yogacara analysis of vijnana

8/17/2019 Yogacara Analysis of Vijnana

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THE JOURNAL

OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

BUDDHIST STUDIES

E D I T O R - I N - C H I E F

A . K. Narain

University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA

E D I T O R S

Heinz Bechert Leon Hurvitz

Universitdt Gottingen, FRG UBC , Vancouve r, Canada

Lewis Lancaster A lexander W. MacDonald

University of California, Berkeley, USA Universite de Paris X, Nanterre, France

B.J. Stavisky A lex Way man

WN IIR, Mosco w, USSR Columbia University, New

York,

USA

A S S O C I A T E E D I T O R

Stephan Beyer

University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA

Volume 3

1980

Number 2


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C O N T E N T S

I . A R T I C L E S

1.

A Yo gacara Analysis of the Mind, Based on the

Vijndna

Section

o f V a su b a n d h u ' s

Pancaskandhaprakarana

wi th Guna-

p r a b h a ' s C o m m e n t a r y ,

by Brian Galloway

7

2 . T h e R e a l m o f E n l i g h t e n m e n t in Vijnaptimdtratd: T h e F o r m u

la t ion of the "Four Kinds of Pure Dharmas" ,

by Noriaki

Hakamaya,

t r ans la t ed f rom the Jap ane se by

John Keenan

21

3 .

Hu-Jan Nien-Ch'i

(Suddenly a Thought Rose) Chinese Under

s t and ing o f Mind and Consc iousness ,

by Whalen Lai

42

4. No te s on the

Ratnakuta

Collect ion, by

K. Priscilla

Pedersen 60

5 . T h e S ix teen Aspec ts o f the Fou r Nob le T ru th s and T he i r

O p p o s i t e s ,

by

Alex Wayman 67

I I . S H O R T P A P E R S

1. Kaniska ' s B ud dh a C oins — T h e Off ic ia l I cono graph y of

Sakyam uni & M ai treya,

by Joseph C ribb

79

2 . "B udd ha-M azda " from Kara-tepe in Old Te rm ez (Uzbekistan):

A P r e li m i n a ry C o m m u n i c a t i o n ,

by

Boris J. Stavisky 89

3 . FausbpU an d the Pa li Ja ta kas , by

Elisabeth Strandberg

95

I I I .

B O O K R E V I E W S

1. L o v e a n d S y m p a t h y i n T h e r a v a d a B u d d h i sm ,

by Harvey B.

Aronson

103

2 . C hu ka n to Vuish ik i (M adhyam ika an d Vi j r iap t imatra ta) ,

by

Gadjin Nagao

105

3 . In t ro du c t io n a la conna issance des h lv in ba l de Th a i lan de ,

by

Anatole-Roger Peltier

107

4 . B ud dh i sm , Imper ia l i sm, and W ar . B urm a and Tha i l and in

M o d e r n H i s t o r y ,

by Trevor Ling.

109

5 . Z ho ng gu o foxue yuanl iu l iie jiang

(Brief lectures on th e origins and dev elopm ent of C hinese

B u d d h o l o g y ) , by

Lu Cheng

111

6. T h e Ja in a Pa th of Pur i f ica t ion ,

by

Padm anabh S. Jaini

112


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IV. NOTES AND NEWS

1.

M inutes of the Jo int M eeting of the Executive Com mittee

and the Board of Directors of the 2nd Annual Conference

of the IABS at Nalanda, 1979 116

Contributors

118


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A Yogacara Analysis of the Mind, Based

o n t h e Vijndna sec t ion of Vasubandhu 's

Pancaskandhaprakararia with

G u i j a p r a b h a ' s C o m m e n t a r y

1

by Brian Galloway

B ud dh ist p hi loso ph y con cern s itself both with the exposi t ion of ul timate

rea l i ty and the funct ioning of

samsdra.

For ul t imate real i ty, most

M ahay anists his torically have pre fer red the analyses of the M adhy am ika

scho ol ; bu t for the funct ion ing of samsara, the Yo gacara school seem s to

have the more sub t l e and complex theory .

Be fore d i scuss ing i t, how ever , we must d ecide how we are to deal

wi th the m an y technica l t e rms fou nd in its l i t e ra ture . T h er e are those

w ho feel tha t t echnica l t e rm s should not be trans la ted a t a ll , and othe rs

who t rans la te them in some very id iosyncra t ic and incons is tent ways ,

based on a supp osed ly sup er io r u nd er s t an d in g tha t they a lone possess .

As for th e f i rs t , it only n ee ds to be po inte d o ut that leaving a ter m

un t ran s l a t e d does no t gua ran tee t ha t we will un de r s t an d it p roper ly .

H av in g said this , i t is a p p a re n t th at ou r f irst task is to

understand

the

word ' s mean ing , and th i s can on ly be done by examin ing the

usage

o f

th e wo rd in th e var iou s con texts in which i t is foun d, an d by taking no te

of th e expl ic i t

definition

of th e w ord , if an expl ici t def ini t ion is fou nd in

the l i t e r a tu re . T h e n , hav ing und er s to od the word , we may indeed find

th at th er e is an a ccu ra te Engl i sh te rm w i th the same ran ge of mea nin g.

C on ce rn in g th e second g ro up , we may say tha t the i r im press ion

i st ic an d h ap h az ar d m eth od of trans la t ing migh t be jus t i fied in deal ing

with texts wri t ten crypt ical ly from the s tandpoint of ul t imate real i ty,

provided tha t the t rans la tor shares the profundi ty of ins ight of the

ori gin al au th o r . Bu t it will ha rdly d o in scient if ic/technical l i tera ture of

the Yogacara type. By scient i f ic/ technical I mean that this l i terature is

analogous to modern sc ient i f ic expos i t ion: i t uses technica l t e rms

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s t r ic tly; it analyzes an d catego rizes; impressionist ic or vag ue ram blings

ar e ut ter ly foreign to i t. T h e difference betw een it an d m od er n scienti

fic th o ug ht is only tha t the B ud dh is t technical wri t ing takes as given the

thesis that there exists, objectively and in real truth, a state of mind,

possible for a hu m an bein g to dev elop , that is qual ita tively different

from and bet ter than ordinary consciousness: d if ferent , in that i t

m ak es a ll worldly con side rat ion s pale into ins ignif icance; b et ter , in th at

i t makes for t rue happiness both for oneself and for the others that one

he lps .

I have goen into the mat ter of Yogacara technical terms in a

prev ious a r t i c le , Vijndna, Samjnd, a n d Manas, which was pr inted in

t h e Middle Way, Vol . 53 , No . 2 (Su m m er 1978). T he re I a rg ued tha t the

words in the t i t le have been incorrect ly t ransla ted in the past ,

2

and

proposed the t ransla t ions given in this char t :

Cor rec t Former ly

Tran s la t ion Preva il ing T r .

vijndna

pe rce pt io n (consciousness)

samjnd recog ni t ion (percep t ion)

manas consciousness (mind)

To recap i tu la te my a rguments o f tha t a r t i c le :

vijndna

is what ha pp en s

w he n t he re is a sense org an , a sense object , no obstru ct ion between

th em , an d a m in d tha t funct ions pro pe r ly; i t is the f irst men tal even t

tha t occurs and does no t involve any " th ink ing" of vitarka-vicara o r

kalpand. I t is " the nak ed , un ad or ne d , appr ehe ns io n of each s t imulus"

(Conze quo t ing t he Abhidharmakosa*); i t "gra sps th e m er e object" or

" the ob jec t a lone"

(don tsam 'dzin

to : G un ap r ab ha i n his com me n ta ry o n

Vasubandhu's Pancaskandhaprakarana*). Vijndna therefore does not

co rr es po nd to the E ngl ish w ord "co nsciousness" , which a lways involves

an ide a of se lfhood (as I show by quo tat ion from the Ox ford Engl ish

Dic t ionary) , bu t to perception in i ts strict , mo d er n , scientific sen se, th at

is ,

s ense -pe rcep t ion . (Thus vijndna co r r e sponds t o t he Ge rman Wahr-

nehmung,

not to

Bewusstsein.)

Som e may a rg ue tha t the wo rd "perce p t ion" (here I am br ing in g

in new ar gu m en ts , no t pres en t in my ear l ier ar t ic le) is pro pe r ly the

transla t ion of the logical term

pratyaksa.

So it is, bu t this do es n ot p ose a

p r o b l e m h e r e , b e c a u s e vijndna a n d pratyaska really mea n the sam e

thing. In Dignaga's Pramdnasamuccaya we find that pratyaksam kalpand-

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podham

5

wh ich is exactly w ha t is said

of vijndna.

"W hen the eye com es in

contact with a color , for ins tance blue, v isual consciousness [sic] arises

wh ich is aw aren ess of the p res en ce of a color ; but it doe s not recognise

tha t i t i s b lu e. T h e r e is no recog ni t ion a t th is s tage" (Rah ula in What the

Buddha Taught

6

). Dig naga, whi le discussing pratyaksa, add uce s this

quota t ion f rom an unspec i f ied Abhidharma t rea t i se :

caksurvijndnasamah gi nilam vijndndti no tu nilamiti

(Daa-2)

7

"O n e w ho can perce ive by the eye perceives blue, but not ' th is is b lu e." '

T h e p o i n t

is

that D ignaga quote s this as an ex planation of the na ture

of pratyaksa,

th ou gh th is wo rd nev er ap pea rs there , and the quota t ion is

cou ched en t i r e ly in t e rm s of vijndna ( the verb vijndndti is used ). T h at is,

he t akes pratyaksa a n d vijndna to be fundamenta l ly the same. The

reason for us ing pratyaksa ra th er than the o lder t e rm is p robably two

fold: i t was desirable to have a special term for use in the context of

ep is temology/ / log ic (pramdna)', and over th e cen tur ies the word vijndna

pe rh ap s beca m e debased in tha t the re g rew up a rou nd it a mass o f

vag ue impres s ions (while i ts fund am enta l m ean ing of course re ma ined

u n c h a n g e d ) .

T o r e t ur n to my form er a r t i c le , I th ink I have shown tha t samjnd

m ean s " recogni t ion ." G un apr ab ha s ta tes tha t samjnd, "having discerned

the same object [as in a pr ior percept ion) , grasps i t wi th sureness"

('du

shes ni yul d e nyid yong su bead nas nges par 'dzin pa

ste).

H

Vasubandhu ' s

def in i t ion of samjnd, on w hich Gu na pr ab ha is com m ent ing , is th i s:

"grasping an object by i ts s ign" (yul la mtshan par 'dzin pa).* Sthiramati ,

ano ther commenta tor on th i s same tex t , exp la ins tha t "a s ign i s the

pa rti cu la r o f a n object, b lue , yellow, etc.; it is the basis of classification

of a phenomenon. Grasping by a s ign is th inking, 'This is b lue, th is is

yel low' (mtshan ma ni yul gyi bye brag sngon po dang ser po la sogs pa dmigs pa

rnam par gzhag pa i rgyu 'o.dela mtshan mar dzin pa ni di ni sngon po o di ni

serpo'o zhes rtogpa'o).

10

Ra hula uses the word "reco gni t ion " as a def ini

t ion of samjnd ( th ou gh he t ransla tes it d i f ferent ly) : samjnd "recognizes

tha t it is b lu e ." ' ' B ud dh ago sa , in h i s

Visuddhimagga,

defin es it exactly as

does V asu ba nd hu , and com pare s it t o wha t hap pen s when a ca rpen t e r

sees a pi le of woo d th at h e has previously m ar ke d with a s ign to indicate

what type of wood it is (he recognizes i t as previously classified).

As for manas, this is explicitly stated in Ab hid ha rm a works (includ

in g th e p re se n t o n e, as we shall see) to be associated with the i l lusion of

self, which means that i t is really "consciousness" in English.

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This may seem to be a great fuss about a few words; but these are

words of absolute and crucia l impor tance . We cannot s imply assume

t ha t we know w ha t they me an . The se t e rms mus t be thought abo ut ; they

must be invest igated ser iously on a theoret ical level and in a scient i f ic

fashion. Of course , there are those who prefer to t rans la te technica l

terms however they see f i t a t a g iven moment , drawing on the la tes t

fashion able ja rg o n of twelve di f ferent W estern phi losophica l and

l inguist ic systems; but this sort of imp ressionist m eth od of transla t ion is

s imply not accura te , authent ic , or appropr ia te for ser ious sc ient i f ic

A bh id ha rm a w orks , how ever use ful i t may be whe n one is p re t end ing

t o b e p r o f o u n d .

We usual ly think of the mind ( the subject of this paper) as the

object ive c orre lat ive of consciou sness. B ut this is no t the B ud dh ist view.

In Buddhism, the s tar t ing point of any discuss ion of the mind i s not

consc iousness bu t pe rcep t ion (vijndna); consciousness comes la ter . T h e

mind is seen as a group of

perception-processes:

somet imes as a group of

s ix , a t o th er t imes as a gr o u p of e ight . Va su ba nd hu , in h is d i scuss ion of

percept ion, which becomes a d i scuss ion of the mind, in h i s Pancaskan-

dhapraharana (which we shal l now examine in detai l together with

G u n a p r a b h a ' s c o m m e n t a r y ) ,

1 2

begins by asking the t ime-honored

ques t ion, What i s percept ion? He answers h i s own ques t ion thus ly:

vijndnam dlambanavijnaptihl

"Pe rcep t ion is t he mani fes t a t ion o f a phe no m en on ." Now we have two

m o re t echn ica l t e rm s to d i scuss .

In ca l l ing the perce ived objec t a "phenomenon" we are avoiding

asse r t i ng tha t any real object exis t s; ph en om en a may be express ion s of

real i ty o r i l lusions. T h is is in kee pin g with the Y ogacara bel ief that rea l

objects do not in fact exist phi losophical ly.

Fo r "man i fes ta t ion " as a t rans la t ion oi'vijnapti see Ap te ' s Practical

Sanskrit-English Dictionary,

wh ere in he def ines it as "com m unica t ion"

and "announcement . " The mani fes t a t i on o f cour se t akes p l ace in the

mind.

Gunaprabha, in h i s commentary , now te l l s us tha t the phenomena

are o f six k inds . Why on ly six? G un apr abh a an d V asuban dhu a re Yoga-

car ins who in tend to e labora te a doct r ine of e ight k inds , but they wish

f ir s t to es tabl ish th e t radi t io nal -B ud dh is t s ix as a foun dat ion on which

to bui ld . G u n ap ra bh a the refo re lis ts the s ix ; le t us lis t the m he re

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toge ther wi th the cor responding sense-organs (ca l led " suppor t s" o r

asraya in Bu ddh i sm ) and the pe rcep t ions .

Pe rcep t ion

(vijndna)

eye -pe rcep t ion

e a r - p e r c e p t i o n

nose -pe rcep t ion

t o n g u e - p e r c e p t i o n

b o d y - p e r c e p t i o n

consc iousness

pe rcep t ion

S u p p o r t

{asraya)

eye

ear

nose

t o n g u e

body

consciousness

(manas)

P h e n o m e n o n

(dlambana)

fo rms

(rupa)

sounds

smells

tastes

tangibles

e l emen t s {dharrna)

C on ce rn in g these term s, first we observe that it is un im po rtan t wh ether

we use s ingular or plural forms; in Engl ish, p lurals are perhaps bet ter

here to indicate that we are not deal ing with abstract ions but with

specific reali t ies.

F o r m (rupa) here means objects perceived by the eye, hence

"sights" ; i t should be noted careful ly , however , that the same word

iorm/rupa has ano th er m ea nin g, in which it includes a ll of the above-

l is ted phenomena plus the f i rs t f ive supports ( the mater ia l sense-

organs) , p lus someth ing ca l led "unmani fes t fo rm" (avijnaptirupa).

(Aside from this last , rupa in this sense corresponds to the Western

con cep t of "m at ter " which is based on the idea that tangibles (sprastavya)

ar e basic bu t a lso can be ap p re h en d ed also by form , sou nd , smell , e tc.)

O ne ha s t o j u d ge f rom con tex t wh e the r iorm/rupa m ea ns sight-objects

or a ll man i fes t and u nm ani fes t fo rm (vijnaptyavijnaptirupa).

T h e " e le m e n t s" (dharrna) in the above chart as objects of conscious

ness (manas) a re no t all e lem ent s in the Y ogacara lis t of on e h u n d re d

elements . Al l are grouped into f ive categories as fol lows.

F o r m (rupa) in the larger sense

M i n d (citta), th e e igh t perc ep t ion s abou t to be discussed

Men ta l s (caitta), cer ta in m enta l funct ions , mostly em otion s

N o n - M e n t a l s (citta-viprayukta), cer ta in funct ions an d processes

U n c o m p o u n d e d s (asamskrta), i nc lud ing tathatd

T h e e lem en ts m ea nt in the p resen t ins tance as ob jec ts o f consc iousness

(manas) a r e t he men ta l s , t he non -men ta l s , t he uncompoundeds , and

avijnaptirupa. Co nce rn ing t he s ix ph en om en a li st ed , G un ap ra bha now

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te l ls us , "Their assimilat ion (khongdu chudpa) is m anife station , is pe r

cep t ion . These a re t he s ix beg inn ing pe rcep t ions

(pravrttivijndna)

He cont inues , expla ining the exact re la t ionship be tween a per

cep t ion , i ts co r re sp on di ng "s up po r t" , or sense-organ, and its cor res

po nd in g "ph en om en on " , o r ob jec t. (Ra the r t han t rans l a te w i th pa in fu l

li teralness, "If i t be asked, what is eye-perception, i t is . . ." I prefer to

give, "Eye-percept ion i s . . . " )

"Eye-percept ion is the various manifestat ions of which the eye is

the suppor t and fo rms a re t he phenomena ; ea r -pe rcep t ion i s t he

var io us man i fes ta t ions of which the ear is the sup po r t and soun ds the

p h e n o m en a; n ose-p ercep t ion is the var ious mani fes ta tions of which

the nose is t he supp or t an d smells t he phe on m en a ; t ongue-pe rcep t ion

is the var ious m ani fes ta t ions of which the tongu e is the sup po r t and

tas tes the ph en om en a; bod y-pe rcept io n is the var ious m ani fes ta t ions

of which th e body is the su pp or t and tangibles the ph en om en a;

consc iousness -pe rcep t ion (manovijndna) is the various ma nifestat ions

of which consciousness (manas) i s the suppor t and [cer ta in] e lements

t h e p h e n o m e n a . "

T h e nex t passage is som ewh at confusingly w r i tten . V asu ba nd hu

tel ls us that percept ion " is mind (citta) an d consciousness (manas),

be cau se i t is va r ieg ated (citra) and the sup po r t of consciousness (yid rten

byedpa, }mana-dsraya).

Percept ion (vijndna)

m i n d (citta) Consciousness (manas)

I I

Variegated (citra) Su pp or t of consciousness

W ha t he m ea ns i s th i s : "T he s ix percept ion s cons t i tu te the mind in the

tra di t i on al B ud dh ist view; this m ind is var ieg ated, or a variety, because

there is a s ixfold variety of percept ion-processes, and because (as

Gunaprabha wil l te l l you) within each of the s ix there is a variety of

form s to be perce ived . (Also, th er e is the pleasing p un of citra with citta.)

Bu t the min d is m or e than th i s . T h e six perce pt ions form the su pp or t

of a sev en th tha t ar ises on t he fo un da t ion of the six. An d this seventh is

consc iousness (manas).

G u n a p ra b h a tells us exactly how this ar is ing takes place: "As it is

said,

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Right after the cessation of the six,

Whate 'e r percept ion comes i s consc iousness .

Tha t which occurs r ight a f te r the s topping of whatever- i t -may-be i s

ca l led consc iousness

(manas).

For example, the son of one may be the

fa ther of another , the f ru i t o f one [ t ree J becomes the seed of another ,

and l ikewise when the six frui ts of the beginning perceptions are

s topped, they become suppor ts of the a r i s ing of another percept ion ,

and hence a re ca l led the suppor ts of consc iousness . So the mind has

be en e xp la in ed a s the six beg inn ing pe rcep t ions . "

But, we must add, i t has been explained as six perceptions giving

rise to the seventh, cal led consciousness

(manas).

A nd this mu st not be

confused wi th consc iousness-percept ion (manovijndna).

Now comes the c ruc ia l par t . Vasubandhu here def ines the mind

in a co m ple tely dif fer en t way; bu t the new view will tu rn o ut to be fully

co m pa tibl e with the old; it will sup ply a d ee p basis or fo un datio n for the

old view. He sta tes:

"In rea li ty , the m ind is the s toreh ous e percep t ion

(dlayavijndna);

be ca us e it is th e assembly (cita, an o th e r p lay on

citta)

of the seeds

(bija)

o f

a l l c o m p o u n d i n g s

(satnskdra).

In this word

sa m

m e a n s together, while

kdra

is the

vrdhhi

form of

kr

'make , do ' p lus

a.

Whitney, in his

Sanskrit

Grammar

(sees. 1145 an d 1148b-c) says th at such a form atio n may be

e i the r a

nomen actionis

o r a

nomen agentis;

thus ou r word may be t rans

l a t e d e i t h e r " c o m p o u n d i n g s" o r " c o m p o u n d e r s " ; t h e T i b e t a n

'du

byed

co uld sta nd for e i th er; th e f irst is a lmos t certa inly correct an d could

also have an a gen tive force. (Cf.

asarnskrtal du

ma

byasl

u n c o m p o u n d e d s . )

The word has a t least two meanings: general ly, a l l worldly things,

including al l the f ive

skandhas

(See Rahula ,

W hat the Buddha Taught,

p .

22 & no . 2 , p . 57 8c n. 2); that is , a l l things that consist of component

p a r t s ,

hence al l things that are subject to analysis (separat ion into

p a r t s ) ;

in th is sense we a re tempted to t ransla te "compoundeds" which

is pr ob ab le an d l inguistically possible ( th ou gh this wo uld m ore specifi

cally be

samskrta).

Exc luded a re space

(dkdsa),

two kin ds of cessation

(nirodha),

and suchness

(tathatd).

Spec i f ica l ly , in the Abhidharma, as here , sarnskdras are the

caitta-

dharmas

o ther than fee l ing

(vedand)

and recogni t ion

(samjnd),

plus the

cittaxnprayuktadharmas.

Since the sarnskdras he re a re specif ic e lem ents we

a re t empted to ca l l t hem "compounde rs" , th ings tha t make up a

compound ing ; bu t fo r bo th senses "compound ings" may be the bes t

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solution. Psychologically samskdras a re "unconsc ious t endenc ies . "

So V asu ba nd hu has now def ined the m ind as the sarvasamskdrabi-

jacita, the assembly of the seeds of al l unconscious tendencies or

"co m po un d i n gs . " G un ap rab ha now te lls u s , '"All com pou nd i ng s '

means the pass iona l e lements {klistadharma). T he y ar ise from four

c o n d i t i o n s (pratyaya) His next words a re more eas i ly comprehended

in the form of a char t :

Bas ic condi t ion Per fumings (vdsand) dwell ing in

(hetupratyaya)

the s toreho use percept ion

R ul in g con di t ion Six sense org an s

{adhipatipratyaya)

Im m ed i a t e cond i t i on Consc iousnes s (manas)

(samanantarapratyaya)

Ph en om en al cond i t ion Form , soun ds , smell s, e t c .

{dlambanapratyaya)

Hetu

is of ten t rans la ted as "cause", but a cause

orces

the resul t, w hereas

a hetu mere ly provides the basis on which the result can occ ur. I t

pro vid es , in ot he r wo rds , the contex t wi thin which the resul t can occ ur .

I t sho uld , there fo re , be t rans la ted as basis. In Bu ddh is t tho ug ht there is

no real "causation" at al l , s ince events merely take place within a net of

in te r re la t ion sh ip s ; they a re dep en de nt on each o th er in a sense (condi

t i oned o r i g i na t i on , pratityasamutpdda), but they d o not force each oth er ;

they merely assist ( in the French sense of

being

present): "this pres ent ,

tha t occurs . "

I t has been suggested that vdsand might bet ter be t ransla ted as

"exper ient ia l ly ini t ia ted potent ia l i ty of exper ience" or some such. But

i f Vasubandhu and o thers had wanted to use such an express ion , they

cou ld easily have do n e so in Sansk r i t : anubhavasambhavdnubhavasakyatd

m igh t se rve . If on e t rans la tes vdsand li terally as "p erf um ing " the idea is

c le are r . If one dip s a c loth into perfu m ed water and th en h ang s it ou t to

dr y, the p er fu m e tha t has pe rva de d the c loth rem ains in it af ter the

water has a l l evaporated. Similar ly the exper iences and pass ions

remain in the s torehouse percept ion ( the Unconsc ious of Wes te rn

th ou gh t) af ter the init ia l s t imu lus is go ne . T h e m ind has been semi

pe rm an en t ly affected (s ince no thi ng at a ll is t ruly pe rm an en t in

B ud dh ism ) and thu s is ca ll ed per fum ed by the per fum ings {vdsand) of

f o rm er ac t ion . T h e wor d

perfuming

does m ake th e idea c lear , an d tha t is

why such a word was chosen by Vasubandhu and others in the f i rs t

14


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place , ra ther than the more complica ted phrase given above.

Now Gunaprabha wishes to exp la in the process of the genera t ion

of the compoundings , the pe r fumings , and the s to rehouse pe rcep t ion

itself.

Beginn ing wi th the beg inn ing pe rcep t ions (prai>rttivijndna)


13/17

called basis

(hetu)

and frui t

(phala)\

the basis being the perfum ings , the

f ru i t be ing the r ipen ing (rnam par smin pa), which means produc t ion

(skyed) by the pe r fum ings of fo rm er ac t ion (purvakarmavdsand). T h u s

we should see that on the basis of one, the other ar ises . For example ,

th e blazing of an oil lam p an d i ts bu rn in g of the wick ar ise mu tual ly a t

the sam e t ime , an d w hen the re is a t en t supp or te d on th ree po les , one

supports another by means of the third so that they do not fa l l ; so the

basis of ar is ing, whatever i t may be, should be unders tood to be the

s to r ehouse pe rcep t ion .

"S ince the s to r eho use i s a percep t io n , wha t is its ph en om en on and

w hat is i ts m od e? " I ts ph en o m en on , of cou rse , is the object that it

perceives; s ince the ear perceives sounds, the nose smells , e tc . , what

does the s torehouse perceive, s ince i t i s sa id to be a percept ion?

F ur th er , wha t i s its

mode (rnampa, dkdra)?

Th is t e rm ap paren t ly rep laces

support

(dsraya,

rten)

y

s ince a su pp or t m us t be som eth ing m ate r ia l , and

the s to rehouse has no mate r ia l suppor t . Vasubandhu answers bo th

quest ions by essent ia l ly not answering them:

" I t s p h e n o m e n o n a n d m o d e a r e u n d i s c e r n e d {aparichinna, yongs

su ma chad pao)

Nor does Gunap rabha commen t . The ma t t e r i s

covered , though none too c lea r ly , in S th i ramat i ' s commentary to

V a s u b a n d h u ' s Trimsika; but i t is a mat ter for an ot he r pap er .

V as ub an d hu now te lls us that the s to reho use is "of on e class an d

continually produ ced (rigs cigpa dangrgyun chagspar 'jugpa'o). "Of one

class" mea ns , accord ing to G un ap rab ha , tha t it is mora l ly ind i ffe ren t

(n ei t he r good no r bad in its essence) ; whi le bein g cont inual ly pr od uc ed

m ea ns tha t it is m om en tary (it is p ro du ce d aga in every mo m ent ) . "Th a t

i t ha s one na tu re {rang bzhin, svabhdva) is known by authori ty (dgama)

and r ea son (?nydya). T h e au tho ri ty is the B lessed One 's verse in the

[now lost?)

Abhidharmasutra:

The rea lm of t ime wi thout beg inn ing i s

The p lace where a l l the e lements res ide .

Since this exists, the realms of sentient beings

And also Blessed Rest , have been obtained.

Gunaprabha takes " the p lace where a l l the e lements res ide" to be the

s to r ehouse pe rcep t ion .

H e has add uc ed th is quo ta t ion in o r de r to show an au thor i ty for

the mora l ly neu t ra l charac te r o f the s to rehouse percep t ion . But the

same quotat ion serves equal ly to show that the s torehouse exis ts in the

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14/17

f i rst place, as against those who do not bel ieve in one's existence.

V as ub an dh u a nd G un ap ra bh a now t ry to dem ons t ra t e its ex i st ence by

means o f r eason .

First , they point to the meditat ional states cal led cessat ion at tain

m e n t

(nirodhasamdpatti), n on-recognit ion attainment (asam jnisamdpatti),

and (p l a in ) non- recogn i t ion (asamjnd). W he n o ne is in these states, the

s ix beginning percept ions "also known as object -mani fes ta t ion (visya-

vijnaptiy

ar e sto pp ed ; w he n on e leaves these states, the six ar ise aga in.

T he y m us t have been s to red some wh ere ; tha t som ewh ere is t he s to re

house percept ion . Gunaprabha asks: " I f we do not accept a s torehouse

percep t ion , f rom what bas i s

ihetu)

wil l the six beginning percept ions

ar i se? Therefo re we mus t accep t a s to rehouse percep t ion . "

Fur ther , i t i s maintained that wi thout a s torehouse percept ion i t

would be impossib le to enter , or more impor tant ly to leave, the round

(samsdra).

Th is is a l so su pp or ted by the scr ip tural verse qu oted above.

Final ly, i t is maintained that the storehouse is the basis even of the

mater i a l body . Gunaprabha s t a t es : "S ince these var ious {gang yin pa)

seeds of a l l pass ionate e lements (samklistadharma) dwell in it, it is called

th e s to re ho us e pe rce pt io n . Again , it dwell s in the m as the actual ity of

the basis iyang na de dag la rgyu'i dngos pot gnas pa'o, }hetuvastu)

Vasubandhu now ident i f ies the s torehouse wi th cer ta in o ther

technic al ter m s that w ere p er ha ps c ur re nt in cer ta in c irc les in h is day:

"T h e s to re hou se pe rcep t ion is itself t he g rou nd (gzhi

nyid;

tddhdra,

ladhisfhdna) of all seeds, is the storehouse of the body, is the basical

(hetuka).

[The two sen tences o f Gunaprabha quo ted jus t above occur

here.] I t is that which resides in the body; again, i t is appropriat ing

(dddna) per cep t ion because it app ropr i a t es a body . " H ere G un ap rab ha

quotes the Sandhinirmocanasutra:

A pp rop r i a t ing percep t ion is p ro fo und and f ine ,

And al l the seeds f low onward l ike a r iver:

It is not right to view it as a

self;

I d id not teach i t to the immature .

1 3

Gunaprabha ' s comment s a re o f l i t t l e ph i losoph ica l i n t e res t here , and

he does not explain how an immater ia l s torehouse percept ion can g ive

rise to a material body; one assumes that to the Yogacarins, material i ty

itself is an i l lusion anyway.

Here the expos i t i on o f t he s to rehouse percep t ion in itself is

f in i shed ; bu t Vasubandu t akes an ex t remely impor t an t s t ep here . He

17


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goes back to the seventh percept ion, "consciousness" , manas, for

another look at i t . We saw i t before as ar is ing out of the s ix beginning

percept ions . Now we shal l see i t as r i s ing out of the s torehouse, or

eighth percept ion; we shal l see i t in i t s relat ion to the s torehouse.

"In real i ty, the consciousness {manas) has the s toreho use perc ep

t i on f o r i t s phenomenon . " Gunapr abha : "Th i s means t ha t i t phenom-

enal i zes [sees the s toreho use perc ept ion as a

self. ( dngos

su nayid ni

kun gzhi mam par shes pa la dmigs te shes bya ba ni, kun gzhi rnam par shes pa

la bdag tu dmigs zhes bya bai tha tshiggo.)

V asub and hu: It is that which is

associated wi th the cons tant delus ion of sel f

(dtmamoha),

view of self

dtmadrsti , ego ism o f self

(dtmamdna),

and lust for self

(dtmardga),

and

so

o n . "

u

G un ap ra bh a: " I t is expla ined as op era t in g a lways, an d ar ises as

g o o d (kusala), b ad (akusala), an d ind ifferen t . His saying 'I t is of on e

class'

me an s [in contras t to what i t m ean s for the s torehou se pe rcept ion

that i t has a pass ionate (klista) n a t u r e (rang bzhin, ?svabhdva). 'It is con

t inual ly p ro du ce d ' me an s that it is m om en tary . I t op era tes always, but

' I t i s not present in an Arhat , on the Noble Path, or at the t ime of the

ces sat io n-a t tainm en t . ' In the last two it is pre ve nte d f rom pr od uc ing

pe rfu m in gs ; w he n on e rises ou t of the m , the seeds ar ise again f rom i t.

In Arhat sh ip they cease comple te ly .

"W ith that , we have explaine d th e eight percept ions that cons t i tute

the pe rcep t ion agg rega te , [ to wi t] the six beginning p ercept ions , th e

s torehouse percept ion , and the pass ionate consc iousness

(klistamanas).

T h e pe r cep t i on - aggr e ga t e has been exp l a i ned . "

So our char t of percept ions above requi res these two addi t ions :

Pe r cep t i on Mode

(dkdra)

P h e n o m e n o n

Cons c i ous nes s (rnanas) (not specif ied) Sto reho use Percep t ion

ak a klistamanas (falsely seen as self)

S t o r e hou s e Pe r cep t i on Und i s ce r ned Und i s ce r ned

(alayavijndna ) (aparichinna ) (aparichinna)

This has been only one sect ion of a very elementary Yogacara

t rea t i se , and the k ind of prob lem s tha t we en cou nter h ere should w arn

us aga ins t the er ro r of thin kin g that we can fully u nd er s ta nd this

doctr ine quickly or easi ly or without r igorous scientif ic analysis .

O f co urse , such a t reat ise as this may raise mo re ques t ions th an it

ans w ers: for instance, how to reconcile the

three

views

of manas

presented :

as a sense organ giving r ise to manovijndna; as aris ing from the six

18


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be gin nin g perc eption s; as arising from the storehouse percep tion. But

befo re study ing this treatise we did not know e nou ght even to ask the

question.

N O T E S

1. I hav e used t he edit ion of the D erg e Ta nju r. I have not been able to obtain th e

San skr i t of t he V as ub an dh u, a nd in any case I do not know wh ethe r i t is the or ig inal or a

ret ra nsla t ion f rom the Ti bet an ; i f the la t ter , the re would be no adva ntage in using i t. In

mo st cases, the Sans kri t equ ivale nt of a given Tibe tan term is kno wn ; in a few cases abov e

I give th e Tibetan w he re I am un su re of the San skri t .

I have t ranslated or paraphrased essent ia l ly every th ing that Vasubandhu and

G un ap ra bh a say her e; a few min or poin ts are passed over cursor i ly . In a couple of p laces

the ir w rit ing is not as clear as it migh t be (they at on e po int seem to be trying to talk abo ut

two things at once); I have tr ied to straighten things out a bit in my exposit ion, but

cer ta in ly I have not chan ge d any of the ideas or technical terms, and all imp ortan t po in ts

a re t r ans l a t ed verbatim.

2. Vijnana has been occasionally translated as perception, but never so far as I am

aw are w i th any exp lana t ion o f why th is is correct and the mo re usual t ranslat ion w rong. 1

th ink i t bet ter to br ing the whole mat ter ou t in to the open .

T hr o ug h ou t th is pa pe r I en gag e in d iscussion of the meaning s of ind iv idual

San skr i t w ord s: th is is no t m er e "phi lo logy" because we investigate the w ords not for the i r

own sake , bu t i n o rder to unders t and the phifmophiral ideas they express . One cannot

un de rs ta nd an idea unless on e fi rs t un de rs ta nd s the words used to explain i t Derel ic tion

of this pri nc iple is w ide sp rea d, beca use peop le pref er to avoid the difficulties (and they

are genuine difficult ies) of dealing strict ly with these technical terms; and this enables

them ( in some cases) to read their own ideas into the texts.

The reader wil l note that my translat ions of technical terms are often quite l i teral

(w hen I thin k tha t the l i teral me an ing most clearly expre sses the idea, as i t often do es),

an d som et im es a mo des t de pa r t ur e fom l i teralness (when it seems bet ter to t ranslate the

meaning than the word, so to speak). Always I give the Sanskri t original if i t can be

asc er t a in ed— unl ik e ce r t a in peop le , I am bo und to say .

I d o no t believe in transl at in g word s inconsistently, but hold to the princ iple of one

Engl ish w ord for one San skr i t word in the overw helm ing major ity of cases . Some main

tain that the profun di ty an d complexi ty of Buddh is t ph i losophical thou ght const i tu tes an

excuse for thei r own terminological inconsis tency and obfuscat ion (a hyper- in tel lectual

but essential ly frivolous point of view, in that i t does not meet the real requirements). On

the contrary , the more profound, subt le , and complex the thought , the more necessary i s

t e rmino log ica l exac t i tude .

3 .

E . Conz e , H uddhvit Thought in India (Ann Arbor: Universi ty of Michigan, 1973),

p . 189.

4 . G u n a p r a b h a ' s c o m m e n t a r y o n V a s u b a n d h u ' s Pancaskandhaprakarartu: Derge

T an ju r si lb l -31b7. Unf or tun ately , when w orking on th is tex t , I neglected to take down

the speci f ic page numbers . Never theless the quotat ion wi l l be found to be accurate .

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17/17

5 . M. Ha t tor i , t r . LHgndga on Perception, being the Pratyaksa pariccheda of Digndga's

Pramanasamuccaya (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard U.P. , 1968), sec. C. of Ski . text (pages

unnumbered i n Sk t . ) . Pratyaksa like vijiuina is nam ed after sense orga ns (aha) (sec. Daa -1).

T h e two a r e no t exactly iden t ical , s ince vipidna ap pe ars within the discussion of pratyaksa as

its specificity (where injhdna has at least two aspects [acc ording to th e logicians in gen eral I,

objec t -cogni t ion [insayavijndna] an d the cog nit ion o f that co gnit ion). But it is clear that

they both are wi thin the range of meaning of the Engl i sh word percept ion. At any ra te ,

they bear much c loser resemblance to each other than e i ther does to "consciousness" ,

which is som eth ing e l se ent i re ly .

6 . W . Rah ula , What the Buddiiu T aught (New York: Grove Press, 1959), p. 23. In

case anyone wonders why Theravada sources are used in the di scuss ion of a Mahayana

text , it is becau se the m ean ing of s tand ard Ab hid har ma technica l t e rms is the same in

both t radi t ions . The Mahayanis t s a f ter a l l bui l t the i r Abhidharma thought on the same

ea r ly -Buddh i s t f ounda t i ons .

7 . Ha t t o r i , op. ctt. Sec. Daa-2 .

8. See n. 4 abo ve.

9 . Locnt.

10. Derg e T a n ju r sh i 195b6ff.

1 1. Ra hu la loc. cit.

12 .

See n. 4 above.

13 .

Th is qu ota t ion also wa rns us against seeing the SP as a

self. i

It is a kin d of

con t i nu i t y (santdna), to be su re, that plants for instance are con tinui t ies without selfhood

(a su pp os ed self in plants is on e of a nu m be r of w rong views refuted by the Bu dd ha in one

of the HInayana Sut ras) . In the Ratnardsi Sutra quoted by Sani ideva (Sihasamuccaya,

Ben dal l , p . 20 1, Vaidya p . I l l , E ng. t rans , p . 195) p lants are s tated to be asvdmika and

amama (without "I" or "mine") . As Rahula says, "If we can understand that in his l i fe we

can co nt in ue w i thout a perm an en t , un cha ng ing sub s tance like Self or Soul , why can ' t we

un de rs ta nd tha t those forces themselves can con t inue wi thout a Self or Soul behind them

af ter the non-funct ioning of the body?" (Ibid., p. 33 . H e also points ou t , p. 65 n. 1, that the

Ijankdxiatnra emphatical ly denies selfhood in the Alayavtjndna o r

Tathdgatagarbhu,

p. 6 8 f f.

of Suz uk i , pp . 7 8 - 7 9 of Skt .) That a con tinui ty is not a self is implicit in th e

V ajracchedikd,

which den i e s

dtman, sattva, jiva,

a n d

pudgala,

bu t not con tinui ty, or funct ioning ent i t ies in

ge ne ra l . The accu sat ion that the Vog acarins ten d towa rds a self- theory is s imply without

f o u n d a t i o n .

14. Mohti

o r

mi'ufhi. drsti, mdna,

an d

rdga

o r

sneha

are four of the six passions, a

subdivis ion wi thin the menta l s (caittadhanna). These four dhamias, then, when associated

with the i l lusion of dtman, are the cons tant accompaniments of the manas. Five other

e lem en ts a lso accom pany i t, acco rding to Sthi ramat i in h is com me ntary to Va suba ndh u 's

Trimsikd: the f ive "everpresents" (.\arvatraga) jth at I ha ve listed in th e List of Techn ical

Te rm s |.

20
http://arvatraga/http://arvatraga/

yogacara analysis of vijnana

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