1 str 421 economics of competitive strategy michael raith spring 2007
TRANSCRIPT
![Page 1: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
11
STR 421STR 421
Economics of Economics of
Competitive StrategyCompetitive Strategy
Michael RaithMichael Raith
Spring 2007Spring 2007
![Page 2: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
22
Today’s classToday’s class
0. Introduction0. Introduction
0.1 Course overview0.1 Course overview0.2 Organizational information0.2 Organizational information
1. Competition and markets1. Competition and markets
![Page 3: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
33
StrategyStrategy
We will be concerned with major, often irreversible We will be concerned with major, often irreversible
decisions such asdecisions such as
– entry in a market and product positioningentry in a market and product positioning
– acquisitions and make-or-buy decisionsacquisitions and make-or-buy decisions
– strategies to deter competitors, strategies to enter a marketstrategies to deter competitors, strategies to enter a market
– technological competitiontechnological competition
Objective: to achieve and maintain above-normal returnsObjective: to achieve and maintain above-normal returns
![Page 4: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
44
CompetitiveCompetitive strategy strategy
All of these decisions take place in a competitive All of these decisions take place in a competitive
environmentenvironment Understanding of short- and long-run competition Understanding of short- and long-run competition
among firms is essential among firms is essential Strategic interaction: one company’s moves lead to Strategic interaction: one company’s moves lead to
responses by othersresponses by others need to understand and anticipate theseneed to understand and anticipate these
![Page 5: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
55
EconomicsEconomics of Competitive Strategy of Competitive Strategy
See “Why economics has been fruitful…“ articleSee “Why economics has been fruitful…“ article Economic perspective introduced by Michael Porter in 1980Economic perspective introduced by Michael Porter in 1980
– Can learn a lot about what firms Can learn a lot about what firms shouldshould do by observing what firms do by observing what firms
are doingare doing But real progress in “economics of strategy” after 1980: application But real progress in “economics of strategy” after 1980: application
of Game Theory to the field of Industrial Organization.of Game Theory to the field of Industrial Organization. Better understanding of Better understanding of
1.1. Competitive advantageCompetitive advantage
2.2. Strategic interactionStrategic interaction One main takeaway from course: Business environments change, One main takeaway from course: Business environments change,
but the principles underlying good strategic decisions don’t.but the principles underlying good strategic decisions don’t.
![Page 6: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
66
What to expectWhat to expect
Course is heavily case-based: case discussions take up Course is heavily case-based: case discussions take up
2/3 of class time 2/3 of class time You will spend most of your time outside class on You will spend most of your time outside class on
analyzing cases (reading, discussions in teams, case analyzing cases (reading, discussions in teams, case
writeups)writeups) In class, your active participation is expectedIn class, your active participation is expected Focus on “big picture”, not on details of implementationFocus on “big picture”, not on details of implementation Cases almost never have “right answers”Cases almost never have “right answers” Be sure to attend next Tues to see what course is like!Be sure to attend next Tues to see what course is like!
![Page 7: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
77
Part I: Obtaining and Sustaining a Part I: Obtaining and Sustaining a Competitive AdvantageCompetitive Advantage
1.1. Markets and competition, industry analysisMarkets and competition, industry analysis– Coors: Coors: Intro to major themes of the course, Market dynamicsIntro to major themes of the course, Market dynamics– Crown, Cork & Seal: Crown, Cork & Seal: Industry analysis (5 forces)Industry analysis (5 forces)
2.2. Value creation and competitive advantageValue creation and competitive advantage– Dell: Dell: Quantification of cost advantageQuantification of cost advantage– Enterprise: Enterprise: Competitive advantage and organizational Competitive advantage and organizational
structure, sustainabilitystructure, sustainability
3.3. The scope of the firm The scope of the firm – Choice Hotels: Choice Hotels: Horizontal scopeHorizontal scope– Birds Eye in the U.K.: Birds Eye in the U.K.: Vertical integrationVertical integration
![Page 8: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
88
Part II: Strategic InteractionPart II: Strategic Interaction
4. Dynamics of price competition:4. Dynamics of price competition:– American Airlines: American Airlines: How can firms avoid price wars?How can firms avoid price wars?
5. Strategic commitments, entry & exit: 5. Strategic commitments, entry & exit: – Dupont: Dupont: Strategic commitments, entry deterrenceStrategic commitments, entry deterrence
– Cereal industry: Cereal industry: Dealing with new market entrantsDealing with new market entrants
– ValuJet Airlines: ValuJet Airlines: How to succeed as an entrantHow to succeed as an entrant
6. Technological competition: 6. Technological competition: – EMI: EMI: Managing innovationManaging innovation
– Instant messaging: Instant messaging: StandardsStandards
![Page 9: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
99
Today’s classToday’s class
0. Introduction0. Introduction0.1 Course overview0.1 Course overview
0.2 Organizational info0.2 Organizational info
1.1. Competition and marketsCompetition and markets
![Page 10: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
1010
Read the information on the web/ Read the information on the web/ in the handout!in the handout!
Organizational info: details on almost everythingOrganizational info: details on almost everything Schedule: info on assigned readings, cases to be Schedule: info on assigned readings, cases to be
discussed, assignments duediscussed, assignments due Case questionsCase questions I must be able to reach you by emailI must be able to reach you by email Please fill out questionnaire on course web page!Please fill out questionnaire on course web page!
![Page 11: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
1111
Course materialsCourse materials
1.1. Textbook: Besanko, Dranove, Shanley, Schaefer:Textbook: Besanko, Dranove, Shanley, Schaefer:
Economics of StrategyEconomics of Strategy, Wiley, 4th Edition (2007)., Wiley, 4th Edition (2007).
2.2. Course packet with casesCourse packet with cases
3.3. Additional readings and lecture notes that I will hand Additional readings and lecture notes that I will hand
out in class and/or post on the webout in class and/or post on the web
![Page 12: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
1212
GradingGrading
Class participation:Class participation: 20%20%
5 Case write-ups:5 Case write-ups: 20%20%
3 Assignments:3 Assignments: 15% 15%
Final exam:Final exam: 45%45%
(No midterm)(No midterm)
![Page 13: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
1313
Case discussions - preparationCase discussions - preparation
Use only the information provided in the caseUse only the information provided in the case Do not discuss cases with students who have taken this Do not discuss cases with students who have taken this
course, or conduct web or library research on casescourse, or conduct web or library research on cases You should know the facts of the case and have You should know the facts of the case and have
thought through the assigned case questionsthought through the assigned case questions See organizational info for detailsSee organizational info for details
![Page 14: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
1414
Case discussions – in classCase discussions – in class
Please bring name card; Please bring name card;
card up = prepared, card down = unpreparedcard up = prepared, card down = unprepared I’ll open by calling on someone to give brief overview of I’ll open by calling on someone to give brief overview of
casecase You carry the discussions! I’ll mainly ask questions.You carry the discussions! I’ll mainly ask questions.
– I cold-call occasionallyI cold-call occasionally Pay attention to flow of discussion, build on previous Pay attention to flow of discussion, build on previous
contributionscontributions Take notes!Take notes!
![Page 15: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
1515
Case write-upsCase write-ups
5 in total, best 4 will count towards grade5 in total, best 4 will count towards grade Choose from Choose from bold-facedbold-faced case questions case questions Up to 2 pages + additional calculations Up to 2 pages + additional calculations You may form teams of up to You may form teams of up to 44 students students Submit Submit electronically by 6pm on day before classelectronically by 6pm on day before class, ,
to: [email protected] to: [email protected] See write-up guidelines for detailsSee write-up guidelines for details
![Page 16: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/16.jpg)
1616
Problem sets and finalProblem sets and final
Problem setsProblem sets– 3 in total, see schedule3 in total, see schedule
– Individually, or in your teamIndividually, or in your team
– Mix of quantitative theoretical, essay-style, true-false, Mix of quantitative theoretical, essay-style, true-false,
quantitative case-relatedquantitative case-related
Final examFinal exam– One half based on HBS case (available a week before exam)One half based on HBS case (available a week before exam)
– Other half: same style of questions as on problem setsOther half: same style of questions as on problem sets
![Page 17: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
1717
Finally, please treat classes like Finally, please treat classes like business meetings:business meetings:
Attend each class.Attend each class. Be on time.Be on time. Keep electronic devices off.Keep electronic devices off. Raise your hand and wait for me to call on you.Raise your hand and wait for me to call on you.
![Page 18: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/18.jpg)
1818
Today’s classToday’s class
0. Introduction0. Introduction
1.1. Competition and marketsCompetition and markets
1.1 Starting point1.1 Starting point1.2 Basics of game theory1.2 Basics of game theory
Next week:Next week:
1.3 Oligopoly1.3 Oligopoly
1.4 Industry analysis1.4 Industry analysis
1.5 Market dynamics1.5 Market dynamics
![Page 19: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/19.jpg)
1919
Efficient marketsEfficient markets
Where there is an opportunity to make a profit, it will be Where there is an opportunity to make a profit, it will be
seized by someone, diminishing or eliminating the seized by someone, diminishing or eliminating the
opportunity.opportunity. On average and in the long run, all investment On average and in the long run, all investment
opportunities have the same (risk-adjusted) returnopportunities have the same (risk-adjusted) return In principle, it’s same in industries as in financial In principle, it’s same in industries as in financial
markets!markets!
![Page 20: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/20.jpg)
2020
The zero-profit equilibriumThe zero-profit equilibrium
Profits attract entry, entry reduces profits In the long run, all firms in all industries make zero profit!
ACMC
Q
q
P
D
S
q*
![Page 21: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/21.jpg)
2121
Industry and firm profitability differencesIndustry and firm profitability differences
High performers Low performers
Industry Firm
Return on invested capital minus cost of capital (%), 2000-2004 Firm
Return on invested capital minus cost of capital (%), 2000-2004
Computer hardware Dell 21.57 Apple Computer -14.41Computer software Microsoft 20.25 Siebel Systems -22.78Steel Nucor 7.75 U.S. Steel -1.58Building supplies Home Depot 6.9 Lowe's 3.78Mass merchandising Wal-Mart 5.02 Target 1.54Personal Care Estee-Lauder 2.53 Revlon -6.27Appliances Whirlpool 1.22 Maytag 0.93Cellular/wireless Borders Group -1.94 Amazon.com -14.26Satellite radio XM -26.54 Sirius -28.88
![Page 22: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/22.jpg)
2222
Differences in performance over Differences in performance over time: Dell vs. Gatewaytime: Dell vs. Gateway
Relative share price performance of Dell, Gateway and the S&P 500 (Jan. 1995 - Dec. 2006)
1
10
100
1000
10000
1/3
/1995
7/3
/1995
1/3
/1996
7/3
/1996
1/3
/1997
7/3
/1997
1/3
/1998
7/3
/1998
1/3
/1999
7/3
/1999
1/3
/2000
7/3
/2000
1/3
/2001
7/3
/2001
1/3
/2002
7/3
/2002
1/3
/2003
7/3
/2003
1/3
/2004
7/3
/2004
1/3
/2005
7/3
/2005
1/3
/2006
7/3
/2006
Month
Clo
sin
g p
rice a
dju
ste
d f
or
div
iden
ds a
nd
sp
lits
(Jan
. 1996 =
100)
GTW
Dell
SP500
![Page 23: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/23.jpg)
2323
Persistent above-normal returns?Persistent above-normal returns?
Some companies seem to be consistently more Some companies seem to be consistently more
profitable than othersprofitable than others Central question of this course: Why do some Central question of this course: Why do some
companies succeed in making profits in the long run, companies succeed in making profits in the long run,
while others fail?while others fail? Two main sources of above-normal returns:Two main sources of above-normal returns:
1.1. Returns from unique resources and capabilities that are difficult Returns from unique resources and capabilities that are difficult
to imitateto imitate
2.2. Market power due to a position in the market that others cannot Market power due to a position in the market that others cannot
profitablyprofitably get into (aka first-mover advantages). get into (aka first-mover advantages).
![Page 24: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/24.jpg)
2424
We need tools that go beyond We need tools that go beyond STR 401STR 401
STR 401: understand perfect competition and STR 401: understand perfect competition and
monopolymonopoly In most markets, we have neither: markets that are In most markets, we have neither: markets that are
dominated by a small number of firms = “oligopoly”dominated by a small number of firms = “oligopoly” Roadmap for this week and next: Roadmap for this week and next:
– Need a bit of game theory to understand interaction of firms in Need a bit of game theory to understand interaction of firms in
oligopolyoligopoly– Link oligopoly theory to traditional industry analysisLink oligopoly theory to traditional industry analysis– Finally, look at market dynamics: what determines market Finally, look at market dynamics: what determines market
structure in the long run?structure in the long run?
![Page 25: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/25.jpg)
2525
Today’s classToday’s class
1.1. Competition and marketsCompetition and markets1.1 Starting point1.1 Starting point
1.2 Basics of game theory1.2 Basics of game theory
Next week:Next week:
1.3 Oligopoly1.3 Oligopoly
1.4 Industry analysis1.4 Industry analysis
1.5 Market dynamics1.5 Market dynamics
![Page 26: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/26.jpg)
2626
Game theory Game theory
Set of tools to analyze situations of Set of tools to analyze situations of strategic strategic
interdependenceinterdependence, i.e. where A’s best decision depends , i.e. where A’s best decision depends
on what B doeson what B does A A gamegame consists of: consists of:
1.1. Players: Which decision makers are involvedPlayers: Which decision makers are involved
2.2. Strategies: What are the options available to each?Strategies: What are the options available to each?
3.3. Outcomes: What is the outcome for each player, depending Outcomes: What is the outcome for each player, depending
on which strategies are chosen? on which strategies are chosen? What will happen if each player pursues his own What will happen if each player pursues his own
interests? interests?
![Page 27: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/27.jpg)
2727
Example: Example: TimeTime and and NewsweekNewsweek
choose a cover story choose a cover story
Two options: Two options: A: Discovery of a new cure for AIDSA: Discovery of a new cure for AIDS
B: A battle between House and Senate over the budget B: A battle between House and Senate over the budget
Suppose: Suppose: – 30% of readers buy only if budget story on cover. 30% of readers buy only if budget story on cover.
– 70% of readers buy only if AIDS story on cover. 70% of readers buy only if AIDS story on cover.
– If magazines run same story, then 60% buy If magazines run same story, then 60% buy TimeTime, 40% buy , 40% buy
NewsweekNewsweek..
Suppose both magazines decide independently. Suppose both magazines decide independently.
What will happen?What will happen?
![Page 28: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/28.jpg)
2828
Payoff matrixPayoff matrix
Players: Time, NewsweekPlayers: Time, Newsweek Strategies: each chooses between A or BStrategies: each chooses between A or B Outcomes: the shares of potential readers for eachOutcomes: the shares of potential readers for each
NewsweekNewsweek
AIDSAIDS BudgetBudget
TimeTimeAIDSAIDS , , 70, 30 70, 30
BudgetBudget ,, ,,
![Page 29: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/29.jpg)
2929
Best responsesBest responses
One player’s One player’s best responsebest response = best strategy, = best strategy, givengiven the the
strategy(ies) chosen by the other player(s)strategy(ies) chosen by the other player(s) Time’s best response… Time’s best response…
……if Newsweek chooses A:if Newsweek chooses A:
……if Newsweek chooses B: if Newsweek chooses B: Newsweek’s best response…Newsweek’s best response…
……if Time chooses A: if Time chooses A:
……if Time chooses B: if Time chooses B:
![Page 30: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/30.jpg)
3030
EquilibriumEquilibrium
Three equivalent definitions of a (Nash) equilibrium:Three equivalent definitions of a (Nash) equilibrium:
An An equilibriumequilibrium is a combination of strategies such that is a combination of strategies such that each player’s strategy is a best response to the each player’s strategy is a best response to the
strategies of the other playersstrategies of the other players each player maximizes his payoff, taking as given the each player maximizes his payoff, taking as given the
others’ strategiesothers’ strategies given the strategies of the others, no player has an given the strategies of the others, no player has an
incentive to deviateincentive to deviate
![Page 31: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/31.jpg)
3131
The equilibrium in our example:The equilibrium in our example:
What’s the equilibrium? Here, it’s fairly easy: What’s the equilibrium? Here, it’s fairly easy: – TimeTime has a has a dominantdominant strategy strategy– NewsweekNewsweek does not have a dominant strategy, but does not have a dominant strategy, but
can anticipate can anticipate TimeTime’s choice and choose its best ’s choice and choose its best
response.response.– Each player’s strategy is best response to the Each player’s strategy is best response to the
other’s. Only one such combination.other’s. Only one such combination. Newsweek must put itself in Time’s shoes! Newsweek must put itself in Time’s shoes!
![Page 32: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/32.jpg)
3232
Example 2:Example 2:
Disney and Dreamworks release new animated moviesDisney and Dreamworks release new animated movies Choice for each: Thanksgiving or ChristmasChoice for each: Thanksgiving or Christmas Christmas is larger market, but both want to avoid Christmas is larger market, but both want to avoid
head-to-head competitionhead-to-head competition
![Page 33: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/33.jpg)
3333
Payoff matrix might look like this:Payoff matrix might look like this:
DreamworksDreamworks
Thanksg.Thanksg. XmasXmas
DisneyDisneyThanksg.Thanksg. 40, 4040, 40 70, 90 70, 90
XmasXmas 90, 7090, 70 50, 5050, 50
Equilibria?Equilibria?
Problem: coordination may be difficult!Problem: coordination may be difficult!
![Page 34: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/34.jpg)
3434
Games with sequential moves Games with sequential moves
In many situations, one player moves before the other.In many situations, one player moves before the other. Example:Example:
– Firm 1 is a monopolist, making a profit of 10Firm 1 is a monopolist, making a profit of 10
– Firm 2 can enter market at a cost of 1, or stay outFirm 2 can enter market at a cost of 1, or stay out
– If firm 2 enters, firm 1 can eitherIf firm 2 enters, firm 1 can either accommodateaccommodate entry: both firms get 4 (not including 2’s entry: both firms get 4 (not including 2’s
cost of entry) cost of entry) fightfight: firm 1 gets 2, firm 2 gets 0 (not including 2’s cost of : firm 1 gets 2, firm 2 gets 0 (not including 2’s cost of
entry)entry)
Here, firm 2 moves Here, firm 2 moves beforebefore firm 1. What will happen? firm 1. What will happen?
![Page 35: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/35.jpg)
3535
Game treeGame tree
Firm 2
Firm 1
Don’tenter
Enter
Fight
Accommodate
(10, 0)
(2, -1)
(4, 3)
![Page 36: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/36.jpg)
3636
Look ahead and reason backLook ahead and reason back
Firm 2’s best strategy depends on what 1 does.Firm 2’s best strategy depends on what 1 does. Look at 1’s decision: If 2 enters, …Look at 1’s decision: If 2 enters, … 2’s simplified tree:2’s simplified tree:
Firm 2
Don’tenter
Enter
(10, 0)
(4, 3)
![Page 37: 1 STR 421 Economics of Competitive Strategy Michael Raith Spring 2007](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062314/56649de45503460f94adbdf5/html5/thumbnails/37.jpg)
3737
Game theory in practiceGame theory in practice
Formal games capture essentials of strategic interactionFormal games capture essentials of strategic interaction In practice, In practice,
– not set up model and solve; not set up model and solve;
– rather, gain insight into the strategic interaction rather, gain insight into the strategic interaction
– What kind of game best describes the situation? What kind of game best describes the situation?
Put yourself in the shoes of others you interact with! If Put yourself in the shoes of others you interact with! If
they don’t do what you expect them to,they don’t do what you expect them to,– don’t assume they’re irrational, insteaddon’t assume they’re irrational, instead
– try to understand how they perceive the gametry to understand how they perceive the game