what ought to be

What Ought to BeAuthor(s): Alan McMichaelSource: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the AnalyticTradition, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Jul., 1980), pp. 69-74Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4319395 .

Accessed: 28/06/2014 11:49

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophical Studies: AnInternational Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 91.220.202.141 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 11:49:06 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=springer

http://www.jstor.org/stable/4319395?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


ALAN McMICHAEL

WHAT OUGHT TO BE

(Received 17 August, 1979)

There is an absolute and unconditional sense in which certain states-of- affairs ought to be. Whether or not a state-of-affairs ought to be in this sense depends solely on its intrinsic merit, not on any consequences of it or prior commitment to it. So when it is said that one ought to refrain from a certain action because it has bad consequences, this is not the unconditional ought. Presumably the action itself is not intrinsically evil. We can imagine a world in which it does not lead to bad consequences. Similarly, when it is said that a man has an obligation to do a certain thing because he promised it, this is not an uncondi. onal obligation. Most likely the promised thing is intrinsically worthless. It is not something that absolutely ought to be. The sense in which it is an obligation is conditional. The condition is the prior promise.

The absolute ought to be is not restricted to actions. Assuming that happiness is a good, it ought to be that everyone is happy, although that state-of-affairs is no action. In fact, it is difficult to see how an action could fall among the things which absolutely ought to be. The value of actions is generally instrumental and so is contingent on previous happenings and on laws of nature.

Does the unconditional ought to be ever appear in ordinary speech? I believe that it does. I believe that it crops up when we express wishful or utopian thoughts and when we discuss what things are intrinsically good.

Perhaps an argument can be given to support this belief. Suppose someone says, 'People ought to be happy'. I do not think he means to contradict the fact that conditions sometimes obtain under which someone ought not to be happy. It seems best to suppose that he is saying that from an absolute perspective, people ought to be happy, although that is not to be attained in this world. Hence he seems to be using the absolute ought to be.

Various notions of unconditional obligation have been presented by deontic logicians. It is interesting to see whether they have succeeded in capturing the absolute ought to be.

Philosophical Studies 38 (1980) 69-74. 0031-8116/80/0381-0069$00.60 Copyright ? 1980 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A.



70 ALAN McMICHAEL

In 'Some main problems of deontic logic', Jaakko Hintikka characterizes a world-relative notion of obligation which applies only to actions:

(H1) p is obligatory from the standpoint of a possible world w if and only if for any alternative world w', if every obligation which appears in w also appears in w', and every obligation which appears in w' is fulfilled in w', then p is performed in w'.'

By deleting relativity and dropping the restriction to actions, it is easy to construct a corresponding principle for the absolute ought to be:

(H2) p ought to be if and only if for every possible world w, if every obligation which appears in w is fulfilled in w, then p obtains in w.

(H2) is useless unless we have an antecedent understanding of what 'an obligation' is. Fortunately, Hintikka's remarks suggest an alternative formulation:

(H3) p ought to be if and only if p obtains in every morally perfect world.

Notice that if there are no morally perfect worlds, then every state-of- affairs ought to be, and any action is obligatory from the standpoint of any world. Hintikka does not seem to fear this distasteful possibility. He regards morally perfect worlds as worlds in which all obligations are fulfilled, and he assumes that obligations are of such a modest extent that they can indeed be jointly satisfied.

But there are theories according to which the value of a world is determined by the goods and evils present within it. Some of these goods can exist in amounts of any size. No world is perfect, since there is no limit on the amount of good which may be present in a world.

Consider a theory according to which happiness is a good. Select any world w, however good. The world w is not perfect. There are better worlds, worlds which, at the very least, contain more happiness than w.

Were such theories manifestly implausible, it would perhaps be rational to accept (H3). But I do not think that they are implausible.

In Counterfactuals, David Lewis introduces a world-relative ought to be:

(L1) p ought to be from the standpoint of a possible world i if and only if there is a world w evaluable from i such that for any world w' evaluable from i, if w' is at least as good as w from the standpoint of i, then p obtains in W'.2



WHAT OUGHT TO BE 71

Is the corresponding unrelativized principle a good account of the absolute ought to be? Let's see:

(L2) p ought to be if and only if there is a possible world w such that for any possible world w' which is at least as good as w, p obtains in w'.

This certainly avoids the outstanding drawback of Hintikka's approach. The possibility of moral perfection is not assumed.

(L2) has some peculiar results. Suppose happiness is a good. Consider the state-of-affairs of Jones being happy. Think of any world w, however good. Then can't we imagine a better world w' in which, although Jones is not happy, there is an overwhelming amount of compensating good? It seems to me that we can. So, by (L2), the state-of-affairs of Jones being happy is not one that ought to be. Yet this seems contrary to our plausible assumption that happiness is a good.3

Lewis does not think such arguments undemine his deontic system.4 I will not dispute the matter here. My purpose is to develop an altemative approach.

Both Hintikka and Lewis base their deontic notions on the comparative values of whole possible worlds. I shall assume instead that we may begin with a list of the various goods and evils that there are.

The things that are good include states such as happiness, knowledge, and love, and such states are good, roughly speaking, in proportion to their degrees. The things that are evil include opposing states, such as unhappiness, ignorance, and hate. These good and evil states are bome by various things; in the case of the given examples, sentient creatures. A given sort of good and evil states and a given thing which may bear such states together determine a family of evaluatively basic states-of-affairs.5 For example, given the goods and evils of states of happiness and unhappiness, and given a person Jones who may bear them, we obtain the family of states-of-affairs of the form: Jones being happy to degree r, where r is a real number. (Negative reals represent degrees of unhappiness. Also, it is convenient to stipulate that the state-of-affairs Jones not existing entails the state-of-affairs Jones being happy to degree zero. Then it follows that for any possible world, exactly one member of the family obtains there.) Other people give rise to other happiness families. And if there are other goods besides happiness, there are yet other families.



72 ALAN McMICHAEL

Let us assume that happiness is a good. Is the state-of-affairs of Jones being happy to degree five, that is, to exactly degree five, one that ought to be? I do not think so. My reason for thinking it is not is that this state-of- affairs puts an upper limit on how happy Jones can be - and that ought not to be.

Some states-of-affairs do not put an upper limit on any particular person's happiness, but do entail that someone's happiness is limited. This is the case with the state-of-affairs of someone being happy to exactly degree five. We can give a rigorous definition of the general notion of upper limitation:

(DI) p puts an upper limit somewhere =df there is a class Q which contains exactly one member from each possible family of evaluatively basic states-of-affairs, and which is such that for any like class Q' every member of which has value equal to or greater than the corresponding member of Q, it is impossible that p obtain in conjunction with every member of Q'

Using this, we can say just what states-of-affairs ought to be:

(P1) p ought to be if and only if -p puts an upper limit somewhere.

There is a correlative principle concerning what ought not to be:

(P2) p ought not to be if and only if p puts an upper limit somewhere.

(P1) and (P2) yield the important theorem:

(Tl) p ought to be if and only if -p ought not to be.

Assuming that happiness is a good, we obtain many desirable results:

(1) Jones being happy ought to be. - Jones not being happy puts an upper limit on Jones' happiness.

(2) It is not the case that Jones being happy to degree five ought to be. - By being happy to degree five, I mean being happy to exactly degree five. Jones not being happy to exactly degree five does not put an upper limit somewhere.

(3) Someone being happy ought to be. - No one being happy puts an upper limit on everyone's happiness.

(4) Someone not being happy ought not to be. -It puts an upper limit somewhere. Notice that it does so whether we mean some



WHAT OUGHT TO BE 73

actual person not being happy, or we just mean some possible person not being happy.

(5) Everyone being happy ought to be. - This follows from (4) and (TI).

(6) You not making me sad ought to be. - You making me sad puts an upper limit on my happiness.

(7) It is not the case that you making me happy ought to be. - You failing to make me happy does not put an upper limit somewhere. In particular, it is possible that I be happy and you not be making me so.

(8) We ought not to be cruel to animals. - If being cruel to animals involves making them unhappy, then it puts an upper limit somewhere.

There are seemingly counter-intuitive consequences of the following sort:

(9) Jones being happy to degree five ought not to be. - Since being happy to degree five is being happy to exactly degree five, this puts an upper limit on Jones' happiness.

This seems counter-intuitive because the state-of-affairs of Jones being happy to degree five is, after all, instrinsically good. That is, this-state-of-affairs has positive intrinsic value. However, it is a confusion to identify intrinsic goodness and the absolute ought to be. Some things which are intrinsically good ought not to be, just as some acts which have overall good results may, in the presence of more beneficial altematives, be morally impermissible.

Notice that Jones being happy to degree five precludes many better states- of-affairs, such as Jones being happy to degree six. It is a limitation on a good that may exist, and so ought not to be. Reflection convinces me that conse- quence (9) is correct, and correct for that very reason which (P2) provides.

No principles referring only to the values of whole worlds have given such felicitious results. Some difficulties, of course, remain. It is not clear how we may treat complex goods, such as justice, nor how we may deal with organic unities.6"7

University of Massachusetts



74 ALAN McMICHAEL

NOTES

1 Jaakko Hintikka: 'Some main problems of deontic logic', in: Deontic Logic: Introduc- tory and Systematic Readings, R. Hilpinen (ed.), (D. Reidel, Dordrecht, Holland, 1970), pp. 59-104, especially pp. 70-7 1. 2 David Lewis: Counterfactuals (Blackwell and Harvard, 1973), Section 5.1, pp. 100- 101. 3 For a more complete presentation of such arguments, see my article 'Too much of a good thing: A problem in deontic logic', Analysis 38 (1978), pp. 83-84. 4 David Lewis: 'Reply to McMichael', Analysis 38 (1978), pp. 85-86.

T This terminology, and the idea that valuable states-of-affairs do fall into families, appear in Warren Quinn's article 'Theories of intrinsic value', American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (1974), esp. Section II. My task is that of saying what ought to be given a Quinnian analysis of value. 6 The ideas contained in this paper would yield only a very weak notion of conditional obligation. For instance, consider a situation in which each alternative action open to you limits someone's happiness. Under the anticipated theory of conditional obligation, all the actions open to you ought not to be, given the circumstances. I I am grateful to Eva Bodanszky, Earl Conee, and Fred Feldman for their comments on an earlier version of this paper.



what ought to be

Documents