This article was downloaded by: [University of North Carolina]On: 11 November 2014, At: 08:16Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number:1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street,London W1T 3JH, UK

South African Journal ofPhilosophyPublication details, including instructions forauthors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rsph20

Virtue Theory and AppliedEthicsLiezi van Zylaa Department of Philosophy, University ofWaikato, Private Bag 3105, Hamilton New ZealandE-mail:Published online: 28 Oct 2013.

To cite this article: Liezi van Zyl (2002) Virtue Theory and Applied Ethics, SouthAfrican Journal of Philosophy, 21:2, 133-143

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/sajpem.v21i2.31341

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of allthe information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on ourplatform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensorsmake no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy,completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views ofthe authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis.The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should beindependently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor andFrancis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings,demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever

or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, inrelation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private studypurposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution,reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of accessand use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

orth

Car

olin

a] a

t 08:

16 1

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

Virtue Theory and Applied Ethics

Liezl van ZylDe part ment of Phi los o phy, Uni ver sity of Waikato, Pri vate Bag 3105, Ham il ton

New Zea landE-mail: <liezl@waikato.ac.nz>

Ab stractCritics of vir tue eth ics have ar gued that its fo cus on char ac ter rather than ac tion,as well as its re jec tion of uni ver sal rules of right ac tion ren ders vir tue eth ics un -able to shed much light on the ques tion of what ought and ought not to be donein spe cific sit u a tions. Ac cord ing to them, this ex plains why so few at temptshave been made to ap ply vir tue the ory to spe cific moral ques tions. In this pa perI aim to go some way to wards de vel op ing a ver sion of vir tue the ory that sat is fies four con straints that ap plied eth ics places upon moral the ory, namely that itshould: (1) pres ent stan dards of right ac tion; (2) show a sen si tiv ity to the com -plex ity of moral life in multi cul tural and plu ral is tic so ci et ies; (3) ac cept the prin -ci ple of universalisability as a nec es sary prop erty of an eth i cal the ory, and (4)pro vide a non-egoistic jus ti fi ca tion and ex pla na tion of uni ver sal rules and prin -ci ples.

IntroductionOne of the most sig nif i cant de vel op ments in eth i cal the ory over the past few de cadeshas been the re vival of vir tue eth ics. This oc curred mainly as a re sponse to the per -ceived in ad e quacy of the at tempt by deontological and consequentialist the o ries to dis -cover uni ver sal rules and prin ci ples that can be ap plied to spe cific is sues to ren der thecor rect an swer to a moral di lemma. In turn, crit ics of vir tue eth ics have ar gued that itsre jec tion of uni ver sal rules of right ac tion ren ders vir tue eth ics un able to shed muchlight on the ques tion of what ought and ought not to be done in spe cific sit u a tions.This short com ing is seen as re sid ing in the very struc ture of vir tue eth ics, which is said to con cern it self pri mar ily with char ac ter rather than ac tion. Very few at tempts havebeen made to ap ply vir tue eth ics to spe cific moral is sues. Ros a lind Hursthouse’s workon abor tion (1987 and 1991) and Philippa Foot’s pa per on eu tha na sia (1977) areamong the few ex cep tions. This, ac cord ing to Rob ert Louden, only serves to sup portthe ob jec tion that vir tue eth ics is “par tic u larly weak in the ar eas of ca su istry and ap -plied eth ics”. In his view, the in creas ing im por tance of ap plied eth ics and ca su istry incon tem po rary so ci ety is a “strike against the move to re vive vir tue eth ics” (Louden1984: 229, 230).

In this pa per I aim to de velop a ver sion of vir tue the ory that sat is fies cer tain con -straints that ap plied eth ics places upon moral the ory. The first of these is the re quire -ment that an eth i cal the ory, if it is to be of any use for ap plied or prac ti cal pur poses,must pres ent stan dards of right and good ac tion. That is, it has to tell us some thingabout what we ought to do and not only about what kind of char ac ter traits we ought to ac quire. Sec ondly, the rise of ap plied eth ics has called for the o ries that in cor po rate asen si tiv ity to the com plex ity of moral life and that are suf fi ciently flex i ble to deal with

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

orth

Car

olin

a] a

t 08:

16 1

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

the dif fer ences in re li gious be lief, cul ture and tra di tion that we come across when deal -ing with par tic u lar cases. Many writ ers con sider the strength of Ar is to te lian eth ics,with its em pha sis on prac ti cal wis dom, as re sid ing in its abil ity to pro vide sit u a -tion-specific and lo cal so lu tions to moral di lem mas. Whereas this re quire ment is of tenseen as ne ces si tat ing a re jec tion of uni ver sal moral rules and prin ci ples, most ethicistsac cept that universalisability is a nec es sary prop erty of any eth i cal the ory. For ex am -ple, Rob ert Heeger (1993), while grant ing that ap plied eth ics has to ana lyse and eval u -ate in di vid ual cases, con vinc ingly ar gues that even the con text-related de ci sions ofprac ti cal wis dom should be com pre hen si ble and pos si ble to du pli cate, that is, theyshould be sup ported by rea sons. As soon as rea sons are to be given for par tic u lar de ci -sions, then in ev i ta bly also gen eral points of view un der lie them, and these gen eralpoints of view can be ex pressed as uni ver sal moral rules and prin ci ples.1 If a moralthe ory is to give any guid ance in ev ery day de ci sion-making, it needs to iden tify cer tain kinds of ac tions or prac tices as right or wrong, given a cer tain set of cir cum stances, in -stead of vaguely as sert ing that a per son will be able to make the ap pro pri ate de ci sion if he or she pos sessed the vir tue of prac ti cal wis dom. This is the third re quire ment. A fi -nal re quire ment is that an eth i cal the ory has to pro vide a non-egoistic jus ti fi ca tion andex pla na tion of uni ver sal rules and prin ci ples, thus ac count ing for our in tu ition that alife strat egy can not be char ac ter ised as truly moral if its fi nal jus ti fi ca tion is sim plythat it fur thers the best in ter ests of the agent. This pres ents a prob lem for Aris to teliansin so far as their an swer to the ques tion “Why be moral?” is that one should ac quire and prac tice the vir tues if one wants to flour ish or live well. Hence they are un able to ac -count for our ob li ga tions to wards other peo ple in a non-egoistic fash ion. I shall dealwith each of these re quire ments in turn.

Character and actionThe ob jec tion that vir tue eth ics can not tell us much about what we ought to do, rests in part on a char ac teri sa tion of vir tue eth ics as con cerned with char ac ter rather than ac -tion. In this view held by crit ics2 as well as pro po nents3 of vir tue eth ics, vir tue andduty are pre sented as com pet i tors; we must choose be tween schemes that eval u atechar ac ter and ones that eval u ate ac tion. For in stance, in his well-known pa per on thevices of vir tue eth ics, Rob ert Louden ar gues that vir tue eth ics is struc tur ally un able tosay much about what we should do in par tic u lar sit u a tions be cause it fo cuses on theques tion “What sort of per son should I be?” rather than “What ought I to do?”(1984:229). How ever, this char ac teri sa tion of vir tue eth ics as con cerned with “be ing”and not with “do ing” is mis taken. To be vir tu ous is to act vir tu ously, and the vir tueeth i cist’s con cern with char ac ter is at the same time a con cern with ac tion. ThusHursthouse ar gues that vir tue eth ics, like deontological and consequentialist the o ries,be gins with a spec i fi ca tion of right ac tion: (P1) An ac tion is right iff it is what a vir tu ous agent would do in the cir cum stances. (P2) A vir tu ous agent is one who acts vir tu ously, that is, one who has and ex er cises the

vir tues.

134 S. Afr. J, Philos. 2002, 21(2)

1 See also James Rachels’s ar gu ments in this re gard (1998).2 See for ex am ple Da vid Sol o mon (1988) and Sa rah Conly (1988).3 See for ex am ple Mi chael Slote (1992), Rich ard Tay lor (1991) and Edmund L. Pincoffs (1986).

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

orth

Car

olin

a] a

t 08:

16 1

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

The first prop o si tion is a purely for mal prin ci ple. It is not meant to serve as an ac tionguide but sim ply forges the con cep tual link be tween right ac tion and vir tu ous agent.The sec ond prop o si tion then goes on to spec ify vir tu ous agent in terms of vir tu ous ac -tions, and is needed to cor rect the ten dency to de fine the vir tu ous agent as one who isdis posed to act in ac cor dance with a deontologist’s moral rules (Hursthouse1991:225). From these two pre mises it seems to fol low that a right ac tion is an ac tionthat is in ac cor dance with the vir tues. How ever, for vir tue eth ics to be of any use in the field of ap plied eth ics, it needs to ex plain why it is that vir tu ous ac tions are right. Twodif fer ent an swers have been given in re sponse – one agent-based, the other agent-fo -cused.4

Ac cord ing to agent-based vir tue the o ries, most no ta bly those in spired by Plato andthe Judeo-Christian tra di tion, an ac tion is right be cause it is per formed by a vir tu ousper son. In this view, a vir tu ous agent pos sesses cer tain in de pend ently ad mi ra ble mo -tives whose very ex pres sion in his ac tions serves to make those ac tions right. AsFrankena (1980:52-53) ex plains, it does not mat ter much what you do but how you doit. All that re mains to be done is to pro vide a list of vir tues and vices and to try to cul -ti vate the vir tues in our chil dren. An ob vi ous short com ing of this ap proach is that itfails to dis tin guish be tween do ing the right thing and do ing the right thing for the right rea sons, ren der ing it un able to ex plain and jus tify as ser tions of the right ness or wrong -ness of spe cific ac tions. Hence Beauchamp and Childress ar gue that:

It is un ac cept able to claim that if per sons dis play vir tu ous char ac ter, their actsare there fore mor ally ac cept able. Peo ple of good char ac ter who act vir tu ouslycan per form wrong ac tions [Em pha sis added]. They may have in cor rect in for -ma tion about likely con se quences, make in cor rect judg ments, or fail to graspwhat should be done. De fenders of char ac ter eth ics can not plau si bly main tainthat just and un just ac tions con sist only in what just and un just per sons do(1994:68).

I ac cept and agree with this crit i cism in so far as it is di rected against agent-based ap -proaches. How ever, Beauchamp and Childress are wrong to hold this against all vir tue the o ries. The Ar is to te lian would agree that a per son of good char ac ter can per formwrong ac tions, but would deny that a good per son acts vir tu ously when he per forms awrong ac tion. Ar is totle thought that both right ac tion and right mo tive should be pres -ent in a vir tu ous ac tion.5 His ac count of right ac tion is agent-focused rather thanagent-based, that is, it fo cuses more on vir tu ous in di vid u als and char ac ter traits thanon ac tions, but it does not de rive the moral sta tus of ac tions from char ac ter. The vir tu -ous in di vid ual does what is vir tu ous be cause it is the no ble thing to do, rather than itbe ing the case that what is no ble to do, has this sta tus sim ply be cause the vir tu ous per -son will choose or has cho sen it. An agent-focused ap proach there fore needs to ex -plain what, if not an agent’s in ten tions or mo tives, makes an ac tion right or vir tu ous.

In re sponse to the lat ter ques tion, Ar is to te lian vir tue ethicists typ i cally ground thevir tues in terms of hu man flour ish ing, in a te le o log i cal man ner. Hursthouse (1991:226) of fers the fol low ing for mu la tion:

S. Afr. J. Philos. 2002, 21(2) 135

4 For a de tailed dis cus sion of this dis tinc tion as well as a de fence of an agent-based ap proach, see Mi -chael Slote (1995:83-101).

5 Beauchamp and Childress (1994:64) them selves point out this fact ear lier on in their dis cus sion of vir -tue eth ics, but they seem to ig nore it in their crit i cism of this ap proach.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

orth

Car

olin

a] a

t 08:

16 1

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

(P3) A vir tue is a char ac ter trait a hu man be ing needs [to pos sess] to flour ish.To flour ish is to live well, to pros per, or to be truly happy or ful filled. In this broadsense hu man flour ish ing is an ob jec tive goal, one that ev ery hu man be ing has goodrea son to aim to achieve. How ever, be cause hu man flour ish ing is agent-relative therecan be as many forms of flour ish ing as there are in di vid u als. Yet this does not meanthat judge ments con cern ing whether a spe cific in di vid ual is flour ish ing are com pletelysub jec tive. I be lieve we can iden tify a list of goods that are nec es sary pre con di tions for the abil ity to flour ish, that is, goods ev ery ra tio nal hu man be ing needs to real ise hermore spe cific con cep tions of the good life. This list will in clude goods such as knowl -edge, health, friend ship, se cu rity, in come or wealth, beauty, cre ative achieve ment,plea sure, and sta tus. Al though we are able to say that a per son whose life lacks most or all of these goods also lacks the ca pac ity to flour ish, there is no sin gle, agent-neutralmodel to which each per son’s pat tern of weight ing of these goods and vir tues mustcon form.6

The in clu sion of (P3) serves to coun ter the ob jec tion that vir tue the ory is triv i allycir cu lar, that is, that it spec i fies right ac tion in terms of the vir tu ous agent, and thenim me di ately spec i fies the vir tu ous agent in terms of right ac tion. In stead, Hursthouse’s ac count of vir tue the ory spec i fies the vir tu ous agent in terms of the vir tues, and thenspec i fies these, not merely as dis po si tions to right ac tion, but as the char ac ter traits re -quired for flour ish ing (1991:226).

Rules of right action: particularity and universalisabilityEven if we ac cept that vir tue eth ics is con cerned with ac tion and that it can pro vide anon-circular ac count of right ac tion, we still have some way to go to meet Louden’sob jec tion, which is not sim ply that vir tue eth ics is not con cerned with ac tion, but that it does not at tempt to for mu late uni ver sal rules of right ac tion. He writes:

If one asks [the vir tu ous per son] why he did what he did, or how he knew whatto do, the an swer – if one is of fered – might not be very en light en ing. Onewould not nec es sar ily ex pect him to ap peal to any rules or prin ci ples whichmight be of use to oth ers... [I]t seems to me that we can not in tel li gently saythings like “The vir tu ous per son (who acts for the sake of the no ble) is also one who recognizes that all men tally de fi cient eight-month-old fe tuses should (orshould not) be aborted...” The lat ter sim ply sound[s] too strange, and [its]strange ness stems from the fact that mo tives of vir tue and hon our can not befully rou tin ized (1984:230).

In re sponse to this charge Aris to telians usu ally emphasise that eth ics is not a sci encethat in volves the ap pli ca tion, in an im par tial and con sis tent man ner, of rules and prin -ci ples to spe cific cases. To this end they of ten cite Ar is totle’s ad mo ni tion in hisNicomachean Eth ics (I.iii) that “it is the mark of an ed u cated man to look for pre ci sion in each class of things just so far as the na ture of the sub ject ad mits”. The vir tu ous per -son is said to have a con cep tion of how to live that can not be cap tured in a set of uni -ver sal prin ci ples that could then be ap plied by a non-virtuous per son to de liver theright ac tion in each case. Moral sit u a tions are too com plex, and moral rules and prin ci -ples are too gen eral and sim plis tic, so that much of right con duct can not be cod i fied in

136 S. Afr. J, Philos. 2002, 21(2)

6 See Douglas B Ras mus sen, (1999) for a de tailed anal y sis of the no tion of hu man flour ish ing.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

orth

Car

olin

a] a

t 08:

16 1

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

rules or prin ci ples.7 In stead, var i ous sub stan tive vir tues like be nev o lence, hon esty, and jus tice are seen as em body ing a form of re spon sive ness to some range of moral consi -derations about help ing oth ers, truth-telling, and so on, whereas vir tues such as sen si -tiv ity and em pa thy op er ate to en sure that one does not over look rel e vant con sid er -ations in the par tic u lar case (Trianosky 1997:52).

This po si tion, of ten re ferred to as the uncodifiability the sis, has mis tak enly led many vir tue ethicists to re ject no tion of universalisability, un der stood as the re quire ment that any moral rea son in one sit u a tion ap plies also in any rel e vantly sim i lar sit u a tion. In -deed, many of them be lieve that the strength of vir tue eth ics lies in its re jec tion of ab -stract and a-historical prin ci ples and its fo cus on pro vid ing sit u a tion-specific and lo calso lu tions to moral prob lems in stead. Ac cord ing to Alasdair Mac In tyre (1985), for ex -am ple, dif fer ent cul tures em body dif fer ent vir tues for they hold dif fer ent con cep tionsof flour ish ing. Re cog nising this plu ral ity of con cep tions leads to the con clu sion that an eth ics based on vir tues will nec es sar ily be non-universalistic and will merely re flectsome lo cal set of vir tues, which has no claim upon in di vid u als from other cul tures. For Mac In tyre, the turn to vir tue eth ics also ex presses a turn to a type of rel a tiv ism, to theidea that there are no trans-cultural cri te ria for moral good ness, and that the cri te ria are in ter nal to the tra di tions and prac tices of each lo cal so ci ety or group that asks it selfques tions about the good. Edmund Pincoffs (1986) sim i larly ar gues that there can beno fixed rules or de ci sion pro ce dures that tell one how to weigh com pet ing con sid er -ations once they are iden ti fied. Greg ory Trianosky (1997:52) in ter prets this view asim ply ing that what makes an ac tion right is sim ply that it is the par tic u lar choice en -dorsed by thought ful judge ment or prac ti cal wis dom and in formed by vir tu ous con -cern. Ex cept when one can look to some mor ally ex em plary or para dig matic in di vid -ual, he con tin ues, the ex tent to which one de cides well will de pend largely on the ex -tent to which one has al ready de vel oped a vir tu ous char ac ter. How ever, as I will ar guebe low, it does not nec es sar ily fol low from the ac cep tance of the uncodifiability thesisthat we can not say any thing more about what makes an ac tion right than that it is whata vir tu ous per son would choose to do in a par tic u lar sit u a tion.

The de nial of the prin ci ple of universalisability leaves the vir tue eth i cist vul ner a bleto the charge of irrationalism. Ra tio nal ity re quires con sis tency, and this can only be as -sured if one can iden tify and ap ply uni ver sal prin ci ples and/or rules to spe cific cases.The lack of any uni ver sal cri te rion for de cid ing be tween dif fer ent con cep tions of thevir tues has as its im pli ca tion the im plau si ble view that there are no re straints on thevir tues that a par tic u lar cul ture or the ory may rec om mend. In what fol lows, I will ar -gue that the uncodifiability the sis does not com mit us to a re jec tion ei ther of uni ver salrules or of the prin ci ple of universal isability. In deed, one of the ear li est ver sions of the prin ci ple of universalisability – the ob li ga tion to treat equals equally and treatunequals un equally – was for mu lated by Ar is totle.

In an at tempt to avoid the charges of irrationalism and rel a tiv ism, some vir tueethicists de rive rules of right ac tion from the vir tues, which in turn are de fined as those char ac ter traits that are nec es sary for flour ish ing. Hursthouse (1991:227) ar gues that“[e]very vir tue gen er ates a pos i tive in struc tion (act justly, kindly, cou ra geously, hon -estly, etc.) and ev ery vice a pro hi bi tion (do not act un justly, cru elly, like a cow ard, dis -hon estly, etc.)”. Rules such as “Act kindly” and “Help oth ers” are uni ver sal rules that

S. Afr. J. Philos. 2002, 21(2) 137

7 See John McDowell (1979:331-350) for a more de tailed ac count of this ar gu ment.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

orth

Car

olin

a] a

t 08:

16 1

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

can be con sis tently ap plied. Louden (1984:230) ob jects that rules that are de rived from vir tues and vices are very vague and will be of lit tle help for per sons who have not yetac quired the req ui site moral in sight and sen si tiv ity. In re sponse to this ob jec tion oneshould firstly point out that, even in their gen eral form these rules, like the prin ci plesen dorsed by util i tar i ans and deontologists, do pro vide some guid ance. When con -fronted by a needy per son whom one is in a po si tion to help, fol low ing the rule of be -nev o lence – even if one does so with lit tle sen si tiv ity or prac ti cal wis dom – is betterthan not fol low ing it at all, for in stance by ig nor ing his plight or by con trib ut ing to hisbad for tune. Even if one fails mis er a bly, the at tempt at gen er os ity is an op por tu nity togain ex pe ri ence so that one may do better next time. Sec ondly, there seems to be norea son why these gen eral prin ci ples can not be spec i fied more closely in the light ofour past ex pe ri ences and with the aid of prac ti cal rea son ing. (In this re gard, vir tue eth -ics is no dif fer ent from prin ci ple-based the o ries whose rules and prin ci ples sim i larlystand in need of spec i fi ca tion and in ter pre ta tion when ap ply ing them in spe cific sit u a -tions.) For ex am ple, to suc ceed in one’s at tempt at help ing an other per son, one needsan un der stand ing of his unique cir cum stances, in clud ing his needs and in ter ests, hiswishes, and his cul tural back ground. The par tic u lar (suc cess ful) act of help ing isuniversalisable and can be come a uni ver sal rule stat ing that in ev ery rel e vantly sim i larsit u a tion it would be right to act in this par tic u lar way. To this ex tent, uni ver sal rulesand prin ci ples do play an im por tant role in moral de ci sion-making. How ever, uni ver sal rules are of lim ited value in ev ery day de ci sion-making, sim ply be cause it is un likelythat one would come across an other sit u a tion that would call for the ap pli ca tion of thesame nar rowly-specified rule. For this rea son it is more con du cive to the moral life fora per son to ac quire cer tain vir tues, in stead of sim ply memo ris ing moral rules.8 The vir -tue eth i cist’s dis taste of uni ver sal rules stems from the ten dency to ap ply these ruleswith out re gard to the spe cific cir cum stances of each in di vid ual case, and not from a re -jec tion of the no tion of universalisability.

An other rea son why mo ral ity is not fully codifiable, why we can not ex pect rules todo all the moral work for us, is that there will al ways be sit u a tions in which con flict ing moral de mands are made upon us. Rule-based the o ries have typ i cally tried to re solvesuch con flicts by ap peal ing to a sin gle, fun da men tal prin ci ple which is to re ceive pri -or ity when ever it con flicts with the de mands made by an other moral rule or prin ci ple.The ap peal to an ab so lute prin ci ple has some odd – and mor ally un ac cept able – im pli -ca tions. As many Kantians have pointed out, the util i tar ian ap proach would sanc tiontor tur ing and kill ing an in no cent child for the sake of ag gre gate wel fare, whereas util i -tar i ans have in turn ob jected that the Kantian would ap prove of truth-telling evenwhere do ing so would have hor ren dous con se quences, such as the dis cov ery by Nazisol diers of a group of Jews hid den in the cel lar. The vir tue eth i cist, like other de fend -ers of plu ral is tic moral the o ries9, de nies that there are any ab so lute prin ci ples (or hi er -

138 S. Afr. J, Philos. 2002, 21(2)

8 This re veals the rea son why we can not in tel li gently say things like, “The vir tu ous per son is also onewho re cog nises that all men tally de fi cient eight-month-old fe tuses should (or should not) be aborted...”. The rule, in this form, is sim ply too gen eral, not tak ing ac count of the par tic u lar cir cum stances of in di -vid ual cases. In or der to make a judge ment that a men tally de fi cient eight-month-old foe tus should beaborted, we need to know more about the facts of the spe cific case, such as the de gree of the de fi -ciency, the wishes of the par ents, their abil ity to take care of a hand i capped child, the sup port net workthat ex ists in their com mu nity, and so forth.

9 Most no ta bly W.D. Ross (1930) and Beauchamp and Childress (1994).

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

orth

Car

olin

a] a

t 08:

16 1

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

ar chy of prin ci ples) to which we can ap peal in cases of moral con flict. In stead, weshould care fully con sider all the mor ally rel e vant as pects of the sit u a tion and seek tobal ance or reach a com pro mise be tween var i ous moral claims.

In short, the view that mo ral ity is not fully codifiable is sim ply the view that thecom plex ity of moral life ren ders it im pos si ble in prac tice to for mu late a set of uni ver -sal rules, the con sis tent fol low ing of which will sat isfy the de mands of mo ral ity. Inother words, the fo cus on char ac ter rather than rules of right ac tion is a re sponse to aprac ti cal prob lem, which does not or need not com mit us to the the o ret i cal view thatthere are no uni ver sal moral rules, nor does it re quire us to re ject the prin ci ple ofuniversalisability. How ever, the ar gu ments pre sented so far have only shown that anysat is fac tory moral the ory has to in clude an ac count of the vir tues along side an ac countof moral rules and prin ci ples, but do not give con clu sive sup port to the view that thevir tues should form the fo cal point of a moral the ory. In deed, sup port ers of plu ral is ticmoral the o ries such as Beauchamp and Childress (1994) will agree en tirely that uni -ver sal prin ci ples stand in need of closer spec i fi ca tion and that prin ci ples are prima fa -cie rather than ab so lute. In the fol low ing sec tion, where I dis cuss the jus ti fi ca tion ofmoral rules within vir tue the ory, the dif fer ence be tween prin ci ple-based and vir -tue-oriented the o ries should be come more ap par ent.

The justification of moral rules: egoism and altruismOnce we ac cept that a vir tue-oriented ap proach to mo ral ity does not nec es sar ily ex -clude an ac count of uni ver sal rules and prin ci ples, a fur ther dif fi culty arises with re -gard to the jus ti fi ca tion of these rules and prin ci ples. Why should n’t we act un justly,and why should we help oth ers? Hav ing re jected the view that the eth i cal sta tus of ac -tions is en tirely de riv a tive from char ac ter, the vir tue eth i cist needs to say some thingabout what kinds of ac tion are right or wrong in them selves, that is, in de pend ent fromfacts about the mo tives, dis po si tions or in ner life of the in di vid u als who per form them.

As noted be fore, Hursthouse fol lows Eliz a beth Anscombe (1958) in pro pos ing thatthe vir tues be iden ti fied as those traits a hu man be ing needs to live a flour ish ing life(P3). This ver sion of vir tue eth ics is for mally ego is tic since it states that, if you want to flour ish, then you should ac quire and prac tice the vir tues. Of course, the the ory is notego is tic in con tent for it holds that, to be fully vir tu ous, an agent’s pri mary mo tive foract ing gen er ously, com pas sion ately or be nev o lently must be a de sire for the other’sgood for its own sake. How ever, this ac count is un sat is fac tory since all of a per son’snor ma tive rea sons for ac tion are de rived from a fun da men tal rea son he has to pur suehis own flour ish ing. In the fi nal in stance, the an swer to the ques tion, “Why should n’t I be cruel?”, is “Be cause cru elty would frus trate your pur suit of the good life”. The the -ory is there fore un able to ac count for our ob li ga tions to wards oth ers in a non-egoisticfash ion. Al though it is true that a cruel per son can not flour ish, this is not the rea son we think cruel acts are wrong.10

Hursthouse at tempts to over come this prob lem by mak ing a dis tinc tion be tweenone’s rea sons for be ing a vir tu ous per son and one’s rea sons for act ing vir tu ously on aspe cific oc ca sion. She ar gues that, in main tain ing that hon esty is a vir tue that a hu manbe ing has rea son to ac quire and prac tice be cause it is part of flour ish ing, we have notsaid any thing about the rea son the vir tu ous per son has for tell ing the truth on any par -

S. Afr. J. Philos. 2002, 21(2) 139

10 Thomas Hurka (1999: 44-71) pro vides a de tailed cri tique of at tempts at an ego is tic der i va tion ofother-re gard ing vir tues.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

orth

Car

olin

a] a

t 08:

16 1

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

tic u lar oc ca sion.11 But Hursthouse has lit tle to say about what these good rea sons areand how the vir tu ous per son would go about es tab lish ing them. She writes: “Ac quiring the vir tue of hon esty is get ting into the habit of tell ing the truth for the right rea sons; Itell the truth be cause I think one must, or be cause I think one can not lie, not even tosave one’s own skin, or be cause I love truth...”. (1987:243-244).12 This re veals themain prob lem for any ego is tic the ory of vir tue, namely that it does not and can not ex -plain why it is wrong or con trary to vir tue to be mo ti vated by one’s own good. It sim -ply as sumes that it is.

The fail ure to pro vide ex plan a tory rea sons for act ing vir tu ously on any spe cific oc -ca sion lends sup port to the view that con sid er ations of vir tue are sup ple men tal to thede ter mi na tion of right and wrong ac tion in that they merely mo ti vate an agent to dowhat is right. Frankena (1973:67) writes, for ex am ple, that “the point of ac quir ingthese vir tues [i.e. be nev o lence and jus tice] is not fur ther guid ance or in struc tion; thefunc tion of the vir tues in an eth ics of duty is not to tell us what to do, but to en sure that we will do it will ingly in what ever sit u a tion we may face”.13 If we want to know whatkinds of ac tion are right and wrong, we need to con sult prin ci ple-based the o ries. Forvir tue eth ics to be more than just a sup ple men tary the ory, then, it has to in clude a(non-egoistic) gen eral rule, one that dif fers from the ones pro vided by util i tar ian anddeontological the o ries, which would ex plain what would count as good rea son to actto wards oth ers in cer tain ways. I be lieve we can de rive such a rule from an ac count ofhu man flour ish ing. Al though I can not fully de velop and de fend this view here, I willtry to give some idea of what a non-egoistic ver sion of vir tue eth ics might look like.

To flour ish is to have an ob jec tively de sir able life, that is, hu man flour ish ing is anob ject of de sire and choice be cause it is de sir able and choiceworthy, not sim ply be -cause it is de sired or cho sen (Ras mus sen 1999:3). There fore, a per son who re cog nisesthe value of hu man flour ish ing and who strives to real ise it in her own life will, if sheis ra tio nal, re cog nise that other hu man be ings, or be ings who are rel e vantly sim i lar toher self, also have good rea son to de sire to flour ish. Of course, this move does not es -tab lish the rea son why she will or should be con cerned with the other’s flour ish ing.We have sim ply shown that a per son who be lieves that “I should be vir tu ous if I wantto flour ish” is also ra tio nally com mit ted to be liev ing that “Pe ter should be vir tu ous ifPe ter wants to flour ish”. In prin ci ple, she will re gard the good of oth ers as equally im -por tant to her own, but she does not yet have a rea son to try to bring about or con trib -ute to an other per son’s flour ish ing.

The nor ma tive rea son for al tru is tic ac tions is pro vided by a rec og ni tion of a fur therfact, namely that an agent’s be ing vir tu ous is not suf fi cient for his or her own flour ish -ing. In or der to flour ish a vir tu ous per son also needs cer tain “ex ter nal goods” (Ar is -totle). In con trast to Plato, who holds the un ten a ble view that the vir tu ous per son is to -tally self-sufficient, Ar is totle ac knowl edges the fact that hu man be ings de pend uponeach other to real ise their goals. In the Nicomachean Eth ics (VII.xiii) he writes, for in -

140 S. Afr. J, Philos. 2002, 21(2)

11 Julia Annas (1992:137) sim i larly ar gues that “vir tue the ory does not im ply that its form ing part of mygood is the rea son why I should care about the good of oth ers. I care about oth ers for their own sake.Their good is part of my own fi nal good. The sec ond thought does not un der mine the first”. As we shall see, her an swer fails for the same rea son that Hursthouse’s does, namely that it con cerns only a per -son’s mo ti vat ing rea sons and not the nor ma tive rea sons for act ing in a par tic u lar way.

12 See also Hursthouse (1995:66-67). 13 Beauchamp and Childress (1994) holds a sim i lar view.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

orth

Car

olin

a] a

t 08:

16 1

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

stance, “Those who say that the vic tim on the rack or the man who falls into great mis -for tune is happy if he is good are, whether they mean or not, talk ing non sense”. Thus,if Mary re cog nises the fact (a) that Pe ter’s flour ish ing is as im por tant as her own, and(b) that Pe ter needs cer tain goods in or der to flour ish, she will have good rea son to tryto pro vide those goods and hence to con trib ute to his flour ish ing (pro vided that she isin a po si tion to do so). Hence a vir tu ous agent’s fun da men tal rea son for act ing vir tu -ously is that she re cog nises that act ing in this way con trib utes to hu man flour ish ing –her own, as well as that of oth ers. To avoid the charge of ego ism, I there fore pro posethat we re place (P3) with the fol low ing prop o si tion:(P4) A vir tue is a char ac ter trait re quired for hu man flour ish ingAl though the vir tu ous per son re cog nises that, in prin ci ple, the other’s good is of equalvalue or im por tance to her own, she can not be con cerned with an other’s flour ish ing inthe same way that she is with her own. By be ing vir tu ous, by de vel op ing cer tain traitsof char ac ter, an agent is di rectly con trib ut ing to her own good. She wins the trust andre spect of oth ers, for ex am ple, or is able to form in ti mate re la tions of friend ship. Inthis re gard the vir tues con sti tute the agent’s good. But her be ing vir tu ous does not con -sti tute the good of the other. She can only seek to con trib ute to the other’s abil ity toflour ish. Be cause flour ish ing is an ac tiv ity, it is im pos si ble to bring about or pro ducesome one else’s flour ish ing as a con se quence of one’s own ac tions

This the ory of hu man flour ish ing is agent- rather than pa tient-focused in so far as itre cog nises that an agent can only be in charge of her own good. (In this sense, Ar is to -te lian vir tue eth ics is rad i cally anti-paternalistic.) The only way in which I can flour ish and can con trib ute to other peo ple’s abil ity to flour ish is by de vel op ing cer tain char ac -ter traits in my self. How ever, the the ory is not ego is tic be cause the nor ma tive rea sonsfor act ing vir tu ously are not de rived solely from the agent’s well-being but in clude, asan es sen tial com po nent, a con sid er ation of the other’s good. Whereas the vir tues con -sti tute the agent’s good, they are in stru men tal to the good of the other, in so far as ex er -cis ing them pro motes the abil ity of oth ers to flour ish. This asym me try can be ex -pressed in two sub sid iary pre mises, nei ther of which is pri mary:

(P4a) A vir tue is a char ac ter trait an agent needs to flour ish or live well.

(P4b) A vir tu ous per son acts so as to promote the abil ity of oth ers to flour ish.

It fol lows from this view that the so-called self-regarding vir tues, such as cour age andin teg rity, al though they are prop erly said to be vir tues in so far as they are nec es sarycon stit u ents of the agent’s flour ish ing, can not be moral vir tues be cause they do not in -clude a con sid er ation of the other’s good as an es sen tial com po nent.

In stead of merely as sert ing that cer tain char ac ter traits are vir tues while oth ers arevices, this ac count al lows us to ex plain why they are to be con sid ered thus. For ex am -ple, the rec og ni tion that a per son needs cer tain ba sic goods in or der to flour ish, ex -plains why be nev o lence or gen er os ity is a vir tue. By be ing gen er ous an agent may at -tain cer tain goods, such as friend ship and a good rep u ta tion, that can not be at tainedthrough other means. At the same time, her gen er os ity helps the other per son to at taingoods that are nec es sary for him to flour ish, such as knowl edge, health, or wealth. Tosuc ceed in her at tempt to help an other, to con trib ute to his flour ish ing, she needs tohave an un der stand ing of his par tic u lar cir cum stances, needs and in ter ests. She can notsim ply as sume that what is good for her self is also good for him. Such an un der stand -ing is made pos si ble by the re lated vir tues of em pa thy and com pas sion. A third vir tue

S. Afr. J. Philos. 2002, 21(2) 141

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

orth

Car

olin

a] a

t 08:

16 1

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

that lies at the ba sis of, and serves to in form the vir tues of com pas sion and be nev o -lence, is re spect ful ness. To re spect a per son is to per mit the other to be his own per -son, to re cog nise his sig nif i cance as a per son. It is to re cog nise that he, like your self,has an in ter est in liv ing well or flour ish ing, but also that his pro jects and goals maydif fer from your own. Al though the vir tue of re spect ful ness would of ten re quire one to re frain from in ter fer ing with an other’s pur suit of his own ide als and in ter ests, in di vid -u als of ten need the as sis tance of oth ers to be able to as sert their val ues and be liefs andto real ise their goals.

ConclusionIn this pa per I have ex am ined what I per ceive to be the main chal lenges fac ing vir tuethe ory if it is to be use ful in the field of ap plied eth ics, and in re sponse, have at tempted to go some way to wards de vel op ing a ver sion of vir tue the ory that is able to meetthese chal lenges. In re sponse to the re quire ment that a moral the ory should be able totell us some thing about what we ought and ought not to do, I have ar gued that thechar ac teri sa tion of vir tue the ory as con cerned with char ac ter rather than ac tion is mis -taken, and that vir tue ethicists can and do con cern them selves with ques tions of whatmakes an ac tion right or wrong. The sec ond re quire ment is that, apart from pro vid ingsit u a tion-specific and lo cal so lu tions to the moral di lem mas raised by par tic u lar cases– some thing vir tue ethicists typ i cally do very well – a moral the ory also must be ableto pro duce gen eral rules and prin ci ples that can be ap plied to cases that are rel e vantlysim i lar (and be able to ex plain why they are rel e vantly sim i lar). I have ar gued that, inor der for vir tue the ory to avoid the charges of irrationalism and rel a tiv ism, vir tue the o -rists need to in cor po rate the no tion of universalisability along side their con cern withthe par tic u lar i ties of spe cific sit u a tions. Finally, with re gard to the re quire ment that itbe able to pro vide a non-egoistic ex pla na tion and jus ti fi ca tion of moral rules and prin -ci ples, I re de fined vir tue with ref er ence to both the agent’s and the pa tient’s good.

ReferencesAnnas, J. 1992. The good life and the good lives of oth ers. So cial Phi los o phy and Pol -

icy 9 (2):133-148.Anscombe, E. 1958. Mod ern moral phi los o phy, Phi los o phy 33:1-19.Ar is totle. 1990. Nicomachean Eth ics D. Ross (trans.) Ox ford and New York: Ox ford

Uni ver sity Press.Beauchamp, T.L. and Childress, J.F. 1994. Prin ci ples of Bio med i cal Ethics, (4th edi -

tion). New York and Ox ford: Ox ford Uni ver sity Press.Conly, S. 1988. Flour ishing and the fail ure of the eth ics of vir tue, in Pe ter A. French

et. al Mid west Studies in Phi los o phy XIII, Eth i cal The ory: Char ac ter and Vir tue.No tre Dame: Uni ver sity of No tre Dame Press.

Foot, P. 1977. Eu tha na sia, Phi los o phy and Pub lic Af fairs, 6:85-112Frankena, W.K. 1980. Thinking about mo ral ity. Ann Ar bor.Frankena, W.K. 1973. Eth ics (2nd edi tion). Englewood Cliffs, New York:

Prentice-Hall.Heeger, R. 1993. What is meant by “The turn to ap plied eth ics”?, in Rob ert Heeger

and Theo van Willinburg (eds.) The Turn to Ap plied Eth ics. Kampen: Kok Phar osPub lishing House.

142 S. Afr. J, Philos. 2002, 21(2)

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

orth

Car

olin

a] a

t 08:

16 1

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

Hurka, T. 1999. The three faces of flour ish ing, So cial Phi los o phy and Pol icy16(1):44-71.

Hursthouse, R. 1987. Be gin ning lives. Ox ford and New York: Blackwell.Hursthouse, R. 1991. Vir tue the ory and abor tion, Phi los o phy and Pub lic Af fairs

10:223-246.Hursthouse, R. 1995. Ap plying vir tue eth ics, in R. Hursthouse, G. Law rence and W.

Quinn (eds.), Virtues and Rea sons: Philippa Foot and Moral The ory. Ox ford:Clar en don Press.

Louden, R,B. 1984. On some vices of vir tue eth ics, Amer i can Philo soph i cal Quar -terly, 21:227-236.

Mac In tyre, A. 1985. Af ter Vir tue, Lon don: Duckworth.McDowell, J. 1979. Vir tue and rea son, The Mo nist 62:331-350.Pincoffs, E.L. 1986. Quan daries and Virtues, Law rence: Uni ver sity Press of Kan sas.Rachels, J. 1998. Eth i cal the ory and bioethics, in H. Kuhse & P. Singer, A Com pan ion

to Bioethics, Ox ford: Blackwell.Ras mus sen, D.B. 1999. Hu man flour ish ing and the ap peal to hu man na ture, So cial

Phi los o phy and Pol icy 16:1-43Ross, W.D. 1930. The Right and the Good. Ox ford: Clar en don PressSlote, M. 1992. From Mo ral ity to Vir tue. New York: Ox ford Uni ver sity Press.Slote, M. 1995. Agent-based vir tue eth ics, Mid west Studies in Phi los o phy, 20:83-101.Sol o mon, D. 1988. In ter nal ob jec tions to vir tue eth ics, in Pe ter A. French et. al, Mid -

west Studies in Phi los o phy XIII, Eth i cal The ory: Char ac ter and Vir tue. No treDame, Uni ver sity of No tre Dame Press.

Tay lor, R. 1991. Vir tue Eth ics Inter laken, NY: Lin den Books.Trianosky, G.V.Y. 1997. What is vir tue eth ics?, in Dan iel Statman (ed.), Vir tue Eth -

ics: A Crit i cal Reader, Ed in burgh: Ed in burgh Uni ver sity Press.

S. Afr. J. Philos. 2002, 21(2) 143

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

orth

Car

olin

a] a

t 08:

16 1

1 N

ovem

ber

2014