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Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 2000 3 2 Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 2000 Everyone listed at the end of an article as a contact point, unless otherwise indicated, is part of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry Biosecurity Authority. All MAF staff can be contacted by e-mail, and the standard format for all addresses is [email protected] For example Ralph Hopcroft would be [email protected] (There are slight exceptions for people with similar names, but these addresses are given where necessary.) PO Box 2526, Wellington New Zealand (+64) 4 474 4100 (switchboard) most staff have direct dial lines which are listed where available (+64) 4 474 4133 Animal Biosecurity Group, except Director (+64) 4 470 2730 Biosecurity Policy Coordination Group Border Management Group International Agreements Group Contracts Management Group (+64) 4 498 9888 Group Director and Business Services Manager, Biosecurity Authority Animal Biosecurity Group Plants Biosecurity Group Forest Biosecurity Group Animal Welfare Group (+64) 4 474 4257 Plants Biosecurity, except Director ASB Bank House, 101 The Terrace, Wellington Biosecurity is published by MAF Biosecurity Authority. It covers biosecurity and animal health, animal welfare and plant and forest health issues. It is of special interest to all those with a stake in New Zealand agriculture, horticulture, forestry and animal welfare. Enquiries: Biosecurity MAF Biosecurity Authority PO Box 2526, Wellington Phone: 04 474 4100 Fax: 04 498 9888 Email: [email protected] Editor: Phil Stewart ISSN 1174 – 4618 Contents How to contact us: Icon Key Animal Biosecurity Plants Biosecurity Forest Biosecurity Animal Welfare www.maf.govt.nz/Biosecurity/index.htm Issue 23 • 1 November 2000 New Zealand’s border protection system is acknowledged to be among the best in the world. Hi-tech X-ray machines and sniffer dogs are among the frontline defences in the battle against invasion by exotic pests and diseases. Less glamorous – but no less important – are the import health standards developed for risk goods like fruit and meat products. This article looks at the various elements of our successful border systems that help to keep out potentially damaging pests and diseases. As an island nation, New Zealand enjoys natural biosecurity barriers that help safeguard its biodiversity. However, increased global trade and modern day transport bring thousands of exotic pests and diseases within just hours of our shores. Border protection helps keep out pests and diseases which, if they established here, could harm our primary products On the border: keeping unwanted invaders at bay and biodiversity. MAF’s Biosecurity and Quarantine groups work as a team to safeguard the border. MAF Biosecurity develops robust and enforceable standards for risk goods, while the Quarantine Service makes sure they are upheld. These two groups are kept fully occupied trying to keep out a range of harmful pests and diseases, including fruit fly, mad cow disease, pine nematode, Asian gypsy moth, the white spotted tussock moth, and many more. Inspection at points of entry MAF border inspection staff are stationed at all main ports of entry into New Zealand. Their role is to check that risk goods entering New Zealand comply with biosecurity requirements and to identify possible pest and disease entry pathways. Ships and aircraft, cargo, passengers’ effects, ballast water, ship and aircraft refuse and mail are all routinely inspected. MAF Biosecurity develops standards outlining the conditions for bringing in such risk goods as apples, meat, and logs via shipping containers, second hand cars and machinery, and other risk pathways. The documents define the conditions that must be met throughout the entire journey from country of origin to 0New Zealand’s shores. Quarantine staff undertake a targeted risk management inspection process to identify and seize risk material as it comes across the border. Imported goods that fail to meet quarantine requirements are treated, re-exported, or destroyed. X-ray machines and sniffer dogs have greatly strengthened New Zealand’s biosecurity border defences in recent years. The purchase of X-ray equipment has boosted detection capability to new levels. These state-of-the-art machines have sophisticated features for detecting biological risk goods. Four machines are in use at Auckland Airport, with one each at the airports of Hamilton, Wellington and Christchurch. Two are also in use at the Auckland International Mail Centre. A nose for trouble Since 1996 detector dogs – trained to sniff out undeclared quarantine material in baggage or parcels – have played an important part in patrolling our borders for illegal importations of plant and animal material. There are six teams (one handler, one dog) based at the Auckland International Air Terminal, two teams at the Auckland International Mail Centre, one team at Wellington, and two more based in Christchurch. Dogs also help in the clearance of passengers on arriving cruise ships. Dog teams from the larger airports service international airports such as Hamilton, Dunedin and Queenstown. Trouble at t’mill The recent import of a used pellet feed mill from the Netherlands into the Port of Timaru created consider- able work for MAF’s Quarantine Service. The mill arrived in a forty-foot con- tainer that on initial inspection was found to be infested with spiders requiring fumigation. That was just the entrée. When the contents – electric motors, elevators, mixers, extruders and gearboxes – were unpacked for inspection they were found to be grossly contaminated with animal feed residue, straw, seeds and dead rodents. In addition to the mill equipment there was a selection of farm tools, old gates and piping – all contaminated with straw, seeds and soil. In total, 180kgs of contaminated material was removed from the consignment during decontamination. A load of old rubbish A used garbage truck amongst a recent consignment of used machinery from Singapore brought its work along for the ride. On inspection, MAF’s Quarantine Service at Wellington Port found a full load of rubbish in the truck. Most of the load consisted of rotten branches and plant material that showed signs of pest infestation. The rubbish was incinerated and the truck directed for cleaning. If the contents of the truck had been visible and accessible while on board the vessel, the ship would have been refused entry to New Zealand and directed back to its country of origin. Continued over page 3 On the border: keeping unwanted invaders at bay 4 Contaminated machinery refused entry K9 capers 5 The thin green line: MAF’s Enforcement Unit EU prosecutions Fumigation operator suspended 6 Border Management Group responsibilities Sparrow deaths investigated Varroa update 7 Johne’s disease review completed 8 Risk disk: a risk analysis resource on CD 9 MAF Biosecurity contracts: how the system works 10 Canine brucellosis tests under scrutiny Animal Welfare Act sets key advisory committees in law 12 Review of consultative forums 13 Interceptions of black widow spiders on California grapes Bilateral quarantine arrangement for importation of plant propagation material 14 Gum leaf skeletoniser kept in check International liaison Biosecurity people: NAEAC appointment 15 Biosecurity people: Plant exports team Director Animal Biosecurity appointed 16 New import health standards issued Draft import health standards for consultation Import health standards revoked 17 Revised containment standard for microorganisms Supervision of animal quarantine and containment Amendment to MINDA identification system Animal Welfare Advisory Committee annual report published Codes of ethical conduct – approvals, notifications and revocations 18 Upcoming conference: Learning, animals and the environment Tropical grass webworm Representation on Biosecurity Council Management options for harmful organisms Unwanted organism request process 19 Biosecurity regulations notified internationally

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Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 2000 32 Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 2000

Everyone listed at the end of an article asa contact point, unless otherwise indicated,is part of the Ministry of Agricultureand Forestry Biosecurity Authority.

All MAF staff can be contacted by e-mail,and the standard format for all addressesis [email protected] example Ralph Hopcroft would [email protected] (There are slightexceptions for people with similar names,but these addresses are given wherenecessary.)

PO Box 2526, WellingtonNew Zealand

(+64) 4 474 4100 (switchboard)most staff have direct dial lines whichare listed where available

(+64) 4 474 4133• Animal Biosecurity Group,

except Director

(+64) 4 470 2730• Biosecurity Policy

Coordination Group• Border Management Group• International Agreements

Group• Contracts Management Group

(+64) 4 498 9888• Group Director and Business

Services Manager, BiosecurityAuthority

• Animal Biosecurity Group• Plants Biosecurity Group• Forest Biosecurity Group• Animal Welfare Group

(+64) 4 474 4257• Plants Biosecurity, except

Director

ASB Bank House,101 The Terrace, Wellington

Biosecurity is published by MAF BiosecurityAuthority. It covers biosecurity and animalhealth, animal welfare and plant and foresthealth issues. It is of special interest toall those with a stake in New Zealandagriculture, horticulture, forestry and animalwelfare.

Enquiries:

BiosecurityMAF Biosecurity AuthorityPO Box 2526, WellingtonPhone: 04 474 4100Fax: 04 498 9888Email: [email protected]: Phil Stewart

ISSN 1174 – 4618

ContentsHow tocontact us:

Icon Key

Animal Biosecurity

Plants Biosecurity

Forest Biosecurity

Animal Welfare

www.maf.govt.nz/Biosecurity/index.htm

Issue 23 • 1 November 2000

New Zealand’s border protection systemis acknowledged to be among the best inthe world. Hi-tech X-ray machines andsniffer dogs are among the frontlinedefences in the battle against invasionby exotic pests and diseases.

Less glamorous – but no less important –are the import health standardsdeveloped for risk goods like fruit andmeat products. This article looks at thevarious elements of our successfulborder systems that help to keep outpotentially damaging pests and diseases.

As an island nation, New Zealand enjoys

natural biosecurity barriers that help

safeguard its biodiversity. However,

increased global trade and modern day

transport bring thousands of exotic pests

and diseases within just hours of our

shores.

Border protection helps keep out pests

and diseases which, if they established

here, could harm our primary products

On the border:keeping unwanted invaders at bay

and biodiversity. MAF’s Biosecurity and

Quarantine groups work as a team to

safeguard the border. MAF Biosecurity

develops robust and enforceable standards

for risk goods, while the Quarantine

Service makes sure they are upheld.

These two groups are kept fully occupied

trying to keep out a range of harmful

pests and diseases, including fruit fly, mad

cow disease, pine nematode, Asian gypsy

moth, the white spotted tussock moth,

and many more.

Inspection at points of entry

MAF border inspection staff are

stationed at all main ports of entry into

New Zealand.

Their role is to check that risk goods

entering New Zealand comply with

biosecurity requirements and to identify

possible pest and disease entry pathways.

Ships and aircraft, cargo, passengers’

effects, ballast water, ship and aircraft

refuse and mail are all routinely inspected.

MAF Biosecurity develops standards

outlining the conditions for bringing in

such risk goods as apples, meat, and logs

via shipping containers, second hand cars

and machinery, and other risk pathways.

The documents define the conditions that

must be met throughout the entire

journey from country of origin to

0New Zealand’s shores.

Quarantine staff undertake a targeted risk

management inspection process to

identify and seize risk material as it comes

across the border. Imported goods that fail

to meet quarantine requirements are

treated, re-exported, or destroyed.

X-ray machines and sniffer dogs have

greatly strengthened New Zealand’s

biosecurity border defences in recent

years.

The purchase of X-ray equipment has

boosted detection capability to new levels.

These state-of-the-art machines have

sophisticated features for detecting

biological risk goods. Four machines are

in use at Auckland Airport, with one each

at the airports of Hamilton, Wellington

and Christchurch. Two are also in use at

the Auckland International Mail Centre.

A nose for trouble

Since 1996 detector dogs – trained to sniff

out undeclared quarantine material in

baggage or parcels – have played an

important part in patrolling our borders

for illegal importations of plant and

animal material.

There are six teams (one handler, one dog)

based at the Auckland International Air

Terminal, two teams at the Auckland

International Mail Centre, one team at

Wellington, and two more based in

Christchurch.

Dogs also help in the clearance of

passengers on arriving cruise ships. Dog

teams from the larger airports service

international airports such as Hamilton,

Dunedin and Queenstown.

Trouble at t’millThe recent import of a used pellet

feed mill from the Netherlands into

the Port of Timaru created consider-

able work for MAF’s Quarantine

Service.

The mill arrived in a forty-foot con-

tainer that on initial inspection was

found to be infested with spiders

requiring fumigation.

That was just the entrée. When the

contents – electric motors, elevators,

mixers, extruders and gearboxes –

were unpacked for inspection they

were found to be grossly contaminated

with animal feed residue, straw, seeds

and dead rodents.

In addition to the mill equipment

there was a selection of farm tools, old

gates and piping – all contaminated

with straw, seeds and soil.

In total, 180kgs of contaminated

material was removed from the

consignment during decontamination.

A load of old rubbishA used garbage truck amongst a recent

consignment of used machinery from

Singapore brought its work along for the

ride.

On inspection, MAF’s Quarantine

Service at Wellington Port found a full

load of rubbish in the truck. Most of the

load consisted of rotten branches and

plant material that showed signs of pest

infestation.

The rubbish was incinerated and the

truck directed for cleaning. If the

contents of the truck had been visible

and accessible while on board the

vessel, the ship would have been

refused entry to New Zealand and

directed back to its country of origin.

Continued over page

3 On the border: keeping unwanted invaders at bay4 Contaminated machinery refused entry

K9 capers5 The thin green line: MAF’s Enforcement Unit

EU prosecutionsFumigation operator suspended

6 Border Management Group responsibilitiesSparrow deaths investigatedVarroa update

7 Johne’s disease review completed8 Risk disk: a risk analysis resource on CD9 MAF Biosecurity contracts: how the system works10 Canine brucellosis tests under scrutiny

Animal Welfare Act sets key advisory committees in law12 Review of consultative forums13 Interceptions of black widow spiders on California grapes

Bilateral quarantine arrangement for importationof plant propagation material

14 Gum leaf skeletoniser kept in checkInternational liaisonBiosecurity people: NAEAC appointment

15 Biosecurity people: Plant exports teamDirector Animal Biosecurity appointed

16 New import health standards issuedDraft import health standards for consultationImport health standards revoked

17 Revised containment standard for microorganismsSupervision of animal quarantine and containmentAmendment to MINDA identification systemAnimal Welfare Advisory Committee annual report publishedCodes of ethical conduct – approvals, notifications and revocations

18 Upcoming conference: Learning, animalsand the environmentTropical grass webwormRepresentation on Biosecurity CouncilManagement options for harmful organismsUnwanted organism request process

19 Biosecurity regulations notified internationally

Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 2000 54 Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 2000

The MAF Enforcement Unit (the EU) isthe principal enforcement arm of theMinistry of Agriculture and Forestry. TheUnit supports both the MAF Biosecurityand Food Assurance Authorities for allenforcement matters. Whileenforcement is taken seriously andprosecutions regularly undertaken, theEU also has a strong educational role.

The EU identifies potential offenders

through complaints and tip offs from the

public, MAF staff and other sources.

Investigations of interest to MAF

Biosecurity focus on animal welfare

concerns and illegal activity regarding

biosecurity risk goods. The EU also

undertakes general surveillance to

identify breaches of the Biosecurity Act

and Animal Welfare Act.

Activities

The Enforcement Unit has 22 staff

including five investigators who tend to be

from law enforcement or legal

backgrounds. These investigators manage

and control all major investigations

including those involving criminal

proceedings.

Seven animal welfare and illegal meat

enforcement advisers support the

investigators. They also educate the public

The thin green line: MAF’s Enforcement UnitContaminated machineryrefused entryA used machinery importer has received a

sharp reminder that import health

standards are there for a purpose.

The discharge of two large used hydraulic

excavators from Japan was prohibited by

the Quarantine Service recently as they

contravened the Import Health Standard

for Forestry or Agricultural Equipment.

The excavators were reshipped as they

posed a serious biosecurity risk. This

brings to four the number of used ma-

chines reshipped to their point of origin

after permission to land was withheld.

The excavators were grossly contaminated

with soil from their previous work site,

and the importer had made no attempt to

clean the machinery before shipping.

Soil was easily visible without removing

any plates.

K9 capers: Passengerssay the darndest things!MAF Quarantine Service’s canine (K9)

contingent continue to prove their worth.

During September, K9 Deva stubbornly

sat alongside a passenger’s trolley covered

by a large down-type jacket. The passen-

ger from Cambodia replied ‘no’ when

asked if he had any fruit in the jacket. On

inspection, two parcels were found

containing fresh leaves and ham, one of

which was partially eaten.

K9 Olive stood for no nonsense from some

other hungry passengers, one who ‘just

forgot about’ 1kg of apples and 1kg of

bananas he was carrying. One and a half

kgs of meat roll and 1kg of eggs were

seized from another passenger who said

that his wife ‘must have packed the food

in case he got hungry’.

Around the same time K9 Holly, while

working a flight, detected 2kgs of chest-

nuts, 1kg of berries and a suitcase filled

with pork sausages.

Fumigation operator suspendedMAF accreditation to provide services related to New Zealand’s biosecurity should not

be taken lightly, as one fumigation operator has discovered to his cost.

The operator was suspended from Level One MAF accreditation for two months,

due to serious non-compliance with MAF’s standards for approval and monitoring

fumigation operators. The suspension has seriously affected the viability of the

operator’s business, requiring full supervision by MAF at cost for each treatment.

The non-compliance included: a lack of fans and heaters; releasing the fumigation

early while fumigating tyres; and two separate cases of gas leaking from containers.

MAF is under no obligation to accredit treatment operators who fail to meet its

standards, and who endanger New Zealand’s biosecurity.

A new standard: Accreditation of Operators Providing Treatment of Imported Risk

Goods and Forestry or Plant Related Material for Export is due to be promulgated

shortly. It will clarify the operator’s obligations and strengthen the monitoring of

treatment operators.

Ken Glassey, Programme Coordinator,

Border Management Group,

phone 04 498 9610,

email: [email protected]

about how they can operate within the law

to protect New Zealand’s biosecurity and

provide appropriate care for pets, livestock

and animals used in teaching or research.

The unit has a strong administration team

to support the investigation and

prosecution activities.

Investigating complaints

The EU investigates complaints and

suspected illegal activity and decides

whether there are sufficient grounds for

prosecution. The unit’s prosecution

coordinators undertake the checks and

balances to determine whether

investigations should proceed for

prosecution and follow cases through the

Court system.

Where investigations establish criminal

liability, the matter may be placed before

the Courts to provide a strong deterrent to

other potential transgressors.

The Enforcement Unit liaises with other

state enforcement agencies on issues such

as technology and techniques.

Jockey Jensen, Manager Enforcement,

Enforcement Unit,

phone 09 357 1051,

fax 09 357 6480,

email: [email protected]

The standard requires the importer to

ensure that all used machinery is disman-

tled and cleaned free of all contaminants

prior to shipping, and stored and carried

in a manner that precludes

recontamination. To verify this, quarantine

officers inspect machinery on board the

ship and have the power to stop discharge

where gross contamination is observed.

The import health standard for forestry

and agricultural equipment from any

country is available on the MAF web site

(see below).

Ken Glassey, Programme Coordinator,

Border Management Group,

phone 04 498 9610,

email: [email protected]

www.maf.govt.nz/Standards/plants/

border/nonorgihs/index.htm

X-ray machines and detector dogs also

play a key role in the inspection of all

parcels entering New Zealand. They have

more than proved their worth – risk

goods, including fresh produce, seeds,

plants and straw items, are regularly

intercepted.

Post-entry quarantine is an extension of

control at the border. It provides a safe

holding facility to ensure that imported

plant or animal materials can be observed

and tested for pests and diseases by

suitably qualified people working to MAF

Biosecurity standards.

Tackling the problem ofcontainers

Close to half a million shipping containers

enter New Zealand’s busy and

overcrowded ports every year. Concerns

about the risks to biosecurity from

organisms carried on and in these steel

boxes has prompted the MAF Biosecurity

to embark on a major survey during 2000.

Approximately 17,000 containers will be

inspected as part of this exercise.

“Most general cargo entering New

Zealand these days comes in the form of

containers. Because these steel boxes travel

around the world and are regularly placed

on soil and grass in different countries,

they pose a potential risk to biosecurity,”

explains Mike Alexander, programme

manager of the MAF Biosecurity Border

Management Group.

“It is not physically possible for us to open

and unload all containers. They are

difficult to inspect. Our preference is to

find effective ways to inspect without

causing major disruption to the

commercial operation of the importer.

“We need to find out more about the real

risks from containers and how we can

manage these risks. In the meantime the

Quarantine Service has been asked to be

especially vigilant when clearing

containers. We are also trialling the use of

dogs in container ports. Last year MAF

inspected 80,000 containers. That number

will increase by at least 5 percent this

year.”

Melissa Wilson, Business Services

Manager, MAF Biosecurity Authority,

phone 04 498 9865,

email: [email protected]

EU ProsecutionsAnimal welfare

MAF’s Enforcement Unit has received 259

animal welfare complaints since 1 July

2000. Two cases have been successfully

prosecuted with two offenders being

convicted and sentenced to two months

periodic detention and $2000 fine respec-

tively for neglect of cows. There are two

additional cases awaiting court hearings.

Offences at the border

The Infringement Notice process for the

offence of erroneous declaration, (s154(s)

of the Biosecurity Act 1993) has not yet

fully come on stream. However the EU and

MAF’s Quarantine Service have been

increasing the enforcement presence at

the border.

There are five files before the Court for

breaches at the border and a further nine

enquiries under investigation. Twenty-nine

warnings have been issued for both failure

to declare offences and attempts to possess

uncleared items since 1 July 2000.

One prosecution of breaches of Biosecurity

Act s154 (f) and s72 Crimes Act has been

completed. The offender was convicted and

fined $750 for erroneous declaration of

plant cuttings.

Animal remedies and pesticides

Six charges of sale of unlicensed animal

remedies are currently with the Hamilton

District Court. Two individuals have been

charged along with a corporation. In

addition, one prosecution is awaiting

hearing under Pesticides Act 1961 for

plant damage by spraying.

Jacqui Pate, Senior Investigating

Solicitor, Enforcement Unit,

phone 09 357 1058,

fax 09 357 6480,

email: [email protected]

Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 2000 76 Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 2000

MAF has adopted the relevantrecommendations from the committeereviewing Johne’s disease in NewZealand. This article reports on thereview process and outlines therecommendations.

The review process

In July 1995 MAF initiated a review of its

policies for Johne’s disease by releasing

the public discussion paper Future

Management of Johne’s Disease in New

Zealand. Although 33 submissions were

received, these did not provide a clear

picture of the industry’s future goals for

the control or eradication of the disease.

MAF concluded that further consultation

would be necessary, using a different

approach, in order for it to understand

stakeholders’ views on these important

issues.

MAF therefore decided to convene a

Johne’s disease steering committee with

representation from: AgResearch,

Federated Farmers of New Zealand Inc,

Lincoln University, Livestock

Improvement Corporation, Massey

University, Merino New Zealand Inc, the

New Zealand Deer Farmers’ Association,

and the New Zealand Veterinary

Association.

Johne’s disease review completedThe committee first met in March 1997.

The agreed terms of reference were:

• To facilitate the consultative process

with livestock industry

stakeholders and assist in the

formulation of tentative

policy recommendations

for Johne’s disease.

• To assist the New Zealand

livestock industries in the

development and

promulgation of

recommended farm

management practices,

for all species of farmed

ruminants, which will aid

in the control of Johne’s

disease.

• To examine whether New Zealand

should develop, using the Australian

models as a basis, voluntary ovine and

bovine control programmes.

• To assist MAF in conducting a cost-

benefit analysis to identify the true

costs of Johne’s disease in New

Zealand, and to examine whether

control/eradication programmes

for Johne’s disease are currently

an option.

• To identify research priorities for

Johne’s disease.

The committee met again in July 1997.

The members agreed that in order for

them to make the best recommendations

they should analyse:

• the costs of Johne’s disease to the

producer; and

• the benefits of various management

options (do nothing, test and cull,

vaccination, and partial or total

destocking).

Overseas cost benefit analyses on Johne’s

disease do not reflect New Zealand

farming conditions and were of limited

value.

MAF commissioned two reports from

Agriculture New Zealand to obtain the

information sought by the committee to:

• quantify the costs to the producer

from Johne’s disease under New

Zealand conditions; and

• analyse the advantages and

disadvantages for each of the

management options for Johne’s

disease.

The sectors covered by this

analysis are the cattle (dairy and

beef), sheep, and deer farming

industries.

The committee met in

September 1998 to consider the

draft reports. Overall, the

committee was pleased with

both reports and felt they

answered many questions about

the costs and management

of Johne’s disease.

The committee acknowledged that many

of the scientific challenges presented by

Johne’s disease are unresolved, especially

in diagnostic technology and vaccination.

Until significant advances are made in

both these areas, the technical feasibility

of national market assurance or control

schemes will remain highly questionable.

The Agriculture New Zealand reports

were then finalised and the committee

consequently finalised their

recommendations. MAF has now agreed

to undertake the actions assigned to it

specifically in the recommendations.

Recommendations of the Johne’sDisease Steering Committee

Development of voluntary market

assurance programmes

• The development of a market

assurance programme for the beef

cattle, dairy cattle, and sheep

industries, as per the Australian

model, is not feasible.

• The deer industry should examine if

it should pursue the development of

a national voluntary market assurance

programme, as per the Australian

model.

• Exporters who can demonstrate that

they have complied with the

Australian guidelines for either the

bovine or ovine market assurance

programmes will be eligible for MAF

certification to this effect. These

programmes would be subject to

MAF audit.

The effects of Johne’sdiseaseJohne’s disease is a bacterial disease of

ruminants which inhibits an animal’s

ability to absorb nutrients through the

intestinal wall. Livestock contract

Johne’s disease, usually when young, by

ingesting an infective dose of the

bacterium Mycobacterium paratuberculo-

sis in feed or water. The bacterium

establishes in the intestine of the

infected animal where it damages and

causes a thickening of the intestinal

wall. Wastage and diarrhoea can result,

followed by death. Offspring may also be

infected while in utero, if the mother is

heavily infected. Not all livestock

infected with Johne’s disease will die

from the disease or even show symp-

toms. When clinical signs do occur, they

tend to be in older animals although this

can vary with species.

• Accreditation of TreatmentOperators2

Email: [email protected],

phone 04 498 9610

Brendan McDonald:Programme Coordinator

Responsible for import health standards for:

• Air Containers

• Sand, Soil, Clay and Water

Other responsibilities:

• Requirements for Airport Approvaland Monitoring2

• Requirements for Aircraft Clearance

• Requirements for Passenger Clearance

• Requirements for Flight Kitchens

• Requirements for Biosecurity ControlAreas

• Requirements for TransitionalFacilities

• Requirements for QuarantineIncinerators for International Refuse

• Requirements for Clearance of Mail

• Clearance of Risk Goods Requiring anImport Health Standard

Email: [email protected],

phone 04 474 4204

1 To be implemented this year2 Under review this year

supported management plan that will run

for two years. Its key objectives are to:

• slow the spread of varroa, especially

to the South Island

• assist the transition of affected

industries, especially beekeepers.

More information about Phase II will be

published in Biosecurity after it has been

approved.

At the same time as Phase II is being

implemented, MAF and the beekeeping

industry will start developing Phase III,

which is expected to be a long-term

management programme under the

Biosecurity Act.

Because the Phase II plan will not be

operational before November, MAF has

implemented some interim measures:

• a preventive treatment programme

• revised movement controls to

facilitate the kiwifruit pollination

season.

More information is available at the

Varroa Information Centre on the MAF

web site. This is updated whenever there

are new developments.

Paul Bolger, Varroa Programme

Coordinator, Animal Biosecurity,

phone 04 474 4144,

fax 04 474 4133,

email: [email protected]

Ashley Edge,

varroa compensation contact,

Biosecurity Policy Coordination,

phone 04 474 4213,

fax 470 2730,

email: [email protected]

To help ensure you are talking to the rightperson, the following is a guide to theresponsibilities of key staff in the newBiosecurity Authority Border ManagementGroup. We also indicate which standardsare under review this year.

Mike Alexander: ManagerResponsible for the following standards:

• Pre-shipment Inspection

• Infringement Fees1

• Pest Identification at the Border2

Email: [email protected],

phone 04 474 4280

Ken Glassey:Programme CoordinatorResponsible for import health standards for:

• Sea Containers2

• Used Tyres

• Bulk Fertiliser

• Imported Machinery

• Imported Vehicles (after currentreview is completed)

Other responsibilities:

• Requirements for Port Approval andMonitoring2

• Requirements for Vessel Clearanceand Monitoring2

• Requirements for Clearance ofPersonal Effects

Border Management Group responsibilities

At the time of

writing, the

results of the

next phase of

the investigation

into unusual

sparrow deaths

are expected in

late October or early November.

Since late September, MAF and the

Department of Conservation have been

investigating the cause of unusually large

numbers of dead sparrows. Salmonella

Typhimurium phage type 160 has been

isolated in two cases to date. Salmonellosis

is a common cause of bird deaths in

winter, but this particular phage type has

not previously been recognised as park

near Christchurch has died, this was not

due to salmonellosis.

Roger Poland, Programme Coordinator,

Surveillance,

Animal Biosecurity,

phone 04 498 9820,

fax 04 474 4133,

email: [email protected]

Sparrow deathsinvestigated

In July, government decided on a three-phase plan for the management ofvarroa in New Zealand (Biosecurity21:5-6, and 22:10).

Phase I, involving the immediate

government-funded treatment of all

known infected hives, ran smoothly and

is now 90 percent completed.

Beekeepers who advised MAF of their

intent to claim compensation have now

been sent a claim form with guidelines

about verifiable losses in the period 12

April to October 2000. MAF recognises

that further losses may occur in relation

to the remaining movement controls.

A plan to implement Phase II was

expected to have been presented to

Cabinet for approval at the end of

October. Phase II is a government-

6

The Johne’s DiseaseSteering Committeerecommendeddevelopment of a newvaccine for thedisease.

Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 2000 98 Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 2000

• To develop a vaccine for all species

that does not possess the adverse

complications of the vaccine currently

available in New Zealand, eg, tissue

reaction, cross reactivity with

tuberculin.

• Quantification of the sub-clinical

costs of Johne’s disease in sheep, beef

cattle and deer.

• Coordination of research within New

Zealand and collaboration, if possible,

with the Australian $40 million

research package on the diagnosis and

control of Johne’s disease, its

subclinical costs, and level of flock/

herd infection.

• Risk management tools to manage

public perception/media if a causal

relationship between Johne’s disease

and Crohn’s disease is proven.

• To determine if Johne’s disease can be

transferred via semen or embryos in

sheep and cattle.

• Regular update of the international

research literature on the relationship

between Johne’s disease and Crohn’s

disease.

Other recommendations

• There is an ongoing need for stock

agents, farm consultants, and

veterinarians to educate farmers on

Copies of reports

A copy of the final versions of the two

Agriculture New Zealand reports can be

obtained from the MAF website, under

Standards/Animal Biosecurity Standards

and Statements/Link to Disease List or

by contacting:

Isabelle Vanderkolk

Agriculture New Zealand

PO Box 841

PALMERSTON NORTH

Phone: 06 356 9063

Fax: 06 355 2031

Email:

[email protected]

the conditions for use of the Johne’s

disease vaccine. With respect to the

protection of New Zealand’s market

access for meat and meat products, it

is critical that all users of the vaccine

observe the requirement to earmark

all vaccinated stock, and notify a new

owner or slaughterhouse when

vaccinated animals are being sold.

• MAF should collate information on

Johne’s disease research projects

within New Zealand.

• MAF (and affected industries)*

should maintain a watching brief over

Johne’s/Crohn’s disease issues.

• An information ‘package’ should be

prepared for the cattle, sheep, and

deer sectors, which will contain an

introductory overview of the history

of Johne’s disease in New Zealand, a

copy of the two Agriculture New

Zealand reports, a diagnostic guide

for Johne’s disease, and the final

recommendations from the Steering

Committee.

*Inserted by MAF.

Roger Poland, Programme Coordinator,

Surveillance, Animal Biosecurity,

phone 04 498 9820,

fax 04 474 4133,

email: [email protected]

conducting a risk analysis, reviewing a

risk analysis for MAF Biosecurity, or

simply wanting to see how we go about

our risk analyses. Risk disk outlines the

procedures we follow when conducting

an import risk analysis.

The CD also contains texts that establish

the context in which we conduct our risk

analyses: namely, the OIE International

Animal Health Code chapter on import

risk analysis and the Agreement on the

Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary

Measures.

Risk disk also includes examples of some

of our recent import risk analyses. We

have not included all the risk analyses we

have worked on – only those which were

subjected to formal and rigorous

scientific peer review before publication.

Risk disk is a living document. New

analyses and significant new background

documents will be added in updated

versions, to be announced in future issues

of Biosecurity and on the MAF website.

To get a copy of Risk disk forward your

details and a cheque for $5 payable to

Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, to:

Martin van Ginkel,

Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry,

PO Box 2526,

Wellington, New Zealand.

www.maf.govt.nz/AnimalIHS/riskanal.htm

MAF Biosecurity contracts out a widerange of services. In this article we lookat the types of services that are bought-in, who supplies them and how thecontracts are managed.

Services provided under contract

MAF Biosecurity currently allocates and

manages 33 contracts covering the supply

of services from external contractors.

These are worth $27 million annually and

fall into several broad categories (see Fig

1). MAF Biosecurity also manages a series

of internal and inter-departmental

service arrangements valued at $19

million annually.

Internal services contracts, or

Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs),

encompass Border Control and

Quarantine services, National Centre for

Disease Investigation (NCDI) and Police

support for Exotic Disease Pest Response

activities (EDPR).

Selecting MAF Biosecuritysuppliers

MAF Biosecurity uses a range of

contractor selection processes to identify

and select suitable contractors. These

include:

• ROI (Registration of Interest) and

RFP (Request for Proposal) processes

• competitive tendering (both open and

restricted)

• preferred supplier arrangements

• competitive quotation selection.

While considerable attention is paid to

the cost of each service, the prime focus is

on quality of service and ensuring that

the risks to biosecurity are covered.

The type of contract issued depends on

the risk to be managed, the type of

service required, the cost to MAF and

period over which the service is to be

provided.

The need for professionalcontracts management

The ongoing need to provide a

transparent ‘actual costs’ system, capable

MAF Biosecurity contracts:how the system works

of satisfying departmental and Treasury

scrutiny in terms of demonstrable value

for money, has driven the development of

MAF Biosecurity’s contracts management

process. The success of this process is

based on accurate technical specifications

and close interaction between the

contract and technical specialists within

MAF Biosecurity. This process is further

enhanced by close interaction with all

contractors and regular performance

reviews.

MAF Biosecurity’s suppliers

MAF Biosecurity uses a wide range of

specialist and general service providers

throughout New Zealand. These include

other government agencies, state owned

enterprises, universities, commercial

organisations and individual specialists.

Due to the technical nature of the MAF

Biosecurity requirement, the range of

professional service providers with the

capability and capacity to effectively meet

MAF standards is limited. As a result,

MAF Biosecurity actively encourages

both individual specialists and

commercial organisations to participate

in the supplier selection process.

Monitoring supplier performance

All MAF Biosecurity service contracts

incorporate a definitive quality assurance

requirement, under which contractors

must develop and maintain a formal

quality assurance programme. This

programme then forms the benchmark

MAF Biosecurity contracts as at October 2000(Contract amounts in NZD millions)

Internal andinterdepartmentalservices

Exotic Disease PestResponse (EDPR)

Surveillance

Specialist services(Analytical Services, IT,Projects, Publicationsand Research)

Animal Health

$19M

$3.7M

$1.97M

$0.24M

$20M

The Risk Management Section of MAF’sBiosecurity Authority has a produced aCD on risk analysis.

The Section’s primary function is the

development and application of risk

analysis methodologies for the

importation of animals and animal

products. The application of the risk

analysis discipline to animal health issues

is a relatively recent development. The

CD, Risk disk, contains information about

the biosecurity risks posed by the

importation of animals and animal

products.

Risk disk was designed to provide

information to veterinarians who are

Risk disk: a risk analysis resource on CD

Development of control/eradicationprogrammes

• The development of national control/

eradication programmes for the sheep,

dairy cattle, and beef cattle industries

is not feasible.

• The deer industry should consider

whether it should develop and

implement a national pest manage-

ment strategy (PMS).

Research priorities

• To further enhance diagnostic test

capability, especially for the detection

of subclinical infection with Myco-

bacterium paratuberculosis in all species.

for ongoing contractor performance.

Wherever possible, MAF Compliance

Group conducts a formal audit of each

contractor annually, against the

requirements of the contract and the

quality assurance programme.

MAF Biosecurity also conducts a

proactive contractor visit programme

within which both technical and

contractual issues are highlighted and

resolved. While the visit programme

tends to be an informal process aimed at

managing the business relationship

rather than the contract, there is

provision for formal evaluation of

contractor performance. When such an

evaluation takes place, the contractor is

provided with a written copy of the final

report and invited to comment.

Mark Murdoch, Contracts Manager,

MAF Biosecurity Authority,

phone 04 474 4184,

fax 04 474 4133,

email: [email protected]

Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 2000 1110 Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 2000

Animal Welfare Act sets key advisorycommittees in law

MAF is reviewing its canine brucellosis

tests for investigating suspected cases in

New Zealand, following a recent

investigation into a suspected case of the

disease.

The investigation revealed a higher that

expected number of false positives from the

screening test. A specialist laboratory in the

United States confirmed the results of the

screening tests carried out here so it is

suspected that there may be some agent in

the New Zealand dog population causing

the higher than expected cross-reactivity

rate.

MAF is waiting for the results of blood

culture. These will clarify New Zealand’s

health status for canine brucellosis. The

results are expected early in November.

MAF still wants to hear of possible signs of

canine brucellosis (abortions in bitches and

testicular inflammation in dogs),

particularly in St Bernards. Phone the MAF

National Centre for Disease Investigation

exotic disease freephone (0800 80 99 66) to

report a case for investigation.

Matthew Stone, Programme

Coordinator, Exotic Disease Response,

Animal Biosecurity,

phone 04 498 9884,

fax 04 474 4133,

email: [email protected]

Canine brucellosis tests under scrutinyWays canine brucellosis can be spread

Sexual transmission

Sexual activity between infected and uninfected dogs poses the highest risk.

Abortion or whelping

Fluids from aborting and whelping infected bitches are highly infectious to other dogs.

They also present a risk to humans and so protective clothing, gloves in particular,

should be worn by owners dealing with such situations. Any bitch that has aborted or

had an abnormal whelping (i.e. stillbirths or infection) should not attend dog shows for

at least 6 weeks after the event. Advice from a veterinarian should be sought if a bitch

aborts, delivers stillborn puppies or suffers infections after whelping.

Infected male dogs

Infected male dogs may have an inflamed or swollen testicle/s. Their urine can contain

numerous bacteria during the early stages of infection, but urine-contact is unlikely to

lead to infection in other dogs. Puppies are more susceptible to infection through urine

than adult dogs.

Casual contact

Long periods (several

months) of living together

in close contact are

typically required prior to

transmission of Br. canis

from an apparently

healthy adult dog to an

uninfected dog. The risk

of transmission from

occasional or casual

contact is very low.

NAEAC members Expiry

of appointment

Mrs Wyn Hoadley

(Chairperson) 31.10.02

Dr A C David Bayvel N/A

Dr Bernhard HH Breier 31.10.01

Mrs Jeanette Crosado 31.10.02

Mr Mark C Farnsworth 31.10.00

Professor John Marbrook 31.10.00

Dr W Barry McPherson 31.10.01

Mrs Lynne M Milne 31.10.01

Mrs Joanna J Roberts 31.10.02

Dr John C Schofield 31.10.01

NAWAC members Expiryof appointment

Professor David J Mellor

(Chairperson) 31.10.02

Dr A C David Bayvel N/A

Dr Mark W Fisher 31.10.00

Dr Neville G Gregory 31.10.02

Mrs Wyn Hoadley 31.10.02

Ms Judith N Jones 31.10.01

Mrs Peggy N Loague 31.10.00

Mr Alistair R Polson 31.10.01

Dr Janet A Quay 31.10.02

Mr Bruce Warburton 31.10.01

NAEAC Chairperson,Mrs Wyn Hoadley.

NAWAC Chairperson,Professor David Mellor.

The Animal Welfare Act 1999 formally

established two independent ministerial

advisory committees, the National

Animal Ethics Advisory Committee

(NAEAC) and the National Animal

Welfare Advisory Committee (NAWAC).

Both committees have existed for some

years, having been set up by the Minister

of Agriculture using his powers to

establish advisory or technical

committees. Now their existence,

functions, membership and other

administrative details are set in law.

NAEAC advises the Minister of

Agriculture on ethical issues and animal

welfare issues arising from research,

testing and teaching. These functions

relate specifically to Part 6 of the Act,

which regulates the use of live animals in

research, testing and teaching.

NAWAC facilitates the development of

animal welfare policy and practice for

New Zealand and advises the Minister of

Agriculture on all animal welfare issues

other than those relating to Part 6 of the

Act.

Appointment of committeemembers

The Minister of Agriculture appoints

NAEAC and NAWAC members for a term

of three years as required in the Act.

Appointments are made on the basis of

the individual’s experience and expertise.

Both committees meet four times a year

but hold extra meetings if required.

Operational plans and strategicplans

Both committees operate in accordance

with operational and strategic plans

which they review and update regularly.

NAEAC’s functions

The Act empowers NAEAC to:

• make recommendations to the

Minister on whether a procedure

should be declared not to be a

‘manipulation’

• make recommendations to the

Director-General of MAF regarding the

approval, or the revocation of approval,

to use non-human hominids for

research, testing or teaching

• provide advice on the development

and review of codes of ethical

conduct and on the approval,

amendment, suspension or

revocation of any code of ethical

conduct

• make recommendations to the

Minister about standards and policies

for codes of ethical conduct

• provide information and advice to

animal ethics committees

• make recommendations to the

Director-General on the

qualifications, experience or other

requirements to be met by people

wishing to become accredited

reviewers

• consider the reports of accredited

reviewers on code holders and animal

ethics committees

• make recommendations to the

Minister on whether to approve

research or testing to be carried out in

the national interest (other than in

emergencies).

Current issues being consideredby NAEAC

• assistance for preparation of codes of

ethical conduct

• whether killing animals for the

purposes of research, testing and

teaching should be classified as a

manipulation

• the collection of animal use statistics

• the process for review of animal ethics

committees

• the upcoming joint NAEAC/

ANZCCART Conference 2001.

NAWAC’s functions

NAWAC’s advice to the Minister includes

advice on areas where animal welfare

research is required and advice on

legislative proposals concerning animal

welfare.

Codes of welfare under the Act may be

prepared by the Minister, NAWAC or any

other person. NAWAC must decide

whether or not to recommend to the

Minister the issue of a code.

NAWAC can issue recommendations to

the Minister on whether a procedure

should be declared, under the Animal

Welfare Act:

• not to be a ‘manipulation’,

• to be or not to be a ‘significant

surgical procedure’,

• to be a ‘restricted surgical procedure’

or a ‘controlled surgical procedure’

In addition, NAWAC provides

recommendations to the Minister on

whether any trap or device should be

prohibited or its use restricted. It also

promotes the development of guidelines

on the use of traps or devices.

Current issues being consideredby NAWAC

• drafting new codes of welfare for

different animal uses and practices

under the Act

• recommendations relating to electro-

immobilisation

• the welfare implications of two types

of rodent traps – glue boards and the

‘Rat ZapperTM’

• a public discussion paper on religious

slaughter.

Of these issues, the majority of NAWAC’s

time is currently focused on the revision

of codes of welfare.

Committee publications

Both NAEAC and NAWAC produce

newsletters and annual reports, which are

publicly available.

Kathryn McKinnon,

Policy Adviser, Animal Welfare,

phone 04 474 4296,

fax 04 498 9888,

email: [email protected]

Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 2000 1312 Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 2000

MAF Biosecurity is continuing toinvestigate the ‘post-border’interceptions of two live black widowspiders in early October.

As well as extra audit checks in

California, the Authority will be

conducting further product inspection to

confirm that the agreed sulphur dioxide/

carbon dioxide fumigation treatment,

required for the control of black widow

spiders, is being effectively implemented

in accordance with current New Zealand

standards. The United States Department

of Agriculture (USDA) is also conducting

independent audits of the treatment

systems.

Based on the information available to

date, MAF Biosecurity is still treating the

situation as two isolated incidents that by

MAF Plants Biosecurity has recently

developed a bilateral quarantine

arrangement (BQA) framework for the

importation of plant propagation

material from accredited offshore

quarantine facilities. BQAs are

established between MAF and the

exporting country’s national plant

protection organisation.

The plant quarantine facility and the

exporting country’s national plant

protection organisation (NPPO) will be

required to enter into a compliance

agreement covering the certification of

plant propagating material from that

facility destined for export to New

Zealand.

The purpose of these inter-agency BQAs

is to document New Zealand’s

requirements for the pre-export testing/

inspection of propagation material from

offshore plant quarantine facilities,

accredited by MAF. This will reduce the

post-entry quarantine testing

requirements in New Zealand.

Interceptions of black widow spiderson California grapes

coincidence happened within a

very short period. The

strengthening of existing

inspection requirements

has been implemented to

confirm that we are

dealing with isolated

incidents and that the

current measures required

for this import pathway

continue to maintain an

appropriate level of

protection.

Kevin Nalder, National

Adviser (International

Operations),

Plants Biosecurity,

phone 04 474 4243

fax 04 474 4257

email: [email protected]

Bilateral quarantine arrangement forimportation of plant propagation material

The BQA with each exporting country

includes a list of approved commodities

for each of the accredited facilities, the

contact details of the quarantine facilities

and operators, and reference of the

quality system procedures. For each

quarantine facility/commodity

combination the BQA also lists the

regulated organisms that need to be

tested and inspected or treated. This

forms the basis for an attachment to

phytosanitary certificates for

consignments exported to New Zealand,

to provide trace-back to the approved

facility and testing.

In addition to a BQA, the relevant

commodity import health standard must

be in place. Facilities that have been

approved in the past will gradually be

pulled into the new BQA framework

together with any requests for new

approvals.

This scheme will be applied shortly

during discussions with NPPO officials in

the United States, Spain and France. The

MAF Biosecurity Authority has beenreviewing its consultative forums. TheMinister for Biosecurity, Hon MarianHobbs, has also taken the opportunity toreview her advisory committees.

Background

MAF Biosecurity Authority has several

consultative forums, many of which have

arisen in an ad hoc manner. Some may

now not be relevant, perhaps because

they were established to deal with a

specific issue that is no longer

prominent, or because government

policy in that area has changed, or

because of government restructurings

where existing committees continued

despite having overlapping functions

with other committees. An example of

the latter is when the Ministry of

Forestry and Ministry of Agriculture

merged in 1998.

In addition to

MAF Biosecurity

Authority’s

consultative

committees, the

Minister for

Biosecurity has

several advisory

committees. Some advisory committees

have confusing roles or terms of

reference and in practice have operated

more as a consultative committee for

MAF, than as a means of independent

advice to the minister.

Ministerial advisory committees

The Minister for Biosecurity has taken

this opportunity to review the need for

her advisory committees. She has

confirmed her need for the Biosecurity

Council, Biosecurity Consultative Forum

and the Pest Management Strategy

Advisory Committee. These three

committees have all been established

within the last four years.

The minister recently announced the

cessation of the Forest Biosecurity

Advisory Committee. She acknowledged

the contribution of the committee over

the years, but considered she no longer

needed a committee to advise her

specifically on forest biosecurity. Her

Review of consultative forumsdesire was for multi-sectoral advice,

which she considered she was getting

through her other advisory committees.

In addition, MAF’s new consultation

committee on forest biosecurity would

provide the appropriate forum for

specific forest biosecurity issues.

Proposed new MAF committees

MAF Biosecurity Authority considers

that it needs consultative committees for

the following areas:

• animals

• plants

• forestry

• border1

MAF proposes that senior staff members

would chair these committees.

Membership would be open to industry

sector representatives, other government

departments and regional government.

Terms of

reference will

be prepared

for the new

committees,

or will be

revised to fit

the new

direction where a committee with a

similar focus currently exists.

Purpose of committees

The reason for establishing these

committees is to provide a forum for:

• industry sector representatives, other

government departments and

regional government to consult with,

and provide advice to, MAF’s chief

technical officers on sector-related

biosecurity issues; and

• MAF’s chief technical officers to

advise and consult on biosecurity-

related issues and proposed activities

with industry sector representatives,

other government departments and

regional government.

Specifically, the committees’ purpose is to:

• inform members and seek input into

proposed activities and policies

• enable issues or concerns to be raised

and clarified

• promote open sharing of information

• build stronger relationships

• seek policy suggestions from members.

Process

MAF Biosecurity Authority has been:

• seeking input from existing

committees on the proposed structure

• reviewing the objectives of existing

committees

• identifying members’ needs

• agreeing the purpose and objectives

of the committees

• agreeing terms of reference

• agreeing membership.

Feedback

MAF Biosecurity Authority is inviting

further feedback from all its consultative

committees to enable terms of reference

to be developed for each committee.

MAF is particularly interested in

feedback on the following questions:

• Should the committee have a

technical or policy focus, or both?

• Who should chair the committee –

a MAF Biosecurity Authority staff

member, an industry sector member,

an independent chair, other?

• Should members’ expenses be paid

(e.g. travel expenses)?

• What should the membership of the

committee be?

• How visible should the committee be

(e.g. should it have a public profile)?

• Are there other issues that need to be

considered when developing the

terms of reference?

Next steps

MAF Biosecurity Authority expects to

have draft terms of reference for the

proposed committees by early November.

Decisions on the final structure and

terms of reference are expected before the

end of the year.

Barry O’Neil, Group Director,

phone 04 474 4128,

email: [email protected]

1The establishment of this committee isdependent on the outcome of recommendationsarising from the border review.

discussions will be followed by visits to

relevant quarantine facilities with the

purpose of accreditation. The costs

associated with the development and

implementation of the scheme will be

met by industry.

Veronica Herrera, National Adviser

(Transitional Facilities),

Plants Biosecurity,

phone 04 470 2767,

fax 04 474 4257,

email: [email protected]

Kevin Nalder, National Adviser

(International Operations),

Plants Biosecurity,

phone 04 474 4243,

fax 04 474 4257,

email: [email protected]

15Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 200014 Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 2000

Egg mass and feedingdamage.

Gum leaf skeletoniser caterpillar.

In September, MAF met with

entomologists from Forest Research to

assess the current progress of the response

and to determine survey guidelines for the

coming season.

The most recent survey commenced on 2

October 2000. The surveillance plan

included the inspection of

eucalyptus trees on private and

commercial properties, golf

courses, schools, streets, parks

and reserves. The results of this

survey are expected to be

published in the next issue of

Biosecurity (Issue 24, 15

December 2000).

MAF Forest

Biosecurity’s

National Adviser

Pest Surveillance

and Response,

Mark Ross, says

that although the

results of the

response are so far

encouraging, additional surveys will be

needed before eradication can be

confirmed.

Mark Ross, National Adviser

(Forest Pest Surveillance and Response),

Forest Biosecurity,

phone 04 498 9611,

fax 04 498 9888,

email: [email protected]

Appointment to NAEACThe Minister of Agriculture recently appointed Mrs Joanna

Roberts to the National Animal Ethics Advisory Committee. Mrs

Roberts is a Kaipara District Councillor. She was nominated by

Local Government New Zealand. As she is associated with neither

the scientific community nor animal welfare groups, Mrs

Roberts’s role is to represent ‘the general public’.

Linda Carsons, Senior Policy Adviser, Animal Welfare,

phone 04 470 2746,

fax 04 498 9888,

email: [email protected]

Director Animal BiosecurityappointedDerek Belton, previously Programme Manager Surveillance andDisease Response, has been appointed Director of AnimalBiosecurity.

Derek is a Massey University veterinary graduate. He joined MAF

Biosecurity in 1999, after three years with the Institute of

Environmental Science & Research (ESR). At ESR Derek lead the

Food Safety science and research programme for clients including

the Ministry of Health, the Foundation for Research, Science and

Technology and the private sector.

Prior to this, Derek worked as a veterinary pathologist in MAF

Quality Management Animal Health Laboratories in Auckland

and Whangarei, with a specialist focus on microbiology.

Derek says the increasing globalisation of trade and industry

highlights the strategic importance of New Zealand’s biosecurity

programme.

“The establishment of the Biosecurity Authority in 1999 and new

government initiatives and investment are a tangible

demonstration of the growing appreciation of the value of

biosecurity to New Zealand,” he says. “Innovation in both

information technology and the detection and definition of

pathogens offers many

opportunities for us to refine

and advance our animal

biosecurity progamme.”

Derek Belton, Director

Animal Biosecurity,

phone 04 474 4155,

fax 04 474 4133,

email: [email protected]

Efforts to deal with a new Australian pestin the Bay of Plenty appear to be payingoff, but MAF is taking a cautiousapproach.

Gum leaf skeletoniser (Uraba lugens) was

first discovered in June 1997 at the Mount

Maunganui Golf Course, and later at the

Omanu Golf Course, both in

the Tauranga District. The

caterpillar is native to Australia

and a potentially serious

defoliator of eucalypts in New

Zealand. The young caterpillars

feed on the fleshy leaf tissue,

leaving a lace-like skeleton that

lends the insect its name.

Since gum leaf

skeletoniser was

initially discovered in

New Zealand, a series

of surveys have been

carried out within a

5km radius of the Mt

Maunganui Golf

Course. Any infested

trees detected during the surveys, and

surrounding host trees within 100 metres,

have been ground treated with the

synthetic pyrethroid insecticide,

deltamethrin (trade name Decis Forte).

In January this year, as a precautionary

measure, the surveillance range was

expanded to include identified host trees

outside the original infestation zone. The

results of the survey were encouraging,

with no evidence of the exotic insect being

found.

Gum leaf skeletoniser kept in check

Bilateral discussions withAgriculture, Fisheries and ForestryAustralia

The Director, Forest Biosecurity, Ruth

Frampton, and the National Adviser,

Forest Product Export Standards, Mark

Self, recently met with senior officials from

Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

Australia (AFFA) in Canberra, Australia.

Topics of interest included:

• recent changes to the structure of AFFA

and Australian Quarantine Inspection

Service (AQIS);

• import requirements for lumber, wood

packaging and seeds to New Zealand

and to Australia;

• import risk assessments;

• exchange of pest lists;

• inspection of forest products and

certification of facilities and

procedures; and

• interceptions on New Zealand lumber

and wood packaging exported to

Australia.

Internationalliaison

Improvements are proposed to the national surveillance pestplant initiative. A discussion document outlining a newapproach is available for comment.

Current approach

The current initiative involves regional councils including a

common list of 110 invasive weeds as ‘pests’ in their regional pest

management strategies. This inclusion makes it an offence under

sections 52 and 53 of the Biosecurity Act 1993 to sell, propagate,

distribute and commercially display ‘pests’. Authorised persons

employed by regional councils inspect commercial plant nurseries

and retail outlets to see whether these plants are present.

Concerns about this approach include:

• inconsistencies

between regional

councils; some

councils are not

able to justify

inclusion of all 110

plants;

• incomplete

national coverage;

two regional

councils do not yet

have regional plant

pest management

strategies;

• the need for more

rigorous analysis for each plant when the strategies come up

for their five-yearly review, as a result of amendments to the

Biosecurity Act since the strategies were put in place.

Proposed approach

The proposed approach is to have a list of invasive plants

determined as ‘unwanted organisms’ by a chief technical officer

(CTO) under the Biosecurity Act. The same offences under

sections 52 and 53 of the act apply to unwanted organisms as to

pests. Authorised persons employed by regional councils but

appointed by CTOs would inspect retail outlets and enforce those

sections.

A ‘national pest plant accord’ between relevant government

departments and regional councils is proposed to formalise

arrangements. A technical working group is being convened to

recommend the initial list of plants to be covered.

To ensure continuity of coverage, the new approach needs to be

finalised before the first reviews of regional strategies. The first

strategies expire on 1 July 2001.

David Harrison, Systems Coordinator, Biosecurity Policy

Coordination, phone 04 474 4173, email: [email protected]

The deadline for submissions is 4 December 2000

New approach forinvasive weeds

17Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 200016 Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 2000

New import health standards issued

The following new import health standards (IHSs) have been issued

by the Director Animal Biosecurity and are available for use. Any

previous IHSs covering these combinations of country of origin and

commodity/species have been revoked.

Specified products for human consumption containing dairyproducts, eggs or meat

Following an outbreak of foot and mouth disease in Greece,

clauses 8.4, 8.5, 8.6 and 8.10 relating to the importation of

private consignments of meat and dairy products have been

amended by removing Greece as a country of origin.

Following an outbreak of classical swine fever in the United

Kingdom and other EC countries, clause 8.6 relating to the

importation of private consignments of meat products has been

amended by removing these countries as countries of origin.

Clause 8.3 relating to the importation of canned meat products has

been deleted and ‘cans’ have been added to clause 8.1. iii for the

importation of cooked meat products.

Following an outbreak of foot and mouth disease in the Republic of

South Africa, clause 8.9 relating to the importation of private

consignments of dairy products has been amended by removing the

Republic of South Africa as a country of origin.

Clause 8.13 relating to the importation of commercially manufac-

tured or home-made confectionery, bread, biscuits and cakes has

been amended by removing the wording ‘animal products’ and

replacing it with ‘dairy and egg ingredients’.

Pig meat products for human consumption from Canada

The United Kingdom has been removed from this standard due to

the presence of classical swine fever in that country. This standard

used to cover pig meat products from both Canada and the United

Kingdom.

Non-viable animal specimens from all countries

This standard has been created by amalgamating three standards,

which are now revoked, for the importation of various animal

specimens. Non-viable in this context means dead.

Sheep and goat meat products for human consumption from Chile

The contents of clauses 9.4, 9.5 and 9.6, which relates to

certification provided by the Chilean authorities, have been

clarified, following some difficulties of interpretation. Clause 9.7

has been added for certification that these products are fit for

human consumption.

Shelf-stable petfoods containing animal products

Clause 8.9 has been added to allow the importation of Dr Walkers

Grit and Dr Walkers Picking Stone for ornamental birds.

Cheese for human consumption from Bulgaria

Dairy products for human consumption from MalaysiaThese standards were notified for consultation in Biosecurity 20:6

and are based on The Importation into New Zealand of Dairy

Products – Risks to New Zealand Livestock, dated January 1998.

Dairy product samples for evaluation

Following an outbreak of foot and mouth disease in the Republic of

South Africa, clause 5.4 has been amended by removing the

Republic of South Africa as a country of origin.

Following an outbreak of foot and mouth disease in Greece, clause

5.4 has been amended by removing Greece as a country of origin.

Pre-cooked heat-and-eat meals containing animal productsfrom Australia

Clause 11 ‘Manufacturer’s declaration’ has been altered by

deleting the need for a declaration in the case of mammalian meat

(beef, pork and sheep meat).

Kerry Mulqueen, National Adviser (Import Management), Animal

Biosecurity, phone 04 498 9625, fax 04 474 4132, email:

[email protected]

www.maf.govt.nz/AnimalIHS

Draft import health standards forconsultation

The following draft import health standards (IHSs) have been

developed by MAF and are available for public consultation.

Procedure for assessing proposals to import animal productsfor human consumption to address both public health andanimal concerns

MAF has been working with the Ministry of Health (MoH) to

develop a procedure to assess proposals to import animal products

for human consumption. The procedure will involve MAF and MoH

working closely together to ensure that animal health and human

health issues are considered simultaneously. The objective is to

produce import health standards that include both public health

and animal health importation requirements.

Cattle meat (beef) products for human consumption fromVanuatu

This document is based on The importation into New Zealand of

Meat and Meat Product – A review of the risks to animal health –

ISBN 0-477-0849-9, dated March 1991. This document includes

the requirement that the products must be derived from animals

that passed veterinay ante-mortem and post-morten inspection at

the time of slaughter.

Jean-Marie Derouet, Technical Adviser, International Trade,

phone 04 498 9897, fax 04 474 4227,

email: [email protected].

www.maf.govt.nz/AnimalIHS/riskanal.htm

The deadline for submissions is 15 December 2000.

Import health standards revoked

The following import health standards (IHS) have been revoked,

and the commodity or species from that country of origin is not

included on any replacement IHS.

Cattle meat products from ArgentinaFollowing an outbreak of foot and mouth disease in Argentina, the

importation of cattle meat products from that country has been

suspended.

Scoured and dehaired cashmere and yak fibre from Mongolia

This import health standard requires certification that Mongolia

has been free from foot and mouth disease (FMD) for 12 months.

Several outbreaks of FMD have occurred in Mongolia in recent

months making the import health standard invalid.

Frozen pig meat and meat products for human consumption fromthe Republic of South Africa

Following an outbreak of foot and mouth disease in the Republic

of South Africa, the importation of pig meat and meat products

from that country has been suspended.

Kerry Mulqueen, National Adviser (Import Management),

Animal Biosecurity, phone 04 498 9625, fax 04 474 4132,

email: [email protected]

www.maf.govt.nz/AnimalIHS

Revised containment standardfor microorganisms

A revision of MAF Biosecurity Authority Standard 154.03.02:

Containment facilities for microorganisms has been approved. The

revised standard is dated 15 September 2000 and replaces the

version dated 26 January 1999.

The revised standard provides a better system for tracking several

approved projects within a containment facility. This is particularly

relevant for projects on genetically modified organisms that have

been approved by the Environmental Risk Management Authority of

New Zealand or an institutional biosafety committee.

Kerry Mulqueen, National Adviser, (Import Management),

Animal Biosecurity, phone 04 4989 624, fax 04 474 4132,

email: [email protected]

Supervision of animal quarantineand containment

People who are not state sector employees can now be appointed as

Biosecurity Act inspectors to supervise animal quarantine and

containment. Supervision is usually done by inspectors employed by

the MAF Quarantine Service but sometimes there are not enough

suitably qualified people available, for example because specialist

knowledge is required or because of the remoteness of a facility.

MAF Quarantine Service continues to be responsible for ensuring

that there are inspectors to supervise all transitional (including

quarantine) and containment facilities in New Zealand and for

ensuring that each inspector is suitably trained and qualified.

Dr Denzil Chin-Fatt, MAF Quarantine Service,

phone 09 256 8696, fax 09 256 8715,

email: [email protected]

Amendment to MINDA identificationsystem

MAF has approved amendments to the Livestock Improvement

Corporation’s MINDA identification system. MINDA and the Animal

Health Board Identification System are approved under the

Biosecurity Act 1993 for the identification of cattle and deer for

bovine tuberculosis control.

Changes to MINDA were implemented in October 2000 and were

detailed in Biosecurity 18:7. They include two new options for

information management intended primarily for beef cattle and

deer farmers.

MINDA is also approved for the voluntary identification of goats.

The amended system has been submitted to the Department of

Conservation for approval under the Wild Animal Control Act 1977.

This means that both deer and goats identified using the MINDA

system will continue to be recognised legally as farmed animals.

Ashley Edge, Policy Adviser, Biosecurity Policy Coordination,

phone 04 474 4213,

email: [email protected]

MINDA identification system: 0800 264 632

Animal Welfare Advisory Committeeannual report published

The Animal Welfare Advisory Committee 1999 annual report has

been published and distributed. This will be the last annual report

for the committee under this name, as it became the National

Animal Welfare Advisory Committee on 1 January 2000.

To receive a copy of the report or to be added to the mailing list for

future reports contact:

Pam Edwards, Executive Co-ordinator, Animal Welfare,

phone 04 474 4129, fax 04 498 9888,

email: [email protected]

Codes of ethical conduct – approvals,notifications & revocations since thelast issue of Biosecurity

All organisations involved in the use of live animals for research,

testing or teaching are required to adhere to an approved code of

ethical conduct.

Codes of ethical conduct approved Nil

Notifications to MAF of arrangements to use an existing code ofethical conduct

• New Zealand Institute for Crop & Food Research Ltd (to use the

New Zealand Pastoral Agriculture Research Institute Ltd’s code

and the AgResearch Lincoln Animal Ethics Committee)

• Plade Holdings Ltd (to use AGVET Consultants Ltd’s code)

(approval subsequent to revocation listed below)

Codes of ethical conduct revoked or arrangements terminated• Alexander and Associates• Animal Control Products Ltd• Animal Health Advisory• Animalz Napier Ltd• Captec (NZ) Ltd• Cook, Trevor George• Crusader Meats New Zealand Ltd• Get Real Productions• Info-Brok• Mulvaney, Christopher John

Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 2000 19Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 200018

Plan

ts b

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curi

ty

Country Reference Status Date notified Summary of content Comments deadline

Chile 65 R 29/8/00 Animal feed 20/10/00

Chile 66 E 2/10/00 Supplementary measure to protect against footand mouth disease n/a

EEC 94 R 18/9/00 Foodstuffs and food of animal origin 30/11/00

Germany 5 R 6/9/00 Feedstuffs, additives and compounds 29/9/00

Indonesia 12 R 22/9/00 Fish health protection 15/11/00

Japan 58 R 9/10/00 Straw and forage as animal disease risk 20/10/00

Korea 74 R 6/10/00 Quarantine and inspection requirements for animals 5/12/00

Netherlands 54 E 26/9/00 Dead cats and dogs as specified risk material n/a

New Zealand 64 R 29/8/00 Live passerines from the United Kingdom 27/10/00

New Zealand 69 E 26/9/00 Suspension of pig meat and pig meat products fromSouth Africa to protect against foot and mouth disease n/a

New Zealand 70 E 26/9/00 Suspension of cattle meat products from Argentinato protect against foot and mouth disease n/a

Peru 20 E 13/9/00 Suspension of sheep, goats, swine and their productsfrom Greece to protect against foot and mouth disease n/a

Peru 21 E 13/9/00 Suspension of sheep and sheep products from Spainto protect against scrapie n/a

Philippines 21 E 15/9/00 Ban on specified avian products because of Newcastledisease outbreak in Brazil n/a

Philippines 22 E 15/9/00 Ban on specified porcine products because of classicalswine fever outbreak in United Kingdom n/a

Singapore 12 E 29/9/00 Suspension of pig meat and pig meat products fromSouth Africa to protect against foot and mouth disease n/a

USA 332 E 25/9/00 Suspension of swine, pork and pork products fromEast Anglia to protect against hog cholera 20/11/00

Argentina 57 R 29/8/00 Inspection procedures for wood packaging 29/9/00

Korea 72 R 6/9/00 Quarantine pest list 1/11/00

Mexico 164 R 4/9/00 Apricots from California, Washington, Oregon and Idaho 25/9/00

Mexico 165 E 4/9/00 Black citrus aphid and citrus tristeza disease n/a

New Zealand 65 R 29/8/00 Used vehicles 25/10/00

New Zealand 65 Add.1 R 9/10/00 Change to date of entry into force 25/10/00

New Zealand 65 Corr.1 R 11/9/00 Correction to email address n/a

USA 317 R 30/8/00 Fruit and vegetables 20/10/00

USA 325 R 6/9/00 Seed treatment 16/10/00

USA 333 R 25/9/00 Artificially dwarfed plants in growing media from China 20/11/00

USA 267 Add1 R 30/8/00 Extension of comments period of Fuji apples from Korea 23/10/00

Zambia 3 R 15/9/00 Protection against African cassava mosaic virus(Uganda variant) in cassava seedlings and plants 1/10/00

Zambia 4 R 15/9/00 Coffee seeds, seedlings and plants 1/10/00

Argentina 57 R 29/8/00 Inspection procedures for wood packaging 29/9/00

Korea 72 R 6/9/00 Quarantine pest list 1/11/00

New Zealand 65 R 29/8/00 Used vehicles 25/10/00

New Zealand 65 Add.1 R 9/10/00 Change to date of entry into force 25/10/00

New Zealand 65 Corr.1 R 11/9/00 Correction to email address n/a

Fore

stbi

osec

urity

Anim

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ty

• NZ Water Management Ltd• Pfizer Laboratories Ltd• Plade Holdings Ltd• Van Wijk, Niek• Veterinary Enterprises Ltd• Wanganui Veterinary Services Ltd

Approvals by the Director-General of MAF for the use of non-human hominids Nil

Approvals by the Minister of Agriculture of research or testingin the national interest Nil

Linda Carsons, Senior Policy Adviser, Animal Welfare,

phone 04 470 2746, fax 04 498 9888,

email: [email protected]

Upcoming conference

Learning, animals and the environment – changing the face ofthe future

This conference will be held in Hamilton on 28/29 June 2001. The

conference will be jointly hosted NAEAC and ANZCCART (the

National Animal Ethics Advisory Committee and the Australian and

New Zealand Council for the Care of Animals in Research and

Teaching).

Session 1 relates to primary and secondary education. It will focus

on how our interaction with animals and the environment has

changed, and how we might develop better interactions through

education. The second session is about tertiary education, research

and teaching. It will look at influences on the acceptability of

research, testing and teaching and how we might acknowledge and

better incorporate them. On day 2, session 3 will look at future

challenges while session 4 will deal with the regulatory aspects of

animals and the environment.

Gill Sutherland, Executive Officer, ANZCCART,

phone 04 4727421, fax 04 4731841,

email: [email protected]

Tropical grass webwormTropical grass webworm (Herpetogramma licarsisalis), a pasture

pest, has been determined to be an unwanted organism under the

Biosecurity Act 1993.

The determination was made following a request from a regional

council. Having ‘unwanted organism’ status allows regional

councils to undertake surveillance or implement a small-scale

management programme under section 100 of the Biosecurity Act

(Biosecurity 22:22). Additionally, the Biosecurity Act prohibits

multiplication, release, sale and commercial display of unwanted

organisms.

Suzanne Main, Policy Adviser, Biosecurity Policy Coordination,

phone 04 498 9930, email: [email protected]

Representation on Biosecurity CouncilThe Biosecurity Council is to increase its membership to include

representatives of the primary production industries and of environ-

mental organisations.

The Minister for Biosecurity, Hon Marian Hobbs, will be calling for

nominations for the two representatives in November. The new

members are expected to be announced before the next council

meeting in mid December.

The Biosecurity Council is an advisory body to the Minister for

Biosecurity. It was established to provide a forum for considering

biosecurity issues and coordinating the activities of the depart-

ments with biosecurity responsibilities (Biosecurity 10:4).

Sue Cotton, Biosecurity Secretariat,

phone 04 474 4283,

email: [email protected]

Management options for harmful organisms

An information paper on management options under the

Biosecurity Act 1993 has been prepared. It should be available to

decision-makers, such as government departments and regional

councils, by the end of October 2000. All options are outlined.

They range from simple and relatively basic surveillance, through

to complex strategies or emergency responses.

While other management options are available, the information

paper looks only at the statutory options under the Biosecurity Act.

The aim of the paper is to facilitate informed decision-making.

Because no two pests are the same, and the circumstances of their

arrival can be so variable, it is difficult and inappropriate to

develop a strict formula for decisions about management options.

However, the paper sets out to show that sound decisions can be

made through effective consultation and informed judgement.

The paper was produced at the request of the Biosecurity Technical

Forum (which advises the Biosecurity Council) and the Pest

Management Strategy Advisory Committee.

The paper will be available on MAF’s website and in print.

Henry Dowler, Pest Management Strategy Coordinator,

Biosecurity Policy Coordination,

phone 04 470 2745, email: [email protected]

Unwanted organism request process

A process for dealing with requests from regional councils to have

organisms determined as ‘unwanted organisms’ has been agreed. A

template to help regional councils make their request to the

appropriate chief technical officer is available on the MAF website.

Key points of the process include:

• a single contact point within MAF Biosecurity Authority;

• all chief technical officers across the four biosecurity depart-ments are advised of the request and have the opportunity toprovide input;

• maximum twelve day turnaround of requests;

• notification to all regional councils of the result;

• advice to all regional councils on why a request was declined.

The process has been endorsed by the Biosecurity Council.

Suzanne Main, Policy Adviser, Biosecurity Policy Coordination,

phone 04 498 9930, email: [email protected]

www.maf.govt.nz/UO

Biosecurity regulations notified internationally

These biosecurity (sanitary and phytosanitary) regulations have been either proposed or implemented

by members of the World Trade Organization, and have been notified under the SPS agreement (the

WTO agreement on the application of sanitary and phytosanitary measures) between 26 August and

11 October 2000.(Under ‘Reference’, Add. refers to an addendum, Corr. to a corrigendum, and Rev.

to a revision. ‘Status’ is either routine or emergency.)

Keawe Woodmore, New Zealand SPS Notification Authority,

phone 04 474 4226, fax 04 474 4133, [email protected]

Photo credits: p8, NZ Warnham & Woburn Deer Society.