what do employee councils do? the impact of non-union forms of representation on trade union...

Industrial Relations Journal 32:4ISSN 0019-8692

What do employee councilsdo? The impact of non-

union forms ofrepresentation on trade

union organisation

Caroline Lloyd

The article examines how non-union forms of employee rep-resentation impact on employee attitudes to unionisation.Through an analysis of union derecognition and the introduc-tion of an employee council in an aerospace plant, it exploresa number of factors that may be important in both sustainingand undermining support for trade unions.

IntroductionThe end of the twentieth century provided a few glimmers of hope for the UK tradeunion movement, as TUC membership rose for the first time in 19 years, the casesof derecognition tailored off and many new recognition agreements were signed (Galland McKay, 1999; Labour Research, 2000). Weighted against this, however, was theevidence from the latest WERS survey which charted the continued decline in unionrecognition, the coverage of collective bargaining and the role of the union represen-tative (Cully et al., 1999). A key issue is how far the years of anti-union policies atgovernmental and company level have fundamentally undermined the way in whichworkers are able to effectively organise at the workplace. This article examines onestrand of this theme by focusing on the management policy of union derecognitionand the use of non-union forms of representation and considers how far this policyhas affected employees’ attitudes to unions.

The ways in which managers have introduced a variety of union avoidance stra-tegies, including derecognition, have been well-documented, but there is less evi-dence on what happens within firms following derecognition (see Bacon, 1999 and

❒ Caroline Lloyd is Warwick Research Fellow, ESRC centre on Skills, Knowledge and OrganisationalPerformance (SKOPE), University of Warwick.

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What do employee councils do? 313

Brown et al., 1998 as exceptions). A number of companies have installed non-unionforms of employee representation as alternatives to unionisation. How haveemployees reacted to non-union representation and can it be seen as a successfulmechanism by which management have been able to undermine support for tradeunions? This is a particularly pertinent question at a time when the statutory tradeunion recognition procedure has come into force and managers may be looking forways to avert pressure from workers to concede union recognition. By installing non-union forms of representation, are management able to subvert workers’ interests tothose of the company or have workers already largely rejected unionisation? Forexample, there is some evidence that derecognition tends to occur where unionorganisation and support are already weak (Claydon, 1996; Smith and Morton, 1993).

This article focuses on a derecognition case from the aerospace industry, wheremembership of unions had been high and where management introduced a relativelysophisticated employee council to replace union representation. The company, there-fore, offers an important perspective in that managers have been relatively proactivein influencing employee views and unions are more likely to have opportunities forre-recognition, due to high levels of membership prior to derecognition. The articleinvestigates the extent to which such a body has been effective in changingemployees’ views towards trade unions and, thereby, the possibility of future unionrecognition. If management are able to influence employees’ attitudes significantlyagainst unions within such an environment, then the prospect for union revival moregenerally remains bleak.

The first section outlines existing evidence on the role of non-union forms of rep-resentation and suggests a framework within which we can evaluate how manage-ment may use these bodies to influence employees’ attitudes to unions. The nextsection provides some background to ‘Aeroparts’1, the case study company, and con-textualises management decision-making by placing it within its specific product andlabour markets. The article then outlines the introduction and operation of theemployee council and provides an evaluation of how far it has influenced employeeattitudes to trade unions. Evidence is presented to argue that the council has had adifferential impact on employees, with a central divide existing between shopfloorworkers and office workers. To a large extent, the perceptions of employees dependson their position within the company, occupational group and their previous experi-ence of trade unions.

Non-union forms of representation

Forms of workplace representation operate in a significant number of non-unionfirms. In non-union private sector workplaces with over 25 employees, 22 per centhad some form of workplace level joint consultative committee (Cully et al., 1999:244). Recent articles by Terry (1999) and Gollan (1999) have summarised the evidenceon the role of non-union forms of representation. The research consists mainly of afew in-depth case studies (Broad, 1994; Cressey et al., 1985; Kidger, 1992; McLoughlinand Gourlay, 1994) and surveys of managers (IDS, 1989, 1994, 1999; IndustrialSociety, 1998). Terry (1999) suggests that the great majority of non-union representa-tive structures are found in unionisable firms, that is workplaces with characteristicsin terms of size and sector normally associated with unionisation. These employeeor company councils2 are aimed at reproducing the benefits to management of unionrepresentation, e.g. the reduced costs of dealing with a collectivised workforce andthe legitimisation of managerial decisions through consultation processes but are alsoabout ‘explicit strategies of union avoidance’ (1999: 22). It seems that employee coun-cils in non-union firms, therefore, are more likely to be used as a means to avoid

1 A fictitious name is used to maintain confidentiality.2 Employee council is used throughout the article as a generic term for a wide variety of collectiveforms of non-union employee representation.

314 Industrial Relations Journal Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 2001.

unionisation in those sectors where the potential for unionisation is high or whereunions have already been derecognised.

There has been some debate, often linked to the role of works councils, on howthese bodies may influence employee attitudes and whether they undermine unionactivity. Kelly (1996) argues that such bodies are a means through which manage-ment can maintain non-union status or consolidate shifts to non-unionism. They mayprovide employees with a ‘voice’ but it is on employers’ terms and, therefore, cannotbe ‘effective’. The result is an institutionalising of worker cooperation and a limitingof the scope for trade union action. In contrast, Hyman argues that non-union rep-resentation at least provides a collective structure of employee representation, whichcan articulate ‘the common interests of workers’ (1996: 80). Terry (1999), opening upthe contradictions of an employer developing non-union representation, suggests itcould be a risky strategy, as it may lead to demands for unionisation once the limi-tations of non-unionism become apparent. These are, however, relatively speculativearguments about the likely influence of these bodies on employee attitudes to union-isation and indicates a clear gap in research, in particular in relation to forms ofrepresentation which have no legal backing and, therefore, lack independent status.

One way of advancing the debate is to consider why people join trade unions orsee the need for collective action and to evaluate how an employee council mightinfluence these factors. Kochan et al. (1994) draw on US research to present a modelof unionisation which requires dissatisfaction with current job and employment con-ditions, a belief that unions can be instrumental to improving those conditions anda willingness to overcome the negative image of unions (particularly important inthe US). McLoughlin and Gourlay (1994) add to these factors the requirement ofa negative view of the utility of non-union voice mechanism for communication,consultation and grievance resolution. Kelly, drawing on social movement theory,emphasises the importance of people acquiring a sense of injustice, the acquisitionof a sense of common identity and the attribution of injustice to the employer. Thecentral problem for unions is then in overcoming the perception that they ‘are tooweak to ‘make a difference’’ (1996: 49).

We might, therefore, investigate four key areas: the satisfaction with conditions ofemployment, the identification of management as being the cause of any dissatis-faction, the effectiveness of alternative voice mechanisms and the belief that unionscan make a difference. To date, there has been very little evidence that attempts toassess these type of factors systematically in relation to the role of employee councils.The most researched area, has been the question of whether non-union forms ofrepresentation offer an effective alternative voice. The evidence summarised by Terry(1999) and Gollan (1999) indicates that these bodies have serious problems. Key issuesraised by the case studies have been their restricted role, the limited commitment ofmanagers to consultation, the lack of sanctions either legal or union-based availableto representatives, the marginalisation of committees when the company faces diffi-culties, the problem of finding reps and the failure to communicate effectively withconstituents (see also Brown et al., 1998).

These complaints about such committees are, however, not unlike many problemsthat exist within unionised environments (eg. MacInnes, 1985; Cressey et al., 1985;Marchington, 1994). The recent findings from Brown et al. (1998), which examinedthe differences between 13 derecognised firms and matched unionised firms, foundlittle variation in outcome. The scope, status and influence of unions had diminishedgreatly and they were largely unable to stop similar policies to those undertaken innon-union workplaces being introduced. In this context, it might be questioned asto why workers would join a union if there is really little difference from non-union-ism. In the absence of strong trade unions and within the situation of the UK volun-tarist system, the support of employers for the role of unions is key to enablingunions to have an influence at the workplace. Where support is lost, particularlythrough derecognition, membership can fall quickly (Brown et al., 1998).

Research suggests that the belief that unions can make a difference is central toworkers’ willingness to join unions. McLoughlin and Gourlay’s (1994) survey of high-

What do employee councils do? 315 Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 2001.

tech firms found that the instrumental belief, ie. that unions could improve the econ-omic position of workers, was central to whether they had a high propensity tounionise. Rose (1996) also argued that membership was linked to a belief that unionshad or could develop some real bargaining power. Survey evidence from Wadding-ton and Whitston (1997) and Kerr (1992) confirms this view, in that workers joinedunions in order to gain support if they had a problem at work and to improve payand conditions. The downside of this is that evidence from case studies (eg. Rose,1996) emphasise apathy towards unions, particularly amongst the young, and resig-nation at union weakness and lack of belief that change is possible. WERS foundthat only 46 per cent of union members thought that unions made a difference towhat it was like at work, with ex-trade union members (26 per cent) being moresceptical than those who had never joined (30 per cent) (Cully et al., 1999). Despitethis type of evidence, Kelly (1996) argues that we still do not really understand whatcauses employees to change their attitudes towards unions.

Negative views of unions are unlikely to reflect satisfaction with current terms andconditions within non-union firms. Although, there is some evidence that in largerfirms, relatively high wages and sophisticated human resource policies can be seenas a means of union avoidance (eg. Scott, 1994; Flood and Toner, 1997; Kochan et al.,1994), this would only appear to be relevant for a minority of employers. There stillremains a union wage gap of between three and 19 per cent in the UK (Booth, 1995)and plenty of evidence of the ‘bleak house’ image of many non-union firms (Sisson,1993). Kelly (1996) drawing on the British Social Attitudes Survey finds little generalchange in workers’ satisfaction with pay and a decline in satisfaction with their sayin decisions at work. WERS also found a rapid growth in the 1990s in industrialtribunal actions (Cully et al., 1999: 245).

The use of individualistic approaches to managing the employment relationshipmay nevertheless add to the difficulties of union organisation and collective represen-tation (eg. Dickson et al., 1988; Bacon and Storey, 1996). Research in the US has shownhow team working, participation, quality circles and employee involvement havebeen used by anti-union employers to promote a unity of interest and control work-ers’ attitudes and behaviour (Grenier, 1988; Clawson and Clawson, 1999). From aUK perspective, it has been argued that consultative bodies can be used to encouragethe development of a common culture and commitment to a managerial-led agenda(eg. Guest, 1995; Townley, 1994). However, one study found that although consul-tation and involvement policies may lead to more interest in company performance,it does not seem to change underlying attitudes of ‘them and us’ (Kelly and Kelly,1991). This suggests a need to examine how far workers have changed their beliefsabout what unions are capable of doing or whether they have simply accepted aunitarist perspective that unions are no longer needed.

McLoughlan and Gourlay’s (1994) findings led them to claim that lack of propen-sity to unionise was not about a sophisticated management approach, ie. high levelsof organisational commitment, but about instrumental and ideological beliefs aboutunions. Yet how management may influence employees’ views about what is possiblefor unions to change is not explored. Although non-union bodies may be ineffectiveas collective forms of representation, they may in contrast influence employee atti-tudes to unions, either positively or negatively. Broad (1994) provides one case whereexperience of an employee council did lead employees to achieve union recognition,while others have found a continuation of non-union status (Cressey et al., 1985;McLoughlin and Gourlay, 1994). Two of these studies also revealed that manualworkers were more open to union recognition than non-manual workers(McLoughlin and Gourlay, 1994; Broad, 1994), although these issues are notdeveloped any further. Previous research (eg. Carter, 1979; Price, 1983) provides anumber of reasons for the attitudes of higher grade, non-manual workers, forexample they may have more discretion and control over their job and a range ofrewards associated with their position, which may lead them to view issues as beingbest resolved through individual rather than collective means. In contrast, skilledcraft workers may still display a ‘sense of common possession of a trade’ identified


by Turner (1962: 295), which gives them a collective interest in protecting the statusof their occupations, thereby making them more likely to unionise.

The existing literature provides a framework for analysing the attitudes ofemployees to unions through exploring their satisfaction with current employmentconditions, their views on the effectiveness of non-union forms of employee voice,the identification of management as responsible for grievances and their belief aboutthe ability of unions to make a difference. By using a case study of an aerospacecompany that has introduced an employee council (EC) as part of an explicit strategyof union derecognition, the intention is to assess whether management have beensuccessful in reducing the demand for unionisation through the above four mech-anisms. The analysis will then be extended by addressing the factors which mayhave led workers to change their views about union effectiveness.

The companyThe evidence in this paper is based upon fieldwork undertaken between October1997 and February 1998 in an aerospace company, ‘Aeroparts’, based at a plant inthe Midlands, UK. At the time of the research, the business unit employed around350 people and designed and manufactured a range of sophisticated civil aerospacesystems for customers such as Boeing and Airbus. The site had been part of amedium-sized UK aerospace company which was taken over in a hostile bid in theearly 1990s. Aeroparts then became a business unit within the aerospace division ofa large UK engineering conglomerate. Following the take-over, trade unions werederecognised at the plant and a non-union employee council was introduced. Thetiming of the fieldwork, therefore, enabled the impact of the council to be evaluatedafter it had been in operation for five years. Over 30 in-depth interviews were carriedout at the company, with senior managers, middle and line managers, employeerepresentatives, and shopfloor and office staff. Interviews were semi-structured andlasted from 45 minutes to two hours. Access was also given to relevant companydocuments and to minutes of Employee Council meetings.

The product and labour markets in the aerospace sector are important in under-standing developments within the company and the pressures which have limitedthe strategies open to management. The company forms part of a sector that is oneof the few UK successes in the area of high value-added manufacturing. As a result,unlike many of the other examples of non-union representation, the workforce com-prised skilled employees, such as engineers, technicians and skilled production work-ers (eg. fitters, machinists and electricians) that the company would have found diffi-cult and costly to replace. Nevertheless, the downswing in the product market duringthe early 1990s enabled the company to undertake radical changes in industrialrelations structures.

The civil side of the aerospace industry is highly cyclical and linked to worldbusiness cycles. During periods of expansion of flight passenger numbers, airlinestend to order fleets of new aircraft and the industry grows rapidly to meet thedemand. When the recession hits and passenger numbers decline, very few neworders are made, leaving the aerospace sector with over-capacity until the next upsw-ing. As a result, although employees have been relatively well paid and highly union-ised, the workforce has been subject to periods of large-scale redundancies, whichhave then been followed by expansionary phases characterised by shortages of labour(see Lloyd, 1999). The recession of the early 1990s was particularly severe, as thedrop in civil orders coincided with widespread contraction in military expenditure.Between 1990 and 1995, turnover in the UK declined by one third in real terms andemployment fell by 36 per cent, from nearly 200,000 to less than 125,000 employees(SBAC, 2000). From 1995 the industry began to expand, by 1997 employment hadreached 140,000, but the seriousness of the recession and the increased level ofresources required to develop new products led to a serious of mergers and take-overs on a worldwide scale, which still continues today. The industry currentlyemploys around 150,000 people directly, an increase of 24 per cent since 1995 (SBAC,


2000). It was within the context of one of the most serious recessions the industryhad ever seen, that Aeroparts derecognised trade unions and introduced anemployee council.

The introduction of the employee councilThe impetus for the changes at Aeroparts was the take-over of the company by alarge UK engineering conglomerate. This multi-divisional company had a very smallcorporate centre, limited divisional resources and decentralised financial account-ability (Marginson and Sisson, 1988) for its 125 small- and medium-sized businessunits. The owners employed 25,000 people worldwide, with around one quarterbased in the UK. Operating under strict financial reporting systems, each businessunit was required to gain approval for budgets and all capital expenditure from thecorporate headquarters. However, as long as business units kept to their budgetsand were meeting financial targets, the local managers had freedom on all issues ofpersonnel and operations. There was no central human resource function or policies,with the exception of guidelines on ethics and equal opportunities. A broader rangeof issues were dealt with at divisional level, but still remained limited to areas suchas management development and the exchange of information on pay and workingtime. There was no central guidance on union recognition, with one other unit withinthe aerospace division taking similar steps to Aeroparts in derecognising unions butother sites remaining unionised.

Following the take-over the plant managers decided that drastic action wasrequired to improve the position of the site and ensure its long-term future. 180redundancies were made (out of a workforce of 650) both voluntary and compulsory.The trade unions (AEEU and MSF) were derecognised for all purposes, with onlyindividual representation by an external union official being allowed at later stagesof disciplinary and grievance cases and check-off remaining in place. There had pre-viously been annual pay negotiations with up to five different bargaining groups,an active shop steward network (predominantly on the shopfloor), but no formalsystem of consultation. The different bargaining groups of employees were stream-lined into one body and single status and monthly pay were introduced for allemployees. A key initiative was the introduction of an employee council (EC), com-prising elected employee representatives and senior management, with the remit thatit would ‘determine relationships between all employees and the Company, includ-ing terms and conditions of employment’ (Constitution). These employee representa-tives also had the role of representing employees in grievance and disciplinary casesif required. As part of what could be described as a ‘union substitution’ approach,the company also introduced a new human resource management strategy ‘to focuson the effective training and development of employees in a manner which is shapedand driven by business needs’ (HR strategy, 1993). The company succeeded in gain-ing Investors in People recognition, introduced regular team briefings and employeeconferences and promised widespread team working and appraisal.

It is difficult to reconstruct precisely the events which led to unions being derecog-nised and the EC being introduced. There was certainly a requirement, following thetake-over, to improve performance at the plant but there was no imminent threat ofclosure and there appeared to be no pressure from the new owners to derecogniseunions. Industrial relations were not seen as particularly poor, while the unions werenot characterised as weak, although there was some suggestion that MSF union mem-bership had been in decline. It can be viewed as being opportunistic, in that it tookplace directly after the 180 redundancies were made, enabling management to rebal-ance workplace relations with little fear of an immediate response from the work-force. The redundancy of all the active shop stewards was effective in limiting anyopposition to the changes, particularly at a time when the industry was in generalrecession. A number of stewards were subsequently compensated by the companyin order to avoid industrial tribunal cases, which the HR manager admitted wouldhave been difficult to defend.


Originally the EC covered nearly 500 employees, but by 1997 the site had beendivided into four separate businesses, with the largest comprising 350 employees(the focus of the research). The workforce consisted of around 175 production andmaintenance manual workers (most with apprenticeships), 100 engineers, plannersand technical workers and the remainder in financial, managerial, admin and clericalgrades. There was very little turnover of manual and more junior office grades. Theworkforce was overwhelmingly male, with less than 10 per cent female, includingonly one shopfloor worker and one engineer. Although there was single status, thereremained a key divide between ‘office staff’, who worked a four-and-a-half-day week(Monday to Friday lunchtime) and ‘shopfloor staff’ who worked a four-day week(Monday to Thursday).

The EC comprised the managing director and the HR manager and 10 employeerepresentatives. It met monthly and its main function was to negotiate annual payincreases and to deal with other changes in terms and conditions. It was also a forumfor management to provide information on the financial performance of the com-pany. Other regular agenda items included continuous improvement, training andhealth and safety. After each meeting a jointly agreed written communication wasproduced and sent to all departments. Elections for reps were held annually on thebasis of geographical areas and positions were open to all employees with one year’sservice. Facilities were provided for reps to meet with their constituencies (allemployees in an area excluding senior management) either individually or as a groupand reps also met as a group prior to the EC meetings. For individual and collectivegrievances a final resolution stage was available through ACAS for conciliation andin the final instance binding arbitration. In effect management had created an insti-tutional framework which mirrored what existed before, with the exception of theuse of single-table bargaining, regular consultation and no union representation.

Five years later the EC was viewed as a source of pride by the senior managers,indicated by their willingness to participate in the research. It showed that they wereforward thinking, viewing employee voice and representation as an essential part ofmodern management practice. Various managers cited a number of benefits whichhad arisen from the employee council. It was claimed that the new body speededup the bargaining process as there was only one group, as opposed to the three orfour negotiating bodies of the union era. It was believed to have increased managerialcontrol, through encouraging employees to identify more with the business andremoving ‘them and us’ attitudes. By merging shopfloor and office staff, it was hopedthat the more compliant office workers would influence the attitudes of the shopfloor,although there was scepticism as to whether this had actually been achieved.Importantly, the derecognition of trade unions was felt to have undermined both theengineers and production workers strength at the point of production. Managementclaimed that previously they had to constantly discuss issues with shop stewards,for example over job demarcation, job specification and overtime:

I thought it was a very good idea. I knew the strength of the unions and what used to happen,how narrow minded the unions were % When you are trying to win work and you have overtimebans and walking out because of local disputes % there was one or two militants and a lot ofsheep. The new system of the employee council and not having strong union activity was musicto my ears. (Senior engineering manager)

Management had hoped to show to employees that they still had the same (if notbetter) involvement, communication and representation with the EC than with tradeunions. However, the workforce had become deeply divided over the existence ofthe EC and their beliefs in the effectiveness of a trade union alternative.

Attitudes to the employee councilOne of the unusual features of this case study was the decision by management tonegotiate over pay with the EC. By exploring the attitudes of employees, it can beseen to have been an astute policy in relation to the specific labour market conditions


faced by the firm. The company pays in the top quartile for the area and with anotheraerospace company (unionised) only a mile or two down the road, it had to remaincompetitive on pay when the industry emerged from recession. The first year of theEC, the staff side was immediately offered three per cent, a relatively generous payincrease at the time, having followed on from a pay freeze the previous year. TheHR manager explained that this had been used as a goodwill gesture, which it washoped would encourage a positive attitude to and an acceptance of the EC. By main-taining pay negotiations and conceding the going rate, the EC could be shown to beas successful as unions in negotiating pay. The policy seemed to work as nearly allof those employees interviewed felt that the annual negotiations over pay increaseshad been reasonably successful. As a result, criticisms of the EC and non-unionismlargely focused around non-pay issues.

The chair of the EC was an office rep who was a MSF member and frequentlyused the union for information and resources in dealing with management, in parti-cular for the annual pay claim. Both he and the other office rep interviewed werereasonably satisfied with what had been achieved over the years, although they wereboth aware of the limitations of the EC. The two EC reps from the shopfloor weremore critical but were the most positive of all the shopfloor workers interviewed.They felt that the workforce had done ‘quite well out of it’ but still viewed it asultimately being against the interests of the workforce. Complaints were made byall employee reps about the ECs lack of power, the failure of management to respondto issues raised and, from the shopfloor reps, the dominance of the office staff.

I have been reasonably satisfied % The big disappointment is the lack of support of members,people willing to sit on the council. We do negotiate but don’t negotiate from a position of ulti-mate power. A union relies on strikes, we have to rely on the goodwill of the workforce. (OfficeEC rep)

They [management] get everything they want% I don’t think it represents them [the workforce]or it’s got a lot of power or influence. It is looked on as something the company’s just got to doand it has done it for that reason. It is not to get ideas or feelings and they don’t seem to respondto them anyway. (Shopfloor EC rep)

The main problem was that issues, even minor ones, were either never resolved ortook a considerable amount of time. The reps complained about the apathy and thelack of employees willing to stand as reps. Both office reps interviewed had been onthe EC since its creation, while turnover from shopfloor reps was very high, withresignations and seats regularly left unfilled.

The opposition to the introduction of the EC had been so great from the shopfloor,that for the first four years the assembly area had refused to elect their two reps,while other shopfloor areas found it difficult to find anyone willing to stand. As aresult, the office reps dominated the EC. One year the EC reps voted to accept areorganisation of the working week from four days to four and a half days for theshopfloor workers, in return for higher pay across the plant. A ballot of the workforcevoted by a small majority to reject the offer but this experience both reinforced thedivide between the office and the shopfloor staff and led to the assembly area electingreps to the EC for the first time.

The response from the shopfloor continued to be overwhelmingly negativetowards the EC, with the exception of the issue of pay, where it was conceded bymost that the trade unions could probably not have done much better. Their com-plaints about the EC was that it had no power, it did not provide any real represen-tation and it enabled the office workers to vote on issues that only affected the shop-floor. Many argued that there were no real negotiations taking place and thatmanagement could push through any decision that they wanted, while the repslacked both the skills and training to undertake such a role.

It is a complete waste of space% after that we never had a voice, things we needed raising as abody. Management decided something, they tell the council and they don’t tell us% The staffside get more of a say. They get to vote on the issues that concern us. It is supposed to be all asone but there is still a big dividing line. (Shopfloor worker)


The shopfloor employees complained about lack of communications with their ECreps, claiming they had to ask to find out anything and, although minutes wereavailable on notice boards, there was a preference for face-to-face discussions andthe use of meetings. Reps from the shopfloor confirmed that in general they hadstopped feeding back information on a regular basis. Meetings only seemed to takeplace for pay deals and particularly big issues, while some shift workers felt theymissed out altogether.

In contrast, there was a much more positive response to the EC from officeemployees. Part of the reason was that they either felt they received more informationfrom EC reps than they had from the unions or they had never been in a union.

Possibly for me because I have never been in a union, I thought it was a better idea becauseespecially factions of the unions in the company, I used to think they were only out for themselves.If you have an EC you have got someone to represent your views within your area and they arenot so bolshie. Instead of seeing in black and white they see the overall picture. (Office worker)

I find it better. It tore down a lot of barriers, ‘them and us’, management and workers, and youcould feel that a lot, it is still there but not half as much. (Office worker)

Reps in the office areas tended to provide feedback from the EC at team briefingsand office employees were more likely to receive minutes of meetings and see thereps on an individual basis. Although there was little outright enthusiasm, it wasseen by most to be doing a reasonable job. Comments such as: ‘to be honest theymust do a good job because I don’t notice that they are there’, while a couple ofemployees emphasised the better relationship that there seemed to be with manage-ment: ‘I’m OK with the EC % it is more intelligent and understanding of what thecompany is trying to do’ (engineer). Another comment was that it was balancing outdivisions between the shopfloor and office workers: ‘everyone can have a voice andbe equal% some individuals were paid poorly compared to the shopfloor. It is notso much now’ (office worker). This reflected a widely held view that the previousmanual union had been much stronger than the office union, while in contrast theEC was dominated by the office reps.

Despite the positive response to the EC there was an acceptance by some officeworkers that it was a fairly weak body, that it lacked the power of trade unionsand that it had not improved levels of trust between management and employees,particularly on the shopfloor. Those who were classified as office workers but workedon the shopfloor, such as production engineers, were represented by a shopfloorworker. They, however, felt that this was not appropriate and that, as a result, theywere not represented by the EC. The same view was expressed by a number of firstline managers from the shopfloor, who found it unsatisfactory both for themselvesand for manual workers to be party to any group feedback from the EC.

Attitudes to unionsHow did the operation of the EC affect attitudes to trade unions and, therefore, thelikelihood of future recognition? 90 per cent of shopfloor workers remained in theunion and all those interviewed wanted to return to union representation. The onlytwo who were hesitant were both EC reps, one wanted a mix of union representationand the EC, while the other had not liked the restrictions unions used to place onovertime. Most of the interviewees felt that the union could not have done any betterin relation to pay negotiations. Instead the issues they felt were more problematiccentred on and around the organisation of work and the production process. It wasclaimed that without unions, management did what they liked and could ask themto do whatever they wanted and there was little they could do about it. Examplesincluded changing shift patterns, the distribution and level of overtime and changesin work organisation.

It is one way traffic and you do as you’re told and you’ve got, although you’re a union member,no representation. Before you had a machine shop as a body, now you are an individual and


they do what they like with you% We work when they want you to. They can phone you up atfive minutes notice % (Shopfloor worker)

This view was reinforced by a first-line manager in the way that he dealt with work-ers.

I feel that since the introduction of the EC the company have managed to bulldoze through anypolicy they feel fit, with hardly any kickback from employees% The things I do now, I wouldn’thave dreamt of doing in a trade union environment because I know I can get away with it. Thereis a very aggressive style of management at my level. We can do anything we like, previouslywe had to go through a formal procedure. I am not saying everything is bad since the demiseof trade unions but there is virtually an open book. (Cell manager)

In contrast the workers spoke of the union as enabling them to be a body, ratherthan an individual, that the union had protected ‘our interests’, and had given ‘usa voice’. Many saw the inability to undertake strike action as a key factor in the lackof power of the EC and non-union status. They talked of the union stewards ascommunicating with them, representing them and enabling them to know what wasgoing on. The union acted as a break on management on the shopfloor, as they had toconsult or negotiate before they introduced new practices. Their own union providedrepresentation for shopfloor views, which were felt to be different from those of theoffice workers. Unions had more power and provided a voice for workers. The unionwas not seen in a completely positive light, as there was the odd criticism, forexample complaints about previous union officials and the secrecy and individualpower of union reps. However, overall there was a positive view about what unionshad done in the past and what would be possible within the current situation. Threeout of the 10 shopfloor workers interviewed though were resigned to never seeingtrade unions reestablished at the plant: ‘I would far rather see a union back in here.Those days are not going to come back, those days are gone’ (process operator).

This view appears to suggest that previously the union had been very strong,whilst currently there was little that shopfloor workers could do to oppose manage-ment. In practice, the reality was a little less clear, as there still remained elementsof collectivity which were organised without formal union input and often in oppo-sition to the EC. The redundancy of the active shop stewards had led to an initialloss of leadership on the shopfloor and a lack of engagement with the union exter-nally. However, what seemed to be emerging was collective action but without theidentification of particular individuals as representatives or leaders. One examplerelated to attempts by management to introduce teams and team leaders into theassembly area. This had led to an unofficial overtime ban and after seven monthsthe introduction of team leaders was still incomplete. One shopfloor worker claimedthat the move from six and seven day working, as a result of the ban, down to fourhad seen nearly a 50 per cent drop in production. The introduction of team workinghad initially by-passed the EC and only went to them for approval once managementrealised the extent of opposition.

We found it a job to deal with. What they [management] did% they had already made up theirmind what they were going to do and it caused a problem and then they called the EC to ameeting. They had already picked the team leaders. They told us what they were going to do,there was no negotiations. (Shopfloor EC rep)

The EC proved to be ineffective in either supporting management’s decision or inproviding an opposition to teamworking. As a result, as the production managerdescribed, the lack of a union had not helped them introduce change quickly.

In some ways it does make it more difficult, we have had issues such as team leaders and thathas still not been sorted. Collectively there are two or three agitators doing it and they won’taccept it at any cost. They are a lot smarter about standing on a podium—they won’t do it. Theycounter the proposals by ridiculous ones of their own. In one area they are taking it in turn to beteam leader every two weeks. They don’t do anything so it doesn’t change. (Production manager)

Amongst shopfloor workers there was a belief that the union would have opposedthese changes, while the production managers felt that a union would have enabledthem to legitimately negotiate its introduction, as in many other workplaces.


Amongst the office workers, most had given up their union membership. Thereremained only two union members (MSF) among the ten staff interviewed. A furtherfive had been in a union prior to the EC but had given up their membership followingtrade union derecognition. Five preferred to keep the current EC rather than returnto a union body, three were indifferent and only two felt that a role for trade unionswas still required. Most had been in a trade union in the past, but comments weregenerally negative, such as ‘they never did anything’ or ‘they were only out for whatthey could get’ and ‘we only saw them once a year’ (at pay negotiations). Four ofthose interviewed claimed that their union had been too weak or had not supportedthem in the past. Ideological opposition to unions was only really apparent in oneinterviewee.

The desire for union recognition, therefore, remained limited, with the belief thatthe EC undertook all the activities that the union had done in the past, plus more,as it met monthly with management. There was a general view that unions had morepower than an EC, yet they felt they had more influence with an EC, they could putforward their views and there was a move towards more of a ‘team’ approach. Anumber of office workers, particularly those at more senior levels, believed that theyno longer needed a union, as one engineer stated, ‘I can look after myself.’ Otherssaw unions as no longer appropriate in the modern world. ‘The trade unions havehad their day and gone. Employees can’t be as strong as they used to be, it is stillso hard and with all the competitive pressures’ (office worker).

Despite this relatively positive view of the EC, the office staff interviewed hadrarely if ever put forward issues to the EC. Those that had, referred to what wereperceived as common issues, such as the heating system, toilet provision or the profitscheme. In fact the main complaints about their own problems were remarkable simi-lar, for example heavy work loads, lack of career progression, poor levels of trainingand pay inequities. Yet these were viewed as individual issues which if raised any-where would be directly with their manager or with the HR department, rather thanthrough the EC or a union. A union was, therefore, seen as unnecessary, as theirperceived grievances were viewed in a very individualistic way, despite the commonissues raised. Their response was in stark contrast to the shopfloor, who viewed thesetypes of complaints as collective grievances, with management being responsiblefor them.

Undermining unionisation?The study presents an example of a workplace where non-union representation wasused explicitly as a mechanism for union substitution. This case fits in with Terry’s(1999) category of those firms most likely to have ECs, in that it is ‘unionisable’. Likesome of the other examples cited, the introduction of the EC took place followingderecognition of trade unions. It could be argued that derecognition was ‘purposive’(Claydon, 1996) in that management’s aim was the long-term removal of unions,rather than being a ‘reactive’ response to the weakening of union power. The replace-ment of one representative body (union-based) with another (employee-based) canbe seen as a mechanism through which management hoped non-unionism would bemore easily accepted by the workforce and thereby more sustainable than if therehad been no representation. Unlike the Bacon case (1999) where disgruntledemployees were ‘encouraged’ to leave, at Aeroparts management had removed ‘dif-ficult’ employees and trade union activists with redundancies and wanted to keepthose employees who remained. The skills required to undertake the different jobsmeant that most workers were not substitutable internally or easily replaced exter-nally. With little turnover and a strong tradition of unionisation, the companyrealised that it would be unlikely to resist concerted attempts at union recognition.Therefore, it had tried to soften the workforce’s demand for unionisation by arguingthat with the EC they were better represented and consulted, while other HR policiessignified what could be achieved in a new, more cooperative environment.

How far has the EC been a successful element of management’s tactic to undermine


the demands for unionisation? This can be considered by returning to some of theconditions felt to be more likely to lead people to join unions, ie. dissatisfaction withemployment conditions, identifying managers as the prime cause of the problems,ineffectiveness of existing employee voice mechanisms and the belief that unions canmake a difference. The decision to let the EC undertake negotiations over pay andconditions, would seem to have been successful in limiting the level of dissatisfactionwith pay. There was though discontent expressed by manual workers over theincreased use of temporary workers, the amount and distribution of overtime, shiftchanges, work load and job demarcation and from a number of office staff over lackof training, poor job mobility and heavy workloads. There was then a recognition ofa sense of grievance amongst both groups of workers, although it appeared to begreater and more directly expressed by shopfloor workers. In the improving econ-omic context, both groups of employees identified internal factors, in particularsenior level management, as being the main cause of their grievances.

The evidence indicates that the EC did not provide an ‘effective’ voice foremployees. However, it appeared to fulfil some needs of office employees, forexample in relation to information and communication. Although shopfloor workersfelt that they lacked the voice that they had previously had with unions, office work-ers did not believe that they either lacked voice or that they really perceived thenecessity of having a voice. In some ways this reflects the way that the two groupsconceptualised their grievances. Shopfloor workers saw their issues as being collec-tive in nature and, therefore, there was a need for a collective voice, whereas officeworkers looked at their problems as individual which could be resolved (or not)through individual action. An important further issue was a shift in relative influenceof the two groups from the stronger shopfloor unions to the dominance of office staffon the EC which may have clouded the fact, for some office workers, that overallthe EC was fairly ineffectual. It was undoubtedly a management tactic to try to usethese divisions to undermine collective action on the shopfloor. Whether it wasexplicitly designed to create divisions between shopfloor and office workers wouldseem unlikely, particularly given the espoused unitarist philosophy of single status.

How far did the two groups feel that unions could make a difference? Followingon from office workers’ perception of their problems as individual, alongside theirpast experience of union representation, largely dealing with collective pay issues,most did not view unions as offering any advantages. In contrast to shopfloor work-ers, their jobs varied significantly and they had much closer relationships with theirline management, while many had the possibility of career advancement. The reason-able pay settlements for employees also ensured that the EC was seen to function wellas a negotiating body, thereby replicating what office staff saw as the key function oftrade unions.

In contrast shopfloor workers, on the whole, believed that unions could make adifference. The retention of membership, despite lack of recognition, could be arguedto reflect a broader adherence to unionism amongst craft workers (Turner, 1962).However, most stressed the importance of union membership for insurance purposesand legal representation, a different set of issues from the more collective reasonsgiven for wanting union recognition. There was an overwhelming desire to returnto union representation and a dismissiveness of the activities of the EC. Thisappeared to stem from their past experience of trade unions, rather than of howunions might be able to operate under the new competitive pressures which domi-nated the industry. For the shopfloor employees, trade unions had played a muchmore central role in their working day than for the staff employees. Issues locatedaround the daily work regime were not reconciled by the EC, while shopfloor ECreps did not provide a local focus for discussion with managers, in a similar waythat shop stewards had done before derecognition.

Can we see ways in which the EC has been fundamental to changing the attitudesof employees towards unionisation? Certainly the plant has remained without tradeunion recognition, although very few of the shopfloor workers had given up theirunion membership. In terms of winning ‘hearts and minds’, it has clearly failed with


the shopfloor. It may well have had an impact on office workers’ views of tradeunions, but this may also be a result of other management practices, such as teambriefings, which have emphasised the importance of improving competitiveness.Identification with the company may be one element, but it also showed the generalpre-existing dissatisfaction with the activities of their union. For the shopfloor work-ers the existence of the EC does not seem to have produced negative attitudestowards unions. It may be that its ineffectiveness in operating as a legitimate formof representation had placed previous union activity in a better light.

Conclusions

The case may be unusual in that it involves complete derecognition at a workplacewhere union membership was high. We may have expected partial derecognition ofwhite collar groups but the opportunism of a change in ownership and jobs losseshad enabled a shift in management culture and change in industrial relations style(see Claydon, 1989). It could be suggested, following Purcell and Ahlstrand (1994),that there had been a move from a bargained constitutional to a more sophisticatedhuman relations style of management where it was unnecessary to have trade unions.Nevertheless styles must be based upon policies and it seems that under a strictfinancial regime, there were very limited resources available to prop up a develop-mental type human resource management practice. The result being instability, con-flict and low levels of workforce morale, providing limited possibilities for the suc-cess of a union substitution policy.

Alongside the contradictions in management policy are the attitudes of workers totrade unions. Previous research has found that negative views of ex-union memberstowards unions can be important in preventing unionisation. In this case there wassome evidence of dissatisfaction amongst office workers but limited for shopfloorworkers. This appears to be one factor, alongside the individual’s own job and theirrelationship with management, which influences employees’ attitudes to recognition.Of particular importance for shopfloor workers was the lack of representation atthe point of production rather than at annual negotiations or monthly consultativemeetings. This may be specific to craft engineering unions but is important in indicat-ing the gaps in union organisation for other groups of workers. If unions are notfulfilling these needs, such as individual and collective representation over changingpatterns and organisation of work, and job mobility, as well as consultation andcommunication of company activities, then the introduction of non-unionised formsof representation may seriously influence employee attitudes to unions. Both con-vincing workers that their grievances are collective rather than individual and reco-gnising the divisions that exist between groups of workers would seem to be vitalto any strategy of unionisation.

The EC was created during ‘difficult’ times when it was hard for employees toresist derecognition. The industry has since been in expansion and, although otherstudies have found that ECs are vulnerable during periods of difficulty, this casequestions whether in ‘unionisable’ workplaces, they are sustainable during periodsof prosperity. If employees feel relatively secure in their employment or think thatthey can easily find a job elsewhere or that management are not sharing the benefitsof growth, not only in terms of pay but in better working conditions, then ECs maycome under threat from the drive for union recognition.

Management in this company had not been successful in persuading a majority ofemployees that an EC was an acceptable alternative to trade unions. As a result,the new recognition legislation should enable this plant to return to a trade unionenvironment, which was something managers acknowledged at the time of theresearch. However, the existence of single-bargaining groups covering all employees(and often junior managers) may make recognition more difficult to obtain, if thiskind of division between manuals and non-manuals is widespread. Due to the posi-tive response of non-manual employees, it would indicate that ECs may be successful


in diffusing demand for union recognition but this is likely to depend both on satis-factory pay outcomes and employees’ prior experience of unions in the workplace.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Mike Terry for his helpful comments on an earlier version ofthis paper and the two anonymous referees for their constructive suggestions. Theresearch was funded by the ESRC Management Research Fellowship scheme, noH53627500796.

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