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Towards a philosophy ofgerontology, version 5

1.Introduction.

2.Fundamentalgerontological considerations

on aging.

2.0.Definition of senescence.

2.1.On the process of

senescence.


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2.3.The forms of the pressure

of time.

2.4. Explanatory-theoreticaspects of senescence.

3. Philosophical thoughts onthe explanation of aging.

4. Towards eradication ofaging: a philosophicalstrategy.

1.Introduction: An atemptto mediate a deeper

compatibility betweenPhilosophy andGerontology

What is philosophy in

general, or what is the


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specific of philosophy? ForAristotel, philosophy is the

knowledge of the firstprinciples and causes - thosesupreme principles whichexplain the wholeexistence(Coltescu, 2002

p.160 ). For Kant, philosophyis knowledge by concepts; orthe search of the limits of ourcognitive capacities. ForHegel, philosophy is therational knowledge ofabsolute. For Wittgenstein,philosophy is the activity ofeludation of thoughts. For

analitical philosophers,philosophy is the analysis ofscientific language or ofcommon language. ForHeidegger, philosophy is the

existential analytics , that is


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investigating of those modesof being that are proper to

human existent(Dasein);

For Frankfurt schoolrepresentatives (Marcuse),philosophy is the critical

theory of modern society andof forms of reification andhuman alienation in thebackground of this society.Coltescu considered that "Inits esence, philosophy is thisreflection, this meditation bywhich we want tounderstand, to distinguish the

sense of world and of ourproper existence---and byunderstanding, to liberate us,to conquer our spiritualautonomy"(Coltescu 2002,

p.21). Most philosophers had


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considered that philosophy isa knowledge, differences

appear either concerning itsobject( first principles, theabsolute, the universal etc.)or its method (by concepts toKant) or its faculty(reason,

senses etc). But, isphilosophy limited just to aform of contemplativeknowledge disinterestedfrom a practical orapplicative point of view?Tudosescu considersthat"...only in limits in whichit conditionate value

reedifications at the level ofother forms of socialconscience and, respective,modifications in the structureof the tables of cultural

values, so that these to


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stimulate changes whith deepcharacter in the structure and

dynamics of civilizations, wecan say that philosophy havean applicativecharacter"(Tudosescu 1997,p.169). Someones had

emphasized the propensitytowards universality, thetendency to cover the wholereality: philosophy is ageneral conception about theworld; it tries to discern themost general determinationsof reality, that is of nature,society and thinking. But,

neither thought is anuniversal characteristic ofunivers nor society. The mostgeneral determinations ofworld concern either the

fundamental-necessary level


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of reality, substance,microphysics level, or some

characteristics of the universas a whole, like evolution orcosmic becoming. Othersconsidered that, philosophystudies existence in its

totality . But Beaufret havewritten about Wollf:"Wollf isproposing for himselftherefore to make the censusof essentialias, that is of allthat it can be said aboutbeing as being. This scienceis, by consequence, thescience of being as

posibility....One can talkabout being without to say aword about its existence. Thelast is just a "complementumposibilitatis", a complement

of posibility."(Beaufret 1998,


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p.11). On the other hand,there are special

philosophies, as ethics orethical philosophy, which arequasi-disinterested aboutsome ontic or ontologicalaspects of reality. There is

some autonomy betweensome philosophicaldisciplines, such as there is acertain freedom in humanlife. An alternativecharacterization ofphilosophy concerns its aims.Thus, for Rescher thecharacteristic aims of

philosophy are: (i) Provideanswers to those domaindefinitive questions, that is,propound and comunicateinformation that conveys

these answers . ( We want


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answers.) (ii) Seek forcogency, that is, fit those

answers out with a rationalethat attains cogency andconviction by way ofevidentiation, substantiation,and demonstration. (We want

not just answers but answersworthy of acceptance.) (iii)Strive for rational economy,pursuing the tasks at issue inpoints (i) and (ii) in a waythat is rationallysatisfacatory, that is, in anefficient, effective,economical ...

The general characterizationproblem of philosophyrelative to its particulardomains or of its specific

relative to other cultural


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forms---art, religion,science---is a

metaphilosophical one. But,how it can be justified thisdiversity of opinions aboutthe esence of philosophy?Coltescu had considered that:

"The two levels ofphilosophy, [first-orderphilosophy andmetaphilosophy] are ininteraction, are situated in acircularity raport, thethinkers options in the planeof proper philosophy havingeffects on their

metaphilosophicalconceptions and, converse,their metaphilosophicalconceptions influence theirinvestigations in the plane of


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proper philosohy."(Coltescu,2002, p.18-19).

About the antireduction ofphilosophy, science, mindand imortality

Like Vacariu et al (2001,p.275), I consider that theprevious characterizationsare partly correct but theyconcern philosophy from asingle perspective,sometimes from areductionist point of view.They can be considered as

quasi-complementary.However, previouscharacterizations, either inparticular or taken alltogether simultaneouslly, do

not succed to surprise all that


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was, all that is, all that willbe, all that can be

philosophy. But, until towhat limits can bephilosophy extended anddeveloped? What isphilosophy? Or, can be it

unificated? If an unificationby reduction at one of theprevious characterizations isinacceptable, still remain aposibility of unification notby reduction but by anultimate persistent aim,ideal. I will ilustrate this withan example from philosophy

of science. Popperconsidered that truth is theregulative ideal of science,and in this sense truth mayhave an unificatory role,

relative to various special


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sciences, as a common aim,ideal, tack toward all the

scientific propensitiesconverge. But, truth singlemaybe is a too strongcriterion of scientificity andis not enough as an ideal of

science, because the commonstatements as "the sun isbrilliant" are not veritablescientific statements, becausethey are too common-truths.More constrains are needed.In addition, science should topursue also sistematicexplanation, the laws and the

freedom grades of universe atall its levels, frommicrocosmos to individualhuman conscience, societyand macrocosmos.


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Against antistructuralreductionism

Fetzer assume that scienceaims at the discovery of lawsof nature that have the formof general principles that are

applicabile for the purposesof explanation andprediction. On the otherhand, science should not toprefere simplicity andeconomy necessarly. Simplertheories ought to be preferedto complex alternatives onlyin the cases in wich they are

also adequate, truth. Iaddition, we do not know apriori that reality is simple.Other think that, science tendtowards unity(cf. Gold and

Stoljar, 1999). However,


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science should to pursueunity only in the case in wich

world is realy unitary. But,we do not know a priori thatuniverse have an ultimateuniversal unity. This aims arepreferable but they are

contingent aims, thereby theyhave a contingent scientificvalue. Maybe, the universehave a fundamentalontological level wich have anecessary existence, andconsequently is universal,for/in every posible world,but the universe unity should

not be identified with theunity of science. The unity ofuniverse exist at thefundamental ontologicallevel, but the unity of human

science is at the level of


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human conscious level. Thehuman consciousness is

something that exist at anupper ontological level, thatdepend on a more complexlevel of organization. If the"elementary particles" are

not elementary, if there existan ultimate unique-type-of-ontological-primitive,however, "organization is aproperty wich cannot bereduced to the properties ofits parts, for the behavior ofeach part depends on those ofthe others and on the aims of

the whole."(Del Re, 1998).By previous phrase I havenot intentioned to defend theautonomy of chemistry,biology or of psychology

against microphysics's


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imperialism. I only intendedto criticize the tendency to

reduce all the emergentproperties of systems withcomplex organization to thesums of the properties oftheir microparts. I disageed

whith idea that all thephenomena from superiororganizational complexitylevels supervene as simplesums of the phenomena fromlower levels.The superior cognitivecapacities of human brain areabsent at the single neuron

level, that is neurons are notsmall brains. Brain is not abig neuron.For exemple, if we take twothousand of resistors and we

try to connect them in all


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posibile structures, we knowthat there is only one

unnecessary structure, wichis total serial, in wich thetotal resistance, thephenomenon from higherlevel, is the sum of the

resistance of each resistor, orthe sum of the properties ofphenomena from the lowerlevel, but in structures thatinvolve parallel conectedresistors, the total resistanceis not a simple sum of theresistance of individualresistors. The property that is

comon both to the higherlevel and to the lower level is"resistitivity".And, in the non-serialresistors corpus the

difference in the total


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resistance is thanks tostructure. However, this

resistor corpus have a aditiveproperty, a property that isonly the sum of theproperties of parts: its mass.Only its mass do not depend

on its structure. But, theprevious exemple concern aset of objects that are of thesame kind. If we add toresistors also condensators,transistors and other parts,and try to erect a computer,than the properties ofcomputer will be only the

sum of the properties of itsparts? How will we addresistivity withcondensativity?An other argument

antireductionist in spirit,


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arborization, and dendriticarborization.

And, with many empiricalevidences(e.g., Bourgeois etal. 1994) they show thatthere is no in the temporal

interval of development achange(a sudenllyeliminatory selectivity aspretend selectionism) wichsustain selectionism, on thecontrary they argue forneural constructivism, that isfor development as anincrease in complexity. And,

this is not in favour ofsimplicity.However, I think that thedevelopmental properties of

mind should to depend also


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on the synaptic spatialdistribution, not only on the

synaptic number.In addition, there are writers,like van den Bos, wichpropose a framework for

animals consciousness studywich is based on ahierarchical organizationalfeedback model of centralnervous system. van den Bosdefined consciousness" as aproperty of neural networksof self-organizing systemsdedicated to dealing with

rapidly changingenvironments affordingflexibility in behavioralpatterning"([van den Bos,2000]). He consider that:


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the brain structures form afunctional unit.

the mental states have twoparts:one invariant(wich isopen to study in relationwith species' Umwelt) andone variant.

the specific contents of amental state at a particulartime point is dependent onmomentarily active neuralconnections within thespecific network and onthe information encoded inthese connections.

the encoded information is

formed by the specificinput (through sensoryorgans) and output (themovements that are made)relationship in the

hierarchical sistem.


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On the other hand, betweenthe neuronal level and the

neuronal network levelthere is a difference that ispartial analogous with thatwich there is between theatomic level and the

molecular level, or betweenthe macromolecular leveland the celular level, orbetween celular and tisularlevels . If thinking there isonly at the conscious level,and the consciousness is aproperty of a network wichis situated at a superior

level of a hierarchy, thenthinking and animalsconsciousness cannot bereduced/limited atproperties of a singular

neuron, as must to pretend


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the neuron doctrine.Thecorrect tendency of present

is to recognize that there isa dependency betweenorganization of conscienceof animals and theorganization of brain. On

the other hand, the posiblerelationships andcomunications betweenneurons depend also on theproperties of neurons. But,the properties ofinteractions between sets ofspecial organized neurons,depend also on the global

properties of those sets,wich depend partial on thespecific organization ofthose sets, and on the otherinfluences from CNS. Thus,

properties of neurons plus


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the quantity (the number) ofneurons determine a big set

of posible CNSs, as the setof the CNSs of mamals.From all posible CNSs, theenvironment [competition,the fight for survival or/and

reproduction, the capacityof problem solving even bydeceptive conditioning]have selected some. But, theproperties of neurons, whenthere are more than oneneuron, cannot determineonly one type of specialorganization of CNS, but

only a non-diferentiated setof posibilities, or thegeneral laws of theorganization of any posibleCNS, wich permit the

existence of a great number


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of different specialorganizations of CNS. And,

if we consider the superiorcognitive emergentproperties of an individualCNS, like that of human, Ithink that, we will realize

that the properties of itssingle neurons form in theexplanation of thosesuperior cognitiveproperties only the necesaryconditions--- with the sameneurons may be constructedother different CNSs--- andthat for the explanation of

the specific or individualproperties of a CNS wehave to consider also itsorganization, structure,functioning, wich form in

its explanation a sufficient


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condition. On the otherhand, there exist aditive

properties, as would be thephysical mass of brain,wich do not depend on thearrangement of the parts ofthe whole. Thus, at different

levels of organizational andfunctional complexity thereare emergent propertieswich cannot be founded atcertain too lower levels andwich are not just simplesums of the phenomenafrom wich they supervene.For exemple, chemists, at

least Del Re, admit theireducibility of higher levelsproperties (like, the globalproperties of cells) to thelower level properties---by

ireducibility I intended to


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say that a cell is not just aquantity of molecules or

macromolecules---in thefolowing way:

a molecule is a collectionof nuclei and electrons.

the way in wich are puttogether nuclei andelectrons matter, and theconnections (chemicalbonds or microforcefields) determine theproperties of the whole.

a complete description ofthe electrons and nuclei

wich form the parts of amolecule is not a completdescription of anindividual molecule,because the whole reality


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of a molecule include alsoemergent properties.

the properties of nuclei andelectrons and theirnumerical cantity, theconstrains of universalenvironment plus the

contextual constrains,determine all the type ofintramolecular connectionsand moleculararrangements.

the particular arrangementof nuclei and electrons in amolecular structure tend tosatisfy the actions of force

fields. but the non-additive

properties of a molecule asa whole depend also on itsspecific molecular

structure, and they neither


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can be finded at level ofthe properties of nucleus,

neither are uniquedeterminated by the theproperties of the nuclei orof the electrons.

a cell, is what it is, not

because it wouldcorrespond to a metastableconfiguration of atoms andelectrons by wich it isconstituted, but because itscoordinated activity(entelehy) is finalized,aimed at holding it alive ina particular (normal) state.

Del Re considers that, for acomplet description of anentity wich appear asunitary at a certain level, wemust to describe the

collection of all the


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previous levels wich appearin a hierarchy of an

organizational andfunctional complexity, andthat at each previous levelthe information about theconsidered object is partial

latent and indeterminated.In evolutionary psychologyit is considered that humanmind is the result of amodular organization ofbrain; the modules of brainhave multiple specializedfunctions like: receptivefunctions, motor functions,

or for the formation and thecriticise of beliefs; andthese modules areinterconnected. However,this modular view is

criticized by neural


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constructivism. All these(the hierarchy, modularity

or networks properties) tendto falsify the thesis thathuman mind or the integralconsciousness animalexperience can be reduced,

or can be the product of asingular neuron, untill to thelevel of the singular neuron,as must to pretend theneuron doctrine. Maybe,neuron can be an unity ofNS, but cannot be an unityof conscious states. Twoman with the same number

of synapses and with samenumber of neurons candiffer in their mentalproperties, due to synapticspatial distribution. Political

sciences do not treats about


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the properties of elementaryparticles, but unity must be,

however, a comm-unity ofthe particular sciences and aspecific unity of science,not a hierarchy of levels ofexistence or a history of

molecular evolution fromelementary particles andforces to the human society.However, systematizationand clasification of sciencesare values from a rationalpoint of view(Hintikka andHalonen, 1999).The unity of science should

be an unity not of all thelevels of materialorganization, but an unity ofall the scientific products.Given the great diversity of

domains of sciences and


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scientific products, acontent unity is less

expectable. On the otherhand, the scientific progresscan change the unity ofscience whith time.Therefore, an regulative

ideal/ideals as unity ofscience is good.

As a kind of conclusion toantistructural ontology

Human brain is a

concretmaterialisation ofan ontologically posiblesystem.

The set of all the posible

systems and structures


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depend on the propertiesof ontological

primitive/primitives, ontheir numerical quantity,on the trans-contextualconditions and on thespecific contextual

conditions.

The properties of thewholes depend on theproperties of ontologicalprimitives, on the quantityof the ontogical primitivesthat constitue them, ontheirstructures; on the

interaction withenvironment; and, thereexist emergent properties.

An ontologically posible

mind is not a product of


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human brain, but it is ahuman discovery.

The posible minds, theproperties of ontologicalprimitive/primitives, thelaws of univers, are not

products of humanmind;their existence is notconditionated by humans;humans cannot exist if theywould not exist; they hadexisted before the lifeapparition and can to existif life would no longerexist.

The ontological posibility

of human brain isimplicated by theproperties of ontological

primitive/primitives, by


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Is there somethingindestructible in Univers?

We can to conceive thewhole space being empty.But, we cannot to imaginesomething aspatial.

Is there something moreprimitive than the emptyspace in univers?

Is there something thatwould can affect the spaceitself?

...The matter density in

some region of space canincrease and decrease, butthe space itself cannot bedestructed?...


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Now, consideredetimologicaly, philosophy

have the sense of love ofwisdom. In an analog way,we can consider that theeternal regulative ideal ofphilosophy is wisdom. We

saw that initial it wasconsidered that wisdominvolve the knowledge ofbeing, but then appeared anenrichment, preoccupationfor the knowledge ofbecoming, then for theknowledge of humanity,then for the knowledge of

the limits of the purereason, and so on. Thehistory of philosophy revealthat the term philosophyhave a dynamical intension

and extension. What would


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should to justify theinclusion or exclusion of

certain conditions to theconceptual sense ofphilosophy is theirconsistency with its finalideal: wisdom. This

historical development andenrichment of intension andextension of the love ofwisdom make us toanticipate that wisdom is anideal toward we tend and/orprogress, not a somethingpresent wich we wouldneed just to analize, like

brain. I think that, brainitself is nothing more thanan mean wich participate,by its cognitive/scientificdevelopment, at the

realization of this ideal


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result, and in conditions inwich its functions or

capacities can be multipleimplementable, brain is notthe only mean or thenecessary condition, theposibility condition of

wisdom. If those capacitiesof brain (like control ofmovement, stimulusreception and codification,information processing,imagination, problemsolving) are reproductibleby robots, then the neuronallevel is not a necessary

condition for the posibilityof mind.

The necessary anduniversal characteristics of

whatever posible mind are


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a set of capacities wich canbe implementated by

architectures wich can bedifferent both at theorganizational-cauzallevel(the same capacity cansupervene on different

structures that do notsimulate brain arhitecture)and at the implementationallevel.

As Block said, "it can beimplementated mecanicaly,electricaly, biologicaly."

Brain is specialized inrealization of certainfunction/functions like:

sensory functions:


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(a) reception, codificationand processing of the light

quanta flux, in the limits ofsome frequencies.(b) reception, codification,processing of acustic/airpertubations, in some limits.

(c) reception, codification,processing of the stimuluscoming from the interactionwith macrobjects.

motor functions:for the reglation ofmovements:(a) for movementpreparation.

(b) for the movement in theexternal environment.(c) for the internal motionsreglation(as the motions ofheart, etc.)


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for the codificated store ofinformations/contents.

for the abstract processingof information.

for reasoning.

But, the function or the

ultimate utility of all thisfunctions is only one:survival and optimization ofconditions of life; tomaximize the quantity andquality of life;or thepreservation and theimprovement of life. Abeter visual system can help

an animal to resolve somevital problems. But, theaccuteness of human visionis inferior whith regard tothe vision accuteness of

other animal visual system.


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the utlity of feelings. Arobot can be programated to

have an ultimate missionand to use all its cogntivepowers to realize it. But inthis case its freedom wouldbe only relative...to means.

Bones, muscles, brains haveas an ultimate utility ormission to solve thepreservation andoptimization of lifeproblem?We can conceive for everyneuronal network of brain

an artificial network wich issuperior both in quantity ofits components and in itsstructural-functional,organizational properties,

that is in its performance.


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What is essential is the finalutility, the set of actual

structures and the actualcapacities maybe is not thebest one. Can we conceivesuperior alternativecapacities of mind? Is the

abstract principles of lifemultiple concretizable? Ifthe first person level of anindividual human cansupervene on differentmaterial implementations, ifits long therm memorywould can be transferred,then the problem of

imortality is multiplesolvable. This was forantireduction of science,mind and imortality.


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We observe that, at thesame time with the

extension of science, art andculture domains it is posiblethe extension of domains ofphilosophy, for exempleapparition of philosophy of

gerontology. However, theenrichment of the content ofthe term philosophy may beinitiated even from theinside of philosophy itself.The progress in philosophycan result in multiple ways:

by development of some

ancient fundamentalquestions and answers.by abandonment of some

theses, directions wich hadbeen proved untrue,

inexacte or improper.


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by addition of new topicssupervened by philosophic

intuition and reflection.

And, may be, every domainof reality or even theposibility can to become an

object for philosophicalreflection, but much morethose themes wich are morecompatible with itsfundamental philosophycalideal: wisdom. Reasoningthinking, and its forms, isthe necesary condition ofhuman wisdom, but it is not

enough. What it can bewisdom? Or, at least, ingreat lines, with what it isincompatible? Wisdomcannot mean ignorance,

therefore it is compatible


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with cognition. However,wisdom cannot mean any

knowledge: philosophy isnot identical neither withscience, nor with religion orart. And, some properobjects for cognitive

philosophy, had beenshowed before . On theother hand, wisdom cannotmean insuficientinteligence, therefore itmust involve alsointeligence. In absolute,inteligence involve thecapacity of solving

problems, indifferent oftheir importance or valuesfor humans. But, inaddition, wisdom should toinvolve also the evaluation

of the fundamental function


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or pragmatic utility ofinteligence in acord with

the fundamental needs ofbiobeings. Thus, wisdom iscompatibile with theconscious attempt to resolvethe folowing problems:

survival; adaptation have avalue only as a mean tosurvival, not an absolutevalue; sometimes is morewiser the adaptation ofunivers to the needs ofhumans.

optimization of life

conditions.extension of life span.eradication of senescence, if

it will be posible.and progressing in this

sense we tend towards an


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ideal limit: imortality andhappiness.

In addition to inteligence,wisdom must to involve thecapacity of correctappreciation of the possesor

most important aims, forlong term. I propose thefolowing measure law , as apotential biouniversal lawof wisdom:

The wisdom of creatures,either at individual level orat species level, is directly

proportional to thequantity, quality and thebalance between quantityand quality of their life inthe history of univers;

however, considering the


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dificulty of their contextualconditions of life.

This law is well-groundedon a supposition and

appreciation of what is andwhat should to be the finalaims of allcreatures[continuouslysurvival, conservation anddevelopment of life].

For 3,x miliards of years,the final sense or utility of

most body-environmentinteractions eitherconscious or unconscious,of knowledge, of thenavigation within

environment, of the


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is the ultimate ethics ofmost humans.

Now, previousconsiderations(the goodones) can function asalternative conditions wich

enrich the conceptual senseof philosophy term. Or,they can subsume thealternative conditions. Ifmankind would be suddenlythreatened by a naturaldisaster, as a collision withan celestial body or by anew glacial era, all the

human knowledge would beutilized as a mean tosolving the problem/aim ofsurvival and unlimitedconservation of life. In

relation with the other body


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parts, brain have a role ofcontrol, orientation,

problems(like survival,reproduction and otherinvolved by happiness)solving, but in relation withlife is only a mean; the

mental life of brain dependon the life, the state and thefunctional relation betweenits (neuronal, glial)cells;and survival andconservation of other bodyparts cells depend, at leastin part, on the braininteligence; there is an

interdependence here.Human mind have asfundamental tack, or,


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In what it will folow, I wantto present a minimal

consideration on someimportant aspects ofgerontolgy.

2.1. Definition of

senescence

Eremia consider that,"senescence is apparentlythe spontaneous process ofprogressively deteriorationof life structures, releasedat the molecular level,starting with the first

moment of this structuresand having as result thepermanent reduction ofbiological performances, aswell as the increase of the

risk of life cesation as a


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result of all environmentalaggressions kinds".

([Eremia, p.38])

2.2. On the process ofsenescence

Strehler divide theprocesses of senescence intwo categories:

determinated, by wich heunderstand that part of anysenescent process wich isgeneticaly determinated.

and,subsidiary, related tothe aggressions efectswich appear in the frameof the interactions betweenbody and environment.


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Most gerontologists (cf.Eremia) consider that a

process is senescent when itfulfil the folowing fourfundamental conditions:

universality: all the

members of species mustto be affected by it withtime.

progressivity: wich supposethat the lesions wich are atbase of senescence areacumulated with time; theaffection of amacromolecule is

spontaneous, butaccumulation of thislesions it is producedgradualy and, therefore,progressively,

regressively.


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to be intrinsic: are excludedthose lesions wich come

from external causes asdiseases.

to be noxious.

2.3. The Forms of the

Time Pressure

Eremia unify under the'time pressure' phrase thefolowing factors withsenectogen character:

thermic agitation ofmolecules wich implement

the structure of life.fotonic and corpuscular

bombardment camingunder the form ofenvironmental radiations.


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interconnection ofmacromolecular chains, in

special of proteins andnucleus acids, wich is thechemical reaction wichgenerate the most amplenoxious efect, starting

from the most lower levelchemical interaction.

2.4. Explanatory-Theoretic Aspects ofSenecence

In his "An attempt at arational clasification oftheories of aging",Medvedev estimated thenumber of theories wich

explain aging to


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program - most often bynon-feeding ( at some

insects, nematods etc.).

1.3. The hypotheses ofmorphogenetical passiveaging:

1.3.0.The hypothesis ofaging as a continuation ofdifferentiation, as asupradifferentiation or as aincrease of genesrepression.

1.3.1. The hypothesis of

aging as adisdifferentiation withgenes repressiondisappearance anddisregulation of sequential

transcription.


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1.3.2.The hypothesis of

aging as an efect ofincomplete repression ofdevelopment program.

1.4.The hypotheses of the

existence of some specificor non-specific genes ofsenescence.

1.4.0.The hypothesis ofnon-balance betweenmutator and antimutatorgenes action.

1.4.1. The hypothesis ofsome pleiotropic geneswich act in the late life.

1.4.2. The hypothesis of the

programmed synthesis of


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some mitotic inhibitors orof some inhibitors of

transcription andtranslation.

1.4.3. The hypothesis ofsome mutations wich

accellerate aging(theoriesinspirated from human thesindroms of prematureaging).

1.5. The hypotheses of theexistence of some longevityspecific genes.

1.5.0.Hypotheses based onthe identification of somegenes wich extend the lifeof some inferior eukariotes.


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1.5.1.Hypotheses wichexplain the human superior

longevity comparativelywith the primates by someadditional genes that havehumans.

1.5.2.Hypotheses wichhave as starting point theidentification of mammalslongevity genes with thehelp of selection byhibridization.

1.5.3. Hypothesis of theexistence of some genetical

programs for correctionwich are released only ingerminal cells.


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1.6.3.Hypothesis of limitedpotential of cellular

divisions.

1.6.4.Hypothesis of thecellular"capitulation".

1.6.5.Hypothesis abouthipotalamic neuroendocrincenters.

2. Theories of the firstlesions

2.0. Hypothesis of wear bywork.

2.1.Hypothesis ofautointoxication.


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2.8. The theory of the

thermic microshocks.

2.9.The theory of somaticmutations.

2.10.The theory of entropy.

2.11. The theory of thedeuterium accumulation.

2.12. The theory of theaccumulation of somemetabolits isomers.

2.13. The theory of themetallic ions accumulation.

2.14. The theory of theradiations senectogen

efects.


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2.15. Theories of lesions by

stress.

3. Theories based on theanalysis of senescencemanifestations at the

molecular, cellular andorganic level

3.0.Theories of thestructural stabilization andof the macromolecularintercconection.

3.1. Theories based on the

calitative modifications ofprotein by post-translationalcauses.


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3.2. Theories based on thecantitative changes of

proteins.

3.3. Theories based onmodifications in proteinbiosynthesis.

3.4. Theories based onmodifications of structureof nucleus acids.

3.4.0. Hypothesis of DNAchain breakings.

3.4.1. Hypothesis of DNA

metilation diminuation.

3.4.2. Hypothesis of metalicions wich are connectedwith DNA.


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3.4.3. Hypothesis ofmodifications in DNA

proprocessing.

4. Evolutionary Theories

4.0. Theories of rate of

living.

4.1. Theories based on thecorrelations betweenbreeding rate and agingrate.

4.2. Theories based on thecorrelation between

development lenght and rateof aging.

4.3. Theories based on thecarrelations between body

sizes and life span.


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5. Theories of certainparticular tissues aging

5.0. Theory of the colesterolin aterosclerosis.

5.1. Theory of the protein

modification in cristalinaging.

5.2. Theory of eritrocitesaging.

5.3. Theory of toothswearing.

7. Unificatory Theories:

- wich try to combineelements from differentgroups of theories; for

exemple, so called "network


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theory of aging" elaboratedby Kowald and Kirkwood

in 1994, wich join thetheory of erors with thetheory of free radicals.

The problem wich is put in

gerontology is that ofdistinction between efectsand causes.The mainquestion will be always thefolowing:

is the incriminatedmodification really a firstcause of senescence or is

only the result of someemergent changes from amore fundamental level?([Hayflick, 1983]).


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Eremia had affirmed that"most gerontologists

consider that senescence is,most probable, amulticauzal andmultifactorial phenomenon,at wich realization take

part many biophysical,biochemical and biologicalmechanisms. Each type ofcell, tissue, organ ororganism have its propertrajectory of aging.Cellular senescentprocesses are at the base ofglobal phenomenon of

aging, but they form, at thesame time, the componentelements of a an interactivesuperior hierachicalnetwork of wich integrity is

deteriorated with time.


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towards macroscopic,tissular levels? There is no a

bidirectionality? Psychicalstress[at the sistemic,emergent, macroneronallevel] would cannot affectsenectogenly the individual

cells level? Or the humanetiological and therapeuticignorance [I think at thepower of present-daygerontology to eradicatesenescence] would cannottake a place, as a condition,in a rational, completeexplanation of human

aging? We see that, thesenescence conditionscannot be found in totatlityat an fundamentalontic[physical-chemical,

atomic-molecular] level,


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because cognition andhuman ignorance are states

wich depend on thedynamical interactions inthe space phases of acellular ensemble.Therefore, a complete

explanation of senescence,wich have to expose all theconditions of senescence,cannot be a reductionisticone, because humanignorance is a cognitiveinsufficiency and consciouscognitive level is anemergent one. And, if

psychical stress mayinfluence the speed or therate of aging, than again thereductive explanation isincomplete. Human

conscience is not to be


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found at the singularintraneuronal level. On the

other hand, senectogenfactors can be bothintrinsec[ for exemple,replicative senecence] andextrinsec [for exemple,

reactive species of oxigenROS], wich make havier thereduction of explanation toa singular factor withsenectogen efect. On theother hand, if we wouldunify the previous theoriesclasificated by Medvedevand create the folowing

reasoning:

T1 or T2 or ...orTN(N=aprox.300)X is a human


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sufficient to produceaging, but a different form

af aging, a different rate ofaging, a differentlongevity. But, there is amea rate of human agingwich determ a mean

human longevity.And if the eradication ofaging is not imposible, thanaging is a contingentfenomenon and previousconclusion is not necesary,therefore the reasoning isnon-valid. Us hope is thathuman aging can and will

be eradicated, maximalminimized, or at least, verymuch minimized. If thereare non-aging cells, likethose wich are caled

"imortal"---but they can be


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reasoning conclusion-prediction is non-necesary

or contingent. Andtherefore, the reductiveexplanation of aging isincomplete. But, even ifhuman aging would be

ineradicable, theexplanation of specific ofhuman aging traiectorywould require aconsideration of humanbody arhitecture, of itsstructural and functionalspecificity. General cellularsenescence would

indiferently explain theaging of all mamals, butthere are certain diferenceswich cannot be explanatedwithout refering to special

structural or arhitectural


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are good tendencies. Suchgeneral theory of aging

would offer an most extenseand rational understandingof aging. On the other hand,the most general=universaltheory is the most minimal

one. If we restrict ourgeneral theory of aging tothe class of living things,than that theory should torefer to celullar processes,because the most simpleliving thing is a unicelullar.But, how much resemble, orhow much relevance have

the unicelullar senescenceto the human senescence?Eremia have wrote thatanemona, a pluricelularorganism, do not age

because it continuously


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replace its unicelullar parts.Some even have said that

all unicelullar do not age,because they are imortal; inthis case a biouniversaltheory of aging is notposible. However, a general

theory of aging can begeneral in another sense: itis general not relativ to allthe living things but to allthe things that areagingable orsenescentable.And, if we conceive agingas transbioaging than thattheory will be from an

absolute perspective verygood, but from aperspective wich quest for acomplete explanation ofhuman aging will be very

minimal and insuficient.


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But, we must evaluatetheories also from the point

of view of solving theproblem of eradication ofhuman aging. It seem that asuch general theory ofaging would offer the most

rational help towardcreating a fundamentalstrategy for eradicating ofhuman aging. But, a generaltheory of aging cannotsubstantiate a completeexplanation of humanaging; and, if that theorycannot justify all the aspects

of human aging, than thestrategy wich is based on itcannot lead to eradicatingof human aging. On theother hand, those laws of

nature, like termodynamics


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laws, that explain the failureof nonliving things, cannot

explain or are quasi-irelevant for explanation ofliving things. Living thingscannot leave in state ofminimal entropy(Oexle). If

the laws of nature thatexplain the progressivedeterioration of non-livingthings are truthly irrelevantto the explanation of theaging of living things, thancan be a general theory ofaging? If the answer is yes,in what sense? A such

theory must be a coverytheory, not general. It mustmust to refer at a formalgenerality, or formalabstractivity. We must to

conceive the general


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concept or idea of aging asan progressive, cumulative

process of deteriorationwich can be initiated bothfrom the inside and theoutside of body. The formof senescence traiectory of

diverse objects, or the theirsenescence rates are notidentical but similar. Thosecharacters of process ofaging that are proper only toliving things, likenoxiousness or thediminuation of biologicalperformances, cannot be

characteristics of theuniversal form aging. Onlythe progessiveness of adeterioration can constituethe universal form of aging.


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Now I want to return to theprevious reasoning-

prediction-explanation. Forthe conclusion to form anecesary consequence, thepremises must to form asufficient condition. But,

even if the theories from thefirst premise are all true, wedont know if they form ornot form a complete causalexplanation; sure, the causalexplanation is not acomplete explanationbecause it do not see thepermissibility conditions of

aging. And, it seem that theprevious theories form acomplete causal explanationof aging, but the premisesof explanans are not

sufficient to determine the


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conclusion as a necessaryconsequence-prediction.

Because the conditions arenot sufficient; explanans donot contain a explicitcondition about theimposibility of eradication

of aging. If the argumentwould contain a conditionabout the absoluteimposibility of eradicationof aging or about theimposibility to arrive at thisresult, by the progress ofscience, in a given period oftime(in the life of X), than

the prediction would folowwith necessity. However,our reasoning was formedin an absolute form, in theconditions is not established

a temporal interval. That


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global aging mustcorrelate(Shurtz) or depend

(Thalos) onendogenous(e.g., genetical,celullar, tisular carelates)and exogenous(e.g.,physical and/or

evolutionary conditions)senectogen corelates it istruth, but in order to aconsequence to benecessary itscondition/conditions mustbe sufficient. For Schurz,"an explicit and completanswer to an explanation-

seeking question ?P isformally a pair A = (Prem,Prem=>P)(for itclaims Prem to be true andPrem => P to be correct... .

Prem is the descriptive and


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Prem=>P the inferentialpart of A"(Schurz 1999).

In our case, the endogenousand exogenous correlates ofaging can form Prem. And,this Prem implies P=agingphenomenon. But, there is a

problem: even if the causalcorpus from Prem iscomplete, the implication isrelative. If Harnad was rightwhen he said that physicallaws are contingent, thenthere is no implicationthere. If the implication itholds only in the case in

wich are excluded accidentsor antiaging interventionsthan it is relative to someconditions. Should we addalways some conditions to

causes/correlates in Prem to


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reduce/limited theexplanation of aging at a

physical process as entropywas criticated. In this sense,Oexle, a specialist, considerthat " Simple generalizingexplanations of aging in

terms of entropy areinsufficient for thefollowing reasons: i) Non-equilibrium entropy itself isnot a simple concept. ii)The second law ofthermodynamics does notdemand that each temporalprocess has to be explained

in terms of entropy. iii)Thermodynamic entropymust not be confused withinformational entropies, i.e.,complexity measures. iv)

None of them is sufficient


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to explain biologicalorganization. The same

applies to the explanation ofdisorganization in aging.Indeed, both types ofentropy may decrease withage. v) Theories that

explain aging as a decliningsequence of minimalentropy production states,are not well founded inthermodynamics.Organisms do not live instates of minimal entropyproduction. Decliningentropy production is a

consequence but not thecause of an age-dependentdecline in metabolicactivity. Aging is a functionof self-maintenance which

varies between species and


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was set by evolution but notby thermodynamic laws. vi)

The effect of free energyavailability on aging is nottransmitted by entropy. vii)The overall entropyproduction of an organism

indicates its activity, but isnot a useful measure ofefficiency. The P/O-ratio(rate of ADPphosphorylation per oxygenconsumption) does notseem to declinesignificantly with age. viii)Aging involves all aspects

of life. Neither life noraging can be explainedsufficiently by a single stateparameter such as entropy.Minute changes in a

regulatory part may cause


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large, positive or negativechanges in entropy and

entropy production of theentire system. ix)Bioenergetics, i.e., theresearch on regulation ofand by free energy, should

be fit into the framework ofemergent properties of anorganism. Then it willcontribute to theunderstanding of aging".And, I think that, even if theuniversal spatialbackground, the quasi-elementary physical

properties, alltogether withmicro an macro forcesinfluence, would determinethe fundamental laws ofmatter compositionality,

and, therefore, would lie at


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base of all forms of posiblematerial existence, and if

microscopic events wouldlie at the base ofmacroscopic entropicprocesses, if entropy wouldhave a fundamental

influence towarddeterioration of allmicroscopic existents,however explanation of aspecific deterioration ofcertain class of existents,aging of living sistems,would involve alsoconditions related to their

specific body arhitecture,and this would mean that,realy, entropy neither havea sufficient and may beneither a necessary role in

the bioaging explanation.


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Appear the folowingquestion: 'really living

organism cannot elude theprocess of entropy?' or'have entropy a necessarysenectogen efect/influencein every moment of life?' At

least, at the age of breeding,it seem that entropy, in thesense ofdisorganization/disorderincreasing, have not power;and than it is not a absoluteinevitable fenomen;therefore the necessarycondition of human aging

must to be at a morespecific level. The causes ofhuman aging are bothexternal(for, exemple, ROS)and internal (for exemple,

replicative senescence). But


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wath about the posibilitycondition/conditions of

aging. It seem thatdestructibility orperishability of human bodyis its first condition ofaging, if aging is

understuded as aprogressive deterioration itis a kind of destruction. Butthis is also posibilitycondition of accidentaldeath. May be thiscondition is too large orthere are multipleconditions that only

together form a agingposibility condition.However, human aging isnot a simple or general formof progressive deterioration;

it involve that some cells to


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arrive non-replicative stage,some cells must to

acumulate certainsubstances(lipofuscin,neurofibrilary tangles,senile plaques and others),deterioration of certain

pathways for signaltransmission; the humanaging is more than the sumof celular senescence, butthe interneuronal pathwaysare also parts of body...;human aging is not a simpledeterioration oforganization or is not just

this, it is a progressivedecrease of functionalcapacities wich maysupervene not only onorganizational

deterioration(for exemple,


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lipofuscin acumulation orquantitative neuronal loss).

A part of aging superveneon organizationaldeterioration and other partscan depend on a functionaldecrease wich is

determinated not only ofbody micropartsorganization deterioration.We must to reduce death toa form of destruction: lifedestruction, at least at thewhole body level. And, wemust to reduce aging at adecrease process, it is a

regressive unidirectionalchange of body. Aging is aspecific change at a higherlevel wich mayemerge/supervene on

multiple microchanges,


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wich are not all of adeterioration character.

Surely this change is astructural one, but thisstructural change notinvolve just deterioration,but also sediments

acumulation(lipofuscin) orcantitativedecrease(neuronal loss, orloss of viable cells). But,what make posible theseemergent changes? On theone hand, the imperfectionof body: absence of certainregenerative mechanisms

[for anti(telomereshoretening)] , theinsufficience eficiency ofsome preventive, protective,reparative mechanisms(like

those again ROS attack,


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wich are antioxidantsubstances like: tocoferols,

SOD, ascorbic acid), theabsecence of somemechanisms for eliminationof certainsubstances(lipofuscin) wich

acumulate continuosly inbody, and on the other handcertain cognitiveimperfection/insufficience.We know about areduction/regresion ofhormonal(testosterone,DHEA,melatonin)production in

aging, but wath are itscauses and wath are itscondition of posibility? Inother cases we know aboutthe inexistence of some

mechanism for regulation of


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some processes (e.g.,celullar senescence,

apopthosis, arteriescalcification([Judit, 2003;Wick et al 2003]) of wichaction is senectogen on longterm. But, is the eradication

of aging problem suitable tobe solutionated at thegenetic level? I dont belive.The solution of thisproblem involve thinkingand cooperation of someresearchers, consciousinteligences. However,brain arhitecture specificity

is partial geneticalydeterminated ([Delacour1998]), and therefore,certain cognitive capacities(like thinking power) and

their limits are at least


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partial geneticalypredestinated, but not

forever and the solution tothe aging eradication is notinborn." In thenature/nurture debate thatstill pervade neuroscience,

Gazzaniga argues in favorof nature, by emphasizingthat nurture alone is notenough to shape brainfunction. He advocates aprominent role formodularity, adaptivespecialization andgenetically driven

mechanisms in theontogenetic/phylogeneticdevelopment of thebrain"(Teixeira 1998).However, I think that the

most general behavioural


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actions and attitudes ofindividual life form have

formed a specialzation; thisspecialization maybehave determined a minimalchange at the genetic level;maybe some genetical

changes due to continuoslylearning have accumulatedvery slowly until theapparition of...species. Bothgenetic factors and nurturefactors should be involvedin the explanation of humanmind development. But,with regard to ontogenetic

development of mind, Iagreed with Quartz andSejnowsky: "learning is adynamic interactionbetween a changing,

structured environment and


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neural mechanisms. Theneural machinery is

extensively shaped byactivity stemming from theenvironment, while itsintrinsic properties alsoconstrain this modulation

and play an indispensablerole in shaping the resultingstructures "( Quartz, S. &Sejnowski, T.J., 1997). Ithink that, something fromthis structures can begenetically transmited.

The solution to the problem

of eradication of aging,wich is one of the mainprovocation of humanmind, require the moreefficient and the more rapid,

intermediation of human


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brain cognitive capacities. Itend to belive and hope that,

the imperfection ofantisenectogen biologicalmechanisms of human bodyor the absence of certaincompensatory means for its

imperfection have as acondition of posibility thepresent human ignorance; Itend to reduce the agingposibility condition to someinsufficience of mind'scognitive states. I believethat we age and die becauseof foolishness. Human

organism was not designedby a conscious inteligence,like a race car. There is noan external entity wich iscall evolution or natural

selection wich act as a


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physical force on the livingorganisms. However, there

was and there is a fight forsurvival, reproduction,adaptation, domination,fame, by force, deceptiveconditioning or by a subtle

psychological coercition.Adaptation have not anindependent of contextvalue, it have value onlywhen is necessary forsurvival or for progress.Progress itself is requiredonly when is necessary forsomething, at least for

happiness. The previousproblems can be solved inmultiple ways, wich hadmaded posible theappearance of certain

habits-specializations-


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specifications wich laterhave genetically preserved.

If certain species havesurvived until now, thismean that they have somecapacities wich, on the one

hand, advantage theirsurvival posibility, on theother hand, advantage themmuch more in solving ofsome fundamentalproblems(for exemple,reproduction, adaptation,control and manipulation ofminds, comunication, social

organization and orhers).Nobody have selected thesecapacities, but they hadadvantaged much moresome species wich

consequently have imposed


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efects, but because theirnegative efects do not make

imposible their life andbecause organisms thatexperience them canreproduce themselves, havenot superior competitors

and not in least measure duehuman insufficienceinteligence.

Why there is celularsenescence and apoptosis?Why exist aging?Supporters of evolutionarytheory of aging propose the

concept of antagonisticpleiotropy for explanationof aging origin. Inconformity withevolutionary theories

(Williams 1954), senecence


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is geneticalypredeterminated and

senescence efectors geneswas selected by evolution,by an accidental processnondirectionted towardaging per se, because, on

the one hand, theyadvantage theirreproductive activity, on theother hand, the force ofnatural selection decreaseafter the post-reproductiveage. Therefore, inconformity evolutionarytheories, the root-cause of

aging is natural selection,that is selection resultedafter the fight, competition,for survival and for theextension of terrestrial

regions domains and of


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alternative species. Thisfight had as a consequence

the disparition of some non-senescent species, though itis not know evidence thatwould be ever existedsuperior species, like

mammals, non-senescent,and about fact that theywould dominated by thesenecent species. But, thereexist also thinkers wichthink differently. Thus,Clark conider that recentgenetic analysis about thesenescence fundamental

mechanisms, and of geneswich underdetermine them,are remarcably similar inevery eukariot organismstudied, wich is hardly

consistent with an independ


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acumulation of mutationswith harmful character in

late life of eukariotsevolutionary history. Clarkpropose, in the place ofgradualy accidentalyaccumulation though the

big periods of time, thethesis in conformity withwich almost every geneticelements of senescence---genes wich determinesenescence(senescenceeffector genes) and thosewich it opose to their efects(senescence resistor

genes)---have beenestablished after short time,or in some cases evenbefore, the eukariotsemergency from their

prokariots antecestors and


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evolutionary theory ofaging have too litle succes

in imagination of someproper mechanism by wichDNA to induce plannedsenescence([Eremia]).

3. Towards eradication ofaging: A philosophicalstrategy

We should not to forget thatthat the final aim ofgerontological research is a

practical one: eradication ofaging. In this sense,research must be guided,organizated towardrealisation of this aim. But

it is needed a first


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strategical idea concerningthe realization or

progression towarderadication of aging. I thinkthat we can divide the agingposibility conditions in twosets:

those aging posibilityconditions concerningimperfection ofbody'mechanisms forregeneration, prevention oflesions(for DNA andmembrane damage due

ROS etc.), or concerningthe absence of someinerent mechanisms wichis also necessary forradical eliminaton of

aging. We can call this


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Elimination of conditions ofaging posibility implies

eradication of the processof aging.

But, eradication of thecondition of posibility of

aging can be multiplerealisable(e.g., freezerreduce efects of aging etc.).

From the set of all posibleways of eradication of allthe conditions of posibilityof aging we must to selectonly those ways wich do

not stop life, if there aresuch ways.We should to conceive theconditions of the posibility

of aging in relations with


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have its proper agingtraiectory([Eremia 1997

,p.126]). However, all celltypes have their first originin an one single egg cell.First egg cell divissiongenerate a celular

multiplicity. Each cell havea finit number of the samegenes. By repression andexpression certain genesdifferentiate the organismdifferent susystems cells:nervous system's cells,muscle's cells, bone's cellsetc. On the other hand, all

celullar types [prokariotsand eukariots] have ceratincommon features: celullarmembrane, DNA,cytoplasm, and ribosomes.


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Even between humanbody's cells there are some

similarities. For exemple,neurons have in commonwith other cells of humanbody some capacities orprocesses:

celular membrane.nucleus.genes.cytoplasm.mitochondria.celular organeles.protein synthesis.energy production.

On the fundamentalmechanisms of senescence,Eremia select the folowingtheories:


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theory of senescence as aresult of genetic

instability. But wath arethe posibility conditions ofgenetic instability. It isposible somehoweliminate them? Or would

be posible to repair thelesions of genetic level.

theory of senescence bysomatic mutations.

theory of senescence as aresult of the deregulationof transcription andtranslation processes.What are the posibility

conditions of thisderegulation. It is posiblefor us to control thisregulation?


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theory of senescence dueacumulation of metabolic

waste products.theory of senescence by

mitochondrialdeterioration.

theory of senescence by

water loss.

However, aging at thehighest level, behavioural,depend on the aging ofdifferent organs; but it isposible that the aging ofeach organ depend not onlyon the its celullar

senescence but also by theother organs aging; and theorgan aging depend also byits quantity and itsstructural/functional/dynam

ical properties. That is,


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aging aspects are bothgeneral and specific.

Maybe, a strategical planwould towards eradicationof aging have to start with

investigation of behaviouralmanifestations of aging, asage-dependent decline ofcognitive performance, atthe all organs and systems(CNS, muscular system,boned system, vascularsistem, digestive system,respiratory sytstem,

imunitar system,reproductive system etc)level; Investigation ofaging at celular, in general,is not enough, tough

research of aging and its


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posibility conditions atgeneral structural-

functional celular patern isnecessary, but issufficient? There are someresearchers that explainthe decline of cognitive

performance, as memory,not by loss of neuronalcells or by majordeterioration of neuronalproperties but bydeterioration of certainsignaling pathways; isorganism more than cells?it maybe that pathways are

not made of cells? Thisfirst step would makeposible the next step.

establishing of aging causes

at each level: the general


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causes of celularsenescence, special causes

of special cells senescence,the causes of aging at theorganic or systemic level,the causes of aging at theintersystemic or

interorganic level, causesof aging at behaviourallevel. Aging must todepend both ofinterdependence betweenorgans, systems, and alsoon the specificity of cells,on the specificity of organarhitectures, and on the

certain posibilityconditions. It is posiblethat at each level to be alsoposibility conditions ofaging?


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most loved dream of man:the dream of youth without

old age...and of life withoutdeath.

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