virtue ethics and anti-theory

VIRTUE ETHICS AND ANTI-THEORY*

ROBERT B. LOUDEN

...[T]his must be agreed upon beforehand, that the whole account of matters of conduct must be given in outline and not precisely, as we said at the very beginning that the accounts we demand must be accordance with the subject-matter; matters concerned with conduct and questions of what is good for us have no fixity, any more than matters of health.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1104al-5, of. 1094b12.

..,[E]thical theory is essentially a modern invention .... [T]he structures known as ethical theories are more threats to moral sanity and balance than instruments for their attainment.

Edmund Pincoffs, Quandaries and Virtues, introduction (p. 2).

I want to attack the whole idea of a moral "theory" which systematizes and extends a body of judgments... [I]f I am right that there is no room for a moral theory as something which is more philosophical and less committed than moral deliberation, and which is not simply an account of our customs and styles of justification, criticism, protest, revolt, conversion, and resolution, then any moral philosophy which is not such a descriptive anthropology will tend to merge with moral action.

Annette Baler, "Doing Without Moral Theory?" in Postures of the Mind (p. 232).

Since the appearance of Elizabeth Anscombe's seminal essay "Modern Moral Philosophy" thirty years ago, the virtue ethics literature has grown enormously.~ It now seems safe to say that the genre has not only established itself as a settled paradigm within ethics, but that it is on the verge of achieving hegemony as the outlook of choice among younger writers in ethics. Today one finds fewer and fewer theorists engaging in

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efforts to construct viable utilitarian or deontological systems: Aristotle has replaced Mill and Kant as the classical moral philosopher most likely to inspire allegiance.

Everyone now accepts the platitudes that virtue comes first in virtue ethics, that it is an agent-centered rather than act-centered approach, that it is primarily concerned with how one should live rather than with formulating rules and decision procedures for resolving quandaries, that most of its practitioners are decidedly more psychological and anthropological in orientation than are writers from other schools of modern ethical thought, that its ancestral lineage is for the most part anti-Enlightenment and can be traced back chiefly to Aristotle, 2 that it assumes a more perceptual, less rule-based model of moral judgment, etc. Still, among the cautious the question "how exactly does virtue ethics differ from modern normative ethical theories?" continues to command attention. For as the paradigm of virtue ethics slowly creeps into textbooks to take its hard-earned place beside utilitarian and Kantian theories, we stand in increasing danger of construing it as just one more effort in ethical theory construction, one which is competing for the same turf as deontic and utilitarian ethics. 3 As my title suggests, in the present essay I wish to call into question this assumption. Virtue ethics, I will argue, in certain fundamental respects is best interpreted not as one more ethical theory but as an anti-theory. It is not competing for the same turf as modern normative ethical theories but instead constitutes a philosophical brief against all such efforts. At the same time, once its brief against modern normative ethical theory is examined closely, we can see that virtue ethics at bottom is not so much anti- theoretic as anti-certain-conceptions-of-what-ought-to-constitute-ethical- theory. In other words, virtue ethics is best interpreted both as a protest against certain modern assumptions concerning what ethical theory should look like as well as an attempt to return us to more realistic avenues of moral reflection.

The overall shape of the essay is as follows: I shall begin in Section I with a list and brief elaboration of the defining features of modern ethical theory. Here my aim is to capture the most significant philosophical characteristics of "ethical theory" as the phrase is currently employed. In Section II I define the concept of an "anti- theory" in ethics, exploring some of the key arguments and assumptions concerning ethics which writers in this school make. Section III examines the focal question of to what extent virtue ethics matches the description of an anti-theory, using the earlier-obtained definitions of both "ethical theory" and "anti-theory" as checklists.

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I. ETHICAL THEORY Before examining the case for virtue ethics as an anti-theory, it is important to clarify the concept of"ethical theory" itself. What exactly do philosophers today mean when they invoke the term "ethical theory?" What are the defining characteristics of "ethical theory?" Ultimately, the ethical theory question leads one into even larger and darker territory: what is a "theory?" I shall not attempt to traverse such territory here, in part because most writers agree that there are certain basic differences between moral and scientific theories. 4 Also, we should admit at the start that"ethical theory" itself is something of a contested concept: there exists no detailed, univocal definition of the term which is employed faithfully by all who profess to be ethical theorists. Still, certain key characteristics do crop up again and again when one surveys statements made by contemporary writers on the nature of ethical theory. What follows is merely an attempt to first highlight and then elaborate briefly on the most frequently mentioned properties of ethical theory as the term is currently used by practitioners in the field. Certainly not all ethical theorists would agree that each of the following properties constitutes a necessary part of what is meant by "ethical theory." The most that can be hoped for is that most ethical theorists would accept most of the following characteristics as together constituting a definition of"ethical theory," with some theorists choosing a slightly shorter list of defining characteristics, and others, perhaps, a slightly longer one.

(1) Solve Problems. A normative ethical theory is supposed to help agents decide what to do when they are faced with a moral problem. Modern ethical theorists typically assume that their theory construction efforts have practical import: agents who correctly apply their theories will be able to resolve moral quandaries. As R.B. Brandt states in the opening sentences of his Ethical Theory: "What is ethical theory about? Someone might propose as an answer: 'Everyone knows what an ethical problem is; ethical theory must be about the solutions to such problems.'"5

(2) Test Beliefs. A normative ethical theory is also intended to provide a test for agents' moral beliefs - - to demonstrate which of an agent's already formed moral beliefs are correct and which are incorrect. Additionally, an ethical theory should be able to systematize and extend agents' moral beliefs. A body of beliefs is systematized once the various individual moral beliefs are made internally consistent with one another, and when their relationships to each other are understood. A body of beliefs is extended when it is applied to new moral issues concerning which the agent has not yet formed beliefs. Ethical theories

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thus provide a means of eliminating errors in one's moral belief system and of justifying those moral beliefs which pass muster. Bernard Williams emphasizes this particular feature of ethical theory when he writes: "An ethical theory is a theoretical account of what ethical thought and practice are, which account either implies a general test for the correctness of basic ethical beliefs and principles or else implies that there cannot be such a test. ''6

(3) Formalism. Modern ethical theorists typically espouse a formalist model of rules and principles which are to be applied to individual cases. The correct decision is to be deduced from the relevant rules and principles, much as a solution to a problem within a formal mathematical or logical system is reached.

(4) Explicitness. Closely related to the previous point is the criterion of explicitness. In order to have what most modern philosophers mean by an ethical theory, moral beliefs must be represented as explicitly statable rules and principles. In fact actual moral communities do not represent most of their values in such a rationalistic manner, but at the same time we can easily see how the requirement that moral beliefs be made explicit makes the work of theorists more manageable#

(5) Decision Procedure. Ethical theories are designed to solve moral problems rationally by providing agents with a step-by-step decision procedure. Theorists assume that agents who apply their decision procedures correctly will always reach correct answers. The steps to be taken can all be laid out discursively, thus eliminating guess-work, bias, subjectivism, and all other non-rational factors from moral deliberation#

(6) Universality. Most modern ethical theorists yearn for a system which is valid not just for one society or for one group of people but which is binding on all rational agents, regardless of their particular space/time locations. Alan Donagan emphasizes this particular feature when he defines"the theory of morality" as "a theory of a system of laws or precepts, binding upon all rational creatures as such, the content of which is ascertainable by human reason. ''9

(7) Objectivity. Ethical theories are not supposed to reflect merely the perspectives of one individual or one group of agents over others but rather to represent reasons for acting which make claims on all agents, regardless of their subjective preferences. Stephen Darwall, a contemporary advocate for this doctrine, writes in the Introduction to his Impartial Reason: "this book seeks to vindicate the feeling of the moralists that considerations other than self-centered ones are reasons to act, indeed, that moral requirements, suitably understood, provide

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reasons for any agent that generally override those based on the agent's own individual preferences. It maintains that practical reaon is, at its base, impartial rather than self-centered. '"0 The words "universality" and "objectivity" occasionally are used interchangeably by writers in ethics, but they can be distinguished in the following way. A moral rule is universal if all agents are obliged to follow it in the appropriate circumstances. It is objective if the reasons why all agents are to follow it are not contingent on any of their particular desires or perspectives.

(8) Abstraction. Closely related to the objectivity requirement is the feature of abstraction. Ethical theorists assume that anyone who employs their methods correctly will arrive at correct moral answers. Background features such as the agent's character, community traditions, etc. are believed to be morally irrelevant, and are hence abstracted from. 11

(9) Systematic Hierarchy. The rules and principles which together compose the ethical theory are viewed as a deductive system. The less general are derivable from the moral general in hierarchical fashion, "with the king consideration at ease on the apex --. . . [a] one-principle system that incorporates all of the moral rules. ''12 Bentham's principle of utility and Kant's categorical imperative both would be classical examples here; Gewirth's principle of generic consistency is a contemporary illustration.

(10) No Moral Dilemmas. An ethical theory is supposed to enable agents to resolve rationally not just some problems but all problems. This is a particularly stern requirement to place on a theory, but it is also one that is clearly embedded in the dominant schools of modern ethical theory, as the contemporary debate on moral dilemmas demonstrates. Christopher Gowans, in the Introduction to his recent anthology, Moral Dilemmas, writes: "...with few exceptions, philosophers from Plato on have viewed moral dilemmas as mere appearances. This has certainly been the case in the two predominant traditions of modern moral philosophy - - Kantianism and utilitarianism. Both Kantians and utilitarians have thought that, for any apparent conflict, either one of the conflicting ought statements is not true or the two statements do not really enjoin incompatible actions."13

(11) An imagined best way of life. Traditionally, people have expected ethical theory to offer a vision of how we should live. Stuart Hampshire, in his Morality and Conflict, emphasizes this particular feature of moral theory when he writes: "All moral theories, which we would consider seriously, imply, when they do not explicitly state, a more or

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less precise conception of what virtues a man must have if he is to be praised in an unqualified way as a human being, and imply also an order of priority among these virtues; and they either imply or state a rather definite conception of the best way of life, and of several distinct dispositions and interests which this admired and sought after way of life will satisfy. ''~4 The requirement that ethical theories offer an imagined best way of life squares well with classical and medieval approaches such as Aristotle's and Aquinas', but it does not describe accurately modern liberal approaches which are committed to the "priority of the right over the good." In the latter case morality typically is conceived of as something which places constraints or limits on what one does, regardless of how one construes the good life. According to the modern liberal conception, morality's function is primarily negative rather than positive. Since we are concerned here primarily with modern conceptions of ethica! theory, inclusion of this particular characteristics on a list of necessary features of ethical theory is debatable. However, it clearly reamins part of what some influential, contemporary writers in ethics mean by "ethical theory,"and it is also quite relevant to the virtue ethics debate. So I have chosen to include it.

(12) Moral Expertise. Finally, it would seem to follow from the earlier-described features of formalism, explicitness, and decision- procedure that some agents may be more adept at reaching correct moral answers than others. Just as some people are better at solving problems in arithmetic or proving theorems in logic than others, so some should be able to solve moral problems more efficiently. Pincoffs writes: "There would be moral experts if the claims of ethical theory were true .... They would know what the formula is by with we determine the difference between right and wrong, and they would know how best to apply it to cases that arise. "15

The above dozen-items list is by no means intended as the last word on what constitutes an ethical theory. It is intended primarily as an aid in deciding whether or not virtue ethics shares the same assumptions and goals as the leading forms of modern normative ethical theories. If, after considering the above conjuction of properties, the reader is inclined to protest that I am using an objectionably narrow sense of the term "ethical theory," and to insist that so-and-so is an ethical theorist, and she certainly does not hold that (e.g.) a decision procedure can solve every moral problem, this is perhaps not such a bad thing. For one of the essay's subplots, to be developed below, is that the dominant conception of ethical theory within modern philosophy is precisely that: too narrow.

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II. ANTI-THEORY An anti-theorist in ethics, in the sense in which I shall be using the term, in someone who is opposed to the enterprise of ethical theory, when "ethical theory" is understood in the manner outlined above. Perhaps the first point to emphasize is that anti-theory is itself a philosophical position which its advocates defend by argumentation. Their opposition to ethical theory is a reasoned one, and they should not be confused with mere nay-sayers or anti-intellectuals. As Bernard Williams notes: "...it is quite wrong to think that the only alternative to ethical theory is to refuse reflection and to remain in unreflective prejudice. Theory and prejudice are not the only possibilities for an intelligent agent, or for philosophy."r 6 A second, related point is that anti-theorists are definitely not opposed to highly refined and detailed reflection about morality. Indeed, their own anti-theoretic stance is itself a product of such reflection. But they do hold that reflection on moral practices and traditions should stop short of theory construction. Granted, determining when wxactly reflection has lapsed into theory is not always easy to resolve, since theory itself (presumably!) is a product of reflection. Also, it may well be that anti-theorists such as Williams are themselves over-simplifying matters by offering a trichotomy of theory, reflection, and prejudice. A more realistic picture might allow room for a variety of kinds of theories, ranging from "harder" rationalist ones of the sort described above to "softer" coherentist models of the sort popular in post-Kuhnian philosophies of science.

The most extensive discussion to date of an anti-theoretic position in ethics is Williams' Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Harvard, 1985). Annette Baler has also explored the theme in several related articles, most notably "Doing Without Moral Theory?" and "Theory and Reflective practices," both of which are reprinted in her collection, Postures of the Mind (Minnesota, 1985). Other contemporary writers associated with anti-theory in ethics include Stuart Hampshire, John McDowell, and Iris Murdoch. t7 A recent article by Stanley Clarke ~s analyzes some central anti-theorist arguments and then attempts to show that Rawlsian coherentist ethical theories are immune to anti- theory criticisms. The remainder of this section in large part follows Clarke (though I will not be concerned to defend Rawlsian coherentist theories).

Clarke offers the following general characterization of anti-theory in ethics: "Anti-theorists take the bold stance of being against any sort of normative theory which guides our behavior by systematizing and extending our moral judgments. They give three types of reason for this

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stance. These are arguments that normative theory is (1) unncessary, (2) theoretically impossible, or (3) undesirable. ''19 Like Clarke, I find the argument for theoretical impossibility to be philosophically the most interesting, and will pursue it alone here. "Theoretical impossibility" means, in the present context, that normative ethical theories, in the strong sense defined earlier, have aims which are incompatible with certain fundamental features of moral practices. Since the theories' aims cannot be met in practice, they are "impossible" theories.

Clarke goes on to present three different arguments for theoretical impossibility, which I here label and summarize:

(1) The vagueness argument. The semantic features of actual moral norms often are vague and indeterminate, and can be given determinate meaning only by an interpretive act which situates them within their relevant cultural institutions and moral practices. But formalist ethical theories require rules and principles which are clear and determinate, so that they can play their proper deductive role in the resolution of moral problems. The requirements that ethical theories place on moral norms are thus incompatible with the actual nature of moral norms. Ethical theory is therefore theoretically impossible. 2~

(2) The Moral Dilemma Argument. Ethical theorists typically assume that moral dilemmas do not exist, and that there is one and only one correct answer to each moral problem. (Cf. # 10 in Section I.) But in real life we are confronted with irremovable moral dilemmas and conflicts. Agents do experience incompatible moral obligations. In Hampshire's words: "there must always be moral conflicts which cannot, given the nature of morality, be resolved by any constant and generally accepted method of reasoning .... [M]orality has its sources in conflict, in the divided soul and between contrary claims .... [T]here is no rational path that leads from these conflicts to harmony and to an assured solution, and to the normal and natural conclusion."2~ So here is a second way in which moral practices are held to be incompatible with the demands of ethical theory, a second reason for calling ethical theory impossible. 22

(3) The virtue argument. The traits of character known as virtues are an integral feature of morality. Many important moral virtues (e.g., humility, integrity) are not explicable in terms of dispositions to act according to rules, even if other virtues (e.g., honesty) are. But formalist ethical theories require that all moral norms be formulated into laws that are action-imperatives. Since not all moral norms can be formulated thusly, the theory's requirements are incompatible with practice and the theory is therefore impossible. 2~

While the above three arguments certainly do not exhaust the anti-

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theorists' arsenal, careful consideration of them should _give the reader a good grasp of the basic anti-theorist position. Finally, Section III turns to virtue ethics, asking to what extent it matches the description of an anti-theory by examining where virtue ethics stands with regard to each of the twelve defining characteristics of ethical theory outlined earlier.

II! . IS VIRTUE ETHICS AN ANTI-THEORY? Are practitioners of virtue ethics opposed to ethical theory? If so, to what extent do they offer the same sorts of arguments against the enterprise of ethical theory that one finds in the anti-theory literature? (I. e., do they hold that ethical theory is theoretically impossible?) These questions are not easy to answer, in part because (as we saw earlier) "ethical theory" itself is a concept used in a variety of different ways. Furthermore, virtue ethics too, much like feminism or Christianity, is an ideologically diverse movement. There are radical, moderate, and conservative voices within the tradition. At any rate, I propose now to take a second look at the twelve basic features of ethical theory presented earlier, asking in each instance whether virtue ethics rejects the feature and if so, on what grounds.

(1) Solve Problems. Virtue ethics, because of its strong agent orientation, is not a problem-oriented approach to ethics. Its most fundamental concern is with the kind of person one ought to be, the sort of moral life one ought to aspire to, not the search for a formula with which to resolve quandaries. Furthermore, according to virtue ethics the problem-focussed aim of mainstream ethical theory is one that cannot be met. In real life morally good people do not usually decide what to do by applying a formula. Thei~ character and experience give them the requisite judgment to see what the situation calls for. Someone lacking this character and exprience cannot suddenly become a good person by applying the "correct" formula to a moral problem (even if such a formula were to exist). Morally right action, from a virtue ethics perspective, depends on good character. But ethical theory, in its eagerness to solve problems, ignores character and is thus incompatible with the approach to moral problems exhibited in actual moral practice.

So on this first point, virtue ethics seems clearly anti-theoretic. At the same time, critics who have argued that virtue ethics is unable to offer guidance on moral problems appear to have overstated their case. There exists now a growing body of "applied virtue ethics" literature which seeks to understand better those ideals of character which are relevant to the various professions. Writers in this area of virtue ethics have made a convincing case for the claim that reflection on what kind

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of persons professionals should be is a needed corrective to the dominant rule orientation in applied and professional ethics. 24

(2) Test Beliefs. Does virtue ethics aim at providing a test to show which moral beliefs of agents are correct and which incorrect? Does it seek to systematize and extend agents' moral beliefs? If by "test" one means something like Bentham's principle of utility or a Rawlsian veil of ignorance, then the answer is clearly no. Virtue ethicists do not believe that abstract principles which are divorced from moral traditions and from the characters of the agents employing such principles can be of much help in real life.

However, there is a different sort of moral belief test concerning which many virtue theorists clearly have shown an interest. Virtue ethicists naturally focus on the moral beliefs of virtuous agents and the manners in which such agents arrive at and express their moral beliefs. Virtue ethicists have not, qua virtue ethicists, displayed much interest in epistemological issues concerning which moral beliefs are correct or true independently of the characters of the agents who hold them. Let us call the former sorts of beliefs character-emanating beliefs; the latter non-character-emanating beliefs. Typically, in virtue ethics correct moral beliefs are held to be those moral beliefs which emanate from the virtuous agent's character. Aristotle, for instance, holds that actions which emanate from moral virtues must fulfill certain conditions not necessary in the case of actions which flow from skills or crafts (technaO: "the agent.., must be in a certain condition when he does them; in the first place he must have knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts and choose them for their own sakes, and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character. These are not reckoned in as conditions of the possession of a craft, except for the knowing itself (EN 1105a30-b2)." Assuming (as I think we should) that what Aristotle says here concerning actions applies also to beliefs, he is then asserting that the virtuous person's moral beliefs are character- emanating beliefs, while the skillful person's beliefs concerning his or her skill are not necessarily character-emanating. Furthermore, it is obvious that Aristotle goes on to set up the morally virtuous agent as an exemplar which others are to imitate. We are to try to develop as well as to express our own moral, beliefs in the way in which he develops and expresses his, for that which is"in truth an object of wish is an object of wish to the good man (spoudaios), while any chance thing may be so to the bad man... [T]he spoudaios differs from others most by seeing the truth in each class of things, being as it were the norm and measure of them" (EN 1113a25-26, 32-33). 23 Aristotle then does specify criteria

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for the testing of those moral beliefs which are held to flow from good character, and he also asserts that we should try to model the relation between our own moral beliefs and character upon that of the morally good person. Therefore, it is incorrect to assert baldly that virtue ethicists reject ethical theorists' attempts to formulate a test for the correctness of moral beliefs. What they do reject are the non-character- emanating belief tests that modern ethical theorists tend to prefer. An Aristotelian virtue ethic which sets up the local spoudaios as the norm of moral truth and then encourages the rest of us to imitate him is offering one sort of test for the correctness of basic ethical beliefs and is thus an example of what Williams calls a positive ethical theory.

(3) Formalism. One of the chief motivating forces behind contemporary virtue ethics is the attempt to combat formalism in ethical theory by doing away with or at least diminishing strongly the role of rules and principles. Even though most writers who are sympathetic to this effort have concluded that rules cannot be dispensed with entirely (since certain key virtues seem to be analyzable as dispositions to follow rules), the general thrust of virtue ethics remains clearly anti-formalist. However, in this context it is important not to forget certain classic attempts to formalize the virtues. For instance, when Aristotle defines virtues as"a state concerned with choice, lying in a mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle (log6) and in the way in which a man of practical wisdom (ho phronimos) would determine it"(EN 1106b36-1107a2), we have hardly dispensed with rules and principles. At the same time, since Aristotle admits earlier that the mean "relative to us" (pros h~mas) is "not one, and is not the same for everyone" (1106a32), his quasi-quantitative talk of an arithmetic mean between extremes cannot be taken too seriously. The proper mean must in each case be tailored to the specific emotional makeup of the individual agent in question.

The real issue that separates virtue ethics from non-virtue ethics here is not whether rules are needed in ethics - - both sides agree that they are. Rather, it is the deeper question of what the rules are supposed to regulate. Mainstream ethical theorists tend to construe moral rules exclusively as rules which regulate actions. But since virtue "is concerned with passions [at well as with] actions" (EN 1106b18), rules in virtue ethics must have broader scope. Here we are concerned not only with rules which regulate actions, but (more fundamentally) with rules which regulate "emotions, passions, desires .... concerns,.., patterns of saliency, attention, perception, and judgment. ''26

(4) Explicitness. This in one of the easiest cases to adjudicate. As we

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saw earlier (see #3 in Sec. II), one of the major anti-theorist arguments for the theoretical impossibility of ethical theory is what I called the virtue argument. Not all virtues are explicable in terms of rules that require or prohibit acts, Baier, a strong advocate of this particular position, writes: "we should not assume that moral norms can be easily represented in the forms of representation that we have developed in the making and administering of law, nor in the scientific description of a world assumed to be orderly and law governed. Norms in the form of virtues may be very difficult to formulate, while being not so difficult to recognize and encourage .... Norms in the form of virtues may be essentially imprecise in some crucial ways, may be mutually referential but not hierarchially orderable, may be essentially self-referential. '~7 Virtue ethics is squarely opposed to the rationalistic assumption of modern ethical theory that moral values must always be represented as statable principles. And here virtue ethics also has a theoretical impossibility argument of the sort offered by the anti-theorists: many integral moral virtues simply cannot be represented as statable rules, contrary to the assumption of ethical theorists that all moral values must be so represented.

(5) Decision Procedure. The attempt on the part of mainstream ethical theorists to construct a decision procedure always has been one of the favorite targets of criticism for writers in the virtue ethics tradition. As they see it, a formalized choice mechanism which any agent (regardless of character and motivation) can plug in to and use correctly is never going to give us an accurate model of the way morally good people perceive situations and make choices. It simply is not the case that morally good people always engage in rule-guided deliberation. Perhaps conscientious behavior can be understood correctly as rule- guided behavior, but behavior which is a manifestation of other virtues, such as courage or friendship, cannot. Virtue ethicists do reject this fifth criterion, and their grounds for doing so are anti-theoretic.

(6) Universality. It is often pointed out that different moral traditions emphasize incompatible virtues (e.g., Christian humility, Aristotelian megalopsuchia) and some contemporary virtue ethicists do seem content to analyze those moral dispositions which are specific to particular communities. At the same time, from Aristotole on, many writers in the virtue ethics tradition have sought to understand those traits which human beings as a species need in order to flourish. Granted, grounding the virtues in an account of human nature does not give one universality on the grandiose Kantian scale (rational agency "as such," with no biological ground), but it is certainly a rejection of

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moral relativism. So here the verdict is mixed: some (primarily contemporary) practitioners of virtue ethics reject the goal of a theory that analyzes traits common to all moral agents, while others embrace it - - at least to the extent that such traits are rooted in basic biological and psychological facts about agents. Writers who fall under the latter category do endorse a qualified universality aim.

(7) Objectivity. One contemporary debate often associated with the virtue ethics movement concerns the issue of whether or not moral considerations must always be based on impartiality. 28 It would seem that the exercise of certain virtues (e.g., personal integrity) requires that one be partial toward oneself, and that the exercise of other virtues (e.g., friendship, patriotism) requires one to be partial toward certain specific others. The demands of morality when viewed from the vantage point of the virtues thus do not place as much weight on objectivity and impartiality as modern ethical theorists would like. At the same time, one should not infer from this claim that virtue ethics seeks to replace the commitment to objectivity with one of subjectivism. Subjectivism is often an even greater term of abuse within virtue ethics than it is in mainstream ethical theory writings. Iris Murdoeh writes: "we discover value in our ability to forget self, to be realistic, to perceive justly .... The value concepts are here patently tied on to the world, they are stretched as it were between the truth-seeking mind and the world, they are not moving about on their own as adjuncts of the personal will. ''29 Still, virtue ethicists clearly are critics of objectivity and impartiality, in the sense that they believe personal and interpersonal considerations often count as moral reasons. And their arguments here are anti-theoretic, since they are claiming that proper exercise of certain fundamental moral virtues requires the abandonment of impartiality.

(8) Abstraction. One of the clearest points of opposition between virtue ethics and modern ethical theory is abstraction. Pincoffs writes: "By focussing on the abstracted-from-the-social order individual and on the'foundations' for decisions concerning what to do in a hopelessly abstract environment in which all that counts is consistency or supposed social contract or the happiness of everyone, ethical theories pass over the topics that should be central in ethics. ''30 Virtue ethicists, on the other hand, by focussing on considerations such as whether a course of action is cowardly, vindictive, selfish, etc., must necessarily examine the particular motives and backgrounds of the agents involved. Considerations of virtue have a much more particularistic focus than do considerations of rights and duties, and so abstraction is another feature of ethical theory which virtue ethics rejects on anti-theoretic grounds.

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(9) Systematic Hierarchy. Critics of virtue ethics often charge that the virtues themselves are chaotic and lack any internal principles of organization. Thus there is Bentham's remark that "there is no marshalling them [viz., the virtues]; they are susceptible of no arrangement; they are a disorderly body, whose members are frequently in hostility with one another...," and, more recently, Lawrence Kohlberg's objection to the "bag of virtues" approach to moral education) = Virtue ethicists are at least perceived by their critics as being opposed to any effort which would introduce a hierarchical ordering of principes into moral reflection. Furthermore, some contemporary practitioners of virtue ethics have themselves asserted that moral reflection reveals no systematic hierarchy of principles at all. Pincoffs, for instance, claims that"there are mutually irreducible types of moral consideration,..., there is no hierarchy.'32 At the same time, in classical virtue ethics two doctrines clearly imply a hierarchy among the virtues. Consider first the doctrine of the four cardinal virtues (wisdom, bravery, moderation, justice) as presented in Plato's Republic. Here justice is viewed as an ordering principle which establishes harmony between the parts of the soul as well as between the classes of thepolis: when each part performs its own task (to ta tautouprattein), justice is present. The Platonic doctrine of psychic harmony, though not a deductive "top down" ordering of principles a la utilitarianism or Kantianism, clearly does imply that the key virtues are internally related in an integral manner. 33 Second, the Aristotelian doctrine of the unity of the virtues implies a strong interconnection among the virtues, "for with the presence of the one quality, phronesis, will be given all the aretai" (l 145a 1-2). According to Aristotle, a man can be neither morally good if he lacks practical wisdom, nor can be possess practical wisdom if he is not also morally good. Aquinas, citing not only Aristotle on this point but also Ambrose, Gregory, and Cicero, is in agreement: "the virtue are connected. "34

In classical virtue ethics then, we do witness an assumption that the virtues can and should be systematically organized. Nor is this systematizing tendency completely absent in contemporary virtue ethics. Wallace holds that moral character"is a system made up of a number of traits and skills in a delicate structure," and argues that the virtues fall into three family groups: conscientiousness, benevolence, and those virtues "concerned with the efficacy of a person's practical reason" (chiefly courage and restraint). Each type of trait performs functions necessary for human flourishing; no single type should be viewed as sufficient. 35 In conclusion, the assumption that the virtues form a

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system is certainly not absent in virtue ethics, though it is much more pronounced in classical than in contemporary virtue ethics. The kind of system assumed is not always the hierarchical, deductive one attacked as an unrealistic abstraction by contemporary virtue ethicists, but still, a system it remains.

(10) No Moral Dilemmas. Much attention has been paid to moral dilemmas in recent ethical theory literature. One common theme, as noted earlier, is that utilitarian and Kantian ethical theories are united in their conviction that moral dilemmas are illusory. Within this context it is sometimes assumed that virtue ethics offers a way out. Utilitarian and Kantian theories are both concerned exclusively with act evaluations, it is claimed, and an ethical outlook that was more concerned with agent evaluations would not have to fear moral dilemmas. Thus Michael Stocker, in his "Moral Conflicts: What they are and What They Show," suggests that a better ethics would "not limit its concern to act evaluations," and that progress will have been made in ethical theory once we come to see moral conflicts "in terms of regret and what is regrettable, in terms of what could or should have been, rather than in terms of conflicting action-guiding evaluations. ''36 Similarly, Alasdair Maclntyre recommends what he calls a"Sophoclean alternative" to the unity of virtues doctrine propounded by Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas. The Sophoclean alternative entails a "heterogeneity of the virtues," recognizes that "our situation is tragic," and allows that we may experience "rival allegiances to incompatible goods . ''37 But why assume that virtue ethics must automatically allow for moral dilemmas? Why must the belief that unresolvable dilemmas exist necessarily be fused to an ethical theory which favors agent evaluations over act evaluations? Maclntyre himself must recognize that the doctrine of the unity of the virtues found in classical virtue ethics rules out moral dilemmas, since he introduces the Sophoclean alternative in order to allow room for moral dilemmas. And Gowans explicitly asserts this claim when he remarks that "the doctrine of unity of the virtues in Aristotle implies that there can be no conflict among the virtues; and the natural law doctrine of Aquinas specifically precludes moral dilemmas. ''3s So here too classical virtue ethics appears to share more of the aims of modern ethical theory than do its contemporary descendants. Contemporary virtue ethics, on the other hand, seems more imbued with the skeptical, anti-foundattionalist spirit peculiar to our own era. This skeptical mood is what gives virtue ethics its anti-theory aura, more than its commitment to the virtuesper se.

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(11) An imagined best way of life. We noted earlier that this particular characteristic of ethical theory is one that has been rejected by a host of modern liberal writers, most of whom favor a rule/act approach to moral and political reflection rather than one which stresses agents and traits. And we noted further that it is precisely classical virtue ethicists, with their belief that human life has a fixed telos and that the virtues are those traits needed by humans to fulfill their nature, who are its strongest advocates. The position of contemporary virtue ethicists with regard to this issue is somewhat self-contradictory. None of them offers a blanket endorsement of the classical view that we can speak unqualifiedly about the goal of human life, but several of them seem to be hankering after the next best thing. Thus Maelntyre, while asserting that we "must" reject Aristotle's metaphysical biology, offers as a replacement his notion of narrative perspective: "The unity of a human life is the unity of a narrative quest .... the good life for man is the life spent in seeking the good life for man...."39 We are to understand here that different agents may have different narratives: there is no single story that all must live. But the result of this relativism with respect to narratives is that Maclntyre's notion of narrative unity is relieved of any real teleological content it otherwise might have had. We are given no criteria for distinguishing good from bad narrative quests. Other contemporary virtue ethicists such as Wallace and Pincoffs continue to endorse a quasi-Aristotelian functionalism which asserts that ethics must proceed from a background of biological facts concerning what is necessary for human creatures to live well, but they stop well short of advocating an imagined best way of life for the entire species. As Pincoffs puts it: "I do not want to issue pronouncements about the 'end of man'. "4~

(12) Moral Expertise. The specific charge here was that ethical theorists, because of their decision procedure conception of moral deliberation, are committed to the possibility that there may be moral experts. These experts would supposedly know what rule to apply in the situation at hand, and they would also be able to apply the rule more efficiently in order to reason out a correct answer. The non-experts would either not know what rule to apply to the problem, or they would make make logical errors in their reasoning - - or both. Virtue ethicists, on the other hand, allegedly see through the myth of moral expertise since they hold that good moral judgment cannot be divorced from character. Good moral reasoning, on their view, is not simply a matter of applying formal rules to cases. It is the result of years of experience and moral education, and cannot simply be handed over to someone in a tidy formula package. 108


I think virtue ethics' opposition to the "technocratic" conception o f moral expertise assumed by ethical theorists is clear, and the grounds for this opposition are persuasive. However, the important question is whether or not a different conception of moral expertise is assumed within virtue ethics. Suppose we accept the claim that the model of technocratic moral expertise cannot stand up to scrutiny. What other possibilities for moral expertise remain? Consider Aristotle's discussion of phron~sis (practical wisdom). Phron~sis, like other intellectual virtues, is a state "by which we possess truth and are never deceived..." (EN 1141a3-4). From this it follows that phronr as Aristotle conceives it, is infallible: it cannot be wrong. Aristotle also claims that the phronimos, the man who posseses practical wisdom, "is the man who is able in his calculation to reach (stochastikos) the best for man of things attainable by action" (1141 b 13-14). From this second remark it follows that phron~sis is an unerring guide to action. The phronimos always knows what to do in any practical situation. 4' I submit that Aristotle's conception of the phronimos is certainly that of a moral expert, one who has acquired knowledge as a result of making a thorough trial of his experiences. And this is precisely what the etymological sense of"expert" signifies (Latin expertus, past participle of experrrr, to make full trial of). Aristotle obviously endorses the view that there exists a clear distinction between moral insight and delusion, and he does not believe that it is difficult to separate competent moral judges from charlatans ["we think Pericles and men like him have phron~sis, viz. because they can see what is good for themselves and what is good for men in general..." (1140b8-9)]. Aristotle'sphronimoi are not mere formula followers, for in the sphere of the practical it is often the case that "the decision rests with perception" (1109b23). But they clearly do possess knowledge which others lack.

My final verdict as to whether virtue ethics is best interpreted as an anti-theory is thus somewhat mixed. I believe I have shown (see points //9-12 above) that classical virtue ethics definitely shares more of the aims of ethical theory than does contemporary virtue ethics. From this I infer that there is nothing in the concept of virtue ethics per se which dictates that its practitioners must adopt an anti-theoretic attitude. Nevertheless, it remains the case that there exists a pronounced anti- theoretic streak in many contemporary virtue ethics writings. However, I believe we should attribute this more to the general anti- foundationalist outlook popular among younger philosophers today rather than to any essential features of a virtues-oriented approach to moral reflection. As to whether ethical theory itself is dying (and as to

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whether virtue ethics is helping to kill it off), I tend to think the reports of its death are greatly exaggerated. First of all, a very narrow Enlightenment conception of ethical theory is always presupposed in such discussions. Part of the message of virtue ethics is that we ought not to take this part icular conception of what constitutes an ethical theory as our only option. It is not so much that writers in the virtue ethics t radi t ion are opposed to theory as that they are groping toward a different conception of what ethical theory ought to look like. This revisionist (but also conservative) conception is for the most part less intellectualistic and abstract than the dominant conception within modern ethical theory. Because the virtues approach, by definition, focusses on moral ly admirable disposit ions of agents, it cannot divorce itself f rom the moral practices and t radi t ions that engender and sustain these dispositions. It thus necessarily rejects the more formalistic t rappings of modern ethical theory, precisely because such trappings, however dear they may be to their phi losophical authors, do not reflect accurately our moral practices. But rather than labelling this rejection a total dismissal of ethical theory, I think the evidence shows instead that it is part of a larger effort to return ethical theory to more realistic possibilities. (Theory with a small 't ' , if you will.) Virtue ethics is not after the same turf as deontic and uti l i tar ian ethics, for it does reject many of their most cherished theoretical aims. But it does not reject the theorist 's quest per se, so long as the theorist is willing to be constrained by a modicum of historical, psychological, and anthropological facts about human beings.

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH MAINE PORTLAND, MAINE 04103

USA

NOTES * The roots of this essay lie in a panel discussion in which I participated on "The

State of Virtue Theory Today," held in conjunction with a conference on The Virtues at the University of San Diego in February, 1986. I would like to thank panel chair and conference organizer Lawrence Hinman for inviting me to participate, and fellow panelists Robert C. Roberts, David J. Depew, Gary Watson, and Arthur Flemming for challenging me to think further on the topic. An earlier version of the paper was presented at the University of Maine at Machias in May, 1988. I would like to thank Jon Reisman for inviting me to

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present the material, and Louis Pojman, Stanley Clarke, and Robert Roberts for helpful criticisms of an earlier written draft.

i See the extensive bibliography prepared by Robert B. Kruschwitz and Robert C. Roberts in their anthology, The Virtues: Contemporary Essays on Moral Character (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1987).

2 This claim should be qualified. Hume is often read as a friend of the virtues ( a strong motif in Annette Baler's writings), and some have even argued that Kant's ethics is an example of an agent-centered approach. On this latter point, see my "Kant'ss Virtue Ethics," Philosophy 61 (1986): 473-89, and Stephen D. Hudson, Human Character and Morality (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), pp. 4, 57, 123, 149.

3 1 plead guilty here. In my "On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics" [American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1984): 227-36, reprinted in Kruschwitz and Roberts, The Virtues and in Louis P. Pojman, ed., Ethical Theory: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1989)] I stated that "the' overall strategy [of virtue ethics] remains the same [as that of utilitarian and Kantian theories].... Virtue ethics is not unique at all" (p. 69, The Virtues). I still believe that the conceptual reductionism charge levelled at strong virtue ethics programs in that article is accurate, but I feel now that my case was in certain respects overstated. Virtue ethics is qualifiedly different in orientation from both deontological and utilitarian theories in several ways, the articulation of which is a major aim of the present essay.

4 Baler, for instance [Postures of the Mind(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), pp. 209-10], argues that normative ethical theories do not describe an independently existing reality, whereas theories of nature do. Williams [Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University press, 1985), p. 111 ] claims that a scientific understanding of the world incorporates the view that humans occupy no special place in it, whereas ethical theory must adopt the perspective that humans have a special status in the world.

5 R.B. Brandt, Ethical Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1959), p. 1. [Cited by Edmund Pincoffs at the beginning of his "Quandary Ethics" Mind 80 (1971): 552-71, reprinted in his Quandaries and Virtues (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1986). See also the additional citations from Stephen Toulmin, R.M. Hare, and Marcus Singer following the reference to Brandt.]

6 Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, p. 72. Williams calls an account which offers a test for the correctness of ethical beliefs a"positive"ethieal theory; one which implies that there cannot be such a test is a "negative" theory. Benthamite utilitarianism is a clear example of a positive theory; Ayer's emotivism would be one version of a negative theory. NOTE: My own remarks in (2) above apply only to what Williams calls positive ethical theories. Most of the efforts within modern ethical theory construction have been positive rather than negative, and it is these which I am seeking to describe. I should also emphasize here that an anti-theory in ethics is neither a positive nor a negative theory in Williams' senses. Anti-theorists are (among other things) more agnostic concerning belief tests: they leave "open the question whether there could be such

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tests" (Williams, p. 74.) For further discussion, see the reviews of Williams by Thomas Nagel, Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986): 351-360 and Susan Wolf, Ethics 97 (1987): 821-33.

7 Cf. Baler, Postures of the Mind, pp. 208,234-35; and Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, p. 100. John McDowell's arguments against the codifiability of virtuous action are also relevant here. See his "Virtue and Reason," The Monist 62 (1979): 331-350.

s Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, p. 101. 9 Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

1977), p. 8. ~0 Stephen L. Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983),

p. 17. For further discussion of objectivity, see Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York; Oxford University Press, 1086), esp. pp. 3-5, 139-43.

J J Pincoffs refers to this feature as "reductivism." See Quandaries and Virtues,p. 2, 5, 10, 28, 35, 70.

~z Pincoffs, Quandaries and Virtues, p. 3. For a recent example, see Alan Gewirth's discussion of his principle of generic consistency in Reason and Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).

~3 Christopher W. Gowans, ed., Moral Dilemmas (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 4.

~4 Stuart Hampshire, Morality and Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard Universy press, 1983), p. 19. For critical discussions of liberalism and the relationship between the reight and the good, see Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), and Michael J. Sandel, ed., Liberalism and its Critics(New York: New York University Press, 1984). See also John R awls' recent reply, "The Priority of the Right and Ideas of the Good," Philosophy and Public Affairs 17 (Fall 1988): 251-76.

15 Pincoffs, Quandaries and Virtues, p. 3. 16 Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, p. 112. 17 Stuart Hampshire, Morality and Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

1983); John McDowell, "Virtue and Reason," The Monist 62 (July 1979): 331-50; Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of the Good(New York: Schocken Books, 1971).

~s "Anti-Theory in Ethics," American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1987): 237-44. See also the recent anthology edited by Clarke and Evan Simpson, Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989).

19 Stanley G. Clarke, "Anti-Theory in Ethics," American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1987), p. 237.

20 Clarke, "Anti-Theory in Ethics," pp. 238-39. 21 Hampshire, Morality and Conflict, p. 152. 22 Clarke, "Anti-Theory in Ethics," pp. 239-40. 23 Clarke, "Anti-theory in Ethics," pp. 240-41. 2, In my "On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics," I argued that we "cannot expect virtue

ethics to be of great use in applied ethics and casuistry" (p. 71, Kruschwitz and Roberts, The Virtues). For recent examples of applied and professional virtue ethics work, see Albert Flores, ed., Professional Ideals (Belmont, CA:

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Wadsworth, 1988), and Earl E. Shelp, ed., Virtue and Medicine (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985).

25 For contemporary moral exemplar arguments, see A.S. Cua, Dimensions of Moral Creativity (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978) and Harold Alderman, "By Virtue of a Virtue," Review of Metaphysics 36 (I 982): 127-53, reprinted in Kruschwitz and Roberts, The Virtues.

26 Robert C. Roberts, "Virtues and Rules," p. 4. (Paper read at 1987 Central Division APA Meetings.) For more on Aristotle's doctrine of the mean, see W.F.R. Hardie, "Aristotle's Doctrine that Virtue is a 'Mean'," in J. Barnes, M. Schofield, and R. Sorabji, eds., Articles on Aristotle, vol. 2, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977). See also Aquinas' discussion in Summa Theologiae, I-II, 64.

27 Baier, Postures of the Mind, p. 220. 28 See Lawrence A. Blum's"Gilligan and Kohlberg: Implications for Moral Theory,'

Ethics 98 (1988): 472-491 and the references cited therein for a recent review of the impartiality/partiality debate.

29 Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of the Good, p. 90. 3o Pincoffs, Quandaries and Virtues, p. 10. 3~ Jeremy Bentham, Deontology: The Science of Morality (London: Longman,

Rees, Orme, Browne, Green & Longman, 18340 I, p. 196. [Cited by Arthur Flemming in "Reviving the Virtues," Ethics 90 (1980), p. 587.] Lawrence Kohlberg, "Education for Justice: A Modern Statement of the Platonic View," in Moral Education: Five Lectures (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

32 Pincoffs, Quandaries and Virtues, p. 3. 33 See Republic IV, esp. 443d-e. 34 EN VI.13 and Summa Theologiae I-, 65 and 1. Granted, there remains an

important difference between the kind of systematic organization among the virtues being asserted here and the kind of systematic organization among rules found in, say, Benthamite utilitarianism. In the latter case, the result is a decision procedure with one master-rule (the principle of utility) at the top. In the former case, no decision procedure is forthcoming.

35 James D. Wallace, Virtues and Vices (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), pp. 126, 160.

36 Michael Stocker, "Moral Conflicts: What They are and What they Show," pp. 1, 28. [Paper presented at conference on Character and Morality, Radcliffe College, April, 1988. Published later in The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 68 (1987): 104-23.] At the Conference, Commentator David Brink also raised several questions concerning Stocker's claim that agent-ethics handle moral conflicts better than act-ethics. I have benefitted from his discussion.

37 Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 2nd. ed., pp. 142-43.

38 Gowans, Moral Dilemmas, p. 5. (See also the references cited in his second footnote.)

39 Maclntyre, After Virtue, pp. 162, 219. k~

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40

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ROBERT B. LOUDEN

Pincoffs, Quandaries and Virtues, p. 6. (Cf. Wallace, Virtues and Vices, pp. 15-16.) Here I am following Troels Engberg-Pederson, Aristotle's Theory of Moral Insight (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), pp. 189-91. See also my "Aristotle's Practical Particularism," Ancient Philosophy 6 (1986): 123-38.

crltica Vol. XXII / No. 64 / Mdxico, abril 1990

,qrtlculos

ADOLFO GARCIA DE LA SIENRA, Estructuras y representaciones

MIGUEL ANGEL QUINTANILLA, Problemas conceptuales y polltieas de de- sarrollo tecnol6gieo

PABLO EUGENIO NAVARRO, Normas, slstemas jurldieos y eficaeia

ERNESTO SOSA, Cuestiones de sobrevivencla

MANUEL CRUZ, Origen y desembocadura de la acci6n: el sujeto inevitable

Nota~ bibliogrdficaz

J. J. E. GRACIA, Individuality. An Essay on the Foundations of Metaphysics [Mauricio Beuchot]

C. WADE SAVAGE & C. ANTHONY ANDERSON (Eds.), Rereading Russell. Es- says on Bertrand Russell's Metaphysics and Epistemology [Alejandro Tomasini]

Libros recibido~

CR[TICA, Revi~ta Hispanoamericaaa de Filosoffa is published in April, August and December. All correspondence should be addressed to CR|TICA, Apartado 70-447, Coyoacfin, 04510-M6xico, D.F. Mdxico.

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virtue ethics and anti-theory

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