white (love and beauty in plato's symposium)

7/30/2019 WHITE (Love and Beauty in Plato's Symposium)

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/white-love-and-beauty-in-platos-symposium 1/10

Love and Beauty in Plato's SymposiumAuthor(s): F. C. WhiteSource: The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 109 (1989), pp. 149-157Published by: The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/632038Accessed: 03/12/2008 07:10

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless

you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you

may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=hellenic.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed

page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the

scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that

promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend

access to The Journal of Hellenic Studies.

http://www.jstor.org

http://www.jstor.org/stable/632038?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=hellenic

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=hellenic

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

http://www.jstor.org/stable/632038?origin=JSTOR-pdf



Journal of Hellenic Studies cix (1989) I49-I57

LOVE AND BEAUTY IN PLATO'S SYMPOSIUM

IT is awidely held view that according to the Symposium he ultimate or 'primary' object' of

love is the Form of Beauty.2 It is almost as widely held that the Form of Beauty is identical with

that of the Good.3 In this paper I argue that both of these views are mistaken.4 In a first section I

present a detailed analysis of Diotima's doctrine, emphasizing features of it which Ijudge to be

often overlooked. In subsequent sections I examine the arguments for and against the claim that

Beauty is the primary object of love, and I then do the same for the assertion that the Form of

Beauty is identical with that of the Good.

I

The first of Diotima's concerns is with the nature of Love (20Id-204d);5 the second with itsfunctions, use and purpose (204d-2o9e); the third with its 'mysteries' (2Ioa-212a). Her teachingon these several issues is as follows.

The natureof Love (20od-204d)

Love is not beautifulor good, nor is it ugly or bad; t issomethingin between. Nor isit to benumberedamong hegods,since t lackswhatthey,beinghappy,alwayspossess:t lackswhat sbeautiful and good. But while Love is not a god, and therefore not immortal, it is not mortal

either.Again t issomethingnbetween, his imeaspirit; nd, ikeallspirits,t actsasmediator

betweenmen andgods, binding hemtogether.We can obtain more light on this if we turn to the origins of Love. Love's father was

Resource and its mother Poverty, as a result of which it has many contrasting characteristics.On

the one hand t is poor,hard,homeless,hoeless ndthe like. On the otherhand t is endlesslyplanningo acquirewhat s beautiful ndgood; t isbrave;t is a seeker fterwisdom.Inshort,Love s neither mmortal ormortal; either esourcelessorwealthy; nd,beingbut a loverofwisdom(aphilosopher),eitherwise asyet norignorant.

Thefunctions, use andpurpose of Love (204d-2o9e)

According

to a view stated earlier

by

Socrates

(20Ie5),

that 'of which' Love is Love-its

'object'-is thebeautiful;but if'beautiful'in thisstatement sreplacedby 'good', anaccountcanmoreeasilybegivenof thefunctions, seandpurpose f Love(itsEpya,XpEiand vaTi).6For,

1 In this paper I make no attempt to draw distinc-tionsbetween primaryandultimateobjects.I take bothto be those which, if forced to a choice, we prefer toothers.

2 For scholars who hold this view, see Section II

below, and footnote 7.3 Instancesof this view may be found in J. Brent-

linger (ed.), The Symposiumof Plato (Amherst 1970)22 fi.; R. G. Bury, TheSymposium fPlato(Cambridge

1932) xliv; F. M. Cornford, 'The doctrine of Eros inPlato's Symposium',The unwrittenphilosophyandother

essays,ed. W. K. C. Guthrie (Cambridge I950) 72;

J. N. Findlay, Plato, The writtenandunwrittendoctrines

(London 1974) 150; G. M. A. Grube, Plato's thought(LondonI935) Io5;W. K. C. Guthrie,A history fGreek

philosophyv (Cambridge 1975)392; W. Hamilton, The

Symposium Harmondsworth I95I) 20 if.; A. Macin-

tyre, A short history of ethics (London 1967) 53;J. E. Raven, Plato's thought n the making(CambridgeI965) I07; A. E. Taylor, Plato, the man and his work3

(London 1929) 231.4 While to the best of my knowledge my arguments

are not to be foundelsewhere,my conclusions-thoughreached independently-coincide with some of thosedrawn by H. Neumann AJPhlxxxvi (1965) 33-59 andG. Santas n TheGreeksandthegoodlife,ed. D. Depew

(Fullerton, California I980) 33-68.5 I write 'Love' with a capital 'L' while analysingDiotima's speech. After that I write 'love', except inthose caseswhere the personof Eros is clearly referredto.

6 That Diotima has the purposeof Love in mind isclear from what she says at 205ai-3.



given hesuggestedeplacement,hat he overmaynow besaid o love snotthebeautiful,utthe good;andwhen we saythat he loves the good we meanthathe desires t to be in his

possession;urther,hat n desiringhishe desireso behappy-since happinesss thatwhich s

broughtaboutby thepossessionf thegood.Sohappinesss what the lover saimingat,since

notonly shappinesshepurposethe vaTi) ofhisdesiringwhat sgood,butalso t isthatwhich,when once possessed,putsan end to furtherquestionsof the kind: 'Whatis its purpose?'OJKTIrl

Tr'poaSEtpEo'at va Tri Eoi8 oXErai EaSaiacov ETvoa pouX6oPEvos,05a.)It should be obvious at once that all men are lovers in the generic sense adverted to above,

since all men desirehappiness;rom which it follows thatlove is nothing more than a desireto

have the good permanentlyin one's possession(Ecrrivpa ucrvA Prlv, Eyri,6 EpcoS OU TO

ayaeov au-r ETvvalEi, o6a).However, we do not characterize ll men as 'lovers'.We reserve

that word for a small subset of them: for those who strive for the permanent possession of the

good through begetting in the beautiful (through T6KOSEVKai\co)-by means of body or of soul.

Whatall of this comes to may now be broughtout in the following way. All humanbeingsalikeare

pregnant,both in

bodyand in

soul,andwhen

theyreach a certain

age theydesire to

beget. But since begetting is something divine, it can take place only in a medium harmonious

with the divine-namely in the beautiful. One whose pregnancy is well advanced, then,

becomes agitated in the presence of the beautiful, because the beautiful alone is able to relieve

him of his pangs.Thus Socrates was quite wrong in asserting that Love is of the beautiful. It is not. Rather,

Love is of engenderingandbegetting in the beautiful-men seekingthisbecauseengenderingconstitutes a sort of immortality, the only sort possiblefor mortal nature. It is preciselyforsimilarreasons hat animalshave so stronga desire o beget:they desire he immortalityof theirkind. It is becauseof this too thatmen love renown;Alcestis,Achilles andothers were reallyinlove with immortality.

Menwho arepregnant nbody, then,turn to women-to engenderwithin theirkind;whilethose who arepregnant n soulconceive andbringforthwisdom (themost importantspeciesof

which areself-masteryandjustice), togetherwithther forms of excellence. Men pregnant n

thisway-poets, inventive craftsmenand the like-look aroundfor personswho arebeautiful,andtakingthe education of these in hand,a once find much to sayon excellence andon howmen ought to live. Inaddition,they produce writings, legal institutionsandother thingsof the

kind; and many of them become famous, as did Solon, for their works and other forms ofexcellence.

The higher mysteries 21oa-212a)

Foramanwho will havebeenproperly aughtandguided,allof theabove-described ctionsand undertakingsrelatingto Love occur for the sakeof yet higher mysteries,and the coursewhich sucha one must follow is this. He mustbegin by loving a particularbody, andin doingthisbringforthandexpress ine andworthy thoughts.Then he mustbe led to seethat thebeautyof one body is likethat of another,andinseeingthis become alover of allbeautifulbodies.Next,he must come tojudge thatbeautyof soul is of greaterworth thanbeautyof body, andasaresultof thisproduceandexpresssuchthoughtsas will makeyoung men better; n attemptingwhichhe will in turn be forced to give thought to admirablecustomsand ways of living.

But the novice is to be led yet further forward, from considering ways of living to

consideringforms of

knowing;so that

thus-beingnow turnedtowards

theentire

ocean ofbeauty-he may bring forth andexpressall mannerof beautiful deas.Then, derivinggrowthandstrength romthese,he will atlengthcatchsightof asingleform of knowledge, theobjectofwhich will in a moment be described.

The man who upto thisstagehasbeenproperlyguidedisatlong lastapproachinghe end ofhis training n mattersof Love. And now of a suddenhe catchesa glimpseof a being altogether

F. C. WHITE50




remarkablyeautifuln itsnature, omethingor thesakeof whichallpreviousabourshave

beenundertaken.irst f all thisbeingalwayss,neitherbecomingnorperishing. ext,it is notbeautifulnpart,noronlyat certainimes,nor n somerespects, ormerely o someobservers.

Third,t doesnotpresenttselfasabodily hing,norasa formofknowledge, orasbelongingo

somethinglse: athertpresentstselfassingle, ternal,xistingbyitself,andasthat nwhichallotherbeautifulhingspartake.

For the sakeof thisbeing,a man mustalwaysbe climbingupwards:o thebeautyof all

bodies,startingromone;onwards o thebeautyof waysof living;then further till to the

beauty flearning ndknowledge.Finally, e mustcometo aknowledge f thatbeingwhich,asearlierdescribed,s pureBeauty tself.

The life of the initiatedwho has reached hisstage,contemplatingndcommuningwith

Beautyitself,is a life of very real worth. Forin living it the lover begetsno longermereimagesbut realgoodness r virtue,havingnow a graspuponreality tself;and n thisbegettingand

nurturingf genuine oodness e becomesdear o thegods,and-he if anyman-possessedof

immortality.

II

Accordingo manyscholars,hecentral hemeof theabovedoctrinesthat heprimary rultimateobjectof love is the Formof Beauty.ThusamongsuchscholarsBeauty s variouslydescribed s: ove'sprimarybjectIrwin);tsfinalobjectCornford);tsfinalgoal Grube);tsfinal'why' Morgan);tsultimateobjectiveRaven);tsultimateobjectTeloh);ts ultimategoal(Grube).Or it isdescribedmoresimplyastheobjectof love(Hamilton);sthegoalof Eros(Bury); sthat

realitynwhich he over indshis rTsosBury); ndsoon.7Inthissection presentwhatItake

to be theprincipal rguments nderlyinghis view.To beginwith, nthecourse f Diotima's peechwe areseveral imes old that heobjectof

love isbeauty.Morethanonce t is assertedhat ove is 'ofbeauty' -rcov cXCOV,0ie, 204d);8that t is 'concernedwith (rrEpi)he beautiful'203c); hat t is alwaysscheming fterwhatisbeautiful and good (Tripou6As arrI TOro KaAoTs,203d).9

Moreimportant,o continue heargument,he whole tenorandstructure f Diotima's

speechmakes it plain that when it comes to Beauty itself, this is not just any object, but theultimate bject of love. For, describing first the lesser mysteries (20 Ie-2Ioa, esp. 209e5-2Ioa2)and then the higher (2Ioa-2I2a), Diotima gradually leads us onwards until she describes the

vision of Beauty as finallyattainedby the lover. And that we aremeant to take this vision of

Beauty as the culminating point of all that has gone before is broughtout in many ways. Tobeginwith, we are told thatthe lover's vision of Beautyis that for which allearlier abourswere

undertaken(2Ioe).Then we are told that the lifeof contemplatingandcommuningwith Beautyis the life which, if any, is worth living (21 d)-a commentwhich, given the context, indicatesthat no otherlife is to be comparedwith it. Yet againwe are told explicitlythatit is for the sakeof Beauty that the whole of the ascent s to be madeby the lover-from the beautyof bodies,

upwards through forms of knowledge, and so on (211 c).

7 For descriptionsof this kind see: Bury (n. 3) xliv, Diotima qualifiesher remarkwith 'cobsr0q'S'. I must

xlix; Cornford (n. 3) 72; G. Grote Plato and the other confessthat what in this section I amdoing isattemptingcompanionsfSokratesii (London1985) i 8;Grube(n. 3) to put forward the reasonswhich I think lie behind the

io05, i6; Hamilton (n. 3) 23 if.; T. Irwin Plato'smoral claim that Beauty is the primary object of love.

theory (Oxford I977) I65; Maclntyre (n. 3) 52; Unfortunately, while this latter claim is frequentlyD. N. Morgan Love: Plato, the Bible and Freud assertedasa conclusion,the argumentssupporting t are

(Englewood Cliffs, N.J. I964) 36; Raven (n. 3) 107 ff.; not so well articulated. hope thatI do not appear o beH. Teloh The developmentof Plato's Metaphysics accusingthose with whom I disagreeof advancingsilly

(University Park and London, I98I) 96. arguments.8 In fact, in the first of these cases (20Ie) Socrates s 9 Se K. J. Dover, Plato, Symposium(Cambridge

explicitly giving his own view, andin the second (204d) I980) note to 204d3.

ISI



Itmightbeadded hatwe hardlyneeded o be told thatBeauty s love'sultimate im.Forwhat else could the lover sensiblyseek,or wish to commune with, when findinghimself in the

presence of perfect, unalterable Beauty-Beauty described in religious, mystical, and even

Parmenidean erms?10

The next argument for the view that Beauty is the ultimate object of love is that this way oftakingit is supportedby parallelsbetween the Symposiumnd the Republic. In the latter,the

Form of the Good is of sovereign value and the source of worth to everything else, and

consequently t is the finalaim andgoal of the philosopher'sascentfrom the cave of thisworld

into thelight of reality.But if the Good in the Republics the final aimof thephilosopher'squestandstriving,surelyBeautyin the Symposium,heobjectof the lover'sascent,will for likereasons

be the finalobjectof the lover'squestandstriving.The fact that both dialoguesdescribeascents

to the world of truebeing-ascents consideredto be more worth while thananythingelse-

suggests strongly thatjust as the Republic'sGood is the ultimateobject to be attainedby the

philosopher n hisascent,so the Symposium'seautyis the ultimateobjectto be attainedby thelover.

It is in anyevent made clear n the Republichat thephilosopher s the lover, andmade clearin the Symposiumhat the lover is the philosopher.12

Parallelsof this sort strike some commentatorsso forcefullythat theyjudge the Republic'sGood and the Symposium'seautyto be the selfsameultimate,perhapsmysticalreality.13 Theysee it presented n the Republic s the final object of knowledge, in the Symposiums the final

object of love. Further,accordingto at least some of thesecommentators,the doctrine of the

identityof Beautyandthe Good gains supportfrom Plato'smore general dentificationof thebeautiful with the good. This identification,they claim, is to be found not only in other and

quite diversedialogues,but in the Symposiumtself. Diotima, they recall, invites Socratestosubstitute good' for 'beautiful', o as to remove a difficultyarising rom herquestionconcerning

men's desirefor the beautiful.But she would not have made this suggestion, they argue,unlessshe had considered'good' and 'beautiful' to be equivalent-only equivalence being able to

produce a satisfactoryanswer to the question at issue. But in any event, it is said, theidentificationof good with beautifulis 'axiomatic for Plato', and stated more thanonce evenwithin the Symposiumcf. I97c, 20IC, 203d, as well as 204e).14

III

Inthis sectionIwish to challenge heargumentsoutlinedabove,sinceIdo not consider hemto be satisfactory.

My first reason for taking this view is that Diotima makes the outright, unqualifiedstatementthat love is not of the beautiful.15Socrates,she says, had thought it to be so, butSocrateswas mistaken(o-rIV yacp, o ZcoKparrEs,p%r,U rOUKaXOU 6 Epcos, cOScra oIEI, 2o6e).

Furthermore, ot only does Diotima tell us that ove is not of thebeautiful,but while engaged n

10 On the Parmenidean influence see F. Solmsen 14 See, for example: R. A. Markus, in Plato ii ed.

AJPh xcii (I97I) 62-70; Teloh (n. 7) 89 if. G. Vlastos (New York 1970) I37, and Dover (n. 9)11 On this supposed parallelsee for example: Corn- comment on 203d4. For more general views on this

ford (n. 3) 75-7; Guthrie(n. 3) 392; Hamilton (n. 3) 21I, point see: Bury (n. 3), note on 20Ic; Guthrie (n. 3) 247,

24; Raven (n. 3) 107 f.; Taylor (n. 3) 230 f. nn. i, 2; Taylor (n. 3) 231.12 On this point see, for example: Bury (n. 3) xlvii 15 Diotima is making more than the limited claim

seqq.;T. Gould Platonic ove (London I963) 99; Grote that love is not of the particular beautiful objects(n. 7) Io if.; Hamilton (n. 3) 2I; Raven (n. 3) 109; G. referred to in the immediate context-namely thoseVlastos Platonic tudies Princeton I973) 19. objectsin which procreationandgenerationare to take

13 Several writers hold very strongly that mystical place. She is explicitly rejecting Socrates'generalbelief

teachings are at stake. See, for example: Bury (n. 3) that love is of the beautiful: dos Ca otei, she says,xlviii-1; Hamilton (n. 3) 2II if.; Raven (n. 3) II6; referring to such claims as those made at 20oIe5and

Taylor (n. 3) esp. 231 f. 204d3.

F. C. WHITE52




explicitly escribingts nature nd unctionshe s careful otto slip ntosaying hat t is.Insteadshe makes use of the word '"rEpi'o expresswhat she considers o be the relationbetween love

and the beautiful.Love, shesays,acts'in the areaof' the beautiful--pcos 6' EarTivpEcSTrEpiTO

KaAo6v,04b-that is, it is concerned with it. But it is not 'of it', and this for the simple reason

that it is of something else. The soleobjectof men'slove, Diotima announces, s the good (oiu6Evy' a&AoEcrrivo0i ipc&Criv &vpcoiroi -rOU yaoou, 205e7-2o6aI); more properly, love has as its

object the lasting possession of the good (TroUr6 yaeOova0i-rTETvat&Ei, 06a). This doctrine is

repeatedon other occasions(cf. 207a, 207c), and is given applicationboth within the lesser

mysteries and within the higher. Within the lesser mysteries, the lover attempts to achieve the

lasting possession of the good through bodily procreation, leaving his progeny behind him as a

memorial. Or he attempts it through creativity of soul, producing all kinds of excellence

(aOeva-Vrovpvvilprv &pE-ris1rEpI,o8d). He produces, for example, wisdom and the other partsof

virtue (pp6v-raiv TEKaOi'iV &AArvaprriv, 209a), or orderliness andjustice in cities and smaller

communities, or again he produces the means of realizing all of these: educational discourses, for

example,or such works of literature as

bringtheir authors

(Homer,Hesiod and the

like)immortalrenown;or systemsof laws like those left by Lycurgusand Solon. Productionsof thiskind are responsible for every sort of excellence (TrravToiavpETriv, 20ge), and sometimes even

shrines are set up in honour of their creators.

When it comes to the higher mysteries (2Ioa ff.), Diotima again speaks of the lover as

producing such discourses as will make others better. And finally she describes how the lover,

having attainedto the vision of Beauty, will bring forthno longer imagesbut realexcellence,and so attain to immortality-in so far as this is possiblefor any man (212a).

Thus at every stage of her discourse Diotima states in one form or another that the object of

love is the good, embodied in forms of excellence which acquirequasi-permanence--inthememories of others or in physical shrines and memorials-or genuine permanence through the

attainment of godlike immortality.Given all of this, surely there is no room for doubt that in Diotima's mind neither beauty nor

Beautyisthe ultimateobjectof love: goodnessaloneplaysthatrole.BeautifulthingsandBeautyitselfprovidea neededenvironmentfor the creationof what is good. Sometimesthecreationofthe good is to the benefitof what is beautiful-as when discoursesor writtenworksare createdfor the sakeof producingexcellence n the lover'spartner.At othertimes thisis not thecase-aswhen forms of knowledge areinvolved, or Beautyitself. But in allcasesthe beautifulplaysthe

secondary role of that which initiates and facilitates. For this reason, Diotima tells us, one who is

pregnantandreadyto give birth,whether in body or soul, becomesagitated n the presenceof

beauty; because he knows that beauty alone can enable him to bring forth, and so be relieved of

his discomforts.In short, it may well be a traditional and popular view that the ultimate object of love is

beauty, but it is not Diotima's. On the contrary, she is at pains to correct it, arguing at length that

whatever role beauty plays in love, it is always subordinate to that of the good.It is worth mentioning in passingthat this way of interpreting he Symposium-asserting

that the good is the ultimate object of love-fits and derives strength from Plato's more generaldoctrine of the good as the goal of action (cf. Lys. 222a-d, Gorg. 467-8, Men. 77-8, Symp. 205a,

Rep. 5s6e). It fits also with the central message of the Republic,according to which not only is the

good the goal of action(50o4df.),but the Formof the Good itselfis theuniquesourceof what isworth while, and the uniquely adequate end of man-the goal therefore of the philosopher'sascent.

However, interpreting the good as the object of love, and the beautiful as consequentlysubordinate to it, presupposes that in Plato's judgment the beautiful and the good are not the

same. But, as was mentioned earlier, according to many scholars they are. Their argumentstherefore need to be looked at. But before I turn to them I wish to consider two lesser difficulties

facing the claim that the ultimate object of love is not beauty but the good.

I53



IV

The first difficulty is that when at 2o6e Diotima announces,contrary to the views of

AgathonandSocrates, hatlove is not of the beautiful,shedoes not follow thisup by repeating

what earliershe had proclaimed,namely that love is of the lasting possessionof the good.Instead, she now assertsthat love is 'of generating and begetting in the beautiful' (Tirs

yEvvio'EcoS Kcal OOUOKOVUv TCO aAco,206e); from which it might appear hat shehaschangedher mind about the objectof love. However, this difficulty s soon clearedup, once accountis

takenof the context.Diotimahadalreadymadeplain n thefollowing way that thepossessionof

the good is not just any object, but is the ultimateobject of love. First she brought out that

happinesss the ultimateobject of humanactivity, by drawingattentionto the fact that while

happinessexplains the pursuitof this or that good, it itself neither requiresnor can receive

justification.Then, havingdone this,she makes clearthathappinessust is (oratany rate svery

intimatelytiedto) thepermanentpossessionof thegood-from whichit at oncefollows that the

latter is the ultimate object of love.16 She had also, immediately afterwards,explainedthesubsidiaryrole of beauty-that of relieving the lover of the pangs of pregnancy.Now, at

2o6e-207a, she goes on to spellout for us how generationandbegetting fit into the schemeof

things. Since love is of the lastingpossessionof the good, she pointsout, 'necessarilyhe lover

desiresimmortality togetherwith thatgood' (aeavaaias 6E avayKaiovE'TrrTluelEv-rtayaeo0,

207a). But for mortalsquamortals,she adds,generationbringsthe only kind of immortalitywithin theirgrasp.Inbrief,the loverisaimingatimmortality,but since he can achieve thisonly

through begetting and generation,these latter are the objectsof his more immediatedesires.

Thus, in saying that love is of begetting and of generation-or, for that matter, of

immortality(207a, 2o8e)-Diotima is not retractingherclaim thatit is of the lastingpossessionof the good. Rathershe is explaininghow it is possiblefor mortal love to be fulfilled,and in

doing thisshe makesplainthattheconceptof beautyis to be accordedonly a modestpositionin

the analysisof love. T6KOSEvKaXcos no more than a means.

The seconddifficultyarises romthe fact thatin spiteof her bluntassertion hat ove is not of

thebeautiful,Diotimaundervariousforms of expression eemsto saythat it is. Forexample,she

saysthat whenever love is present,the 'object'of that love (Tr6paaTrov) s that which is reallybeautiful (204c). She describesLove's father,the source of Love's positive characteristics, s

constantly scheming to acquire the beautiful and the good (203d), a description which has been

takenby some to mean the sameas theassertion,or atanyrate to endorse heassertion, hat love

is of the beautiful.17Shesaysmore thanonce thatlove is 'concernedwith' the beautiful(isTrrEpiTOKaXov, 203c, 204b).Yet again,in the courseof describing he higher mysteriesshesaysthat

the novice must be led from loving one body to becoming a lover of all beautifulbodies(TravT6covCO)Vavv aXvcopaTCV epaaTqv, 2iob)-from which it follows that, in a very obvious

sense, she considers beautiful bodies and the like to be the objects of love. She even says, though

this time by implication, that it is the beauty of people, ways of living and so on-their Ka?AoS

itself-which is loved (2Iod2).However, there is no inconsistencybehind all this. Diotima's concern was first to put

forward-andlucidate he doctrine hattheprimaryor ultimateobjectof love isnot the beautiful

or Beauty,but the good; andsecondlyto bringout thatbeautyis subservient o the good. But

neither of these points is at odds with the assertion that the beautiful and Beauty are objects of

16 Diotima spends a lot of time saying what and in any event is not inconsistentwith her definition.

happiness is, and it seems pretty certain that her For if 'good' and 'beautiful'are co-extensive, as theyintention in the long passagefrom 204e to 2o6a is to seem to be in Plato'smind, it follows that the happyare

define t, doing so in terms of 'good' (and ending up those who possessboth the good and the beautiful,butwith: Errivapa vuAA,q5rnv.. 6 EpocsTOUT'6 yaO6v nothing follows making 'beautiful'part of the defini-

aOUTCcTlva&Ei, 206a). Her remark that the happy are tion of happiness.those in possession of the good and the beautiful comes 17 Dover (n. 9) seems to imply this in his comment

(at 202c) before she gets down to her careful analysis, on 204d3.

F. C. WHITEI54




love. Infactthey are. But in thelight of what has been said n previoussections t shouldbe clear

that, while truly objects, they are but proximateand secondary.

Why then did Diotima assert n so unqualifieda mannerthat love is notof the beautiful,

implying that Socrateswas altogethermistaken n thinkingit to be so? Because she wantedto

bring out forcefullyand dramaticallyhow subservient s the role of beauty in love, and howmistaken s the popularview-repeated by Agathonand Socrates-that love is to be described

sansphraseas of the beautiful.

V

To turnnow to thequestionof theidentityor non-identityof the beautifuland thegood. Aswasmentionedearlier, here are scholarswho hold thataccording o Plato theterms 'good' and'beautiful'areinterchangeable,nd thatalsoaccording o PlatotheFormof Beauty,theobjectofthelover'scontemplation, s no other than the Formof the Good 'in itsaspectasBeauty'.But if

this istrue,

the relevantarguments

npreceding

sections of thispaper

areidle. Forit is vain to

insistthat the good, as opposedto the beautiful,is the ultimateobject of love, if all the while

'good' and 'beautiful' are interchangeableand their referentsidentical. What then are the

argumentsfor this supposed dentity, and are they convincing?The firstargumentappeals o Diotima'ssuggestedsubstitutionof'good' for 'beautiful'.In

the courseof theirconversation,Socratessaysthat in loving what is beautifula man desires o

possesst;but he admitsto beingunableto saywhat further ucha man will acquireas a resultofthis. Diotima thereuponsuggeststhathe substitute'good' for 'beautiful',and armed with thissubstitution eeif he can discernwhat the lover will furtheracquire.Socratessatonce ableto saythat in loving what is good the lover will acquire happiness.

Thishas led some scholars o conclude thatPlato hereconsiders'good' and 'beautiful' o be

interchangeable.They appealat the same time to the passage(20 I) where it is arguedthatbecause love lacks the beautiful,eo ipsoit lacks the good-an argumentwhich they take asfurthersupportfor the interchangeability f'good' and'beautiful'.18Yet again, they appeal o

passagesn otherdialogueswhere they claim to find interchangeabilitye.g., Prot.36ob;Hipp.

Maj.297b-c; Phil.64e if.). But, more importantly,they see all of thesepassagesasreinforcingtheir belief in the identityof the Formsof Good andBeauty;an identity for which, aswe have

seen,they claimto haveindependentevidence-based on parallelsbetween the ascentsof lover

and philosopherdescribed n the Symposiumnd in the Republic espectively.

VI

What arewe to make of thesearguments?To begin with, there is a generalconsideration

weighing at leastprima acie againstthe identities so farreferred o (identitiesconcerned with

sense,reference,Formsandparticularnstances).This is thatPlatoneversaysthat the good andthe beautiful,or the Good and the Beautiful,areidentical.He neversaysthatthey areEvTEKai

TcrarTOV. ut, given thatthere arenumerous contexts in the dialogueswhich would be suitablefor an assertion of identity, if that were Plato's belief, and some which fairly clamour for it, it is

implausible o interpret ilenceasindicatinganythingother thannon-belief Forafterall,if Platohadbelievedin theseidentities,his silence would have been incomprehensible. f he hadreallyheld, say, that the Form of the Good, the keystoneto his metaphysics n the Republic,was thesame asthe Form

of Beautyin

the Symposium,he objectof the lover'sascent,whatconceivablereasoncould he have hadfor not sayingso? Infact,althoughhe hadprettythoroughlydiscussedthe Form of Beauty previously as an object of philosophical knowledge, it is not Beauty but the

Good which he goes on to single out for a uniqueplace-ontological and epistemological-among the Forms.Morecompellingstill,if all the time he had consideredBeautyand the Good

18 See Bury (n. 3) note on 201c.

I55



I56 F. C. WHITE

to be the same, why shouldhe have gone out of his way, as he does in the very middle of hisdiscussionof the Good, carefullyanddeliberately o posittwo separateForms,the Good andtheBeautiful(507b)?Or againwhy shouldhe have contrasted he beautifuland thegood sostronglyin other ways, as he does for example when he arguesthat men are prepared o put up with

apparent beauty, but not with apparent good (5o5d)? More generally, why should he sofrequentlyhave referred to things as both good andbeautiful, if he judged there to be nodifferencebetween thesetwo?It ismoresensible o believe thathe continuedto distinguishgoodfrombeautifulalong moreor lesstraditionalines,19while concedingthathe waspuzzledaboutthe nature of both.

A more significantpoint pertainingto the Symposiums that an equationof good withbeautifulwould have underminedDiotima'sanalysisof love, relying as the latterdoes upon acontrastbetween the two. For,pacesome, Diotima does not say thatthe sightof beautycausesthe beholder to bring forth beauty. The essence of her story rather is that beauty producessomethingbeyondit-the good. Had Platomeantthestoryto be understood n termsof beautyalone

(thelover

begettingfurther

beauty,and so

on),he could

easilyhave saidso. It is

unlikelythathe would havetold so complicateda story,contrasting he rolesof beautyandgoodness,iffrom the start he had meantmerely that beautybegets beauty,or thatgood begetsgood. It ismore plausibleto conclude that he did not considerthe two to be the same, nor their terms

interchangeable.It remains in conclusion to comment briefly on those passages n the Symposiumwhich

scholarsrely on for the claim that 'good' and 'beautiful'areinterchangeable ndtheirreferentsidentical.The firstof these s thepassagewhereDiotimaencouragesSocrates o substitute'good'for 'beautiful'.As was saidbefore,some writers concludefrom this thatin Plato'smind 'good'and'beautiful'areuniversallynterchangeable.But this isnot so. Or, atanyrate n thelight of allthat is subsequentlysaid about love, it is more likely that Plato was thinkingof the particularcontext before him. For only when 'good' has been substitutedfor 'beautiful'can Diotima'sanalysisof love get underway, positing good asits ultimateend, andbeautyas its means.The

substitution, n short, is the firststep in correctingthe falseview of love as 'desirefor beauty'without further qualification.It is worth adding that without an explanationof this kindDiotima's proposedsubstitution s baffling,seemingly a piece of gratuitousobfuscation.

The secondpassage s the one which arguesthatbecause ove lacks the beautiful,eo ipso tlacks the good. But surelynothing follows from thisabout the samenessof good andbeautiful;and,once more, if Plato hadheldthat theredid,hecouldhave told us so. Forexample,at20Ic hecould have made Socrates ask of Agathon: T&yaOa Kai rTaKaAa ou TaoJTOV SOKElaoi ETval?

Instead, he has him merely ask: rTyaa ov KaiKaXKaaOKEToi ETval?n brief, the only point that

he makes is that good things are beautiful. He says nothing of identity.2019 On this see, for example: I. M. Crombie, An

examination f Plato'sdoctrines (London 1962) 204-6;G. C. Field,Platoandhiscontemporaries3London1967)102 ff.

It is worth noting here that while for Plato the

propertiesof being good and being beautiful are notidentical, nor consequently the expressions'good' and'beautiful' in all contexts substitutable, it does notfollow that the two propertiesarenot co-extensive. Toillustrate the point with a further example, Plato in

Republic i saysthat no one will have an adequategraspof thejust and the beautiful before he knows in what

way they are good (6-rrTlrOTE&yaOcd OIV, 5o6a)-aclaim which makes sense only on the supposition thatthe propertiesof being good andbeautiful aredifferent.But theirbeing differentdoes not entail that thereexistbeautifulobjects which are not good, or good objectswhich are not beautiful.

20 Ifmy main thesis s correct,the Symposiumannot

be thought to furnishthe following moral theory(cf.Irwin [n. 7] I64 if.). The primaryobject of love is

Beauty, and the lover having attained to the vision ofthis is henceforthable to see why and how those lesserembodiments in men, laws, institutionsand the like arebeautiful.Furtherhe will not cease to love those lowermanifestationsof Beauty; on the contrary, he will bemore anxious than ever to bring them to birth, havingnow the full backing of reason for creating virtue inman and in their institutions. This theory cannot befound in the Symposium,because Beauty is not the

primary object of love there. Moreover, given

Diotima's views, thereis no evident reasonwhy a loverin communion with Beauty should want to create

imperfect manifestationsof it: on the contrary, whenthe lover comes to appreciate he contrastbetween themortal and the divine, he discerns at once that theformer is but trash.



LOVE AND BEAUTY IN PLATO'S SYMPOSIUM I57

I conclude hat in the Symposiumlato did not consider'good' and 'beautiful' o be

interchangeable, nddid not considereithertheirreferentsor theircorrespondingForms to be

identical.ConsequentlyIjudge my principal hesis o stand,thathe thoughtof the beautifuland

Beautyassubserviento thegood.21

F. C. WHITE

University of Tasmania,Box 252C, G.P.O., Hobart,

Tasmania,Australia 7001

21 I am mostgratefulorcomments romtheeditorand referees f thisjournal.

white (love and beauty in plato's symposium)

Documents