understanding society december 2013 - great britain: the ... · a great deal a fair amount not very...
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GreatBritain: the way we live now
December 2013
Ipsos MORI - Understanding Society December 2013
General economic optimism has been rising consistently since the spring after a long period in the doldrums – to its highest level for some years. But people are more pessimistic about their own personal financial situation.
The economy and personal optimism
The recovery
Parties on living standards and the economy
...grow the economy
...best for me personally ...best for the country
... reduce you and
your family’s cost
of living
... ensure that you and
your family benefits from
a growing economy
Despite growing optimism about the national economy, this is not yet translating into a feel-good factor for families’ own standard of living. Just one in seven feel the recent economic upturn has had at least a fair amount of impact on their standard of living, while half say it has had no impact at all. And only slightly more expect economic growth to have much impact on them over the next year.
Which party, if any, do you trust most to...
CONSERVATIVE LABOUR LIBERAL DEMOCRATS
UKIP
The economy, the recovery and living standards
4 5 54 4 3
Conference policies
I am going to read out a number of policies announced by political parties. Which two or three, if any, of the following do you think would be…
*Do you think that your personal financial circumstances will improve, get worse or stay the same over the next 12 months?
Base: 1,019 British adults 18+, 9th – 11th November 2013
Base: 1,004 British adults 18+, 12th -15th October 2013, split sample question- approximately half (c.500) the sample were asked each version
A freeze on gas and electricity prices for 20 months
A freeze on petrol duty for the next 18 months
Raising the income tax threshold so that no-one
earning the minimum wage pays income tax
Free school meals for all children aged under eight
A government scheme to guarantee mortgages for people
buying a home with a deposit between 5% and 20%
25 hours of free childcare per week
50
56
40
29
23
22
62
44
44
41
33
33
36
2328
2431 27
National economic optimism NET 42% / 27% / 27% / 4% +15
Personal financial optimism* NET 23% / 42% / 33% / 3% -10
4% 15% 44% 33% 3%
3% 11% 36% 48% 1%
A great deal A fair amount Not very much None at all Don’t know
Improve Stay the same Get worse Don’t know
Ipsos MORI Economic Optimism Index (net optimism +-%)
What impact, if any, do you feel this growth in the economy has had on you and your family’s standard of living so far?
What impact, if any, do you think the growth in the economy will have on you and your family’s standard of living over the next 12 months?
Do you think that the general economic condition of the country will improve, stay the same or get worse over the next 12 months?
0
20
-40
-60
-80
Year
20
40
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
-64-48
+23+15
IMPACT OF RECOVERY
NOV2013
Infographic: The economy, the recovery and living standards
01.Foreword by Bobby Duffy
02.The way we feel: the national mood in the modern worldWhat do we know about the
attitudes and behaviours of
people living in Britain today?
Daniel Cameron
07.Top advice An interview with Sir Jeremy
Heywood, Cabinet Secretary
Ben Page
13. The way we engage: Political activism in 2013As we see younger
generations becoming less
likely to associate with a
political party what does this
say about British political and
social engagement in the 21st
century?
Gideon Skinner
Tom Mludzinski
18. Switched on or off?What is the public’s
perspective on the UK’s
energy challenges, and what
is the direction of travel?
Edward Langley
23. After Britain?The 2014 Scottish referendum
will undoubtedly mean a
rethink of what it means to be
British.
Sunder Katwala, British Future
26.Keeping fitIs the public open to
behavioural interventions
to help them live healthy
lifestyles?
Louise Park
30. Children of the digital revolutionHow pervasive are information
technologies and how do we
feel about them?
Anne Charlton
Editorial:Gideon Skinner
Chloe Forbes
Bobby Duffy
Daniel Cameron
Information [email protected]
Follow
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Scan the QR code below to download an electronic version of this report.
Welcome to the latest edition of the
Ipsos MORI Social Research Institute’s
Understanding Society. In this issue, we
look at the way Britons live now and how
our attitudes, values and behaviours
compare with those in other countries.
The tail end of 2013 has seen
Britain edge into economic recovery and
a relatively strong sense of economic
optimism. But the focus has increasingly
shifted to what type of recovery this
is, who’s feeling the benefit and, in
particular, the growing public concern
about stagnating living standards. We
flagged this much earlier in the year
– the economy has been the national
concern since 2008, but prices have
been the top personal worry – and this
is further illustrated by the infographic at
the front of this publication.
To help us make sense of this
year and the state of British society,
peppered throughout our articles are
findings from our new Global Trends
Survey. This study aims to build a more
comprehensive picture of what matters
to people in Britain, compared with 19
other countries across the world.
The survey has hundreds of
questions covering a diverse range
of subjects including perceptions of
government, our deeper values, views
of some of the key challenges facing
the world and measures of a wide range
of behaviours. We will be reporting
on these findings in much more detail
through 2014 and the data included
here is just a taster of what is to come.
We are also delighted to have an
interview with the Cabinet Secretary,
Sir Jeremy Heywood, Britain’s top civil
servant and the Prime Minister and
Deputy Prime Minister’s most senior
policy adviser. Sir Jeremy considers the
future of the British civil service, the skills
needed to succeed in the civil service
and the role of data in policy-making.
We are also extremely pleased to
have an article on British identity from
Sunder Katwala, director of the think
tank, British Future. He unpicks the
notion of Britishness and its constituent
parts, as well as considering the extent
to which the referendum next year in
Scotland will trigger a further rethinking
of national identities across Britain.
Some of the key topics covered in
this edition include how we understand
success as a nation, our attitudes to
complexity and how optimistic we
feel about the future, compared with
other countries. We also consider our
changing relationships with institutions,
and in particular how our youngest
generation are passively rejecting the
“wholesale” offers from political parties
and other traditional institutions.
The extent to which the public is
open to behavioural interventions – or
nudges – to help them live healthy
lifestyles is also discussed. Nudges
done well can be simple and low-cost
whilst still having a real impact on our
lives, going with the grain of human
behaviour - but the public acceptability
of such approaches still needs to be
considered.
This behavioural focus is also
central to energy policy – but we need
to understand the public’s shifting
beliefs about the causes of climate
change and the viability of renewable
energy sources. Here we take a look
at the public’s perspective on the UK’s
energy challenges, and their own role in
dealing with them.
Finally, we also look at how information
technology affects our lives and the
new concerns it raises. We know that
not all parts of society are embracing
technology to the same extent: within the
huge shifts we have seen in overall take-
up of technology, some patterns seem
set within generations. This has clear
implications for the public sector as it
seeks to move much of its interaction with
citizens online.
We hope you enjoy this update
on our latest thinking on British
public opinion. We remain committed
to sharing the messages from our
research, in the belief that a better
understanding of public opinion and
behaviour will lead to better policy
outcomes and a better society. If you
would like to discuss any of the issues
raised in this report, or wish to learn
more about what we do, please get in
touch. In the meantime, best wishes for
2014.
Bobby Duffy
Managing Director
Ipsos MORI
Social Research Institute
@BobbyIpsosMORI
Foreword
1.
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Figure ONE.Q: To what extent do you agree or disagree…‘I measure my success by the things I own’?
Figure TWO.Q: To what extent do you agree or disagree…‘I feel under a lot of pressure to be successful and make money’?
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The way we feelThe national mood in the modern world Daniel Cameron
Over recent years the British public’s mood has been shaped to a great extent by the country’s economic performance. The media continues to be dominated by stories about the recession and its aftermath: youth unemployment, more part time and unstable jobs, benefit cuts, house prices, and wider pressures on the cost of living.
As the country finally emerges from
recession there are signs that things
are beginning to change. Concern
about the economy is at its lowest level
since the ‘credit crunch’ (as it was then
called) began in earnest in summer
2008. According to our regular monthly
Issues Index, attention is increasingly
turning to other worries, like the NHS
and immigration. The economy will
continue to be important, particularly if
things take another turn for the worse.
But if the Bank of England is right, and
stronger growth returns next year, the
way people see their lives in Britain will
be less dominated by worries about
the national economy, even if concerns
about personal financial circumstances
look like they will remain for some time
to come.
In the years immediately before the
recession, politicians of all persuasions
talked up the need to take a more
holistic view of what makes for a life
worth living1. They said that focusing on
the economy and individual wealth was
not enough. Instead they argued that
we need to develop a more nuanced
understanding of what drives individual
happiness, before determining the role
government and others should play in
helping to make life more worthwhile
and enjoyable.
Work to develop a set of measures
of national well-being has continued
during the downturn, with the latest
revision to the indicators published
by ONS in September 20132. These
measures of societal well-being are
grounded in research about what makes
individuals feel happy and fulfilled. A
growing economy is not enough on its
own to make a successful country, any
more than increasing personal wealth
is enough to make a life worth living.
Even business leaders are increasingly
making the case that profits on their
own are not enough for successful
companies3.
‘We’ll continue to measure GDP as we’ve always done, but it is high time we admitted that, taken on its own, GDP is an incomplete way of measuring a country’s progress.’
David Cameron, November 2010
As we anticipate a return to priorities
other than the economy, what else can
we say about the attitudes and
behaviours of people living in Britain
today? What is life like for us? And
how are our views changing? Our new
Global Trends Survey aims to build a
more detailed picture of what matters
to people, in Britain and 19 other
countries across the world. There are
hundreds of questions covering a wide
range of topics including perceptions
of government, cultural attitudes,
views of some of the key challenges
facing the world, and measures of
consumer behaviour.
During early 2014 we will be
reporting on these findings in much
greater detail. Ahead of this fuller
analysis, this article pulls together
three themes that emerge from an initial
review of the data – how we understand
success, our views of complexity, and
how optimistic we are about the future.
The meaning of success
In Britain, most of us certainly do
not want to define our personal success
based on the things we own. Just one
in eight (16%) of us agree that we do,
and this view has become slightly less
common since 2008 (20%). What is
most striking though, is the huge range
of attitudes across countries, with
agreement as high as 72% in China.
Britons are in a group who claim lower
material aspirations, alongside citizens
from Sweden, Spain, Canada and the
US. It seems a real and significant split
is emerging between countries like
China, India and Turkey at one end, and
some more developed economies at the
other. The openness to consumer culture
in emerging markets helps explain
why global companies are focusing so
strongly on growth in these countries.
However, there is plenty of evidence
that ‘owning things’ is important in our
culture too. Around £16bn a year is
spent on advertising in the UK4, and
there is an on-going debate about the
influence of advertising and brands on
society5. Our work for the Advertising
Standards Agency and others suggests
that, at a personal level, we generally
value the role products and brands
play in our lives and do not feel unduly
pressured by marketing6. Even so,
we do worry about the wider impact
of consumer pressures on society,
and particularly on children and other
vulnerable groups.7
The Global Trends Survey findings
also suggest that people are feeling
under more pressure to ‘be successful
and make money’. While most of us
continue to disagree that we face
Ipsos MORI - Understanding Society December 2013
2. 3.
The way we feel
Figure THREE.Q: To what extent do you agree or disagree…‘I would like Britain to be the way it used to be’?
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Figure FOUR.Q: To what extent do you agree or disagree…‘The world today is changing too fast’?
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Figure FIVE.Q: To what extent do you agree or disagree…‘I wish I could slow down the pace of my life’?
pressure to make money (55%), two in
five of us now agree (39%), a significant
increase since before the recession
(27% agreed in 2008). This is linked
to the squeeze on real incomes over
recent years, which has made feeling
financially comfortable more difficult
for all but the wealthiest in society. We
are slightly higher than some of our
European neighbours, but feel under
much less pressure than those in North
America and emerging economies.
Yet these signs of a growing
pressure to make money do not
necessarily translate into a willingness
to take more risks. Overwhelmingly, the
British public think it is better to have a
secure job (57%) than to have a well-
paid one (9%). Even among those who
say they feel under a lot of pressure to
make money and be successful, only
14% think it is better to have a well-paid
job. Perhaps it really is the case that, for
many in Britain, success means having
enough to be comfortable, and feeling
secure about continuing to have enough
in future.
ComplexityIt is a cliché that most of us want
life to be simpler, but it is a theme of
how many Britons perceive their lives.
Most of the British public would like
the country to be the way it used to be.
Nostalgia peaked at the beginning of
the recession in 2008, although now
appears to be dropping slightly as
things start to improve economically.
Another consistent theme is the
notion that life was easier in the past,
irrespective of how true that really is.
Twice as many of us agree that ‘people
led happier lives in the old days when
they had fewer problems to cope
with’ than disagree (61% and 30%
respectively). And the pattern is very
similar when it comes to agreement
that ‘the world today is changing too
fast’ (62%), even if we are among the
least likely to agree across the countries
included in the Global Trends Survey.
This nostalgia for a less complex life
is shared across many countries,
including both developed and emerging
economies. This concern about the
pace of change in nations considered
to be fast-developing success stories
is perhaps counter-intuitive. It seems
the public in these countries are able
to mix pride and confidence in their
development with an awareness of the
downsides and a desire to preserve
what was best about the past8.
Of course it is also worth
remembering that not everyone shares
this view about the past, and that there
are things about modern life we do like.
In Britain, half do not want to slow down
the pace of our lives (51%). Agreement
with this statement is lower in Britain
than in any of the other countries
included in the Global Trends Survey.
Another consistent theme is the notion that life was easier in the past, irrespective of how true that really is.
This suggests our society has
something of a complex relationship
with complexity. Many of us are
nostalgic for a world that changes less
rapidly, and when we think people were
happier. On the other hand, there is
a level of confidence in dealing with
the rapid pace of modern life that is
perhaps surprising given the challenges
it brings to a country like Britain.
Optimism The story on optimism is not
straightforward either. The infographic
at the very front of this publication
summarises public attitudes to the
economy and the effect growth is – and
isn’t – having on our living standards.
Optimism about the general economic
condition of the country has increased,
with 42% now thinking that it will
improve over the next year. But when we
ask the public about personal economic
optimism – whether they think their
financial circumstances will improve, get
worse or stay the same over the next 12
months – just one in four (23%) thinks
things will get better for them personally.
While this is higher than during the
recession (the figure was 14% in March
2011), it highlights the continuing
gap between our expectations of the
economy generally and how we see our
own economic prospects.
But consistent with the view that
money isn’t everything, most of us are
optimistic about ourselves and our
families over the next 12 months (61%).
However, as we think further away from
our immediate experience, our optimism
falls away. Personal optimism bias is a
well-established phenomenon in human
psychology.9 In part this is because we
feel in less control of things outside our
Ipsos MORI - Understanding Society December 2013
4. 5.
The way we feel
Figure SIX.Q: Looking ahead to the next 12 months, are you optimistic or pessimistic about the following?
The world in general
Very optimistic Fairly pessimistic Don’t knowFairly optimistic Neither optimistic nor pessimistic Very pessimistic
You and your family
The city/town villagewhere you live
Great Britain
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families. Media stories focusing on the
challenges the world faces do not help
either. Nonetheless, the pattern is striking
and largely consistent across countries,
reinforcing the idea that one aspect of
the human condition is to worry about
what happens ‘out there’, even if we
remain optimistic closer to home.
There is much more work to do to
analyse what life in Britain today is like
from the Global Trends Survey. Many of
us hark back to a time when we assume
life was easier, but on a personal
level more of us are content with the
pace of our lives than not. We do not
think success is just about money,
possessions or a great career, but we
do worry about our own economic
prospects in the short term. And it
seems we have more confidence in our
ability to deal with change than might
be expected – an important skill in
adapting to the shifting dynamics of the
modern world.
Many of us hark back to a time when we assume life was easier, but on a personal level more of us are content with the pace of our lives than not.
Top advice An interview with Sir Jeremy Heywood, Cabinet Secretary Ben Page
BP: Can you tell us a bit about your current role of Cabinet Secretary and how you approach it?
My role as Cabinet Secretary means
that I am a policy adviser to the Prime
Minister and Deputy Prime Minister
and act as Secretary to the Cabinet,
responsible to all ministers for the
running of Cabinet government.
The most important thing about my
job is that it is impossible to do it without
relying upon my team, the individual
permanent secretaries running their own
departments and Sir Bob Kerslake10 who
runs the civil service.
If you look at my diary, it is a
succession of meetings, some I am
attending as an advisor, some I am
chairing. I have to be able to see the
wood from the trees and be able to spot
the two or three things in an area that
really matter. It is very easy to be sucked
into the detail - there are vast amounts
of paper, huge numbers of emails each
day, many people wanting my time.
That is particularly important when
you are dealing with busy people like
the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime
Minister and you have half an hour with
them. If you are the sort of person who
just sees this as a job 9 to 5, let’s just
maintain status quo and just get out
with no mistakes having been made
at the end of the day, that is a wasted
opportunity. I see this as an opportunity
to help ministers achieve the things they
want to achieve in their time in office.
BP: Do you bring any of your own vision to bear on your role?
On issues about the civil service,
it is important that Bob and I do have
a vision about what needs to change
in the civil service as an organisation
but when it comes to policy, it is very
important that we do not have our own
agenda. Our cue is taken from the
manifestos and the coalition agreement.
That is a place where quite rightly, policy
is set and implementation priorities are
established. It should not matter and
does not matter what my personal views
are. My job is to be a civil servant, if I
wanted to be making decisions I would
be attempting to become a politician.
BP: What would your advice be to someone in their twenties starting out on their career in the civil service?
Good question! My advice would be,
it is a great career, so you made the right
call if you have already decided to join
us. There is no career more varied and
more interesting in any other sector. So
first of all, congratulations!
BP: What is the secret of a successful civil service career?
Ok so if I confine my comments
to the policy civil service if you like,
the Whitehall bit, which is only a small
minority of the overall service. If you
want to be a successful policy advisor,
you really have to be rigorous in your
thinking. You have to be innovative too.
You cannot be stuck in the mud. You
have to be prepared to be out there,
talking to practitioners about what
works. You have to be aware of best the
thinking in academia, think tanks and in
other countries.
You have to be open and you have
to be prepared to stand your ground.
Most ministers I have ever worked with
want fearless and challenging advice.
They do not want yes men or yes
women. Most young people that I meet
are geared up for that and they are not
deferential. They are reasonably tough
minded. That sort of confident mind-
set that someone brings to bear at the
start of his or her civil service career is
exactly what is needed.
BP: One of the trends we see in many occupations, including inside the civil service, is the move towards greater specialisation. How does that affect the civil service overall? Does it help to be brilliant at something or can you be master of several things inside the civil service?
It has never been true that policy
generalists in the civil service are
amateurs; let me just nail that myth
for a second. There is a specialism in
providing policy advice to ministers
or getting legislation through the
House of Commons or the House
of Lords, or helping ministers think
through communications. These are
all specialisms even though we do not
Ipsos MORI - Understanding Society December 2013
6. 7.
Top advice
think of them as such in our everyday
language in the civil service. We do
need a broader range of specialisms
now than we have ever done before:
digital specialists, commercial
specialists, big data analysts, contract
managers, project managers, as
well as the traditional specialisms of
economists, lawyers, statisticians and
so on.
One of the challenges that we have
in the civil service is to work out what
constitutes a good policy generalist.
How many of those special subjects
do they need to have awareness of?
How far do individual departments
need to have a whole bank of deep
experts or can we rely upon shared
pools of specialists at the centre or
in a department that is available to
others? This is one of the organisational
questions that we grapple with the
whole time.
BP: Do you think having some time in Private Office is essential for anybody climbing the civil service food chain during his or her career?
It is not essential but it is definitely
helpful to understand very clearly how
Parliament works, how ministers work
and the pressures that ministers are
under. It also gives you an ability to see
the wood for the trees, which is a vital
role for any senior person in the civil
service. So you can see in a 20-page
document or PowerPoint the one or two
things that really matter. For learning
those sorts of skills, Private Office is
one way of achieving that.
BP: Thinking about public service reform or indeed the shape of the state, Britain is in a period of fiscal
consolidation. The public sector is handling that pretty well, based on at least the data I look at in terms of public perception11. How do you think the relationship between government and public services has changed over the years? And do you see it changing further in the coming years?
In general, we are all going to
have to become more transparent. The
public will be more and more powerful
in holding public services to account,
either by having budgetary power or
governance power. I see the trend
towards more openness and more
decentralisation.
BP: In your time working in government and public services, you have seen many attempts at reforms of public services. Which policies do you think have been most and least successful?
One generic lesson would be that
reform programmes based on what
frontline practitioners think have a better
chance of being well designed and
properly implemented than those just
conceived purely in Whitehall. It is a
bit of a cliché but involving the people
involved in delivering policy in the
design of policy is an absolute sine qua
non of successful policymaking.
Equally, we have seen under the
current regime, very interesting reforms
involving payment by results contracts.
Transferring the risk to the private sector
or the third sector and greater use of
transparency. I also think the ‘nudge
revolution’ and the work of the Behavioural
Insights Team is incredibly powerful12.
Under the Tony Blair, Michael
We are all going to have to become more transparent. The public will be more and more powerful in holding public services to account, either by having budgetary power or governance power.
Barber13, David Blunkett14 regime
we saw the performance of primary
schools significantly improve over a
short period. That was a top down
approach using targets, which were
successful, at least for a period.
Targets can help when you have abject
performance that needs to be turned
into a basic minimum performance.
It depends on where you are in the
performance trajectory, what technique
is most powerful. Obviously different
governments have their own political
philosophy and a different approach is
required at different times. Depending
on whether you are dealing with trying
to establish floor standards or whether
you are trying to make something good,
better or the best, different techniques
apply. If you are trying to turn good or
average performance into a brilliant
performance, just continuing with
targets from the centre does not really
work. You have to incentivise and free
up the managers of the service to get
truly excellent performance.
BP: You spent three years working at investment bank Morgan Stanley, returning to the civil service in mid-2007. How has that experience shaped your thinking?
It was both a shock to the system
and interesting. It was a very different
environment working in an American
investment bank. It was personally
challenging because obviously I had no
reputation or knowledge in that sector.
The first thing I had to do was go away
and do my professional exams and it
was quite tough going back to school.
So that was interesting but what
did it teach me? You always learn more
about an organisation if you spend a bit
of time outside it. It convinced me that
I actually preferred working on public
policy than making money for other
people. So I learnt a bit about myself.
I also picked up something from
the incessant drive for innovation,
differentiation and creativity that you get
in the best private sector organisations.
Morgan Stanley was constantly
competing for that new idea to convince
companies, chief executives or
chairmen that they had something fresh
to say. That competition occasionally
can spill over into something
undesirable but if suitably harvested, it
can provide very innovative thinking.
Since coming back into the civil
service, I have been quite keen to find
a way of opening up parts of the civil
service’s thinking to external competition.
But you need to do that in a very
cautious way. You do not want to throw
away what the civil service uniquely
brings - a lack of vested interest.
BP: Sounds like you would not be a supporter of the American model where a good proportion of the senior staff change with political regime in power?
I don’t favour that at all. I certainly
benefited from my time in the private
sector and we should have more people
coming in for short spells and such like.
But effectively to review most of the
top tier every five years, or every ten
years, creates major instability around
any changes of government. When we
moved from a long period of a Labour
government to a Coalition government,
the civil service provided some stability.
Reform programmes based on what frontline practitioners think have a better chance of being well designed and properly implemented than those just conceived purely in Whitehall.
Ipsos MORI - Understanding Society December 2013
8. 9.
Top advice
BP: The civil service did pretty well, I think most people would say.
The civil service did extremely well.
A lot of planning went into that but most
politicians would say that that worked
really well for the benefit of the country.
The other point about that is you
would not attract the best and brightest
to the civil service if they felt there was
a glass ceiling above a certain point
and all the top jobs would go to political
appointees. Despite the fact that our
pay is not the highest people choose
in their droves to come and work for
the civil service. That is because you
can have a whole career in the civil
service, potentially stretching as high as
permanent secretary.
BP: Since the Coalition came to power, big data has been on the agenda. Think-tanks and political researchers believe that a big data revolution will be one of the upcoming global trends. In an age of mass information, do you think this government is equipped to employ big data analytics and use it to aid economic growth and public service improvements? Our latest Global Trends Survey shows the public do have some concerns around data privacy.
There is huge potential but we have
to proceed very carefully, with complete
transparency. The principle should be
that people should control their own
personal data. There is a difference
between personal data and anonymised
data, untraceable back to the individual.
BP: Ipsos MORI found recently in a survey that people said the thing that
would offend them most about a large corporation - be it a supermarket or bank - was not them despoiling the third world, or them paying their bosses trillions, it was actually selling their anonymous data to somebody else15.
You have to have the public’s consent
on this issue. We have to proceed
very carefully and steadily and I would
probably say slowly too. There is more
data sharing we can do and most
people in the country would support that
provided they knew it was happening and
was properly legitimised by Parliament
where necessary. For instance, people get
very frustrated having to give their name
and address multiple times to different
government bodies.
BP: Much has also been made of evidence-based policy-making since 2010. Ipsos MORI conducted a survey for the Royal Statistical Society on public perceptions16. It revealed that the British public are wildly wrong on key economic issues, allowing anecdotal evidence to influence their view of society over objective evidence. For example, out of every £100 spent on benefits, people believe that £20 is fraudulently claimed; the government estimate is 70p. To what extent is it the role of government or the civil service even, to act as neutral arbiters and actually to spend time clarifying misperceptions?
Well it is certainly important that
when we put information out it is as
accurate, informative and well marketed
as possible. We have the Office of
National Statistics and UK Statistics
There is more data sharing we can do and most people in the country would support that provided they knew it was happening and was properly legitimised by Parliament where necessary.
Authority; we have mechanisms in
place when it comes to the data that
is being put out. I do not think you can
necessarily hold us responsible for how
that data is received. We cannot compel
people to read our press releases and
so on.
But we live in straitened times
and we have had to cut our marketing
budgets down. If there are areas
where misperception is causing real
damage to a community or to peoples’
personal health then that would be
an area to prioritise for a public
information campaign.
BP: My hypothesis is that there is, in both government and the private sector, a lot of data and it’s rarely condensed in a helpful way. This is from my professional viewpoint. How do we get more evidence informed policy?
We are better than people give
us credit for when it comes to using
evidence and using data but we need
to be a lot better. There is a view out
there, in some quarters, that the pace
of government these days is much
faster. It is definitely true that the pace
of decision taking has massively
accelerated in my time in government.
Nevertheless, data and evidence are
still very important.
One of the things I am most keen
to pursue as Cabinet Secretary is to
raise the quality of evidence-based
policymaking. So that is partly about
open policymaking and being aware for
example of what front-line practitioners
are doing. You have to have a better
sense of what is happening in other
countries and what the best think-tank
thinking is. Also crucial are the What
Works initiatives and the evidence
centres for social policy that we have
established17.
Dr David Halpern, Head of the
Behavioural Insights Team, is leading
the work for us18. We are aiming for the
centres to match NICE’s record of using
rigorous evidence to shape decisions.
The Education Endowments Foundation
has been designated a What Works
centre to ensure an evidence-based
approach in education policy19. And
we set up four or five other centres that
now have the task of sifting through all
the research work that’s been done,
particularly academic work. The idea is
to run them as control files across the
world and really try to understand which
particular social policy or economic
policy interventions actually have an
effect. This is with a view to making
sure that when we advise ministers
or when commissioners decide what
to commission, they are not wasting
government money. We have a lot less
money to spend than we used to.
BP: To what extent do you think the policy advice that ministers receive before making decisions should be made public or not.
I do not think it should be at all, as
much as I believe in transparency.
BP: I ask because it would be good to see the evidence that ministers were given on which they based their decision.
Our responsibility is to work privately
with ministers so that ministers can
make decisions and then we should
collectively explain the basis on which
We are better than people give us credit for when it comes to using evidence and using data but we need to be a lot better.
Ipsos MORI - Understanding Society December 2013
10. 11.
Top advice
decisions have been taken. Therefore, I
am all in favour of giving the evidence
and the explanations but I do not
think we should be providing advice
in public. If you force the civil service
to give their advice in public, it will
lead to less candid advice, probably
more risk averse advice and less
innovative advice. And it would blur
accountabilities in my view.
BP: Thank you for your time.
Biography
Sir Jeremy Heywood was
appointed Cabinet Secretary
following the announcement of Sir
Gus O’Donnell’s retirement in
December 2011.
Prior to that, Sir Jeremy Heywood
was Permanent Secretary to two
successive Prime Ministers at 10
Downing Street. He also spent over
three years as a Managing Director
including as co-head of the UK
Investment Banking Division at
Morgan Stanley. Before joining
Morgan Stanley, Sir Jeremy Heywood
occupied a range of senior civil
service roles, including as Principal
Private Secretary to the Prime
Minister (1999–2003).
Prior to that, he had a variety of
senior roles at HM Treasury including
Head of Securities and Markets Policy
and Head of Corporate and
Management Change. He also served
as Principal Private Secretary to
Chancellors Norman Lamont and
Kenneth Clarke and had a spell at the
International Monetary Fund in
Washington DC. His first job in the civil
service was as an Economic Adviser
to the Health and Safety Executive.
If you want to be a successful policy advisor, you really have to be rigorous in your thinking. You have to be innovative too. You cannot be stuck in the mud. You have to be prepared to be out there, talking to practitioners about what works. You have to be aware of the best thinking in academia, think tanks and in other countries.
The Royal Society for the Protection of Birds has more members than all the major political parties in the UK combined20. Our new Global Trends Survey highlights the huge disparity between the public’s involvement with a political party compared with their engagement with charities or campaign organisations. As we see younger generations becoming more individualistic and less likely to associate with a political party what does this say about British political and social engagement in the 21st century?
Party membership figures are down,
dramatically so compared with the
1950s. A House of Commons Library
Report21 published in December 2012
shows that Conservative membership
has fallen from nearly three million in the
1950s to between 130,000 and 170,000
while Labour membership currently
stands at around 193,000 (down from
more than a million in the 1950s).
Highlighting the very low participation
in party politics, our new international
survey reveals that just 3% of British
adults say they have donated to or paid
a membership fee to a political party.
This compares with four in ten (39%)
who claim to have donated money or
paid a membership fee to a charity or
campaigning organisation. Similarly, just
1% of Britons have volunteered their
time to a political campaign in the last
few years compared with 22% who say
they have volunteered for a charity or
campaign organisation.
The international comparisons tell
a story about the nature of political
engagement in Britain. Whether in
terms of donating money or time,
Britain stands out as being relatively
much more interested in charity work
than getting involved in formal party
politics. In both cases, Britons are
among the countries most likely to say
they have been involved in charities, but
with some of the biggest gaps to their
involvement in politics. While few in
any country say they donate to political
parties, there is more of a range in
terms of volunteering time to political
campaigns, especially when compared
to countries such as India, Turkey, Brazil
and Argentina (perhaps reflecting the
trend in some South American countries
towards participatory democracy, also
seen in attitudes towards feeling able
to influence decisions that Ipsos MORI
has seen in other work22). This pattern
is reflected across a range of other
The way we engage Political activism in 2013 Gideon Skinner Tom Mludzinski
Ipsos MORI - Understanding Society December 2013
12. 13.
The way we engage
Figure SEVEN.Donating to charity vs donating to political parties
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Figure EIGHT.Volunteering time to charity vs. volunteering time to a political campaign
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indicators – for example Britons are
more likely than average to say they
have organised an event for charity,
but less likely to have taken part in a
demonstration or march or attended
a public meeting – again especially
compared with countries such as
Brazil or Argentina. The Charity Aid
Foundation’s World Giving Index
also places Britain fourth out of 146
countries in terms of its propensity to
donate (although, interestingly, we only
come 35th for our volunteering of time)23.
Of course, there are many historical,
structural and cultural differences
between countries that will explain
these differences between countries.
Nevertheless, our focus here is on the
UK, and this research ties into other
findings raising important questions
about the health – and nature – of
political engagement in the UK,
especially among young people.
The clearest expression of political
activism is of course voting and while
the 65% who turned out at the 2010
General Election is up on 2001 and
2005, it is still historically low. In
particular, that less than half of 18
to 24 year olds say they voted in the
2010 General Election is a clear sign
of disengagement – or at least that
most young people simply did not care
enough to bother to vote. Generational
analysis of those telling us that they
do not intend to vote at elections
draws out an interesting “competitive
election” effect, similar to that found
in other research (for example, that
carried out by Julianna Pacheco24).
Our analysis shows that a greater
proportion of the younger generations
(generation Y, and to a slightly lesser
extent generation X) seemed relatively
uninterested by the elections in 2001
and 2005, with the proportions saying
they would not vote increasing following
the 1997 election and not coming down
again until the 2010 election started
to loom on the horizon. This reflects
Pacheco’s research, which shows that
the competitive context is a particularly
important driver of political engagement
among the young, where early
experiences of close fought elections
affect not only immediate voting levels
but can continue to affect levels of
participation in future elections.
Declining levels of party
membership and activity are also no
surprise when we take into account
the findings from the European Social
Survey, which shows two similar
patterns to those noted above: an
increasing lack of engagement in formal
political structures in each successive
generation, and Britain being the most
extreme example of this across major
European countries.
While Britain is not alone with this problem, it is starker here than for many of our neighbours.
What the findings shows is that
party identification over the last ten
years is generally flat by generation; it
is just that the younger generations are
far less likely to feel close to a political
party than older generations. This has
obviously worrying implications for the
future of party affiliation, as the older
generations die out.
But the European comparisons
further suggest that while Britain is not
alone with this problem, it is starker
here than for many of our neighbours.
Germany has similar generational
differences (as does France) – but
even for Germany there is a gap of 28
points between the oldest and youngest
generations, compared with a 36 point
gap in Britain. And in Sweden the gap
is just 15 points.
Of course, this trend hasn’t gone
unnoticed - witness Ed Miliband’s
pledge to extend the vote to 16-17 year
olds25, for example.
And political parties are not alone
in facing these problems of increasing
detachment among successive
generations – almost identical patterns
are seen with religious affiliation and
connection to the welfare state26. Going
back to our original discussion about
the difference between charitable
and political involvement, while young
people are, as might be expected, much
less likely to have donated money to a
charity or a political party than older
people, they are equally as likely to say
they have volunteered time to a charity
(25% of 18-34 year olds vs 20% of
those aged 45+). So is there evidence
here of a rejection of formal institutions
by younger people in favour of inaction,
or in favour of different types of action?
Certainly there are figures to add
to the worrying generational patterns
on party affiliation. The Hansard
Society’s Audit of Political Engagement
series has consistently shown interest,
Political parties are not alone in facing these problems of increasing detachment among successive generations – almost identical patterns are seen with religious affiliation and connection to the welfare state.
Ipsos MORI - Understanding Society December 2013
14. 15.
The way we engage
Key.
Pre war (before 1945)
Baby boomers (1945-65)
Generation X (1966-1979)
Generation Y (1980-2000)
General elections
Figure NINE.Q: How would you vote if there were a General Election tomorrow? % Would not vote
0
5
10
15
20
25
96Year 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 1312
Figure TEN.Q: Do you feel closer to a particular party than all other parties?% Yes
10
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40
50
60
70
80
0 Year 02 03 04 05 06 1107 08 09 10 12
knowledge and participation in politics
to be lower among young people than
other age groups27. But at the same
time there is much evidence to suggest
that young people simply engage in
politics in different ways. Dr Pippa
Norris’ democratic phoenix hypothesis
argues that a traditional view of political
engagement is insufficient for the
developing variety of ways that political
activism can be expressed, and that
“younger generations, in particular, have
become less willing than their parents
and grandparents to channel their
political energies through traditional
agencies exemplified by parties
and churches, but are more likely to
express themselves through a variety
of more ad hoc, contextual and specific
activities”28. Furthermore, even if there
is a withdrawal from the institutions, it
does not necessarily mean that levels
of trust in the individuals are any lower
– indeed, generational analysis of Ipsos
MORI’s Veracity Index suggests that, if
anything, younger generations are more
trusting of politicians than older ones
(although it seems as if the expenses
scandal reduced that gap in 2009).
So perhaps it is just that formal
political institutions are not doing
enough to enable young people to
ensure their political views are taken
into account – regardless of how
they are expressed. But there is still
a sting in this tail. Firstly, analysis of
the European Social Survey by James
Sloan of the University of London29
suggests yet again that the UK seems
to be suffering particularly heavily from
this problem. The gap between youth
political participation and the level of
participation in the population as a
whole is higher in the UK compared to
other European countries (although,
interestingly, once again engagement
in charitable work and volunteering
is relatively high amongst the British
youth). And the same analysis points
to inequalities in political participation
among young people, with rates of
participation higher among those with
degree level education than for those
who left school without qualifications
(although the difference in participation
in newer forms is less pronounced than
for the population as a whole). Even
if there are reasons to have some
optimism that young people have not
opted out of politics completely, there
may still be a significant group who
remain excluded.
As Michelle Mitchell, then Age UK
Charity Director General, pointed out in our
October issue of Understanding Society30:
“Generation Y do not appear to be organising themselves, presenting a strong voice for the issues that affect them and putting political pressure on the parties to respond
with a policy programme to improve their lives. They could potentially learn from the power of a collective voice. The seeds for that activism and agitation are there; it is not to say younger people are not political, they are. They actively participate in interest groups, they organise extremely effectively through digital networks and communications.”
If this mismatch between how young
people choose to be political active
and the types of political activity that
are most recognised by our system
continues, then there is a danger that
we will miss the opportunity to allow
them to shape the way we live now and
in years to come. The gap between youth political participation and the level of participation in the population as a whole is higher in the UK compared to other European countries.
Ipsos MORI - Understanding Society December 2013
16. 17.
The way we engage
Figure ELEVEN.Q. As far as you know, do you personally think the world’s climate is changing, or not? (%)
Figure TWELVE.Q. How concerned, if at all, are you about climate change, sometimes referred to as ‘global warming’? (%)
91
Yes
No
Don’t know
2005
2010
2013
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72
19
9
82 2005
2010
2013
71
60
Figure THIRTEEN.Issues Index: Most important issue: Pollution/Environment
Figure FOURTEEN.Q: To what extent do you agree or disagree... ‘The climate change we are currently seeing is largely the result ofhuman activity’?
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96Year 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
Key.
Daily Mail
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Financial Times
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The Independent
The Sun
The Times
Anyone who has seen the US TV series ‘Revolution’ will appreciate just how dependent we are on energy31. The show depicts how society disintegrates when one day the lights go out and do not come back on. Of course, the stars continue to have great hair and dazzling white teeth, so it is not all bad.
In the last six months, both Ofgem
and the National Grid have issued
warnings about the increased potential
for power blackouts in Britain32. The
margins are increasingly tight between
supply and demand as the more
polluting power stations are closed.
However, the latest IPCC report
on climate change also reminds us of
the importance of decarbonising our
energy supplies33. The report states
that it is extremely likely that human
influence has been the dominant cause
of the global warming observed since
the mid-20th Century.
But the security of our energy supply
and the need to tackle climate change
are not the only challenges. Energy
has been something of a political
football during 2013. In the same week
as the IPCC report, Labour leader Ed
Milliband pledged at the party’s annual
conference to freeze energy bills for
20 months, if Labour won the next
general election. And with further price
increases announced in October 2013,
the affordability of supply has become
one of the hottest topics around.
What, though, is the public’s
perspective on the UK’s energy
challenges, and what is the direction of
travel? Ipsos MORI’s own research, as
well as studies we have undertaken for
Cardiff University and Department of
Energy and Climate Change (DECC) help
shed light on this critical policy area.
Challenge 1: Addressing climate change
The public appears to be moving
in a different direction to the scientific
community on climate change. While
the scientists are increasingly confident
about man-made climate change, the
public are less so. A clear majority
still believe that the world’s climate is
changing (72%), but this has declined
from 91% in 2005.This is mirrored by
a fall in concern about climate change
from 82% to 60%.
Switched on or off? The way we view energy and climate change Edward Langley
Most of the British public continue
to think the climate is changing and
are concerned about it, but the trend is
clear. What has prompted this increased
scepticism? Our recent research
suggests that at least three factors are
important: the economic situation, recent
weather patterns and media coverage:
• Ipsos MORI’s Issues Index clearly
shows how the British public placed
greater emphasis on the economy
and unemployment after the financial
crash. This was at the expense of other
issues, including the environment.
Even the level of concern about
the environment amongst Guardian
readers has dropped.
• In addition, our qualitative research
shows that some members of
the public feel the cold winters
experienced in recent years are at
odds with their expectations of what
climate change, or ‘global warming’,
‘should’ feel like. Of course, for
others, the very same weather
patterns provide evidence for
climate change34.
Ipsos MORI - Understanding Society December 2013
18. 19.
Switched on or off?
Figure FIFTEEN.Q: What are the three most important environmental issues in your country? % Future energy sources and supplies
5856
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HungaryArgentinaIndonesia
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MexicoRussiaBrazil
Figure SIXTEEN.Q: From what you know or have heard about using nuclear power for generating electricity in Britain, on balance, which of these statements, if any, most closely reflects your own opinion?
Risks outweigh benefits Benefits outweigh the risks
Year 05 10 13
10%
20%
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• Indiscussions about climate
change, the public also reference
contradictory information in the
media about whether climate
change is happening or not. In turn,
this leaves them feeling confused
over what to believe. Older people,
in particular, sometimes feel they
have heard it all before.
Most people here will remember
after World War Two we were told
we were heading to the next ice
age.’ (respondent)
The British public express more
scepticism than other nationalities. Our
new Global Trends Survey shows that
64% of the British public agree that
the climate change we are currently
seeing is a result of human activity.
This compares to an average of 76%
across the 20 nations surveyed, and the
only nation that is more sceptical than
Britain is the US. Fifty-four per cent of
Americans believe in anthropogenic or
human made climate change.35
Despite the trend over recent years,
the majority of Britons still believe in
climate change, and are concerned
about it. The data suggests that
politicians should not rush to abandon
the green agenda; but there also needs
to be leadership on the issue to deal with
the growing undercurrent of scepticism.
Challenge 2: Keeping the lights on
Energy security is a key environmental
concern for Britons. International Ipsos
data from 2011 highlights this as the
most important environmental issue to the
British public, and one that we are more
concerned about than most other nations.
The British public are not comfortable
with the idea of relying on Mr Putin – or
others – to keep the lights on. Indeed four
in five people are concerned that we will
become too dependent on energy from
other nations (81%) and that supplies of
fossil fuels will run out (78%). This concern
may have led to an increased acceptance
that nuclear power should be part of the
energy mix. In contrast to 2005, Britons
are now more likely to feel the benefits of
nuclear power outweigh the risks, although
opinion remains finely balanced.
The public continue to feel most
favourable towards renewable energy
sources, albeit to a lesser extent than in
2010. We have not explored the reasons
for this slight dip in favourability but it
could be linked to increased concern
over how support for renewables might
affect energy bills, or their aesthetic
impact on the landscape. Even so, it
is clear that Britons continue to favour
renewables and want them to be part of
the energy mix.
Challenge 3: Paying the bills
Labour leader Ed Milliband’s focus
on living standards and higher energy
bills is clearly in tune with public
sentiment. His pledge on a retail energy
price freeze was the most popular of
a number of policy announcements
made during the 2013 party conference
season. Ipsos MORI research showed
62% of the British public felt it was the
best policy announcement for them
personally. Indeed, research for DECC
consistently shows that over 80% of
British bill payers are concerned about
the cost of their energy bills36.
As is often noted by commentators
a key element of reducing our bills is
reducing demand, which requires us
to improve the energy efficiency of our
homes and change our behaviours. Our
research for DECC shows that three in
five energy bill payers agree they could
do more to reduce their energy use.
The British public are not comfortable with the idea of relying on Mr Putin - or others - to keep the lights on.
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20. 21.
Switched on or off?
Figure SEVENTEEN.Q: How favourable or unfavourable are your overall opinions or impressions of the following energy sources for producing electricity currently? % Very/fairly favourable
7788
87
727676
648282
595656
4957
53
343435
3433
39
3336
38
Solar
Hydro
Wind
Gas
Biomass
Nuclear
Oil
Coal
2005
2010
2013
This raises two questions. For
politicians and policy-makers, do we
have the right policies in place to
support the public to reduce energy
use? Politicians are going into battle
on these questions; since Mr Miliband
announced plans at the Labour Party
conference, the Prime Minister has
retorted with an announcement of a
review of ‘green levies’. And for the
general public, the question is to what
extent are we as users prepared to play
our part to secure the nation’s energy
supply? For the moment, the jury is out
on both questions.
As is often noted by commentators a key element of reducing our bills is reducing demand, which requires us to improve the energy efficiency of our homes and change our behaviours. Our research for DECC shows that three in five energy bill payers agree they could do more to reduce their energy use.
2014 could be a decisive year for Great Britain. Scots will vote, next September, on whether to end three centuries of political union in the United Kingdom. Whatever its outcome, the referendum will trigger a further rethinking of national identities across Britain. Indeed, the 2011 Census results appeared to show that British identity has become a minority pursuit, not just in Scotland, but across England and Wales too.
In the Census, 62% of Scots chose
only ‘Scottish’ as their national identity,
with 18% identifying as both Scottish
and British, and 8% just British. If
that eye-catching result boosted the
morale of the pro-independence camp,
it presented a puzzling paradox too.
If most Scots are Scottish, and only
a minority are British too, shouldn’t
that fertile soil produce stronger pro-
independence sentiment? Might those
national identity Census findings foretell
a referendum surprise in 2014?
This appears unlikely. After all,
Census day across Britain was back in
March 2011, shortly before the SNP won
its Scottish Parliament majority and the
chance to call a referendum. In the two
and a half years before those Census
results were publicly released this
Autumn, poll trends on independence
had been characterised by a
remarkable stability: about one in three
favour independence, with a narrow
majority against, though both the Yes
and No campaigns stress that one in
four voters remain undecided, and that
the result is not a foregone conclusion.
What has been little noticed, north
or south of the border, is the striking
similarity between the Scottish findings
on national identity, and those in
England and Wales.
In Wales, of the 66% who gave
‘Welsh’ as their choice of national
identity, just over a tenth also reported
that they felt British, with 58% choosing
Welsh alone
In England, 60% gave ‘English’
as their sole national identity. Another
20% made ‘British’ their only choice.
In England, this reflected a striking
difference between the British identity
of ethnic minority respondents - 70%
identified themselves as British – and
its apparent absence among the white
majority: seven out of ten identified
themselves only as ‘English’, with fewer
than one in three choosing ‘British’
These findings confirm that the
old National Front street slogan of the
seventies ‘there ain’t no black in the
Union Jack’ was decisively routed, but
with a surprising twist. Taken at face
value, the Census results suggest that
Britishness is clearly now a majority
identity among minorities, but only
a minority identity among the white
majority. Could Britishness have come
full circle in a generation, arriving at a
counter-intuitive destination where there
might only be black in the Union Jack?
This widespread embrace of British
identity by ethnic minorities would not
give us a shared national identity if the
creation of a civic, multi-ethnic identity
triggered majority ‘white flight’ from it.
However, there are good arguments
for not over-interpreting these Census
findings. The figures probably reveal
as much about how people fill out a
Census form as about how we feel
about our national identities.
The national identity question was
a new innovation for the 2011 Census.
Respondents could tick as many boxes
as they wanted from a long list – but
the vast majority chose to tick only
one. Nine out of ten across Britain
After Britain?What impact will the 2014 referendum in Scotland have on what it means to be British? Sunder Katwala
Ipsos MORI - Understanding Society December 2013
22. 23.
After Britain?
selected one option, including eight
out of ten in Scotland.
This may well reflect a certain level of
box-ticking fatigue when filling out a long
Census form. It would be a mistake to take
this failure to tick a second box as a proof
that two-thirds of people do not identify as
British, given the weight of countervailing
evidence, where most people report plural
identities, with Britishness still playing a
significant, supporting role for majorities
across Britain.
Asked directly about their Scottish
and British identities, 24% say they are
‘Scottish not British’. The most popular
answers are more Scottish than British
(30%) and equally both (31%). Most
surveys of the English and Welsh give
broadly comparable results.
For British Future’s State of the
Nation 2013 survey, by 61% to 19%
Scots told Ipsos MORI that they would
still feel British if the country became
independent, a feeling reciprocated
by the English declaration, by 64% to
14%, that they would never think of the
Scottish as being foreign.
IPPR’s detailed research on
Englishness shows a long-term growth
of English identity, surpassing British
identity in overall salience since 2007.
But that research does not support the
Census finding that British identity is
confined to 30% of the English. How
English and British people feel often
depends on the context. Asked by
IPPR which passport they would prefer
to hold, 59% say British and 41% say
English. Ipsos MORI’s polling for British
Future after the Olympic Games found
81% thought the Games would make
people prouder to be British. By 75%
to 8% people agreed that they showed
Britain to be ‘a confident multi-ethnic
society’, a shared pride which resonated
for minorities and white Britons alike.
So the Census results do capture
one key finding – projecting which
identity has primacy in bold primary
colours – but the Census is not an
effective method for capturing the
nuances of national identity in a multi-
national polity.
Scottishness is a ubiquitous identity
in Scotland. Knowing that somebody is
a proud Scot tells us little about whether
they intend to vote Yes or No, because
the referendum is an argument between
Scottish patriots with differing visions
of where Scotland’s best interests lie.
Scottish Social Attitudes surveys show
that ‘Britishness’ is more contested
– and does correlate significantly to
referendum voting intentions, while
Scottishness does not.
Englishness, largely absent from
public discourse beyond the sporting
stadium for so long, is more contested.
There is a fair measure of liberal
ambivalence about the rising salience
of Englishness: some are allergic to
expressions of Englishness, fearing this
will be a grievance-driven reactionary
force. This caricatures the opinion of
those who express an English identity,
though a challenge to the narrowly
metropolitan assumptions of London
opinion is among the drivers of English
identity, in north and south alike. Yet
the left-liberal fear that Englishness
remains ethnically defined is out-of-
touch with how attitudes are shifting.
British Future’s research finds that white
and non-white citizens reject the idea
of an ethnically defined Englishness, by
margins of three to one. The growth of
non-white Englishness has been gradual
and generational, and our public
vocabulary has yet to catch up with
it. English identity is now increasingly
being claimed by clear majorities of the
English-born children and grandchildren
of the first generation of post-war
migrants who felt they were welcomed
as citizens into the British fold, but were
less likely to feel Englishness was open
to them.
The historic tendency of the English
to conflate British and English identity
– usually oblivious to Celtic chagrin
– has been eroded since devolution.
Yet this strengthening of Englishness
arguably makes the English-British more
like the Scottish-British and the Welsh-
British. British identity persists, but may
become a more conscious, civic coming
together - for high days and holidays, as
with the Jubilee and Olympic summer
of 2012, or the solemn ceremonies of
Remembrance – even as the everyday
emphasis in politics and culture is
shifting towards Scottish, Welsh and
English identities. Next year will be a
year in which identity matters, not just
through Scotland’s referendum, but
Glasgow’s Commonwealth Games, the
more inclusive ‘football-Englishness’ of
the World Cup, politicians grappling with
what the UKIP insurgency means, and
the solemn British commemoration of
the First World War Centenary. Expect
2014 to tell a story about how our
identities interact that goes deeper than
which Census boxes we tick.
BiographySunder Katwala is the director of
British Future (www.britishfuture.org). He
has previously worked as a journalist.
He was general secretary of the Fabian
Society think-tank from 2003 to 2011,
and was previously a leading writer
and internet editor at the Observer, a
research director of the Foreign Policy
Centre and commissioning editor for
politics and economics at the publisher
Macmillan. He celebrated his 10th
wedding anniversary with his wife,
Stacy, in 2011, and is the proud father
of four children, Zarina, Jay, Sonny
and Indira. His support for Everton and
Southend United football clubs reflects
an upbringing in Cheshire and Essex,
though he was born in Doncaster,
Yorkshire, to parents who came to
Britain from India and Ireland, to work
for the NHS.
Ipsos MORI - Understanding Society December 2013
24. 25.
After Britain?
Keeping fitIs the public open to behavioural interventions to help them live healthy lifestyles? Louise Park
Figure EIGHTEEN.Q: Which of the following statements best reflects your thinking about the NHS? (%)
6072
2013
2012
The NHS is a symbol of what is great about Britain and we must do everything we can to maintain it
The NHS was a great project for its time but we probably can’t maintain it in its current form
3021
Neither / don’t know
107
Figure NINETEEN.Q: It is the government’s responsibility to influence people’s behaviour to encourage healthy lifestyles (%)
5248
4746
4541
4039
36
3432
303030
2927
2624
12
RussiaSouth Korea
ArgentinaIndiaSpainItaly
BrazilGermany
PolandAverage
South AfricaSwedenBelgium
TurkeyGreat Britain
JapanAustralia
FranceCanada
US
35
The growing pressures on the NHS gives the government a strong rationale for encouraging people to live healthier lifestyles. But to what extent is the public open to government intervention? And what can (or should) be done to foster their support?
The demands on the NHS are well-
rehearsed. A number of factors are
working together to squeeze service
provision, including constrained public
spending, the increasing costs of care
as a result of an ageing population, and
more expensive technology. The good
news for all of us is that more and more
medical conditions can be successfully
managed and treated, but this too adds
to the burden.
And then there are the public health
challenges. For example, in the context
of all these other demands, how will the
NHS be expected to cope when 47% of
men and 36% of women are expected
to be obese by 202537?
Signs are that the public is starting to
recognise the considerable challenges
facing the health service. The proportion
agreeing that the NHS ‘will face a severe
funding problem in the future’ has been
steadily increasing and now stands at
88%38. And though people still uphold
the NHS as a symbol of what is great
about Britain, there is a movement (albeit
slow) towards expecting that the NHS
cannot be maintained in its current
form39. Indeed, the public is beginning to
anticipate the need for difficult decisions,
with almost half agreeing that, ‘if people
choose not to take care of their health,
the NHS should be able to limit the
treatment it offers them for free’ (47%
versus 33% who disagree)40.
Should government intervene?
Finding ways to encourage people
to take better care of their health could
be one way to reduce the future burden
placed on the NHS. Some would feel
uncomfortable with this kind of focus,
arguing that people do not always have
free choice over their behaviour. Others
would point out that a reduction in
conditions associated with preventable
illnesses will naturally be offset by the
increased demands of a population that
lives longer.
But what do the British public think
about government intervention in their
lifestyle choices?
Evidence from our Global Trends
Survey shows that, as a nation, we are
divided on whether the government
should get involved in people’s lifestyles
or not. Around one third of us in Britain
believe the government should not be
‘interfering’ in people’s lifestyles (35%),
but another three in ten (30%) feel that
the government has some responsibility
for encouraging the adoption of healthy
lifestyles, leaving a final third with no
view either way (35%). Views are more
polarised than in many other countries,
where opinion is often balanced one
way or the other. The range of views
is striking – from 52% supporting
intervention in Russia, to 12% in the US.
Our other work on behaviour change
shows a similar pattern, with deep
suspicion in the US about government
having a role in private decisions.41
Whether or not we support
government involvement, we clearly
believe responsibility for maintaining a
healthy lifestyle remains in the hands
of individuals, at least to a large
extent. Only five per cent of the British
public strongly believe it is the job of
the NHS to keep people healthy – this
compares to a far greater proportion
(39%) who strongly believe it is the
individual’s responsibility to keep
themselves healthy42.
Whether or not we support government involvement, we clearly believe responsibility for maintaining a healthy lifestyle remains in the hands of individuals.
Ipsos MORI - Understanding Society December 2013
26. 27.
Keeping fit
Figure TWENTY-ONE.To what extent do you support or oppose <an additional/ a 20%> tax being added to the cost of all sugary soft drinks (such as sugar-sweetened colas, lemonades and energy drinks) in an effort to reduce obesity in the UK? (%)
Unspecified tax
Strongly support Tend to oppose Don't knowTend to support No views either way Strongly oppose
16
20% tax
20 29 13 20 2
18 24 20 16 20 3
36 32
41 35
Figure TWENTY.Q: What, if anything, do you think government should do? (Average over all four policy areas) % Strongly support/tend to support
92Provide information
87Provide incentives
69Make behaviour more expensive/ difficult
62Ban behaviour
88Make companies act against behaviour
How can the government secure public support?
The acceptability of government
interventions matters. Levels of
acceptability may impact on the
effectiveness of an intervention,
particularly if the intervention relies on
public uptake of a scheme or product.
And the fact that any interventions are
debated in parliament and the media
also affects the likelihood of these
policies being introduced.
Research shows that the more
‘forceful’ the intervention, the less
acceptable it is to the public43. There is
little objection to government providing
information on how to live a healthy
lifestyle. However, the evidence suggests
information provision alone is ineffective
in modifying risky behaviours44. Public
acceptability diminishes quickly when it
comes to interventions at the opposite
end of the spectrum, for example those
that restrict choice45.
If behavioural interventions are
classified into ‘shove’ and ‘nudge’
categories – what about a potential
‘hug’ from government? How open are
people to the idea of financial incentives
for positive, healthy behaviours? One
recent example of this is the trial of
incentivising new mothers to breastfeed
through the use of shopping vouchers46.
In general, using public funds to
provide a financial incentive to reward
healthy behaviour is not welcomed by
the public. Opposition to this principle
far outweighs support (51% versus
21%)47. It raises too many objections
that may be difficult for policy-makers
to successfully navigate. In recent
research using our Ipsos MORI
Levels of acceptability may impact on the effectiveness of an intervention.
Connects online community, the concept
of financial incentives provoked strongly
negative responses in relation to
fairness (‘why should they be rewarded
for smoking?’) and questions over the
policing of schemes (‘money is usually
effective as a reward but I can’t imagine
how you would enforce it’). Instead,
people expressed a preference for other
interventions – often a reduction in the
costs of living a healthy lifestyle.
So what about how interventions are
framed? How does public acceptability
change depending on the presentation
of interventions?
When asked to comment on the
concept of a fizzy drinks-tax, a common
response was, ‘why should those who
are of normal weight have to pay this
tax?’ Yet the public appears to be more
accepting of an additional tax when
the proposition is framed clearly. For
example, defining the hypothetical
scenario as a 20% tax increase sees
support increase slightly to 41%
(from 36% when the tax rise remains
unknown). While the difference is
relatively small, having the specifics
seems to move some of those who
would otherwise have no views either
way towards having an opinion.
Little research exists in this area.
Since the public is starting to recognise
the need to respond to the pressures
facing the NHS, more should be
done to involve people fully in the
rationale behind different government
interventions. There is a need to
understand how interventions can be
better aligned with individuals’ views
and preferences on the one hand, and
how the benefits of a healthier lifestyle
can be convincingly communicated on
the other.
‘The problem being if we don’t do
something to reverse the unhealthy
styles of living, we will all be paying in
the long-term’ (online respondent)
Ipsos MORI - Understanding Society December 2013
28. 29.
Keeping fit
Figure TWENTY-TWO.Q: To what extent do you agree or disagree…‘We need modern technology because only this can help to solve future problems’?
Chin
a
Turk
ey
Indi
a
Russ
ia
Sout
h Af
rica
Braz
il
Japa
n
Gre
at B
rita
in
Aver
age
Pola
nd
Aust
ralia
Italy
Sout
h Ko
rea
Ger
man
y
Spai
n US
Arge
ntin
a
Belg
ium
Can
ada
Swed
en
Fran
ce
Agree Disagree Don’t know
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
25
62
28
61
Figure TWENTY-THREE.Q: To what extent do you agree or disagree…‘I cannot imagine life without the internet’?
Chin
a
Sout
h Af
rica
Gre
at B
rita
in
Turk
ey
Indi
a
Pola
nd
Ger
man
y
Aust
ralia
Swed
en
Aver
age
Belg
ium
Sout
h Ko
rea
Japa
n US
Fran
ce
Can
ada
Spai
n
Russ
ia
Braz
il
Italy
Arge
ntin
a
Agree Disagree Don’t know
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1827
6676
Figure TWENTY-FOUR.Q: Own a smartphone by gender and age September 2013 (%)
Males
Males AB
Males C1
Males C2
Males DE
Females
Females AB
Females C1
Females C2
Females DE
57 79 78 71 62 36 15
61 79 92 86 73 47 23
63 82 84 76 70 34 14
53 79 71 58 60 34 9
47 76 67 56 43 20 7
48 77 71 70 45 27 11
55 87 84 80 52 44 23
54 84 80 77 47 26 6
42 75 62 60 41 18 7
39 67 61 56 38 11 7
70-100% 50-69% 0-49%
All 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
Figure TWENTY-FIVE.Q: Accessing the internet by gender and social grade September 2013 (%)
Males
Males AB
Males C1
Males C2
Males DE
Females
Females AB
Females C1
Females C2
Females DE
86 98 97 94 89 80 63
95 100 100 100 100 93 86
94 99 98 99 96 90 74
82 99 95 96 85 74 41
71 92 95 76 71 50 31
81 92 95 94 92 77 48
93 100 98 97 100 93 76
88 98 96 99 93 90 56
76 88 95 91 92 66 34
66 86 90 84 75 53 24
70-100% 50-69% 0-49%
All 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
Children of the digital revolutionOur changing views of technology Anne Charlton
Modern life is becoming increasingly technology and data driven. When historians come to look back on these early years of the information technology era, and the subsequent economic and social changes through which we are living, they will likely rank this period alongside the other greatest periods of human change.
One measure of this is the internet
economy’s contribution to UK GDP,
which currently stands at 8.3%.
Forecasts predict that this share will
increase to 12.4% by 201648. Google
executive chairman, Eric Schmidt,
identified the UK as ‘among - if not
the - world leader in this,’ in a speech
at London’s Science Museum last
spring49. This importance of embedding
the internet in British life is not lost on
the Coalition government either. Most
recently, for instance, a Department of
Culture, Media and Sport report showed
that for every £1 the government invests
in rolling-out superfast broadband and
improving access to it, the UK economy
will benefit by £2050.
The Government also acknowledges
the benefits of information technology
to the public sector. The Cabinet Office
estimated in its Digital Strategy that
moving services from offline to digital
channels would save between £1.7 and
£1.8 billion a year51. And the information
technology revolution has helped to
usher in the age of Big Data. Very large
datasets amassed by public services in
the course of their operation can now
be examined and used to improve the
efficiency of services. Policy Exchange
estimates that ‘achieving cutting-edge
performance [in this way] could in time
save the public sector up to £16 billion
to £33 billion a year – equivalent to £250
to £500 per head of the population’52.
But what of the impact of these
changes on the individual? How
pervasive are these new technologies
and how do we feel about them? How
do we perceive they are influencing our
daily lives?
According to our new Global
Trends Survey three-quarters (76%)
of those surveyed feel that technology
generally makes life better and three in
five (62%) would agree that we need
modern technology because this can
help solve future problems. The future
problems and technological solutions
may not be certain now, but the majority
of those in Great Britain appear to
be enthusiastically embracing the
possibilities technology brings.
The past three decades have seen
an unprecedented rise in the use
of technology on a personal level.
According to Ipsos MORI’s Technology
Tracker, over four-fifths (84%) of the
British public now say that they have
access to the internet, an increase
of 23 percentage points since 2007.
Over half of Britons (55%) now have
the ability to stay constantly online via
their smart phones, a growth of 19
percentage points since 2011. And,
three in ten of us (30%) have adopted
tablet technology since the iPad first
came to the market53. Many of us now
live multiscreen lives it seems.
But this comes with new worries.
Our Global Trends Survey shows that
although three-quarters (76%) of online
Britons say that they could not imagine
life without the internet, around half
(45%) say that they cannot keep up
with new developments in technology
because of the speed of change. And
those who feel more comfortable with
the pace of change are, of course, the
younger generations, such that adoption
of information technology is not yet
Ipsos MORI - Understanding Society December 2013
30. 31.
Children of the digital revolution: our changing views of technology
Figure TWENTY-SIX.Q: How do you access the internet? Please include all ways you ever access the internet. % No access
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
0 Year 08 09 11 1210 13
Figure TWENTY-SEVEN.Q: In which of these ways have you used the Internet in the last three months? % Buy products and services online
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
0 Year 08 09 11 1210 13
Key.Pre war (before 1945)
Baby boomers (1945-65)
Generation X (1966-1979)
Generation Y (1980-2000)
Figure TWENTY-EIGHT.Q: In which of these ways have you used the Internet in the last three months? % Download/stream music
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
0 Year 08 09 11 1210 13
Figure TWENTY-NINE.Q: In which of these ways have you used the Internet in the last three months? % To visit social networking sites, or to look at or/and to take part in discussion forums or blogs
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
0 Year 09 11 1210 13
uniform across society. It is worth
keeping in mind that these are findings
from an online survey and thus only
a good approximation of the general
working age population. Respondents
may, however, be more predisposed
to information technology than they
otherwise would if the survey had been
conducted by other means.
Although over time we are seeing
more people moving online and
embracing smart phone technology,
Ipsos MORI’s Technology Tracker shows
that still, those in lower social grades
and older people are less likely to have
access to the internet or own a smart
phone. Gender also appears to be a
factor, as fewer women appear to be
online or smartphone owners.
All of this poses challenges for
the public sector since not everyone
is experiencing the digital revolution
to the same degree. Bridging the
‘digital divide’ is indispensable as
the government adopts a ‘digital by
default’ approach to implementing
welfare reforms and seeks to generate
cost savings by moving to online
communication with service users.
Another way of looking at the ‘digital
divide’ is through a generational frame,
to see whether some cohorts are being
left behind or whether their behaviour
with respect to digital technology
is changing over time. Generational
analysis54 shows different generations
have different levels of access to these
new technologies. The ways they use the
technology they have are also different.
First off, we see that the pre-war
generation are the most likely not to
have embraced information technology
at all. Although the numbers continue to
reduce, in 2013, over half of all of the
pre-war generation (56%) say they have
no access to the internet, compared to
20% for the baby boomers and 9% and
6% for generation X and Y respectively.
The gap between pre-war and other
generations remains consistent such that
for many in our oldest generation, their
lives will be completely untouched by the
internet. Similarly, they are less likely to
have a computer in their household, to
own a laptop or a smart phone.
The pre-war generation are less
likely to use the internet to buy products
and services online than generations
X and Y and the baby boomers, all of
which are significantly more au fait doing
so. In 2013, only 24% of the pre-war
generation said they bought products and
services online, compared to over half for
generations X (65%) and Y (58%), and
the baby boomers (54%). It is interesting
to note that when it comes to buying
products and services online generation
X are leading the way here, slightly
ahead of generation Y. This may be due
to finding themselves living busy lives,
juggling children and jobs, and finding
buying online a time saving device.
However, it is not just the pre-war
generation who have not wholeheartedly
embraced information technology and
all that it can enable us to do. Let’s take
streaming music from the internet as an
example. Ahead of other generations are
generation Y with 42% streaming music
from the internet, compared to three in ten
(31%) of generation X and only 16% and
3% for the baby boomers and the pre-war
generation respectively. Looking at the
patterns of behaviour over time, we see
a distinct cohort effect where the extent
to which a generation has embraced
streaming music is different and already
appears set. Perhaps for generation X
and even more so for the baby boomers,
we are seeing some cultural norms of
needing to ‘own’ the music in a more
conventional sense playing out?
Ipsos MORI - Understanding Society December 2013
32. 33.
Children of the digital revolution: our changing views of technology
Again, we see this cohort effect
when we look at those who say they visit
social networking sites. Generation Y
are striding ahead with seven in ten of
them (71%) visiting the likes of Facebook
or Twitter, compared to just over half
(56%) of generation X, three in ten (30%)
of baby boomers and only 8% of the
pre-war generation. Unlike our previous
example, we do see more signs of an
upward trend for the baby boomers,
although the pre-war generation seem
unlikely to take up social networking to
any significant extent.
Further worries present themselves
in the form of data privacy. The
government’s Independent Review
of Public Sector Information (2013)
acknowledges, ‘Data allows us to
adapt and improve public services
and businesses and enhance our
whole way of life, bringing economic
growth, wide-ranging social benefits
and improvements in how government
works’55. While we may have become
more enthusiastic about these
possibilities, laws around data
protection and personal data have
been an increasing battleground since
the increase in digital data storage by
public services and private companies.
Around two-thirds of Britons are
concerned about how companies
use information collected about them
online (69%), with a similar proportion
concerned about how the government
will use online information it holds about
them (64%). Moreover, Ipsos MORI work
for Deloitte shows that of all the things
that would make people consider not
use a company again, failing to keep
safe or losing people’s personal data
topped the list, followed by selling
anonymous data about customers to
other companies56. It appears that
misuse of data by companies are worse
than exploiting overseas workers or
damaging the environment.
The scale and range of data
about our behaviour is only going
increase in the coming years - and the
debate about its use will only intensify.
Indeed, this topic of privacy versus
personalisation is something Ipsos
MORI will address further in 2014.
Undoubtedly, information technology
and social media have changed how
younger generations in particular
communicate, connect, engage
and share. Most of us welcome the
opportunities technology brings to us
as individuals, and the government has
a vision of realising the potential of
technology for British society and the
economy. However, there remains the
dual need to reassure Britons that their
data privacy is respected and to ensure
that those perhaps most in need of the
state’s services are not left out as the
ways we use and rely on technology
develop.
The scale and range of data about our behaviour is only going increase in the coming years - and the debate about its use will only intensify.
1 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/5003314.stm;
http://www.newstatesman.com/uk-politics/2010/11/
happiness-science-measure-life
2 http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/user-guidance/
well-being/index.html
3 http://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/why-making-money-is-
not-enough/
4 http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/jul/11/uk-
marketing-budgets-ipa-bellwether-report
5 http://www2.le.ac.uk/study/why-us/discoveries/the-
influence-of-brands-and-celebrity-culture-on-children
6 http://www.asa.org.uk/News-resources/~/media/Files/
ASA/Misc/ASAHarmOffenceReport.ashx
7 http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/
publications/1441/Childrens-Wellbeing-in-UK-Sweden-
and-Spain.aspx
8 http://www.slideshare.net/IpsosMORI/emerging-markets-
and-the-changing-lobal-order-is-there-a-new-model-of-
development
9 Weinstein, N.D. Unrealistic optimism about future life
events. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 39, 806–820 (1980).
10 Sir Bob Kerslake is Permanent Secretary for the
Department for Communities and Local Government.
Since 1 January 2012, he has also been Head of the UK
civil service, where he gives professional and corporate
leadership to the civil service.
11 http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/
researcharchive/3081/Public-at-tipping-point-on-attitude-
towards-cuts-poll-shows.aspx
12 The Behavioural Insights Team, often called the ‘Nudge
Unit’, applies insights from academic research in
behavioural economics and psychology to public policy
and services. In addition to working with almost every
government department, they work with local authorities,
charities, NGOs, private sector partners and foreign
government, developing proposals and testing them
empirically across the full spectrum of government
policy. https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/
behavioural-insights-team
13 Sir Michael Barber is a British educationist and Chief
Education Advisor to Pearson. In the past, Sir Michael
served as a partner and head of the global education
practice at McKinsey, advisor to UK Prime Minister
Tony Blair and a global expert on education reform and
implementation of large-scale system change. He has
worked for over 20 years in education and government
reform and improvement.
14 Rt Hon David Blunkett MP is a British Labour Party
politician. He rose to become Education and Employment
Secretary, Home Secretary and Work and Pensions
Secretary in Tony Blair’s Cabinet following Labour’s
victory in the 1997 general election.
15 http://www.slideshare.net/IpsosMORI/big-data-
opportunity-and-concerns
16 http://www.slideshare.net/IpsosMORI/perils-of-
perception-perception-gaps ; http://www.ipsos-mori.com/
researchpublications/researcharchive/3188/Perceptions-
are-not-reality.aspx ; http://www.ipsos-mori.com/
researchpublications/researcharchive/3188/Perceptions-
are-not-reality.aspx
17 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/136227/What_Works_publication.pdf
18 As What Works National Adviser, David Halpern will
support the development of the What Works centres,
ensuring that they meet the required standards and
deliver on time. He will also set up and chair the What
Works Network Council to promote the network’s
approach across government, advising ministers and
government leaders on the effectiveness of good
evidence in policy and spending decisions. https://www.
gov.uk/government/news/david-halpern-appointed-as-
what-works-national-adviser
References
Ipsos MORI - Understanding Society December 2013
34. 35.
19 http://educationendowmentfoundation.org.uk/news/sir-
peter-lampl-welcomes-designation-of-sutton-trust-and-
eef-and-what-works
20 “Nature needs a voice”, RSPB, http://www.rspb.org.uk/
Images/Nature%20needs%20a%20Voice_tcm9-237123.
21 http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05125
22 http://www.ipsos-mori.com/DownloadPublication/1361_
sri-one-world-many-places-june-2010.pdf
23 https://www.cafonline.org/publications/2012-publications/
world-giving-index-2012.aspx
24 Pacheco, J. Political Socialization in Context: The Effect
of Political Competition on Youth Voter Turnout in Political
Behaviour, Vol. 30 No 1 (2008)
25 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-24229366
26 http://www.ipsos-mori-generations.com/Religion ; http://
www.ipsos-mori-generations.com/Pride-in-welfare-state
27 http://www.ipsos-mori-generations.com/welfare
28 http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Acrobat/APSA%20
2002%20Democratic%20Phoenix.pdf
29 James Sloan, The ‘Outraged Young’: How Young
Europeans are Reshaping the Political Landscape in
Political Insight, Volume 4, Issue 1, pages 4–7, April 2013
30 http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/
publications/1613/Understanding-Society-October-2013-
Generations.aspx
31 http://www.nbc.com/revolution/
32 https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/75232/
electricity-capacity-assessment-report-2013.pdf
33 http://www.ipcc.ch/index.htm#.UnpyrHARBiM
34 Ipsos MORI research for Defra: Programme of research
on preparedness, adaptation and risk
35 Anthropogenic climate change refers to the production of
greenhouse gases emitted by human activity.
36 http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/
researcharchive/3033/Public-Awareness-Attitudes-and-
Experience-of-Smart-Meters.aspx
37 Tackling Obesities: Future Choices 2nd Edition –
Modelling Future Trends in Obesity and Their Impact on
Health. Foresight, Government Office for Science, 2007.
http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/bispartners/foresight/docs/
obesity/17.pdf
38 Ipsos MORI/ Department of Health: Public perceptions of
the NHS, December 2012. 1,004 English adults aged 16+
39 Ipsos MORI/ Foundation Trust Network. September/
October 2013. 1,244 English adults aged 15+
40 Ipsos MORI. August 2013. 1,015 British adults aged 15+
41 Ipsos MORI: Acceptable Behaviour. February 2012.
http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/
publications/1454/Acceptable-Behaviour.aspx
42 Ipsos MORI. April 2010. 1,646 British adults aged 15+
43 Ipsos MORI: Acceptable Behaviour. February 2012.
http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/
publications/1454/Acceptable-Behaviour.aspx
44 Label, nudge or tax? A review of health policies for risky
behaviours. Galizzi, M. Journal of Public Health Research
2012, volume 1:e5
45 Ipsos MORI: Acceptable Behaviour. February 2012.
http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/
publications/1454/Acceptable-Behaviour.aspx
46 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-24900650
47 Ipsos MORI. October 2013. 480 British adults aged 15+
48 ‘The Connected World’, Boston Consulting Group, 2012
49 http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/archive/2013/04/
features/londons-moment
50 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/257006/UK_Broadband_Impact_
Study_-_Impact_Report_-_Nov_2013_-_Final.pdf
51 http://publications.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/digital/
strategy/#executive-summary
52 http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publications/
the%20big%20data%20opportunity.pdf
53 http://www.ipsos-mori.com/DownloadPublication/1587_
Ipsos-Mediact-Tech-Tracker-Report-Q3-2013.pdf
54 For further information on Ipsos MORI’s generational
analysis across a range of topics, please visit: www.
Ipsos-mori-generations.com
55 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/198752/13-744-shakespeare-review-
of-public-sector-information.pdf
56 http://www.ipsos-mori.com/_emails/sri/
understandingsociety/july2012/mobile/no5.html
FIGURE References
1. Source: Ipsos Global Trends Survey
Base: 16,039 adults across 20 countries (1,000 GB),
online, 3-17 September 2013, data is weighted.
2. Source: Ipsos Global Trends Survey
Base: 16,039 adults across 20 countries (1,000 GB),
online, 3-17 September 2013, data is weighted.
3. Source: Ipsos Global Trends Survey
Base (2013): 1,000 adults, online, 3-17 September 2013,
data is weighted. (1997-2008) C; 1,00 0 adults
4. Source: Ipsos Global Trends Survey
Base: 16,039 adults across 20 countries (1,000 GB),
online, 3-17 September 2013, data is weighted.
5. Source: Ipsos Global Trends Survey
Base: 16,039 adults across 20 countries (1,000 GB),
online, 3-17 September 2013, data is weighted.
6. Source: Ipsos Global Trends Survey
Base: 1,000 GB adults, online, 3-17 September 2013,
data is weighted.
7. Source: Ipsos Global Trends Survey
Base: 16,039 adults across 20 countries (1,000 GB),
online, 3-17 September 2013, data is weighted.
8. Source: Ipsos Global Trends Survey -
Base: 16,039 adults across 20 countries (1,000 GB),
online, 3-17 September 2013, data is weighted.
9. Source: European Social Survey
All data points represent >200 responses
10. Source: European Social Survey
All data points represent >200 responses
11. Source: Nuclear Power, Ipsos MORI/Cardiff University/
UKERC, 2013
Bases: 2013: 973 British adults, aged 15 and over, 8th -
26th March 2013; 2010: 1,822 British adults, aged 15 and
over, 6th January - 26th March 2010; 2005: 1,491 British
adults, aged 15 and over, 1st October – 6th November
2005
12. Source: Nuclear Power, Ipsos MORI/Cardiff University/
UKERC, 2013
Bases: 2013: 973 British adults, aged 15 and over, 8th -
26th March 2013; 2010: 1,822 British adults, aged 15 and
over, 6th January - 26th March 2010; 2005: 1,491 British
adults, aged 15 and over, 1st October – 6th November
2005
13. Source: Ipsos MORI Issues Index, 1996-2012
14. Source: Ipsos Global Trends Survey
Base: 16,039 adults across 20 countries (1,000 GB),
online, 3-17 September 2013, data is weighted.
15. Source: Ipsos Global @dvisor Base: Between 500-1010
respondents per country, February 2 - 14 2011
16. Source: Cardiff University / Ipsos MORI
Bases: 2013: 973 British adults, aged 15 and over, 8th -
26th March 2013; 2010: 1,822 British adults, aged 15 and
over, 6th January - 26th March 2010; 2005: 1,491 British
adults, aged 15 and over, 1st October – 6th November
2005
17. Source: Nuclear Power, Ipsos MORI/Cardiff University/
UKERC, 2013
Bases: 2013: 973 British adults, aged 15 and over, 8th -
26th March 2013; 2010: 1,822 British adults, aged 15 and
over, 6th January - 26th March 2010; 2005: 1,491 British
adults, aged 15 and over, 1st October – 6th November
2005
18. Source: Ipsos MORI/ Foundation Trust Network (2013)/
British Future (2012)
Base: Sept/Oct 2013 1,118 adults 16-75 living in
England, face-to-face Nov 2012 2,515 GB adults 16-75,
online
19. Source: Ipsos Global Trends Survey
Base: 16,039 adults across 20 countries (1,000 GB),
online, 3-17 September 2013, data is weighted.
20. Source: Ipsos Global @dvisor
Base: c.500 - 1,000 residents aged 16-64 (18-64 in the
US and Canada) in each country, November 2010
Ipsos MORI - Understanding Society December 2013
36. 37.
References
21. Source: Ipsos MORI
Base: 481 (unspecified)/ 526 (20%
tax) GB adults 15+, October 2013
22. Source: Ipsos Global Trends
Survey
Base: 16,039 adults across 20
countries (1,000 GB), online, 3-17
September 2013, data is weighted.
23. Source: Ipsos Global Trends
Survey
Base: 16,039 adults across 20
countries (1,000 GB), online, 3-17
September 2013, data is weighted.
24. Source: Ipsos MORI TechTracker
Base: c. 4,000 GB adults aged 15+
25. Source: Ipsos MORI TechTracker
Base: c. 4,000 GB adults aged 15+
26. Source: Ipsos MORI Observer
27. Source: Ipsos MORI Observer
28. Source: Ipsos MORI Observer
29. Source: Ipsos MORI Observer
Ipsos MORI - Understanding Society December 2013
38.
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