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Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 2000 32 Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 2000
Everyone listed at the end of an article asa contact point, unless otherwise indicated,is part of the Ministry of Agricultureand Forestry Biosecurity Authority.
All MAF staff can be contacted by e-mail,and the standard format for all addressesis [email protected] example Ralph Hopcroft would [email protected] (There are slightexceptions for people with similar names,but these addresses are given wherenecessary.)
PO Box 2526, WellingtonNew Zealand
(+64) 4 474 4100 (switchboard)most staff have direct dial lines whichare listed where available
(+64) 4 474 4133• Animal Biosecurity Group,
except Director
(+64) 4 470 2730• Biosecurity Policy
Coordination Group• Border Management Group• International Agreements
Group• Contracts Management Group
(+64) 4 498 9888• Group Director and Business
Services Manager, BiosecurityAuthority
• Animal Biosecurity Group• Plants Biosecurity Group• Forest Biosecurity Group• Animal Welfare Group
(+64) 4 474 4257• Plants Biosecurity, except
Director
ASB Bank House,101 The Terrace, Wellington
Biosecurity is published by MAF BiosecurityAuthority. It covers biosecurity and animalhealth, animal welfare and plant and foresthealth issues. It is of special interest toall those with a stake in New Zealandagriculture, horticulture, forestry and animalwelfare.
Enquiries:
BiosecurityMAF Biosecurity AuthorityPO Box 2526, WellingtonPhone: 04 474 4100Fax: 04 498 9888Email: [email protected]: Phil Stewart
ISSN 1174 – 4618
ContentsHow tocontact us:
Icon Key
Animal Biosecurity
Plants Biosecurity
Forest Biosecurity
Animal Welfare
www.maf.govt.nz/Biosecurity/index.htm
Issue 23 • 1 November 2000
New Zealand’s border protection systemis acknowledged to be among the best inthe world. Hi-tech X-ray machines andsniffer dogs are among the frontlinedefences in the battle against invasionby exotic pests and diseases.
Less glamorous – but no less important –are the import health standardsdeveloped for risk goods like fruit andmeat products. This article looks at thevarious elements of our successfulborder systems that help to keep outpotentially damaging pests and diseases.
As an island nation, New Zealand enjoys
natural biosecurity barriers that help
safeguard its biodiversity. However,
increased global trade and modern day
transport bring thousands of exotic pests
and diseases within just hours of our
shores.
Border protection helps keep out pests
and diseases which, if they established
here, could harm our primary products
On the border:keeping unwanted invaders at bay
and biodiversity. MAF’s Biosecurity and
Quarantine groups work as a team to
safeguard the border. MAF Biosecurity
develops robust and enforceable standards
for risk goods, while the Quarantine
Service makes sure they are upheld.
These two groups are kept fully occupied
trying to keep out a range of harmful
pests and diseases, including fruit fly, mad
cow disease, pine nematode, Asian gypsy
moth, the white spotted tussock moth,
and many more.
Inspection at points of entry
MAF border inspection staff are
stationed at all main ports of entry into
New Zealand.
Their role is to check that risk goods
entering New Zealand comply with
biosecurity requirements and to identify
possible pest and disease entry pathways.
Ships and aircraft, cargo, passengers’
effects, ballast water, ship and aircraft
refuse and mail are all routinely inspected.
MAF Biosecurity develops standards
outlining the conditions for bringing in
such risk goods as apples, meat, and logs
via shipping containers, second hand cars
and machinery, and other risk pathways.
The documents define the conditions that
must be met throughout the entire
journey from country of origin to
0New Zealand’s shores.
Quarantine staff undertake a targeted risk
management inspection process to
identify and seize risk material as it comes
across the border. Imported goods that fail
to meet quarantine requirements are
treated, re-exported, or destroyed.
X-ray machines and sniffer dogs have
greatly strengthened New Zealand’s
biosecurity border defences in recent
years.
The purchase of X-ray equipment has
boosted detection capability to new levels.
These state-of-the-art machines have
sophisticated features for detecting
biological risk goods. Four machines are
in use at Auckland Airport, with one each
at the airports of Hamilton, Wellington
and Christchurch. Two are also in use at
the Auckland International Mail Centre.
A nose for trouble
Since 1996 detector dogs – trained to sniff
out undeclared quarantine material in
baggage or parcels – have played an
important part in patrolling our borders
for illegal importations of plant and
animal material.
There are six teams (one handler, one dog)
based at the Auckland International Air
Terminal, two teams at the Auckland
International Mail Centre, one team at
Wellington, and two more based in
Christchurch.
Dogs also help in the clearance of
passengers on arriving cruise ships. Dog
teams from the larger airports service
international airports such as Hamilton,
Dunedin and Queenstown.
Trouble at t’millThe recent import of a used pellet
feed mill from the Netherlands into
the Port of Timaru created consider-
able work for MAF’s Quarantine
Service.
The mill arrived in a forty-foot con-
tainer that on initial inspection was
found to be infested with spiders
requiring fumigation.
That was just the entrée. When the
contents – electric motors, elevators,
mixers, extruders and gearboxes –
were unpacked for inspection they
were found to be grossly contaminated
with animal feed residue, straw, seeds
and dead rodents.
In addition to the mill equipment
there was a selection of farm tools, old
gates and piping – all contaminated
with straw, seeds and soil.
In total, 180kgs of contaminated
material was removed from the
consignment during decontamination.
A load of old rubbishA used garbage truck amongst a recent
consignment of used machinery from
Singapore brought its work along for the
ride.
On inspection, MAF’s Quarantine
Service at Wellington Port found a full
load of rubbish in the truck. Most of the
load consisted of rotten branches and
plant material that showed signs of pest
infestation.
The rubbish was incinerated and the
truck directed for cleaning. If the
contents of the truck had been visible
and accessible while on board the
vessel, the ship would have been
refused entry to New Zealand and
directed back to its country of origin.
Continued over page
3 On the border: keeping unwanted invaders at bay4 Contaminated machinery refused entry
K9 capers5 The thin green line: MAF’s Enforcement Unit
EU prosecutionsFumigation operator suspended
6 Border Management Group responsibilitiesSparrow deaths investigatedVarroa update
7 Johne’s disease review completed8 Risk disk: a risk analysis resource on CD9 MAF Biosecurity contracts: how the system works10 Canine brucellosis tests under scrutiny
Animal Welfare Act sets key advisory committees in law12 Review of consultative forums13 Interceptions of black widow spiders on California grapes
Bilateral quarantine arrangement for importationof plant propagation material
14 Gum leaf skeletoniser kept in checkInternational liaisonBiosecurity people: NAEAC appointment
15 Biosecurity people: Plant exports teamDirector Animal Biosecurity appointed
16 New import health standards issuedDraft import health standards for consultationImport health standards revoked
17 Revised containment standard for microorganismsSupervision of animal quarantine and containmentAmendment to MINDA identification systemAnimal Welfare Advisory Committee annual report publishedCodes of ethical conduct – approvals, notifications and revocations
18 Upcoming conference: Learning, animalsand the environmentTropical grass webwormRepresentation on Biosecurity CouncilManagement options for harmful organismsUnwanted organism request process
19 Biosecurity regulations notified internationally
Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 2000 54 Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 2000
The MAF Enforcement Unit (the EU) isthe principal enforcement arm of theMinistry of Agriculture and Forestry. TheUnit supports both the MAF Biosecurityand Food Assurance Authorities for allenforcement matters. Whileenforcement is taken seriously andprosecutions regularly undertaken, theEU also has a strong educational role.
The EU identifies potential offenders
through complaints and tip offs from the
public, MAF staff and other sources.
Investigations of interest to MAF
Biosecurity focus on animal welfare
concerns and illegal activity regarding
biosecurity risk goods. The EU also
undertakes general surveillance to
identify breaches of the Biosecurity Act
and Animal Welfare Act.
Activities
The Enforcement Unit has 22 staff
including five investigators who tend to be
from law enforcement or legal
backgrounds. These investigators manage
and control all major investigations
including those involving criminal
proceedings.
Seven animal welfare and illegal meat
enforcement advisers support the
investigators. They also educate the public
The thin green line: MAF’s Enforcement UnitContaminated machineryrefused entryA used machinery importer has received a
sharp reminder that import health
standards are there for a purpose.
The discharge of two large used hydraulic
excavators from Japan was prohibited by
the Quarantine Service recently as they
contravened the Import Health Standard
for Forestry or Agricultural Equipment.
The excavators were reshipped as they
posed a serious biosecurity risk. This
brings to four the number of used ma-
chines reshipped to their point of origin
after permission to land was withheld.
The excavators were grossly contaminated
with soil from their previous work site,
and the importer had made no attempt to
clean the machinery before shipping.
Soil was easily visible without removing
any plates.
K9 capers: Passengerssay the darndest things!MAF Quarantine Service’s canine (K9)
contingent continue to prove their worth.
During September, K9 Deva stubbornly
sat alongside a passenger’s trolley covered
by a large down-type jacket. The passen-
ger from Cambodia replied ‘no’ when
asked if he had any fruit in the jacket. On
inspection, two parcels were found
containing fresh leaves and ham, one of
which was partially eaten.
K9 Olive stood for no nonsense from some
other hungry passengers, one who ‘just
forgot about’ 1kg of apples and 1kg of
bananas he was carrying. One and a half
kgs of meat roll and 1kg of eggs were
seized from another passenger who said
that his wife ‘must have packed the food
in case he got hungry’.
Around the same time K9 Holly, while
working a flight, detected 2kgs of chest-
nuts, 1kg of berries and a suitcase filled
with pork sausages.
Fumigation operator suspendedMAF accreditation to provide services related to New Zealand’s biosecurity should not
be taken lightly, as one fumigation operator has discovered to his cost.
The operator was suspended from Level One MAF accreditation for two months,
due to serious non-compliance with MAF’s standards for approval and monitoring
fumigation operators. The suspension has seriously affected the viability of the
operator’s business, requiring full supervision by MAF at cost for each treatment.
The non-compliance included: a lack of fans and heaters; releasing the fumigation
early while fumigating tyres; and two separate cases of gas leaking from containers.
MAF is under no obligation to accredit treatment operators who fail to meet its
standards, and who endanger New Zealand’s biosecurity.
A new standard: Accreditation of Operators Providing Treatment of Imported Risk
Goods and Forestry or Plant Related Material for Export is due to be promulgated
shortly. It will clarify the operator’s obligations and strengthen the monitoring of
treatment operators.
Ken Glassey, Programme Coordinator,
Border Management Group,
phone 04 498 9610,
email: [email protected]
about how they can operate within the law
to protect New Zealand’s biosecurity and
provide appropriate care for pets, livestock
and animals used in teaching or research.
The unit has a strong administration team
to support the investigation and
prosecution activities.
Investigating complaints
The EU investigates complaints and
suspected illegal activity and decides
whether there are sufficient grounds for
prosecution. The unit’s prosecution
coordinators undertake the checks and
balances to determine whether
investigations should proceed for
prosecution and follow cases through the
Court system.
Where investigations establish criminal
liability, the matter may be placed before
the Courts to provide a strong deterrent to
other potential transgressors.
The Enforcement Unit liaises with other
state enforcement agencies on issues such
as technology and techniques.
Jockey Jensen, Manager Enforcement,
Enforcement Unit,
phone 09 357 1051,
fax 09 357 6480,
email: [email protected]
The standard requires the importer to
ensure that all used machinery is disman-
tled and cleaned free of all contaminants
prior to shipping, and stored and carried
in a manner that precludes
recontamination. To verify this, quarantine
officers inspect machinery on board the
ship and have the power to stop discharge
where gross contamination is observed.
The import health standard for forestry
and agricultural equipment from any
country is available on the MAF web site
(see below).
Ken Glassey, Programme Coordinator,
Border Management Group,
phone 04 498 9610,
email: [email protected]
www.maf.govt.nz/Standards/plants/
border/nonorgihs/index.htm
X-ray machines and detector dogs also
play a key role in the inspection of all
parcels entering New Zealand. They have
more than proved their worth – risk
goods, including fresh produce, seeds,
plants and straw items, are regularly
intercepted.
Post-entry quarantine is an extension of
control at the border. It provides a safe
holding facility to ensure that imported
plant or animal materials can be observed
and tested for pests and diseases by
suitably qualified people working to MAF
Biosecurity standards.
Tackling the problem ofcontainers
Close to half a million shipping containers
enter New Zealand’s busy and
overcrowded ports every year. Concerns
about the risks to biosecurity from
organisms carried on and in these steel
boxes has prompted the MAF Biosecurity
to embark on a major survey during 2000.
Approximately 17,000 containers will be
inspected as part of this exercise.
“Most general cargo entering New
Zealand these days comes in the form of
containers. Because these steel boxes travel
around the world and are regularly placed
on soil and grass in different countries,
they pose a potential risk to biosecurity,”
explains Mike Alexander, programme
manager of the MAF Biosecurity Border
Management Group.
“It is not physically possible for us to open
and unload all containers. They are
difficult to inspect. Our preference is to
find effective ways to inspect without
causing major disruption to the
commercial operation of the importer.
“We need to find out more about the real
risks from containers and how we can
manage these risks. In the meantime the
Quarantine Service has been asked to be
especially vigilant when clearing
containers. We are also trialling the use of
dogs in container ports. Last year MAF
inspected 80,000 containers. That number
will increase by at least 5 percent this
year.”
Melissa Wilson, Business Services
Manager, MAF Biosecurity Authority,
phone 04 498 9865,
email: [email protected]
EU ProsecutionsAnimal welfare
MAF’s Enforcement Unit has received 259
animal welfare complaints since 1 July
2000. Two cases have been successfully
prosecuted with two offenders being
convicted and sentenced to two months
periodic detention and $2000 fine respec-
tively for neglect of cows. There are two
additional cases awaiting court hearings.
Offences at the border
The Infringement Notice process for the
offence of erroneous declaration, (s154(s)
of the Biosecurity Act 1993) has not yet
fully come on stream. However the EU and
MAF’s Quarantine Service have been
increasing the enforcement presence at
the border.
There are five files before the Court for
breaches at the border and a further nine
enquiries under investigation. Twenty-nine
warnings have been issued for both failure
to declare offences and attempts to possess
uncleared items since 1 July 2000.
One prosecution of breaches of Biosecurity
Act s154 (f) and s72 Crimes Act has been
completed. The offender was convicted and
fined $750 for erroneous declaration of
plant cuttings.
Animal remedies and pesticides
Six charges of sale of unlicensed animal
remedies are currently with the Hamilton
District Court. Two individuals have been
charged along with a corporation. In
addition, one prosecution is awaiting
hearing under Pesticides Act 1961 for
plant damage by spraying.
Jacqui Pate, Senior Investigating
Solicitor, Enforcement Unit,
phone 09 357 1058,
fax 09 357 6480,
email: [email protected]
Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 2000 76 Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 2000
MAF has adopted the relevantrecommendations from the committeereviewing Johne’s disease in NewZealand. This article reports on thereview process and outlines therecommendations.
The review process
In July 1995 MAF initiated a review of its
policies for Johne’s disease by releasing
the public discussion paper Future
Management of Johne’s Disease in New
Zealand. Although 33 submissions were
received, these did not provide a clear
picture of the industry’s future goals for
the control or eradication of the disease.
MAF concluded that further consultation
would be necessary, using a different
approach, in order for it to understand
stakeholders’ views on these important
issues.
MAF therefore decided to convene a
Johne’s disease steering committee with
representation from: AgResearch,
Federated Farmers of New Zealand Inc,
Lincoln University, Livestock
Improvement Corporation, Massey
University, Merino New Zealand Inc, the
New Zealand Deer Farmers’ Association,
and the New Zealand Veterinary
Association.
Johne’s disease review completedThe committee first met in March 1997.
The agreed terms of reference were:
• To facilitate the consultative process
with livestock industry
stakeholders and assist in the
formulation of tentative
policy recommendations
for Johne’s disease.
• To assist the New Zealand
livestock industries in the
development and
promulgation of
recommended farm
management practices,
for all species of farmed
ruminants, which will aid
in the control of Johne’s
disease.
• To examine whether New Zealand
should develop, using the Australian
models as a basis, voluntary ovine and
bovine control programmes.
• To assist MAF in conducting a cost-
benefit analysis to identify the true
costs of Johne’s disease in New
Zealand, and to examine whether
control/eradication programmes
for Johne’s disease are currently
an option.
• To identify research priorities for
Johne’s disease.
The committee met again in July 1997.
The members agreed that in order for
them to make the best recommendations
they should analyse:
• the costs of Johne’s disease to the
producer; and
• the benefits of various management
options (do nothing, test and cull,
vaccination, and partial or total
destocking).
Overseas cost benefit analyses on Johne’s
disease do not reflect New Zealand
farming conditions and were of limited
value.
MAF commissioned two reports from
Agriculture New Zealand to obtain the
information sought by the committee to:
• quantify the costs to the producer
from Johne’s disease under New
Zealand conditions; and
• analyse the advantages and
disadvantages for each of the
management options for Johne’s
disease.
The sectors covered by this
analysis are the cattle (dairy and
beef), sheep, and deer farming
industries.
The committee met in
September 1998 to consider the
draft reports. Overall, the
committee was pleased with
both reports and felt they
answered many questions about
the costs and management
of Johne’s disease.
The committee acknowledged that many
of the scientific challenges presented by
Johne’s disease are unresolved, especially
in diagnostic technology and vaccination.
Until significant advances are made in
both these areas, the technical feasibility
of national market assurance or control
schemes will remain highly questionable.
The Agriculture New Zealand reports
were then finalised and the committee
consequently finalised their
recommendations. MAF has now agreed
to undertake the actions assigned to it
specifically in the recommendations.
Recommendations of the Johne’sDisease Steering Committee
Development of voluntary market
assurance programmes
• The development of a market
assurance programme for the beef
cattle, dairy cattle, and sheep
industries, as per the Australian
model, is not feasible.
• The deer industry should examine if
it should pursue the development of
a national voluntary market assurance
programme, as per the Australian
model.
• Exporters who can demonstrate that
they have complied with the
Australian guidelines for either the
bovine or ovine market assurance
programmes will be eligible for MAF
certification to this effect. These
programmes would be subject to
MAF audit.
The effects of Johne’sdiseaseJohne’s disease is a bacterial disease of
ruminants which inhibits an animal’s
ability to absorb nutrients through the
intestinal wall. Livestock contract
Johne’s disease, usually when young, by
ingesting an infective dose of the
bacterium Mycobacterium paratuberculo-
sis in feed or water. The bacterium
establishes in the intestine of the
infected animal where it damages and
causes a thickening of the intestinal
wall. Wastage and diarrhoea can result,
followed by death. Offspring may also be
infected while in utero, if the mother is
heavily infected. Not all livestock
infected with Johne’s disease will die
from the disease or even show symp-
toms. When clinical signs do occur, they
tend to be in older animals although this
can vary with species.
• Accreditation of TreatmentOperators2
Email: [email protected],
phone 04 498 9610
Brendan McDonald:Programme Coordinator
Responsible for import health standards for:
• Air Containers
• Sand, Soil, Clay and Water
Other responsibilities:
• Requirements for Airport Approvaland Monitoring2
• Requirements for Aircraft Clearance
• Requirements for Passenger Clearance
• Requirements for Flight Kitchens
• Requirements for Biosecurity ControlAreas
• Requirements for TransitionalFacilities
• Requirements for QuarantineIncinerators for International Refuse
• Requirements for Clearance of Mail
• Clearance of Risk Goods Requiring anImport Health Standard
Email: [email protected],
phone 04 474 4204
1 To be implemented this year2 Under review this year
supported management plan that will run
for two years. Its key objectives are to:
• slow the spread of varroa, especially
to the South Island
• assist the transition of affected
industries, especially beekeepers.
More information about Phase II will be
published in Biosecurity after it has been
approved.
At the same time as Phase II is being
implemented, MAF and the beekeeping
industry will start developing Phase III,
which is expected to be a long-term
management programme under the
Biosecurity Act.
Because the Phase II plan will not be
operational before November, MAF has
implemented some interim measures:
• a preventive treatment programme
• revised movement controls to
facilitate the kiwifruit pollination
season.
More information is available at the
Varroa Information Centre on the MAF
web site. This is updated whenever there
are new developments.
Paul Bolger, Varroa Programme
Coordinator, Animal Biosecurity,
phone 04 474 4144,
fax 04 474 4133,
email: [email protected]
Ashley Edge,
varroa compensation contact,
Biosecurity Policy Coordination,
phone 04 474 4213,
fax 470 2730,
email: [email protected]
To help ensure you are talking to the rightperson, the following is a guide to theresponsibilities of key staff in the newBiosecurity Authority Border ManagementGroup. We also indicate which standardsare under review this year.
Mike Alexander: ManagerResponsible for the following standards:
• Pre-shipment Inspection
• Infringement Fees1
• Pest Identification at the Border2
Email: [email protected],
phone 04 474 4280
Ken Glassey:Programme CoordinatorResponsible for import health standards for:
• Sea Containers2
• Used Tyres
• Bulk Fertiliser
• Imported Machinery
• Imported Vehicles (after currentreview is completed)
Other responsibilities:
• Requirements for Port Approval andMonitoring2
• Requirements for Vessel Clearanceand Monitoring2
• Requirements for Clearance ofPersonal Effects
Border Management Group responsibilities
At the time of
writing, the
results of the
next phase of
the investigation
into unusual
sparrow deaths
are expected in
late October or early November.
Since late September, MAF and the
Department of Conservation have been
investigating the cause of unusually large
numbers of dead sparrows. Salmonella
Typhimurium phage type 160 has been
isolated in two cases to date. Salmonellosis
is a common cause of bird deaths in
winter, but this particular phage type has
not previously been recognised as park
near Christchurch has died, this was not
due to salmonellosis.
Roger Poland, Programme Coordinator,
Surveillance,
Animal Biosecurity,
phone 04 498 9820,
fax 04 474 4133,
email: [email protected]
Sparrow deathsinvestigated
In July, government decided on a three-phase plan for the management ofvarroa in New Zealand (Biosecurity21:5-6, and 22:10).
Phase I, involving the immediate
government-funded treatment of all
known infected hives, ran smoothly and
is now 90 percent completed.
Beekeepers who advised MAF of their
intent to claim compensation have now
been sent a claim form with guidelines
about verifiable losses in the period 12
April to October 2000. MAF recognises
that further losses may occur in relation
to the remaining movement controls.
A plan to implement Phase II was
expected to have been presented to
Cabinet for approval at the end of
October. Phase II is a government-
6
The Johne’s DiseaseSteering Committeerecommendeddevelopment of a newvaccine for thedisease.
Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 2000 98 Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 2000
• To develop a vaccine for all species
that does not possess the adverse
complications of the vaccine currently
available in New Zealand, eg, tissue
reaction, cross reactivity with
tuberculin.
• Quantification of the sub-clinical
costs of Johne’s disease in sheep, beef
cattle and deer.
• Coordination of research within New
Zealand and collaboration, if possible,
with the Australian $40 million
research package on the diagnosis and
control of Johne’s disease, its
subclinical costs, and level of flock/
herd infection.
• Risk management tools to manage
public perception/media if a causal
relationship between Johne’s disease
and Crohn’s disease is proven.
• To determine if Johne’s disease can be
transferred via semen or embryos in
sheep and cattle.
• Regular update of the international
research literature on the relationship
between Johne’s disease and Crohn’s
disease.
Other recommendations
• There is an ongoing need for stock
agents, farm consultants, and
veterinarians to educate farmers on
Copies of reports
A copy of the final versions of the two
Agriculture New Zealand reports can be
obtained from the MAF website, under
Standards/Animal Biosecurity Standards
and Statements/Link to Disease List or
by contacting:
Isabelle Vanderkolk
Agriculture New Zealand
PO Box 841
PALMERSTON NORTH
Phone: 06 356 9063
Fax: 06 355 2031
Email:
the conditions for use of the Johne’s
disease vaccine. With respect to the
protection of New Zealand’s market
access for meat and meat products, it
is critical that all users of the vaccine
observe the requirement to earmark
all vaccinated stock, and notify a new
owner or slaughterhouse when
vaccinated animals are being sold.
• MAF should collate information on
Johne’s disease research projects
within New Zealand.
• MAF (and affected industries)*
should maintain a watching brief over
Johne’s/Crohn’s disease issues.
• An information ‘package’ should be
prepared for the cattle, sheep, and
deer sectors, which will contain an
introductory overview of the history
of Johne’s disease in New Zealand, a
copy of the two Agriculture New
Zealand reports, a diagnostic guide
for Johne’s disease, and the final
recommendations from the Steering
Committee.
*Inserted by MAF.
Roger Poland, Programme Coordinator,
Surveillance, Animal Biosecurity,
phone 04 498 9820,
fax 04 474 4133,
email: [email protected]
conducting a risk analysis, reviewing a
risk analysis for MAF Biosecurity, or
simply wanting to see how we go about
our risk analyses. Risk disk outlines the
procedures we follow when conducting
an import risk analysis.
The CD also contains texts that establish
the context in which we conduct our risk
analyses: namely, the OIE International
Animal Health Code chapter on import
risk analysis and the Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures.
Risk disk also includes examples of some
of our recent import risk analyses. We
have not included all the risk analyses we
have worked on – only those which were
subjected to formal and rigorous
scientific peer review before publication.
Risk disk is a living document. New
analyses and significant new background
documents will be added in updated
versions, to be announced in future issues
of Biosecurity and on the MAF website.
To get a copy of Risk disk forward your
details and a cheque for $5 payable to
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, to:
Martin van Ginkel,
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry,
PO Box 2526,
Wellington, New Zealand.
www.maf.govt.nz/AnimalIHS/riskanal.htm
MAF Biosecurity contracts out a widerange of services. In this article we lookat the types of services that are bought-in, who supplies them and how thecontracts are managed.
Services provided under contract
MAF Biosecurity currently allocates and
manages 33 contracts covering the supply
of services from external contractors.
These are worth $27 million annually and
fall into several broad categories (see Fig
1). MAF Biosecurity also manages a series
of internal and inter-departmental
service arrangements valued at $19
million annually.
Internal services contracts, or
Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs),
encompass Border Control and
Quarantine services, National Centre for
Disease Investigation (NCDI) and Police
support for Exotic Disease Pest Response
activities (EDPR).
Selecting MAF Biosecuritysuppliers
MAF Biosecurity uses a range of
contractor selection processes to identify
and select suitable contractors. These
include:
• ROI (Registration of Interest) and
RFP (Request for Proposal) processes
• competitive tendering (both open and
restricted)
• preferred supplier arrangements
• competitive quotation selection.
While considerable attention is paid to
the cost of each service, the prime focus is
on quality of service and ensuring that
the risks to biosecurity are covered.
The type of contract issued depends on
the risk to be managed, the type of
service required, the cost to MAF and
period over which the service is to be
provided.
The need for professionalcontracts management
The ongoing need to provide a
transparent ‘actual costs’ system, capable
MAF Biosecurity contracts:how the system works
of satisfying departmental and Treasury
scrutiny in terms of demonstrable value
for money, has driven the development of
MAF Biosecurity’s contracts management
process. The success of this process is
based on accurate technical specifications
and close interaction between the
contract and technical specialists within
MAF Biosecurity. This process is further
enhanced by close interaction with all
contractors and regular performance
reviews.
MAF Biosecurity’s suppliers
MAF Biosecurity uses a wide range of
specialist and general service providers
throughout New Zealand. These include
other government agencies, state owned
enterprises, universities, commercial
organisations and individual specialists.
Due to the technical nature of the MAF
Biosecurity requirement, the range of
professional service providers with the
capability and capacity to effectively meet
MAF standards is limited. As a result,
MAF Biosecurity actively encourages
both individual specialists and
commercial organisations to participate
in the supplier selection process.
Monitoring supplier performance
All MAF Biosecurity service contracts
incorporate a definitive quality assurance
requirement, under which contractors
must develop and maintain a formal
quality assurance programme. This
programme then forms the benchmark
MAF Biosecurity contracts as at October 2000(Contract amounts in NZD millions)
Internal andinterdepartmentalservices
Exotic Disease PestResponse (EDPR)
Surveillance
Specialist services(Analytical Services, IT,Projects, Publicationsand Research)
Animal Health
$19M
$3.7M
$1.97M
$0.24M
$20M
The Risk Management Section of MAF’sBiosecurity Authority has a produced aCD on risk analysis.
The Section’s primary function is the
development and application of risk
analysis methodologies for the
importation of animals and animal
products. The application of the risk
analysis discipline to animal health issues
is a relatively recent development. The
CD, Risk disk, contains information about
the biosecurity risks posed by the
importation of animals and animal
products.
Risk disk was designed to provide
information to veterinarians who are
Risk disk: a risk analysis resource on CD
Development of control/eradicationprogrammes
• The development of national control/
eradication programmes for the sheep,
dairy cattle, and beef cattle industries
is not feasible.
• The deer industry should consider
whether it should develop and
implement a national pest manage-
ment strategy (PMS).
Research priorities
• To further enhance diagnostic test
capability, especially for the detection
of subclinical infection with Myco-
bacterium paratuberculosis in all species.
for ongoing contractor performance.
Wherever possible, MAF Compliance
Group conducts a formal audit of each
contractor annually, against the
requirements of the contract and the
quality assurance programme.
MAF Biosecurity also conducts a
proactive contractor visit programme
within which both technical and
contractual issues are highlighted and
resolved. While the visit programme
tends to be an informal process aimed at
managing the business relationship
rather than the contract, there is
provision for formal evaluation of
contractor performance. When such an
evaluation takes place, the contractor is
provided with a written copy of the final
report and invited to comment.
Mark Murdoch, Contracts Manager,
MAF Biosecurity Authority,
phone 04 474 4184,
fax 04 474 4133,
email: [email protected]
Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 2000 1110 Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 2000
Animal Welfare Act sets key advisorycommittees in law
MAF is reviewing its canine brucellosis
tests for investigating suspected cases in
New Zealand, following a recent
investigation into a suspected case of the
disease.
The investigation revealed a higher that
expected number of false positives from the
screening test. A specialist laboratory in the
United States confirmed the results of the
screening tests carried out here so it is
suspected that there may be some agent in
the New Zealand dog population causing
the higher than expected cross-reactivity
rate.
MAF is waiting for the results of blood
culture. These will clarify New Zealand’s
health status for canine brucellosis. The
results are expected early in November.
MAF still wants to hear of possible signs of
canine brucellosis (abortions in bitches and
testicular inflammation in dogs),
particularly in St Bernards. Phone the MAF
National Centre for Disease Investigation
exotic disease freephone (0800 80 99 66) to
report a case for investigation.
Matthew Stone, Programme
Coordinator, Exotic Disease Response,
Animal Biosecurity,
phone 04 498 9884,
fax 04 474 4133,
email: [email protected]
Canine brucellosis tests under scrutinyWays canine brucellosis can be spread
Sexual transmission
Sexual activity between infected and uninfected dogs poses the highest risk.
Abortion or whelping
Fluids from aborting and whelping infected bitches are highly infectious to other dogs.
They also present a risk to humans and so protective clothing, gloves in particular,
should be worn by owners dealing with such situations. Any bitch that has aborted or
had an abnormal whelping (i.e. stillbirths or infection) should not attend dog shows for
at least 6 weeks after the event. Advice from a veterinarian should be sought if a bitch
aborts, delivers stillborn puppies or suffers infections after whelping.
Infected male dogs
Infected male dogs may have an inflamed or swollen testicle/s. Their urine can contain
numerous bacteria during the early stages of infection, but urine-contact is unlikely to
lead to infection in other dogs. Puppies are more susceptible to infection through urine
than adult dogs.
Casual contact
Long periods (several
months) of living together
in close contact are
typically required prior to
transmission of Br. canis
from an apparently
healthy adult dog to an
uninfected dog. The risk
of transmission from
occasional or casual
contact is very low.
NAEAC members Expiry
of appointment
Mrs Wyn Hoadley
(Chairperson) 31.10.02
Dr A C David Bayvel N/A
Dr Bernhard HH Breier 31.10.01
Mrs Jeanette Crosado 31.10.02
Mr Mark C Farnsworth 31.10.00
Professor John Marbrook 31.10.00
Dr W Barry McPherson 31.10.01
Mrs Lynne M Milne 31.10.01
Mrs Joanna J Roberts 31.10.02
Dr John C Schofield 31.10.01
NAWAC members Expiryof appointment
Professor David J Mellor
(Chairperson) 31.10.02
Dr A C David Bayvel N/A
Dr Mark W Fisher 31.10.00
Dr Neville G Gregory 31.10.02
Mrs Wyn Hoadley 31.10.02
Ms Judith N Jones 31.10.01
Mrs Peggy N Loague 31.10.00
Mr Alistair R Polson 31.10.01
Dr Janet A Quay 31.10.02
Mr Bruce Warburton 31.10.01
NAEAC Chairperson,Mrs Wyn Hoadley.
NAWAC Chairperson,Professor David Mellor.
The Animal Welfare Act 1999 formally
established two independent ministerial
advisory committees, the National
Animal Ethics Advisory Committee
(NAEAC) and the National Animal
Welfare Advisory Committee (NAWAC).
Both committees have existed for some
years, having been set up by the Minister
of Agriculture using his powers to
establish advisory or technical
committees. Now their existence,
functions, membership and other
administrative details are set in law.
NAEAC advises the Minister of
Agriculture on ethical issues and animal
welfare issues arising from research,
testing and teaching. These functions
relate specifically to Part 6 of the Act,
which regulates the use of live animals in
research, testing and teaching.
NAWAC facilitates the development of
animal welfare policy and practice for
New Zealand and advises the Minister of
Agriculture on all animal welfare issues
other than those relating to Part 6 of the
Act.
Appointment of committeemembers
The Minister of Agriculture appoints
NAEAC and NAWAC members for a term
of three years as required in the Act.
Appointments are made on the basis of
the individual’s experience and expertise.
Both committees meet four times a year
but hold extra meetings if required.
Operational plans and strategicplans
Both committees operate in accordance
with operational and strategic plans
which they review and update regularly.
NAEAC’s functions
The Act empowers NAEAC to:
• make recommendations to the
Minister on whether a procedure
should be declared not to be a
‘manipulation’
• make recommendations to the
Director-General of MAF regarding the
approval, or the revocation of approval,
to use non-human hominids for
research, testing or teaching
• provide advice on the development
and review of codes of ethical
conduct and on the approval,
amendment, suspension or
revocation of any code of ethical
conduct
• make recommendations to the
Minister about standards and policies
for codes of ethical conduct
• provide information and advice to
animal ethics committees
• make recommendations to the
Director-General on the
qualifications, experience or other
requirements to be met by people
wishing to become accredited
reviewers
• consider the reports of accredited
reviewers on code holders and animal
ethics committees
• make recommendations to the
Minister on whether to approve
research or testing to be carried out in
the national interest (other than in
emergencies).
Current issues being consideredby NAEAC
• assistance for preparation of codes of
ethical conduct
• whether killing animals for the
purposes of research, testing and
teaching should be classified as a
manipulation
• the collection of animal use statistics
• the process for review of animal ethics
committees
• the upcoming joint NAEAC/
ANZCCART Conference 2001.
NAWAC’s functions
NAWAC’s advice to the Minister includes
advice on areas where animal welfare
research is required and advice on
legislative proposals concerning animal
welfare.
Codes of welfare under the Act may be
prepared by the Minister, NAWAC or any
other person. NAWAC must decide
whether or not to recommend to the
Minister the issue of a code.
NAWAC can issue recommendations to
the Minister on whether a procedure
should be declared, under the Animal
Welfare Act:
• not to be a ‘manipulation’,
• to be or not to be a ‘significant
surgical procedure’,
• to be a ‘restricted surgical procedure’
or a ‘controlled surgical procedure’
In addition, NAWAC provides
recommendations to the Minister on
whether any trap or device should be
prohibited or its use restricted. It also
promotes the development of guidelines
on the use of traps or devices.
Current issues being consideredby NAWAC
• drafting new codes of welfare for
different animal uses and practices
under the Act
• recommendations relating to electro-
immobilisation
• the welfare implications of two types
of rodent traps – glue boards and the
‘Rat ZapperTM’
• a public discussion paper on religious
slaughter.
Of these issues, the majority of NAWAC’s
time is currently focused on the revision
of codes of welfare.
Committee publications
Both NAEAC and NAWAC produce
newsletters and annual reports, which are
publicly available.
Kathryn McKinnon,
Policy Adviser, Animal Welfare,
phone 04 474 4296,
fax 04 498 9888,
email: [email protected]
Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 2000 1312 Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 2000
MAF Biosecurity is continuing toinvestigate the ‘post-border’interceptions of two live black widowspiders in early October.
As well as extra audit checks in
California, the Authority will be
conducting further product inspection to
confirm that the agreed sulphur dioxide/
carbon dioxide fumigation treatment,
required for the control of black widow
spiders, is being effectively implemented
in accordance with current New Zealand
standards. The United States Department
of Agriculture (USDA) is also conducting
independent audits of the treatment
systems.
Based on the information available to
date, MAF Biosecurity is still treating the
situation as two isolated incidents that by
MAF Plants Biosecurity has recently
developed a bilateral quarantine
arrangement (BQA) framework for the
importation of plant propagation
material from accredited offshore
quarantine facilities. BQAs are
established between MAF and the
exporting country’s national plant
protection organisation.
The plant quarantine facility and the
exporting country’s national plant
protection organisation (NPPO) will be
required to enter into a compliance
agreement covering the certification of
plant propagating material from that
facility destined for export to New
Zealand.
The purpose of these inter-agency BQAs
is to document New Zealand’s
requirements for the pre-export testing/
inspection of propagation material from
offshore plant quarantine facilities,
accredited by MAF. This will reduce the
post-entry quarantine testing
requirements in New Zealand.
Interceptions of black widow spiderson California grapes
coincidence happened within a
very short period. The
strengthening of existing
inspection requirements
has been implemented to
confirm that we are
dealing with isolated
incidents and that the
current measures required
for this import pathway
continue to maintain an
appropriate level of
protection.
Kevin Nalder, National
Adviser (International
Operations),
Plants Biosecurity,
phone 04 474 4243
fax 04 474 4257
email: [email protected]
Bilateral quarantine arrangement forimportation of plant propagation material
The BQA with each exporting country
includes a list of approved commodities
for each of the accredited facilities, the
contact details of the quarantine facilities
and operators, and reference of the
quality system procedures. For each
quarantine facility/commodity
combination the BQA also lists the
regulated organisms that need to be
tested and inspected or treated. This
forms the basis for an attachment to
phytosanitary certificates for
consignments exported to New Zealand,
to provide trace-back to the approved
facility and testing.
In addition to a BQA, the relevant
commodity import health standard must
be in place. Facilities that have been
approved in the past will gradually be
pulled into the new BQA framework
together with any requests for new
approvals.
This scheme will be applied shortly
during discussions with NPPO officials in
the United States, Spain and France. The
MAF Biosecurity Authority has beenreviewing its consultative forums. TheMinister for Biosecurity, Hon MarianHobbs, has also taken the opportunity toreview her advisory committees.
Background
MAF Biosecurity Authority has several
consultative forums, many of which have
arisen in an ad hoc manner. Some may
now not be relevant, perhaps because
they were established to deal with a
specific issue that is no longer
prominent, or because government
policy in that area has changed, or
because of government restructurings
where existing committees continued
despite having overlapping functions
with other committees. An example of
the latter is when the Ministry of
Forestry and Ministry of Agriculture
merged in 1998.
In addition to
MAF Biosecurity
Authority’s
consultative
committees, the
Minister for
Biosecurity has
several advisory
committees. Some advisory committees
have confusing roles or terms of
reference and in practice have operated
more as a consultative committee for
MAF, than as a means of independent
advice to the minister.
Ministerial advisory committees
The Minister for Biosecurity has taken
this opportunity to review the need for
her advisory committees. She has
confirmed her need for the Biosecurity
Council, Biosecurity Consultative Forum
and the Pest Management Strategy
Advisory Committee. These three
committees have all been established
within the last four years.
The minister recently announced the
cessation of the Forest Biosecurity
Advisory Committee. She acknowledged
the contribution of the committee over
the years, but considered she no longer
needed a committee to advise her
specifically on forest biosecurity. Her
Review of consultative forumsdesire was for multi-sectoral advice,
which she considered she was getting
through her other advisory committees.
In addition, MAF’s new consultation
committee on forest biosecurity would
provide the appropriate forum for
specific forest biosecurity issues.
Proposed new MAF committees
MAF Biosecurity Authority considers
that it needs consultative committees for
the following areas:
• animals
• plants
• forestry
• border1
MAF proposes that senior staff members
would chair these committees.
Membership would be open to industry
sector representatives, other government
departments and regional government.
Terms of
reference will
be prepared
for the new
committees,
or will be
revised to fit
the new
direction where a committee with a
similar focus currently exists.
Purpose of committees
The reason for establishing these
committees is to provide a forum for:
• industry sector representatives, other
government departments and
regional government to consult with,
and provide advice to, MAF’s chief
technical officers on sector-related
biosecurity issues; and
• MAF’s chief technical officers to
advise and consult on biosecurity-
related issues and proposed activities
with industry sector representatives,
other government departments and
regional government.
Specifically, the committees’ purpose is to:
• inform members and seek input into
proposed activities and policies
• enable issues or concerns to be raised
and clarified
• promote open sharing of information
• build stronger relationships
• seek policy suggestions from members.
Process
MAF Biosecurity Authority has been:
• seeking input from existing
committees on the proposed structure
• reviewing the objectives of existing
committees
• identifying members’ needs
• agreeing the purpose and objectives
of the committees
• agreeing terms of reference
• agreeing membership.
Feedback
MAF Biosecurity Authority is inviting
further feedback from all its consultative
committees to enable terms of reference
to be developed for each committee.
MAF is particularly interested in
feedback on the following questions:
• Should the committee have a
technical or policy focus, or both?
• Who should chair the committee –
a MAF Biosecurity Authority staff
member, an industry sector member,
an independent chair, other?
• Should members’ expenses be paid
(e.g. travel expenses)?
• What should the membership of the
committee be?
• How visible should the committee be
(e.g. should it have a public profile)?
• Are there other issues that need to be
considered when developing the
terms of reference?
Next steps
MAF Biosecurity Authority expects to
have draft terms of reference for the
proposed committees by early November.
Decisions on the final structure and
terms of reference are expected before the
end of the year.
Barry O’Neil, Group Director,
phone 04 474 4128,
email: [email protected]
1The establishment of this committee isdependent on the outcome of recommendationsarising from the border review.
discussions will be followed by visits to
relevant quarantine facilities with the
purpose of accreditation. The costs
associated with the development and
implementation of the scheme will be
met by industry.
Veronica Herrera, National Adviser
(Transitional Facilities),
Plants Biosecurity,
phone 04 470 2767,
fax 04 474 4257,
email: [email protected]
Kevin Nalder, National Adviser
(International Operations),
Plants Biosecurity,
phone 04 474 4243,
fax 04 474 4257,
email: [email protected]
15Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 200014 Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 2000
Egg mass and feedingdamage.
Gum leaf skeletoniser caterpillar.
In September, MAF met with
entomologists from Forest Research to
assess the current progress of the response
and to determine survey guidelines for the
coming season.
The most recent survey commenced on 2
October 2000. The surveillance plan
included the inspection of
eucalyptus trees on private and
commercial properties, golf
courses, schools, streets, parks
and reserves. The results of this
survey are expected to be
published in the next issue of
Biosecurity (Issue 24, 15
December 2000).
MAF Forest
Biosecurity’s
National Adviser
Pest Surveillance
and Response,
Mark Ross, says
that although the
results of the
response are so far
encouraging, additional surveys will be
needed before eradication can be
confirmed.
Mark Ross, National Adviser
(Forest Pest Surveillance and Response),
Forest Biosecurity,
phone 04 498 9611,
fax 04 498 9888,
email: [email protected]
Appointment to NAEACThe Minister of Agriculture recently appointed Mrs Joanna
Roberts to the National Animal Ethics Advisory Committee. Mrs
Roberts is a Kaipara District Councillor. She was nominated by
Local Government New Zealand. As she is associated with neither
the scientific community nor animal welfare groups, Mrs
Roberts’s role is to represent ‘the general public’.
Linda Carsons, Senior Policy Adviser, Animal Welfare,
phone 04 470 2746,
fax 04 498 9888,
email: [email protected]
Director Animal BiosecurityappointedDerek Belton, previously Programme Manager Surveillance andDisease Response, has been appointed Director of AnimalBiosecurity.
Derek is a Massey University veterinary graduate. He joined MAF
Biosecurity in 1999, after three years with the Institute of
Environmental Science & Research (ESR). At ESR Derek lead the
Food Safety science and research programme for clients including
the Ministry of Health, the Foundation for Research, Science and
Technology and the private sector.
Prior to this, Derek worked as a veterinary pathologist in MAF
Quality Management Animal Health Laboratories in Auckland
and Whangarei, with a specialist focus on microbiology.
Derek says the increasing globalisation of trade and industry
highlights the strategic importance of New Zealand’s biosecurity
programme.
“The establishment of the Biosecurity Authority in 1999 and new
government initiatives and investment are a tangible
demonstration of the growing appreciation of the value of
biosecurity to New Zealand,” he says. “Innovation in both
information technology and the detection and definition of
pathogens offers many
opportunities for us to refine
and advance our animal
biosecurity progamme.”
Derek Belton, Director
Animal Biosecurity,
phone 04 474 4155,
fax 04 474 4133,
email: [email protected]
Efforts to deal with a new Australian pestin the Bay of Plenty appear to be payingoff, but MAF is taking a cautiousapproach.
Gum leaf skeletoniser (Uraba lugens) was
first discovered in June 1997 at the Mount
Maunganui Golf Course, and later at the
Omanu Golf Course, both in
the Tauranga District. The
caterpillar is native to Australia
and a potentially serious
defoliator of eucalypts in New
Zealand. The young caterpillars
feed on the fleshy leaf tissue,
leaving a lace-like skeleton that
lends the insect its name.
Since gum leaf
skeletoniser was
initially discovered in
New Zealand, a series
of surveys have been
carried out within a
5km radius of the Mt
Maunganui Golf
Course. Any infested
trees detected during the surveys, and
surrounding host trees within 100 metres,
have been ground treated with the
synthetic pyrethroid insecticide,
deltamethrin (trade name Decis Forte).
In January this year, as a precautionary
measure, the surveillance range was
expanded to include identified host trees
outside the original infestation zone. The
results of the survey were encouraging,
with no evidence of the exotic insect being
found.
Gum leaf skeletoniser kept in check
Bilateral discussions withAgriculture, Fisheries and ForestryAustralia
The Director, Forest Biosecurity, Ruth
Frampton, and the National Adviser,
Forest Product Export Standards, Mark
Self, recently met with senior officials from
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
Australia (AFFA) in Canberra, Australia.
Topics of interest included:
• recent changes to the structure of AFFA
and Australian Quarantine Inspection
Service (AQIS);
• import requirements for lumber, wood
packaging and seeds to New Zealand
and to Australia;
• import risk assessments;
• exchange of pest lists;
• inspection of forest products and
certification of facilities and
procedures; and
• interceptions on New Zealand lumber
and wood packaging exported to
Australia.
Internationalliaison
Improvements are proposed to the national surveillance pestplant initiative. A discussion document outlining a newapproach is available for comment.
Current approach
The current initiative involves regional councils including a
common list of 110 invasive weeds as ‘pests’ in their regional pest
management strategies. This inclusion makes it an offence under
sections 52 and 53 of the Biosecurity Act 1993 to sell, propagate,
distribute and commercially display ‘pests’. Authorised persons
employed by regional councils inspect commercial plant nurseries
and retail outlets to see whether these plants are present.
Concerns about this approach include:
• inconsistencies
between regional
councils; some
councils are not
able to justify
inclusion of all 110
plants;
• incomplete
national coverage;
two regional
councils do not yet
have regional plant
pest management
strategies;
• the need for more
rigorous analysis for each plant when the strategies come up
for their five-yearly review, as a result of amendments to the
Biosecurity Act since the strategies were put in place.
Proposed approach
The proposed approach is to have a list of invasive plants
determined as ‘unwanted organisms’ by a chief technical officer
(CTO) under the Biosecurity Act. The same offences under
sections 52 and 53 of the act apply to unwanted organisms as to
pests. Authorised persons employed by regional councils but
appointed by CTOs would inspect retail outlets and enforce those
sections.
A ‘national pest plant accord’ between relevant government
departments and regional councils is proposed to formalise
arrangements. A technical working group is being convened to
recommend the initial list of plants to be covered.
To ensure continuity of coverage, the new approach needs to be
finalised before the first reviews of regional strategies. The first
strategies expire on 1 July 2001.
David Harrison, Systems Coordinator, Biosecurity Policy
Coordination, phone 04 474 4173, email: [email protected]
The deadline for submissions is 4 December 2000
New approach forinvasive weeds
17Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 200016 Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 2000
New import health standards issued
The following new import health standards (IHSs) have been issued
by the Director Animal Biosecurity and are available for use. Any
previous IHSs covering these combinations of country of origin and
commodity/species have been revoked.
Specified products for human consumption containing dairyproducts, eggs or meat
Following an outbreak of foot and mouth disease in Greece,
clauses 8.4, 8.5, 8.6 and 8.10 relating to the importation of
private consignments of meat and dairy products have been
amended by removing Greece as a country of origin.
Following an outbreak of classical swine fever in the United
Kingdom and other EC countries, clause 8.6 relating to the
importation of private consignments of meat products has been
amended by removing these countries as countries of origin.
Clause 8.3 relating to the importation of canned meat products has
been deleted and ‘cans’ have been added to clause 8.1. iii for the
importation of cooked meat products.
Following an outbreak of foot and mouth disease in the Republic of
South Africa, clause 8.9 relating to the importation of private
consignments of dairy products has been amended by removing the
Republic of South Africa as a country of origin.
Clause 8.13 relating to the importation of commercially manufac-
tured or home-made confectionery, bread, biscuits and cakes has
been amended by removing the wording ‘animal products’ and
replacing it with ‘dairy and egg ingredients’.
Pig meat products for human consumption from Canada
The United Kingdom has been removed from this standard due to
the presence of classical swine fever in that country. This standard
used to cover pig meat products from both Canada and the United
Kingdom.
Non-viable animal specimens from all countries
This standard has been created by amalgamating three standards,
which are now revoked, for the importation of various animal
specimens. Non-viable in this context means dead.
Sheep and goat meat products for human consumption from Chile
The contents of clauses 9.4, 9.5 and 9.6, which relates to
certification provided by the Chilean authorities, have been
clarified, following some difficulties of interpretation. Clause 9.7
has been added for certification that these products are fit for
human consumption.
Shelf-stable petfoods containing animal products
Clause 8.9 has been added to allow the importation of Dr Walkers
Grit and Dr Walkers Picking Stone for ornamental birds.
Cheese for human consumption from Bulgaria
Dairy products for human consumption from MalaysiaThese standards were notified for consultation in Biosecurity 20:6
and are based on The Importation into New Zealand of Dairy
Products – Risks to New Zealand Livestock, dated January 1998.
Dairy product samples for evaluation
Following an outbreak of foot and mouth disease in the Republic of
South Africa, clause 5.4 has been amended by removing the
Republic of South Africa as a country of origin.
Following an outbreak of foot and mouth disease in Greece, clause
5.4 has been amended by removing Greece as a country of origin.
Pre-cooked heat-and-eat meals containing animal productsfrom Australia
Clause 11 ‘Manufacturer’s declaration’ has been altered by
deleting the need for a declaration in the case of mammalian meat
(beef, pork and sheep meat).
Kerry Mulqueen, National Adviser (Import Management), Animal
Biosecurity, phone 04 498 9625, fax 04 474 4132, email:
www.maf.govt.nz/AnimalIHS
Draft import health standards forconsultation
The following draft import health standards (IHSs) have been
developed by MAF and are available for public consultation.
Procedure for assessing proposals to import animal productsfor human consumption to address both public health andanimal concerns
MAF has been working with the Ministry of Health (MoH) to
develop a procedure to assess proposals to import animal products
for human consumption. The procedure will involve MAF and MoH
working closely together to ensure that animal health and human
health issues are considered simultaneously. The objective is to
produce import health standards that include both public health
and animal health importation requirements.
Cattle meat (beef) products for human consumption fromVanuatu
This document is based on The importation into New Zealand of
Meat and Meat Product – A review of the risks to animal health –
ISBN 0-477-0849-9, dated March 1991. This document includes
the requirement that the products must be derived from animals
that passed veterinay ante-mortem and post-morten inspection at
the time of slaughter.
Jean-Marie Derouet, Technical Adviser, International Trade,
phone 04 498 9897, fax 04 474 4227,
email: [email protected].
www.maf.govt.nz/AnimalIHS/riskanal.htm
The deadline for submissions is 15 December 2000.
Import health standards revoked
The following import health standards (IHS) have been revoked,
and the commodity or species from that country of origin is not
included on any replacement IHS.
Cattle meat products from ArgentinaFollowing an outbreak of foot and mouth disease in Argentina, the
importation of cattle meat products from that country has been
suspended.
Scoured and dehaired cashmere and yak fibre from Mongolia
This import health standard requires certification that Mongolia
has been free from foot and mouth disease (FMD) for 12 months.
Several outbreaks of FMD have occurred in Mongolia in recent
months making the import health standard invalid.
Frozen pig meat and meat products for human consumption fromthe Republic of South Africa
Following an outbreak of foot and mouth disease in the Republic
of South Africa, the importation of pig meat and meat products
from that country has been suspended.
Kerry Mulqueen, National Adviser (Import Management),
Animal Biosecurity, phone 04 498 9625, fax 04 474 4132,
email: [email protected]
www.maf.govt.nz/AnimalIHS
Revised containment standardfor microorganisms
A revision of MAF Biosecurity Authority Standard 154.03.02:
Containment facilities for microorganisms has been approved. The
revised standard is dated 15 September 2000 and replaces the
version dated 26 January 1999.
The revised standard provides a better system for tracking several
approved projects within a containment facility. This is particularly
relevant for projects on genetically modified organisms that have
been approved by the Environmental Risk Management Authority of
New Zealand or an institutional biosafety committee.
Kerry Mulqueen, National Adviser, (Import Management),
Animal Biosecurity, phone 04 4989 624, fax 04 474 4132,
email: [email protected]
Supervision of animal quarantineand containment
People who are not state sector employees can now be appointed as
Biosecurity Act inspectors to supervise animal quarantine and
containment. Supervision is usually done by inspectors employed by
the MAF Quarantine Service but sometimes there are not enough
suitably qualified people available, for example because specialist
knowledge is required or because of the remoteness of a facility.
MAF Quarantine Service continues to be responsible for ensuring
that there are inspectors to supervise all transitional (including
quarantine) and containment facilities in New Zealand and for
ensuring that each inspector is suitably trained and qualified.
Dr Denzil Chin-Fatt, MAF Quarantine Service,
phone 09 256 8696, fax 09 256 8715,
email: [email protected]
Amendment to MINDA identificationsystem
MAF has approved amendments to the Livestock Improvement
Corporation’s MINDA identification system. MINDA and the Animal
Health Board Identification System are approved under the
Biosecurity Act 1993 for the identification of cattle and deer for
bovine tuberculosis control.
Changes to MINDA were implemented in October 2000 and were
detailed in Biosecurity 18:7. They include two new options for
information management intended primarily for beef cattle and
deer farmers.
MINDA is also approved for the voluntary identification of goats.
The amended system has been submitted to the Department of
Conservation for approval under the Wild Animal Control Act 1977.
This means that both deer and goats identified using the MINDA
system will continue to be recognised legally as farmed animals.
Ashley Edge, Policy Adviser, Biosecurity Policy Coordination,
phone 04 474 4213,
email: [email protected]
MINDA identification system: 0800 264 632
Animal Welfare Advisory Committeeannual report published
The Animal Welfare Advisory Committee 1999 annual report has
been published and distributed. This will be the last annual report
for the committee under this name, as it became the National
Animal Welfare Advisory Committee on 1 January 2000.
To receive a copy of the report or to be added to the mailing list for
future reports contact:
Pam Edwards, Executive Co-ordinator, Animal Welfare,
phone 04 474 4129, fax 04 498 9888,
email: [email protected]
Codes of ethical conduct – approvals,notifications & revocations since thelast issue of Biosecurity
All organisations involved in the use of live animals for research,
testing or teaching are required to adhere to an approved code of
ethical conduct.
Codes of ethical conduct approved Nil
Notifications to MAF of arrangements to use an existing code ofethical conduct
• New Zealand Institute for Crop & Food Research Ltd (to use the
New Zealand Pastoral Agriculture Research Institute Ltd’s code
and the AgResearch Lincoln Animal Ethics Committee)
• Plade Holdings Ltd (to use AGVET Consultants Ltd’s code)
(approval subsequent to revocation listed below)
Codes of ethical conduct revoked or arrangements terminated• Alexander and Associates• Animal Control Products Ltd• Animal Health Advisory• Animalz Napier Ltd• Captec (NZ) Ltd• Cook, Trevor George• Crusader Meats New Zealand Ltd• Get Real Productions• Info-Brok• Mulvaney, Christopher John
Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 2000 19Biosecurity Issue 23 • 1 November 200018
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Country Reference Status Date notified Summary of content Comments deadline
Chile 65 R 29/8/00 Animal feed 20/10/00
Chile 66 E 2/10/00 Supplementary measure to protect against footand mouth disease n/a
EEC 94 R 18/9/00 Foodstuffs and food of animal origin 30/11/00
Germany 5 R 6/9/00 Feedstuffs, additives and compounds 29/9/00
Indonesia 12 R 22/9/00 Fish health protection 15/11/00
Japan 58 R 9/10/00 Straw and forage as animal disease risk 20/10/00
Korea 74 R 6/10/00 Quarantine and inspection requirements for animals 5/12/00
Netherlands 54 E 26/9/00 Dead cats and dogs as specified risk material n/a
New Zealand 64 R 29/8/00 Live passerines from the United Kingdom 27/10/00
New Zealand 69 E 26/9/00 Suspension of pig meat and pig meat products fromSouth Africa to protect against foot and mouth disease n/a
New Zealand 70 E 26/9/00 Suspension of cattle meat products from Argentinato protect against foot and mouth disease n/a
Peru 20 E 13/9/00 Suspension of sheep, goats, swine and their productsfrom Greece to protect against foot and mouth disease n/a
Peru 21 E 13/9/00 Suspension of sheep and sheep products from Spainto protect against scrapie n/a
Philippines 21 E 15/9/00 Ban on specified avian products because of Newcastledisease outbreak in Brazil n/a
Philippines 22 E 15/9/00 Ban on specified porcine products because of classicalswine fever outbreak in United Kingdom n/a
Singapore 12 E 29/9/00 Suspension of pig meat and pig meat products fromSouth Africa to protect against foot and mouth disease n/a
USA 332 E 25/9/00 Suspension of swine, pork and pork products fromEast Anglia to protect against hog cholera 20/11/00
Argentina 57 R 29/8/00 Inspection procedures for wood packaging 29/9/00
Korea 72 R 6/9/00 Quarantine pest list 1/11/00
Mexico 164 R 4/9/00 Apricots from California, Washington, Oregon and Idaho 25/9/00
Mexico 165 E 4/9/00 Black citrus aphid and citrus tristeza disease n/a
New Zealand 65 R 29/8/00 Used vehicles 25/10/00
New Zealand 65 Add.1 R 9/10/00 Change to date of entry into force 25/10/00
New Zealand 65 Corr.1 R 11/9/00 Correction to email address n/a
USA 317 R 30/8/00 Fruit and vegetables 20/10/00
USA 325 R 6/9/00 Seed treatment 16/10/00
USA 333 R 25/9/00 Artificially dwarfed plants in growing media from China 20/11/00
USA 267 Add1 R 30/8/00 Extension of comments period of Fuji apples from Korea 23/10/00
Zambia 3 R 15/9/00 Protection against African cassava mosaic virus(Uganda variant) in cassava seedlings and plants 1/10/00
Zambia 4 R 15/9/00 Coffee seeds, seedlings and plants 1/10/00
Argentina 57 R 29/8/00 Inspection procedures for wood packaging 29/9/00
Korea 72 R 6/9/00 Quarantine pest list 1/11/00
New Zealand 65 R 29/8/00 Used vehicles 25/10/00
New Zealand 65 Add.1 R 9/10/00 Change to date of entry into force 25/10/00
New Zealand 65 Corr.1 R 11/9/00 Correction to email address n/a
Fore
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• NZ Water Management Ltd• Pfizer Laboratories Ltd• Plade Holdings Ltd• Van Wijk, Niek• Veterinary Enterprises Ltd• Wanganui Veterinary Services Ltd
Approvals by the Director-General of MAF for the use of non-human hominids Nil
Approvals by the Minister of Agriculture of research or testingin the national interest Nil
Linda Carsons, Senior Policy Adviser, Animal Welfare,
phone 04 470 2746, fax 04 498 9888,
email: [email protected]
Upcoming conference
Learning, animals and the environment – changing the face ofthe future
This conference will be held in Hamilton on 28/29 June 2001. The
conference will be jointly hosted NAEAC and ANZCCART (the
National Animal Ethics Advisory Committee and the Australian and
New Zealand Council for the Care of Animals in Research and
Teaching).
Session 1 relates to primary and secondary education. It will focus
on how our interaction with animals and the environment has
changed, and how we might develop better interactions through
education. The second session is about tertiary education, research
and teaching. It will look at influences on the acceptability of
research, testing and teaching and how we might acknowledge and
better incorporate them. On day 2, session 3 will look at future
challenges while session 4 will deal with the regulatory aspects of
animals and the environment.
Gill Sutherland, Executive Officer, ANZCCART,
phone 04 4727421, fax 04 4731841,
email: [email protected]
Tropical grass webwormTropical grass webworm (Herpetogramma licarsisalis), a pasture
pest, has been determined to be an unwanted organism under the
Biosecurity Act 1993.
The determination was made following a request from a regional
council. Having ‘unwanted organism’ status allows regional
councils to undertake surveillance or implement a small-scale
management programme under section 100 of the Biosecurity Act
(Biosecurity 22:22). Additionally, the Biosecurity Act prohibits
multiplication, release, sale and commercial display of unwanted
organisms.
Suzanne Main, Policy Adviser, Biosecurity Policy Coordination,
phone 04 498 9930, email: [email protected]
Representation on Biosecurity CouncilThe Biosecurity Council is to increase its membership to include
representatives of the primary production industries and of environ-
mental organisations.
The Minister for Biosecurity, Hon Marian Hobbs, will be calling for
nominations for the two representatives in November. The new
members are expected to be announced before the next council
meeting in mid December.
The Biosecurity Council is an advisory body to the Minister for
Biosecurity. It was established to provide a forum for considering
biosecurity issues and coordinating the activities of the depart-
ments with biosecurity responsibilities (Biosecurity 10:4).
Sue Cotton, Biosecurity Secretariat,
phone 04 474 4283,
email: [email protected]
Management options for harmful organisms
An information paper on management options under the
Biosecurity Act 1993 has been prepared. It should be available to
decision-makers, such as government departments and regional
councils, by the end of October 2000. All options are outlined.
They range from simple and relatively basic surveillance, through
to complex strategies or emergency responses.
While other management options are available, the information
paper looks only at the statutory options under the Biosecurity Act.
The aim of the paper is to facilitate informed decision-making.
Because no two pests are the same, and the circumstances of their
arrival can be so variable, it is difficult and inappropriate to
develop a strict formula for decisions about management options.
However, the paper sets out to show that sound decisions can be
made through effective consultation and informed judgement.
The paper was produced at the request of the Biosecurity Technical
Forum (which advises the Biosecurity Council) and the Pest
Management Strategy Advisory Committee.
The paper will be available on MAF’s website and in print.
Henry Dowler, Pest Management Strategy Coordinator,
Biosecurity Policy Coordination,
phone 04 470 2745, email: [email protected]
Unwanted organism request process
A process for dealing with requests from regional councils to have
organisms determined as ‘unwanted organisms’ has been agreed. A
template to help regional councils make their request to the
appropriate chief technical officer is available on the MAF website.
Key points of the process include:
• a single contact point within MAF Biosecurity Authority;
• all chief technical officers across the four biosecurity depart-ments are advised of the request and have the opportunity toprovide input;
• maximum twelve day turnaround of requests;
• notification to all regional councils of the result;
• advice to all regional councils on why a request was declined.
The process has been endorsed by the Biosecurity Council.
Suzanne Main, Policy Adviser, Biosecurity Policy Coordination,
phone 04 498 9930, email: [email protected]
www.maf.govt.nz/UO
Biosecurity regulations notified internationally
These biosecurity (sanitary and phytosanitary) regulations have been either proposed or implemented
by members of the World Trade Organization, and have been notified under the SPS agreement (the
WTO agreement on the application of sanitary and phytosanitary measures) between 26 August and
11 October 2000.(Under ‘Reference’, Add. refers to an addendum, Corr. to a corrigendum, and Rev.
to a revision. ‘Status’ is either routine or emergency.)
Keawe Woodmore, New Zealand SPS Notification Authority,
phone 04 474 4226, fax 04 474 4133, [email protected]
Photo credits: p8, NZ Warnham & Woburn Deer Society.