Volume 30 2019

Abraham Lincoln in 1861 Latin America

Christopher S. German

(public domain)

In this issue: “One War at a Time”: Abraham Lincoln’s Latin American Foreign Policy

by Jason H. Silverman

Casablanca’s Hotel Lincoln: The Moroccan Legacy

by Michael R. Hall

Lincoln’s Legacy in West Central Africa: The Case of Burkina Faso

by Fatimah Smith and Navdeep Singh

VV

Abraham Lincoln Advisory Board

Teresa Leporace, Argentina Henry R. Abraham, University of Virginia

Patricia Moral, Lincoln College, Lincoln, Argentina A.B. Assensoh, Indiana Univ.-Bloomington Sarker Hasan Al Zayed, Univ. of Liberal Arts, Bangladesh Ronald J. Byrd, LSU in Shreveport (Emeritus)

Yvette Alex-Assensoh, Indiana Univ.-Bloomington Shiyi Chen, San Francisco, CA

Shahab Ghobadi, Kurdistan, Iran Sura P. Rath, Univ. of North Texas-Dallas

Rita Uotila, Finland Robert P. Watson, Lynn University

Bettina Hofman, Germany Frank J. Williams, The Lincoln Forum Balaji Ranganathan, Ahmedabad, India Douglas E. Saffel, Texarkana College Jyotirmaya Tripathy, India Helen C. Taylor, UK

M. Ranjendra Pandian, Madurai, India Alexander Mikberidze, Republic of Georgia

Prafulla C. Kar, Baroda, India Alvaro Rodriquez, Alvarez, Spain

Stefano Luconi, Univ. of Florence & Pisa, Italy Burris M. Carnahan, McLean,, Virginia

Sunil K. Sarangi, India Amiya Bhaumik, Malaysia

“For years I attempted to work out the theoretical underpinnings of an ideal U.S.

foreign policy. I found it difficult to advance much beyond Abraham Lincoln’s hope that

our country would be not the terror but the encourager of the world . . .”

Henry S Reuss, When Government Was Good: Memories of a Life in Politics

Copyright by the International Lincoln Association. All members of the ILA receive Abraham Lincoln Abroad as a part of their regular services. Individual copies are available for $10.00 each. ISSN: 1522-1326.

Founded in 1987, Abraham Lincoln Abroad is the annual publication of the International Lincoln Association (ILA), www.http://internationallincolnassociation. The ILA promotes the democratic leadership of Abraham Lincoln, as well as information about his life and values (peace, justice, and prosperity). It encourages the worldwide study of his legacy, especially in schools, through lectures, symposia and conferences, as well as publications. For further information, please contact:

William D. Pederson, co-editor Jason Silverman, co-editor Donna F. Byrd, co-editor

International Lincoln Center, LSU Shreveport, One University Place, 321 BH

Shreveport, Louisiana 71115-2301

“Mexican affairs have suddenly come to be very interesting to the Black

[Lincoln’s] Administration,” was the confidential comment John Forsyth, former U.S.

minister to Mexico, sent to his Confederate colleagues from the last gasp

Washington Peace Conference in late March of 1861. Earlier that month President

Lincoln, while considering diplomatic appointments for England, France, Mexico,

and Spain, had written, “We need to have these points guarded as strongly and

quickly as possible.” Indeed, Mexico might become the most important foreign

post, editorialized the New York Tribune, since it would counteract “the filibustering

projects of the Southern Confederacy.” For the significant Mexican appointment

Lincoln chose Thomas Corwin, a rabid anti-expansionist, after being informed by

Secretary of State William Seward that the post was “perhaps the most interesting

and important one within the whole circle of our international relations.” With that,

the new president launched his foreign policy toward Latin America.

The Mexican diplomatic assignment was the climax to Corwin’s long,

distinguished career. Formerly a member of Congress, governor of Ohio, United

States senator and, secretary of the treasury in Millard Fillmore’s cabinet, Corwin’s

oratory was so influential that it often shaped public sentiment. So powerful was his

opposition to the United States war against Mexico that he declared in the U.S.

Senate his hope that the Mexicans would receive the invading armies “with bloody

hands and hospitable graves.” For this statement he was hanged in effigy even by

members of his own party.

Lincoln instructed the new minister to do all that he could to combat the

Confederate influence in Mexico. He was to block Confederate attempts to gain

diplomatic recognition from Mexico, warning against any aggressive plans of the

Confederacy, especially attacks from California and Texas. This he accomplished

within a few months and with little difficulty. His second assignment was to initiate

Lincoln’s new Latin American policy which was intended primarily to mitigate the

previous administrations’ overzealous demands in regard to the American

acquisition of Mexican land and the claims of loss of lives and property of United

States citizens. In view of the threatened intervention of European monarchies,

Corwin was to give assurances to Mexican President Benito Juarez that the United

“One War at a Time”: Abraham Lincoln’s Latin American Foreign Policy

by

Jason H. Silverman

States desired Mexico to “retain its complete integrity and independence,” and

form of republican government. At the Mexican capital he readily made friends

with Mexican officials for whose problems he had both understanding and

sympathy. “In the last forty years Mexico has passed through thirty-six different forms

of government, has had...seventy-three Presidents,” Corwin wrote Secretary of

State Seward, “Still I do not despair of the final triumph of free government...The

signs of regeneration, though few, are still visible. Had the present liberal party

enough money at its command to pay an army of 10,000 men, I am satisfied it

could suppress the present opposition; restore order and preserve internal peace...I

am persuaded the pecuniary resources to effect these objects at this time must

come from abroad. This country is exhausted...by forty years of almost

uninterrupted civil war.”

By July 1861, Corwin received “positive assurance...that...the [Juarez

government] will not entertain any proposition” leading to recognition of the

Confederacy. Rumors rapidly spread that the Confederates were already referring

to the Gulf of Mexico as “Confederate Lake.” And Corwin added that “well-

informed Mexicans in and out of the Government seem to be well aware that the

independence of a Southern Confederacy would be the signal for a war of

conquest with a view to establishing slavery in each of the twenty-two states of this

Republic.” Corwin had been at his post for little more than a month when John T.

Pickett, the Confederacy’s diplomatic agent, landed at Veracruz.

Pickett’s mission had originated in March of 1861 while he was serving as

secretary to the Confederate Peace Commissioners at the last ditch Washington

Peace Conference. One of the commissioners, John Forsyth, recommended Pickett

as one possessing a “thorough knowledge of Mexican character,” who knew the

leaders and was “eminently suitable for a position so delicate and important.” This

endorsement, however, was premature and misplaced. Indeed, Pickett was

tactless and far from exemplary in his conduct, alternating between threatening

language and unauthorized hints of bestowing patronage.

Pickett soon reported to the Confederate government that, in his opinion,

there would be no stability in the Mexican government as long as the country was

governed by Mexicans; only foreign intervention would bring about peace. The

Confederacy demanded that Mexico observe the strictest neutrality in the

American Civil War and Pickett was instructed to use all means at his disposal “to

match the proceedings of...and to counteract” the Lincoln administration.

Pickett informed his superiors that Mexico supported the Confederacy

because slavery was similar to Mexican peonage, and the South was sincere in

comparison with Northern hypocrisy. Such was the sympathy between Southerners

and Mexicans that, if secession did not result in the independence of the South,

“hundreds of thousands” of her sons would emigrate “with their goods and chattels

(as did the children of Israel) to some convenient and attractive [Mexican]

Promised Land.”

The situation changed dramatically when Pickett learned that the Juarez

government had given the Union permission to march troops from Guaymas, on

the Gulf of California, to Arizona, in order to protect Arizona from a suspected

Confederate advance. In a shrewd move to undercut the Lincoln administration,

Pickett promised the Mexican government “proposals for the retrocession to

Mexico of a large portion of the territory hitherto acquired from her by the United

States” (i.e. California, New Mexico territory, Arizona territory, and all other land

obtained in the Mexican American War).

Nevertheless, by the early Fall of 1861, Mexico regarded the Confederacy

with unmitigated suspicion. Pickett blamed Corwin and the Lincoln administration

for creating this distrust. President Lincoln knew that Mexico’s immediate dangers

were not from the Confederacy; rather, it was her empty treasury, her continued

internal unrest, and the demands of European powers. Money was the lifeline of

the Juarez government, and Lincoln was Mexico’s only prospect of getting it. As a

South Carolinian wrote from Mexico to the Confederate government in Richmond,

the Mexicans believed that men, money, and arms would be “lavishly supplied” by

the United States in support of the national integrity of Mexico and of the Monroe

Doctrine.

It was not long before Pickett reluctantly conceded that the Confederacy

had “few or no friends” in Mexico. He had been arrested for disorderly conduct in a

bar and his “confidential” reports to Richmond with many unflattering remarks

about Mexico had been intercepted in New Orleans and shared with the Juarez

government. His mission to Mexico was relegated to utter failure.

As danger from the Confederacy declined, the Lincoln administration turned

its attention to the larger problem of European intervention in Mexico. Lincoln could

not spare any military assistance to Mexico as his own domestic war clouds were

getting darker and more ominous. Thus the only recourse for Lincoln to assist Mexico

was money from loans, which would be effective only if England, France, and

Spain agreed to settle peacefully their claims to Mexico.

With this is mind Corwin recommended to Lincoln that the United States lend

Mexico an amount not exceeding $10,000,000 to $12,000,000, payable in

installments. In return the United States might receive Baja California, thought to be

in danger of seizure by the Confederates, or, alternatively, a tariff reduction on

imports. Such an arrangement would be unpopular in both countries, Lincoln

realized, remembering vividly his own opposition to the acquisition of Mexican

territory during his one term in Congress. Corwin anticipated that England and

France intended to intimidate Mexico or, worse yet, intervene militarily. “Europe is

quite willing to see us humbled,” Corwin wrote, “and will not fail to take advantage

of our embarrassment to execute purposes of which she would not have dreamed

had we remained at peace.” Corwin concluded that President Juarez and his

republican government, if given financial aid, could withstand any foreign

intervention in their country. Only from the United States could such aid come. At

the same time that Lincoln was seeking to assist Mexico, the Mexican Congress

suspended interest payments on debts and claims owed England, France, and

Spain. Corwin quickly proposed that the United States pay Mexico’s suspended

interest obligations, taking as security the mining rights of the northern states of

Mexico. The American loan, then, would be specifically designed to assist the

Mexican debt settlement. For the United States to pay debts other than her own

was an unprecedented move and it was highly unlikely that England and France

would permit the United States to pay Mexican debts and thereby gain further

influence in that country.

To Lincoln, and to his own Mexican countrymen, the youthful Mexican

diplomat, Matias Romero argued futilely in behalf of a general loan to his country.

But Mexican Foreign Minister, Manuel María Eutimio de Zamacona refused to

consider the price: “It is inconceivable,” he declared, “that this government would

make agreement about the sale of territory...or mortgage the wealth of

undeveloped lands...which would foreshadow any danger to our nationality.” Both

Lincoln and Seward convinced Romero that, the Monroe Doctrine notwithstanding,

a loan to Mexico would never by approved by either the Department of State or

the Senate if the money were used to make war on other powers, especially in the

midst of an American Civil War. This would risk an international crisis and, as Lincoln

said repeatedly, “one war at a time.”

If a general loan to Mexico was not feasible, then perhaps one earmarked to

meet the interest payments on the Mexican debts might work, Lincoln was advised.

Thus on August 24, 1861, Lincoln and Seward gave Corwin permission to pursue

such negotiations. Corwin was authorized to frame a treaty by which the United

States would pay, “over a period of five years, the interest of 3 percent on Mexico’s

funded foreign debt. Repayment would bear 6 percent interest and the loan would

be secured public lands and mineral rights in the northern states of Mexico.” The

treaty was not to be signed until and unless Britain, France, and Spain agreed not

to make reprisals. By the following month, the proposed American treaty with

Mexico became well known in London and Paris. Charles Francis Adams, U.S.

minister to London brought the question to the attention of British Foreign Secretary

Lord John Russell and informed Russell that the United States was disturbed by

rumors of interference in Mexico and the possibility of the creation of a new

Mexican government by foreign intervention. Adams insisted that it would be much

better if the threatened use of force by the European powers were prevented by

an agreement whereby the United States guaranteed, for a specified period,

interest payments on Mexican debts.

Despite their initial reluctance, Lincoln and Seward recognized the veracity in

the proposal to pay Mexican interest payments. But, much to Lincoln’s chagrin,

when the resolution endorsing the project of a loan was brought to the floor of the

U.S. Senate it was decisively rejected, and instead an opposing resolution was

adopted declaring that it was not advisable to negotiate a treaty that would

require the United States to assume any portion of the principal or interest of the

debt of Mexico, or that would require the concurrence of foreign powers. Despite

Lincoln’s lobbying, the Senate would not approve any loan that would drain

money from Civil War expenditures.

Lincoln regarded European intervention in Mexico as only slightly less ominous

than the rebellion at home. An aggressive Britain, France, and Spain might start a

war which could result in the complete subjugation of Mexico. If that took place

and the Confederacy prevailed, the outcome could once again be a return “of

the American continent under European domination.” As 1861 faded, Abraham

Lincoln watched with grim uncertainty the unfolding situation in Mexico.

Mexico was rapidly becoming one of the most compelling elements of the

Lincoln Latin American foreign policy. The foreign policy toward Latin America

established in Mexico by Lincoln, continued by his successor, President Andrew

Johnson, and administered throughout both administrations by Secretary of State

Seward, was gradually applied to the other Latin American republics.

As was the situation in Mexico, advocates of monarchy in most of the Latin

American countries were from conservative and clerical groups. These groups

came from deeply rooted positions of power and wealth which had “suffered

disastrously...under the republican form of government.” In dire terms, Friedrich

Hassaurek, American minister to Ecuador, reported such to President Lincoln. “We

must either...be swallowed up in the end by the Anglo-Saxon race or follow the

example of the French in Mexico...bad...as foreign intervention may be, it is our last

and our only hope.” Prior to the Lincoln administration, the American State

Department had so relentlessly persisted in pro-annexationist claims as to alienate

and anger the Latin American nations. As Manifest Destiny spawned aggressive

expansionists who professed that Anglo-American dominance was a heaven-sent

process ordained by God, Latin American resentment, fear, and hatred were

intensified.

Despite being consumed by his own war, Lincoln realized that the American

relationship with Latin America must be repaired and improved. That attitude was

shared by the Mexican diplomat Matias Romero. “Before the [U.S.] Civil War

commenced,” Romero wrote, “it appeared that…[the United States] was the only

enemy...because [its] usurping policy had deprived us of half our territory and [was]

a constant menace….Nothing, therefore, was more natural than to see with

pleasure...a division which...would render [America] almost impotent against us….

[However] We [now] find ourselves [facing] the hard alternative of sacrificing our

territory and our nationality at the hands of…[the United States] or our liberty and

our independence before the despotic thrones of Europe. The second danger is

immediate and more imminent….”

Lincoln’s plans were intended to rectify the mistakes of the past and to

eschew the traditional American expansionist pressure on Latin America and

create a new foundation of mutual understanding and self-respect. Toward that

end, Lincoln’s instructions to American diplomats in Spanish America constituted

“an emotionally earnest crusade for the survival of free institutions.” This included

the condemnation of slavery, long abolished in free Spanish America, and the

vigorous defense of human and natural rights. Lincoln drew sharp distinctions

between the Confederacy which he described as composed of filibusterers and

expansionists, intent on the spread of slavery into Latin America with its ultimate

intention of overthrowing legally constituted governments. Ever the successful and

compelling trial lawyer, Lincoln also indicted Confederate policies by linking them

closely with the aggressive foreign policies of French and Spanish imperialism

directed toward the Latin American nations. This vastly departed from Lincoln’s

predecessors, and along with Secretary of State Seward, he assured the Spanish

American republics that the “United States was one powerful defender of

republicanism against monarchy and Old World interference and, therefore, the

protector of all sovereignty in the Western Hemisphere.”

Although lost in the myriad of his domestic woes and his concerns that

European nations would interfere in the American Civil War, Lincoln was a quiet, yet

staunch, defender of the Monroe Doctrine. And, while his foreign policy initiatives

were obviously designed to preserve the Union, Lincoln never took his eye off

European encroachments elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere and sought to

stop them wherever they existed. He was truly, as one historian wrote many years

ago, a perceptive, compassionate, and unpretentious “diplomat in carpet

slippers.”

Jason H. Silverman is the Ellison Capers Palmer Jr. Professor of History Emeritus at

Winthrop University and author, most recently, of Lincoln and the Immigrant. He is

the co-editor of Abraham Lincoln Abroad.

With almost seven million people, metropolitan Casablanca is Morocco’s

largest city and the commercial center of the nation. First established by Berber

tribesmen in the tenth century BC, the city was initially called Anfa (the top) in their

language. After the Roman Empire conquered the region in 15 BC, the city was

known as Anfus for three centuries. Following the capture of the city by the

Portuguese Empire during the fifteenth century, they renamed the city Casa

Branca (white house) because of the proliferation of white-washed houses in the

port town. The present name is the Spanish version of Casa Branca, which took

place during the period of unification of the Spanish and Portuguese monarchies

(1580-1640). During the period of French colonial domination (1912-1956), known as

the Protectorate, the name remained Casablanca.

Initially a small trading post, the town’s population began to grow during the

nineteenth century. Local merchants exported wool to the British textile industry

while the British merchants sold gunpowder tea to the Moroccans. Anyone who has

visited Morocco knows of the Moroccan penchant for mint tea. Between 1850 and

1900, Casablanca’s population increased from roughly 5,000 to 10,000 residents. In

1904, France and Spain carved out zones of influence in Morocco. The Treaty of Fez

(1912) officially made a large portion of Morocco, including Casablanca, a

protectorate of France, which triggered massive immigration (both European and

Moroccan) to the region. By 1920, there were 110,000 residents in Casablanca.

French plans for a Moroccan railway based in Casablanca were unveiled in

1907. The main railway station in Casablanca, known as Casa Voyageurs today, is

currently Morocco’s largest railway hub, serving direct trains throughout Morocco.

The rail station was completed in 1923 by a private French corporation, the

Compagnie des Chemins de fer du Maroc (CFM). To connect the railway station to

the coast, the French colonial government had built a grand boulevard, the

Boulevard de la Gare, in 1915, which was later renamed the Boulevard

Mohammed V in honor of Morocco’s first king after independence was restored in

1956. French colonial administrators and private investors envisioned a vast

commercial network would line the boulevard. In 2002, Casablanca’s first electric

tramway was constructed along the boulevard.

Casablanca’s Hotel Lincoln: The Moroccan Legacy

by

Michael R. Hall

The first building to be built along the newly-constructed Boulevard de la Gare was

the Hotel Lincoln. At the beginning of the twentieth century, there were only three

small hotels in Casablanca. Businessmen and tourists needed a comfortable place

to lodge. The beautiful Art Deco building crowned by a spectacular canopy of

green tiles, was one of the most prominent symbols of the French colonial era in

Casablanca and served as the template for dozens of subsequent Art Deco

buildings along the boulevard. Completed in 1917, the Hotel Lincoln occupied the

western façade (facing the boulevard) of a mixed commercial property known as

Immeuble Bessoneau that covered a surface area of more than 3,000 square

meters. Designed by French architect Hubert Bride (born in 1889 in Rennes), the

hotel was initially to be called the Grand Hotel Moderne, but the name was

changed after the United States joined England and France in their struggle against

the Central Powers during World War I. During World War I, the Hotel Lincoln housed

American spies when it served as the headquarters of the U.S. Office of Strategic

Services (OSS). The Casablanca Conference, attended by U.S. president Franklin D.

Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and France’s Charles de Gaulle

was held at the nearby Anfa Hotel. Over time, the owners of the hotel allowed the

building to deteriorate. In 1989, one of the hotel’s terraces collapsed, killing two

people. As a result, the hotel closed and the building was abandoned. The

building’s owner, who was forbidden from legally demolishing the building,

encouraged homeless squatters to live in the building, hopeful that they would

hasten the building’s total collapse. Two more homeless people have subsequently

died in the ruin, one in 2004 and one in 2015.

In 2000, one of the first acts of King Muhammed VI’s government was to

declare the Hotel Lincoln an historic monument. In 2001, the Hotel Lincoln served as

the back-drop scene of a bombed-out Beirut in the film Spy Game. In December

2017, while attending the 35th annual conference of the Association of Global

South Studies (AGSS) in Marrakesh, Dr. William Pederson and I had the opportunity

to visit the Hotel Lincoln’s ruins. Surrounded by scaffolding and protective metal

wall, the building awaits its restoration.

Michael R. Hall is professor of history at Georgia Southern University

Hotel Lincoln in 1917, Casablanca Morocco

Ruins of Hotel Lincoln, Casablanca, Morocco

Ruins of Hotel Lincoln, Casablanca, Morocco

Michael R. Hall and William D. Pederson

Site of Hotel Lincoln, Casablanca, Morocco

As a small landlocked country in West Africa, Burkina Faso evaporated during

the first half of the twentieth century after being divided among Cote d’Ivoire,

French Sudan, and Niger. It then faced tension as a French colony between ties to

its European colonizers and the desire for independence. Better known African

independence leaders emerged such as Léopold Sédor Senghor in Senegal, Felix

Hauphouët-Boigny in Ivory Coast, and Kwame Nkrumah in the Gold Coast (modern

Ghana). It is a wonder that in such situation that there would be room for the

legacy from a short-term mid-nineteenth century president. The irony is that the

persistence of that legacy has continued to evolve while West Central Africa has

experienced multiple coups.

Figure 1

Map of Burkina Faso

Lincoln’s Legacy in West Central Africa: The Case of Burkina Faso

by

Fatimah Smith and Navdeep Singh

For purpose of analysis and discussion, this paper is divided into three

sections: (1) the context of former French colonies in Africa making the transition to

democracy, just as France itself was trying to transition from an empire to a modern

democratic nation; (2) how sub-Sahara colonies in West Central Africa at the same

time were making a transition to independence; (3) the use of a philatelic index to

show how Burkina Faso has identified with the Great Emancipator since he defined

in both words and actions what it means to be a democratic nation; and a

conclusion suggesting overall Nelson Mandela has come closest to achieving a

model of democratic leadership in Africa.

It may surprise many but France is the only nation in Europe to contain

Lincoln’s definition of democratic government in its constitution. That feat was not

accomplished until immediately after World War II. Like Louisiana in the United

States, it took France ten previous attempts to arrive at a democratic constitution

and finally one that “got it right” with Lincoln. This was largely the result from work

the French left which first accomplished it in 1946, and again in 1958, with its current

constitution. The executive branch was strengthened to fit the needs of Charles de

Gaulle (French president from 1945-46 and 1958-60); he kept Lincoln’s definition of

democratic government. Though the pull of a colonial empire remained strong, de

Gaulle’s leadership was necessary in finally ending it when given a choice; the

French colonies in Africa opted for independence in 1960. Yet even with

independence, several of its former colonies echoed Lincoln’s words from the 1947

and 1958 French Constitution.

When other French colonies opted for independence in Western Africa in

1960, five of them bordered land-locked Burkina Faso (Upper Volta) and nearby

Senegal, as well as Ghana (Gold Coast) which first had achieved independence

from the British in 1957, in Sub-Sahara Africa.1 In comparison to these other new

nations, Burkina Faso was at a leadership disadvantage due to the fact that

Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana had a three year head start. He would promote his pan

-African mantra while Senegal’s founding president, Léopold-Sédar Senghor (b.

1906), had established himself decades before as one of Africa’s leading poets

known for his cultural philosophy of negritude combining sub-Sahara African values

with political socialism. Similarly, in the adjacent Ivory Coast Felix Houphouet-Boigny

(1905-1993) was a larger than life figure.

Figure 2

Presidents of Upper Volta/Burkina Faso

*Between 2014-15, six individuals claimed to be president

In contrast to these figures in West Central Africa, Burkina Faso’s (Upper Volta)

first president was an accidental one following Quezzin Coulibaly’s death three

months before independence. Maurice Yaméogo (b. 1921) was a skilled speaker

but was only 39 years of age when he became president. He quickly and

unexpectedly jettisoned the Mali Federation advocated by the better known poet-

president of Senegal, Léopold Sengher (b. 1906). And then just as quickly Yaméogo

eliminated the parliamentary opposition and turned his new nation into a

dictatorship. He envied the bordering president of the Ivory Coast, Felix Houpouët-

Boigny (b. 1905) who would build the largest Catholic cathedral in Africa before his

death.

Yaméogo, who had a twin sister, attended Catholic missionary school.

Originally, he intended to become a priest but by his teenage years he left the

seminary without graduating after discovering partying and women. Eventually, he

married his mistress who became his second wife. She was nearly half his age and

was a former Miss Ivory.2 Although not legally divorced from his first wife, the

marriage occurred on October 17, 1965 in which Felix Houphouët-Boigny served as

a groomsmen. Afterwards, the new couple went on an enormously expensive

honeymoon in Paris and Latin America. Unsurprisingly, Yaméogo’s new marriage

Name Tenure Birth/Death

Maurice Yamégo 1960-1966 1921-1993

Sangoulé Lamizana 1966-1980 1916-2005

Saye Zerbo 1980-1982 1932-2013

Jean-Baptiste Ouédrago 1982-1983 1941-

Thomas Sankara 1984-1987 1949-1987

Blaise Compaoré 1987-2014* 1951-

Roch Marc Christian Kaboré 2015- 1957-

angered many people, including important politicians whose support he needed.3

Prior to his second marriage, he had become the first African head of state

to visit Israel in June 1961, and was also invited to the White House four years later.

During the American trip, Yaméogo also used the trip as a way to learn better

farming techniques for his country.4 He specifically visited Washington, D.C. where

he was photographed in front of the Lincoln Memorial along with Lyndon B.

Johnson (see Figure 3). As an avid Lincoln fan, in November 1965, Yamégo would

issue the first stamp from his country with the image of the Great Emancipator on it

(see Figure 4).

Figure 3. Photo of Maurice Yameogo and LBJ in front of the Lincoln Memorial (page 13, Freeport Journal-

Standard from Freeport, Illinois. Issue Date: Monday, April 5. Accessed May 11, 2017.)

Figure 4. First Lincoln stamp issued. Centennial Observation of the Lincoln Association

3 November 1965

Scott. No. 144

International Lincoln Center Collection

Due to his ineffective presidency, Yameogo was overthrown in a military

coup during a time of great unrest among the people of the country. As a result,

this would begin the long era of military rule in Upper Volta (renamed Burkina

Faso).5 In 1966, Yameogo’s successor was Sangoulé Lamizana.6 He would initially

rule the country as a military dictator but returned Upper Volta to a constitutional

rule in 1970.7 The most important Lincoln contribution during his reign was the

adoption of the French Constitution preamble to the new constitution of Upper

Volta. After ten attempts the French finally “got right” with Lincoln borrowing his

definition of a democratic government, and putting for the first time the phrase

“government of the people, by the people and for the people” into their 1947

Constitution.8 Moreover, President Lamizana would also issue the second stamp

with Lincoln on it in May 1970 (see Figure 5).

After returning Upper Volta into a more civilian kind of government,

President Lamizana was faced with many economical problems.9 A severe drought

in the Sahel exacerbated tensions among Lamizana and his political enemies.10 By

the end of the 1970s, the country relied heavily on foreign aid which made up a full

70% of their budget.11 As a result, powerful trade unions and other key civil groups

persistently made attempts to overthrow the Lamizana government which caused

him to revert to the same mechanisms that former President Maurice Yameogo

had used.12 In the end, he would be overthrown by a military veteran, Sayo Zerbo.

Unexpectedly, the thirty-one member junta would have among its members two

future presidents. Thomas Sankara and Blaise Compaoré.13

Figure 5. New Universal Postal Union Building in Switzerland

20 May 1970

Scott No. 220-221

After years of ineffective government and political instability, another

approach was taken. Captain Thomas Sankara became president in 1984 after

leading a coup against Jean Baptiste Ouédrago.14 Unlike his predecessors, Sankara

tried the Marxist option. As a young ideological Marxist, Sankara upended the

traditional approaches taken by former leaders. For example, after new African

leaders had replaced the colonizer they opted to live exactly like the colonizer by

isolating them from the rest of society.15 During his presidency, Sankara in his

youthful ambition actually attempted to clean up corruption that had begun

officially under former President Yameogo. As part of Sankara’s new approach to

government, he officially changed the name of Upper Volta to Burkina Faso in the

hope of increasing national unity and he actually mingled with the commoners,

unlike his predecessors. For example, he got rid of the government’s expensive cars,

the Mercedes, in exchange for the cheapest car, the Renault 5. In tune with Marx’s

favorable view of Lincoln for having ended American slavery, Sankara issued the

third stamp of the Great Emancipator in May 1984.

Figure 6. One of 8 stamps of famous men worldwide

21 May 1984

Scott No. C 299

*Incorrect birthdate

Yet, also similar to his predecessors, a mere three years later Sankara would

be overthrown by another faction in the military led by a close friend, Blaise

Compaoré. Although Compaoré became one of Burkina Faso’s longest serving

presidents, he was also overthrown in 2014 after an attempt to change the

constitution in order to extend his term.16 As a result, finally Roch Christian Kaboré

became the president after numerous short-term interim leaders in the 2015

election.17 Unlike his predecessors, Kaboré became the first civilian president who

did not have any past ties to the military in forty-nine years.

One should not be too harsh judging ex-colonies in Africa. It took the French

ten times to come up with a workable constitution after the French Revolution. At

least Burkina Faso had persistently identified with Abraham Lincoln and his definition

of a democratic government. French colonialism allowed for political equality in

theory but not in practice. Nonetheless, the people in Burkina Faso and even its

leaders to a limit have highlighted Lincoln’s democratic values. Although the

country has been long overshadowed by larger than life neighboring and nearby

nations, such as Ghana, the Ivory Coast, and Senegal, Burkina Faso continues to try

to find a successful leader with genuine democratic values.

Fatimah Smith and Navdeep Singh are research associates in the International

Lincoln Center for American Studies.

Endnotes

1. Mensah, Eric Opoku. “Past Africanism and Civil Religious Performance: Kwame Nkrumah and the

Independence of Ghana.” Journal of Pan African Studies, no. 4:47. Literature Resource Center.

EBSCOhost, 2016. (Accessed December 14, 2017) 49.

2. Williams, Justin C. 2014. “New Africa in the World Coming to Harlem: A Retrospective

Comparison of Jerry Rawlings and Thomas Sankara.” Journal of Pan African Studies, no. 7:7.

Literature Resource Center. EBSCOhost. (Accessed December 12, 2017). 10.

3. Ibid.

4. (page 13, Freeport Journal-Standard from Freeport, Illinois. Issue Date: Monday, April 5, 1965.

Accessed May 11, 2017).

5. Rupley, Lawrence; Bangali, Lamissa; Diamitani, Boureima, Historical Dictionary of Burkina Faso.

(Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2013) 44-47.

6. Williams, Justin C. “New Africa in the World Coming to Harlem: A Retrospective Comparison of

Jerry Rawlings and Thomas Sankara.” Journal of Pan African Studies, no. 7:7. Literature Resource

Center, EBSCOhost, 2014. (Accessed December 12, 2017) 10.

7. Ibid.

8. ps://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/France_2008.pdf?lang=en (Accessed November

11, 2017).

9. Williams, Justin C. 2014. “New Africa in the World Coming to Harlem: A Retrospective

Comparison of Jerry Rawlings and Thomas Sankara.” 10.

10. Lawrence; Bangali, Lamissa; Diamitani, Boureima. Historical Dictionary of Burkina Faso. (Lanham:

Scarecrow Press, 2013). 44-47.

11. Ibid.

12. Williams, Justin C. 2014. “New Africa in the World Coming to Harlem: A Retrospective

Comparison of Jerry Rawlings and Thomas Sankara.” 10.

13. Ciment, James; Hill, Kenneth, eds. Encyclopedia of Conflicts Since World War II. (London:

Routledge, 2012).

14. Williams, Justin C. 2014. “New Africa in the World Coming to Harlem: A Retrospective

Comparison of Jerry Rawlings and Thomas Sankara.” 13.

15. Harsch, Ernest. Thomas Sankara: An African Revolutionary. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press,

2014. eBook Collection (EBSCOhost), EBSCOost. (Accessed December 12, 2017). 18.

16. https://www.newstatesman.com/world-affairs/2014/11/exiled-strongman-tricky-legacy-compaor

(Accessed November 11, 2017).

17. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/12/burkina-faso-elects-leader-historic-election-

151201033702594.html (November 11, 2017),