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USAF ltr, 12 Jul 1966

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4~R 65- 10

PRESENT

AND"ANTICIPATED

C L F r.ft I ; 'd•; $ ' .. :"-,w K,., -, ALTERNATIVE

simrlcopy1Mri~31(,H I - IUNITED STATESMILITARY STRATEGIES

/i111j;§L LA• U'i. . SUMMARY REPORT

Frederick S. PisbkyNoi-mbe.- 1065

Analytic Services Ir,c

56,3 Leesburg Pike,Falls Church, Virginia 22041

Distribution of this

documtent is unlirnitedj

ANSER REPORT

AR 65-1u

PRESENT AND ANTICIPATEDALTERNATIVE UNITED STATES MILITARY STRATEGI.i$S

SUMMARY REPORT

Frederick S. Pishky

November 1965

Th.ts document presents results of wor& sponsored br theDi•vete of Operotionel Requirements end DevelopmentPlans. DCS Reseorch a'd Development. HeadquortersUnited States Air Force, under Controct A F 49(63 3-1259.These results de not necessarily represent Air Forceofficial opinion or policy.

Analytic Services Inc.5613 Leesburg Pike, Falls Church, Virginia 22U41

Distributioen of this document is unlimited.1

PREFACE

A major project was undertaken in 1965 by the PlansBranch of Analytic Services Inc. to develop a methodologicalapproach to the planning and programing of Air Force opera-tional requirements, research, and development. The closerelation between specific hardware development and the prin-cipal trends in the Nation's military strategy wav fullyrecognized at an early stage of the study. The hardwaredeveloper-looking to the future in order to anticipate therequirements and contingencies of national defense-needed"1plausible alternatives" in future military postures in aform which would lend itself to determination of supportingsystem options, technologies, and R&D programs. The concep-tual framework of this approach is summarized in ANSERReport AR 65-4, Methodoloqical Approach to Planninq and Pro-gqraming Air Force Operational Requirements, Research, andDevelopment (MAPORD , by H. E. Emlet (Analytic Services Inc.,Falls Church, Virginia, December 1965).

This paper was written as an integral part of the largereffort and is now published in a simplified form in an attemptto describe--primarily for the research and developmentplanner-the most pertinent views of the Nation'a political-military community concerning strategic alternatives.

Because of the nature of the subject, this ANSER Reportis largely eclectic, drawing heavily on the wisdom of others(as interpreted by the author). The ideas, views, and argu-ments of the many persons are intermixed to such extent thatcrediting the individual sources is impossible within thelimited cpace of this report. Yet, some record should bemade of the many contributions to this study. Appendix B isa selected bibliography which lists a portion of the relhtedliterature on the subject of national defense.

In the course of the inquiry, the aut.hor was privilegedto consult a number of experts whose comments and construc-tive advice were particularly helpful: Messrs. FrancisArmbruster, Harvey Averch, Bernard Brodie, Andre Caranfil,Herbert S. Dinerstein, Arnold Horelick, Malcolm Hoag,

iii

Morton H. Halperin, Samuel P. Huntington, Herman Kahn, PaulKecakemeti, William P. Kaufman, Oskar Morgenstern, DaveK%2rvey, Max Sing:r, Edmund Stillman, Thomas C. Schelling,Marshall D. Schulman, Edward Teller, Sorrel Wildhorn, andThomas E. Wolfe.

"Professional" military views-although not official-were generously contributed by Colonel Robert G. Brotherton,United States Air Force; Colonel Eugene B. Ely, United StatesArmy (Ret.); Colonel William A. Stewart, United States AirForce (Ret.); Colonel John L. Sutton, United States AirForce; and Colonel Erwin F. Wann, United States Marine Corps(Ret.).

Finally, the author wishes to acknowledge th(-" assistanceand encouragement received from Mr. Harry E. Emlet, Jr.,ANSER Plans Branch Chief, who initiated the inquiry.

iv

SUMMARY

This ANBER Report reviews, primarily for the researchsad development planner, pertinent thoughts concerningnational defense. The various concepts are grouped andrelated to specific strategic military altnernatives.

Two constant elements, which have emerged in the courseof the past two decades, appear to guide and limit U.S.strategic thinking:

-1 Forward deployment ("forward strategy")

-2 Controlled use of power ("controlled response").

These two concepts represent the military counterparts ofthe present and anticipated future national policy in thenext 10 years and eliminate some of the strategic theoriesas plausible alternatives.

The number of theories is further reduced by geopoliticalconsideratLons-analysis of the political-military situationand trends in the various theaters. The observations pointout that:

-1 The U.S. "bipolar" view of the world must bere-examined.

-2 A militarily strong and politically viable NATOremains the prerequisite of U.S. defense of Europe.

-3 A firm U.S. nuclear-response theory is needed forthe containment of Conmunist China.

-4 There is an increasing probability of local warswhich will .ot fit into any nuclear-response theory.

-5 Drastic changes in the existing political alignmentof the nations in the Pacific theater may occur inthe next 10 years.

v

-6 In the probab ly increasing local revolutions, identi-fication of subversive elements with outside Communistcenters will become difficult.

S-7 The trend toward increasing arms control measures isS~clearly indicated in the U.S. national policy.

Selection, or--because each strategy represents a varietyof ideas, theories, and substrategies--compilation and descrip-tion of alternative strategic mixes is simplified by groupingthe spectrum of conflicts and the corresponding force canabil-ities into four broad categor-ies

-1 General nuclear: wear

-2 Controlled strategic (nuclear) war

-3 Limited W4ar

" ~-4 Counterinsurgency.

In these terms, five alternative strategic postures arepresented, based on the differing emphasis in their politicalrationale :

-1 Strategy 1 (a posture of "retained options") is basedon, but not necessarily identical with, the prevail-ing views of the present Akdministration.

-2 Strategy 2 (a "Soviet-oriented" posture) emphasizesthe concentration of efforts to build and maintaindecisive military superiority over the Soviet Unionbecause the advocates of this strategy question thestabilit=y of the present detente.

-3 Strategy 3 (a "China-oriented" posture) assumes aFstatic detente with the Soviet Bloc but points tothe specific need of a firm strategy of demonstrat-ing U.S. military superiority in the Far East.

-4 Strategy 4 (a modified "fallback" posture) visual-izes the successful development of viable, regional

vi

defense aystems that would enable the United Statesto resume its former role of "strategic reserve."

-5 Strategy 5 (an "arms control" posture) takes intoaccount the impact of the most probable arms limita-tions on the U.S. defense system in the forthcomingdecade.

Appendix A offers a comparative tabulation of the mainfeatures of the five alternatives.

Because strategies evolve with time and circumstances,the reader should bear in mind that the five postures are,by no means, mutually exclusive. Strategy 1, for example,may gradually evolve into Strategy 3, 4, or 5. The combi-nations are numerous and go well beyond the scope of thisreport.

vii

J TABLE O- CONTENTS

Pacqe

I. INTRODUCTION ................... ................

A. Purpose and Scope .......................... .1

B. Definition and Approach ....................C. Histor-ical Backgroun 4 . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

D. C-eopolitical Considerations ................. 5

II. CONF!,ICTS AND CAPABILITIES ....................... 9

A. Spectrum of Conflicts ...................... 91. General Nuclear War ...................... 92. Controlled Strategic-Nuclear War ....... 93. Limited War ............................... 104. COIN-Counterinsurgency Warfare ........ 10

B. Required Capabilities ....................... 101. Assured Destruction .................... 112. Damage Limitation ...................... 123. Limited Conflict ....................... 144. Counterinsurgency Operation ............ 15

III. STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES ......................... 17

A. Strategy 1-A Posture of "RetainedOptions .. ............................. 17

B. Strategy 2-A "Soviet-oriented" Postur. 20C. Strategy 3-A "China-Oriented" Posture 24D. Strategy 4-A Modified "Fallback" Posture 27E. Strategy 5-An "Arms Control" Posture ...... 29

APPENDIX A-Comparative Tabulation of theCharacteristics of Five AlternativeStrategic Postures ................... 35

APPENDIX B-Selected Bibliography ................... 39

ix

PRESENT AND ANTICIPATEDALTERNATIVE UNITED STATES MILITARY STRATEGIES

SUMMARY REPORT

I. INTRWUCTION

A. Purpose and Scope

This ANSER Report is designed to serve as a workingtool in R&D planning and programing to estimate U.S. AirForce operational requirements. Accordingly, it treatsthe historical background and the geopolitical considera-tions as briefly as possible, summarizing only pertinentpoints which seem to be indispensable for enabling thereader to follow the author's approach in srreening andreducing strategic theories to the five alternative pos-tures presented.

The synthesis contains the author's answer to thequestion that was the basis of the assignment: What arethe plausible competing strategic alternatives-presentand future-if any, which can be used in planning opera-tional requirements and R&D to meet the Nation's futuredefense needs? The specific. practical requirements ofthe task mentioned above made it necessary that the com-plex nature of cowpeting strategies be greatly simplifiedand yet be valid re-fle.tions of the real situation. Thisproved to be a formidable task.

a. Definition and ADnraac)1

In order that the aims of the inquiry be understood,two key words, "strategy" and "plausibility," need someelaboration.

The broadest definition of "strategy" was probablyformulated by Dr. Herbert Rosinaki and excellently elabo-rated by Ree" Admiral Henry 1. Ncclesr it incorporates

1

all the more specifi.c, and therefore sometimes controver-sial, formulae:

"Strategy is the comprehensive directionof power to control situations or areas inorder to attain broad aims or objectives."

This is, of course, "grand strategy," applicable to thedirection of all means of national power, of which militarypower is only one. Narrowing this to military strategy,but within the context of the broadest possible definition,the form employed by the U.S. Air Force Dictionary isadopted:

"Military strategy [is] the art and scienceof employing the armed forces of a nationto attain over-all military or nationalobjectives by force or the threat of force."

The word "employing" shows the dual meaning of thedefinition, for it calls for both a concept of how toattain the objectives and a posture, the combination offorce capabilities required for the implementation of theconcept at the various levels of conflict.

This report translates "plausible" concepts into pos-

ture formulae which, simplified as they are, may help thehardware developer to understand the strategic planner andhis requirements. Plausible strategies are those whichharmonize with national interests and internationalcommitments.

The first phase of the inquiry was directed towarddefining some of the political objectives--and their mili-tary counterparts-which represent a guideline or constraintto any strategic theory claiming plausibility. A survey ofpolitical-military developments' beginning with the end ofWorld War II, helped to identify such determinants. Recog-nition of these constant elements led to elimination of anumber of theories.

2

- a .~ -- - - - - -- - - - - -- -

The second phase scrutinized the remaining contestantsin the light of "international political realities," que3-tioning not only the feasibility but also the desirabilityof the various theories, in terms of political consequences.This "geopolitical screen" further reduced their number.

The third, and final, phase called for a synthesis ofthe remaining plausible strategic concepts and the develop-ment of the formula for each corresponding posture.

C. Histogrical Background

Present American strategic thinking began to take formin about 1946 or 1947 in a dramatically new international-political, socio-economic, and military-technologicalenvironment. Its present status and its future trendscannot be linderstood and anticipated without an examinationof its origins and the environmental factors that have moti-vated its course. The first phase of the inquiry surveyedthe interaction of political, economic, and military eventsfrom the end of %orld War II up to the present conflict inVietnam in search of constant elements in U.S. strategicthinking which:

-1 Limit the theoretically unlimited number of stra-tegic alternatives

-2 Serve as guidelines for military concepts in theforeseeable future.

The survey showed that, as long as military strategysupports and serves the attainment of the Nation's politi-cal objectives and remains •n integral part of the national"grand stzatecy," two distinctly discernible elements canbe called "constant," because they cannot be discardedwithout basic changes in the U.S. Wetanschauung:

-1 Forward deployment ("forward strategy") is designedto meet any enemy aggression in the most forwardgeographic pusition and carry over the hostilities"to the enemy's own territory as quickly as possible.

3

.ý -A

-2 Controlled use of power ("controlled response") isdesigned to apply force or threat of force-inresponse to the enemy's action-in a flexible,graduated, measured manner that avoids or minimizesunnecessary escalation of the conflict.

Forward deployment is the strategic expression of thcNation's political determination to 'contain" communism;hence, its geostrategic rigidity, which rules out a numberof theories-for example, those visualizing an isolationist"Fortress America."

Controlled, flexible respo.ise, on the other hand, sternsfrom the realization of the devastating effects of generalnuclear war and from the desire to counter ccnflict situa-tions effectively at the lowest possible level of violence;hence, the need for flexibility in the choice of strategicas well as tactical means of rerponse and elimination oftheories proposing automatic or uncontrolled "massive retal-iation." Even if the United States resumed the militaryinitiative and were no longer responding to a threat, therequirement for controlled flexibility would not diminishbut, on the contrary, further increase.

The first phase concluded that these two concepts-under various labels-have motivated most of the realisticmilitary theories in the course of the past decades andthat they are likely to continue to exert tVis s8av- type oflimiting influence. These two constant ieements are thefirst criteria for determining the plausibility of stra-tegic alternatives.

However, as the optimum balance between forward deploy-ment and flexible response differs in almost every individualconflict situation-depending on its geostrategic sensitivityand its (lowest desirable) level of intensity-the number ofalternatives is still unmanageably large. There are at leastas many strategies as there %re conflict possibilities. Seek-ing to further reduce the number of alternative strategies,the study posed the questions which of the conflict situationscan be considered plausible? The answer requires c insiderationof geopolitical factors.

4

0. Geopolitical Considerations

The second phase of the study evaluated the political-military situation of the world and pointed to some of themajor trends in order to test the plausibility of variousstrategic concepts.

The first observation was that during the past twodecades, development and structure of the entire U.S. mili-tary posture have reflectad a bipolar view of the world(United States ve-sus Soviet Union). Offensive anddefensive forces of the United States-strategic-nuclear,tactical-nuclear, conventional- and unconventiona.-warcapabilities-have all been built around this ooncept. Themuch debated escalation theories have centered around it.The bipolar concept has worked quite well and, perhaps withsome modifications, will continue to work well against anythreat that operates under the Soviet strategic-nuclearumbrella. Yet, as the new decade begins, it appears thatthe threat will become increasingly multipolar. Thus, theprimarily "Soviet-oriented" bipolar concept of the UnitedSta t es must be re-examined.

The second observation concerns the somewhat paradoxicaleffects on the European theater of the Sino-Soviet rift andthe aspirations of the satellite nations. The diffusion ofpower in the once monolithic Communist empire contributes tothe creation of a static, if not stable, situation all alongthe Soviet perimeter Nut, at the same time, encouzages simi-lar centrifugal trends within the Atlantic Alliance. Whilethe United States welcomes the former, it is determined toresist the latter. The policy of containment toward theSoviet Union continues to rest on a militarily strong andpolitically viable NATO, however difficult to maintain.

In view of the Sino-Soviet rift and the fact that Chinahas acquired nuclear power, formulation of a firm Americannuclear-response theory is needed for a policy of contain-ing China. Such a selcctive strategy must not reactivatethe Sino-Soviet collaboration ard has to be tailored to thespecific political circumstances of the Far East, which arecharacterized by the lack of a viable defense system suchas NATO.

Even if an effective "strategic-nuclear umbrella" canbe extended to support the policy of containing CommunistChina, 'here is an increaving probability of intraregional(local) wars which will not fit into ary ,uclear-responsetheory and in which the use ct theater (tactical) nuclearweapons will not serve the interests of the United States.Nonetheless, such confiicts may "equire sustained massiveWestern support.

In the Pacific theater, American political interestsrule out any major rollback strategy includinr, a "fallback"on the defense alliance of Australia, New Zealand, and theUnited States (ANZUS), whether or not it is militarilyfeasible. Nevertheless, the coming decade may bring suchdrastic changes in the exist..ng political alignment ofnations in this region that the muit serious considerationhas to be given to sea mobility, air mobility, and "floatingdepots" as i partial compensation for the possible loss offoreign bases because of political uncertainty.

The spread of "wars of national liberation"-subversiveinsurgencies-and local revolutions is highly probable.Huwever, identification of hostile elements with outsideCommunist centers (e.g., Moscow, Peking, Havana) willbecome increasingly difficult, if not impossible. The localand international political consequences of any direct mili-tary intervention by the United States will have to beweighed in each case with extreme care. Ar indirectapproach-through United Nations or regional defense alli-ances-seems preferable.

A trend toward more unilateral, bilateral, and multi-lateral limitations in the conduct of general nuclear war-increasing arms control measures-is clearly indicated inthe American national policy. Such constraints graduallyreduce, and perhaps remove, the "holocaust" character of anuclear conflict and increase the signiflicance of militarycapabilities in the terminal or postnuclear phase of thewar.

These and many other geopolitical considerations indeedreduce the rumrber of alternatives. It becomes quite obvious

6

that a concept fox, a specific strategic posture can beplausible only if it offers a blend or mix of militaryforce capabilities that fully takes into consideration theentire spectrum of probable conflict situations, the rapidlychanging world environment, and the unchanged requirementsset forth by the two constant elements-forward deploymentand flexible reaponse. SurpriLsingly small is the number ofstrategic mixes which can "orchestrate"' the Nation's mili-tary power in such manner.

in the third phase of the inquiry, the results of whichare presented in the following sections, a method was devel-oped for grouping the required force capabilities so thatsimplified formulae of strategic mixes of alternative stra-tegic postures could be derived.

7

II. CONFLICTS AND CAPABILITIES

It was pointed out in the Introduction that the defini-tion of a military strategy calls for both a concept and aposture-a posture is explained as a combination of forcecapabilities at various levels of conflict. The ensuingdiscussion describes first the levels of conflict and thenthe force capabilities.

A. Spectrum of Conflicts

The study revealed that, in defining the major alterna-tive strategies, it was not necessary to go beyond the fourcommonly recognized levels of war: general nuclear war,controlled strategic-nuclear war, limited war, and counter-insurgency. Cold war, as a separate category of confliutsituations below the counterinsurgency level, was deliber-ately omitted, since it is-in terms of this report-thepsychological-political exploitation of the over-all mili-tary posture of the Nation.

1. General Nuclear War

General nuclear war-in present terminology--overs awide rang of high-intensity conflict situations in which avariety of strategies can be employed against countervaluetargets, counterforce targets, or any combination of thetwo. The purpose of the general nuclear war strategy ofthe United States is to deter and prevent the enemy fromfurther escalation of the conflict by reserving the capa-bility of "assured destruction" of the enemy's society.However, once conflicts escalate to that level, targetingwill respond increasingly to military imperatives wkichinevitably lessen the concern over collateral damage toindustrial and city populations.

2. Controlled Strategic-Nuclear War

In controlled strategic-nuclc.r war, countervalue tar--gets, counterforce targets, or any combination of the twomay be selected, as in general nuclear war. Its character

9

tends, however, toward counterforce, because its purposeis less than assured destruction of the enemy (some authorscall it "limited nuclear war"). The key word is "controlled,"

and the purpose is to coerce the enemy through exemplary stra-tegic demonstration or highly selective damage infliction.

3. LimtgaWa

Limited war is limited in its objective by geography,political considerations, or any combination of the two.Political considerations include weapon and military objec-tive limitations. Nuclear weapons may or may not beemployed to attain these limited objective.. Accordingly,a number of strategies may be chosen which employ minimalconventional forces backed up by strategic-nuclear forces(the conventional forces serve as a "tripwire" for thestrategic-nuclear forces), purely conventional forces, ora variety of comtinations of conventional and theater(tactical) nuclear forces.

4. COI--C-unterinsuraencv Warfare

COIN in now accepted as the designation for the lowestlevel of military involvement and ranges from militaryassistance and training programs through advisory andlogistic (noncombat) support to defensive and offensivecombat support-the latter already blurring the divisionbetween COIN and limited war.

B. Reauired Cababilitin

The required military force capabilities roughly corre-sponding to the four broad categories of conflict situationsjust described are assured destruiction, damago limitation,limited conflict, and counterinsurgency operation. (Assureddestruction and damage limitation both relate ro nuclear warand cannot be separated logically from a warfighting strategyfor such a war. By itself, az. assured destruction capabilityaims at nothing but deterrence.)

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1. A�aured Destruction

The required capabilities corresponding to the categoryof general nuclear war are predominantly those which callfor assured destruction, a force capability which is partof Strategic Offensive Forces in terms of the Department ofDefense program packages. Assured destruction describes alevel of nuclear capabiiity that can destroy the enemy "asa viable society" (a substantial percentage of its oopula-tion combined with an even higher percentage of its indus-trial capacity) even after a well-planned surprise attackis absorbed. The United States already possesses such capa-bility, while the Soviet Union is rapidly approaching acomparably credible posture; hence the phrases "nuclearstalemate," "balance of terror," and "mutual deterrence."Although Europe is not capable of absorbing massive nuclearattack and retaliating with sufficient strength to destroythe attacker as a viable society, European military think-ing leans toward a countervalue targeting concept, withheavy reliance on its deterrent character:

-1 Budgetary considerations make it more attractivebecause it is cheaper than the maintenance of thehighly sophisticated and much bigger selectiveretalitatory systems.

-2 The relatively less sophisticated technologyrequired for target selection and weapon deliverymakes it a more realistic-and therefore more"credible"-posture for European strategists.

-3 The general conviction is that any major, directconfrontation between the Soviet Union and theWestern Allies in the Central Europe'An theater ishighly unlikely in the foreseeable future as longas a credible deterrent exists.

One can see that assured destruction has a close af fin-ity with "finite deterrence" as well as an extensive involve-ment with countervalue targets. By its nature, assureddestruction favors hardened, survivable, surface-to-surfacemissiles; submarine-launched ballistic missiles; and,

11

generally speaking, second-strike (multistrike) capabilities.A somewhat distorted European interpretation erroneouslyidentifies assured destruction with massive retaliation andthe "tripwire" concept. The truth is that assured destruc-tion has a strongly emphasized flexible-response character

based on survivability with no fixed threshold for trigger-ing nuclear response.

Maintaining a capability for assured destruction hasbeen simplified to date by the assumption that any complete,meaningful defense system (covering Western Europe as wellas North America) has been almost "unacceptably" costly,even if technologically possible. Because an assured-destruction capability is mainly a deterrent rather than awar-fighting capability, it would constitute the "last card"in national security that would be retained during arms con-trol or gradual disarmament.

2. Damaae Limitation

Damage limiting (as a capabilit, added to assureddestruction) is the force capability which mest closelycorresponds to the requirements for controlled stratceicwar. The damage-limitation concept is intended to covera number of missions that have one thing in common: theyall intend to limit or minimize the damage that wouldresult from an enemy ' attack.

The concept includes both offensive and defensivecomponents:

-1 The offensive component of damage limitation is apart of the Strategic Offensive Forces and alsoincludes the assured-destruction ftorce capability,although requirments differ significantly.

-2 The defensive component is assigned to the Stra-tegic Defense Forces and Civil Defense packages ofthe DOD program. A large part of antisubmarinewarfare (AW), now included in the General PurposeForces, also belongs here.

12

omn ------ __

The very nature of damage limitation suggests, to somestrategists, pre-emptive action or a first strike. Thesecan certainly reduce the enemy's war-making capacity and,obviously, limit the anticipated damage to the United States.Any pre-emptive action, however, should be firmly controlledand flexibly selected. Because it seeks to eliminate theenemy's war-making capability, damage limitation has a strongcounterforce character. Offensive damage limitation callsfor constant reconnaissance; highly accurate target acquisi-tion; precise, carefully controlled delivery; damage assess-ment; quick retargeting; and a foo'proof command and ccntrolsystem.

Damage limitation is by no means limitee to a firststrike. However, any extension of the Concept beyond U.S.pre-emption strongly accentua'es the need for active andpassive defenses alike.

There is no doubt that a survivable damage-limitingposture is the optimum one can ask for and the most desir-able from the viewpoint of the Nation's political principles.However, the price tag on an effective damage-limiting pos-ture vis-a-vis a sophisticated cremy like the Soviet Unionhas been considered prohibitive. It would be practical andmay be imperative to develop such a posture, on a smallerscale, against less sophisticated nuclear opponents oi thefuture (such as China) and for the conduct of -ontrolledetrategic-nuclear war requiring the very same capabilities."TIhe active and passive defenses created for such a posturecould also become, i.f later desired, the nucleus of a mean-ingful system limiting the damage which could be inflictedby a sophisticated opponent's attack.

Offensive damage limitation would likely be the firstforce capability subject to limitation under any serioisarms control agreement. Because of this fact, some regardit as a wasteful investment, some consider it a potentialbargaining lever, and others point out that an ability toeliminate the enemy's withheld forces makes a significantlylarge contribution to reducing losses of U.S. populationand industry.

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3. Limited Conf i~r

Military capabilities-assigned to General PurposeForces and Airlift and Sealift Forces in the DOD program-that are required for the conduct and successful termina-tion of a modern limited oar arp not too well understoodbecause of the misconception of the very nature of limitedwar. It is not a return to the old conventional wariare,nor is it an introduction to strategic-nuclear warfare.It is ruled by the specific circumstances that made, itlimited. For example, according to the "ground rules," itmay or may not be confined to certain geographic areas andmay or may not involve nuclear weapons. The argument iswell founded that if nuclear weapons are employed, thedanger of miscalculation and unnecessary escalation isconsiderably high in this kind of war. On the other hand,the nuclear option has too much potential value to be pre-cluded. Introduction of theater (tactical) nuclear weaponsshould be decided on the principle of juj 2 odest (whoseinterest would be better served). In most instance, theiremployment would not necessarily serve the U.S. interests;thus, limited-war requirements will probably continue to beprimarily conventional forces backed up by very-low-yield,highly accurate nuclear weapons. An enemy's intent tolaunch a massive attack or increase its own theater nuclearweapons, or drastic cuts in the U.S. forces-in-being, wouldautomatically increase the necd for the nuclear component.

Another distinction should be made between offensiveand defensive theater employment of nuclear weapons. Theeccalation potential of the defensive use of ground-to-airor air-to-air missiles with nuclear warheads over one's ownterritory (even the declared establishment of atomic demoli-tion munition zones) in repelling outside aggression isdefinitely lower than that of any offensive nuclear weapon.This distinction is often overlooked in discussions ofescalation.

In any case, one of the chief characteristics stronglydesired for modern limited-war forces is their capabilityto operate afficiently in conventional, prenuclear, nuclear,and postnuclear environments alike. Methods of deployment,

14

Logistics, and operational doctrines are not completelyworked out. Experts point out thdt this multipurpose char-acter cannot be expected from some of today's major weaponey. tom.

The paramount importance of mobility in limited war iswell recognized-mobility in every sense of the word, fromstrategic air mobility and sea mobility to cross-countrymobility. This includes an increasing need for airbornefirepower and logistics. Modern limited war also creates"sanctuaries," whose existence challenges traditional doc-trines and calls for added force capabilities; for instance,in the field of area denial or air-to-atr combat.

Strateqists recognize that the value of strategiccmserves in limited war is increased by the speed of theirSmployment disproportionately to their size. It has to beiled, however, that this disproportionate increase isvitally needed for various reasons:

-1 Domestic politics are not likely to permit themaintenance of large (limited-war) standby forcesin peacetime.

-2 Eventual arms control agreements may freeze orreduce force levels.

-3 Quick redeployment capabilities may replace-wher-ever politically feasible-the permanent stationingof U.S. forces.

m&r X o iration

In terms of the DOD program packages, the COIN missionLs assigned to Special Forces which are part of the Generalmrpose Forces. This assignment is logical, since the lineotween COIN and limited-war capabilities is blurred. TheIifference is in the otigins of the conflicts rather thanSn the required capabilities of men and weapons. Transi-:ion from deployment of uniquely trained Special Forces to

-ighly trained regular forces (Marines, Air Cavalry, Para-roopers, et cetera) occurs naturally when circumstances

15

warrant it. Many observers feel that the escalated formof COIN warfare-as seen in Vietnam-show.; some markedcharacteristics of future limited wars in any other partof the world with the possible exception of Western Europe.

COIN operations represent the most extended form offorward deployment. In its original concept, COIN extendsthe "American military presence" to countries where nomajor American forces are deployed ordinarily, but wherethe nation's intention to defend that area from any formof subversion or agglession is openly declared.

The initial concept of COIN was based on the principleof preventing local subversive movements froir growing intocivil wars which could eventually lead to the establishmentof local Communist or pro-Communist regimes. It cannot beemphasized too strongly that this is still the primaryobjective of COIN. If there are special capabilitiesrequired-as there are, but mostly in the nonmilitaryfield-they are most needed at this preventive stage. Oncethe conflict develops into organized guerrilla warfare, theinitial COIN mission has failed.

Russian, Chinese, and Castroite 'rands of communism areunited in their eagerness to explore and exploit the "warsof national liberation." In the spectrum of conflicts, sub-versive insurgency has the highest probability of occurringin the coming decade. The capability of the United Statesto prevent, counter, and repel this type of aggression isan indispensable part of future military posture.

COIN is the logical counterpoint to assured destructionand requires a capability that cannot be given up in anyarms control agreement.

16

III . 8T.ATUGIC ALTEZRATIVES

Division of the spectrum of conflicts into fouc sim-polified categories and assignment to these categories ofcorresponding force capabilities make possible the follow-ing description of alternative strategic mixer which con-form to the guidelines of the two constant determiningelements-forward deployment and flexible response-andwhich are based on international political realities.

Five alternative strategic postv res were selected-orrather compiled, since each of theta represents a varietyof ideas, theories, and substrategies. For this reason,these alternatives should not be identified with a partic-ular person or persons. The five alternatives are asfollows:

Strategy 1-a posture of "retained options"

Stzategy 2-a 'Soviet-oriented" posture

Strategy 3-a "China-oriented" posture

Strategy 4-a modified "fallback" posture

Strategy 5--an "arms control" posture.

Each of the alternatives in briefly described belowwith the condensed political rationale that made it appearplausible. A4penrdix A compares main characteristics ofthese postures.

A. Strategy 1---A Posture of "Retained Ontions"

The po.itical rationale behind this strategic postureis that the) situation in regatd to the Soviet Union and theWarsaw Pact nations will continue to be relatively static,even to the extent that certain arms control measures seempossible. It reognizes the Far mast as the area where

17

major conflict situations may be imminent in the comingdecade and stresses a determination to contain Red Chineseexpansion in that area. The high probability of Communist-inspired "wars of national liberation" in Africa, Asia, andLatin America and the need for U.S. capability to countersuch subversive insurgencies are strongly emphasized.

7%is school of thought believes that the United Statesnow possesses such a quantitative and qualitative superioz-ity in the strategic-nuclear field that it has-in terms ofassured destruction-not only a stable deterrence but alsoa margin big enough to hedge dgainst a gradual increase inSoviet nuclear capabilities, barring any spectacular techno-logical bc-eakthrough. Consequently, its strategic-nuclearthinking is characterized by efforts to economize and todelay certain major decisions, since there seems to be timeto "preserve the option" to choose at some later date.

In regard to strategic offensive forces, this school-referring to pragmatic-technological circumstances ratherthan doctrinal beliefs--shows a marked preference forimproved survivable (hardened or submarine-launched) mis-siles over manned systems. Consistent with its targetingphilosophy-which is characterized by the recognition thattechnology limits the "city-sparing" capabilities ofstrategic-nuclear forces-it tends toward an almost "finitedeterrent" posture which limits the number and yield of mis-si.les and minimizes the number and role of strategic aircraft.

The school's pti'tion on strategic defenses is somewhatself-.ontradicting. On one hand, it realizes that anyincremt-nt to the offensive forces-above the ceiling of

assured-nestruction capability-is subject to the "law ofdiminishin,-t returns" and that added credibility can beachieved through strengthening the defensive profile.Therefore, it recognizes the importance of active defenses(including ASW) and advocates a civil defense program. Onthe other hand, it is preoccupied with the "comparativeinvestment" side of the problem, stating that high-costinvestment in defensive damage limitation can be counter-balanced by a corresponding increase of the Soviet assured-destruction capability at substantially less additional cost.

18

The result is a rather stagnant attitude, based on theassumption that the Soviet posture is governed by similarconsiderations. Lately, a distinction has begun to emergebetween the "indefensible" Soviet threat and the threatpresented by the less sophisticated sy3tems of "Nthcountries" (China) where an effective defense seems possible.Efforts to achieve such a posture are predictable.

This school lays strong emphasis on conventional capa-bilities in its limited-war concept and is keenly aware ofthe "nuclear threshold." Some proponents do not choose todistinguish between the various nuclear thresholds that maybe crossed in the course of controlled escalation. othersfeel that the use of low-yield nuclear weapons againstclearly indicated military targets in a geographically lim-ited area establishes an "intermediate" threshold which itis hoped would not automatically trigger general nuclear war.In both cases, it may be said that the nuclear capabilitiesof the General Purpose Forces are regarded mainly as comple-ments to nuclear strategic systems or as "theater deterrence"rather than backup capabilities integrated with conventionalarmaments. A moderate-sized but highly mobile land, air,and sea force is advocated with increasing capability forfighting escalated COIN wars. This school would prefer tohave this force based in the continental United States as acentral strategic reserve but recognizes the politicalnecessity of massive peacetime deployment in certain forwardareas.

The characteristics of this posture, summarized andgrouped according to the four major categories of desiredcapabilities, are:

-1 Assured destruction is regarded as an almost finitedeterring, second-strike capability whieh reliesprimarily on missiles. It has been already achiev~idand-probably with only marginal improvements of thesystems-can be maintained through the coming decade.

-2 Damage limitation, in the sense of a "war-fightingcapability" for a controlled strategic-nuclear war,ia not well developed, because it is considered

19

mainly as an increment over the ceiling of assureddestruction and not as a capability per so. Activeand passive defenses are advocated but not puasuedvigorously. The development. of a amall-scaledefensive system against "primitive" nuclear-missile threats will probably be accepted.

-3 L requirerents place strong emphasis nrthe conventional capability of a highly mobile,moderate-sized force * light protracted (c'nven-tional) conflicts under exoti-_" conditione. Tact;-cal nuclear weapons "preserve the nuclear -ption"rather than add to the practical war-fighting capa-bility of theater forces.

-4 CM capabilities, as part of the limited-war, war-fighting capabilities, are vigorously stressed; theeffort to maximize them during the coming decade isclearly predictable.

B. Strateav 2-A "Soviet-Oriented" Posture

Alternative Strategy 2 is based on the thoughts ofthose who criticize U.S. present defense posture and are,in general, alarmed by the euphoria that exists on bothsides of the Atlantic as a result of the East-West detente.

The political philosophy that lends a certain degree ofplausibility to this theory acknowledges the disintegrationof Stalin's "monolithic empire" but points to the fact thatthe Sino-Soviet rift and the various brands of communismhave placed the Soviet Union in the favorable position ofbeing the strategic reserve of the broad anti-imperialistcoalition, uncommitted in preliminary skirmishes or tacti-cal engagements, and, if possible, playing a role similarto that of the United States in World War I and World War II.In fact, the Soviets gained this important strategic optionthrough the process of the diffusion of power, while theUnited States, in spite of all its frantic efforts in questof options, did not. The diffusion of power within theWestern Alliance left the United States in the front lines,directly exposed to skirm4.shes, probing attacks, and tacti-cal engagements. In other words, the Soviet Union, once an

20

I

underdeveloped country itself, was able to consolidateCommunist rule over its vast territory amidst the hostileworld of capitalists, imperialists, and Fascists; it com-pletely understands the reasoning of the Chinese, even ifconvinced that the Mao/Lin Piao/Giap formula will not work.

The Soviet Union knows that the United States will sooner

or later become fully aware that acceptanco of the Chinesechallenge would result in a new form of the war of attri-tion and, at a critical p,5int, may prefer a showdown,striking out against the "center of gravity." The SovietUnicn simply does not want to be identified as the centerof gravity at this point in the dialectic-historical devel-opment of the inevitable clash between communism and capi-talism. Whether the Soviet Union chooses to join the fightis, once acain, not the point. The point ia that it has the

positive option to join and, perhaps, decide the outcome ofthe fight, while the United States has a negative option-withdrawal.

How does the Soviet Union utilize its favorable poei-tion that enables it to choose the time, place, and formof committing its forces? The "Soviet-oriented" schooladmits the internal economic difficulties that exist inthe Soviet Union and concedes that a considerable part ofits national resources is being channeled to satisfy con-sumer demands. Yet, this school points to the vast, spec-tacular Soviet space program that was initiated and carriedout under economic and social circumstances much lessfavorable than those of the present. Secrecy, relativelyeasy maneuverability (Nazi-Soviet Pact!), and the militant,close organization of the Communist society enable Sovietleaders to follow any course of action that maximizes theirstrategic advantage. Moreover, "they would be traitors tocommunism" if they failed to do so.

Therefore, United States strategy must remain geared tothe fact that, detente or no detente, the Soviet Union con-tinues to represent a very real-and, in terms of nationalsurvival, the gnal•-danger.

Only a clearly superior posture can deter the SovietUnion from "joining the fight" at the most opportune zroment.

21

Only with the Soviet Union kept at bay does the UnitedStates have a chance to contain or defeat China and success-fully liquidate subversive insurgencies.

The school dismisses most "comparative investment"arguments by saying that "we can afford much more than theRussians." Thus, the United States must ensure the sur-vivalof its viable society through the most extensive program ordamage limitation possible, regardless of cost, because"survival has little to do with cost efficiency." Accord-ingly, this alternative places its heaviest emphasis on thereal damage-limiting profile-active Lnd passive defensesthat enhance the efficiency of the offensive damage-limitingcapability. The arguments grouped around this theme areundoubtedly forceful. Some of the major points are:

-1 The extent of Soviet progress in the anti-ballistic-missile field is not really known; the United Stateshas been surprised time and again.

-2 It is known, however, that the Soviet Union has acivil defense system, World War II experience, andnearly 50 years of militant social organization.

-3 If the Soviet Union wants to keep up with the UnitedStates, it will strain its economy to a far greaterextent than damage-±imitation measures would taxU.S. economy.

-4 The United States has a great advantage in the fieldof civil defense over the Soviet Union-surplus foodsupplies against constant food shortages. The sameapplies to medical supplies, transportation and com-munication means, and so forth.

-5 A defensive damage-limiting profile will make theflexibile-response strdtegy of the United States farmor - credible.

-6 Because defensive damage limitation cannot berestricted to the North American Continent, butmust cover the Buropean allies too, U.S. efforts

22

in developing defensive damage-limitation capabili-ties will help these allies overcome their "juvenilemassive retaliation period" and understand theflexible-response strategy of the United Statesapplied to forward areas.

-7 Some of the current NATO problems will be seen ina few perspective: the problem of U.S. "mo.•cipoly"over nuclear response ("who is dying fcor whom, when,and 'ny?") would lore some of its gravity onceneither Europe nor the United States is risking itssurival as a viable society (particularly appli-cable to Germany).

-8 Joint NATO planning, R&D, and maybe delegated com-mand and control authority in defensive damagelimitation are far less provocative or "prciiferating"than face-saving "stillborn" ideas of offensivecoordination like the Multi-Lateral Force (NLF); theformer may be "the thing" NATO needs for greaterunity.

-9 The implamentation of a meaningful defensive damage-limiting strategy would also result in badly neededpsychological and functional training for theAmerican people who, unlike Zuropeans, have nopractical experience in civil defense.

In regard to the other elements of the strategic posture,the "Soviet-oriented" school believes that the increasedcredibility of the Nation's flexible-nuclear response capa-bility would further deter limited wars. In sumarys

-1 Assured destruction is not a finite quantity ofdestruction because it must hedge against all pos-sible surprises and uncertainties of the enemy'sdamage-limiting capability. Some representativesof the school reconsend the development of very-high-yield weapons for use against countervaluetargets in retaliatory general nuclear war.

23

-2 Damaae limitation is not simply an increment over

assured destruction. It represents a real capabil-ity for fighting controlled strategic-nuclear warup to the Lighest possible level. The offensiveprofile is not detached from the similar capabili-

46 ties of assured destruction, although the reliabil-ity of missiles is loes taken for granted and,accordingly, the role of manned systems is somewhatmore appreciated. Defensive damage limitation,active and passive alike, is heavily emphasized and,admittedly, would require an increase in the defensebudget. This posture's assured-destruction anddamage-limiting capabilities include both (selective)offensive and defensive requirements against an "Nthcountry" threat.

-3 Limitc•d Lr---because it is held less probable inthe framework of this posture-perhaps requiressomewhat smaller forces than atrategy 1 with essen-tially the same characteristics of mobility and dualcapability.

-4 2g.I--in view of official Soviet endorsement of"wars of liberation," this school does n.t questionthe requirement for a strong capability of this kind.

C. Strateav 3-A "Ching-Oriented" Posture

The third alternative strategy would seem to have theclosest affinity to the posture of "retained options." Thebasic assumptions of the political rationales are almostidenticals continued, static, power balance and relative(military) tranquility in the Western front, because theSoviet Union would risk less and gain more by refrainingfrom direct intervention in intraregional conflicts (Cyprus,Greece, Turkey) and eploiting only the political opportuni-ties created by the crises. The same Soviet attitude,although with smewhat less confidence, is projected to theMiddle Bast (Iran, Iraq) and to the Par last (India,Indonesia).

The interpretation of the political indicators differsfrom Strategy I in the evaluaticn of the Sino-Soviet rift.

24

This school believes that historical, racial, and culturalfactors, as well as China's unhidden territorial claims,stem from such a solid basis (i.e., not simply an "ideologi-cal" difference) that the Chinese problem can safely beseparated from that of the Soviet Union by proper strategy.

A common Senominator in the varied thinking of thisschool is the recognition that, while the United Stateshas been successful in containing the Soviet expansionthrough a firmly postulated nuclear-response concept, nosuitable nuclear-response theory has been devised-or, atleast, enunciated--in regard to China. This is the pointwhere the "China-oriented posture" school d.verges fromthe officially accepted theory on assured destruction-that is, "destruction of the eneny as a viable society"measured in percentages of population and industrialcapacity destroyed. This targeting philosophy simply couldnot be applied to China, since she has unlimited "floorspaceand personnel" and the roots of her Communist society are asdeep in the far-removed villages as in the cities. Howviable the 730-million-plus Communist Chinese nation willremain as a guerrilla society carrying on protracted warfareon a vast, basically primitive continent, after losing itsmajor cities and newly acquired industries, is a questionthat cannot be easily comprehended, much less quantified.

The "China-oriented" theorists are convinced that thefirm nuclear-response policy needeJ to contain China lieswithin the strategic fraiework of the controlled strategic-nuclear war. "oxemnlary coercion," "selective damageinfliction," "progressive attrition to coerce," and "stra-tegic demonstration" are their different expressionsdescribing basically the same concept: strictly controlled,graduated, nuclear warfare against selected targets of themilitary-political apparatus, with minimum damage to thepeople. This is the war the United States faces in the FarBast, the school maintains, because any major conflict inthat area would, sooner or later, involve China's homeland.

The nature of controlled strategic-nuclear war stressesthe importance of selective targeting, or, rather, thesequence of targeting, to allow time to get the political

25

mossage across clearly. The political context of the waranu its limited goals (no showdown)-a concept familiar tothe "pause-uAnd-negotiate" theorists of the "retainedoptions" school-must be kept in the forefront at each stepof the campaign. This would, it is hoped, keep the SovietUnion out of the conflict and minimize the possibility ofescalation to general nuclear war. The concept •also empha-sizes the necessity of having communication chat.nelsavailable.

Some of the proponents of this school consider thecurrent air campaign against North Vietnam an embryonicexample of applying such strategy. Because this strategyrequires constant and accurate reconnaissance, quick tar-get acquisition, precision delive~y, and damage aisessment-,with maximum psychological effect on, but with minimumdamage to, the civilian population, the school looks favor-ably on manned systems with very-low-yield nucleaz weapons.

The "China-oriented" alternative proposes to withhold"tactical" n'iclear wearans, except as a means of "exemplarycoercion." On the other hand, it rules out Korean-style"limited wars" as a test of strength between China ana theUnited States.

In most of its other aspects, the "China-oriented"concept agrees with Strategy 1, recapitulating in termsof the four categories:

-1 Assured destruction, with its almost finite,countervalue, missile-based, survivable second-strike character, is primari..y. designed to containthe industrialized Soviet Union. With marginalimprovements of the present systems, it is likelyto be effective throughout the coming decade.

-2 D0me limitatMon, designating the characLeristicsof controlled, strategic-nuclear, war-fightingcapabilities, requires a conceptually and function-ally different approach, especially tailored to theneeds of the Far Rastern theater# controlled,graduated, progressive strategic-nuclear offense

26

against primarily counterforce targets, mosteffectively carried out by manned systems. As theChinese Communists do not represent a sophisticatednuclear threat to the United States in the comingdecade, the development of a relatively small-scale,defensive, damage-limitation system A.s feasible anddesirable.

-3 Limited calls for highly mobile, conventionalforces. Theater-based nuclear component3 may beused for strategic demonstration or exemplary coer-cion, complementing offensive damage limitation,but not for tactical purposes. As damage limitationis both a deterrence and a minimum-risk strategicwar-fighting capability, the size of the requiredconventional forces may be somewhat smaller than inthe case of Strategy 1.

-4 COMN requirements call for maximum capabilities, inrecognition of the fact that identification of sub-versive insurgencies with outside Communist powersmay be increasingly difficult, if not impossible;thus, COIN forces may have to operate efficientlyoutside any "nuclear umbrella."

D. Stratev 4-!j Modified "Fallback" Posture

The fourth alternative posture is based on a school ofthought advocating a fallback strategy for the United States,under such conditirns, and with such capabilities that iLcannot, by any standards, be called an "isolationist" or a"Fortress America" concept. Indeed, a closer examinationshows that this alternative would conform Lo the principlesof both forward deployment and controlled response. Itleaves, however, the primary responsibility of theaterdefense to the friendly local forces and replaces continuedAmerican military presence with eplicit and mutually satis-factory guarantees of quick redeployment of tactical forcesand/or strategic support.

The concept is attractive, for it would reinstate theUrited States as the central strategic reserve oi a world-wide defense system, in a position similar to the one it

27

hold in two world wars. It was this decisive role thatenabled the United States to assume the military leader-ship of the non-Communist world. Undeniably, this postureis also militarily sound and economically feasible. Itmight even appeal to American yublic sentiments strainedby protracted peripheral confl Acts.

It is an optimistic alternative. Tb what degree thisposture is politically plausible cannot be ascertained.One mry call it a marginal case, since it depends on inter-national political conditions which are extremely difficultto achieve. Yet, as the proponents of the theory point out,it represents exactly that "kind of world" the United Statesforeign policy would like to zee. It is politically as wellas militarily difficult; but, in view of the history of thepast two'decades, one cannot categorically rule out the pos-sibility of such achievements in the next 10 years.

The political rationale assumes a continued detentebetween the Warsaw Pact countries and the Atlantic Alliance,a basically unchanged nuclear balance between the UnitedStatOs and the Soviet Union, and the existence of a viableEuropean defense community with conventional as well ascoordinated nuclear capabilities (which presupposes thesolution of both the French and the German problems). Thetheory further visualises a steady deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations (an interpretation similar to that ofStrateg.1y 3) that woulV facilitate the formulation of acrodit.e nuclear-response policy to contain China (stillsimilar to Strategy 3). In turn, this policy would serveas a strategic-nuclear backup to a strong Far Easterndefense system similar to NATM. In regard to LatinAmerica, the theory postulates progress for tiie Alliancefor Progress. As to the rest of the world, it counts onthe increased peacekeeping role of the United Nations.

It must be noted that, even under such favorable cir-cumstances, a considerable element of uncertainty andinsecurity is likely to remain.

28

Zn summarys

-1 Alsured destruction, as far as forces-in-being areconcerned, acquires an almost "minimum deterrence"character, somewhat less than Strategy I postulates,although the school does not deny the need for astrong R&D profile to minimize tbh surprise of aSoviet technological breakthrough.

-2 Damaae limitation, offensive and defensive, shouldbe tailored to the non-Soviet threat (similar toStrategy 3) and to the explicit and implicit guaran-tees given to the regional alliances. This impliesa rather moderate (Strategy 3) levei of forces.

-3 L requires moderate-sized, but completelymobile, extremely high-performance, land, sea, andair forces, probably with reliance on low-yield,high-accuracy nuclear weapons, for tactical use and-'n'ylementing strategic systems.

-4 aa capability requirements, assuming the existenceof efficient, local defense systems, should besmaller than in Strategy 1.

R. 8trateav -- An "Arms Control" Posture

Among the repeatedly declared objectives of the Nation'spolicy, attainment of a peaceful world oamunity-assketched in the Preamble, and in Articles One and Two of theUnited Nations Charter-ranks high.

This goal visualizes a world of independent nations-each with the institutions of its own choice, but cooperat-ing with one another to promote the mutual interest of theircitisens-a world free of aggression, a world which rwvestoward the rule of law, a world in which human rights aresecure, a world of better life for all mankind.

This goal is indeed distant. It is to be approachedwith care, through a step-by-step limitation of the armsrace and Vradual disarmament. Five Presidents have

2 1

confirmed the Nation's desire, as well as its persist, rnce,to work toward this enc.

As a major politics.. objective, however desirable, itis subordinated to the tasic requirements of nationalsecurity, particularly in a nuclear age, when no less thannational survival As at stake. This fact eliminates anumber of theories stemaLig from either idealistic pacifismor the realistic fear of r.uclear holocaust.

However, some practical avenues of unilateral (policyof mutual example), bilateral, and multilateral arms controlmeasures and agreements remain which represent a slow andgradual approach toward the world envisioned by the UnitedNations Charter.

TVe fact that an "arms control environment" alreadyexists becomes strikingly cleat when some of the past mile-stones are reviewed:

-1 Nuclear-test moratorium (1958)

-2 Treaty banning military use of Antarctica (1959)

-3 D1 facto acknowledgment of non-nuclear SouthAmerica (1962)

-4 "Hot Line"-a bilateral step to prevent accidentalwar (1963)

-5 Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963)

-S Implementation of inspection provisions of theAntarctic Treaty (1963)

-7 Peaceful weploration and use of outer space-U.N.

Resolution (1963)

-8 No nuclear weapons in space-U.N. Resolution (1963)

-9 & luction of fissionable materials production-"understanding" between the United States and theSoviet Union, joined by the United Kingdom (1964).

30

Presidents Kennedy and Johnson delineated a number ofsubjects about which the United States is prepared to cometo terms, independently fwim, but leading toward, a "Generaland Complete Disarmanent." These subjects include, amongothers, a "verified freeze of strategic nuclear offensiveand defensive vehicles," a comprehensive test-ban treaty,restriction of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, andthe exchange of military observers in certain strategicpoints to redice surprise mobilization and deployment offorces.

In view of this clearly discernible trend, a conceptthat takes into realistic consideration the impact of anarms control environment on U.S. military posture must beincluded among the plausible strategic alternatives.

In summary:

-1 Assured destruction, in the form of a "minimumdeterrence," should remain the "laut card" ofnational defense until an adequate world systemof deterrence and international law enforcementdevelops. The force is likely to consist of hard-ened, survivable missiles with the possibility oftheir periodic replacement, including a chance forthe introduction of improved follow-on systems ona strictly limited scale.

-2 Damaae lmitation appears to be the principal areaof arms control agreements. The offensive profilemay be entirely eliminated. While strategic warn-ing systems may be retained and overtly improved,the role of active defenses is highly controversial,and their deployment may be frozen or barred. Itis highly unlikely that a civil defense programwould be supported in the United States under suchcircumstances.

-3 w is another major area for possible armsreductions agreements may freeze force levels at amutually acceptable minimu. Also, tactical nuclearweapons may be prohibited. Nstablishment of a

31

functional system of inspection in staging areasand/or key mobilization centers, may lead to thethinning out of theater forces and ultimately tomere "tripwires" on both sides of the NATO-WarsawPact front. The geostrategic advantages of theCommunist Bloc-the "inner circle"-must be bal-anced by retainment of quick deploymentcapabilities.

-4 COI capabilities should not be subject to negotia-tions and must be retained at the strongest possiblelevel, since there is no likelihood that the Com-munists would or could offer acceptable guaranteesagainst subversive insurgency.

32

APPENDIX A

COMPARATIVE TABULATION OF THE CHARACTERISTICS

OF FIVE ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC POSfTJRES

PRESENT AND ANTICIPATED

ALTERNATIVE UNITED STATES MILITARY STRATEGIES

BUSN= REPORT

COMPARATIVE TABULATION OF THE CHARACTERISTICSOF FIVE ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC POSTURES

General Controlled Stratgic- Limited War, Nuclear War HcecWrI~ie a

Assured Destruction Damage Limitation Limited Conflict ;terinburgc

Capability Capability Capability p~eratiny :arability

Alwost finite Not well-developed Primarily con- Part of limited.d.err*ence venti.nal with w.r forces

Offensive: Incre- tactical "nuoCity-epqring ment of assured clear option" Strongest pobsi-

countervalue destruction ble. both inModerate size prevention and

Strategy I Primarily Primarily war-fightLne,missile-bimed missile-based Dual capabilit.y under conven-

tions

Second strike* Defensive: limited High mobility conditionscapabilitiesagainst Nth countrythreats

Not finite Most developt4 ialenced con- Part of limiteddeterrence ventlonal and war forces

Offensive: incre- nuclear withWar-fighting ment of assured option to use Less 1han maximur

countervalue destruction either or both (conventional)

Strategy 2 capability, inMixed force Mixed force L.ss than the belief that

n'derate site over-all atra-

Second strike* Defensixe: maximum tegic posturecapabilities Dual capability would keep LOINrequired warfare at a

High mobility moderate level

Almost finite Well-developed Primarily con- Part of limitvJ-deterrence ventional with war forces

Ofgfnsivet tailored theaterCity-sparing to Far last nuclear as Less than nattimum

countervalue complemant to (convention7a)Primarily manned strategic capability, in

.Strategy 3 primarily systems system the belief thatliesile-based controlled

DeosMtYg: limited Lass than strategic (nu-Second strike* to Nth country moderate size clear) response

threats wzuld deterDual ciapability escalation of

COIN warsHigh mobility

(Continued)

35

COMPARATIVE TABULATION OF THE CHARACTRISTICSOF FIVE ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC POSTURES-Continued

SCotro ia dta ~r -

Assured Destruction Damge Limitation edLitod Conflict CounterinswrgencýCapablNbity Capability Capabiltty Operation

Capability

Mintmo deterrence Developed slonced con- Part of limited,antional and war forces

Coautr.rvalue't OLffesiv: tailored nuclear with

to Nth country option to u"e Relatively smallNiasile-based either or both war-fighting

Nixed force force onStrategy h Scond strike* moderate size assumption that

Dfowige: limited effectiveto Nth country Dual capability raetonalthreats defense caps-

Very high bilitia, ecistmobility

inimimm deterrence Bargaining point Sarainpr4 point Part of limited-war forces

Counterva lye5 Affemwsil none Nissmg - isA

Strongest possi-Misaile-baaed ARIMMAM: warning Peacekeeping- ble, both in

system probably con- prevention and

Strategy 5 Secoed strike* ventional war-fight ing.Nok AIN urder €onven-

Very high tioe nCivil defense not moiLlity conditions,

likely complementingeffectivepeacekeeping hyb.N. forces

*fMretotrt use of eurvivble seeendd-strike ee e ieuteded.#Tending tewod eeomtervalut, but Pot clearly delfted.

36

APPENDIX B

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRESENT AND ANTICIPATED

ALTERNATIVE UNITCD STATES MILITARY STRATEGIES

SUMMARY REPORT

APPENDIX B

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

The works and statements listed below do not represent a reference list ir a sensewhich implies that there works would necessarily lead the reader to the author's conclu-

sions. They do represent, however, an important segment of the abundantly rnc 1 literature

related to the subject of national defense and offer historical insight into the recent post,as well as a great variety of strategic theories and political considerations,

Pshire and Allen, eds. National Security-Political, Mili-Starv and Economic StrateQies in the Decade Ahead (New York:

F. A. Praeger, 1963, published for the Hoover Institutionon War, Revolution and Peac-).

Vbshire, M. and Crane, R. D. "Soviet Strategy in the 60's,"Army Magazine (July 1963V.

tcheson, Dean G. "The Premises of American Policy," Orbis,Vol. III, No. 3 (Fall 1959).

siop, Stewart. "Our New Strategy-The Alternatives to'Total War," laturdav Evening Post (1 December 1962,pp. 13-19).

• rmbruster, Francis and Singer, Max. The Defense of ETiropein the Pervasive Presenge of Nuclear Weapons, Vols. I, II,III (HI-496-RR, Hudson Institute, New York, 16 March 1965,prepared for Office of Secretary of Defense).

Iron, Raymond. The great Debate--Tleo2ries of NuclearStrategv (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc.,1965).

Saldwin, Hanson W. "Kremlin Cloud Over Our Bases," New YorkTimes (9 October 1960).

"The McNamara Monarchy,' Saturday Evening Post(9 March 1963).

39

Barck, Oscar T., Jr. A History of the United States Since1945 (New York: Dell Publ 4 .shing Company, Inc., 1965).

Barnet, Richard J. and Raskin, Marcus G. After 20 Years:Alternatives to the Cold War (New York: Random House,].965).

Beaufre, General Andre. An Introduction to Strategy (NewYork: F. A. Praeger, 1965).

Berkowitz, Morton and Bock, P. G., eds. American NationalSecurity (New York: The Free Press, 1965).

Blackett, Patrick Maynard Stuart. "A Critique of DefenseThinking," Encounter (April 1961).

Studies of War, Nuclear and Conventional (NewYork: Hill and Wang, 1962).

Bowie, Robert R. Shaping the Future-Foreign Policy in anAge of Transition (New York: Columbia University Press,1964).

"Tensions Within the Alliance," Vol. 43, No. 1,Foreign Affairs (October 1963).

Brennan, Donald G., ed. Arms Control. Disarmament andNational Security (New York: George Braziller, 1961).

_ Arms Control Policies (HI-549/1-BN, Hudson Insti-tute, New York, 19 June 1965).

Brodie, Bernard. Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1959).

. "Unlimited Weapons and Limited War," The Reporter(18 November 1954).

_, "What 1Price Conventional Capabilities in Europe,"

The Reporter (23 May 1963, pp. 25-33).

Brower, M. "Controlled Thermonuclear War," New Republic(30 July 1962).

40

Drown, Neville. jfle jja (NMw York: F. A. Praeger, 1965).

__ .0 Strateaic mobility (New York: F. A. Praeger,1964, published for the Institute for Strategic Studies,London).

Buchan, Alastair. NATO in the 1960's--Te ImDlications ofInterdependence (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1963).

_ 6. "The Changed Setting of the Atlantic Delate,"Fcreicmn Affair. (July 1965).

Buchan, Alastair and Windsor, Philip. Arms and Stabilityi (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1963, published forthe Institute for Strategic Studies, Londonl.

Bull, Hedley. Strateav and the Atlantic Alliance: ACritiaue of United States Dogtrine (Center of InternationalStudies, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, 1964).

_ The Control of the ArM Race (New York: F. A.Praeger, 1961, published for the Institute for StrategicStudies, London).

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57

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PRESENT AND ANTICIPATED ALTERNATIVE UNITED STATES MILITARY. TRAT9GIES-SUMMARY REPORT

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ANSER ReportS AUT40'($) Ldt n.m.o. flirt name. Initial)

Pishky, Frederick S.

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13 ANSTRACT

Five competing military strategies are presented which can be usedin planning for the future needs of the United States. These stra-tegies are considered pliusible within the framework of today'sinternational political realities.

A, survey or- the military environment from the end of World war IIuntil the present identified two constant elements in militarystrategic thinking-forward deployment and controlled response.These elements were used as criteria to eliminate less plausiblet strategies. The strategies finally chosen are described in terms

j of four categories of conflict (general nuclear war,' controlledstrategic-nuclear war, limited war, and counterinsurgency) and interms of force capabilities associptted with the kinds of conflict(assured destruction, damage limaitation, limited conflict, andcounterinsurgency operations). (Editor).

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