibid..

53 Andranik Migranian, "Russkie Pribaltiki," Nezavisimaia gazeta, 1 March 1992, p. 3.

22

in the newly independent Latvia remains volatile. Several specific issues are at the core of

ethnic differences, and have the potential to ignite further conflict. These include:

Language Rights

There is no question that use of the Latvian language has dropped considerably since

1940, and that Latvians have been compelled to learn Russian more comprehensively than

Russian speakers have had to learn Latvian. Russian speakers have, in fact, made very little

effort to learn Latvian at all: in 1979 only 20 percent of non-Latvian residents of Latvia

designated themselves as fluent in Latvian.54 In schools students were not required to know

Latvian, but were required to have a good working knowledge of Russian in order to

complete middle school.55 Even Interfront leaders acknowledged that this situation was not

acceptable; they recognized the decision to adopt Latvian as the state language is "correct,"

and supported the idea of Russian as the second state language.56

The Law on Languages passed in May, 1989, if carried out and enforced, is not very

realistic. According to the law, employees and specialists in trade, consumer services,

municipal services, public transport, communication, education, health care, social security,

and law enforcement were to be required to know Latvian within a period of three years of

54 Vestnik Statistiki, 1980, No. 7-12, cited in Rasma Karklins, Ethnic Relations in the USSR,Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986, 233.

55 Andrejs Urdze, "Nationalism and Internationalism: Ideological Background and ConcreteForms of Expression in the Latvian SSR," Journal of Baltic Studies, Vol. XIX, No. 3 (Fall1988), 191,

56 Ibid., 3.

23

the law's passage, i.e. in May 1992.57 Provisions were made for choice of language of

education in the schools, but all official business is to be transacted in Latvian.

Provided that sufficient time and educational measures had been taken to teach non-

Latvians the language, the premise might not have been unfair. The three-year deadline was

not realistic, even less so since no comprehensive program has been enacted to teach adult

non-Latvians the language, beyond the appearance of cooperative language schools priced far

beyond the means of the average citizen. Decrees on language qualifications for official

positions appeared. One such decree outlines a three-tier system of evaluating proficiency,

and lists prospective types of occupations falling into each category. For example, doormen,

elevator operators, chauffeurs and barbers would be required to meet Level A, "Elementary

Command of the Language." Managers, clerical workers, dispatchers, and accountants fall

into Level B, "Master of that Language Which is Occupationally Necessary,", and physi-

cians, government officials, lawyers, and employees of mass media fall into Level C,

"Fluency in the Language." Provisions are outlined for administration of the tests, and

certification procedures.58

In June 1991 a decree of the Committee on Language of the Supreme Council of

Latvia was published, establishing testing procedures to begin in May 1992 for all workers

for whom Latvian is a requirement, as described above.59 That decree included provisions

57 "Zakon Latviiskoi Sovetskoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki o iazykakh," Sovetskaia Latviia,May 7, 1989, No. 106, 3.

58 "Draft Regulations on the Levels and Procedures for Evaluating the Knowledge of theLatvian Language as the State Language of the Latvian SSR," Sovetskaia Latviia, February 2,1990, p. 3; JPRS Report on the Soviet Union - Political Affairs, March 13, 1990, 25-27.

59 D. Orlovskii, "Iazyk - drug moi," Sovetskaia Latviia, 5 July 1991, 2.

24

for the elimination of simultaneous translation in the Supreme Council of Latvia in 1992,

since Latvian was now the official state language. When an Equal Rights faction deputy

attempted to protest this decision, the microphone was turned off.60 Deputies Zaletaev and

Matveev point out that this decision directly contradicts articles 6 and 7 of the 1989 Law on

Languages, which guarantee the right of those who do not know the state language to use

Russian in government organs and in documents of government business.61

Another complication is the question of bilingual education. As one editorial writer

puts it, it is " . . . one thing to speak Latvian, but another to receive your education in

Latvian."62 The July 1991 Law on Education adopted by the Supreme Council does not

include any guarantee of equal educational rights for all residents of Latvia. The original

version gave no guarantees to non-Latvians in education, but on appeal from Chairman

Gorbunovs, a guarantee of general secondary education in Russian was included. Higher

education in Russian will not necessarily be provided.63 Furthermore, the guarantee of

secondary education was revoked in April 1992.

Procedures are being established for enforcement of the Law on Languages, and

enforcement of the employment provision of the law is already beginning, especially at the

managerial level, where all business is now to be conducted in Latvian, and Russian-speaking

60 Nezavisimaia gazeta, 6 November 1991, 3 .

61 S. Zaletaev, K. Matveev, "Ne znaete iazyka? Uvoleny . . . " Sovetskaia Latviia, 27 June1991, 3 .

62 Natalia Ipatova, "Russkie v Pribaltike: ikh kartu mogut razygrat'," Smena, 26 December1991.

63 Irina Litvinova, Izvestiia, July 6, 1991, 2.

25

enterprise managers without sufficient skill in Latvian are to be dismissed. Soon thousands

of Russian-speaking workers could find themselves out of work, and subsequently forced to

leave their present housing arrangements, since housing is still commonly connected with

place of employment.64

Soviet Military Presence

The Soviet military is not a popular institution among Latvians - not only do many

consider it an "occupation army," but additional resentment surrounds the conduct of the

army and the OMON troops in Latvia, and formerly the obligation of Latvians to serve in

that army. Although the exact number of Soviet troops in the Baltic region is still unknown,

estimates run to more than 300,000, with a possible 180,000 in Latvia. There are also

substantiated charges of environmental damage caused by military maneuvers and military-

related production.

Like the other Baltic republics, Latvia engaged in defiance of the draft following the

independence resolution and passed its own laws providing for alternatives to military service

and protecting citizens who refuse to serve in the USSR armed forces.65 By January 1991,

some 8000 youths had chosen alternative service, and less than 10 percent of youths had

complied with the draft.

PFL members and other political groups have complained consistently of intimidation

64 Barry Newman, "Soviet Demise Strands Russians in the Republics," Wall Street Journal,February 4, 1992.

65 "Incidents at the Supreme Soviet Building," Izvestiia, May 16, 1990, p. 2; Current Digestof the Soviet Press, Vol. XLII, No. 20 (1990), 5.

26

Russian leadership. The fate of the civilian Russian-speaking population of Latvia is a

separate question, however, and should not be confused with the question of withdrawal of

the Soviet Army from the Baltic.

Voting and Citizenship Rights

In passing the requisite laws to make provisions for the new elections in 1989, the

three Baltic republics attempted to implement residency requirements for voters and candi-

dates. Proposed restrictions ranged from two to five years residence in a district or five to

fifteen in the republic, but the Law on Elections of People's Deputies actually adopted in

1989 provided for universal franchise for citizens of the LaSSR over the age of 18 who had a

permanent address in Latvia.68 The right to vote was not denied anyone at that time on the

basis of length of residence - however, voting rights are now dependent on the definition of

citizenship, and the proposed definition will exclude many.

The question of citizenship rights in Latvia evolved with the election rights issue. If

citizenship standards are established, the question of voting rights is predetermined, as only

the citizens of a republic would have voting rights. Latvia's August secession renders the

issue even more pressing. The establishment of a new republic creates the question of who

will be included in citizenship, and what exclusion will mean - one of Kitschelt's three main

"problems" of democracy.

The citizenship question has been the subject of heated debate in Latvia since the first

68 "Draft Law of the LaSSR on Elections of Latvian SSR People's Deputies," SovetskaiaLatviia, May 24, 1989, pp. 2-3; "Provisions of New Latvian Electoral Law Explained," JPRSReport on the USSR - Political Affairs, 89-047, July 27, 1989, 44-46.

28

tactics, threats and misbehavior from the OMON troops. Since secession, the conflict

regarding the role of the troops of the now former Soviet Union has escalated. OMON

troops were removed from Riga and transferred to Tiumen shortly after the failed coup

attempt. November 5, 1991 the Latvian Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution which declared

all property occupied by the USSR Armed forces to be property of the Republic of Latvia.

The Soviet army was deprived of the right to sell any property on the territory of Latvia, and

all transactions involving that property that took place after August 24, 1991 were declared

invalid.66

Debate over timing of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Baltic countries has

vacillated: one week it is announced by a Baltic government that troops will be removed

early in 1992, the next week the Russian government gives the date as 1994 or beyond.

Withdrawal of troops from Lithuania has officially begun, but only a small symbolic number

of troops has actually departed. The main complication in withdrawing troops is simply

finding a place to send them. Shortages in housing and employment are serious problems all

over the former USSR, especially in Russia. Soldiers withdrawn to Russia from Eastern

European countries last year have yet to receive housing, and some reportedly are living with

their families in tents.67 Estimates of Russian soldiers and officers without housing in the

former USSR are in the hundreds of thousands. The possibility of adding 300,000 additional

men to the already disgruntled ranks of the military in Russia is clearly not appealing to the

66 Nezavisimaia gazeta, 7 November 1991, 3.

67 Iu. Stroganov, "Voiskam ukhodit' s berogov Baltiki. No kogda i kuda?" Pravda, 9December 1991, 1-2.

27

draft Law on Citizenship was published in July, 1989. The Russian-speaking population was

most alarmed by the appearance of the Latvian "Citizens' Committees." These groups began

a movement to register all ethnic Latvians, in order to compile a list of the "true" citizens of

Latvia. The Citizen's Committees advocate a citizenship law in Latvia that includes only

Latvians or those who lived in Latvia before 1940 and their descendants, and have taken a

very confrontational approach in their public statements and registration process.69 Interfront

and Ravnopravie have consistently demanded a "zero version" citizenship law, which would

extend the possibility of citizenship to all current residents of Latvia regardless of language

skills, a possibility at one time even endorsed by PFL leaders.

In July 1991 a draft document appeared in the Supreme Council called the "Basic

Law of the Latvian Republic for the Transitional Period." This document would have

reinstated the 1922 Constitution de jure for a transitional period which would end with the

dismissal of the People's Deputies of the Supreme Council and the new election of a Saeima

(representative assembly) by citizens of the republic (according to an impending citizenship

law). The document made a distinction between "citizens" and "persons" and their rights.

Persons would not have the right to vote, own property, or choose their place of residence

within Latvia.70 This proposal made explicit a prospect that had been discussed before by

PFL deputies: some kind of system of permanent residency without citizenship for the

Russian-speaking population of Latvia.

69 Irina Litvinova, "Who Will Receive Citizenship," Izvestiia, April 26, 1990, p. 3;Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XLII, No. 17 (1990), 28.

70 Irina Litvinova, "Latviia eshche raz vyshla iz SSSR?" Izvestiia, June 21 1991, 2.

29

October 15, 1991 the Supreme Council of Latvia adopted a decree, "On the Restora-

tion of the Rights of Citizens of the Republic of Latvia and Regulations of Naturalization,"

establishing the following criteria for citizenship: command of spoken Latvian; 16 years

residency in Latvia, proof of knowledge of the 1922 constitution of Latvia, an oath of

allegiance to Latvia, and renunciation of citizenship of any other country. Denied citizenship

altogether will be: those who attempted to hinder restoration of Latvia's statehood, convicted

criminals, Soviet servicemen, demobilized servicemen who were not transferred to Latvia

during their service; those who have committed "crimes against humanity," those convicted

of disseminating racist or totalitarian ideologies, drug addicts and chronic alcoholics, and

those who have no legal means of subsistence (not including the officially registered

unemployed). Naturalization is to begin no earlier than July 1, 1992.71

Those who were citizens of Latvia before 1940 and their descendants can be restored

to citizenship. Under the original version of the decree, those currently living outside the

country would have been required to prove that any citizenship they had received from

another country had been revoked, since dual citizenship is not allowed - an attempt to

prevent non-Latvians from maintaining citizenship in another republic.72 A revision was

passed in November which will allow those Latvians and their descendants who were forced

to leave Latvia between June 17, 1940 and August 21, 1991 to hold dual citizenship.

Russian speakers immediately protested the residency and language requirements.

71 BALTFAX, in English, 1125 GMT 16 October 1991; "Principles for GrantingCitizenship Detailed," FBIS-SOV-91-201, 17 October 1991, 47.

72 Dzintra Bungs, "Latvia Adopts Guidelines for Citizenship," Report on the USSR,November 1, 1991, 17.

30

One of Interfront's former leaders once cited calculations that even if the five-year or ten-

year residency requirement variants were adopted, at least 200,000 residents would suddenly

find themselves with no status.73 The sixteen-year requirement is extreme; the 1919 Law

on Citizenship in Latvia had only a five-year residency requirement, and did not include a

list of those ineligible for citizenship. One Latvian demographer insists that if the residency

requirement were raised to 20 years, 12.6 percent of the non-Latvian population would be

excluded; if the requirement were ten years, 6.2 percent would be excluded, and five years,

2.5 percent. The implication is that more than 90 percent of the Russian-speaking population

would be eligible for citizenship as far as residency is concerned. The fact that only 22

percent of that population knows the Latvian language will clearly be the bigger barrier.74

Non-citizens will not have the right to own property, hold official posts, vote, or

found political organizations, according to a law passed October 22, 1991 regarding the

rights and duties of citizens.75 The question of property rights is especially important as the

governments of the former USSR privatize a system almost entirely government-owned.

Those with no right to purchase or obtain property during this process would be severely

disadvantaged economically. Discrimination against non-Latvians wishing to obtain housing

73 Ninel Meshkun, "A Report on the Session of the Supreme Soviet of the LaSSR," MoscowDomestic Service, in Russian, 1500 GMT, July 28, 1989; "Latvian Autonomy, Citizenship LawDiscussed," FBIS Daily Report on the USSR, July 31, 1989, 74-5.

74 Bungs, "Latvia Adopts Guidelines for Citizenship," November 1, 1991, 18.

75 Iurii Zubkov, "Odnim - Bublik, Drugim - Dyrka ot Bublika" Nezavisimaia gazeta, 5November 1991, 3.

31

and office space is already in evidence.76 Reportedly 80 percent of entrepreneurs in private

enterprises outside of the agricultural sphere in Latvia are Russian speakers; where will the

property rights implications of the citizenship qualifications leave them?77 Moreover, the

stipulation that only those employed or officially registered as unemployed raises the question

of who will be entitled to register as unemployed and receive unemployment benefits. If

non-citizens are excluded from such benefits, another serious barrier to attaining citizenship

may be lurking around the corner.

Just how are some of the above standards for disqualification from citizenship to be

determined? According to these standards, anyone who opposed the secession of Latvia

from the USSR, actively or inactively, is ineligible for citizenship. This standard in itself

violates principles of free speech; moreover, who or what principle is to determine this for

each individual applicant? Discrimination against "known alcoholics and drug addicts" is

surely questionable in its principle, let alone the dubious nature of disqualifying someone by

reputation. As outlined in the legislation, these citizenship standards provide ample opportu-

nity for random discrimination against any individual applying, and are clearly intended to

prevent as many non-Latvians as possible from attaining citizenship.

All citizens of Latvia under Soviet rule had, according to Soviet citizenship laws, dual

citizenship. Citizens of a Union republic were simultaneously citizens of the USSR and of

the republic in which they were permanent residents, regardless of ethnicity. Although the

76 Barry Newman, "Soviet Demise Strands Russians in the Republics," Wall Street Journal,February 4, 1992.

77 Vladimir Griaznevich, "Latviia v dvizhenii: mezhdu Vostokom i Zapadom," Chas pik,23 December 1991, 6.

32

Soviet Union has ceased to exist, the non-Latvian permanent residents of Latvia consider

themselves citizens of Latvia. The citizenship decree treats these people as applicants

applying for naturalization, rather than as current citizens. This is in direct violation of the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in the UN General Assembly in 1948,

which states in Article 15 that:

1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.

2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right tochange his nationality. 78

"Nationality," in international law, means citizenship. Furthermore, in the "Convention on

Reduction of Statelessness" adopted by the General Assembly in 1961, Article 8, 1 reads:

"A Contracting State shall not deprive a person of his nationality if such deprivation would

render him stateless. "79 The treatment of the Russian-speaking residents of Latvia as non-

citizens applying for citizenship deprives them of citizenship in any existing nation and

renders them stateless.

Other stipulations from the Convention on Statelessness are violated by the October

1991 Citizenship decree, including: "Article 1, 1. A Contracting State shall grant its

nationality to a person bom in its territory who would otherwise be stateless." Among

potential conditions for granting citizenship to applicants, the maximum residency require-

ment, stated in Article 1 is five years.80 And finally, if the non-Latvian residents are not to

78 Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments, Geneva, United NationsCentre for Human Rights, 1988, 4.

79 Ibid., 277.

80 Ibid., 273-4.

33

be considered citizens of Latvia, the stipulation that only citizens of Latvia will be allowed to

own property is in direct violation of Article 5, 2, (d) of the "Declaration on the Human

Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country in Which They Live."81 Clearly

violations of international human rights standards will be a direct result of implementation of

the citizenship standards outlined in the October 1991 legislation.

SUMMARY

The legislative actions of the new state in Latvia clearly are attempts to promote

emigration of the non-Latvian population. The language laws, while in original premise

defensible, have been unfairly implemented and create a potentially critical situation. If

more than a third of the population is rendered incapable of communication, their rights to

expression, alternative sources of information, and by extension, representation and eligibility

for public office are eliminated. The legislation most questionable, in terms of the standards

of democracy/polyarchy, is that on citizenship. By the estimates cited above, more than 87

percent of the non-Latvian population has lived in Latvia more than twenty years, yet they

will be denied virtually all the rights extrapolated above from Dahl, and a number of the

human rights standards outlined in United Nations declarations.

Kitschelt's "problem" of who is allowed to play the game is, in this case, a part of

the question of how to deal with the "Old Guard" in the process of transformation of regime

types. In the Transitions from Authoritarianism series O'Donnell and Schmitter point out "

. . .the sensitive issue of how to treat parties which are avowedly 'antidemocratic' or whose

81 Ibid., 324.

34

conception of democracy is not that of contingency."82

The fact that the Old Guard is partially (although not entirely) distinguishable by

nationality has exacerbated relations to the extent that democratic ideals play little role in

decision-making process. Even if all non-Latvians were part of the Old Guard, the path of

exclusion and discrimination could be tactically detrimental to development of democratic

standards, democratic principles notwithstanding. Giuseppe di Palma argues that "maximal

inclusion of parties in the game, even of avowedly 'extremist' parties, can overcome their

resistance to democracy."83 In the case of Latvia a good portion of the non-Latvian popula-

tion is not a part of the Old Guard. Discrimination against these residents appears to have a

purely racial basis, irrespective of their actual political positions, as reflected in polls and

according to their lack of participation in and support for the conservative movements that

claimed to represent them.

The achievement of independence from the former USSR has not guaranteed

democracy for the Republic of Latvia. Sergei Stankevich, a leading political advisor to

President Yeltsin of Russia, recently charged that Latvia is following a policy of "apartheid"

in dealing with the Russian-speaking population remaining in the republic.84 The term

"apartheid" is probably too strong to describe conditions in the Latvia at this time. Nonethe-

less, if the legislation on language and citizenship, with its serious economic repercussions, is

82 Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule:Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press,1986, 59.

83 Ibid., 60.

84 Sergei Stankevich, "Derzhava v poiskakh sebia," Nezavisimaia gazeta, 28 March, 1992.

35

implemented as it now stands, clear violations of the civil rights of non-Latvians, based on

ethnic standards of ethnicity and political views, will be national policy in Latvia.

36

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