unclassified//for official use only in intelligence... · 2016. 9. 14. · eign broadcast...

64Assistant Secretary of

State Breckinridge Longbecame increasinglyworried about the

possible loss ofdiplomatic reporting....He looked to radio as asupplemental source of

intelligence.

99

AU statements of fact, opinion, or analysisexpressed in Studies in Intelligence are those ofthe authors. They do not necessarily reflectofficial positions or views of the Centralintelligence Agency or any other US Governmententity, past or present. Nothing in the contentsshould be construed as asserting or implying USGovernment endorsement of an article's factual•taternents and Interpretations.

Stephen C. Mercado serves inFBIS in the Directorate of Science

DECEIAMPInebIll. 0 RELEASED BYCENTRAL IN TELLIGENCE AGENCYSOUR . CE SMETHOOSEXEMPT ION 3020NAZI WAR CR IMES DISCLOSURE ACTDATE 2007

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Studies in Intelligence (2001)

°SINT From the Airwaves

FBIS Against the Axis, 1941-1945 (U)Stephen C. Mercado

The development of radio as ameans of mass communication inthe early 20th century soon led to itsexploitation as a vehicle for propa-ganda In the period between thefirst and second world wars, thegovernments of Berlin. London,Moscow, Paris. Rome, and Tokyoall used government broadcastingorganizations to disseminate offi-cial views in a multitude oflanguages to influence foreignopinion. (U)

Increasing global tensions in the1930s fueled the propaganda com-petition among the CommunistSoviet Union, Fascist Germany andItaly; and France, Great Britain, andimperialist Japan. Germany's short-wave transmission capacity grewfrom four kilowatts in 1930 to 280kilowatts in 1940. France surgedfrom zero to 123 kilowatts andGreat Britain's capacity grew fromseven to 240 kilowatts. (U)

The airwaves crackled with a vari-ety of programs for foreignconsumption. Prior to theAnschluss, Berlin put forth appealsto Austrians to cast their lot withthe Reich. Tokyo's broadcast lan-guages included English foraudiences in North America andelsewhere. The radio programs attimes resulted in diplomatic reper-cussions London protested theinflammatory language of Rome'sbroadcasts in Arabic to British colo-nies in the Near East until theAnglo-Italian accord of 1938brought a halt to such propa-ganda.' (U)

As the development of offensiveweapons led to countermeasures,so the rise of radio broadcasting asa medium of propaganda and psy-chological warfare led to theestablishment of monitoring ser-vices. The British BroadcastingCorporation (BBC), for example,began listening to foreign broad-casts shortly after the First WorldWar. (U)

Washington Catches On

In comparison with London. Wash-ington was slow off the mark inestablishing an official monitoringservice. By 1941, much of theworld was already engulfed in warand the Axis partners were flood-ing the airwaves Apart fromamateur radio operators and suchcorporate ventures as the CBS Lis-tening Post in San Francisco,Americans were largely in the dark.One of the few sources of light wasthe Princeton Listening Center.Launched in November 1939 atPrinceton University with fundingfrom the Rockefeller Foundation,the Center was the US pioneer in

the systematic monitoring, transla-tion, and analysis of broadcasts

from Berlin, London, Paris, Rome,and, to a lesser extent, Moscow.2(U)

' Harold N. Graves, Jr., Irar on the ShortWave (New York: The Foreign Polley Associ-anon, 1941). pp. 6. 142 Records of the Princeton Listening Center(1939-1941), at http //hbweb.prince-ton edu:2003/11branes/firestonerbsc/finding_aide/pic html.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 1

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYFBIS

Assistant Secretary of State Breckin-ridge Long became increasinglyworried about the possible loss ofdiplomatic reporting and otherinformation if the war causedAmerican embassies to close. Helooked to radio as a supplementalsource of intelligence and turned toFCC Commissioner James L. Fly foraction. In charge of regulatingdomestic radio, the FCC was giventhe expanded task of monitoringForeign broadcasts. The concept,according to a later article, was tolaunch "an official U.S. monitoringservice, to give greater coveragearid more detailed service than was'possible through private radiochains or the newspapers."3(U)

On 26 February 1941, the FCCreceived funding to launch the"Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Ser-vice," the first name for FBIS. 4 Theservice began its monitoring dutiesat 316 F Street. NE. On 1 October,FBIS opened its first bureau out-side Washington—in 3 farmhouseat 13005 NE Glissan Street in Port-land, Oregon—to monitor Japanesebroadcasts. On 1 December, abureau in Kingsville, Texas, wentinto operation to track broadcastsfrom Latin America. Other bureausfollowed in the course of the war.(U)

As with the Princeton ListeningCenter, FBIS began monitoring,transcribing, translating, reporting.and analyzing Foreign broadcasts.The service published its first Dai/y

3 Helena Huntington Smith, "it Pays to Lis-ten." Colliers, 30 January 1943, pp 43-44.

The initial monitonng serviLe was renamedthe Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service in1942 and evolved into the Foreign BroadcastInformation Service in 1967

66FBIS's first analyticreport, released on6 December [1941],warned of Tokyo's

Increasingly belligerenttone.... The next day, theJapanese air raid on the

US naval base at PearlHarbor plunged the

United States into war.

9

First FBIS headquarters In Washington at 316F Suret, NE. (CIA photo) (L11

Report of translations on 18 Novem-ber 1941 Its first analytic report,released on 6 December, warned ofTokyo's increasingly belligerenttone. Based on broadcasts from theprevious week, FB1S noted that'Japanese radio intensifies still fur-ther its defiant, hostile tone; incontrast to its behavior during ear-lier periods of Pacific tension,Radio Tokyo makes no peaceappeals. Comment on the UnitedStates is bitter and increased; it is

broadcast not only to this country,but to Latin America and Southeast-ern Asia." The next day, theJapanese air raid on the US navalbase at Pearl Harbor plunged theUnited States into war. (U)

A Fine Collection of "Screwballs"

The fledgling FBIS became respon-sible for providing open-sourceintelligence (osiNT) as its part ofthe military and civilian wartimeintelligence effort. The organiza-tion faced numerous challenges ingearing up. At FBIS headquarterson F Street, an address describedby staff members as "three blocksfrom Union Station and three milesfrom a decent place to eat," a signin the monitoring room said it all:"We've our own-Axis to grind." 5 (U)

Putting together a radio monitoringservice proved challenging FBISneeded employees with a variety oftalents to execute its multiple tasksThe service had to compete withthe military draft and myriad othergovernment agencies for personnelto fill managerial, secretarial, andengineering positions. Analytic andlinguistic slots presented unusualchallenges. There were no collegecourses in OSINT in 1941. More-over, finding people to monitor,transcribe, and translate dozens of

FB1S, -Purveyors of Fine Open SourceIntelligence Since 1941 A History of the For-eign Broadcast Information Service and Mod-ern Open Source Intelligence" (brochurepublished in 1997). FBIS, On the Beam,24 December 1942. p. 6 This and otherissues of On the Beam are collected in Onthe Beam Newsletter of the Foreign BroadcastInformation Service, 1942-1945, which waspublished by FBIS in 1991 in celebration ofits 50'h anniveisary

2 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

• UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYFESIS

foreign languages was daunting. Itwas not enough to recruit some-one capable of translating aGerman newspaper. FBIS neededofficers able to make sense of thescratchy broadcasts pulled from thestatic; understand the bewilderingnumber of military terms, politicalslogans, and such; and render thematerial into proper English. More-over, FBIS required capable officersnot only for the relatively commonlanguages of French, German, Ital-ian, and Spanish, but also for suchexotic ones as Arabic, Burmese,Chinese, and Japanese. In 1941, noAsian studies centers existed in theUnited States. (U)

FBIS managers rose to the chal-lenge, assembling a team oftalented employees with diversebackgrounds. Harold N. Graves, Jr.,who held a master's degree in jour-nalism from Columbia University,joined FB1S as senior administratorin March 1941. Graves had directedthe Princeton Listening Center,which was absorbed by FBIS inJune. Many of the analysts werefirst-rate academics. Dr HansSpeier. an e'mig,r0 from Germany,had been conducting research onGerman war propaganda under theaegis of the Rockefeller Founda-tion at the New School for SocialResearch in New York 6 Among thegifted linguists, at the KingsvilleBureau, a Texas native namedGeorge Chestnut regularly handledSpanish, Portuguese, French, and

Ernst Kris and Harts Speier, German RadioPropaganda Report on Home BroadcastsDuring the War (London. Oxford UniversityPress, 1944), p v "Interview of Hans Speierby Martin Collins of RAND Corporation,5 April 1988, www nasm edu/nasnildsh/thpi-p2.html Dr Speicr joined the RAND Corpo-ration after the war

66One journalist. . .found

'the greatest collection ofindividualists,

International rollingstones, and slightly battygeniuses ever gathered

together in oneorganization.'

99Italian broadcasts, with occasionalforays into German and Dutchwhen needed. 7 In Washington, Dr.Habib J. Awad monitored Axisbroadcasts in Arabic, Hindustani,Farsi, Turkish, and other languagesof the Near East. s In Portland,where most of the monitors tack-led Japanese, Bill Pollockmonitored Tokyo's broadcasts inFrench and German, as well as theSoviet Union's Russian bmadcasts.9

(U)

7 FBIS, cm the Beam, 1 January 1944, p 5Smith, pp 42, 44.

9 FB1S. On the Beam, 1 January 1944, p. 5

Apparently, the FBIS workforcestood out in comparison to theclose-shaven officers of the armedforces and the genteel lawyersfound in large numbers in theOffice of Special Services (OSS).One journalist reported that the restof the organization called the 60 orso linguists at FBIS headquartersthe "Screwball Division." In Wash-ington, she found "the greatestcollection of individualists, interna-tional rolling stones, and slightlybatty geniuses ever gatheredtogether in one organization." Theresult was "a unique combinationof newspapermen and Ph.D.s thatgives the listening post its color andits crackle Maybe it's the otherthings, too—the banging of tele-types, the global maps on everywall, the casual kidding in seven-teen foreign languages, the feelingthat something big may come overat any minute.” 10 (U)

Obstacles to Recruiting AsianStaff

Against stiff competition from OSSand military intelligence, FBIS man-aged to build a core of outstandinglinguists with Asian experience. Dr.Chitoshi Yanaga, who assumeddirection for all Asian languages inWashington. had earlier taught atthe University of California,instructed intelligence officers atthe US Navy Japanese LanguageSchool, and headed Japanese trans-lation and research at the Office ofWar Information (0W1). FromHawaii came Satoru "Sugi" Sug-imura, a graduate of the Universityof Hawaii and student at Meiji

1 °Smith, pp. 42-44

UNCLASSIFIED/TOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3


Translating room with maps of Japanese empire and China, at FBIS Bureau in Portland, Oregon (CIA photo) (U)

University in Tokyo. An interpreter/translator at the Interior Depart-ment, Sugimura joined FBIS in1941. First an "ace monitor at Port-land, he later became chief of theJapanese Monitoring Section ofFBIS Pacific Bureau in Hawaii.11Beate Sirota was another valuablelinguist. Born in Vienna. the daugh-ter of the Russian concert pianistLeo Sirota, she had lived from theage of five with her parents inTokyo, where her father taught atthe Imperial Academy of Music.

11 FBIS, On the Beam, 9 Apnl 1945. p 7, Onthe Beam, 1 April 1944, p. 7. After the war,Dr Yanaga taught at Yale University andpublished the masterlyJapan Since Perry(New York. McGraw-Hill, 1949i, and BigBusiness in Japanese Politics (NewHaven Yale University Press, 1968)

While attending Mills College inOakland, she began working as aJapanese translator in the summerof 1942 at the CBS Listening Post inSan Francisco. FBIS, whichabsorbed the CBS unit that Septem-ber, was fortunate to employ heruntil she graduated in 1943 andtransferred 10 the OWI. While withFBIS, she monitored not onlybroadcasts in Japanese, but alsothose in French, German, andSpanish. 12 (U)

Several of the editors handling theJapanese copy were newsmen whohad been working in Asia when thewar broke out, had been capturedand incarcerated by the Japanese,and later were returned in prisonerexchanges. Matthew C. Ford—who

had worked in Asia for 14 years forInternational News Service, Lon-don's Datly Express, and CBS—joined the FBIS office in San Fran-cisco in 1943, following hisrepatriation. Raymond C. Phillips,another editor who landed in SanFrancisco following Japanese deten-tion, had worked for two radionews services and two radio sta-

" Beate Sirota Gordon The On/y Woman inthe Room (Tokyo . Kodansha International,1997); The Key Reporter, Phi Beta Kappa, Yol.65 No 3. Spring 2000, pp. 6-8; FBIS On theBeam, 6 October 1942, p 5. Bete &rotaLater lobed General MacArthur's staff inoccupied Japan, where she was instrumentalin inserting language guaranteeing equalrights for women into the Japanese Constitu-tion of 1946. For her activities in occupiedJapan, see John W. Dower, EmbracingDefeat Japan in the Wake of World War 11(New York. Norton, 1999), pp, 365-367



tions during nine years in ChinaIsabelle Heck had worked at theEvening Post and Mercury inShanghai before imprisonment bythe Japanese and repatriation" (U)

As demands for OSINT increased,FBIS needed to broaden its recruit-ment. Outside of Hawaii, thegreatest pool of talent for the intel-ligence war against Japan residedbehind barbed wire in the hastilybuilt internment camps in the west-ern United States. In late 1942, theWar Relocation Authority (WRA)Employment Division in Washing-ton issued a memo to the heads ofnine relocation centers informingthem that FBIS would be sendingMary J. Mueller, assistant chief ofthe Translation Division. to thecamps to recruit "highly qualified"Japanese linguists "to make rapid,summary translations of Japaneseradio broadcasts." Successful appli-cants, "when cleared by the Army,will be granted exemption fromevacuation and stationed at Port-land, Oregon." Given the volatileatmosphere in the camps, wheremany Japanese-Americans were bit-ter over their internment, the WRAofficial asked camp directors "toanticipate Mrs. Mueller's visit bylprelselecting as many qualified andinterested applicants as possible."14(U)

Mueller's travels west proved noordinary recruiting trip. In a letterwritten on 31 December to Harold

FBIS. On the Beam. 1 October 1943, 11 3,On the Beam, 15 February 1944, p 8: On theBeam, 1 April 1944, p. 6,"Davis McEntire, WRA Employment Divisionmemorandum, 18 December 1942, NationalArchives and Records Administration (hereaf-ter NARA). RG 262, Entry 83, Box 65

44Outside of Hawaii, the

greatest pool of talent forthe intelligence war

against Japan residedbehind barbed wire in

the hastily builtinternment camps in the

western United States.

99Graves, she informed him that theWRA had advised her to delay herscheduled visit to the ManzanarRelocation Project "until this weekwhen they expected that the Armywould have completely quelled theuprising." She also explained thedecision to have camp staff quietlyrecommend applicants, given theconcern that posting advertise-ments would stir the "pro-Japaneseelement" among the interned to putpressure on applicants and fami-lies. In one camp, where a generalstrike had taken place, Mueller hadheard that a woman had beenexpelled from her housing blockfor voicing pro-American senti-ments. (U)

Difficulties did not end with theinterviews and testing According toher records, Mueller interviewed174 Japanese Americans, gave 100of them tests, and found 22 of themwell qualified. Five of the bestapplicants accepted her offer ofemployment, although at least onewas lost to another governmentagency before he could startwork. 16 Mueller recounted the corn-

'Mary J. Mueller, Memorandum "Record ofJapanese Language Tests." undated, NARA,RG 262 (Records of the Foreign BroadcastIntelligence Service), Entry 83, Box 65. Mem-orandum -Recommendations of PossibleApplicants for Position of Japanese Transla-tor," undated, NARA, RG 262, Entry 83,Box 65.

petition for recruits in her letter toGraves: "Unfortunately, ColonelRasmussen, who I understand is incharge of the Army IntelligenceJapanese language instruction pro-gram at Savage, Minnesota, andelsewhere, visited all the projectsabout six weeks ago and did anexcellent job of cream skimming.He has taken literally dozens of thebest people and left very few." Shealso noted a reluctance of someapplicants co move to Portland andfound, to her further frustration,"several capable people among theIssei." The Issei, or first generationof those who had come to theUnited States, were resident aliensineligible for employment. Never-theless, she asked Graves whetherFBIS could still hire them, havingheard a rumor that the Army andNavy language schools were "tak-ing aliens." She describeddrawbacks affecting considerationof second generation Japanese-Americans (Nisei), including thoseeducated in Japan (Kibei): "MostNisei seem to have very littleknowledge of Japanese and mostKibei have evidently been influ-enced by their years ofIndoctrination in Japan and areeither afraid or unwilling to workfor the American Government.",6(U)

Compounding the difficulties ofrecruiting among Americans resent-ful of their incarceration, FB1S hadto deal with Lt. Gen. John I.. DeW-itt, who was in charge of WestCoast defense. DeWitt had over-seen the removal of the Japanese

°Mary J. Mueller to Harold N. Graves,31 December 1942, NARA, RG 262, Entry 83,Box 65


UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYFB1S

and was reluctant to see any return.even those working for the govern-.nient, As FBIS Director Robert D.Leigh explained in a letter to Dr.William Langer, director of OSSResearch and Analysis (R&A), "Ourproblem is a vexatious one. It isthat of actually obtaining person-nel who will be approved byLieutenant General Dewitt, Com-manding General of the WesternDefense Command and FourthArmy, and of securing persons whohave the practical competence toperform the very difficult task ofmonitoring these broadcasts."I7Eventually, many FBIS Japanese-American officers went to work in abureau in Denver, established as aresult of DeWitt's antipathy to Niseiintelligence officers working on thecoast. I8 (U)

°SINT Proves Its Worth

Despite the recruiting challenges.FBIS racked up numerous suc-cesses during the war years. Theservice's several hundred memberswere few in comparison to thelarge numbers in the military orsuch counterpart civilian intelli-gence agencies as OSS and OWLSeen in that light, FBIS's achieve-ments in OSINT were all the moreimpressive. (U)

FBIS provided a number of ser-vices of common concern, such astracking news of Allied prisoners ofwar. The service also landed many

ti Robert D Leigh to William L Langer,25 November 1942, NARA, RG 262, Entry 68,Box 22

Utahna Hall, "Another 'Secret' is Out," Ore-gon SundayJournat Pacific Parade Maga-zine (Portland), 21 October 1945.

FBIS maintained a specialtelephone connection tothe White House at the u

time, 'and on 10September [19431, when I")Hitler Went on the air In

reaction to Italy'ssurrender, 'Eager

listeners on the line werePrime Minister Churchill,Gen. Marshall, and Harry

Hopkins.'

99"scoops." At the time of Italy's sur-render in September 1943, FBISwas out ahead of CBS and the restof the commercial pack in report-ing the reactions of Axis andneutral radio to the development.Before the end of the surrenderproclamation by Marshal PietroBadoglio, FBIS had notified its gov-ernment clients of the news andidentified the speaker as Badoglio

FBIS maintained a specialtelephone connection to the WhiteHouse at the time, and on 10 Sep-tember, when Hitler went on the airin reaction to Italy's surrender,"Eager listeners on the line werePrime Minister Churchill, Gen. Mar-shall, and Harry Hopkins.Ejaculations and remarks ofChurchill could be clearly heard,"according to the FB1S newsletter. 19(U)

In addition to its Daily Report trans-lations, FBIS published specialreports. Beginning in January 1943,the Analysis Division's German Sec-tion prepared the Celina' European

• Radio Analysis. A Weekly Intelli-gence Report on Nazi Propaganda.

,, FBIS, On the Beam, 1 October 1943, p. 1

The report was based on tran-scripts of German internationalshort-wave broadcasts and weeklysummaries of German domesticprograms monitored in London,where FBIS maintained a bureau aspart of the global partnership withthe BBC that was formed inDecember 1941. Analysis Divisionalso covered the war with Japanthrough its serial publication RadioReport on the Far East, first pub-lished on 24 August 1942. Thesespecial publications offered a depthof reporting and analysis foundnowhere else in the United States.The first issue of Radio Report onthe Far East, for example, includedreferences and analysis of broad-casts from Berlin, Rome. and Tokyoon the reported unrest in India.which was part of the Japanesecampaign of psychological warfareto subvert British rule in SouthAsia. z° (U)

Apart from monitonng propagandalines, FBIS delivered intelligence ondistant developments. Towards thewar's end, FBIS reported the Impe-rial Japanese Navy's spokesman forthe China Seas Fleet boasting, in a28 May 1945 broadcast from Shang-hai, that Japan was placing stay-behind guerrillas on strategicislands throughout the southwestPacific so that "when the timecomes for our major counter-offen-sive to be initiated we will finda. „force out in the expanse of thewide Pacific Ocean waiting toreceive us and to cooperate withus." In fact, US forces had to flushout such stay-behinds for many

4I FBIS, Radio Report on the Far East, No, 1,24 August 1942, p 82, NARA, RG 262, Entry34, Box 1.


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UNCLASS1FIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 7


months after the surrender in thePacific One of them, LieutenantHiroo Onocla, remained at largeuntil he left the jungles of the Phil-ippines to return to Japan in 1974.21(U)

FBIS also relayed technical detailsthat came over the air. A Japanesebroadcast from Singapore on31 May 1945 to the United Stateslaid out the mechanical workings ofthe Japanese balloon bombs thathad been floating across the PacificOcean to explode in the westernhalf of North America. According tothe radio, a barometric devicewould automatically release anattached sandbag each time the bal-loon fell to a certain altitude. Oncethe balloon had reached the conti-nent after 80 to 120 hours and thelast sandbag had fallen, the devicewould drop its payload. On 7 June,a Japanese propaganda broadcastto North America said that, "InWashington the Army disclosedyesterday that Japanese bomb bal-loons have fallen in Michigan iri thepast few months.... Previously bal-loon bombs reportedly killedseveral persons, damaging wideareas throughout the westernstates." 22 (U)

High Praise

FBIS received frequent praise andrequests for expanded service. TheState Department's Breckinridge

" For an account of Imperial Japan's 'last sol-dier," see Hiroo Onotfa, No Surrender. MyThirty-Year War (New York. Kodansha Inter-natlonat, 1974)."FBIS, Radto Report on the Far East, No 75,15 June 1945, pp B/0-11. NARA, KG 262,Entry 34, Box 3.

Long. "godfather" of FBIS,congratulated FCC Chairman Fly ina letter of 10 September 1941:

I want to express my apprecia-tion of the work the radiomonitoring unit is doing underthe FCC.... As you know, themonitoring system has been oneof my pet ideas for years. ... Myown opinion is it is a most valu-able addition to our foreignintelligence I want to give., on mypart, evely encouragement 1 canto the continuing success of theexcellent work you are doing.23

Nelson A. Rockefeller, Coordinatorof inter-American Affairs in theExecutive Office of PresidentRoosevelt, wrote Fly on 29 July1942 that, "We have been able thusfar to make good use of the mate-rial provided by teletype from theKingsville Field Bureau of the Mon-itoring Service of yourCommission." Rockefeller was writ-ing to request a greater volume ofverbatim transcripts for use in gen-erating propaganda to promotehemispheric solidarity during thewar. 24 (U)

Senior military officials also wroteletters of aPpreciation. Secretary ofWar Henry Stimson noted in a let-ter of 6 August 1941 to FCCChairman Fly that the Special StudyGroup in the Military IntelligenceDivision of the War Departmentwas a regular recipient of the SpotBulletin series. Stirnson concluded

"Breckinndge Long to James L Fly. 10 Sep-tember 1941, NARA, RG 262, Entry 66, Box2026 Nelson A Rockefeller to James L. Hy.29 July 1942, NARA, RG 262 Entry 68.Box 22

that, "This service is greatlyappreciated and is a valuable con-tribution to War Departmentinformation." Less than a monthafter Pearl Harbor, Brig. Gen. Ray-mond E. Lee, then the actingassistant chief of staff, G-2.recorded his own appreciation, not-ing that, "For many months thisservice has made available to us, indigest form, a general picture ofwhat propaganda was being broad-cast to the world from the Axiscountries and England. In additionto propaganda, information issometimes contained in thesebroadcasts which serve as a checkon information received from othersources and in this way haveincreased the value of this sevice."25(U)

Working Closely with OSS

Among civilian intelligence agen-cies, FBIS perhaps worked mostdosely with OSS. Their relation-ship began before the war. In hisSeptember 1941 letter of apprecia-tion, Long had advised Fly to workwith OSS, pointing out that, " IFBISIhas a counterpart in the organiza-tion of which Mr. Donovan is thehead, and I assume that the infor-mation which you get is madeinstantly available to some of hispeople so that the habit will beestablished for them to be able tocounteract the effect of some of thethings which you will discover.26(U)

25 Raymond E. Lee to James L. Fly, 26 Decem-ber 1941. NARA, RG 262, Entry 66, Box 2026 Breckinridge Long to James L Fly, op. cit.



OSS found OSINT invaluable. Dr.Charles B. Fah, acting chief of theFar Eastern Section of OSS, wroteon 13 August 1942 to FBIS DirectorRobert D. Leigh that, "The Far East-ern Section of the Office ofStrategic Services has found the var-ious reports of the ForeignBroadcast intaigence Service ofthe Federal Communications Com-mission indispensable in our workMonitored Japanese broadcastsoffer the most extensive singlesource available for information ondevelopments since December 8.1941, in Japan and the territoriesshe has occupied. Monitored Chi-nese broadcasts are importantindications of thought and moralein Free China." Dr. Fah concludedby requesting expanded coverageof Japanese broadcasts. Later thatyear, OSS R&A Director William D.Langer wrote Leigh that, "Withoutthe monitoring service of the Fed-eral Communications Commission,our knowledge of current events inJapan would be meager, and thefact that we would like more of agood thing does not imply any lackof appreciation of what we are nowreceiving. I can speak only for our-selves, but I am sure that there areother agencies in Washington'whose members feel as we do.",(U)

Even OSS Director William "WildBill" Donovan took the time towrite regarding the value of OSINT:

We have, as you know. beenreceiving from the FINS tran-scripts of both the Japanese short

n William L. Langer to Robert D. Leigh.16 November 1942. NARA, RG 262, F.ntry 6s.Box 22.

Three employees fromMIS were among the

dozens of civil servantsthat Congressman Dies

accused of 'un-Americanbeliefs.'

99wave broadcasts beamed at thiscountry and, at such timesduring the year as they can bebeard, standard Japanese broad-casts intended for homeconsumption. These transcriptsare ofparticular Interest andvalue in that they Indicate thedifferentJapanese propagandalines and often, though perhapsunintentionally, they containIntelligence which when com-bined with material from othersources contributes substantiallyto the political and economicintelligence now available onJapan. af)

Running into Partisan Politics

While contributing to the war effortagainst the Axis, FBIS had tocounter attacks from enemies ofPresident Roosevelt's New Deal onCapitol Hill. As a division of theFCC, FBIS became entangled in abitter dispute between FCC Direc-tor Fly and Representative EugeneCox of Georgia. Fly, heading thecommission interested in curbingthe monopolistic activities of CBS,NBC, and the National Associationof Broadcasters, locked horns withCox and other congressmen whowere more comfortable withmonopoly capitalism than with fed-eral regulatory zeal. Cox called Fly

D'Donovan to Leigh. op cit.

the "most dangerous man inWashington" for seeking to regu-late big radio. 29 (U)

The congressman launched hear-ings against the FCC in January1943 for suspected abuse of its reg-ulatory powers. He dragged FBISinto the spotlight as well, chargingthe service with being a glorifiednews agency that provided noth-ing of value to the military. Thehearings ended with a whimper on2 January 1945. and the Cox-LeaCommittee concluded that, "Obvi-ously, the U.S. could not conductan intelligent program for counter-acting enemy propaganda withouta reasonably accurate knowledge ofthat propaganda. Monitoring of for-eign broadcasts is the only way inwhich such knowledge can beobtained fully and promptly. And itwas perfectly natural and logicalthat the Communications Commis-sion was selected to do this job."3°(U)

The other thorn in the side of FBISwas Representative Martin Dies ofTexas. Less interested in craftinglegislation than chasing publicity,Dies poured his efforts into charg-ing civil servants with disloyalty.Strongly opposed to the RooseveltAdministration, he denouncedthose executing the president's pol-icies as "New Deal Communists."He became the first chairman of theHouse Un-American Activities Com-mittee (HUAC) in 1938. 31 (U)

Andie Tucher, "The Hutchins Commission,"Media Studies Journal, Sprmg/Surnmer 1998(Freedom Forum Washington, DC)(www.freedomfortim.org).N FBIS. On the Beam. 3 February 1945. p 3."David Brinkley, Washington Goes to War(New York . Knopf, 1988), pp. 17, 199



Three employees from FB1S wereamong the dozens of civil servantsthat Congressman Dies accused of"un-American beliefs." One of thetargets was Dr. Goodwin B. Wat-son, chief of the FBIS AnalysisDivision, a prolific author on edu-cation and public opinion and oneof the two creators of Central Euro-pean Radio Analysis 32 Anothertarget was Dr. Frederick Schu-mann, an authority on the SovietUnion and Nazi Germany who hadleft Williams College in October1942 to ioin the Analysis Division'sGerman Section 33 The third, Will-iam E. Dodd, Jr.. was a member ofthe Report Section. (U)

Dies might have directed his wrathagainst FB1S because the organiza-tion had drawn attention to the factthat the congressman's public pro-nouncements were meeting withhigh approval in Nazi Germany.Vice President Henry Wallace hadcriticized Dies for his remarks, say-ing that, "the doubts and angerwhich statements of Mr. Dies tendto arouse in the public niind mightas well come from Goebbels him-self as far as their practical effect isconcerned." 34 (U)

FBIS, On the Beam, 15 February 1943, P 8Dr Watson's works before the war includedOrtetn and Occident, if Preliminary Study ofOpinions and Attitudes of Amencans Regard-ing Oriental Peoples and Questions (1927),submitted to the Institute of Pacific Relations,and Education and Social Welfare in Mexico(1940), a report prepared for the CouilcdPan American Democracy." BB'S, On the Beam, 5 November 1942, p 3.Dr. Schumann's publications included littlerand the A'azi Dictatorship . A Study in SocralPathology and the Politics of Fascism (Lon-don. Hale, 1936) and Europe on the Eve TheCrises of Diplomacy. 1933-1939 (New York:Knopf. 1939).-"Michael Sayers and Albert Kahn. Sabotage!The Secret R'irr Against America (New YorkFlarper and Suns, 1942), p 248

The FCC stood behind its employ-ees pilloried before the Diescommittee and House Appropria-tions committee. The FBISnewsletter of 15 February 1943printed a defense of the three,describing the material presented as"in error."

In the cases of Watson, Schu-mann, and Dodd, in FBIS, theywere interventionists during theperiod of tbe 30's and wereextremely active in trying toarouse theirfellow citizens to thedangers offascism. In so doing,they tended to approve of the for-eign policies of all Europeancountries which themselves werestrongly anti-fascist This includesthe Spanish Loyalists and the Rus-sians up to the time of theGerman-Russian Pact. The tem-porary defection of Russia towardthe Nazis was strongly con-demned by these three persons. Ingeneral, there would seem to beno great difficulty in disprovingthe accusations thus made, as theactivities of the FBIS are matte'sof public record.35 (U)

Despite the efforts of the FCC todefend the three men, Dies suc-ceeded in driving them fromgovernment service. Schumannreturned to Williams College. FBIShad intended to keep Watson andDodd on board, but the Housetook further steps. In a move laterruled unconstitutional by theSupreme Court ((Jutted States v.Lovett, 1946), the House Appropria-tions Committee acted, underSection 304 of the Urgent Defi-ciency Appropriation Act of 1943,to halt all compensation for the twoFB1S employees and for

FDIS, On the Beam. 15 February 1943. p 3

Robert Morse Lovett of the InteriorDepartment after 15 November1943. Based solely on the accusa-tions of Dies, the committee hadbesmirched the reputation of, andbarred permanently from federalservice, two well-regarded FBISstaffers. 36 (1..1)

Another thunderbolt soon struckthe service. FBIS Director Leighannounced in the newsletter of15 February 1944 that the HouseAppropriations Committee waseliminating 30 percent of the ser-vice's budget from July onward.Noting that the committee hadgiven no reason, Leigh bitterlywrote that, "The obvious conclu-sion is that the proposed cut relatesto the opposition on the part ofRepresentative Cox to FCC for rea-sons well known and [to] theDodd-Watson case." Dr. Leighresigned that summer. Writing inthe newsletter of his pride at howFBIS had faced its inquisitors, headmitted how "discouraging" theaffair had been. He wryly added,"But Congressional investigations,as well as monitoring the Axis, arean inevitable part of a democracy atwar. 37 (U)

The fall of the budget ax broughtcries of alarm from the intelligencecommunity. OSS R&A Director

36 FBIS, On the Beam, 15 February 1943, p. 2.On the Beam, 1 January 1944, p. 4 For anexplanation of United States v Lovett, 328U.S 303 (1946) (United Stares SupremeCourt), see the Legal Information Institute ofCornell Law School at: http.//www law.cor-nell edu The Supreme Court concluded.'When our Constitution and Bill of Rightswere wntten, our ancestor had ample tea-son to know that legislative trials and punish-ments were too dangerous to liberty to existin the nation of free men they envisioned.And so they proscribed bills of attainder. Sec-tion 304 is one'37 FBIS, On the Beam, 15 February 1944. p 9;On the Beam, 4 July 1944, p 3_


UNCLASSIFIEDUFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYFBIS

Robert D Leigh, FBIS Director during war-time battles with Congress. (CIA photo) (U)

Langer wrote on 22 April 1944 toFB1S Director Leigh:

Speaking for the numerous work-ers in the Research and AnalysisBranch, I should like w eApressour regret that recent develop-ments have led to a curtailmentof the output of the ForeignBroadcast Intelligence Service.Your group's contribution to ourwork has been of such value thatthe present situation has calledforth expressions of concern frommany of the analysts on the R&Astaff

FBIS reports provide complete andauthoritative summaries of cur-rent news developments. Thisprompt coveragefiernisbes awealth of relatively detailed infor-mation on the areas understudyby our various sections.Furthermore, our entire PoliticalSubdivision has conic to relyupon your reports to supply

66A naval intelligence

officer observed, "Thereis very little confidentialagents can tell that is not

accessible to an alertanalyst who knows what

he is looking for andknows how to find it in

open sources.'

99important evidence of enemy pro-paganda lines as they appear inthe broadcasts of Axis and Axis-controlled radio stations.Through these stations it is pOssi-hie to discern the most Importantand persistent directions ofenemy psychological warfare. Ofcomparable importance to us isthe opportunity to study the reac-tions of neutral nations and ourAllies as expressed by radio.

In sending you this expression ofdisappointment at the reductionIn FB1S output, I wish particu-larly to include with it a sincerehope that future decisions mayempower you and tour staff toresume to theirfull extent theactivities which have proven somuch to the benefit of our organi-zation. 38 (U)

At War's End

With the Axis defeated, US leadersdismantled in a matter of months

the military and civilian intelli-gence structure built up over fouryears. The American public.euphoric at the moment of victory,

30 V7illiam L Langer to Robert D Leigh.22 April 1944, NARA, RG 262, Entry 69,box 22

demanded that its boys comemarching home immediately. Withthe Axis in ashes, people wereready to forget the world oncemore. OSS was disbanded in Sep-tember, the month that Japansigned the instruments of surren-der. On 15 August, FB1S hadmonitored Emperor Hirohito'sannouncement that Japan wouldsurrender. Four months later, on4 December, the last Daily Reportappeared. The FCC terminated FB1Sthe following day. (U)

It didn't take long, however, for thegovernment to recognize the valueof OSINT even in peacetime. Anaval intelligence officer made thecase eloquently in his memoirs in1946:

Approximately 95 per cent of ourpeacetime intelligence comes tous from open sources: from bookspublished abroad; from thereports of observing travelers;

from newspaper articles or sur-veys in professional magazines;from foreign radio broadcastsand similar sources. An addi-tional 4 per cent comes fromsemi-open sources: reports ofnaval attaches or informants whogather their data in the normalpursuit of their everyday busi -ness. Only 1 per cent, and oftenless than that, is derived fromtruly secret sources: agent reportsand the information obtainedfrom certain confidants and con-tacts. There is very little theseconfidential agents can tell that isnot accessible to an alert analystwho knows what he is looking forand knows how to find it ill opensources 39 (U)

34 Ellis M Zacharias, Secret Missions The Storyif Inlelligence Officer (New York . G.P.Putnam's Sons, 1946), pp. 117-18

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MIS headquarters from 1942-1947 at 1424 KStreet, NW. In Washington (CIA photo) (u)

In January 1946, the War Depart-ment's Military IntelligenceDivision took the baton from theFCC and assumed ownership ofFBIS. The first issue of the newDaily Report was published thatsame month. 40 (U) •

Then. on 31 July, the War Depart-ment relinquished the service to thenew Central Intelligence Group(CO), which the following yearbecame the Central IntelligenceAgency (CIA). Principal members ofthe nascent postwar intelligencecommunity had discussed thatspring different options for admin-istering FBIS. U. Gen. Hoyt SVandenberg, Director of CentralIntelligence (DC/), had suggested

4̂ FBIS, Daily Report, Foreign Radio Broad-casts, Far Eastern Section, 3 January 1946,NARA, RG 262, Entry 25. Box 1.

that the State Department take FBISunder its wing. Foggy Bottomdeclined. Vandenberg and the otherintelligence principals, who assem-bled in Washington on 10 June forthe fifth meeting of the IntelligenceAdvisory Board, learned why. Dr.William I.. Langer, who had left hiswartime post of OSS research direc-tor to become Special Assistant tothe Secretary of State for Intelli-gence and Research, explained thathis department worried overassuming responsibility for an orga-nization whose costs wouldincrease State's intelligence budgetby 50 percent, while the Depart-ment was still awaiting finalapproval from Congress for thepresent budget. State also foresawadministrative headaches associ-ated with operating overseasbureaus in military zones Boardmembers considered having CIGrun FIRS while the War Depart-ment funded it. RADM SidneySouers, chairing the meeting, notedthat CIG was not authorized toaccept fund transfers to administerFBIS. The members concluded,then, that the DCI would operateFBIS with administrative input fromthe War Department.'(UHFOU0)

The fledgling C/A thus gained onethe brightest intelligence stars ofthe Second World War to assist inmeeting the challenges of the

k Ntmutes of the Fifth Meeting of the Intelli-gence Advisory Board, Washington, 10 June1946 C Thomas Thorne, Jr , and David SPatterson, Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates, 1945-2950—Truman Senes. Emer-gence of the Intelligence Establishment(Washington, DC Government PrintingOffice. 1996)—available electronically athttp.//wwir state,gov/www/about_state/his-tory/inte1/155_164 html

postwar era. While the circum-stances had changed, the men andwomen of FBIS continued the orga-nization's fine tradition. LawrenceK. "Red' White, who took the helmat FB/S in 1947, reflected later onthe esprit de corps he found there:"I felt pretty good," he said. "Theywere proud of being in FBIS, and Ireally enjoyed it. You had amonopoly on the business. Every-one liked your product, they justhad to have more."42(UHFOUO)

Years later, former CIA DeputyDirector for Intelligence Ray Cline,who must first have encounteredthe service's products while chief ofcurrent intelligence for OSS RecA,

encapsulated the early years ofFBIS in the following passage:

The Federal CommunicationsCommission, at the suggestion ofthe State Department, establisheda Foreign Broadcast MonumingService to record broadcasts offoreign origin, translate speechesand news items, and report theimportant findings to other agen-cies. Being up-to-date andreliably filled in on the details ofstatements by foreign and mili-tary leaders was obviouslysensible for U.S. diplomats, policyplanners, and military staffs.Thus was born the intelligenceservice that Is indispensable toForeign Service office's andambassadors—and even to theAmerican press—as a referencefile Its name was settled upon

42 "An Interview with Former ExecutiveDirector Lawrence K 'Red' White," Studies inIntelligence. Unclassified Edition No 10,Winter-Spruig 2001 (Washington, DC. Centerfor the Study of Intelligence, 2001)

12 UNCLASSIFIENFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIEDHFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYFBIS

later as the "Foreign BroadcastInformation Service" (FBIS) andit eventually ended up as a "ser-vice of common concern"managed hr the CIA. Its reports,its analytical summaries, and itsfiles are still invaluable 43

(U//FOU0)

13 Ray S Cline. The CM Under Reagan, Bush6 Casey: The Fro(aton of the Agency floorRoosevelt to Reagan (Washington, DC Acrop-olis Books, 1981). p 32 For Cline's OSSbackground, see John Ranelagh. Tbe AgencyThe Rtse and Dechne of (b CM (New York:Simon and Schuster. 1986), p 223

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