ADAM BALCER

TURKEY AND THE WESTERN BALKANS A VIEW FROM POLAND

Resume of the Lecture at the Institute for European Studies in BelgradeJune 23rd 2011

Duringthepastfewyears,expertsandthemediahaveoftenspokenabout“thereturnofTurkeytotheWesternBalkans”,i.e.aboutthegrowthoftheeconomicandpoliticalinfluenceofTurkeyinthisregion.TurkeyisundoubtedlyquiteanimportantcountryfortheWesternBalkans,whoseinfluenceisconstantlyontherise.Whatismore,theBalkansisimportantforTurkeyasaregionwhereithasthegreatestinflu-enceinEuropeandwhichplaysaroleasasortofabridgetowardstheWest.However,Turkeydoesnothaveadecisiveinfluenceontheforeignpolicyorientationofthecountriesintheregion.TheinfluenceismorevisibleinthecountrieswithahigherpercentageofMuslimpopulation:Albania,BosniaandHerze-govinaandMacedonia,andaswellinKosovo.Therefore,thepositionofTurkeycouldbecomparedwiththeoneofRussia,whichholdsasimilarinfluenceovertheOrthodoxpopulationintheregion.

InSerbia,thisnewroleofTurkeyintheWesternBalkansisoftenexaggerated.TheWesternBalkansarenaturallyimportantfortheTurkishinterests,buttomuchlesserextentthanitisspeculatedinthepub-lic.ForTurkeyitself,muchmoreimportantaretheMiddleEast,theBlackSeabasinandtheformerUSSRrepublics.ThesinglebiggestforeignpolicychallengeforTurkeyisthefutureofIraq,becauseoftheKurdishissue.AlthoughTurkeyhasthepotentialtoplayamuchmoresignificantpartintheWesternBalkans,itsleadershipisawareoftherelativelysmallchancesofchallengingthepredominantinfluenceoftheEuro-peanUnion(EU)intheregion.

THE NEW TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

Turkeyisanemergingpower,whichcouldbecomparedtoothermid-sizeregionalpowerswithgrowingimportanceininternationalrelations,suchasSouthAfrica,Indonesia,etc.Oneofitsmajorcharacteristicsisitsdemographicpotential.Althoughitspopulationgrowthisindeclinecomparedtopreviousdecades,itisstillmuchhigherthantheEuropeanaverage.AccordingtoUNestimates,intheyear2050therewillbearound95millioncitizensinTurkey.TurkisheconomicgrowthisveryhighandalsofarabovetheEuro-peanaverage.Intheperiod2002-2010,theaverageannualgrowthoftheTurkisheconomywasaround7%.Comparedbypurchasingpowerparity,Turkeyholds16thplaceintheworld.ItsGDPpercapitaishigherthantheonesofpoorerEUmemberstates,suchasBulgaria,RomaniaandLatvia.Inthelongrun,Turkeyhasthepotentialtobecomethe10thlargesteconomyintheworldanditsGDPcouldreachtheEuropeanaverage.Thiseconomicgrowthcontributedtotheriseinself-confidenceoftheTurkishelite.Turkeyisalsoanimportantmilitarypower,holdingthe7thplaceintheworld(accordingtothecapacitiesofconventionalarmedforces).ItsarmedforcesareamongthebestequippedinNATO.Ineffect,Turkeyhasamuchgreaterpotentialthanmostcountriesinitsneighbourhood.

Furthermore,Turkeypossesalsoaveryfavourablegeopoliticalposition,betweenAsiaandEuropeanditsproximitytoAfrica,TheconceptofStrategic Depth isthefoundationofthenewTurkishForeignPolicy.ItwascreatedbyAhmetDavutoglu,auniversityprofessorandthecurrentTurkishMinisterofFor-eignAffairs.Accordingtothisconcept,Turkey’swishistocreateazoneofinfluenceinitsneighbourhood,whereitcanplaytheroleofthestabilizerandkeyregionalpower.Softpower,intheformoftrade,educa-tion,foreigninvestments,construction,tourism,developmentaid,etc.,isforeseenasthemostimportantinstrumentofTurkishinfluenceinitsneighbourhood.TheconservativePartyofJusticeandDevelopment(AKP),whosepoliticalprogramhasitsrootsinIslam,has,toagreatextent,appliedthisconceptinpracticesincetakingpowerin2002.

Oneoftheessentialideasofthisstrategyisapolicy,symbolicallytitledzeroproblemswithneigh-bours,whichpresumesresolvingopenquestionsandmisunderstandingwithneighbouringstates.AlthoughTurkeyhassignificantlyimproveditsrelationswithsomecountries,suchasSerbiaandGreece,ithasman-agedtoevendeterioraterelationswithsomeothercountries.Ineachoftheregionsthatsurroundit,thereisonestatewithwhichTurkishleadershipcannotfindcommongroundwith:inCentralAsiaUzbekistan,inMiddleEastIsrael,inSouthCaucasusArmenia,intheWesternBalkansRepublikaSrpskainBiH.Theseexamplesclearlydemonstratetheshortcomingsoftheconcept.

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Theconceptof Strategic Depth istightlyconnectedtoquestionoftherelationshipbetweenTurkeyandtheEU.Itisclearthatforitsconception,AhmetDavutogluusedEUNeighborhoodPolicyashisinspiration.Byimplementingthisconceptinpractice,TurkeyisattemptingtoshowtheEUhowitsaccessiontotheUnionwouldbeasubstantialassetfortheEU,increasingit’scapacityandtheleverageontheMiddleEast,Cen-tralAsiaandNorthAfrica.Ontheotherhand,creatingazoneofinfluencerepresentsabackupplanforTurkeyshoulditsnegotiationswiththeEUfailtobringtheexpectedresults.Thisreasoning,amongTurkishelites,canbesummarizedwiththefollowingsentence:“IftheEUdoesnotwantus,weshallhaveourzoneofinfluenceandgoodrelationswithChina,RussiaandIran”.InthiswayTurkeyisindirectlyblackmailingtheEU.

However,thechancesofsomesortofamini-coldwarbetweenTurkeyandtheEUareratherslim.Turkeyisnotinapositiontocompletelytransformitspolicyintoananti-Westernone,firstandforemost,becauseoftheeconomicandmilitaryties.EUisthemostimportanteconomicpartnerofTurkey,andinmilitarytermsthecooperationwiththeUSAandtheEUismuchmoreimportantthancooperationwithRussiaorChina.Nevertheless,TurkeywhichfeelsrejectedbytheEUcanactunpredictably,andletit’sdecision-makingbeguidedbyemotions.

TURKEY AND THE WESTERN BALKANS

TurkeyisanimportantcountryintheBalkans,whichhasasignificantinfluenceovertheMuslimsinthere-gionandwishestoplayaroleoftheirprotector.ThisinfluenceisbasedontheOttomanheritageandtightsocialconnectionbetweentheTurksandBalkanMuslims.Accordingtoopinionpolls,theMuslimsfromtheBalkanshavetheclosestrelationshiptowardsTurkey,andviceversathecitizensofTurkeyarefavourabletowardstheMuslimscitizensfromtheBalkancountries(morefavourablethantotheArabs).

Inaddition,accordingtothedataofGallupBalkanMonitor,mostofthecitizensoftheWesternBalkansstatesdonothaveanegativeopinionaboutTurkey.Theirattitudeinclinestowardsneutral.Thisdataisre-allyimportantforTurkey,ifwetakeinconsiderationtheattitudeoftheEUcitizensregardingthepotentialmembershipofTurkeyintheEU.TurkeyisaquitepositiveactorintheeyesofthemostofBosniaksandAlbanians(frombothKosovoandAlbania),butalsoMacedoniansduetotheMacedonia/Greecenamedis-pute.Sincethesestatesbecameindependent,Turkeyplayedaroleoftheirprotectorontheinternationalscene.OnlySerbsfromRepublikaSrpskadonotconsiderTurkeyasapositiveactorbutasanenemy.

TheimprovementofrelationswithSerbiarepresentsofthemostimportantsuccessesoftheTurkishfor-eignpolicyintheWesternBalkans.TheultimategoalofAnkaraistoplaytheroleofarbiterontheWesternBalkans.However,veryclosebondswiththeBalkanMuslimssignificantlydecreasetheTurkishcapacitytobeanimpartialmediator.

However,theimportanceofTurkeyfortheregionisincomparablewiththeimportanceoftheEU.TurkeyisoneofthemajorforeignactorsintheeconomiesoftheFederationofBosniaandHerzegovina,Albania,KosovoandMacedonia.Turkeyhasanimportantshareintheinvestmentbalanceofthesecoun-tries(from4%to15%),andforeigntrade(from4%-8%).Turkeyhasparticipatedinrealizationofimportantconstructionprojectsinthesecountries/regions,withatotalamountofaround2billiondollars.Ontheotherhand,thepositionofTurkeyisweakwithintheeconomiesofSerbia,Montenegro,CroatiaandRe-publikaSrpska(withinBosniaandHercegovina).Intotal,TurkisheconomicinfluenceintheregionismuchweakerthantheinfluenceofAustriaorevenSlovenia.ThereisaperceptioninTurkeythattheregionoftheWesternBalkansistoosmall,andthereforenotveryinterestingfortheinvestmentsandtrade.Also,theEUismuchmoresignificantbecauseofthenumberofgastarbaitersthatareworkinginitsmemberstates,andtheEUdevelopmentaidandnumerousscholarshipsforthestudentsintheregion.Turkeydoesn’thavethepowertochangethissituationduetomuchsmallereconomicpotentialincomparisonwiththeEU.Still,

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around2.000students,mostlyMuslims,fromtheWesternBalkansattendingtheTurkishuniversities.Inad-dition,Turkeyhasestablishedseveraluniversitiesandhighschoolsintheregion.Ontheotherhand,Mus-limAlbaniansgenerallyprefertostudyinItalyandGreece,andveryfewgoestoTurkey.ThesamegoesforBosniaks,whomostlychooseCroatia,AustriaandGermanyoverTurkey.

TurkeydoesnothaveasignificantnumberofvisitingtouristsfromtheWesternBalkansexceptfromMace-doniaandfromKosovo(proportionalnumbers).Whenspeakingaboutthedevelopmentaid,10-15%oftotalTurkishaidgoestotheWesternBalkans.Foreachofthestates(exceptAlbania)Turkeyrepresentsoneofthemostimportantdonors(Turkeyholds8th-10thplacebytheamountofdonations,andthetotalaidshareaverages3-4%).Nevertheless,thisaidisconsiderablysmallerthantheaidcomingfromtheEU.

TheimportanceofTurkeyfortheregionismostvisibleincombatingtraffickingofAfghanistanheroin,andasaparticipantwithinthemissionsoftheEUandNATOintheregion.TurkeyhasparticipatedinalmostallofthemissionsoftheEUandNATOintheBalkans,henceitrepresentsoneofthemostimportantstatesthatareinvolvedinthestabilizationoftheWesternBalkans(inthismomentTurkeyparticipateswith15%oftotalpersonnelintheMissionAltheainBosnia,with7%inKFORandwitharound4%inEULEX).Also,TurkisharmyhasanimportantroleintrainingofthearmiesofBosnia,AlbaniaandMacedonia.Turkeyisover5timesmoresuccessfulincuttingoffAfghanistanheroinsmugglingchannelsthanalloftheBalkancountriestogether.Also,TurkeyplaysanimportantroleinpreventingfurtherexpansionofWahhabismtroughthesupportofthereligiouscommunitiesandtraditional“Ottoman”,mainstream,Islam.

TurkeydesirestoprovethatitisacrediblepartnertotheWestintheWesternBalkans,asaproofthatitisnotananti-WesternCountry.TurkeycouldalsouseitsengagementintheWesternBalkansasan“alibi”totheWestfortheoccasionaldifferentpositionstowardsIsrael,IranandRussia.AlthoughthereareseveralproblemsinregardsofWesternBalkansbetweenTurkeyandtheEU,thisregionisstilltheareaofoverlap-pinginterestsofAnkaraandBrussels(particularlyinstabilizationoftheregiontroughEuro-Atlanticinte-gration).ThissituationcouldbechangedifTurkey’sintegrationprocesstotheEUishaltedorpostponed.TurkeycannotpreventtheEUenlargementontheWesternBalkans,butitcanslowitdowninthecaseofproblemsofthecountriesoftheregionwiththeEU(stalemateoftheiraccessionprocess).Ontheotherhand,inthecaseofcrisisinrelationbetweenTurkeyandtheEU,theWesternBalkanscouldbetheareawheretheirrelationsmightimprovefirst.

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