ShanthiM

File Attachment

2000f214coverv05bjpg

TRANSFORMING EUROPEAN

MILITARIES

This book addresses Europersquos ability to be a key actor in the new international security environment by assessing its capability to respond to threats in a networked manner If the risk of a Soviet invasion of Europe has now disappeared new security threats have emerged and the military has taken on a new range of responsibilities including peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations As military operations are increasingly undertaken within the framework of international coalitions their success depends largely on the degree to which national forces can work in a coordinated way in the fi eld

Written by two experts in the fi eld of defense technologies and European security this book takes an in-depth look at European capabilities to conduct Network-Based Operations (NBO) and their implications for intra-European and transatlantic interoperability in the future It examines national NATO and EU capabilities and analyses the three technology areas most crucial for interoperability ndash command and control communications and intelligence gathering and dissemination ndash as well as looking at the doctrinal and strategic commitment to NBO The book also examines the technology and industrial bases supporting European NBO It concludes that although there exist adequate European know-how and strong industries to supply the relevant capabilities much remains to be done to do so more rapidly and effi ciently Finally the book makes recommendations for policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic on ways to improve interoperability in future coalition operations

This book will be of great interest to students of security studies European politics and international relations as well as to US and European policymakers

Gordon Adams is Professor of International Affairs and Director of Security Policy Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs The George Washington University He has written extensively on US and European defense budgeting and planning and on transatlantic defense policyGuy Ben-Ari is a Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies where he researches issues related to the US and European technology and industrial bases supporting defense He regularly serves as an expert evaluator to the European Commissionrsquos research and technology Framework Program

CONTEMPORARY SECURITY STUDIES

NATOrsquoS SECRET ARMYOperation Gladio and terrorism in western Europe

Daniel Ganser

THE US NATO AND MILITARY BURDEN-SHARINGPeter Kent Forster and Stephen J Cimbala

RUSSIAN GOVERNANCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURYGeo-strategy geopolitics and new governance

Irina Isakova

THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND FINLAND 1938ndash1940 Diplomatic sideshow

Craig Gerrard

RETHINKING THE NATURE OF WAREdited by Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom

PERCEPTION AND REALITY IN THE MODERN YUGOSLAV CONFLICT

Myth falsehood and deceit 1991ndash1995Brendan OrsquoShea

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PEACEBUILDING IN POST-DAYTON BOSNIA

Tim Donais

THE DISTRACTED EAGLEThe rift between America and Old Europe

Peter H Merkl

THE IRAQ WAREuropean perspectives on politics strategy and operations

Edited by Jan Hallenberg and Haringkan Karlsson

STRATEGIC CONTESTWeapons proliferation and war in the greater Middle East

Richard L Russell

PROPAGANDA THE PRESS AND CONFLICTThe Gulf War and Kosovo

David R Willcox

MISSILE DEFENCEInternational regional and national implications

Edited by Bertel Heurlin and Sten Rynning

GLOBALISING JUSTICE FOR MASS ATROCITIESA revolution in accountability

Chandra Lekha Sriram

ETHNIC CONFLICT AND TERRORISMThe origins and dynamics of civil wars

Joseph L Soeters

GLOBALISATION AND THE FUTURE OF TERRORISM Patterns and predictions

Brynjar Lia

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND STRATEGYThe evolution of American nuclear policy

Stephen J Cimbala

NASSER AND THE MISSILE AGE IN THE MIDDLE EASTOwen L Sirrs

WAR AS RISK MANAGEMENTStrategy and confl ict in an age of globalised risks

Yee-Kuang Heng

MILITARY NANOTECHNOLOGYPotential applications and preventive arms control

Jurgen Altmann

NATO AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTIONRegional alliance global threats

Eric R Terzuolo

EUROPEANISATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY IDENTITYThe EU and the changing security identities of the Nordic states

Pernille Rieker

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACE-BUILDING

Sustaining the peace in post confl ict societiesEdited by T David Mason and James D Meernik

CONTROLLING THE WEAPONS OF WARPolitics persuasion and the prohibition of inhumanity

Brian Rappert

CHANGING TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY RELATIONSDo the US the EU and Russia form a new strategic triangle

Edited by Jan Hallenberg and Haringkan Karlsson

THEORETICAL ROOTS OF US FOREIGN POLICYMachiavelli and American unilateralism

Thomas M Kane

CORPORATE SOLDIERS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITYThe rise of private military companies

Christopher Kinsey

TRANSFORMING EUROPEAN MILITARIESCoalition operations and the technology gap

Gordon Adams and Guy Ben-Ari

GLOBALIZATION AND CONFLICTNational security in a lsquonewrsquo strategic era

Edited by Robert G Patman

TRANSFORMING EUROPEAN MILITARIES

Coalition operations and the technology gap

Gordon Adams and Guy Ben-Ari

First published 2006 by Routledge

2 Park Square Milton Park Abingdon Oxon OX14 4RN

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canadaby Routledge

270 Madison Ave New York NY 10016

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor amp Francis Group an informa business

copy 2006 Gordon Adams and Guy Ben-Ari

All rights reserved No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic mechanical or other means now known or hereafter invented including photocopying and recording or in any information storage or retrieval system without permission in writing

from the publishers

British Library Cataloguing in Publication DataA catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataA catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN10 0ndash415ndash39264ndash0 (hbk)ISBN10 0ndash203ndash96910ndash3 (ebook)

ISBN13978ndash0ndash415ndash39264ndash8 (hbk)ISBN13 978ndash0ndash203ndash96910ndash6 (ebk)

This edition published in the Taylor amp Francis e-Library 2006

ldquoTo purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor amp Francis or Routledgersquos

collection of thousands of eBooks please go to wwweBookstoretandfcoukrdquo

vii

CONTENTS

List of tables viiiAcknowledgements ixList of abbreviations x

1 Introduction networked operations and European capabilities 1

2 European strategies for network-based operations 9

3 European national capabilities for network-based operations 19

4 NATO and other multilateral network-based capabilities 84

5 The European Union and network-based capabilities 107

6 European collaboration on space assets for network-based operations 121

7 The European industrial and technology base for network-based capabilities 132

8 European network-based capabilities policy recommendations 144

9 Conclusions 157

Glossary 161Bibliography 164Index 169

vii i

TABLES

31 Principal European national capabilities for network-based operations 2232 French capabilities for network-based operations 3433 United Kingdom capabilities for network-based operations 4834 German capabilities for network-based operations 5935 Italian capabilities for network-based operations 6736 Dutch capabilities for network-based operations 7137 Spanish capabilities for network-based operations 7538 Swedish capabilities for network-based operations 80

ix

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors would like to acknowledge the support and assistance of many offi cial and private sector sources in the United States Britain France and at NATO and the European Union whom we interviewed for this study Most of them remain necessarily anonymous but their assistance was clearly essential to the study Several specifi c individuals deserve special mention and thanks Christine Bernot Adm (ret) Jean Betermier Henri Conze Christophe Cornu Emmanuel Germond Michel Iagolnitzer Erol Levy Xavier Pasco Diego Ruiz Palmer and Burkard Schmitt

Special thanks go to Professor John Logsdon and to Professor Ray Williamson of the Space Policy Institute at the George Washington University in Washington DC who were participants in the research and writing process for the original monograph which was the starting point for this book Their knowledge of European space policies and of the national and multinational space programs in Europe were a signifi cant contribution to the space chapter in the book and their comments overall were very helpful

Finally this book is based on a monograph ldquoBridging the Gap European C4ISR Capabilities and Transatlantic Interoperabilityrdquo published by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy of the National Defense University in Washington DC The Center sponsored and funded the research on which the monograph and much of this book is based and we are grateful for their support We particularly want to thank the Centerrsquos Director Hans Binnendijk and staff members Stuart Johnson Elihu Zimet Charles Barry and Richard Kugler for their assistance and excellent comments

x

ABBREVIATIONS

ABCA American British Canadian Australian Armiesrsquo Standardization Program

ACCIS Automated Command and Control Information SystemACCS Air Command and Control SystemACE Allied Command EuropeACLANT Allied Command AtlanticACO Allied Command OperationsACT Allied Command TransformationACTD Advanced Concept Technology DemonstratorADGE Air Defense Ground EnvironmentAEHF Advanced Extremely High FrequencyAERIS All Environment Real-Time Interoperability SimulatorAEW Airborne Early WarningAEWampC Airborne Early Warning and ControlAGS Alliance Ground SurveillanceAirborne Ground

SurveillanceAJCN Advanced Joint Communications NodeAMS Alenia Marconi SystemsAPAR Active Phased Array RadarASCC Air Standardization Coordinating CommitteeASTOR Airborne Stand Off RadarATM Asynchronous Transfer ModeAUSCANNZUKUS Australian Canadian New Zealand United Kingdom

and United States Naval C4 OrganizationAWACS Airborne Warning and Control SystemBACCS Backbone Air Command and Control SystemBCSS Battlefi eld Command Support SystemBi-SCAIS Bi-Strategic Command Automated Information SystemBLD Battlefi eld Land DigitizationBMS Battlefi eld Management SystemCS Collaboration at SeaC2 Command and ControlC3 Command Control and Communications

ABBREVIATIONS

xi

C3I Command Control Communications and IntelligenceC4ISR Command Control Communications Computers

Intelligence Surveillance and ReconnaissanceCAESAR Coalition Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance CCEB Combined Communications Electronics BoardCCIS Command Control and Information SystemCEC Cooperative Engagement CapabilityCEPA Common European Priority AreaCFIUS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United StatesCFSP Common Foreign and Security PolicyCIS Communications and Information SystemsCJTF Combined Joint Task ForcesCOMINT Communications IntelligenceCOMSAT Communications SatelliteCOTS Commercial Off The ShelfCRONOS Crisis Response Operations in NATO Open SystemsCSABM Collaborative System for Air Battlespace ManagementCSS Command Support SystemCTAS Cooperative Transatlantic AGS SystemDARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects AgencyDCI Defense Capabilities InitiativesDCN Deployable COTS NetworkDERA Defense Evaluation and Research AgencyDGA Deacuteleacutegation Geacuteneacuterale pour lrsquoArmement (French armament

agency)DII Defense Information InfrastructureDSCS Defense Satellite Communications SystemEADS European Aeronautic Defense and Space CompanyEC European CommissionECAP European Capabilities Action PlanEDA European Defense AgencyEHF Extremely High FrequencyERG European Research GroupingERRF European Rapid Reaction ForceESA European Space AgencyESDP European Security and Defense PolicyESM Electronic Support MeasuresEUCLID European Cooperation for the Long Term in DefenseEUFOR European Union Force [in Bosnia and Herzegovina]EUROPA European Understandings for Research Organization

Programs and ActivitiesEUSC EU Satellite CentreEW Electronic WarfareEXECOM Executive Support CommitteeFADR Fixed Air Defense Radar

ABBREVIATIONS

xi i

FLIR Forward-Looking Infrared FOCSLE Fleet Operational Command SystemFP Framework ProgramGMES Global Monitoring for Environment and Security GPS Global Positioning SystemHALE High-Altitude Long-EnduranceHF High FrequencyIACD Intelligent Advisor Capability DemonstratorIBS Integrated Broadcast ServiceIEPG Independent European Program GroupIFF Identifi cation Friend or FoeIFOR [NATO] Implementation Force [in Bosnia and

Herzegovina]IJMS Interim JTIDS Message StandardIMINT Imagery IntelligenceINMARSAT International Maritime SatelliteINTA Instituto Nacional de Teacutecnica AeroespacialIP Internet ProtocolISAF International Security Assistance ForceISR Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance ISTAR Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and

ReconnaissanceITAR International Traffi c in Arms RegulationsITV Integrated Technology VehicleJCS Joint Command SystemJFHQ Joint Forces HeadquartersJOCS Joint Operational Command SystemJRRF Joint Rapid Reaction ForceJRRP Jaguar Replacement Reconnaissance PodJSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar SystemJTIDS Joint Tactical Information Distribution SystemJTRS Joint Tactical Radio SystemJUEP Joint Service UAV Experimentation ProgramKFOR [NATO] Kosovo ForceLCS Littoral Combat ShipLEO Low Earth OrbitLOI Letter of IntentM3 Multimode Multi-role Multi-bandMAJIIC Multi-sensor Aerospace-ground Joint ISR Interoperability

CoalitionMALE Medium-Altitude Long-EnduranceMASC Maritime Airborne Surveilllance and ControlMCCIS Maritime Command and Control Information SystemMCCS Mobile Command and Control SystemMIC Multinational Interoperability Council

ABBREVIATIONS

xi i i

MIDS Multifunctional Information Distribution SystemMILSATCOM Military Satellite CommunicationsMIP Multilateral Interoperability ProgramMIWG Multinational Interoperability Working GroupMMA Multi-mission Maritime AircraftMNE Multinational ExperimentMP-RTIP Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion ProgramMRS Multi-Role SwitchMTI Moving Target IndicatorNAC North Atlantic CouncilNACMO NATO ACCS Management OrganizationNACOSA NATO Communications and Information Systems

Operating and Support AgencyNBC Nuclear Biological ChemicalNBD Network-Based DefenseNBO Network-Based OperationsNC3A NATO Command Control and Consultation AgencyNC3B NATO C3 BoardNC3O NATO Consultation Command and Control OrganizationNC3TA NATO C3 Technical ArchitectureNCOIC Network-Centric Operations Industry ConsortiumNCW Network-Centric WarfareNDP National Disclosure ProcessNEC Network-Enabled CapabilitiesNGCS NATO General Purpose Communication SystemNILE NATO Improved Link ElevenNMS NATO Messaging SystemNNEC NATO Network-Enabled CapabilitiesNRF NATO Response ForceOCCAR Organization Conjoint pour la Cooperation en Matiere

drsquoArmamentORFEO Optical and Radar Federated Earth ObservationPASR Preparatory Action on Security ResearchPCC Prague Capabilities CommitmentsPFI Private Finance InitiativePJHQ Permanent Joint HeadquartersPNT Position Navigation and TimingPRT Provisional Reconstruction TeamRampD Research and DevelopmentRampT Research and TechnologyRAPTOR Reconnaissance Airborne Pod for TornadoSACEUR Supreme Allied Commander EuropeSAMOC Surface-Air-Missile Operations CenterSAR Synthetic Aperture RadarSATCOM Satellite Communications

ABBREVIATIONS

xiv

SCA Software Communications ArchitectureSDR Software Defi ned RadioSFOR [NATO] Stabilization Force [in Bosnia and Herzegovina]SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers EuropeSHARC Swedish Highly Advanced Research Confi gurationSHF Super High FrequencySIGINT Signals IntelligenceSLAR Side Looking Airborne RadarSOC Statement of CooperationSOSTAR Standoff Surveillance Target Acquisition RadarSPOT Systegraveme Pour lrsquoObeservation de la TerreSSA Special Security ArrangementSTANAG Standardization AgreementTCAR Transatlantic Cooperative AGS RadarTCDL Tactical Common Data LinkTCPIP Transmission Control ProtocolInternet ProtocolTETRA Terrestrial Trunked RadioTHALES Technology Arrangements for Laboratories for Defense

European ScienceTIPS Transatlantic Industry Proposed SolutionTMD Theater Missile Defense TOPSAT Tactical Optical SatelliteTR TransmitReceiveTTCP The Technical Cooperation ProgramTUAV Tactical Unmanned Aerial VehicleUAV Unmanned Aerial VehicleUCAV Unmanned Combat Aerial VehicleUHF Ultra High FrequencyUUV Unmanned Underwater VehicleVCCS Vehicle Command and Control SystemVHF Very High FrequencyVMF Variable Message FormatVOIP Voice Over Internet ProtocolWAN Wide Area NetworkWASP Wide Area Situation PictureWEAG Western European Armaments GroupWEAO Western European Armaments OrganizationWEU Western European UnionZODIAC Zone Digital Automated and Encrypted Communication

1

1

INTRODUCTION

Networked operations and European capabilities

Network-based operations and the twenty-fi rst century security environment

The international security environment has changed dramatically over the past decade for both the United States and Europe This has meant profound changes for national security strategy and for military capabilities Before 1990 strategy was based on the assumption that the principal tension was between an alliance of democracies led by the United States and the Soviet Union and its allies For the military this meant that both deterrence and victory on the battlefi eld would go to the side with the more capable land air and sea forces massed in formation fi elding heavy weapons produced in substantial numbers by a strong defense industrial base Though this confrontation never occurred in Europe wars elsewhere such as Vietnam tended to be fought using that model

Today both the nature of the strategic threat and the required military capability to meet it have changed Although the fi rst Gulf War involved a more traditional type of threat and massed formations were critical to the response subsequent crises and confl icts have involved more shadowy and asymmetrical opponents and a different range of security challenges The need to fi ght large-scale wars has been replaced by the need to address a wide range of challenges from international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to failed or failing states escalating regional confl icts and humanitarian crises

Military operations to deal with these threats demand different capabilities strategic airlift and sealift deployable logistics precision-guided munitions and force protection elements Most important they require deployable command control communications computers intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities ndash collectively known as C4ISR ndash that are both networked and interoperable National governments and coalitions need the capability to survey large areas of the globe and share and jointly analyze the intelligence they gather in order to make informed decisions on when and where to deploy their forces Once forces have been committed intelligence-gathering assets and sensors are needed to provide the information for operations They also require command and control systems capable of processing the information and providing networked forces with a real-time digitized picture of the situation Reliable and interoperable

INTRODUCTION

2

communication systems need to carry this information across forces and back to command centers in the fi eld and the nationrsquos capital A network of all these capabilities enables more effective and effi cient operations

Even for more traditional operations the evolution of military and dual-use technology has changed the face of combat The fi rst Gulf War suggested that large armies and heavy weaponry were no longer a guarantee of success information dominance proved critical Destroying the adversary had become less important than disrupting his lines of communication and supply Today it is widely accepted in the US military that advanced sensors communications and information technologies networked together to distribute the results are a key ingredient of military success especially for the high intensity operations for which they are planning These technologies and the doctrine that accompanies them allow warfi ghters to see better and further orient themselves on the battlefi eld decide faster strike more accurately and assess the results of their actions more quickly

Changes in US forces and doctrine lead the way

US military planning has been the most responsive to the changing security conditions and the revolution in C4ISR technologies At the strategic level with the end of the Soviet threat US security concerns have focused away from Europe toward the Middle East and Persian Gulf North Asia and the Pacifi c and toward such global security problems as failed states terrorism ethnic and religious confl ict and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction NATO Europe became a secondary concern As a result the US military evolved toward a capability that could operate globally through near-continuous presence or expeditionary operations The focus was no longer on a specifi c theater but looked to reassure all friends and allies dissuade potential military competitors anywhere on the globe deter adversaries and defeat any of them decisively (United States Department of Defense 2003 4ndash5)

US military doctrine began to move away from giving priority to major land battles of massed armies and toward a doctrine that would ensure US ability to be ldquodominant across the full spectrum of military operationsrdquo through a combination of ldquodominant maneuver precision engagement focused logistics and full dimensional protectionrdquo (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2000 2ndash3) This change in doctrine has begun to transform operational concepts training and technology Global forces need to be able to move rapidly and their communications command and control and sensors need to be networked together This requirement has come to be know as ldquotransformationrdquo defi ned by the Defense Department as

A process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts capabilities people and organizations that exploit our nationrsquos advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position which helps underpin peace and stability in the world

(United States Department of Defense 2003 8)

INTRODUCTION

3

To put such forces in place the US relies on a technological revolution that has been taking place for at least 25 years Rapid changes in information and communications technologies made it possible to imagine develop and deploy equipment that supported the process of ldquotransformationrdquo Despite shrinking defense budgets in the 1990s the US military began to move in the direction of what it called network-centric warfare (NCW) As defi ned by the Department of Defense network-centric warfare refers to ldquothe combination of emerging tactics techniques and technologies that a networked force employs to create a decisive warfi ghting advantagerdquo Network-centric warfare ldquoaccelerates our ability to know decide and act linking sensors communications systems and weapons systems in an interconnected gridrdquo (United States Department of Defense 2003 13) Analysts have described NCW this way

The United States hellip is poised to harness key information technologies ndash microelectronics data networking and software programming ndash to create a networked force using weapons capable of pinpoint accuracy launched from platforms beyond range of enemy weapons utilizing the integrated data from all-seeing sensors managed by intelligent command nodes By distributing its forces while still being able to concentrate fi res the US military is improving its mobility speed potency and invulnerability to enemy attack

(Gompert et al 1999 8)

This increasingly networked global capability has been displayed since the fi rst Gulf War in the Balkans and most recently in combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq Desert Shield and Desert Storm revealed the military advantages of networking such capabilities as the Pioneer UAV earth observation satellites and the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) Advanced sensors on manned and unmanned platforms provided real-time intelligence to commanders on the ground via a state-of-the-art command control and communications network In Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo the US used a more advanced UAV ndash the Predator ndash that provided its operators with gigabytes of high-resolution imagery in support of missions The ldquosensor-to-shooterrdquo loop ndash the time between identifi cation of a target and its destruction ndash was reduced from hours to minutes

This rapid change in military capabilities has far-reaching implications for the transatlantic security community Although European militaries have participated in expeditionary operations in the last 15 years their forces ndash structured to defend the European heartland ndash did not adjust as quickly to the expeditionary requirements and asymmetries of the post-Cold War international security environment Throughout the 1990s Europersquos armed forces suffered from a kind of ldquoidentity crisisrdquo While the task of defending the homeland remained a central focus for some of them the new challenges were emerging in every dimension demanding new or transformed capabilities European governments had not yet shaped a strategy and doctrine to deal with this emerging reality nor was the message yet entirely clear as to how military forces were to be used or how the

INTRODUCTION

4

capabilities they need were to be created Equally important uneven attention was paid in the 1990s to how European forces could or should link up with the rapidly changing American military capability For many European countries forces shrank in the 1990s along with defense budgets and the transformation underway in the US was not matched by a similar investment in Europe As a result it became increasingly diffi cult for US and European forces to operate in coalition as the fi rst Gulf War and especially combat operations in the Kosovo and Serbia air war demonstrated (Adams 2001a)

Is there a gap

The emerging sense in the 1990s that European forces were lagging behind the Americans even declining led to an atmosphere of judgment and criticism in the late 1990s From the American perspective this gap was technological and budgetary and had a direct and negative consequence for the ability of the US to operate in coalition with the Europeans either in NATO or coalition operations facing the new security threats of the twenty-fi rst century A common view in the US was that the US military had become so far advanced compared to its European counterparts that military interoperability was increasingly impossible the Europeans would simply never ldquocatch uprdquo

Some of this perception was not new the history of the NATO alliance is riddled with debates about the ldquogaprdquo between the United States and European militaries American policymakers have rarely felt that the European allies produced an adequate capability even to meet the requirements of traditional Central Front war plans If this was true to some degree it did not matter NATO forces were in static positions as a defending force not engaged in active combat testing the reality of the proposition

The new international security environment is different The military forces of the allies have been repeatedly tested in combat and military operations from the Gulf War to the Balkans to the Middle East Combining the more active use of the forces with the presumed ldquogaprdquo in technologies and capability has made the transatlantic interoperability issue a central problem for NATO particularly with respect to C4ISR capabilities and the problem of ldquonetworkingrdquo US defense planners have regularly expressed concern about the extent to which European forces were ldquointeroperablerdquo with the networked capabilities of the US While their contribution in the Balkans and the Middle East were welcome the inability to ldquoconnectrdquo the forces led to operational problems The disparity between the military capabilities of the United States and the European members of NATO came to be known as ldquothe gaprdquo This ldquogaprdquo became so large in the view of some analysts that it threatened the very ability of the Alliance to function as a military partnership (Gompert et al 1999)

Rising concern about this gap led American defense planners to become increasingly critical of European defense efforts Aside from the differences in strategic outlook and expeditionary doctrine the criticism focused on the lag in overall defense investment and especially a low European commitment to the

INTRODUCTION

5

C4ISR technologies that make network-centric operations possible According to this view European defense technologies have fallen signifi cantly behind Gompert et al captured the essence of this critique

The use of transformation technology is far more extensive in US forces than in European forces The quality of US precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and C4ISR (command control communications computers intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance) has improved greatly since the Gulf War whereas European forces still remain incapable even of the type of operations that the US force conducted in 1991

(Gompert et al 1999 4)

According to the critique this gap is most obvious in information and communications technologies the core of C4ISR The United States can gather and fuse data from a wide variety of sensors and integrate them into military operations in ways Europeans cannot Europeans lack the C4ISR capabilities that link target intelligence to shooters in a secure real-time manner What technologies the Europeans do possess it is argued cannot connect smoothly to US technologies making coalition operations diffi cult or even dangerous Some US critics have suggested that European information technologies lag behind the United States making their application to defense needs and interoperability even more problematic (Gompert et al 1999 74ndash7 Deutch et al 1999 54ndash67)

European efforts to improve on current capabilities are greeted with skepticism The European Union ldquoHeadline Goalrdquo process it is argued will not bring into being forces capable of conducting twenty-fi rst century combat missions or being interoperable with US forces European decisions to acquire new equipment such as the A400M transport and Galileo satellites are viewed as redundant even wasteful of scarce defense resources As a result in this view European forces even in a multinational mode will continue to rely on the United States (via NATO) for lift logistics and communications and will continue to pose communications and information distribution problems

This study set out to examine the reality behind this critique The result of a three-year research process it examines European C4ISR capabilities both in national settings and as they are refl ected in the work of NATO and the EU (Adams et al 2004) As such it is the fi rst in-depth view of the extent to which major European defense powers have begun to adapt their forces by integrating advanced C4ISR technology into their force planning and acquisition strategies It focuses on the technologies at the heart of network-based operations information and communications capabilities that are integrated into military systems allowing national and coalition forces to be networked from sensor to shooter and back In effect the study takes a close look at the claim that European forces have fallen hopelessly behind those of the United States and cannot close the technology gap with the United States

The results are inevitably complex It is clear that important European military partners of the United States are actually making signifi cant investments

INTRODUCTION

6

in C4ISR technologies and working to integrate them into military systems While European defense budgets and especially European investment in military research and development (RampD) have declined over the past 15 years many European countries are researching developing and deploying advanced C4ISR capabilities While efforts to develop these systems vary from country to country there is no denying the overall trend in Europe including activity in NATO and the European Union towards obtaining improved capabilities for conducting network-based operations

The conventional wisdom about the ldquogaprdquo is not entirely wrong but it is not entirely right either as this study shows As such this study provides a corrective to the standard view based on hard data well beyond general impressions of the ldquogaprdquo If the practical realities of interoperability in networked operations is to be achieved it will be important to move beyond the rhetoric of the gap and work with actual developments and real technology

Overview

This study has a specifi c focus It is not a general examination of defense transformation in Europe thus does not examine force reductions or restructurings power projection and expeditionary capabilities or precision strike weaponry All of these are worthy of study and a comprehensive understanding of European military capabilities requires such an investigation Networking and C4ISR are however at the heart of effective force transformation Hence this study focuses specifi cally on the investment and deployment of C4ISR within European militaries

The study provides an overview of the strategies and doctrines of major European countries with respect to network-based operations No European country plans to create a fully networked force built around a unifi ed command control and communications architecture and few are planning for the kind of ldquonetwork-centric warfarerdquo capabilities the US seeks to create Europersquos militaries are quite aware of the utility of C4ISR and networking however and see it as a way of linking their forces and equipment through more effective digital communications European militaries and defense planners avoid such terms as ldquonetwork-centricrdquo and ldquowarfarerdquo refl ecting both a different view of the role of C4ISR technologies and of the purposes for which they are prepared to commit military force For many Europeans networking is a utility that enhances their capability not a goal in itself Moreover the purposes of their forces extend well beyond the range of warfare to encompass a wide array of military missions including post-war stability and reconstruction

The most advanced European militaries with respect to C4ISR and network thinking are the UK Sweden Finland and the Netherlands whose doctrines are discussed in some depth France Germany and Norway have yet to formulate a complete in-depth network-based doctrine but are clearly rethinking the ways in which they foresee their militaries operating in the future The doctrines of two European defense powers ndash Italy and Spain ndash are not discussed as they were

INTRODUCTION

7

found to deal little with C4ISR or network-based operations though both possess relevant deployed technologies

There is of course a difference between doctrine and deployment The study examines systematically the actual deployed and developing capabilities for networked operations of seven European countries six of them NATO allies ndash France the United Kingdom Germany Italy Spain and the Netherlands ndash and one non-NATO Sweden These seven were chosen as they are the NATO allies with the largest overall defense investments the largest and most modern forces and in varying degrees have the strongest commitment to deploying advanced C4ISR and being interoperable with the United States

The study explores in some depth the actual C4ISR capabilities of each country including current deployments and programs that are being researched and developed The focus is both on the advanced character of the technology and on the attention being paid to building in interoperability The examination is somewhat arbitrarily divided into discussions of C2 communications and computers and ISR In reality these technologies are and should be integrated as part of a networked capability The capabilities discussion also examines the extent to which national capabilities are being contributed to coalition operations with other countries as well as the countryrsquos involvement in current or planned bi- and multinational expeditionary military frameworks such as the NATO Response Force or the EU Battlegroups To the extent possible the discussion explores interoperability in three dimensions interoperability across a nationrsquos military services with other Europeans (NATO and EU) and with the United States

Because so much of the C4ISR and networking efforts are taking place at a level above single nations the study examines network-based doctrine capabilities and interoperability in multinational frameworks NATO is the key multilateral setting in which networking issues are formally addressed and joint programs most fully developed NATOrsquos networking and C4ISR efforts are signifi cantly more advanced than those of the EU for example Moreover recent initiatives in NATO ndash the Prague Capabilities Commitments the NATO Response Force and Allied Command Transformation ndash all give specifi c priority to developing interoperable network-based capabilities NATO is probably the most important context for focusing on what needs to be done to close the gap with respect to C4ISR The efforts of other multinational entities ndash the Multinational Interoperability Council the Combined Communications-Electronics Board the Multilateral Interoperability Program and the Combined Endeavor exercises ndash arealso important and examined here

While European Union defense planning is at an initial stage it is also becoming an increasingly important context for C4ISR investment and networking discussions and commitments Because the EU effort is both serious and long-term it deserves discussion The trend toward a more common defense capability in Europe autonomous to some extent from the NATO alliance will have important implications for future joint military operations European defense planners are already well aware that such a capability will require autonomous dedicated C4ISR capabilities

INTRODUCTION

8

European programs and activities in the defense fi eld are worthy of separate discussion Space systems are increasingly important to C2 communications and ISR While national space capabilities are reviewed within the discussion of each country there is also a growing network of European-level programs Some of these capabilities are being developed outside the defense context but have important and recognized implications for defense planning In addition the attention paid to cross-European interoperability in space is even more advanced than for other C4ISR activities and hence deserves a more in-depth analysis

The European industrial and technology base is an important part of the emerging capability in C4ISR Europeans have chosen to rely extensively on domestic industrial and technology suppliers for their C4ISR needs and the European capability to respond to such demands is quite extensive Many C4ISR systems are based on civilian or dual-use technologies leading European militaries like their American counterparts to make use of a broad and innovative commercial sector In the European case this sector has been encouraged for decades through public investments in RampD activities The recent emergence of several multinational fi rms ndash EADS Thales and BAE Systems ndash has further strengthened European technological capabilities Europeans argue that their dual-use technology sectors in information sensoring guidance and communications for example are fully competitive with the United States and like American fi rms draw on and participate in a truly global marketplace At the sub-system level it is clear that a substantial two-way street for such technologies applied to defense needs already exists (International Institute for Strategic Studies 1998 273)

Based on this detailed analysis the study makes a number of recommendations for policy changes both in Europe and the United States that would accelerate the pace at which the Europeans invest in and deploy C4ISR and networked capabilities and would substantially enhance transatlantic interoperability While there clearly is some truth to the ldquogaprdquo argument it is also based on a misperception Only the United States has set for itself the twin goals of global operations and a fully network-centric military force to conduct those operations European agendas are more modest with respect to geographic reach and the creation of a fully networked force This does not mean however that American and European military forces cannot be interoperable as they function in NATO or coalition operations There are increasingly clear ways in which they can be connected but a good deal of work remains to be done on both sides of the Atlantic to achieve this goal This study suggests what the elements of a work agenda could be

9

2

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES FOR NETWORK-BASED OPERATIONS

To date thinking and planning for network-based operations has been most advanced in the United States Technological advances over the past 25 years have enabled the US to begin creating the network that is at the heart of this twenty-fi rst century requirement Despite shrinking defense budgets in the 1990s the US Department of Defense began to focus on the ldquotransformationrdquo of its forces pushing towards network-centric warfare (NCW) NCW combined innovative tactics and technologies to give the military a decisive warfi ghting advantage and included linking command and control communications and intelligence gathering systems with weapons systems in an interconnected grid Americarsquos military has demonstrated this increasingly networked global capability in the fi rst Gulf War the Balkans and more recently in combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq

The European militaries have not moved as swiftly to create comparable capabilities With the end of the Soviet threat European defense strategies remained focused on regional security which did not seem to demand advanced networked capabilities European defense budgets declined through the 1990s and were largely focused on hardware inherited from the Cold War era ndash fi ghter aircraft main battle tanks and large ships ndash and on maintaining the existing military force structure European governments were concerned about the potential costs of pursuing a doctrine of network-centric warfare and the impact of such an investment on other defense requirements (James 2004 167)

European thinking began to evolve with the Gulf War of 1991 but especially as a result of the campaigns in the Balkans where Europeans were struck by the disparities between their deployed capabilities and those of the United States This stimulated greater interest in transforming European militaries to acquire similar capabilities that could be interoperable with the US A number of European militaries have made signifi cant progress since then As will be discussed in the next chapter several countries notably France the UK Germany Italy the Netherlands Spain and Sweden are researching developing procuring and deploying signifi cant networked capabilities and the trend is accelerating These include unifi ed digital communications infrastructures cross-service command and control systems and various ISR platforms manned unmanned and space-based Moreover European countries are discovering that these capabilities are

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

10

not as costly as initially perceived and that the European industrial and technology base is capable of providing them The overall trend in a networked direction is clear though progress is uneven across European countries Programs have also been initiated in NATO and the European Union to expedite the use of networked advanced C4ISR in existing and planned forces In NATO the European allies agreed to the Defense Capabilities Initiatives (DCI) in 1999 and to the Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC) in 2002 which include substantial commitments to advanced C4ISR NATO C4ISR programs now include SATCOM V Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) and Air Command and Control System (ACCS) In the EU there is an effort to create expeditionary ldquoBattlegroupsrdquo and to explore C3 jointly between the new European Defense Agency and the EU Military Staff

Only a few European countries however have begun to formulate doctrines for networked operations based on the uses of these technologies in warfare and their views on likely military operations over the coming decades Countries that have begun to explore such doctrine also shy away from the use of such terms as ldquocentricrdquo and ldquowarfarerdquo refl ecting different views both on the importance of C4ISR technologies and on the purposes for which they would commit military force There is no European country planning to create a fully networked force built around a unifi ed command control and communications architecture and few which are willing to place C4ISR technologies at the heart of warfi ghting capabilities in the way the United States has Moreover Europeans foresee a much broader range of military operations than the word ldquowarfarerdquo suggests As a result Europeans tend to use different terms to address planned capabilities such as Network-Enabled Capabilities (NEC) in the UK Networked Operational Command (Vernetzte Operationsfuumlhrung or NetOpFuuml) in Germany and Network-Based Defense in Sweden and Finland NATO has also designated its doctrine differently as NATO Network-Enabled Capabilities (NNEC)

The limitations of European military transformation are not the result of an inadequate technology base Local and multinational suppliers are readily available and largely as technologically advanced as American suppliers Analysts suggest that inadequate investment is the constraint Certainly the signifi cantly lower European defense research and technology investment limits the speed at which such technologies could be acquired and these budgets are unlikely to grow quickly However C4ISR systems are generally more affordable than large defense platforms and as force multipliers can provide a bigger ldquobang for the eurordquo One of the most important constraints on the Europeans is the absence of a long-term strategy and doctrine on the use of force which would integrate networked C4ISR into a strategic design Without clear well-defi ned strategic and doctrinal visions European militaries have hesitated to commit funding to a transformation effort

Such strategies and doctrines as exist moreover remain largely at the national level The United Kingdom Sweden Finland and the Netherlands have all been European pioneers in formulating and implementing network thinking and capabilities into their military doctrines but have done so largely based on specifi c national defense strategies and requirements Others including France

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

11

Germany and Norway are still in the process of formulating national doctrines for network-based operations but have yet to connect this planning to national RampD and acquisition plans Thinking and planning at the European level is still at a very early and tentative stage

This chapter fi rst discusses the C4ISR doctrines of those European countries that have most advanced their thinking about defense transformation and network-based operations the United Kingdom Sweden Finland and the Netherlands It then considers developments in other European countries ndash France Germany and Norway ndash that are at a more initial stage in considering their network-enabled doctrines Two of the larger European defense powers ndash Italy and Spain ndash are not discussed as their defense doctrines deal little with C4ISR or network-based operations though both possess relevant deployed technologies While Italy is undertaking signifi cant change in its military based on a strategy review C4ISR investments do not play a major role in this transformation process There do not appear to be major efforts in Spain to integrate capabilities for network-based operations into national defense planning

United Kingdom

The British Ministry of Defense has moved the most swiftly among the Europeans to embrace the concept of integrating sensors weapons systems support capabilities and decision-makers developing its own doctrine Network-Enabled Capabilities (NEC) It is not the goal of NEC to create a universal network via a single technical solution Nor indeed is the doctrine extremely technically focused Rather than view networks in a centric role it prefers to see them in a more underpinning and supporting role It perceives networks as enabling forces to better exploit the information carried on them to make better and timelier decisions on more agile and appropriate actions that result in effects more closely aligned to strategic aims and objectives

In the NEC doctrine a network of networks is envisioned in which a number of nodes carried by deployed operational assets are interlinked The NEC emphasis is on ldquothe ability to collect fuse and analyze relevant information in near real-time so as to allow rapid decision-making and the rapid delivery of the most appropriate military force to achieve the desired effectrdquo (UK Ministry of Defense 2003 11) NEC will exploit the current and future sensors that gather information ensure that the information is better managed fused and exploited to support decisions and link the network to strike assets that can act upon the information collected As an investment priority NEC compatibility will be built into current and future military platforms

Using this network of networks concept some parts of the battlespace will be linked through a C4ISR backbone using the Skynet satellite constellation and the Bowman Cormorant and Falcon networks In other parts the network will be made up of different communications systems optimized for operating in particular environments (eg air to air communications land communications) While all assets will have to possess some communications capability only a few

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

12

will need to be a permanent and integral part of the network the rest will plug into it via specifi c permanent nodes

Interoperability both technical and non-technical is a critical element of the British NEC concept A key challenge for NEC is to keep abreast of other transformation processes occurring within the armed forces of potential allies most notably the United States Through relatively frequent upgrading of C2 and communications technologies somewhat easier procurement procedures and constant participation in US defense RampD programs the British armed forces today have the highest level in Europe of interoperability with American forces The Royal Navy and Royal Air Force however have a higher level of interoperability with their American and European counterparts than does the British Army

In the near term delivering NEC means identifying options to modify existing systems Delivery in the medium term will require intervening in programmed equipment to ensure that delivered systems are capable of exploiting the information they collect andor receive Over the long term the procurement program is to deliver platforms and systems that are net-ready

In January 2005 the British Ministry of Defense published the NetworkEnabled Capability Handbook designed to introduce the concept of NEC to the larger UK defense community and to outline key programs that will be undertaken to implement the concept The Handbook which will be updated annually describes how NEC will contribute to the strategic operational and tactical levels of command as well as its links with the Command and Battlespace Management program and the Joint High Level Operational Concept (Jt HLOC) being formulated by the Ministry of Defense (UK Ministry of Defense 2005)

Britain restructured the Ministry of Defense to emphasize its commitment to NEC NEC policy and coherence now falls under the Ministry of Defensersquos Directorate of Command and Battlespace Management (CBMJ6) which works closely with the directorate responsible for the equipment in the Directorate for Equipment Capability ndash Command Control and Information Infrastructure (DEC-CCII) headed by a one-star general DEC-CCII is the largest equipment capability area in the Ministry of Defense (the other Core Capability DECs being DEC ISTAR responsible for Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance DEC TA responsible for Air Enablers and DEC CBRN responsible for chemical biological radiological and nuclear warfare) It is responsible for delivering solutions to C2 and information technology gaps in British military capability DEC-CCII is able to balance funding across programs and between other DECs to deliver operational capability

Sweden

Urged by the Swedish parliament the Swedish armed forces moved quickly to rethink defense strategy after the Cold War In addition to their traditional role of territorial defense they are now also required to collaborate with other national security elements such as police and emergency management units as well as

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

13

with the forces of other countries within international coalitions Swedenrsquos long-standing policy of neutrality and non-participation in alliances and its defense strategy of border defense are both evolving rapidly As its new roles and missions emerge the Swedish military is evolving a doctrine of Network-Based Defense (NBD) NBD will facilitate joint operations in defense of the borders as well as in international coalitions at all levels of command using information technology to create a system of systems infrastructure with different platforms linked into it

Once in place NBD will allow the combination of different resources to provide task forces for specifi c operations These task forces will be able to interoperate with other participants The doctrine seeks to obtain the greatest possible effect by combining inputs and outputs from all systems regardless of their organizational affi liation (Nilsson 2003 8) The transition to NBD is expected to take twenty years or so however the fi rst steps are underway including developing and purchasing advanced C2 and communications capabilities for aircraft ships and land vehicles and the initial design of a Network-Based Defense architecture The Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI) and the Swedish Defense Materiel Administration (FMV) play a key role in shaping this vision (Rehnstroumlm 2002 11ndash12)

The Swedes conducted major experimental demonstrations of the key elements of the NBD doctrine between 2002ndash6 The experiments focused on secure information service-oriented architectures and the demonstration of dominant battlespace awareness and C2 elements for rapid reaction forces They also included the demonstration of methods and techniques for effects-based operations The demonstrations brought together units from different services each with its own functional systems and included simulations of a system of systems (Naumlsstroumlm 2004 152ndash3) The demonstrations were undertaken in a special NBD Laboratory in Enkoumlping near Stockholm built and operated by FMV for the Swedish armed forces The implementation phase of the NBD doctrine is planned to begin in 2010

Finland

Since the end of the Cold War Finlandrsquos national security strategy has changed dramatically The 1000 km border with Russia remains a security issue but the Finns are focused on participation in international security and relief operations as the central national security goal As a result of this two-pronged defense strategy Finland is making international defense interoperability a priority to enhance both its ability to receive outside aid for national emergencies as well as the effectiveness of its contributions to multinational operations overseas

A key part of the new strategy is to formulate and implement a doctrine that networks all elements of the nationrsquos defense and security forces using international standards Finland decided that its various forces could be much more effective if connected via a single command control and communications network that would enable seamless coordination and deployment of all of them The planned network would connect all military security police and other emergency and fi rst-

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

14

responder forces Though the Finnish doctrine is called Network-Based Defense it implements a truly network-centric vision plugging in all relevant users

Finland began installing this network ndash VIRVE (the Finnish acronym for Common Network for Authorities) ndash in 1999 and it became operational that same year It was fi rst used in live operations in 2000 and completed in 2002 Today VIRVE is the worldrsquos only fully operational IP-based nationwide command control and communications network for security and rescue forces It is owned by the Finnish Ministry of the Interior and operated by Suomen Erillisverkot an entity owned by the Finnish government and Sonera Finlandrsquos largest telecommunications service provider It currently serves some 30000 users from 20 different agencies and organizations including the Finnish Defense Forces police border security paramedics and fi refi ghters providing them with secure voice and data communications A related system is the basis for Finlandrsquos contribution of a deployable command control and communications network to the European Unionrsquos forces in the Balkans (EUFOR) Co-developed by Finnish companies and the Finnish Defense Forces and known as the Deployable COTS Network (DCN) it is a data transfer network that uses microwave links fi ber optic cables and broadband information services to transfer speech and data and provide Internet access between headquarters and troops in the fi eld

VIRVE is an example of how a national doctrine for network-based defense is taking the fi rst steps towards creating a common joint interoperable C4I system linking all government agencies The architecture structures and datafl ow of this network will be operated together allowing the sharing of information and resources according to specifi c needs It will include an integrated data transfer processing and management environment that covers all services and branches of the Finnish Defense Forces Initial focus will be on the strategic and operational levels but foundations will also be built for tactical level cross-service interoperability (Finnish Prime Ministerrsquos Offi ce 2004 107) By 2012 the army air force and navy are expected to be integrated into the national C4I network developed and able to conduct network-based operations both in Finland and overseas

While the Finnish military strongly supports this capability (the Finnish Chief of Defense Admiral Juhani Kaskeala has clearly prioritized integrated C4I systems as one of the militaryrsquos top development programs) other parts of the Finnish government face a challenge in developing their parts of the network Organizational cultures and operational procedures differ signifi cantly and most agencies lack the capacity for long-term planning and capabilities development However interagency cooperation is strong and there is signifi cant public support for improving both homeland defense and expeditionary capabilities

Netherlands

During the Cold War the Dutch armed forces saw one of their major roles as being able to provide C2 and communications capabilities to the theater of operations Over several decades they built up a C2 and communications capability through

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

15

investment in signals brigades With the end of the Soviet threat sustaining of a massive C3 capability became unnecessary At the same time the revolution in commercial information and communications technologies led to a ldquobrain drainrdquo away from the armed forces into the private sector Dutch defense planners wished to maintain some C2 capacity within the armed forces and to develop the C2 requirements of the future To this end they created three Support Centers in 2001 one for each service to bring together engineers and operational commanders for research development testing and evaluation on C2 systems that could serve the Netherlands armed forces in their new mission Unable to match the salary levels of the private sector the Dutch military compensated by offering the Support Center personnel a free hand in the use of their budget included total fl exibility for acquisition and program management

As the Dutch Ministry of Defense began to move toward a doctrine of expedi-tionary warfare the ability of the C2 Support Centers to provide the customer with deployable and fl exible systems became more important The armyrsquos C2 Support Center was tasked with developing C2 systems for all ground-based operations and is now the largest of the three Support Centers employing some 200 people half of whom are civilians The Center also develops technologies used by the marines the navyrsquos landing platform dock ships and helicopters attached to an airmobile brigade It is responsible for building a common open C2 architecture allowing both old and new systems to work together As of 1 January 2005 the Center was integrated into the newly created joint Defense Materiel Organization

This model of support centers while not a doctrine for network-based operations per se is an important contribution to European strategies for C4ISR Such centers bring together expertise from industry and defense ensuring that user needs and requirements are balanced with an understanding of what technology can support Competitive salaries and a free hand to experiment with the latest technologies and participate in groundbreaking research draw the best and brightest employees from the private sector and the military Finally the technology development strategy of ldquoplan a little build a little fi eld a little and learn a lotrdquo (similar to the US ldquospiral developmentrdquo) will be of interest to many European countries Instead of setting down complex requirements packages in advance and then developing and producing a turnkey product systems are designed in manageable parts that are then gradually developed and tested Along each step of the way the product is evaluated in accordance with overall specifi cations Only then is a prototype built and tested with the end-user While many European companies use this development strategy doing so in a setting with industry the military and end-users has the advantage of making it easier to identify and fi x problems swiftly

Other European countries

Encouraged by the success of the United Kingdom Sweden Finland and the Netherlands other European nations are beginning to formulate strategy and doctrine for network-based operations Rather than create distinct network-based doctrines C4ISR or networked capabilities tend to be included in broader defense

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

16

planning documents alongside plans for refocusing the militaryrsquos roles from territorial defense to expeditionary operations downsizing forces improving training for individual soldiers reorganizing the military command structure and reallocating resources from large platforms to more easily deployable capabilities Most of these efforts are still at an early stage however

France is a signifi cant example of this trend As is discussed in the next chapter France is a European leader in researching developing testing and deploying state-of-the-art C4ISR technologies The broad French technology investment does not however emerge from a comprehensive networking or transformational strategy and doctrine This strategy is not yet in place though use of the concept of network-centric operations (opeacuterations reacuteseaux-centreacutees or ORC) is becoming more widespread within the French armed forces Rather the commitment to obtaining advanced C4ISR is part of an overall French desire to remain self-suffi cient in military capabilities across the board For decades France has pursued a defense doctrine and procurement strategy that would provide its armed forces with independent autonomous capabilities The deployment of a broad arsenal and the avoidance of military specialization in the view of French defense planners make the countryrsquos military more fl exible and less dependent upon others More recently French strategy and doctrine have begun to emphasize military cooperation in the European context recognizing that total autonomy is militarily and fi nancially unachievable

Recent military planning in Germany suggests a growing focus on achieving expeditionary and network-centric capabilities Germany is one of the few European countries to have adopted the concept of transformation in the broadest US sense defi ning it as ldquothe forming of an ongoing forward-looking process of adaptation to a changing security environment in order to improve the Bundeswehrrsquos ability to operaterdquo (Thiele 2005 7) The German government announced in 2003 that it would downsize the armed forces to 211000 troops and to 392 bases by 2010 from the current 252000 troops and 621 bases (CPM Forum 2005 29ndash30) Moving away from a massive land warfare capability and toward an expeditionary capability the German military force will be divided into three categories The fi rst category some 35000 troops will become response forces (Eingreifkraumlfte)capable of participating in high-intensity combat operations These forces will fi eld state-of-the art C4ISR technologies for network-centric operations and interoperability with coalitions and allies The second category approximately 70000 troops will be stabilization forces (Stabilisierungskraumlfte) for medium- to low-intensity operations and will be only partially networked The third category will be support forces (Unterstuumltzungskraumlfte) some 145000 troops which will provide support for the fi rst two and be responsible for basic operations of the Bundeswehr While there are no planned procurement cancellations the funds saved by downsizing forces and the change in defense doctrine are promising for Germanyrsquos future C4ISR capabilities and its interoperability with allies Germany has also formulated a network-centric doctrine that is very similar to the US strategy of Network-Centric Warfare Named Networked Operational

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

17

Command (Vernetzte Operationsfuumlhrung or NetOpFuuml in German) the strategy calls for linking new and existing sensors and weapons platforms on a common information network

Norway which is not in the EU but is a NATO member sees network-based defense as crucial for remaining relevant as a NATO partner and as a contributor to multilateral operations and has made this strategy an important part of the broader restructuring of its armed forces In 2001 the Norwegian parliament approved a major military reform between 2002ndash5 As in Sweden and in other countries this reform was initiated by a shift in the roles assigned to the Norwegian armed forces from primarily territorial defense to expeditionary operations

As a result of this shift the command structure of the military was reorganized the Headquarters Defense Command Norway was disbanded and the Chief of Defense together with his strategic functions was integrated with the Ministry of Defense A new Defense Staff consisting of representatives of the three services and an Inspector General was established to support the Chief of Defense in his role as head of the armed forces In addition the size of the military reduced by approximately 5000 The savings generated from this restructuring would be invested in advanced capabilities and systems These investments have included upgrading the national Defense Data Network (known as FDN) and procuring locally developed advanced multi-role tactical radios (Norwegian Ministry of Defense 2002) In the next cycle 2005ndash8 the Norwegians plan to create a joint Information and Communications Infrastructure unit to support Norwegian forces deployed overseas and an ISTAR unit focused primarily on reconnaissance missions using special forces and UAVs that can operate within multinational coalitions (Norwegian Ministry of Defense 2004)

Conclusion

There is not yet a consistent approach in Europe to Network-Based Operations Some countries still view territorial defense as the principal mission for their armed forces and see stovepiped C4ISR systems as suffi cient for fulfi lling their current and future defense requirements Still a growing number of European nations have learned important lessons from studying US Network-Centric Warfare doctrine and observing such capabilities in action on the battlefi eld in coalition operations Some including Germany France and Norway are beginning to include language about C4ISR networks in their defense modernization plans but have yet to create specifi c detailed doctrines discussing how these networks will be linked with existing military doctrine tactics and technologies Other European countries particularly the United Kingdom Sweden Finland and the Netherlands have developed detailed doctrines and strategies for creating advanced capabilities based on linking communications intelligence gathering and weapons systems into a network capable of distributing information

It is not always true that countries that have worked through doctrine in detail have also deployed the most advanced technology consistent with that doctrine As

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

18

the French case suggests doctrinal leaders are not always the same as technology leaders Over time the two will need to develop together if the Europeans are to obtain a network-based capability that is interoperable within Europe as well as across the Atlantic

19

3

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES FOR NETWORK-

BASED OPERATIONS

Efforts are well underway in many European countries to develop and acquire national and in some cases multinational capabilities for network-based operations As already noted no country has fully embraced the concept of network-centric operations to the extent the American military has None are seeking to create a full single infrastructure fusing all existing and future assets Most have opted at least for some integration and upgrading of existing capabilities toward greater networking Major procurement programs focus particular attention on cross-service C2 systems digital communications and ISR platforms (tactical operational and strategic) In all of these countries rapid advances in commercial communication and information technology have created a wealth of products applicable to military C4ISR at a relatively low unit cost As a result for many of these countries expensive weapons platforms can be improved through C4ISR-related upgrades thereby increasing capability at an affordable cost

This chapter focuses on actual deployed and planned C4ISR capabilities in seven European countries France the United Kingdom Germany Italy the Netherlands Spain and Sweden As noted doctrines for network-based capabilities are unevenly developed among these countries However these seven countries are clearly the most advanced in Europe both in terms of overall military capability and in the deployment of C4ISR technologies Not surprisingly with the exception of the Netherlands they are also the countries with the highest defense budgets in Europe They are also the most likely partners of the US in coalition operations either individually or as members of NATO and the EU

An overview of the trends in C4ISR-related acquisition and RampT programs in Europe identifi es developments that have been observed in several ndash if not the majority ndash of EU and NATO countries This chapter then reviews developments relevant to network-based operations in each of the seven key countries summarizing major national capabilities both deployed and projected and examining in some detail each countryrsquos network-based systems in terms of C2 communications (including computers) and ISR

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

20

Overview

Signifi cant efforts are already underway in most European countries to connect existing C2 systems across services Several countries are creating a new cross-service C2 infrastructure including the United Kingdom (the Joint Command System) France (SICA) and Italy (CATRIN) Interoperability among these C2 systems is signifi cantly less advanced especially for ground forces The French army for example has three command levels while most other European armies ndash including the United Kingdom Germany and Italy ndash have two which makes the creation of a common C2 architecture among them a challenge

All of the countries reviewed believe that a common digital communications backbone for their services is crucial Several countries fi eld tactical systems based on asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) switches many others have integrated digital switches capable of interfacing with high-speed data networks and complying with European and NATO standards Many of them are at advanced stages in upgrading their communications infrastructure whether through terrestrial networks satellite systems or a combination of both including the British Bowman and Skynet programs the German AUTOKO-90 and BIGSTAF programs and the French SOCRATE RITA 2000 and Syracuse programs Sweden the Netherlands and Italy are also making signifi cant progress in the military communications fi eld

For communications in general the civilian industry is the main driver of innovation and therefore the main standard setter It is not surprising that while different companies are working on communications programs for Europersquos militaries the systems being put in place share attributes they are digital increasingly based on the Internet Protocol (IP) capable of handling voice as well as data and use ATM switching equipment and widespread transmission technologies (satellite radio and fi ber optics)

In addition to space-based military communications many European countries are turning to space for future surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities While military communications satellites (COMSAT) usually are built and operated by individual countries earth observation programs have become increasingly multinational Furthermore intra-European agreements are being put in place to link national space assets In the not-so-distant future data collected by satellites owned by different countries will be disseminated between partners through sharing agreements and communications satellites will carry military transmissions from countries that lease their bandwidth from others A growing number of militaries are acquiring the capability to link their headquarters with their expeditionary forces using broadband mobile communications The French ARISTOTE the German KINTOP the British Cormorant and the Swedish KV90 are examples of such systems already in place

Finally the Europeans are making increased use of unmanned platforms especially aerial ones to fulfi ll the tactical and in some cases operational and strategic intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance requirements While most European countries possess manned platforms for this purpose particularly for

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

21

aerial reconnaissance these are either in need of upgrading or are nearing the end of their service lives All the militaries discussed in this chapter as well as those of several other European countries have begun to experiment with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) ndash often developed by their indigenous technology and industrial base ndash and most have used them in military operations They are viewed as affordable versatile and dependable options for future surveillance and reconnaissance missions Several countries notably the United Kingdom France and Germany are looking to UAVs for other operational needs including signals intelligence (SIGINT) electronic warfare airborne ground surveillance and strike missions However unlike what is often the case in communications and C2 different ISR standards are set by each country which makes interoperability a diffi cult challenge

France

France invests in almost all areas of defense technology relevant to network-based operations However as was explained in the previous chapter the broad French investment in C4ISR capabilities does not yet grow out of a comprehensive network-centric strategy Although the concept of network-centric operations (opeacuterations reacuteseaux-centreacutees or ORC) is widespread within the French armed forces only a handful of offi cers within the French Joint Staff are currently working on network-centric doctrines Nevertheless between 1991 and 1993 several new organizational frameworks were created to review and modernize French doctrine and strategy in this direction The single joint Directorate of Military Intelligence (Direction du Renseignement Militaire or DRM) replaced a variety of existing services and reports to the chief of the defense staff A joint planning staff the Etat-Major Interarmeacutees (EMIA) was created to plan operations in and out of Europe and the Centre Opeacuterationnel Interarmeacutees (COIA) became the joint operations center France also put in place a joint theater C2 structure (Poste de Commandement Interarmeacutee de Theacuteacirctre or PCIAT) and the space bureau in the French Joint Chiefs of Staff was folded into the Command Control Communications and Intelligence (C3I) staff (Thomas 2000 20) The initial purpose of these organizational changes was to facilitate force projection and expeditionary warfare operations However these new organizational structures could provide a setting for developing a military doctrine increasingly focused on transformation and coordination across services

Because force projection expeditionary forces and out-of-theater operations require among other things advanced C2 systems communications networks and real-time intelligence the C4ISR systems that provide this are playing an increasingly important role in French military plans The French defense procurement agency (Deacuteleacutegation Geacuteneacuterale pour lrsquoArmement or DGA) has set up a task force of capability managers (architectes des systegravemes de force) in charge of future issues for defense RampD and procurement and their cross-service applications The areas covered are deterrence C3I force projection deep strike and maintaining operational capability The task force meets regularly

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TR

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bull P

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chke

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prog

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(5)

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ial s

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al M

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Vs

bull S

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e sa

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e 3

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ies

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ork-

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erat

ions

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tegy

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mun

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ions

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ybull

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ectiv

e ac

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n of

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s (U

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s s

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)bull

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ry f

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d M

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ers)

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ed s

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ed tr

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nary

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ir f

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y C

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stem

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ork)

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ty

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ry f

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e C

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em

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ed D

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se

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rine

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ross

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ited

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nd A

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(6

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us a

ircr

aft)

bull U

AV

and

UC

AV

pro

gram

s

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

24

with representatives of the French defense industry to coordinate government requirements with private-sector projects and planning In fact several of the larger defense contractors in Europe have set up new groups to act as permanent liaison with members of the task force for this purpose such as the Thales Think Tank (T3)

In 2004 there were still more changes in Francersquos defense organizations The DGA was restructured to include expanded and improved in-house technical capabilities for research technology and testing The French Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Offi ce of the Secretary-General of the Defense Ministry are beginning to assume responsibility for monitoring the development and demonstration of defense programs a responsibility currently held by the DGA These changes are seen as a way to bring industry closer to its client the French military (Tran 2004 4)

The importance of C4ISR for current and future military capabilities has also been refl ected in Francersquos defense budget planning C2 systems space technologies and interoperability enablers have received priority for RampD investment in the 2003ndash8 fi ve year defense plan (the Loi de Programmation Militaire) During the fi rst two years DGA planners focused on space-based SIGINT assets a space-based early warning system demonstrator integrated C2 systems for the army and navy and advanced navigation technologies For 2005ndash6 UAVs and the interlinking of European space assets are the priority By the end of the fi ve year plan France hopes to raise its defense RampT budget to some 12 billion euros (out of a total 15 billion euros) up from 800 million euros in 2004 (Boulesteix 2004) For all C4ISR requirements DGArsquos Directorate of Force Systems and Prospective Systems Analysis (Direction des Systegravemes de force et de la Prospective or DSP) has been replaced by the Directorate of Force Systems and Industrial Technological and Cooperation Strategies or Direction des Sytegravemes de Force et des Strateacutegies Industrielles Technologique et de Coopeacuteration (D4S) which decides on the best and most affordable solutions without prejudice toward any specifi c technology

The DGA is also working on two plans to assess the future C4ISR needs of the French armed forces The fi rst is a technological capabilities plan of systems including C4ISR systems to be acquired by the year 2015 The second is the Prospective Plan for 30 Years (Plan Prospectif agrave Trente Ans or PP30) which looks specifi cally at longer-term needs and solutions for meeting them mainly in the fi elds of telecommunications intelligence networking C2 sensors and UAV technologies The latter fi rst unveiled at the 2005 Paris Air Show (although circulated within the French Ministry of Defense for several years prior to that) is groundbreaking in that it provides a 30 year draft acquisition plan for the French military based on an analysis of expected threats uses of force and technology developments Both plans are updated periodically to guide RampT investments and procurement plans in collaboration with the European Defense Agency other allies ndash most notably the UK ndash and with industry

Working closely with the Joint Planning Staff (EMIA) and with DGA on network-based capabilities is the French space agency known as the Center for

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

25

National Space Studies (Centre National drsquoEtudes Spatiales) or CNES This collaboration refl ects the French governmentrsquos recognition that space has major strategic operational and tactical advantages for networking and intelligence collection purposes As a result CNES has begun overseeing some military space programs on behalf of the Ministry of Defense The French Chief of Staff chairs the space coordination group (Groupe de Coordination Espacendash GCE) which includes representatives from EMIA DGA and other military institutions CNES has also created a team dedicated to military space projects Its members who can either be CNES employees or Ministry of Defense staff seconded to CNES report to the president of CNES as well as to the relevant program managers at the Ministry of Defense The team works on four major areas future planning ongoing projects implementation of dual-use space programs and RampT

More broadly recognizing the costs of an autonomous French defense strategy France is continuing its defense cooperation with the EU and NATO In addition to its Eurocorps commitments France will commit a whole Battlegroup to the EU Battlegroup effort and participate in two others one with Germany Belgium and Luxembourg the other with Belgium France is also committed to participating in the NATO Response Force despite viewing it as duplicative of the EU Rapid Reaction Force It is unlikely however that France will periodically rotate the same forces through the NRF it would be more interested in NRF experience for different kinds of troops drawn from various services While the French understand that smaller countries will participate in the NRF in a specialized manner they prefer to rotate different types of forces through and maintain autonomy

France also views the Allied Command Transformation as an important development and a target for closer cooperation which might provide a window for the EU into US transformation However within the EU the French strongly believe that there needs to be a European fl ag on European military capabilities At this point it is unclear whether the French expect EU capabilities to be able to complement US capabilities to be oriented principally toward autonomous operations or both This issue has major implications for interoperability require-ments and capabilities Currently France is very supportive of the plan to give the European Defense Agency increasingly greater RampT and procurement responsibilities However France also believes that the European national investments in major platforms stand in the way of greater interoperability between European C4ISR systems In the French view European defense budgets include a major commitment to a platform strategy which leaves little funding for C4ISR and interoperability

At the transatlantic level major French platforms such as the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier have good tactical interoperability with the US Navy using Link-16 technology In Afghanistan for example French E-2C aircraft from the Charles de Gaulle guided American fi ghters toward their targets when US E-2C aircraft were overtaxed or unavailable French Special Operations Forces also have good interoperability with their US counterparts At the European level French naval and air forces are fairly interoperable with most European forces but French

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

26

ground forces are not The French Army still fi elds communications systems for example that are not fully interoperable with its allies The coordination of French RampD efforts is focused for now totally on achieving jointness at the national level

As a European leader in space France also seeks greater cooperation with the United States especially for earth observation communications and navigation programs France also views itself as a potential intermediary between the United States and the space-related activities of other European nations and organizations including the European Space Agency and the European Commission (Hura et al2000 64ndash5)

France has arguably the most advanced operational battlespace digitization program in Europe both deployed and planned While there is not yet full interoperability between all French military services the initial investment in cross-service systems has been made and deployment is well underway The major building blocks are a cross-service C2 system a digital communications infrastructure and a network linking national HQs and expeditionary forces In 2004ndash5 two laboratories for demonstrating network-based concepts were created Bulle Opeacuterationelle Aeacuteroterrestre (BOA) demonstrates the ability to fuse information from UAVs and land-based sensors in real time to create a common battlespace picture for land forces and enable a coordinated engagement of targets The second laboratory will focus on linking data collected by ISR assets from all services Since France has also invested heavily across the board in ISR capabilities it is important to demonstrate the ability to link UAVs manned air- and ship-borne platforms and space-based assets

Command and control

France has operational C2 systems in every service The army has four fully operational digital C2 programs the Force Command and Information System (Systegraveme drsquoInformation et de Commandement des Forces or SICF) for division-level C2 (including C2 for overseas task forces) the Regimental Information System (Systegraveme drsquoInformation Reacutegimentaire or SIR) originally for regimental-level C2 but redirected to company level in 2001 the Final Information System (Systegraveme drsquoInformation Terminal or SIT) for tactical-level C2 and armored vehicles and the Automated Surface-to-Surface Artillery Fire and Liaison System (Automatisation des Tirs et des Liaisons de lrsquoArtillerie Sol-sol or ATLAS) Some 750 SIR vehicles 650 SIT systems and nine ATLAS systems are deployed

Other operational digital C2 systems are the armyrsquos Martha air defense system the air forcersquos Aerial Operations Command and Control System (Systegravemede Commandement et de Controcircle des Opeacuterations Aeacuteriennes or SCCOA) and the navyrsquos SIC21 system The French navy also deploys several Naval Tactical Information Exploitation Systems (Systegraveme drsquoExploitation Navale des Informations Tactiques or SENIT) Ships equipped with SENIT can operate as single distributed anti-aircraft systems In addition the French navy in 2004 initiated the Multi-Platform Engagement Capability (Capaciteacute drsquoEngagement

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

27

Multi Plate-formes or CEMP) demonstrator as a possible locally developed counterpart to the US Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) to provide air and naval assets with additional cooperative engagement capability France initially sought to develop CEMP as a collaborative program offering Italy Germany and the Netherlands participation but the offer was not accepted Initial operational capability is expected in 2006

These C2 systems are only partially interoperable with each other or with allied capabilities though SICF and SIR are both compliant with NATO STANAGs The SIR and SIT systems can both be linked to French combat and C2 helicopters and ATLAS and SIR both interface with the French Rapsodie surveillance system ATLAS is currently interoperable with United States United Kingdom Italian and German surface-to-surface fi ring systems as well as with SIR and SCCOA is planned to be interoperable with the NATO Air Command and Control System (ACCS) The French SENIT system is also interoperable with the C2 of the United States Navy and the British Royal Navy through Link-16 and Link-11 which allows interoperability in naval air defense

France is now in the fi nal stages of deploying the next generation C2 system in the form of a strategic-level system called the Joint Information and Command System (Systegraveme drsquoInformation et de Commandement des Armeacutees or SICA) This system which will link the armyrsquos SICF the navyrsquos SIC21 and the air forcersquos SCCOA systems is already installed on various weapons platforms and headquarters It is linked to the SOCRATE and the Syracuse 3 communications systems (see below) and interoperable with the British JOCS and the German Rubin systems

Communications and computers

The Operational System of Joint Telecommunications Networks (SystegravemeOpeacuterationnel Constitueacute des Reacuteseaux des Armeacutees pour les Teacuteleacutecommunicationsor SOCRATE) is the current communications infrastructure linking all of Francersquos services Its 120 ATM switching sites in France cover all military communications including radio fi ber optic and satellite and connect the system to civilian and allied communications networks In addition a more advanced tactical communications system for the French army will enter into service around 2004ndash5 It will be based on IP-networked PR4G (Programme Radio 4egraveme Geacuteneacuteration or 4th Generation Radio Program VHF tactical radios used in man-portable vehicle-mounted or aircraft-mounted confi gurations) and the Automatic Transmission Integrated Network (Reacuteseau Inteacutegreacute de Transmissions Automatiques 2000 or RITA 2000) switching platform both supplied by Thales The RITA 2000 project was initiated in 1993 and has progressively upgraded the French tactical communications infrastructure to facilitate interoperability with allied networks and expeditionary forces and increase bandwidth Its link into the armed forcesrsquo C2 network management is known as the Command Network Center (Centre de Commandement du Reacuteseau or CECOR) In August 2003 the French defense procurement agency announced a 100 million euro plan to upgrade

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

28

the RITA 2000 system with new hardware and software to provide state-of-the-art tactical Internet and mobile communications services

For tactical communications France currently uses older versions of the PR4G radios which nevertheless include features such as frequency hopping encryption Since 2005 however several units have begun using newer versions that include a built-in Global Positioning System (GPS) and tactical Internet capabilities A total of 7050 PR4G-IP radios will be delivered to the French military by 2009 at a cost of 235 million euros In addition the tactical Local Area System (LAS) developed by Thales provides a tactical command post in the fi eld with digital communications capabilities through a vehicle-mounted IP-based system In the French navy several platforms including some E-2C aircraft the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle and several anti-air frigates possess Tactical Digital Information Link technology of the Link-11 and Link-16 types This technology is now installed in aircraft of the French air force as well The Link-11 systems will be replaced by Link-22 (also known as NATO Inproved Link Eleven or NILE) systems in the near future France also procures MIDS terminals and is a partner in the US navy-led MIDS JTRS program to make MIDS terminals compliant with the US JTRS software defi ned tactical radios

French military satellite communications capabilities are also at quite an advanced stage with the Syracuse satellite constellation The previous operational system Syracuse 2 used the military payloads of four Teacuteleacutecom 2 commercial satellites launched between December 1991 and August 1996 and was operated jointly by France Teacuteleacutecom and the French armed forces The system did not provide global coverage but did cover all of Europe and reached the United States to the west and India to the east Its satellites began to reach the end of their lives in 2004 and while most are still available as backup a new system Syracuse 3 was put in orbit to replace them Syracuse 3A was launched in October 2005 and the second satellite is scheduled for launch in 2006 total costs for both are estimated at around 3 billion euros including roughly 600 airborne terrestrial and ship-borne terminals A third satellite to be launched around 2010 is under study The satellites have both SHF and EHF channels Syracuse 3A has nine SHF channels and six EHF channels The Syracuse constellation belongs to the French government though the French Ministry of Defense is considering the possibility of turning management of the third satellite over to a private consortium using the model of Britainrsquos Skynet 5 (De Selding 2003a 6) The Syracuse 3 satellites will form part of the British-French-Italian solution for NATOrsquos future satellite communication needs and France has additional agreements with Germany Belgium and Spain to share Syracuse 3 capacity (Laurent 2001 30)

Since 2002 France also has a deployed system (ARISTOTE) to provide end-to-end communications between operational units in external theaters of operation and their commanders in France ARISTOTE uses the Syracuse constellation and other available allied and commercial COMSATs to provide a broadband architecture based on the latest commercial standards The system supports voice video teleconferencing telegraph fax and data (including tactical Internet)

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

29

Future communications projects include a naval intranet system (RIFAN) a secure e-mail system for the French Ministry of Defense (Universal Secure Messaging or Messagerie Universelle Seacutecuriseacutee or MUSE) and the Airborne Laser Optical Link (Liaison Optique Laser Aeacuteroporteacutee or LOLA) a 2006 test of a 50 million euro demonstrator to explore the feasibility of high-rate laser optical links between an ARTEMIS civilian communications satellite and a UAV in fl ight The Airborne Communication Node (Noeud de Communication Aeacuteroporteacuteor NCA) a UAV-borne high-bandwidth hub capable of linking up to 50 mobile ground or maritime gateways is also under advanced stages of development with a fi rst demonstration expected in 2006 France also plans to procure additional Link-16 equipment for its Rafale aircraft and for some naval platforms

Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance

France is the European leader in deployed space-based ISR capabilities and the operator of Helios the only European military earth observation system currently in orbit Despite the cancellation of the Horus radar satellite program in 1998 France continued its earth observation efforts with the development of two Helios 1 satellites The fi rst was launched in July 1995 and remains operational the second was launched in December 1999 but failed in October 2004 A joint French Italian and Spanish project Helios 1 satellites carry optical imagers with approximately one-meter resolution and are capable of imaging any point on earth within 24 hours providing a dozen images a day They do not have infrared capability Each participating nation can control the onboard imaging system on a pro rata basis based on its fi nancial contribution to the program (France 789 per cent Italy 141 per cent and Spain 7 per cent) The Helios 1 system allows each of the co-owners to maintain strict secrecy from each other regarding the use they make of it However to make optimum use of the imaging capacity the three partner nations have agreed on certain common needs and program the satellite accordingly More than 30 per cent of the imagery taken by Helios 1 is shared between the partners In addition to fi xed ground stations to receive Helios 1 imagery France possesses at least one mobile ground station built by EADS

Helios 2A the fi rst in the next generation of French earth observation satellites was launched in December 2004 and began operating in April 2005 The second satellite will probably be launched in late 2008 Helios 2A carries two sensors operating in the visible and infrared spectrums One is a medium-resolution sensor with a wide fi eld of view and is capable of producing images with a resolution of approximately 1 meter the other has a narrower fi eld of view but is capable of producing images with a 50 cm resolution The satellite has a contractual service life of fi ve years during which it will produce roughly 100 images per day (Fiorenza 2005a)

The ground segment of the Helios 2 system has an open architecture allowing for interoperability with other imagery sources including other satellites reconnaissance aircraft and drones Users whether in Europe or in an overseas theater of operations will have access to a workstation connected to the main

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

30

ground segments from which they will be able to request specifi c tasking perform analysis or access an imagery archive Overall costs for the Helios 2 program are approximately 2 billion euros Belgium and Spain each have a 25 per cent stake in the program and Greece will join it in the future with a small ownership share Helios 2 imagery will also be shared with other EU Member States through the EU satellite center in Torrejoacuten

France is also working on a dual-use satellite system ndash Pleiades ndash a constellation of earth observation satellites able to cover both military and civilian requirements The constellation to be built by EADS Astrium of France will include two new French high-resolution optical satellites capable of resolutions of about 60 cm Other satellites linked to the constellation will be the four Italian COSMO-Skymed X-band radar satellites designed for a resolution of less than one meter for military images and one meter for commercial ones The Pleiades-HR satellite is expected to be launched in 2008 with the other French contribution to the constellation being launched approximately one year later The Italian satellites are expected to be operational by 2007

Pursuant to an agreement signed between France and Italy in January 2001 the Italian system will be linked to the French via Optical and Radar Federated Earth Observation (ORFEO) which will ensure interoperability and information sharing between the two systems France will also give Italy access to SPOT (Systegraveme Pour lrsquoObservation de la Terre) 5 and to Helios 2 imagery The Swedish National Space Board signed an agreement with the French Space Agency in April 2001 guaranteeing its participation in the civilian aspects of the program as well as providing access to some of the data The most recent additions to the Pleiades program in 2002 and 2003 are Spainrsquos defense RampD agency INTA and the civilian space agencies of Austria and Belgium all of which secured their industrial cooperation on Pleiades and the sharing of data acquired by the system The total non-French role on the Pleiades program however is not likely to exceed 15 per cent An information-sharing agreement between France and Germany is also expected

France also has its own limited airborne ground surveillance capabilities The On-Site Radar and Investigation Observation Helicopter (Helicoptre drsquoObservation Radar et drsquoInvestigation sur Zone or HORIZON) is a heliborne ground surveillance radar that operates in moving target indicator mode but not in a synthetic aperture radar mode Operational in the French army since 2002 the system consists of four radars mounted on AS-532 Cougar helicopters and two ground stations It provides ISR capabilities for the tactical and operational levels A similar system was sold to the Swiss army and Turkey has shown an interest Maritime ISR capabilities take the form of the Breguet Atlantic manned aircraft Additional manned aerial ISR is provided by Mirage F1-CR aircraft outfi tted with the Raphael Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) pod an infrared pod and the Stand-Off Reconnaissance Pod (Pod de REconnaissance STand Off or PRESTO) digital camera pod and by the navyrsquos Super Etendard 4 aircraft carrying a camera and infrared and radar pods In land ISR systems the Rapsodie ground radar system is under development with full operational capability expected in 2008ndash9

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

31

It will be interoperable with the SIR command and control system and with the ATLAS fi re control system

In addition France deploys four Boeing Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) E-3 aircraft delivered to the French air force between 1991 and 1992 In 1998 France began upgrading these aircraft to outfi t them with Boeingrsquos Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system and the new Radar System Improvement Program (RSIP) kit Upgrade of the fi rst aircraft was completed in 2005 and the other three will be completed by the end of 2006 The ESM system provides the E-3 with passive listening and detection capabilities which enable it to detect identify and track electronic transmissions from ground airborne and maritime sources The RSIP kit will improve the aircraftrsquos ability to detect and track smaller targets

France has also taken the European lead with respect to surveillance and reconnaissance UAVs Some like the 12 Crecerelle (Kestrel) TUAVs operational with the artillery corps and the four Hunter MALE UAVs tested by the air force have been operational for many years and are approaching the end of their lifetimes The Hunter UAV is a version co-developed by Israeli Aircraft Industries and EADS The Crecerelle has been deployed by the army since 1995 and has been successfully used as part of French NATO operations in the Balkans A communications-jamming version is also in service Each Crecerelle is outfi tted with a TV camera and optical and infrared sensors and the systems were fully operational until 2004

Other TUAVs continue to be operational The army has 54 CL-289 UAVs for tactical reconnaissance missions at the corps and division levels Co-developed with Germany and Canada and successfully deployed in the Balkans it has been operational since 1993 Its payload was initially limited to black and white cameras and infrared sensors but it has been upgraded to include a synthetic aperture radar and its fl ight software and navigation system have also been improved A separate program known as Reconnaissance Vehicle Programming Interpreting and Displaying (Programmation Interpreacutetation Visualisation drsquoEngins de Reconnaissance or PIVER) was undertaken to develop ground stations for this program In addition the French army is purchasing man-portable mini-UAVs for very close range reconnaissance and surveillance These include several Pointer hand-launched UAV systems similar to those in use with the US army marines and special forces which received an export license by the United States in 2001 and the DRAC (Drone de Reconnaissance Au Contact or Drone for Reconnaissance Upon Contact) of which 160 systems (consisting of two UAVs each) are being procured

For its future MALE missions the air force is fi eld-testing the Eagle-1 system as part of the Intermediary MALE Drone System (Systegraveme Inteacuterimaire de Drone MALE or SIDM) This UAV system is based on the Heron UAV produced by Israeli Aircraft Industries modifi ed by EADS Several of these systems are currently being tested with air vehicles carrying synthetic aperture radar moving target indicator radar TV cameras Forward-Looking Infrared (FLIR) and a satellite data link

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

32

The French air force has also begun work on the next generation of MALE UAVs under project EuroMALE planned for deployment between 2008 and 2010 In May 2002 the Netherlands air force announced that it would collaborate on EuroMALE and by 2004 Sweden Italy Switzerland the United Kingdom and Spain had also expressed their interest in joining Out of an estimated cost of 300 million euros the French Ministry of Defense will invest 75 million the rest will be contributed by other governments and industry

The French army is planning the next generation of tactical UAVs The armyrsquos Intermediary Tactical Drone System project (Systegraveme de Drone Tactique Intermediaire or SDTI) for the replacement of the Crecerelle UAVs began in February 2003 with the development of a UAV derived from the Safran Grouprsquos Sperwer The fi rst trial fl ights were undertaken in December 2003 Eighteen vehicles outfi tted with a black-and-white camera and an infrared sensor and four ground stations are expected and will be able to interoperate with the French ATLAS Martha and SICF C2 systems The system became fully operational in 2005

For longer-term needs the Multi-Collector Multi-Mission program (MultiCapteurs Multi Missions or MCMM) has been underway since September 2002 MCMM will provide for the armyrsquos TUAV needs beyond the year 2008 when the CL-289 and SDTI systems will go out of service In addition a tactical rotor-wing UAV built by ECT Industries of France is currently under development for the French navy The fi rst prototype of this project Helicopter Operated from Afar (Heacutelicoptegravere Teacuteleacuteopeacutereacute or HETEL) was fl own in December 2002 and trials began in 2005 Plans are also in place for the development of a long-endurance maritime UAV known as the Long Endurance On-Board Drone (Drone Embarqueacute Longue Endurance or DELE)

France has also begun to develop unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) with two major projects The fi rst outfi ts Sperwer B TUAVs with Israeli-made Spike ER (extended range) precision strike missiles First unveiled in the summer of 2005 this project is similar to the US success with armed Predator UAVs using Hellfi re missiles The second is RampD on a new UCAV Neuron to be operational by 2009 Led by Dassault Aviation which holds a 50 per cent share the program has drawn interest from several European governments and fi rms Alenia Aeronautica of Italy is the second largest industrial partner with a 22 per cent stake In addition EADS CASA of Spain Saab of Sweden Greecersquos Hellenic Aerospace Industry and Switzerlandrsquos RUAG have all signed on as partners and further government-to-government agreements are likely The French Ministry of Defense has set aside some 400 million euros for this program The use of NATO STANAGs in choosing the datalink will ensure its interoperability with other alliance ISR systems using the same standard

To manage mission and support data from geographical and intelligence sources and databases France has deployed the Multi-Source Interpretation Assistance System (Systegraveme drsquoAide agrave Interpreacutetation Multicapteur ndash SAIM) This imagery intelligence analysis system uses data fusion techniques to create an all-digital

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

33

image chain for imagery from sensors (satellites air sea and ground radars) and has some interoperability with national and allied intelligence systems It is in service with the French air force army and navy and was used during recent confl icts and multinational exercises where it proved its interoperability with the Canadian observation satellite Radarsat-1 the US JSTARS system and the French HORIZON system A separate system TIPI3D exists for the exploitation of available imagery for special operations and missile targeting TIPI3D two of which are deployed translates imagery into 3D graphic models

In addition France possesses a number of collection and analysis capabilities for other types of intelligence Airborne SIGINT gathering and analysis capabilities (for both communications and electronic intelligence) have existed since the 1980s Two Gabriel systems mounted on C-160 transport aircraft are currently deployed More recently airborne SIGINT capabilities have been upgraded with the introduction of the Airborne Electronic Warfare Information Collection System (Systegraveme Aeacuteroporteacute de Recueil drsquoInformations de Guerre Electronique or SARIGUE) in 2001 Currently one such system carried by a DC-8 airplane is known to be operational

The French armed forces also deploy terrestrial and naval SIGINT and electronic warfare capabilities The French army deploys the Forward Electronic Warfare System (Systegraveme de Guerre Electronique de lrsquoAvant or SGEA) as well as other mobile electronic warfare and SIGINT collection systems The French navy possesses several vessels carrying SIGINT equipment and deployed its newest one the Dupuy de Locircme under the Joint Forces Electromagnetic Research program (Moyen Interarmeacutees de Recherches Electromagneacutetiques or MINREM) in 2005

France has also deployed military space SIGINT systems since the 1990s Initially two micro-satellites Cerise (Cherry) and Clementine were piggybacked on each of the two Helios 1 satellites launched in 1995 and 1999 An additional signals interception system Euracom was also piggybacked on the fi rst Helios 1 satellite These systems which were intended mainly as pilot projects were complemented in late 2004 by a cluster of four Essaim (Swarm) micro-satellites specializing in COMINT These were piggybacked on the fi rst Helios 2 satellite and began their planned three years of operations in May 2005 Design of two satellites for the monitoring of radar communications from low orbit was initiated in early 2005 under the ELINT program A joint DGA-CNES demonstrator with some 170 million euros in funding the satellites will be in orbit around 2008ndash9 by which time France hopes to persuade other European governments to join in developing a fully operational intelligence collection capability in space

The DGA has initiated the design and production of a space based optical early warning system demonstrator the Preparatory Infrared Alert System (Systegraveme Preacuteparatoire Infra-Rouge pour lrsquoAlerte or SPIRALE) This 124 million euro demonstrator will be a complete system capable of collecting and analyzing infrared imagery against a land background in order to detect ballistic missiles as they are launched It could also be used for other operational missions such as monitoring of weapons proliferation SPIRALE will consist of two micro-

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e 3

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loye

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6ndash7

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ter

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rces

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)

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l be

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ter

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riel

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n op

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tica

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r (S

AIM

)

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T s

yste

m a

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to

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te a

n al

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n fo

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tes

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tion

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n ea

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rvat

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nd o

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llit

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ched

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ery

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ing

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emen

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ith

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gium

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to

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ery

from

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man

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e sy

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chan

ge f

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s 2

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ery

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e de

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ne

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ique

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erm

edia

re

(SD

TI)

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t gen

erat

ion

of ta

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al

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Wil

l be

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rope

rabl

e w

ith

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as M

arth

a an

d S

ICF

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2 sy

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s

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e 3

2 co

ntin

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loye

d to

day

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loye

d by

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d af

ter

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rope

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lity

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aim

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lati

on o

f 4

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T s

atel

lite

s

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en I

nter

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eacutees

de R

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s E

lect

rom

agneacute

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es(M

INR

EM

)

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p-ba

sed

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T a

nd

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INT

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tem

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oMA

LE

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ure

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LE

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o-de

velo

ped

wit

h th

e N

ethe

rlan

ds o

ther

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untr

ies

have

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ress

ed

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rest

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EIA

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o ea

rth

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rvat

ion

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llit

es w

ith

a re

solu

tion

of

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roxi

mat

ely

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m

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ery

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ing

wit

h B

elgi

um S

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ly

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tria

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eden

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erm

any

Mul

ti C

apte

urs

Mul

ti

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sion

s (M

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M)

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ure

arm

y U

AV

Neu

ron

UC

AV

pro

gram

Co-

deve

lope

d w

ith

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y

Spa

in S

wed

en G

reec

e an

d S

wit

zerl

and

Heacutel

icop

tegravere

Teacutel

eacuteopeacute

reacute

(HE

TE

L)

Tact

ical

rot

or-w

ing

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V

for

the

Fre

nch

Nav

y

EL

INT

2 ra

dar

mon

itor

ing

mic

ro-

sate

llit

es

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

40

satellites to be launched in 2008 and a ground segment This project will be the fi rst space early warning system in Europe and may pave the way for a future European early warning space program

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom also has an extensive investment in C4ISR systems and the creation of sensor networks The UK has developed a program to integrate the British C2 and communications infrastructures into a single Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) DII will incorporate the Joint Operational Command System (JOCS) C2 system the Bowman communications system and other individual information systems into a single infrastructure Following a prequalifi cation stage during which four industry teams were invited by the Ministry of Defense to submit outline proposals in March 2005 a team led by EDS and including Fujitsu EADS General Dynamics and LogicaCMG was chosen The contract will be worth some pound3 billion over 10 years Initially DII will provide a fully networked and managed service to around 70000 desktops in Whitehall and in forward deployed headquarters around the world Delivery of the DII system is expected to begin around 2007

As part of the effort to implement the NEC doctrine the British Ministry of Defense is also making considerable investment in new sensors systems The largest and most recent ISR RampD and acquisition programs include the Watchkeeper UAV the Airborne Stand Off Radar (ASTOR) airborne battlefi eld surveillance system and the Soothsayer electronic warfare system In addition several sensor platforms already operational such as the Phoenix UAVs and the Jaguar and Tornado reconnaissance aircraft are being upgraded to include more advanced and integrated ISR suites

In addition the Ministry of Defense created the Network Integration Test and Experimentation organization (NITEworks) in partnership with industry in 2003 to provide an environment to assess and demonstrate the potential applications of the NEC concepts In industry the NITEworks partnership includes BAE Systems QinetiQ Alenia Marconi Systems (AMS) EDS UK Thales UK General Dynamics UK and Raytheon UK Key system integration and interoperability issues will be resolved through testing experimentation and evaluation of various NEC options Eventually NITEworks will identify opportunities for changes in defense RampD and procurement programs

In general the British have paid close attention to interoperability and networking with the United States and somewhat less with its EU partners On the other hand the recent British decision to participate in the EU Battlegroups with one British and a second British-Dutch group opens new possibilities for exploring interoperability in the EU context

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

41

Command and Control

The Royal Navy Royal Air Force and Army deploy separate C2 systems that are not for the most part interoperable Since 1995 the Army has deployed the Joint Operations Command Systems (JOCS) designed to pass information between the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) the Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ) the Joint Rapid Reaction Force (JRRF) headquarters and other headquarters of joint and potentially joint operations It thereby allows the PJHQ to maintain a joint operations picture of deployed forces comprising maritime land and air activities within certain areas The system is deployable and can operate over wide area network connections provided by the Ministry of Defense as well as a range of civilian infrastructures employing the appropriate cryptography JOCS is also synchronized with the US Global Command and Control System

Today JOCS has become the basis for defi ning and developing a more capable system the Joint Command System (JCS) Under JCS plans are in place to integrate the Armyrsquos C2 system with those of the other services ndash most importantly the Royal Navyrsquos Command Support System (CSS) and the Royal Air Forcersquos Command Control and Information System (CCIS) (described below) ndash using state-of-the-art commercial technologies under the Defense Information Infrastructure project

The Royal Air Force deploys the CCIS for aerial C2 and the Air Defense Ground Environment (ADGE) system for tactical control of air defense operations A deployable system for the support of RAF missions both in the United Kingdom and overseas the Collaborative System for Air Battlespace Management (CSABM) is currently under development it is expected to be fi elded by the year 2008 In addition the Backbone Air Command and Control System (BACCS) is currently under development as the British air defense system of the future although the design concept requires it to be fully interoperable with NATO air defense capabilities (the NATO Air Command and Control System will provide the core BACCS software and infrastructure on which the system capability will be based) BACCS is due to enter operational service with the RAF from 2009

The Royal Navy possesses the CSS which replaced the more outdated Fleet Operational Command System (FOCSLE) and provides C2 information to the Command Teams of ships submarines and the Royal Marines 3rd Commando Brigade The system supports situation awareness data message handling and several decision and planning aids for amphibious operations In addition the navy is currently working to install CEC systems on Type 45 destroyers and the Type 23 frigates This system will allow units to exchange radar information delivering a single composite and coherent air picture and allowing units to engage targets on the basis of information from other units In the future CEC may be extended to other air and land platforms but this is not envisioned before 2010 The Royal Navy has also installed the American Collaboration at Sea (CS) tactical maritime C2 system on several vessels This system uses leased bandwidth on commercial satellites (mainly INMARSAT) to transmit a common battlespace picture to all vessels and the naval headquarters to which it is linked

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

42

On the international level the United Kingdom is working with the United States Canada Australia and New Zealand to link their respective C2 systems via a coalition WAN and web server This collaborative program is being carried out in the Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) framework and will most likely be broadened to include France and Germany (discussed in the NATO chapter)

Communications and computers

The British Army currently fi elds Ptarmigan a tactical trunk network linking all headquarters in the fi eld The system was upgraded in early 2003 with the introduction of 30 vehicle-mounted units providing improved data access to mobile subscribers and enabling deployment independent of main Ptarmigan trunk networks Ptarmigan is interoperable with US and NATO forces through interfaces with specifi c systems Beginning in 2008 it will be replaced by Falcon a fully digital air-portable Falcon battlefi eld communications infrastructure Falcon will permit the transmission of data between army headquarters including real-time video and is planned to be interoperable with various NATO communications systems

The British began to deploy Bowman the next-generation tactical combat HFVHFUHF radio network for all British services in July 2003 This capability is being delivered incrementally and the initial capability (secure HFVHF voice and data) was accepted into service by the Ministry of Defense in March 2004 This new infrastructure replaces the 20-year-old Clansman system and the Headquarters infrastructure element of the Ptarmigan trunk communications system It provides Britain with an integrated network supporting digital voice and data for radio telephone intercom and tactical Internet information in a single system As part of the Command and Battlespace Management (Land) (CBM(L)) program ndash battlefi eld information systems being developed for armored fi ghting vehicles artillery fi re control air and nuclear biological and chemical defense ndash Bowman will be used as a communications and C2 infrastructure from fi ghting platform up to divisional level Full deployment is expected by 2006ndash7 when some 20000 military vehicles 156 ships and 276 aircraft will be outfi tted with more than 47000 radios and 26000 computer terminals In December 2004 some 300 Bowman radios were deployed with British forces in Iraq However Bowman will face bandwidth limitations as well as the problem of being digital but lacking a software communications architecture (SCA) Since this would make it hard to interoperate with the US Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) the US program is being adapted to enable it to handle the Bowman waveform

A fully transportable United Kingdom operational-level communications network ndash Cormorant ndash exists for expeditionary forces linking them back to head-quarters in Britain The Cormorant system is provided by EADS and is intended to meet the communications requirements of the United Kingdomrsquos JRRF headquarters in any theater of operations Cormorant can interface with Ptarmigan

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

43

and will be able to interface with its successor Falcon It will also be able to pass data to and from the Bowman network once Bowman is fully fi elded

Military satellite communications capabilities are currently based on the Skynet 4 constellation Two of the fi rst three satellites launched between 1988 and 1990 remain in service These support three newer spacecraft launched between 1998 and 2001 In October 2003 the British Ministry of Defense concluded arrangements to transfer operation of the Skynet 4 system to Paradigm Secure Communications a subsidiary of EADS Under this Private Finance Initiative (PFI) Paradigm was also to upgrade by 2005 the two main Skynet 4 ground stations and to supply new ground stations and a network control center in order to increase bandwidth and refresh technology Paradigm will also manage the leasing of commercial SATCOM bandwidth for the Ministry of Defense The arrangement which is to run until 2019 assures delivery for Ministry of Defense needs while permitting Paradigm to resell unused bandwidth to the governments and militaries of other nations under commercial terms To maintain services to the Ministry of Defense and to its other customers Paradigm will develop launch and operate two to three new satellites built by Astrium also an EADS subsidiary (De Selding 2003b 10) The fi rst of the new Skynet 5 satellites is expected to enter service in 2007 Both the existing and new Skynet satellites remain accessible via the Ministry of Defensersquos existing fl eet of terminals Higher bandwidths are possible with the new Talon (man-portable) and Dagger (vehicle-mounted) mobile terminals Some 50 new Reacher mobile land terminals will also be delivered under the Skynet 5 contract arrangements

The Royal Air Force and Navy have installed the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) Link-16 communications system on most aircraft and helicopters (including Tornado F3s Nimrods Sea Kings and E-3D AWACS) and on several vessels (including carriers frigates and destroyers) providing these and their US counterparts with a common air picture The Royal Navyrsquos Sea Harriers were outfi tted with Link-16 equipment in 2004 Many Royal Navy ships and RAF E-3D AWACS and Nimrods are also equipped with the Link-11 tactical data link system

Finally since interoperability with US forces is still a major concern for British warfi ghters the United Kingdom will most likely buy American JTRS radios and install them on various other aerial maritime and terrestrial platforms as an interim solution for current and upcoming coalition operations

Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance

Britain has initiated a program to fi ll capability gaps identifi ed in the Strategic Defense Reviewrsquos New Chapter in the area of persistent ISR collection and target acquisition deep within the battlespace The DABINETT program will provide information to be used to gather strategic operational and tactical intelligence answer commandersrsquo requests for information provide targeting information to systems in all environments support Special Forces and manage intelligence data The initial phase of the program will address current Management Tasking

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

44

Processing Exploitation and Dissemination (MTPED) shortfalls in the current UK system Once completed DABINETT will comprise a system of systems that provides access to archive data as well as the ability to collect persistently process and disseminate near real time intelligence This capability will offer rapid deployment long reach standoff deep penetration loiter and interoperability with coalition forces in network-based operations It will form an integral part of the British networked-enabled capability enabling precision geo-location for targeting including time sensitive targeting which will be delivered via a Network Centric Collaborative Targeting (NCCT) system Initial deployment is expected by the end of 2006

British UAV capabilities consist primarily of the Phoenix tactical short-range UAV in service since 1998 with the Royal Artillery for reconnaissance and target acquisition Though Phoenix cannot currently share the information it collects directly with other British systems improved data modems currently being developed could make it interoperable with Skynet 4 RAF Tornados and army Apaches However its performance recently tested in Kosovo and Iraq is somewhat limited even at the tactical level including an inability to operate in high-temperature environments a payload consisting solely of a thermal imaging sensor and a slow data link In both the Kosovo and Iraq campaigns these limitations led to the loss of a high number of Phoenix UAVs Twenty-three were lost in Iraq all due to technical failures ndash a ratio of one in six fl ights undertaken ndash and the program was restricted to nighttime operations However the Phoenix was involved in what was probably the fi rst joint close air support operation coordinated by a UAV mission controller it was able to relay imagery and geographical details on Iraqi tank movements to US fi ghters via its ground station (Chuter 2003a 8)

Watchkeeper the British long-endurance operational-level UAV program was completed with two consortia one led by Thales UK and the other by Northrop Grumman ISS International Inc The initial program requirement called for an A and B vehicle the former for battlefi eld surveillance targeting and bomb damage assessment and the latter for close-in surveillance and target identifi cation Following the selection of the Thales-led consortium in July 2004 it was announced that the Hermes 450 and Hermes 180 ndash manufactured by Elbit Systems of Israel ndash would be the A and B vehicles respectively However during contract negotiations in 2005 the smaller Hermes 180 was removed from the requirement and broader roles were assigned to the larger Hermes 450 Its payloads will include electro-optical sensors infrared sensors laser target designators synthetic aperture radar and moving target indicators The Watchkeeper in-service date was also pushed back to 2010 The system will be operated and deployed by the Royal Artillery Corps

To complement the Watchkeeper program the United Kingdom is collaborating with the United States to develop the Advanced Joint Communications Node (AJCN) Once integrated into Watchkeeper it will provide a communications and electronic warfare system that can be reprogrammed in fl ight Based on software radio technology the AJCN will be linked to the UAV ground stations via a

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

45

Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL) This will create a network comprising the different types of Watchkeeper UAVs and tactical radios ndash such as the American JTRS ndash that are also reprogrammable

In early 2004 pending Watchkeeper development the British Ministry of Defense began discussing an Urgent Operation Requirement (UOR) for another UAV system to be fi elded within a shorter timeframe and to be usable by British troops in Iraq The Ministry of Defense reviewed purchasing or leasing the Thales-IAI Hermes systems as well as several micro-UAV systems To date several Desert Hawk and one Buster micro-UAV system (comprising two vehicles and one ground control station) have been acquired and are deployed with British forces in Iraq for very short-range reconnaissance missions In addition the success of the British cooperation with the Combined Joint Predator Task Force in Iraq has led the Ministry of Defense to examine the possibilities of purchasing Predator B UAVs for operations in Afghanistan (Chuter 2005b 4)

In addition to the Urgent Operation Requirement and Watchkeeper the United Kingdom is exploring other future UAV initiatives The Joint Service UAV Experimentation Program (JUEP) was the fi rst step of this process In 2003ndash5 JUEP assessed the wider operational use of UAVs in the tri-service battle environment mainly for maritime and urban operations JUEP involved developing viable concepts of operations for UAVs and assessing the possibilities for exploiting new types of UAV payloads including those giving the vehicle offensive capabilities (Fiorenza 2003b 37ndash9) The program included a demonstration of the Eagle MALE UAV carrying a high defi nition synthetic aperture radar electro-optic and infrared sensors and laser target marking and designation systems It also demonstrated the capability to control a ScanEagle maritime surveillance UAV from a British warship to integrate a British RAPTOR ISR pod (see below) on an American Predator UAV and the utility of several mini-UAV systems Demonstrations of the Global Hawk HALE UAV system and of the use of UCAVs were also planned under JUEP but were not undertaken

The United Kingdom initially envisioned an unmanned combat aerial vehicle program as part of the Future Offensive Air System (FOAS) program However the FOAS was terminated in 2005 and UCAV research was made part of an international collaborative program the Strategic Unmanned Air Vehicle (Experiment) or SUAV(E) An agreement was signed in December 2004 with the United States to participate in the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) program focusing on Boeingrsquos X-45 UCAV However uncertainties about technology transfer and the location of production in the UK led the Ministry of Defense to look to Europe to fulfi ll some of its needs in this area The French-led Neuron program was considered but no decisions have been made on Britainrsquos participation in it (Chuter 2005a 1 8)

The United Kingdom also possesses unmanned underwater ISR capabilities with the deployment in 2002 of the Marlin Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) an electrically powered vehicle intended to be launched from a submarine torpedo tube It is fi tted with seabed imaging sensors but the design is modular and allowing for alternative future payloads

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

46

Britain also currently deploys several manned aerial ISR platforms including four Canberra PR-9 aircraft for photoreconnaissance missions and eighteen Nimrod MR2 maritime patrol aircraft Most Nimrods are equipped with magnetic and acoustic detection equipment (three are outfi tted for SIGINT collection missions) and are interoperable with US Rivet Joint aircraft An upgrade (Nimrod MRA4) will mean some are capable of both maritime and land surveillance missions The upgraded Nimrod aircraft are due to enter into service around 2006 at which point those that were not upgraded will be taken out of service

The Royal Air Forcersquos Jaguar and Tornado GR4 fi ghters provide additional ISR capabilities Since 2000 the Jaguars have been outfi tted with the Jaguar Replacement Reconnaissance Pod (JRRP) containing both electro-optic and infrared sensors that can record digital images onto videotape Several of the latter have been fi tted with the Reconnaissance Airborne Pod for Tornado (RAPTOR) operational since the fall of 2002 This new technology provides an electro-optical and infrared camera system that can capture high-resolution digital imagery day or night and transmit the data to ground stations in near real time It features on-board recording and near real time data link transmission to ground stations The system consists of eight pods and two cabin-based ground stations and has been in use since fall 2002 It made its operational debut during Operation Iraqi Freedom in early 2003 and performed extremely well

The United Kingdom is developing the Airborne Stand Off Radar (ASTOR) system for air-ground surveillance ASTOR will provide strategic long-range all-weather theater surveillance and target acquisition capabilities Raytheon the prime contractor for ASTOR is producing fi ve systems to be deployed on modifi ed Bombardier Global Express business jets as well as two portable ground sites and six tactical ground stations mounted on trucks The radar is a dual-mode system capable of operating in both synthetic aperture radar and moving target indicator mode The aircraft known as the Sentinel R Mk 1 are also outfi tted with operator workstations where the mission management and imagery can be processed and transmitted to the various brigade divisional or joint level ASTOR ground stations Initial deployment is expected to begin in 2006 with the delivery of the fi rst two fl ight-tested aircraft and their ground stations and full operational capability is expected in 2008 Data will be disseminated to allied forces via United Kingdom headquarters only and few direct links to allied systems are anticipated (though an interim solution for interoperability with the US JSTARS system may be through deploying JTRS on the ASTOR platform) ASTOR was the basis for one of the two proposed NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) solutions presented by British Aerospace and Raytheon an option rejected by NATO

In addition the United Kingdom deploys seven E-3D Sentry AEW-1 AWACS aircraft for air-picture management The Sentry aircraft are all equipped with the US JTIDS and are interoperable with US and NATO AWACS systems with Rivet Joint and E-P3 aircraft and with the British Nimrod aircraft Project Eagle currently in the assessment phase is intended to provide an air battle management and combat ID-enabling capability for the E-3D to coordinate air operations and

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

47

to direct forces during operations The in-service date defi ned as the fi rst platform fi tted with the Eagle capability is scheduled for June 2012

As of 2006 when the Canberra planes leave service the United Kingdom will have no assets that can loiter over the battlefi eld and deliver a constant stream of data for extended timeframes nor does the United Kingdom have a program to obtain such persistent surveillance capabilities The Ministry of Defense is considering various options including high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) UAVs satellites and manned platforms In 2004 the Tactical Optical Satellite (TOPSAT) earth observation micro-satellite led by Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd was initiated as part of a pilot program to demonstrate space-based ISR capabilities and their link to commanders on the ground via stationary as well as mobile ground stations The one-year program involved the launching of one 120 kg satellite capable of producing 25 meter resolution optical imagery The success of TOPSAT may lead to the launching of a constellation of satellites in the future

For future maritime surveillance the Maritime Airborne Surveillance and Control (MASC) program will provide an assured airborne surveillance and control capability The options being considered under MASC include the continuation of the capability currently provided by the Sea King Mk 7 Airborne Surveillance and Control (ASaC) system other ship-optimized rotary wing platforms and possible contributions from UAVs although the latter currently form only a peripheral component of the MASC activities The MASC program has recently moved into the assessment phase

The British intelligence analysis and dissemination systems in place include the RAFrsquos Lychgate system ndash which connects intelligence staffs at HQ RAF Strike Command the Ministry of Defense other services and front-line squadrons ndash and the intelligence communityrsquos web-based UKINTELWEB Neither is interoperable with allied systems However the United Kingdom is part of the Integrated Broadcast Service (IBS) network which uses commercial off the shelf (COTS) hardware to exchange information with the intelligence dissemination systems of the United States Canada and Australia In addition the Griffi n TCPIP-based WAN provides a classifi ed electronic information-sharing environment for collaborative planning activities between the strategic and operational level headquarters of Britain Canada Australia New Zealand and the United States In the future Germany and France may also be linked to Griffi n

Germany

The German military is beginning to move toward an advanced networked architecture and deploys a variety of C4ISR systems The German Ministry of Defense completed the formulation of its network-centric doctrine in 2005 and has begun the implementation of some of that doctrine in its acquisition and RampT programs However over the next decade previously planned hardware programs such as the Eurofi ghter Typhoon A400M transport Tiger and NH-90 helicopters will consume the lionrsquos share of German defense acquisition resources In

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llan

ce p

rogr

am

Tabl

e 3

3 co

ntin

ued

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

53

addition Germanyrsquos defense RampD spending has been declining a trend expected to continue through 2010 (Aguumlera 2003 32) Both of these budgetary realities will affect the pace at which Germany develops networked C4ISR capabilities Nevertheless several large-scale C4ISR expenditures are expected the most signifi cant being new C2 and computer networking programs a HALE UAV and advanced communications systems (CPM Forum 2005 33)

German forces do not have a cross-service C2 architecture nor have broadband communications systems been widely deployed Germany has begun embracing the use of UAVs especially since the Balkan and Afghanistan campaigns The German military is currently equipped with several UAVs for tactical and operational missions and funding for a major UAV program the HALE EuroHawk has been approved Once the fi rst UAV comes into service in 2009 outdated manned platforms for ISR will gradually be scrapped and Germany will become increasingly reliant on unmanned ISR capabilities

Germany has been a member of the bi-national German-Netherlands Corps since 1995 Between 2000 and 2002 the Corps became a NATO High Response Force under operational command of SACEUR This Corps has more advanced C4ISR capabilities including the German HEROS C2 system the Dutch TITAAN communications infrastructure (VoIP WAN with SATCOM and HF radio) and French-made tactical Sperwer UAVs Germany is also a member of the Multinational Interoperability Council and will contribute to four of the European Unionrsquos Battlegroups one with France Belgium and Luxembourg one with the Netherlands and Finland one with Austria and the Czech Republic and one with Poland Slovakia Latvia and Lithuania

Command and control

The Bundeswehr C2 systems serve the individual services but lack a common infrastructure The German army is beginning to deploy the HEROS (Heeres-Fuumlhrungsinformationssystem fuumlr die rechnerunterstuumltzte Operationsfuumlhrung in Staumlben or Army Command and Control System for Digitally-supported Command of Operations in Staffs) system that provides C2 for corps division and brigade levels HEROS is an IP-network-based infrastructure for data transmission and can be fi xed or mobile It has been fi elded in one army division with a second still to be fi elded HEROS is also deployed with EUROKORPS and with the German-Netherlands Corps

For battalion-level C2 and below the German army operates the FAUST (Fuumlhrungsausstattung taktisch or Tactical Command Provision) system which includes mobile modules mounted on armored personnel carriers Initially fi elded only in small numbers with German forces in Bosnia Kosovo and Afghanistan FAUST is now being deployed across the German army (Quast 2003 66ndash7) The system is mounted on various command reconnaissance and support vehicles at the platoon squad and section level In addition the armyrsquos tanks and armored vehicles designated for overseas deployment are outfi tted with the Mobile Command and Control System (MCCS) MCCS hardware is based on a

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

54

COTS notebook with integrated communication interfaces GPS and compass unit as well as C2 software developed by STN Atlas (now Rheinmetall Defence Electronics) Several such systems are operational with the German forces in Kosovo and Afghanistan

The German navy uses a C2 system called MHQ (marine headquarters) This IBM mainframe-based infrastructure links all headquarters into a single network In addition all ships in the German navy use the Maritime Command and Control Information System (MCCIS) and the CS tactical C2 system purchased from the United States This enables all German navy vessels to be fully linked between each other and with their various headquarters as well as interoperable with many ships in the US navy

The German air force uses the Eifel C2 system an IP-based infrastructure that has been upgraded to incorporate the whole service (the system is also known as the GAFCCIS ndash German Air Force Command and Control Information System) Other C2 networks that are unique to specifi c units of the German armed forces include the artillery corpsrsquo ADLER (Artillerie- Daten- Lage- und Einsatz-Rechnungsverbund or Integrated Artillery Computer System) and the air defense systemsrsquo Hfl aAFuumlSys (Heeres-Flugabwehr- Aufklaumlrungs- und Fuumlhrungssystemor Army Air Defense Surveillance andd Command System) Finally the armed forces command is linked to the German Ministry of Defense via Rubin an IP-based stationary system for high-level C2

The German army is planning to deploy a more network-oriented C2 infrastructure Known as FuumlInfoSys H (Fuumlhrungsinformationssystem des Heeresor Army Command System or Army Command System) this system will integrate the FAUST and HEROS systems which are not interoperable today Initial testing is scheduled for 2008 Other efforts to upgrade German C2 capabilities include development of the next generation of air defense system through the Surface-Air-Missile Operations Center (SAMOC) project expected to be operational by the end of 2004 A C2 system integrating all services is planned through the project known as FuumlInfoSys der Streitkraumlfte or C2 System of the Armed Forces This project still in its initial stages will eventually integrate the Rubin HEROS FuumlInfoSys H GAFCCIS MHQ and MCCIS systems and connect all military staffs

In 2001 the German Ministry of Defense began to create a common C2 system for the armed forces of the Baltic States (Latvia Lithuania and Estonia) that would be interoperable with Germanyrsquos C2 systems and comply with NATO STANAGs Known as BALTCCIS the project is managed by the German air force in collaboration with BAE Systems and is still in the development stage

Communications and computers

The main tactical communications infrastructure of the German army is the digital Automated Corps Network (Automatisiertes Korpsstammnetz 90 or AUTOKO-90) built by Siemens and deployed since 2000 This network can deliver only limited bandwidth cannot handle IP traffi c and uses EUROCOM a

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

55

communications standard developed in Western Europe in the 1970s as an effort to make all tactical military communications systems interoperable but not widely deployed outside Germany As a complement to AUTOKO-90 the army has added the BIGSTAF (Breitbandiges integriertes Gefechtsstand-Fernmeldesystem or Integrated Broadband System for Command Posts Communications) system to its communications infrastructure Built using Thales and EADS IP and ATM technologies BIGSTAF provides broadband communications (voice and data) for command posts at brigade division and corps levels However BIGSTAF also uses EUROCOM and is therefore not interoperable with most other systems In an effort to move away from EUROCOM Germany has initiated the 420 million euro MobKommSysBw (Mobiles Kommunikationssystem der Bundeswehr or Armed Forces Mobile Communications System) project to develop the Bundeswehrrsquos future mobile communications network Together with the SATCOM-BW network (see below) it will link all fi eld radio communications systems in theaters of operations with communications bases in Germany Service introduction will start in 2007

The German navy has deployed its own communications network the IP-based Tactical Mobile Radio Network on all vessels In addition many navy ships are outfi tted with Link-11 ndash soon to be replaced by Link-22 systems ndash and other communications equipment that were a quick method to achieve interoperability with the US navy The German air force has deployed AutoFuuml (Automatisches Fuumlhrungsfernmeldenetz der Luftwaffe or Air Force Automatic Command Communications Network) a communications infrastructure on all its bases This system is also IP-based with medium bandwidth capabilities For tactical communications some of the Luftwaffersquos Tornados and NH-90 helicopters carry or are being outfi tted with the Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) which will be carried on all 180 new Eurofi ghters The German navy has also equipped two Class 123 frigates with MIDS systems As a partner in the MIDS JTRS program Germany is helping migrate MIDS to a JTRS software communications compliant architecture In addition the German Ministry of Defense has awarded Rohde amp Schwarz a 170 million euro contract for a joint networked family of Software Defi ned Radio (SDR) systems These radios will be fully JTRS and SCA compliant and will be introduced into service in 2009

A cross-service digital communications network the ISDN-BW has been deployed since the mid-1990s carrying voice and data to all central commands The navy and air force have both successfully integrated their own communications infrastructures with ISDN-BW but the army integration is incomplete

To link expeditionary forces with allied forces the local telecommunications infra-structure and headquarters Germany initiated a program known as Interoperability for Crisis Reaction Forces (Krisenreaktionskraumlfte-Interoperabilitaumlt or KINTOP) It involved the development and acquisition of mobile communications gateways based on the TETRAPOL (TErrestrial Trunked RAdio POLice) standard The program was discontinued and the current communications solution for linking expeditionary forces with headquarters is the KommServer-BW a low-tech COTS

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

56

technology linking mobile communications systems such as tactical radios to fi xed communications networks

Germany is also undertaking a satellite communications program known as SATCOM-BW The fi rst phase of the project includes leasing C- and Ku-band capacity from commercial satellites and procuring 40 single- and multi-channel ground stations Expeditionary forces can deploy several relatively large mobile ground stations and communicate with one or both fi xed ground stations in Germany The second phase which is still in the planning stage will build and orbit one X-band and one UHF-band satellite both operated by the private sector Phase 2 is expected to begin in 2005 with at least one satellite in orbit by 2008 and progressive introduction continuing until 2013 Once completed Germanyrsquos expeditionary forces will be able to deploy a larger number of small mobile ground stations giving them more fl exibility and agility in the fi eld (Reder 2005 48ndash9)

Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance

Germany is reassessing its ISR capabilities and planning future research and procurement The major issues are the replacement of the Breguet Atlantic fl eet for maritime patrol the acquisition of land-based ISR assets and the development of an unmanned aerial battlefi eld surveillance capability

Germany is making signifi cant use of UAVs given the expertise in this technology to be found in German industry For tactical reconnaissance and target acquisition missions at the corps and division level the German army uses CL-289 UAVs a tri-national project between France Germany and Canada equipped with a camera and infrared sensor The system has been used successfully in the Balkans since 1993 and has been upgraded recently to improve the on-board navigation system and fl ight software and to enable the outfi tting of the UAV with a SAR payload The Germans use the KZO (Kleinfl uggeraumlt fuumlr Zielortungor Small Device for Target Acquisition) for shorter-range reconnaissance which carries infrared and SAR or laser range fi nder and target designator payloads Six such systems each consisting of ten aircraft are in service Rheinmetall DeTec the manufacturers of the KZO system are making it interoperable with the Safran Grouprsquos Crecerelle and Sperwer UAVs currently in use by France the Netherlands Denmark Sweden and Greece The armed forces of these six countries will in the future be able to exchange tactical and battlefi eld intelligence and target data collected by all of their systems and will have access to a common command and control infrastructure

The German armyrsquos LUNA (Luftgestuumltzte Nahaufklaumlrungsausstattung or Airborne Close-range Reconnaissance System) tactical UAV initially designed for the artillery corps has been fl own over Kosovo ndash carrying video cameras only ndash and in Afghanistan ndash carrying infrared and video cameras as well as SAR Eight systems have been procured It can also be outfi tted with a miniature SAR system and used for NBC detection and electronic warfare missions The hand-launched ALADIN (Abbildende Luftgestuumltzte Aufklaumlrungsdrohne im Naumlchstbereich or Imaging Airborne Close-Range Reconnaissance Drone) mini-UAV which carries

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

57

television and infrared was successfully deployed in Afghanistan and some 155 systems each consisting of two aircraft have been ordered

Germanyrsquos army and navy also deploy manned airborne ISR capabilities including reconnaissance pods fi tted onto Germanyrsquos Tornado aircraft outfi tted with a camera and infrared system The Breguet Atlantic 1150 fl eet performs maritime ISR missions using 11 aircraft carrying MTIs sonars and magnetic detectors and 4 aircraft carrying SIGINT and electronic warfare suites The fl eet has been operational since 1965 Although the aircraft have experienced several upgrades they are scheduled for replacement in 2010 A project to develop the next generation of maritime patrol aircraft initially to be conducted with the Italian armed forces was cancelled Instead Germany is moving toward long endurance unmanned platforms For maritime missions these may consist of UAVs deployed by the German navy on their new corvettes with Northrop Grummanrsquos Fire Scout and Bell Helicopter Textronrsquos Eagle Eye as possible alternatives In the interim Germany bought eight upgraded PC-3 aircraft from the Netherlands in late 2004

For ground-based ISR the German army began deploying the Fennek vehicle in 2004 produced by Krauss-Maffei Wegmann of Germany and SP Aerospace and Vehicle Systems BV of the Netherlands The Fennek is equipped with a sensor platform that includes a camera a thermal imager and a laser rangefi nder co-developed by EADS and Rheinmetall Defence Electronics and the HRM-7000 tactical radio produced by EADS Maritime ISR capabilities include three OsteClass 423 ships that have been deployed since the late 1980s for SIGINT and electronic warfare missions

Germany has several future ISR programs underway The lesson of the Kosovo air campaign was that Germany could not rely on timely sharing of imagery intelligence data from the United States and hence needed to acquire its own intelligence-gathering capability The most important result of this decision is the plan to buy fi ve Global Hawk HALE UAVs from Northrop Grumman and working with EADS install German synthetic aperture radar and signals intelligence collection and analysis suites This 600 million euro project was initiated in 2000 and received the approval of the US air force and the German Ministry of Defense in 2001 A number of successful trial fl ights were conducted in California and Germany during 2003ndash4 and the fi rst prototype delivery is scheduled for 2009 All fi ve systems are expected to be delivered and operational by 2013 The C2 and the crypto technologies will be the same as those mounted on the Global Hawk making the EuroHawk interoperable with its US counterpart EuroHawk is also planned to be interoperable with other ISR capabilities of the German armed forces as well as with NATO EuroHawk UAVs will be the German contribution to the NATO AGS program

Germany is also investing in UCAV technology though the program is still at an early phase Initially known as Taifun (Typhoon) and recently re-named the Tactical Advanced ReconnaissanceStrike System (TADRES) it is being designed to carry an electro-optic sensor for target identifi cation and a synthetic aperture radar for target acquisition Development will continue until 2009 when

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

58

a procurement decision will be made In addition the German army is formulating requirements for micro-UAVs

German security space observation capabilities are also an important development also infl uenced by the Kosovo data-sharing issue The leading program is SAR-Lupe a satellite-based synthetic aperture radar to be deployed by 2007 SAR-Lupe will consist of fi ve Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites the fi rst to be launched in 2006 and a ground segment Total cost of the project is approximately 300 million euros A European consortium led by OHB Systems of Germany is undertaking the project Once SAR-Lupe is operational Germany plans to exchange the data it provides with data collected from the French Helios 2 and Pleiades and the Italian COSMO-Skymed satellites The German Space Agency and EADS Astrium are also working on a commercial synthetic aperture radar satellite named TerraSAR-X which will begin providing image products with a resolution of up to one meter in mid-2006

Intelligence collected from Germanyrsquos surveillance and reconnaissance assets is disseminated to warfi ghters in several ways The German army uses is the LBAA-BW (Luftbild-Auswerteanlage der Bundeswehr or Aerial Picture Analysis Station for the Armed Forces) system designed for the exploitation of intelligence (still images and fi lm) collected by manned or unmanned aerial reconnaissance systems It can be deployed in both stationary and mobile (vehicle-mounted) stations Originally designed for the CL-289 tactical UAV it has been in operation since 1991 An extension program was launched in 1999 to upgrade the system to a common aerial image exploitation station The LBAA-BW can work with imagery collected by CL-289 UAVs as well as by Tornado and Breguet Atlantic aircraft More than 50 units have been deployed In 2007 the GAST (GemeinsamesAuswerte-System or Common Analysis System) project begun in 2003 will create a common system for the dissemination of all intelligence collected via technical means through a single database

Italy

Italy is moving at a slower pace toward a network-oriented defense strategy deployment of advanced C4ISR systems and inter-service interoperability Much of the countryrsquos defense budget over the next few years will be spent on weapons platforms most notably 121 Eurofi ghter aircraft Much-needed C4ISR assets such as early warning aircraft and MIDS data links for aircraft may not be purchased in the near term

ItalianndashUS industrial collaboration is seen as one way of advancing the deployment of network-based capabilities and achieving interoperability with the United States Italy is prepared to buy US technologies as interim solutions to operational problems as seen in the recent procurement of four Predator UAV systems and several Link-16 terminals and in the interest shown in the US Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) project Some Italian defense policymakers have argued that American C4ISR standards will lead the way and that Italy should work toward those standards For now Italy intends to ensure that all

Tabl

e 3

4 G

erm

an c

apab

ilit

ies

for

netw

ork-

base

d op

erat

ions

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

C2

Hee

res-

Fuumlh

rung

sinf

orm

atio

ns-

syst

em f

uumlr d

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rech

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nter

stuumlt

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ng in

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taumlbe

n (H

ER

OS

)

Cor

ps-

div

isio

n- a

nd

brig

ade-

leve

l C2

syst

em

incl

udes

mob

ile

elem

ents

Als

o de

ploy

ed w

ith

EU

RO

KO

RP

S a

nd th

e G

erm

an-D

utch

Cor

ps

Fuumlh

rung

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stat

tung

takt

isch

(FA

US

T)

Reg

imen

t-le

vel a

nd b

elow

C

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stem

inc

lude

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e A

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veh

icle

-ba

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elem

ents

Mob

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Com

man

d an

d C

ontr

ol S

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m (

MC

CS

)C

2 sy

stem

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yrsquos

tank

s an

d ar

mor

ed

vehi

cles

des

igna

ted

for

over

seas

dep

loym

ent

Mar

ine

Hea

dqua

rter

s (M

HQ

)M

arit

ime

Com

man

d an

d C

ontr

ol

Info

rmat

ion

Sys

tem

(M

CC

IS)

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labo

rati

on a

t S

ea (

C

S)

Tact

ical

nav

al C

2 sy

stem

s (i

ncl

link

s to

HQ

s)C

S

ena

bles

in

tero

pera

bili

ty w

ith

som

e U

S s

hips

Ger

man

Air

For

ce

Com

man

d an

d C

ontr

ol

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rmat

ion

Sys

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AF

CC

IS)

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ce C

2 sy

stem

AD

LE

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rtil

lery

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ps C

2 sy

stem

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Air

def

ense

C2

syst

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ntin

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Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

Rub

inH

igh-

leve

l C2

syst

em

link

ing

arm

ed f

orce

s co

mm

and

wit

h M

OD

Sur

face

-Air

-Mis

sile

O

pera

tion

s C

ente

r (S

AM

OC

)

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t gen

erat

ion

mob

ile

air

defe

nse

C2

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emIn

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pera

ble

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h N

AT

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nati

onsrsquo

air

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C

2 sy

stem

s f

or u

se in

m

ulti

nati

onal

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loym

ents

FuumlI

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ys H

Inte

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ER

OS

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US

T in

to s

ingl

e ar

my

C2

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ymen

t ex

pect

ed in

200

6

FuumlI

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ys S

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tegr

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n of

all

C2

(nav

y

air

forc

e a

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s

Com

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and

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mpu

ters

Aut

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netz

(A

UT

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0)

Arm

y ta

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mun

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ions

dig

ital

in

fras

truc

ture

in

plac

e si

nce

2000

its

lim

ited

ba

ndw

idth

wil

l req

uire

a

seri

es o

f up

grad

es in

the

near

fut

ure

Can

not h

andl

e IP

traf

fi c

li

mit

ed in

tero

pera

bili

ty

due

to u

se o

f E

UR

OC

OM

st

anda

rd

Bre

itba

ndig

es i

nteg

rier

tes

Gef

echt

ssta

nd-

Fer

nmel

desy

stem

(BIG

STA

F)

Bro

adba

nd c

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post

co

mm

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atio

ns n

etw

ork

for

brig

ade

div

isio

nal a

nd

corp

s co

mm

and

post

s

inte

grat

ed in

to A

UT

OK

O-

90

Lim

ited

inte

rope

rabi

lity

du

e to

use

of

EU

RO

CO

M

stan

dard

Tabl

e 3

4 co

ntin

ued

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

Tact

ical

Mob

ile

Rad

io

Net

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kN

avy

com

mun

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sy

stem

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ing

all v

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Aut

oFuuml

Com

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sys

tem

li

nkin

g al

l air

for

ce b

ases

Lin

k-11

MID

SE

quip

ped

on s

ome

navy

ve

ssel

s an

d L

uftw

affe

To

rnad

os a

nd N

H-9

0 he

lico

pter

s

Ena

bles

inte

rope

rabi

lity

w

ith

othe

r ve

ssel

s an

d ai

rcra

ft e

quip

ped

wit

h L

ink-

11

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S

ISD

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WC

ross

-ser

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dig

ital

co

mm

unic

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ns n

etw

ork

link

ing

all c

entr

al

com

man

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mS

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r-B

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ased

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ns li

nk f

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expe

diti

onar

y fo

rces

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TC

OM

-BW

Pha

se 1

Lea

sing

of

com

mer

cial

sa

tell

ite

capa

city

for

li

nkin

g ex

pedi

tion

ary

forc

es b

ack

to H

Qs

SA

TC

OM

-BW

Pha

se 2

2 ne

w s

atel

lite

s fi

rst o

ne

in o

rbit

by

2008

Mob

Kom

mS

ysB

wB

unde

sweh

rrsquos

futu

re

mob

ile

com

mun

icat

ions

ne

twor

k li

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g al

l fi e

ld

radi

o co

mm

unic

atio

ns

syst

ems

in th

e va

riou

s th

eate

rs o

f op

erat

ions

wit

h co

mm

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ns b

ases

in

Ger

man

yco

ntin

uedhellip

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

ISR

CL

-289

Ta

ctic

al c

orps

- an

d di

visi

on-l

evel

rec

on a

nd

targ

et a

cqui

siti

on U

AV

pa

yloa

ds in

clud

e co

lor

and

IR c

amer

as a

nd S

AR

KZ

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hort

-ran

ge U

AV

wit

h IR

and

SA

R o

r la

ser

rang

e fi

nder

and

targ

et

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gnat

or p

aylo

ads

Pro

gram

is u

nder

way

to

mak

e K

ZO

TA

DR

ES

and

F

renc

h C

rece

rell

e (a

lso

used

by

Net

herl

ands

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ark

Sw

eden

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reec

e) in

tero

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ble

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ery

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e co

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NB

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tors

and

EW

su

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Dep

loye

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kans

and

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fgha

nist

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guet

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anti

c 11

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anne

d ai

rcra

ft f

or

mar

itim

e S

ampR

and

S

IGIN

TE

W m

issi

ons

Fen

nek

ISR

veh

icle

Sim

ilar

veh

icle

s de

ploy

ed

by R

oyal

Net

herl

ands

A

rmy

Tabl

e 3

4 co

ntin

ued

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

Ost

e S

IGIN

T a

nd E

W s

hips

Luf

tbil

d-A

usw

erte

anla

gede

r B

unde

sweh

r (L

BA

A-

BW

)

Com

mon

aer

ial i

mag

e ex

ploi

tati

on s

tati

on f

or a

ll

Ger

man

def

ense

for

ces

Exp

loit

s im

ages

fro

m C

L-

289

nav

y To

rnad

os a

nd

Bre

guet

Atl

anti

c ai

rcra

ft

Tact

ical

Adv

ance

d R

econ

nais

sanc

eS

trik

e S

yste

m (

TAD

RE

S)

UC

AV

pro

gram

(fo

rmer

ly

know

n as

Tai

fun)

wit

h ta

rget

iden

tifi

cati

on a

nd

enga

gem

ent c

apab

ilit

ies

in

itia

l dep

loym

ent

expe

cted

in 2

009

Pro

gram

is u

nder

way

to

mak

e K

ZO

TA

DR

ES

and

F

renc

h C

rece

rell

e (a

lso

used

by

Net

herl

ands

D

enm

ark

Sw

eden

G

reec

e) in

tero

pera

ble

Eur

oHaw

kH

AL

E U

AV

sys

tem

w

ill i

nclu

de in

tell

igen

ce

coll

ecti

ng a

nd p

roce

ssin

g ca

pabi

liti

es i

niti

al

depl

oym

ent i

n 20

09

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

wit

h di

ffer

ent I

SR

sys

tem

s of

th

e G

erm

an a

rmed

for

ces

N

AT

O a

nd E

U is

pla

nned

as

wel

l as

wit

h U

S G

loba

l H

awk

SA

R-L

upe

5 L

EO

sat

elli

tes

and

a gr

ound

seg

men

t in

itia

l op

erat

iona

l cap

abil

ity

in

2007

Ger

man

y w

ill h

ave

acce

ss

to I

taly

rsquos C

OS

MO

and

F

ranc

ersquos

Hel

ios

2 im

ager

y in

exc

hang

e fo

r S

AR

-Lup

e im

ager

y

Gem

eins

ames

Aus

wer

te-

Sys

tem

(G

AS

T)

Com

mon

sys

tem

for

di

ssem

inat

ion

of a

ll

inte

llig

ence

col

lect

ed v

ia

tech

nica

l mea

ns

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

64

communications systems and information databases are compliant with NATO STANAGs while purchasing additional modules from the United States when these can solve specifi c interoperability needs especially for the navy and air force

Italy also seeks active participation in European RampD programs as a way to defi ne common European requirements and standards at an early stage as well as participation in such NATO programs as AGS and ACCS Italy has also begun deployment of UAV-based ISR capabilities Having developed independent capabilities in satellite communications Italy is also committed to greater intra-European cooperation in the development of future space assets

Italian troops participate in the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force (SIAF) and have good interoperability with their Spanish counterparts In addition Italy will create one of the European Unionrsquos Battlegroups and participate in two others one with Hungary and Slovenia the other with Spain Greece and Portugal It remains to be seen how interoperability issues will be addressed in the latter two Battlegroups

Command and control

Each of Italyrsquos services has its own C2 The air force system is SICCAM (Sistema di Comando e Controllo dellrsquoAeronautica Militare or C2 System for Military Aviation) and the navyrsquos is Leonardo The army has the SIACCON (Systema Automatizzato di Commando e Controllo or Automated Command and Control System) which provides automated support for military units at corps division brigade and battalion level and is compliant with NATO STANAGs The SIACCON land system is fused with the air defense C2 system into a single network under the CATRIN (sistema CAmpale di TRasmissioni ed INformazionior Battlefi eld Information System) program as of July 2000 CATRIN is made up of three different functional subsystems The SORAO (sottosistema di SORveglianza e Acquisizione Obiettivi or Target Surveillance and Acquisition subsystem) subsystem controls ground surveillance and provides battlefi eld awareness target acquisition and information from meteorological and NBC sensors The SOATCC (SOttosistema di Trasmissione Integrate or Integrated Transmission Subsystem) subsystem is responsible for air surveillance and provides C2 over army air defense units and army aviation units The third subsystem SOTRIN (SOttosistema di Trasmissione Integrate or Integrated Transmission Subsystem) ensures the communication fl ow between the various command centers

The most important future C2 system will be the Command Control and Navigation System (Sistemi di Comando Controllo e Navigazione ndash SICCONA) a C2 system that will link all the armyrsquos armored vehicles and provide them with access to the existing SIACCON system Fifty units of the SICCONA system are expected to be deployed sometime in 2006ndash7

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

65

Communications and computers

Most of the communications systems deployed by the Italian armed forces were designed to meet NATO STANAGs Some Link-16 systems purchased from the United States have been installed on Tornado F3 aircraft and Italy is a partner in the MIDS consortium and the MIDS JTRS program In addition the Italian navy has installed Link-11 systems on several of its ships which will be replaced with Link-22 However the tactical digital communications infrastructure of the Italian armed forces is still in its early stages An intranet backbone for the Ministry of Defense called DIFENET based on fi ber optic links is currently under development A military digital information network (Rete Numerica Interforzendash RNI) is also under discussion

Italyrsquos terrestrial communications system is reinforced by the SICRAL (SistemaItaliano per Comunicazioni Riservate ed Allarmi or Italian System for Reserved Communications and Warning) military satellite communications system The fi rst satellite SICRAL 1A was launched in 2001 carrying the fi rst operational EHF communications capacity produced in Europe as well as SHF and UHF However SICRAL does not include onboard processing and therefore cannot be fully interoperable with US systems or compatible with recently approved NATO EHF STANAGs However SICRAL is interoperable with the British Skynet 4 and with most of the channels of the French Syracuse and the Spanish Hispasat systems The system includes over 100 fi xed and mobile terminals including several to be deployed on Italian fi ghter aircraft SICRAL 1B is scheduled to begin service in 2006 and once operational will contribute all of Italyrsquos NATO SATCOM commitments as well as serving as backup for SICRAL 1A It too has UHF SHF and EHF capability The constellation will have coverage from the United States to the Middle East for NATO use The next generation of satellites in this series SICRAL 2 is still being planned but is scheduled for launch around 2010 It will replace SICRAL 1A and is expected to include onboard SHF processing and frequency-hopping capabilities

Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance

Italyrsquos unmanned ISR capabilities are based largely on non-Italian technologies although eight domestically developed Mirach-26 and Mirach-150 tactical UAVs were introduced to the Italian army in 2002 Italy acquired four Predator MALE UAVs intended mainly for reconnaissance missions which became fully operational in 2005 In addition twenty CL-289 tactical UAVs were purchased from EADS in 2002 Italy also possesses manned ISR assets including eighteen Breguet Atlantic aircraft for maritime reconnaissance and one Alenia G-222VS aircraft for airborne SIGINT operations (the latter was used successfully in Kosovo but is scheduled to be replaced by two new C-130J aircraft in 2005 or 2006)

A battlefi eld surveillance system called CRESO (Complesso Radar Eliportato per la Sorveglianga or Combined Heliborne Surveillance Radar) is deployed

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

66

for operational and tactical missions The system carried onboard Agusta-Bell 412 helicopters includes a moving target indicator and forward-looking infrared sensor Four such systems are currently operational all designed to meet NATO STANAGs and to link with other systems via MIDS and the Italian SICRAL system In addition the Italian air force fl ies several Tornado fi ghter-bombers (ECR Electronic Combat Reconnaissance version) equipped with forward-looking infrared sensors and an infrared line scanner for reconnaissance missions

Italyrsquos space-based observation capabilities are in the advanced development stage Having participated in the French Helios 1 and Franco-German Horus satellite programs (the latter was discontinued in 1998) Italy is seeking independent earth observation capabilities Under the COSMO-Skymed project (COnstellation of Satellites for Mediterranean basin Observation) Italy will deploy a constellation of four radar-imaging satellites The X-band radar satellites would feature a SAR payload capable of less than one-meter resolution for the military and of approximately one-meter resolution for images sold commercially The COSMO-Skymed system is managed by the Italian Space Agency and Alenia Spazio is the prime contractor The Italian Ministry of Defense has committed funds to the project in exchange for 20 per cent of the satellitesrsquo viewing time COSMO-Skymed is expected to be fully deployed and operational by 2007 Once all satellites are in place the constellation will be able to take images of any location on the earthrsquos surface with a revisit time of 6ndash12 hours

As a result of an agreement signed between France and Italy in January 2001 COSMO-Skymed will be linked to the French Pleiades constellation via ORFEO a program designed to ensure interoperability and information sharing As part of this agreement Italy will receive access to SPOT 5 and to Helios 2 imagery from France Italy is also negotiating with Argentina regarding the possibility of integrating two Argentinian radar satellites into the COSMO-Skymed system

Future ISR capabilities were also expected through the Italo-German maritime patrol aircraft program This program now canceled would have provided Italy with 14 aircraft by the year 2010 It is currently unclear if Italy will continue with an independent program for the deployment of next-generation manned maritime ISR capabilities There has been talk of Italy joining the US MMA project or acquiring patrol aircraft made by ATR as well as leasing American P-3 Orion aircraft to replace the ageing fl eet of Atlantics jointly operated by the Italian navy and air force In addition Italy is a partner in the French-led Neuron UCAV program

The Netherlands

The Dutch armed forces place a high priority on C4ISR interoperability with NATO and all new Dutch equipment is required to be compatible with NATO STANAGs The armyrsquos C2 Support Center is also the core of a new NATO C2 Center of Excellence (see the NATO chapter) The Royal Netherlands Army Navy and Air Force are increasingly interoperable with each other and with other European services With recent upgrades to the ISIS and TITAAN projects the air

Tabl

e 3

5 It

alia

n ca

pabi

liti

es f

or n

etw

ork-

base

d op

erat

ions

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

C2

Sys

tem

a A

utom

atiz

zato

di

Com

man

do e

Con

trol

lo

(SIA

CC

ON

)

Arm

y C

2 sy

stem

Mee

ts N

AT

O S

TAN

AG

s

SIC

CA

MA

ir F

orce

C2

syst

em

LE

ON

AR

DO

Nav

y C

2 sy

stem

CA

TR

INA

rmy

and

air

defe

nse

C2

com

mun

icat

ion

and

inte

llig

ence

sys

tem

SIC

CO

NA

Inte

grat

ion

of a

ll C

2 sy

stem

s to

be

depl

oyed

by

2006

ndash7

Com

mun

icat

ions

and

co

mpu

ters

Lin

k-11

16

MID

SD

eplo

yed

on s

ever

al

airc

raft

and

shi

psL

inks

to a

llie

d L

ink-

111

6 sy

stem

s

DIF

EN

ET

MO

D in

tran

et b

ased

on

fi be

r op

tic

link

s

Sat

elli

te I

tali

ano

per

Com

unic

azio

ne R

iser

vate

(S

ICR

AL

1)

MIL

SA

TC

OM

sys

tem

Part

ly (

only

SH

F a

nd U

HF

ca

pabi

liti

es)

mee

ts N

AT

O

STA

NA

Gs

inte

rope

rabl

e w

ith

Sky

net 4

and

wit

h m

ost o

f th

e ch

anne

ls o

f th

e S

yrac

use

and

His

pasa

t sy

stem

s

cont

inue

dhellip

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

SIC

RA

L 2

Onb

oard

SH

F p

roce

ssin

g ca

pabi

lity

and

fre

quen

cy-

hopp

ing

prot

ocol

s

Com

pati

ble

wit

h N

AT

O

and

Sky

net 4

but

not

wit

h U

S

Ret

e N

umer

ica

Inte

rfor

ze

(RN

I)M

ilit

ary

digi

tal

info

rmat

ion

netw

ork

ISR

Mir

ach-

261

50Ta

ctic

al U

AV

s us

ed b

y ar

my

Pre

dato

rM

AL

E U

AV

s P

urch

ased

fro

m U

S

CL

-289

Tact

ical

UA

Vs

CR

ES

OH

elib

orne

SA

R s

yste

m f

or

oper

atio

nal a

nd ta

ctic

al

ISR

Mee

ts N

AT

O S

TAN

AG

s

link

s to

all

ied

syst

ems

via

MID

S a

nd S

ICR

AL

Torn

ado

EC

RF

LIR

sen

sor

and

IR

scan

ner

for

reco

n m

issi

ons

Hel

ios

1Ju

nior

par

tner

in F

renc

h op

tica

l sat

elli

te p

rogr

am

Bre

guet

Atl

anti

cM

arit

ime

ISR

Ale

nia

G-2

221

SIG

INT

air

craf

tU

sed

duri

ng th

e K

osov

o cr

isis

C-1

30J

SIG

INT

air

craf

t

CO

SM

O-S

kym

edC

onst

ella

tion

of

four

SA

R

sate

llit

esA

cces

s to

Fre

nch

Hel

ios

2 an

d G

erm

an S

AR

-Lup

e im

ager

y in

exc

hang

e fo

r C

OS

MO

imag

ery

Neu

ron

Part

ner

in F

renc

h-le

d U

CA

V p

rogr

am

Tabl

e 3

5 co

ntin

ued

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

69

force and army will share the same C2 system and communications infrastructure and the navy will link into it in the future

The Netherlands military cannot afford to acquire C4ISR across the full spec-trum of capabilities They have focused instead on several major high-technology programs such as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and Patriot anti-aircraft batteries and on ensuring that deployed C4ISR assets are built to NATO STANAGs Defense budget cuts for 2003 and 2004 put further in doubt the ability of the Netherlands military to carry out a full transformation of the armed forces In these two budget years the reduction in force element size targeted traditional platforms including the navyrsquos frigates which were reduced from 14 to 10 as well as in C4ISR assets such as maritime patrol aircraft all of which are being sold (De Wijk 2004 124ndash5)

The bi-national German-Netherlands Corps created in 1995 became a NATO High Readiness Force between 2000 and 2002 It is under operational command of SACEUR but can also carry out EU-led operations Its C4ISR assets include the German HEROS C2 system the Dutch ISIS battlefi eld awareness and TITAAN communications systems and French Sperwer tactical UAVs In addition the Netherlands will participate in two European Union Battlegroups one with Germany and the other with the United Kingdom

Following the NATO Prague summit the Netherlands army announced that it would build an Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) battalion that will be able to operate with other NATO allies In addition the TITAAN and ISIS systems were successfully deployed as part of the Dutch-led fourth NATO Response Force exercise (NRF-4) including battalion headquarters from Germany France Denmark and Norway

Command and control

The Netherlands has invested signifi cantly in state-of-the-art C2 systems For the Royal Netherlands Army and Air Force the most important of these is the ISIS (Integrated Staff Information System) for mobile headquarters from the brigade level up The program was initiated in 1996 and the latest version ISIS-3 became operational in early 2004 It provides commanders with an advanced PC-based situation awareness tool at the tactical level The Royal Netherlands Air Force the Belgian army and the GermanNetherlands High Readiness Forces Headquarters also have the ISIS system and it has been successfully deployed in Iraq Afghanistan and Liberia as well as with the Dutch contingent of the NRF

Other Dutch C2 programs include the armyrsquos OSIRIS Battlefi eld Management System (BMS) for lower command levels (battalion-level and below) the navy LCF frigates C2 systems the artillery corpsrsquo VUIST system the armyrsquos Advanced Fire Support Information System (AFSIS) for mortar teams at the battalion and brigade level and the armor corpsrsquo Target Information Command and Control System(TICCS) All are compliant with NATO STANAGs and in a short time all of the operational stand-alone C2 applications in use by the artillery will be brought under the AFSIS program However it is not yet clear that a full integration

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

70

of all C2 systems (navy air force and army) is planned Future programs currently being evaluated include C2 systems for logistics engineering and intelligence processes and for individual soldiers and vehicles as well as the interoperability of Dutch C2 systems with those of other nations

Communications and computers

The Dutch militaryrsquos digital communications infrastructure is the Netherlands Armed Forces Integrated Network (NAFIN) supplied by Nortel Networks Fully operational NAFIN supersedes the previous leased public line systems with a secure high-speed network linking more than 250 military installations in the land sea and air services

The Dutch army deploys a mobile tactical digital communications system Its backbone the ZODIAC (ZOne DIgital Automated and enCrypted Communication) system supplied by Thales Netherlands is based on the EUROCOM standard making it interoperable with a few NATO allies principally Germany The radios deployed are Single Channel Radio Access units by Thales Netherlands as well as HF EZB systems In addition the Royal Netherlands Air Force is currently in the process of procuring some 120 MIDS terminals for its F-16s and a few aircraft are already equipped with this technology

The new generation of military communications for the Royal Netherlands armed forces is the TITAAN (Theater Independent Tactical Army and Air Force Network) that brings together legacy and new systems into a converged network It provides the Netherlands army and air force with voice (via IP telephony) and video as well as network management and security In 2002 the army began replacing the ZODIAC system with the fi rst TITAAN modules In 2004 the air force began deploying the TITAAN system for mobile communications TITAAN will eventually also link to the navyrsquos communication network It has been used successfully in operations in Iraq Afghanistan and Liberia and deployed at the Land Component Command level and at the brigade and below levels as part of the Dutch-led fourth NATO Response Force exercise (NRF-4) There are plans to upgrade the TITAAN system to support tactical data links such as Link-11 and Link-16

In 2002 the Dutch Ministry of Defense launched the fi rst phase of its MILSATCOM program The German company ND Satcom was awarded a contract to deliver a turnkey SATCOM network to the Dutch armed forces consisting of one ground station with two C-band one Ku-band and one X-band terminal (plans for a second X-band terminal are being drafted) To date the project has allowed the Satellite Ground Segment at Lauwersmeer to interconnect with NAFIN the communications backbone of the Netherlands armed forces Two new Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) terminals should be operational by 2009 The Dutch have also offered to fi ll part of NATOrsquos future MILSATCOM needs through their system

Tabl

e 3

6 D

utch

cap

abil

itie

s fo

r ne

twor

k-ba

sed

oper

atio

ns

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

C2

Inte

grat

ed S

taff

In

form

atio

n S

yste

m (

ISIS

)A

rmy

and

air

forc

e m

obil

e he

adqu

arte

rs C

2 sy

stem

Mee

ts N

AT

O S

TAN

AG

s

OS

IRIS

Bat

tlefi

eld

M

anag

emen

t Sys

tem

(B

MS

)

Low

er a

rmy

com

man

d le

vels

(ba

ttal

ion

and

belo

w)

Mee

ts N

AT

O S

TAN

AG

s

LC

F f

riga

tes

C2

syst

ems

Nav

y C

2 sy

stem

Mee

ts N

AT

O S

TAN

AG

s

VU

IST

Art

ille

ry C

2 sy

stem

Mee

ts N

AT

O S

TAN

AG

s

Targ

et I

nfor

mat

ion

Com

man

d an

d C

ontr

ol

Sys

tem

(TIC

CS

)

Arm

or C

2 sy

stem

Mee

ts N

AT

O S

TAN

AG

s

Com

mun

icat

ions

and

C

ompu

ters

Net

herl

ands

Arm

ed

Forc

es I

nteg

rate

d N

etw

ork

(NA

FIN

)

Dig

ital

com

mun

icat

ions

in

fras

truc

ture

link

ing

all

thre

e se

rvic

es

ZO

DIA

CA

rmy

mob

ile

tact

ical

di

gita

l com

mun

icat

ions

in

fras

truc

ture

Inte

rope

rabl

e w

ith

thos

e N

AT

O f

orce

s us

ing

the

EU

RO

CO

M s

tand

ard

TIT

AA

N (

The

ater

In

depe

nden

t Tac

tica

l A

rmy

and

Air

For

ce

Net

wor

k)

Nex

t gen

erat

ion

VoI

P-

base

d ar

my

and

air

forc

e m

obil

e di

gita

l net

wor

k

wil

l eve

ntua

lly

repl

ace

ZO

DIA

C a

nd a

lso

be

depl

oyed

by

navy

CO

TS

-bas

ed

cont

inue

dhellip

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

MIL

SA

TC

OM

pro

gram

1 gr

ound

sta

tion

and

4

term

inal

s 2

AE

HF

te

rmin

als

to b

e ad

ded

by

2009

Con

nect

ed to

NA

FIN

ne

twor

k

ISR

Spe

rwer

Tact

ical

UA

Vs

used

fo

r S

ampR

and

targ

et

acqu

isit

ion

mis

sion

s

Sim

ilar

sys

tem

s ar

e de

ploy

ed b

y F

ranc

e

Den

mar

k S

wed

en G

reec

e

Fen

nek

Rec

onna

issa

nce

vehi

cle

wit

h ca

mer

a a

ther

mal

im

ager

and

a la

ser

rang

efi n

der

Co-

deve

lope

d w

ith

Ger

man

y

Squ

ire

Man

-por

tabl

e su

rvei

llan

ce

rada

rs fi

elde

d by

Roy

al

Net

herl

ands

Arm

y an

d M

arin

e C

orps

Eur

oMA

LE

Co-

deve

lope

d w

ith

Fra

nce

Tabl

e 3

6 co

ntin

ued

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

73

Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance

Dutch unmanned ISR capabilities expanded considerably with the procurement of 38 Sperwer UAVs from France Deployed since mid-2000 they are chiefl y used for tactical ISR and target acquisition missions The Dutch are also interested in UAV systems that can perform more elaborate missions and are collaborating with France in the development of EuroMALE (Chuter 2003b 4)

For ground-based ISR the Royal Netherlands Army began deploying the Fennek vehicle in 2004 Produced by Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW) of Germany and Dutch Defense Vehicle Systems of the Netherlands the Fennek is equipped with a sensor platform that includes a camera a thermal imager a laser rangefi nder and HRM-7000 tactical radios

For maritime reconnaissance the Netherlands navy has relied on its fl eet of thirteen Orion P-3C aircraft ten of whose ground surveillance capabilities have recently been upgraded The upgraded planes delivered in November 2003 possess new electronic support measures more advanced radar and acoustic sensors and improved mission systems The upgrades also make the P-3C aircraft more interoperable with those of the US navy However eight of these aircraft will be sold to Germany and the remainder to Portugal thereby eliminating a critical C4ISR element of the Dutch navy

Ground ISR capabilities include 62 recently acquired and deployed Squire man-portable surveillance radars for the Royal Netherlands Army and Marine Corps The radars provide MTI as well as bomb damage assessment capabilities

Spain

Spain has been slower to integrate cross-service C2 and communications infra-structures in its armed forces Army and air force C2 systems were fully deployed only recently SATCOM fi lls much of the militaryrsquos communications needs There is a limited budget for ISR systems for which Spain relies heavily on locally developed products (principally UAVs and SIGINT systems) Few of the Spanish systems are interoperable across services or internationally

Spain is however one of the few Western European countries to have signifi cantly increased its defense budget in recent years The 2004 increase of 45 per cent was focused on a 15-year modernization program which principally involves acquisition of major platforms such as the Eurofi ghter Typhoon A400M airlifter Leopard tank and Pizzaro infantry fi ghting vehicle Few large C4ISR procurement or RampD programs are expected in the near future

Spain has participated in coalition expeditionary operations through its membership in the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force (SIAF) created in 1997 SIAF is a bi-national amphibious force with Italy its fi rst exercise was in 1998 It is activated on call by common agreement and can be called on for Multinational Amphibious Task Force operations under NATO the EUrsquos European Marine Force (EUROMARFOR) or for national missions SIAF command rotates every 12 or 24 months between the two member nations Spain is also creating one

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

74

of the European Unionrsquos Battlegroups and will participate in another with Italy Greece and Portugal

Command and control

The main C2 system for the Spanish army is the Army Command and Control Information System (Sistema de Informacioacuten para Mando y Control del Ejeacutercito de Tierra ndash SIMACET) which provides a common battlefi eld picture for all command centers It covers all operational echelons from army corps division brigade and battalion and independent units (eg expeditionary forces groups of armored vehicles) The Aerial Command and Control System (Sistema de Mando y Control Aeacutereo ndash SIMCA) has been deployed by the Spanish air force since 2001 and is compliant with NATO standards There is no plan for the integration of the Spanish C2 system across services

Communications and computers

The Spanish tactical communications infrastructure consists of PR4G digital radios deployed through the ARGOS project There is little funding for further network integration of communications systems except for the procurement of several MIDS systems for aircraft and the upgrading of Link-11 systems to Link-22 on some ships Spain is also a partner in the MIDS JTRS program that will make its MIDS systems compliant with the JTRS waveforms

Military communications are carried through Hispasat civilian telecom-munications satellites and the XTAR-EUR X-band satellite Four Hispasat satellites are currently in orbit the most recent launched in 2002 However only the two oldest satellites launched in 1992 and 1993 carry military communications payloads The Hispasat system is compatible with Francersquos Syracuse 2 Britainrsquos Skynet 4 and the NATO 4 system The XTAR-EUR satellite operated since April 2005 by Space Systems Loral and Hisdesat is the worldrsquos fi rst satellite developed for commercial X-band services The Spanish Ministry of Defense is its fi rst customer It provides Spain with coverage from Eastern Brazil and the Atlantic Ocean across all of Europe Africa and the Middle East to South East Asia The satellite features on-board switching and multiple steerable beams allowing users access to X-band capacity The XTAR-EUR satellite will be accessible to all existing and future X-band terminals used by the United States and NATO

Future military satellite capabilities are under development through the Spainsat program (XTAR-LANT) undertaken by Hisdesat and Space Systems Loral This satellite will operate in the X-band and possess an anti-jamming system The Spanish Defense Ministry will lease fi ve of Spainsatrsquos thirteen transponders the rest are expected to be leased by the United States and other NATO allies The satellite will cover the region between the Middle East and the Midwestern United States and be fully operational in 2006 It will also be fully interoperable with all existing and future US and NATO X-band terminals

Tabl

e 3

7 S

pani

sh c

apab

ilit

ies

for

netw

ork-

base

d op

erat

ions

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

C2

Sis

tem

a de

Inf

orm

acioacute

n pa

ra M

ando

y C

ontr

ol

del E

jeacuterc

ito

de T

ierr

a (S

IMA

CE

T)

Com

mon

bat

tlefi

eld

pi

ctur

e fo

r al

l arm

y co

mm

and

cent

ers

in

clud

ing

mob

ile

ones

Sis

tem

a de

Man

do y

C

ontr

ol A

eacutereo

(S

IMC

A)

Air

for

ce C

2 sy

stem

Com

plie

s w

ith

NA

TO

S

TAN

AG

s

Com

mun

icat

ions

and

co

mpu

ters

AR

GO

SP

R4G

rad

io-b

ased

tact

ical

di

gita

l com

mun

icat

ions

in

fras

truc

ture

MID

SIn

stal

led

on s

ever

al

airc

raft

and

nav

y sh

ips

Lin

ks to

oth

er M

IDS

sy

stem

s in

all

ied

nati

ons

His

pasa

t C

omm

erci

al S

AT

CO

Ms

from

ear

ly 1

990s

wit

h so

me

tran

spon

ders

leas

ed

to S

pani

sh m

ilit

ary

Part

ly in

tero

pera

ble

wit

h th

e S

yrac

use

(Fra

nce)

S

kyne

t (U

K)

and

NA

TO

4

syst

ems

Spa

insa

tM

ILS

AT

CO

M ndash

UH

F a

nd

SH

F c

apab

ilit

y al

ong

wit

h so

me

EH

F c

apac

ity

and

an

anti

-jam

min

g sy

stem

ISR

Sis

tem

a In

tegr

ado

de

Vig

ilan

cia

Aeacuter

ea (

SIV

A)

Tact

ical

UA

V f

or s

hort

-ra

nge

reco

nnai

ssan

ce

surv

eill

ance

and

targ

et

acqu

isit

ion

cont

inue

dhellip

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

Ori

on P

-3B

Upg

rade

d in

200

3 to

in

clud

e F

ITS

mis

sion

sy

stem

an

elec

tron

ic

war

fare

sys

tem

new

rad

ar

acou

stic

sys

tem

IF

F

VU

HF

and

HF

rad

ios

da

ta li

nk a

nd s

atel

lite

and

in

erti

al n

avig

atio

n sy

stem

s

San

tiag

oB

oein

g 70

7-35

1C

confi

gur

ed f

or C

OM

INT

E

LIN

T o

pera

tion

s

Falc

on-2

02

airc

raft

for

CO

MIN

T

mis

sion

s

Hel

ios

1 +

2Ju

nior

par

tner

in F

renc

h ea

rth

obse

rvat

ion

sate

llit

es I

R a

nd o

ptic

al

IMIN

T c

apab

ilit

ies

Neu

ron

Part

ner

in F

renc

h-le

d U

CA

V p

rogr

am

Tabl

e 3

7 co

ntin

ued

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

77

Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance

For unmanned ISR Spain relies on the locally manufactured SIVA (SistemaIntegrado de Vigilancia Aeacuterea or Integrated System for Aerial Surveillance) a tactical UAV for reconnaissance surveillance and target acquisition Spain has also expressed an interest in Northrop Grummanrsquos Fire Scout vertical take-off and landing tactical UAV for maritime SampR capabilities Manned ISR assets include fi ve Orion P-3B aircraft upgraded in 2003 by EADS to include the Fully Integrated Tactical Mission System (FITS) data fusion system an electronic warfare system new radar acoustic system ID friend-or-foe interrogator VUHF and HF radios a data link and satellite and inertial navigation systems

Spainrsquos space observation capabilities originally depended on the Ishtar optical earth observation satellite but the project did not go forward Instead Spain became a junior partner in the French Helios 1 and Helios 2 satellite programs of which it owns 7 and 25 per cent respectively The Spanish Ministry of Defense has recently revived its plans for an independent earth observation capability discussing a high-resolution synthetic aperture radar satellite possibly with civil security applications

Since March 1998 Spain has operated a single Boeing 707 (the Santiago) confi gured for SIGINT and ISR missions Two Falcon-20 aircraft are also in operation for COMINT missions

Sweden

Although there has been signifi cant progress in formulating a Swedish doctrine for Network-Based Defense (NBD) the Swedish armed forces today are still only partially interoperable across services Infrastructure is currently being put in place for a mobile joint C2 function since all the services are now under a single national command This command is part of the process of transforming the Swedish military into a contingency organization with a mobile high-quality force able to operate in expeditionary mode Many of the new systems procured by the Swedish military are compliant with NATO STANAGs and US military specifi cations (MILSPECS) giving them a good basis for interoperability However most of the older Swedish systems were not designed with international interoperability in mind

Each of the services has its own rapid reaction unit created in 1998ndash9 The army has SWERAP (Swedish Rapid Reaction Unit) the air force has SWAFRAP (Swedish Air Force Rapid Reaction Unit) and the navy has SWENRAP (Swedish Navy Rapid Reaction Unit) Four air force C-130s provide air insertion capability for ground units SWAFRAP is comprised of JAS-39 Gripen aircraft which carry out airborne surveillance and combat search and rescue missions SWENRAP missions are principally mine clearing and peacekeeping operations Swedish rapid reaction forces have been deployed to Liberia as part of the UN force and Swedish Special Forces have operated in the Congo and Afghanistan By January 2008 Sweden intends for its rapid reaction units to be part of the European Unionrsquos Nordic Battlegroup together with Finland Norway and Estonia

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

78

The SWERAP units use a commercial satellite system to link with national headquarters and the KV90 high frequency radio system ndash with two stations in the mission area and two redundant stations in Sweden ndash as a backup Tactical communications in-theater rely on the armyrsquos TS-9000 system Based on the EUROCOM standard this system uses a Thales tactical switchboard an Ericsson tactical radio link system and Cisco routers that form the backbone of a tactical Intranet The TS-9000 also includes radio access points for VHF Ericsson Starcom radios as well as HF-radios

The C4ISR capabilities of the Swedish rapid reaction units do not use groundbreaking or unique technology solutions instead they rely on COTS equipment adapted for their specifi c requirements The Swedish deployment to Kosovo in 1999 needed to be equipped rapidly and within a relatively short period SWERAP became the fi rst battalion in the Swedish armed forces to fi eld advanced C2 and communications systems relying on this COTS approach

Command and control

Current C2 systems in the Swedish armed forces include the 9LV system in service with the navy and the StriC-90 system deployed since 1998 for command and control of attack aircraft and air defense systems StriC-90 is connected to the Giraffe 3D and the Erieye radars and includes data links with Gripen attack aircraft Swedish air force systems are tied into a single network named Airforce 2000 which enables a tactical C2 loop for all the servicersquos units The Swedish army uses the demonstrator IS-Mark information system for mobile and non-mobile ground based headquarters and the SLB (Stridsledningssystem Bataljon or Battalion C2 System) system at the battalion level The two are not interoperable however and data must be manually transferred between them (Nilsson et al2004 24ndash5) Sweden began to integrate all the servicesrsquo C2 systems at all levels in 2005 under the name of SWECCIS (SWEdish C2 Information System)

In October 1995 the Swedish Armed Forces Headquartersrsquo Department of Operations tasked the Defense Research Establishment (Foumlrsvarets Forskningsanstalt or FOA) the Defense Materiel Administration (Foumlrsvarets Materielverk or FMV) and the National Defense College (Foumlrsvarshoumlgskolanor FHS) to propose a vision for a mobile military joint C2 system for the year 2010 This project ndash Mobile Joint Command and Control Function for 2010 (Roumlrlig Operativ Lednings Funktion or ROLF 2010) ndash has been expanded to include civilian C2 elements relevant to national security The goal is a single C2 environment for Swedenrsquos national defense and fi rst responder services in 10ndash15 years The vision calls for the creation of an ldquoaquariumrdquo (Visionarium) a device to present crisis situations in a three-dimensional environment fusing information from many sources Once deployed Visionarium will enable informed and timely decision-making and the dissemination of decisions to security forces

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

79

Communications and computers

For the past ten years the tactical communications infrastructure of the Swedish armed forces has been based on a digital network the TS-9000 The system uses Thales switches and Ericsson radios and relay equipment and has recently been upgraded to include tactical Intranet However it will encounter problems of data capacity once the new information system SWECCIS is introduced The requirement for more bandwidth will be fi lled through satellite communications and the procurement of the HF-2000 radio communications network to be fully deployed by 2008 This system will provide all services with a fully automated data text and voice communications network that can be used from fi xed and mobile stations

Only a few of Swedenrsquos tactical communications systems are interoperable outside Sweden All were designed and deployed under a strategy of Swedish neutrality which ruled out coalition operations Sweden has now participated in several of the Combined Endeavor annual exercises which have tested and proven the interoperability of its tactical communications systems with those of other countries at the non-secure level In the near future Sweden is expected to join the successor of the Tactical Communications (TACOMS) Post 2000 project a NATO initiative to develop STANAGs for IP-based communications between different tactical communications systems

With the change in Swedish strategy the need for interoperable commu nica-tions systems has grown As a result Sweden expects to procure Link-16 terminals and IFF systems Link-16 will fi rst be introduced in the air force and navy with an army deployment to follow Initially it will be installed as stand-alone terminals with limited capacity Sweden has also recently launched a program known as GTRS to acquire a Software Defi ned Radio system built on SCA standards The goal is to introduce the new system to the armed forces after 2008

In 2005 Sweden also began to deploy its national radio communications infrastructure for public safety authorities including the armed forces police coast guard customs service local crisis management and rescue services and emergency healthcare and ambulance services RAKEL (Radio Kommunikation foumlr Effektiv Ledning or Radio Communication for Effi cient Command) based on the TETRA (TErrestrial Trunked RAdio) standard will be supplied by a consortium of Saab Nokia and Eltel Networks and will be owned by the Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) Deployment will start in the south of Sweden and fi nish in the north of the country by 2010 RAKEL is part of the Network-Based Defense doctrine aimed at connecting the Swedish military and the fi rst responders in one network

Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance

The Argus system has been Swedenrsquos principal manned airborne ISR capability since 1997 Argus is based on six Saab 340 aircraft outfi tted with Ericssonrsquos Erieye PS-890 radar along with four ground stations It performs mostly airborne early

Tabl

e 3

8 S

wed

ish

capa

bili

ties

for

net

wor

k-ba

sed

oper

atio

ns

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

C2

Str

iCA

ir d

efen

se C

2 sy

stem

Inte

rope

rabl

e w

ith

the

Sw

edis

h A

rgus

air

born

e ra

dar

syst

em

9LV

Mar

k 3E

Nav

al C

2 sy

stem

IS-M

ark

Arm

y C

2 sy

stem

de

mon

stra

tor

for

mob

ile

and

non-

mob

ile

head

quar

ters

SL

BA

rmy

C2

syst

em f

or

batt

alio

n le

vel

9LV

CE

TR

ISN

aval

C2

syst

em f

or n

ext-

gene

rati

on V

isby

-cla

ss

corv

ette

s

SW

EC

CIS

Inte

grat

ion

of a

ll C

2 (n

avy

air

for

ce a

nd a

rmy)

sy

stem

s a

t all

leve

ls

RO

LF

201

0M

obil

e Jo

int C

omm

and

and

Con

trol

Fun

ctio

nIn

tero

pera

bili

ty is

sues

m

ay b

e sa

crifi

ced

to

rem

ain

on s

ched

ule

Com

mun

icat

ions

and

co

mpu

ters

TS

-900

0A

rmy

tact

ical

co

mm

unic

atio

nsin

fras

truc

ture

inc

ludi

ng

tact

ical

Int

rane

t

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

KV

90C

omm

unic

atio

ns s

yste

m

for

Sw

edis

h R

apid

R

eact

ion

Forc

e

RA

KE

LN

atio

nal m

obil

e ra

dio

syst

em f

or p

ubli

c sa

fety

in

clud

ing

arm

ed f

orce

s

secu

rity

for

ces

and

fi rs

t re

spon

ders

Bas

ed o

n T

ET

RA

sta

ndar

d

HF

-200

0F

utur

e hi

gh-f

requ

ency

ra

dio

com

mun

icat

ions

ne

twor

k (d

ata

and

voic

e)

for

all s

ervi

ces

(ful

ly

depl

oyed

by

2008

)

Mee

ts N

AT

O S

TAN

AG

s

GT

RS

Sw

edis

h eq

uiva

lent

to

the

US

JT

RS

tact

ical

so

ftw

are-

base

d ra

dio

SC

A c

ompl

iant

ISR

Ugg

lan

Tact

ical

UA

V (

base

d on

S

agem

rsquos S

perw

er)

Sim

ilar

sys

tem

s ar

e de

ploy

ed b

y F

ranc

e

Den

mar

k N

ethe

rlan

ds

Gre

ece

FS

R-8

90 A

rgus

Saa

b-34

0 ai

rcra

ft w

ith

Eri

eye

rada

r fo

r ae

rial

C2

and

mar

itim

e su

rvei

llan

ce

Ful

ly in

tegr

ated

into

S

wed

ish

air

defe

nse

syst

em

AR

TH

UR

Art

ille

ry a

nd m

orta

r lo

cati

on r

adar

Dep

loye

d w

ith

ISA

F

cont

inue

dhellip

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

Gir

affe

Sea

Gir

affe

Lan

d-ba

sed

and

mar

itim

e S

ampR

rad

ars

S-1

02B

Kor

pen

(Rav

en)

2 G

ulfs

trea

m I

V-S

P

airc

raft

for

SIG

INT

Hav

e be

en d

eplo

yed

in

the

Adr

iati

c in

sup

port

of

NA

TO

pea

ceke

epin

g op

erat

ions

Neu

ron

Part

ner

in F

renc

h-le

d U

CA

V p

rogr

am

Ple

iade

sA

cces

s to

Fre

nch

sate

llit

e im

ager

y

Tabl

e 3

8 co

ntin

ued

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

83

warning and maritime surveillance and reconnaissance missions Other manned ISR assets include two Gulfstream IV-SP aircraft deployed since 1997 for SIGINT missions The Ericsson Giraffe radar recently deployed provides land-based ISR capabilities though its principal mission is air defense The Swedish navy also deploys a maritime version the Sea Giraffe The Swedish ARTHUR (Artillery Hunting Radar) system is fully operational and has been used in Afghanistan

Sweden has only a limited unmanned aerial ISR capability Three Ugglan (Owl) tactical UAV systems were procured from France in 1999ndash2000 based on the Sperwer UAV modifi ed to be able to take off in severe winter conditions As part of the Swedish armed forces long-term vision a number of advanced UAV concepts are currently being studied Gladen is one candidate a HALE UAV equipped with a SAR electro-optic and infrared sensors and able to carry an early warning suite Also under discussion are two combat UAVs the Swedish Highly Advanced Research Confi guration (SHARC) and Skuadern a stealthy MALE reconnaissance and strike UAV both being developed by Saab the latter in collaboration with BAE Systems Sweden is also a partner in the French-led EuroMALE UAV and Neuron UCAV programs

84

4

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL

NETWORK-BASED CAPABILITIES

NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization provides the most important and broad-reaching setting in which the transatlantic allies can address C4ISR technology and interoperability issues Military planning in the European Union though moving forward rapidly is at too early a stage and insuffi ciently comprehensive to resolve interoperability problems today In any case the United States is not an EU member making NATO the most important institutional setting in which transatlantic C4ISR issues can be discussed and resolved

During the Cold War NATO force planning was the setting for allied discussions on C2 communications air defense air operations and air-to-air surveillance Although this review of national network-based capabilities suggests that national systems are imperfectly interoperable at the national level and not always interoperable within the NATO framework the intent to make them NATO interoperable is clear Moreover a number of capabilities developed in the NATO context remain important tools for coalition interoperability even when the Alliance is not formally involved For the purposes of this discussion we will use the defi nition of interoperability common in NATO as described by Major General Picavet Director of the NATO HQ C3 Staff ldquothe ability of alliance forces and when appropriate forces of partner and other nations to train exercise and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasksrdquo (Picavet 2003 34)

NATO has dedicated common C2 and communications capabilities The MIDS upgrade of the US Link-16 system connecting allied aircraft was developed through NATO and NATOrsquos naval communications are largely interoperable through Link-11 technology The AWACS air-to-air surveillance system is a common NATO capability As an organization NATO defi nes and issues Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) for many weapons systems including C3I which set targets for planning national C2 and communications systems among the member nations NATO continues to provide an important setting for future common programs that are part of the C4ISR universe such as the Air Command and Control System (ACCS) program the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) program theater missile defense (TMD) research and the Coalition Aerial Surveillance and

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

85

Reconnaissance (CAESAR) advanced concept technology demonstration NATO will be a driving force for future transformations of European military forces and their links to the US defense as a result of three key decisions made at the November 2002 Prague Summit the Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC) the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the creation of the new Allied Command Transformation (ACT)

While NATO remains the principal transatlantic context for C4ISR discussions and planning the future evolution of the Alliancersquos role is unclear The European allies are increasingly committed to doing parallel planning in the European Union context whose military missions and commitments are growing In addition the future of the US role in coalition operations under a NATO fl ag is somewhat uncertain The US National Security Strategy (2002) and the Quadrennial Defense Review of 2001 both give preference to ad hoc coalitions over a systematic use of NATO for out-of-area operations

NATO roles and capabilities

Throughout the Cold War the allies used the NATO context for common C2 capability planning NATO strategy and force planning and military exercises set the expectations and goals for NATO membersrsquo military forces Based in part on Alliance needs members set goals for their own national defense investment which in turn infl uenced the requirements for equipment including Command Control Communications and Computers (C4) Past practices in the Alliance however may not be an adequate incentive for defi ning and meeting C4ISR requirements today NATO force planning goals are not obligatory and have often not been met in national defense budgets and plans Moreover because they have been developed through negotiation goals and targets developed in the NATO context tend to be incremental while defense technology and mission need to move ahead more quickly As a result as Gompert and Nerlich note the NATO force planning process since the end of the Cold War has become increasingly disconnected from the US national force transformation process

Adjustments in NATOrsquos military plans are worked out through tedious diplomatic negotiations among professionals trained to avoid abrupt change Consequently the United States and the lead European allies do not presently rely on the NATO planning process to guide their force planning and they cannot count on it to organize and guide their effort to create cooperable transformed forces

(Gompert and Nerlich 2002 64)

Nevertheless NATO has served as an important context for allied C4ISR planning The Alliance breaks down network-based capabilities and C4ISR into three categories Command Control and Consultation (C3) Communications and Information Systems (CIS) and ISR Over time separate NATO organizations

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

86

have been created to deal with the fi rst two areas (C3 and CIS) while ISR has been further broken down into specifi c programs and organizations

The NATO concept of C3 covers planning and architecture design of systems while that of CIS covers the management and operation of systems For C3 the Alliance has developed specifi c packages ndash Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) headquarters ndash that play a central role in planning and implementing specifi c Alliance operations such as IFOR and SFOR in the Balkans Since the mid-1990s CJTF core staffs have been established on a permanent basis within selected parent headquarters in the NATO military command structure When the need arises for a CJTF to be deployed the core staff is assembled and augmented as necessary forming a CJTF headquarters specifi cally structured to meet the requirements of the operation in question These CJTF headquarters receive C2 and communications capabilities both from the Alliance and from national forces They will also provide the new NATO Response Force with the joint headquarters it requires to operate (see below)

The Alliance has developed its own dedicated C2 and communications capability for military operations involving senior levels of military and political decision making (Barry 2003) NATO hardware and software can reach across the entire NATO territory connecting land air and maritime forces and political decision makers in national capitals and Brussels including voice data messaging and video teleconferencing This capability uses wireless networks satellites landlines optical fi ber and digital radio and includes local area and wide area networks A signifi cant volume of the traffi c is carried on the Internet and uses commercial equipment including satellites

These C3 and CIS infrastructures are overseen by the NATO Consultation Command and Control Organization (NC3O) The NC3Orsquos mission is to develop the technical architectures standards protocols and overall design for all systems from the tactical military level to the strategicpolitical one Since its reorganization in 1996 the NC3O is linked to three organizations The NATO C3 Board (NC3B) is the senior CIS planning and policymaking body in the Alliance It is composed of representatives of all member nations the strategic military commands and other relevant NATO organizations It reports directly to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the Defense Planning Committee and acts as the oversight board for all NC3O activities The Board has subcommittees on joint requirements and concepts frequency management information systems identifi cation systems interoperability information security communication networks and navigation systems (Picavet 2003)

The NATO Command Control and Consultation Agency (NC3A) is directly responsible for CIS issues within the Alliance It carries out the policies of the Board procures systems and conducts fi eld trials of prototypes NC3Arsquos goal is to create architecture for a common operating environment into which member states can plug in their own C3 networks Lastly the NATO systems are operated by the NATO Communications and Information Systems Operating and Support Agency (NACOSA) It manages CIS conducts joint training and monitors the quality of service both in static and forward deployed locations Over time the Board and

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

87

the NC3A are pushing NATO toward a command and information system with greater mobility and interoperability increasingly based on commercial products and systems The Alliance goal is to create a ready-made architecture that member nations can plug into and to provide a test bed for communications and Internet technologies (Barry 2002 253)

NATO C2 programs

The current NATO C2 systems and related communications capabilities have their limitations The systems have not been mobile though deployability is going to be critical for future out-of-area operations Moreover the current capability is stove-piped Horizontal communications between forces and between governments are not systematically possible Thus the current NATO systems are not yet a network-based capability that would allow all sources of data voice and video (including sensor data) to be brought together vertically and horizontally in real time to provide coherent real-time awareness of the battlefi eld across forces

NATO has however been upgrading this C2 capability with a number of major programs underway or recently completed which will allow Alliance operations to be more network-based The Allied Command Europe (ACE) Automated Command and Control Information System (ACCIS) is intended to be a strategic-level system providing decision support software and a combined operational picture It is currently being given a common hardware and software baseline that will form the core of a future bi-Strategic Command (ACE and ACLANT) automated information system (Bi-SCAIS) the Alliancersquos future C2 system The core services of the Maritime Command and Control Information System (MCCIS) an Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) strategic-level COTS-based information system will be implemented in the ACE ACCIS architecture The NATO C3 Technical Architecture (NC3TA) a new open systems approach for the Alliancersquos C2 infrastructure was initiated in December 2000 and addresses the near-term interoperability requirements of NATO C2 systems setting down technical requirements and guidelines for their implementation

There are additional NATO programs addressing future Alliance C2 require-ments More than a decade ago the Alliance initiated a program to upgrade and expand NATOrsquos air defense net the Air Command and Control System (ACCS) a commonly funded development and procurement program ACCS is intended to be an open architecture program using off-the-shelf components Given the decline in the European theater air threat the ACCS program could have been terminated However ACCS has been designed not only to detect and defend against air attack but also for air tasking and carrying out the tactical planning tasking and execution of all air defense offensive air and air support operations It is intended as a multi-mission simultaneous planning capability coordinating fl ight paths of various aircraft integrating the AWACS air picture preparing offensive operations and coordinating a combined air operations center along with reconnaissance squadrons and fi ghter wings It will include both fi xed sites and deployable components

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

88

Air operations over Kosovo revealed shortfalls in the Alliancersquos capability to coordinate combined air attack and support giving new impetus to the need for the ACCS capability Moreover it became clear that ACCS could provide a vehicle for communications and C2 involving air operations as part of a broader network-based system linked to air-ground surveillance and conceivably even to theater missile defense systems (TMD) As a result the Alliance decided to continue the ACCS effort In 1999 NATO signed a $500 million contract for the initial development effort with Air Command Systems International part of the Thales Raytheon Systems joint venture

Over fi ve years the ACCS system core software was developed and tested concluding the fi rst phase of the program The next phase of the ACCS from 2004 to roughly 2008 includes software integration incremental testing and the introduction of ACCS into national forces The goal is to create ACCS sites in 18 NATO member nations NATO members without an ACCS site will interface with the system via their national airdefense and operations centers (Fiorenza 2004 38)

Theater missile defense is not generally seen as an element of C2 However the NATO TMD effort is relevant to overall C2 capabilities as missile defense can be closely linked to the air defense and air operations capability provided by the ACCS program Moreover a TMD architecture could include mobile tactical missile and air defense capabilities which Alliance forces may require in out-of-area deployments including the NATO Respose Force (NRF) The Alliance has issued two contracts for studies of an Alliance TMD architecture and there is growing consensus that it may be appropriate to develop such a system

NATO introduced still another C2-related program in the summer of 2005 creating a new C2 Center of Excellence based on the model of the Dutch C2 Support Center (described in the previous chapter) Under the auspices of Allied Command Transformation this joint Center is to provide the Alliance with a framework for the exchange of C2 knowledge and lessons learned in order to improve interoperability The initial staff is composed of 15 Dutch Belgian Norwegian and US exchange or liaison offi cers but will expand to include other nationalities The Center will undertake training and education activities related to C2 interoperability including the analysis of case studies and the production of ldquolessons learnedrdquo reports As part of its work the Center will assess the value of the NRF as a stimulus for NATO network-enabled capabilities assist member states in synchronizing their national C2 programs to make them more interoperable and validate network-centric and C4ISR concepts and doctrines developed in other NATO organizations such as the NC3A

The Center was also offered to the European Union as part of the Dutch contribution to the European Strategic Defense Initiative (ESDI) It will collaborate with the European Defense Agency and make its expertise and facilities available to the European Battlegroups (see Chapter 5 on EU capabilities) Though a relatively new addition to the Alliancersquos C4ISR effort the Center of Excellence could become an important arena for NATOrsquos efforts

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

89

NATO communications and information programs

NATOrsquos communications and information networks have also been evolving toward more networked capabilities The NATO General Purpose Communications System (NGCS) is a communications backbone tying all military C2 (data and voice) together with semi-permanent bandwidth on demand using secure and non-secure telephone message wireless and satellite links NGCS is being deployed to replace the obsolete NATO Integrated Communications System The NATO Messaging System (NMS) will provide Alliance commands with e-mail and secure military message handing capability Crisis Response Operations in NATO Open Systems (CRONOS) a Windows NT-based information system initially developed for Bosnia provides secure connectivity (up to NATO Secret) between NATO and several national and coalition systems

Increasingly NATO platforms are also being equipped with the Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) a modernized version of the US Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) The development of MIDS illustrates the increase in Alliance telecommunications interoperability It was designed as a tactical data communications network linking NATO alliesrsquo aircraft (fi ghters and bombers) and air-based ground-based and ship-based C2 centers (Hura et al 2000) As it is deployed across alliance platforms MIDS will also enable better aircraft Identifi cation Friend or Foe (IFF) information The United States France Germany Italy and Spain signed the project memorandum of understanding in 1991 MIDS development has been led by the United States with France acting as deputy program leader (refl ecting the cost shares of the two major program partners)

MIDS like the US JTIDS is based on Link-16 a tactical digital network of encrypted jam-resistant data links and terminals Budget pressures and the desire to gain access to US military technology led the Europeans to support an international program but almost all were unwilling to simply buy JTIDS off the shelf For the United States the need for international collaboration was operational a common tactical communications network would increase interoperability with European allies and increase effectiveness in coalition warfare

A modular open terminal architecture was developed for MIDS followed by an affordable terminal that could be tailored to fi t various military platforms MIDS terminals were developed fi rst for integration into a specifi c set of platforms then modifi ed to accommodate others Finally interoperable jam-resistant data links between US and allied platforms were developed The member nations participating in the program were prohibited from developing competing systems to MIDS

A US chartered international joint venture MIDSCO was awarded the RampD phase of the program in 1994 The JV included GEC-Marconi (UK) Hazeltine (United States) Thomson (France) Marconi Italtel Defense (Italy) Siemens (Germany) and ENOSA (Empresa Nacional de Optica SA Spain) The RampD phase was concluded in 2000 followed by an acquisition phase that included two US vendors (Data Link Solutions and ViaSat Inc) and one European vendor for production and sale of the terminals The European vendor is EuroMIDS a

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

90

consortium comprising Thales (France) Marconi Mobile (Italy) Indra (Spain) and EADS (Germany)

In 2004 the US navy initiated a program within the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) program that would enable it to communicate with MIDS terminals The MIDS JTRS program will transition the existing MIDS Link-16 terminal to a Software Communications Architecture (SCA) compliant with JTRS radio The MIDS JTRS radio will provide three additional programmable channels that will be able to run any of the JTRS approved waveforms The United States France Italy Spain and Germany all participate in the program which will enable them to receive copies of the technical data package for MIDS JTRS and produce terminals to meet their national needs Eventually all US French German Italian and Spanish platforms outfi tted with MIDS JTRS radios will be able to communicate and share a common picture of the battlefi eld

NATOrsquos Satcom V project is also underway intended to provide global wideband video voice and data links to the Alliance Satellite communications have been an important element of the Alliancersquos common communications capability since 1970 when the fi rst NATO satellite was launched The NATO IV satellite system consisted of one active satellite one backup satellite 27 satellite ground terminals and two control centers Operational since 1991 it provided communications in both the UHF and SHF bands NATO has retired the last remaining NATO IV satellite Instead of purchasing and operating the next generation of satellites the Satcom V program ndash previously known as NATO Satcom Post-2000 ndash will purchase capacity from existing European satellites and upgrade existing ground stations The NATO C3 Agency leads the Satcom V program

The United Kingdom France and Italy submitted a joint bid to supply SHF and UHF capacity from existing and planned national programs (Skynet in the United Kingdom Syracuse in France and SICRAL in Italy) The US Department of Defense also submitted a bid offering SHF capacity on its Wideband Gapfi ller satellite system and the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) and UHF capacity on the UHF Follow-On system and the Mobile User Objective System The United States also proposed selling NATO EHF capacity on its Advanced Extremely High Frequency system while France proposed EHF capacity on one of its Syracuse 3 satellites

In May 2004 the NATO C3 Agency selected the joint British-French-Italian bid for the SHF and UHF parts of the Satcom Post-2000 program The 15-year contract includes establishing a NATO Mission Access Center that will route all NATO satellite communications via satellites in the Skynet 5 Syracuse 3 and SICRAL systems Beginning in 2007 the NATO system will be based on two Skynet 5 two Syracuse 3 and two SICRAL satellites A selection for the EHF part of the program is expected soon although EHF capacity is not expected to be needed before 2010 (Fiorenza 2005b)

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

91

NATO intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance programs

NATOrsquos current major ISR program is the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and the Alliance is in the process of acquiring additional ISR capabilities through the NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance program (AGS) The NATO AWACS fl eet is composed of 17 aircraft with dedicated common air-to-air surveillance capability and provides an important sensor input to understanding the battlefi eld Purchased during the late 1980s this NATO E-3A fl eet is currently being improved through modernization programs managed by the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEWampC) Program Management Organization In 2004 the upgrading of the missions systems on board the NATO aircraft was begun and the process will be completed in 2008 The upgrades will enable the AWACS aircraft to receive mission orders and updates via satellite allow the integration of data collected by other platforms with that gathered by the aircraftrsquos sensors increase the number of targets it can track and improve its interoperability with other platforms The United Kingdom France and the United States all possess the AWACS systems giving the Alliance good interoperability in air-to-air surveillance

In 2000 NATO began a research and testing program with direct bearing on the integration of sensor data collected by various different platforms operated by member nations The Coalition Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance (CAESAR) program is unprecedented an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrator (ACTD) funded by the US Defense Department but carried out by NATO The premise of CAESAR is that the NATO interoperability challenge is about information what is needed who needs it and where it comes from The objective of CAESAR is to test national and NATO air- and space-based ground surveillance systems and develop ways to integrate them ultimately leading to a new STANAG for the Alliance

To achieve this objective the CAESAR program is testing tactics techniques and procedures for linking together independent national air reconnaissance and surveillance systems currently deployed on a variety of platforms including the British ASTOR the French Horizon JSTARS Global Hawk RADARSAT (Canada) Predator CRESO (Italian helicopter-based) and others In the future it could be extended to other platforms including the British CEC network and ultimately ACCS and AGS

If the data emerging from CAESAR leads to investments and operational planning it could make a valuable contribution to the NATO effort to network sensor data into its C2 and communications systems It could also make it easier for coalition forces to rely on a variety of national air ground surveillance systems in the absence of a common NATO AGS asset

In addition CAESAR may demonstrate the benefi ts of funding technology demonstrators at the international level ACTDs a result of acquisition reform by the US Defense Department and designed to move technology more quickly into the forces have normally been restricted to US participants More multinational ACTDs in the C4ISR arena could stimulate transatlantic efforts to address the

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

92

interoperability dilemmas in network-based operations For example as a complement to the CAESAR program the United States could increase NATO participation in the Multi-sensor Aerospace-ground Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition (MAJIIC) program This is a 5-year technology demonstrator initiated in 2004 by US Joint Forces Command Its objective is to enhance the interoperability of ISR systems fi elded within a coalition framework via a common military website and made available for coalition operations in near real time Canada France Germany Italy the Netherlands Norway Spain and the United Kingdom already participate in MAJIIC

The most signifi cant NATO program for future ISR capabilities is the NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) project which has been an active RampD program for over a decade It will provide NATO with an aerial battlefi eld surveillance capability using a radar suite with both MTI and SAR modes fusing information gathered by other sensors into a combined digital picture The United States currently fi elds such a capability in the JSTARS (a modifi ed Boeing 707 carrying a communications surveillance reconnaissance and intelligence suite) The system is expected to cost some 4 billion euros which will be shared by all participating nations with initial operational capability targeted for 2010 The United Kingdom is the only NATO nation not taking part in the AGS program

The AGS program has evolved over several years as a number of alternatives were considered and rejected The United States proposed that the Alliance simply buy JSTARS which few allied nations were willing to do The United Kingdom decided to proceed independently with ASTOR and pulled out of the NATO planning effort Competing US and European solutions emerged the Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP an upgrade of the system deployed on JSTARS) and the Standoff Surveillance Target Acquisition Radar (SOSTAR)

In 2003 NATO issued a Request for Proposals for a two-year design and development phase This RFP called for the design and development phase to begin in late 2004 leading to a full program of six aircraft plus UAV systems by 2010 Two transatlantic strategic consortia responded to this Request for Proposals both offering the same radar solution the Transatlantic Cooperative AGS Radar (TCAR) which would fuse MP-RTIP and SOSTAR One consortium was the Transatlantic Industry Proposed Solution (TIPS) led by Northrop Grumman Thales EADS Galileo Avionica General Dynamics Canada Indra and some 70 other companies from all 19 NATO member nations The other was the Cooperative Transatlantic AGS System (CTAS) proposed by Raytheon and British Aerospace Systems based on the United Kingdom ASTOR system (Fiorenza 2003b) In the spring of 2004 the NATO AGS Steering Committee and the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors selected the TIPS consortium as the winner

The AGS system was initially to be deployed solely on manned aircraft However in response to German urgings the program was redesigned for both manned and unmanned aircraft It is not yet clear which version will be deployed fi rst The TIPS-based mixed fl eet is based on manned medium-size aircraft ndash the

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

93

Airbus A321 ndash and the German EuroHawk HALE UAVs a version of Northrop Grummanrsquos Global Hawk

Developing the radar posed a problem for both consortia since US export regulators indicated that they would forbid the export of some crucial technologies such as the TransmitReceive (TR) modules Frustrated by this problem the European partners have spent time and resources to duplicate existing US TR modules creating a capability that downstream will compete with the American technology The TCAR solution offered by the TIPS consortium faces other signifi cant technology transfer issues as the radar is to be co-developed by several European countries ndash France Germany Italy the Netherlands and Spain ndash as well as the United States

The ultimate fate of the AGS system is unclear given the signifi cant additional costs required for full deployment and uncertainty that some key NATO members ndash France the United Kingdom and Germany ndash will continue to participate over the long term A commitment to deploy AGS would involve a considerable increase in common NATO investments and an increase in the NATO common budget ceiling AGS spending might compete with other national defense priorities On the other hand a deployed AGS would give the Alliance a signifi cantly enhanced sensoring capability for operational deployments outside the NATO area and relieve the overload on the US JSTARS currently much in demand

As this discussion suggests there is substantial NATO investment in the elements of common C2 communications and ISR capabilities for the Alliance What is lacking is a clear vision of what the Alliance needs to link sensor and other information into the decision-making and command structures and down to the tactical war fi ghter NC3A is working on such a vision trying to defi ne the linkage between the many NATO systems and standards and achieve the incorporation of common programs such as MCCIS ACCIS ACCS and AGS into a joint system and the integration of that system with the national systems of the member states This C2 and communications architecture needs to be accompanied by a NATO-wide vision of the sensor architecture to which it might be linked NATO does not yet have clear standards for the ISR elements of network-centric operations nor an agreed view on the way in which they should be networked with each other

NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAGs)

NATO has worked for decades to set common standards for defense equipment including C4ISR systems Working groups in the NATO Military Agency for Standardization in conjunction with NATOrsquos Committee of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) have negotiated more than 1700 such STANAGs which set out the standards members should seek to reach when acquiring new equipment Roughly 300 of these standards relate to C4 technology (Grapin 2002 37)

The NC3TA proposes such standards for C2 and communications equipment and information architecture Their guidance should make it possible for nationally procured systems to link up with or plug into the C2 and communications architecture being put together by the Alliance (Barry 2003 10) As noted in the

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

94

review of national programs in this study many C4 items in national inventories are said to be compliant with NATO STANAGs which in theory enhances Alliance interoperability

The STANAG process has not however been fully successful in reaching this goal STANAG compliance is not mandatory but voluntary and there is no institutional process in NATO for validating membersrsquo compliance with the STANAGs As a result many NATO member nations including the United States have developed equipment that does not enhance interoperability as was the case with the German land force communications protocol As one analyst has noted ldquoMost European countries including France are willing to use NATO standards but it is not a usual practice in US procurement for military services to refer (and defer) to themrdquo (Grapin 2002 3)

Non-compliance with STANAGs is linked to the desire in some countries notably the United States to move forward quickly toward a network-based capability The STANAG process tends to be long tedious and bureaucratic often taking several years and resulting in a standard that is a lowest common denominator Once a STANAG has been ratifi ed it is often well behind the evolution of modern technology As a result the process does not have high-level attention and tends not to be viewed as a part of the strategic evolution of the Alliance

In the case of C2 and CIS technologies the pace of innovation is particularly fast and heavily reliant on the commercial sector As some countries move down the road toward networked capabilities they are inclined to set STANAGs aside and move to the best available and most up-to-date technology One analyst estimated that US defense technology is 80 per cent compliant with NATO STANAGs but the remaining 20 per cent includes the technologies critical to the development of network-centric capabilities (Grapin 2002 3) Moreover in the critical area of ISR there are few agreed STANAGs and none as yet for UAVs (Grapin 2002 77)

New NATO commitments to network-based operations

The Alliance took a major step forward toward a commitment to network-centric capabilities with the Prague summit of November 2002 First and most important the NATO agenda moved from a focus on Article 5 missions involving the defense of the NATO member countries to a clear focus on Article 6 out-of-area missions This shift in focus had been emerging since the 50th anniversary Washington summit of 1999 Though the European allies initially resisted efforts to focus on out-of-area missions this change emerged for three reasons First NATOrsquos experience in Bosnia Serbia and Kosovo ndash the fi rst war conducted by NATO as an alliance ndash made it clear that the European defense mission had been superseded by responsibilities for peacemaking and peacekeeping at Europersquos Balkan fringe Balkan operations also exposed a number of weaknesses and gaps in Alliance capabilities

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

95

Moreover 911 the war on terrorism and the war in Afghanistan all involved a new adversary whose transnational character made it a potential threat to all but whose global location necessitated action outside the NATO area While NATO invoked Article 5 for the fi rst time in its history the day after the 911 attacks on the United States the Alliance was not initially involved in the war in Afghanistan However NATO has been directly involved in post-war security operations around Kabul and at the request of the UN took complete control of the security operation around Kabul in August 2003 The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been commanded by the SACEUR and conducted by Allied Command Operations (ACO) ever since and is in the process of deploying to locations outside of Kabul in the form of Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT) This was a signifi cant new out-of-area deployment for many European countries and for the Alliance

Third the 911 attacks and what was presumed at the time to be a potential threat of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq both focused NATO attention more squarely on the risk that hostile states or terrorist organizations might acquire such weapons and the means to deliver them on NATO territory As a result new impetus was given to the Alliancersquos planning for WMD operations and TMD programs

These major security developments brought renewed attention to defense spending and force planning in most of the major NATO allies including the new members from the former Warsaw Pact Persistent US and NATO pressure on allied defense budgets led to a small but important reversal of course in the trend toward declining budgets in the United Kingdom France Italy and the Netherlands and considerable soul-searching about defense budgets and plans in Germany

The new security issues have also intensifi ed European concern about acquiring more modern defense technology particularly transportation logistics and especially relevant to this study C4ISR Balkans operations stimulated the Europeans to engage in more European-level planning for peacekeeping and peacemaking operations as they exposed severe European shortcomings in communications equipment sensors for surveillance and reconnaissance and data fusion CRONOS NATOrsquos Windows-based information-sharing network developed for IFOR in Bosnia was infected with viruses While the United States and the United Kingdom could connect to CRONOS digitally the French and Germans had to use an analog interface which meant slower data rates Secure communications especially at the tactical level were also a problem while communications between aircraft had to be transmitted in the clear Interoperability was problematic a number of ISR systems were used including JSTARS Nimrod Breguet Atlantic Horizon and C-160 aircraft but they could not cross-transmit data ndash thus could not provide all allies with a common picture of the battlespace or transmit directly to strike aircraft Finally Europeans depended on intelligence derived from US surveillance and reconnaissance assets The United States met 95 per cent of the allied intelligence requirements in Kosovo but was slow to release data to coalition partners (Thomas 2000 43ndash53)

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

96

Combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have intensifi ed this need for greater European network-centric capability The progress made by the US since the fi rst Gulf War in agility mobility and information networking of its forces is increasingly clear European C4ISR capabilities are signifi cantly less capable Moreover despite having more than 2 million men and women under arms the European allies still have only a small expeditionary capability largely British and French forces The military missions of the future whether national European or transatlantic depend on a high state of readiness advanced logistics networked C4ISR and a high degree of fl exibility and agility Only US forces came close to meeting this test with the British and French trailing and the other allies far behind

The Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) was agreed on at the 1999 NATO Washington Summit with the goal of addressing these capability shortfalls The DCI identifi ed 58 key capability shortfalls needing investment and multi-national cooperation The shortfalls were divided into fi ve core areas mobility and deployability sustainability effective engagement (the ability to engage an adversary in all types of operations from high to low intensity) survivability (ability to protect forces and infrastructure against future threats) and interoperable communications However the DCI lacked a common strategic orientation provided few doctrinal and institutional links to the US force-transformation process set no priorities and failed to stimulate allied investment in force modernization (Gompert and Nerlich 2002 10)

The 2002 Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC) were adopted to address the DCIrsquos failure Initially PCC goals numbered more than 450 including over 100 commitments related to C2 and information systems far higher than the DCI number However NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson identifi ed eight as a priority focus given their link to expeditionary operations including in particular C3I The PCC particularly targeted the lack of deployable C2 facilities reconnaissance and surveillance assets common interoperable intelligence mechanisms and systems architecture and the shortfalls in the communications arena to link them together PCC were intended to provide a more measurable and reachable target for European force planning and acquisition Some progress has been made notably in strategic airlift and sealift Survivability has been improved with the creation of a chemical biological radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defense battalion under the leadership of the Czech Republic However in many areas related to network-based operations results have been more modest Even the highly successful Czech-led CBRN battalion is still struggling with problems related to communications and deployment

The Alliance took two other signifi cant actions in Prague with major implications for the future of the Alliance in the area of network-based capabilities the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the creation of Allied Command Transformation as part of a major restructuring of the NATO command structure NATOrsquos new command structure is built around a single Strategic Command for Operations at SHAPE in Belgium and three subordinate operational-level joint commands in the Netherlands Naples and Lisbon which are intended to be the parent

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

97

headquarters of three deployable CJTFs two land-based and one sea-based Both of these actions could provide signifi cant incentive for the Europeans to move toward enhanced C4ISR capabilities and greater interoperability with the United States military

Although NATO has a number of common force packages and headquarters under the CJTF label until Prague the Alliance lacked the capability to deploy a small agile and light intervention force with the dedicated transport logistics and communications capabilities such a force needs to sustain itself The NRF is intended to fi ll this gap This force would be highly ready available for out-of-area missions on short notice capable of forcible entry and able to establish a foothold as the point of the spear for a larger NATO ground force to follow In addition the force could do non-combatant evacuations support counterterrorism and assist with post-confl ict management

The NRF will consist of roughly 20000 troops plus naval and air capabilities drawn from the High Readiness Forces of the NATO members With lift logistics and network-capable equipment it could deploy within 5 days and be self-sustaining for 30 The NRF-designated forces would remain actively committed to this mission for a six-month period at which time a new set of forces would become the NRF package while the fi rst group stood down and returned to a lower state of readiness The force would train and exercise together during the highly ready period Because of its high state of readiness the Alliance could use the NRF more often than it might deploy its massive heavier slower capabilities (Binnendijk and Kugler 2002 117ndash32)

The NRF capability has a deeper signifi cance While it would be time-consuming and costly to overhaul all of European NATOrsquos current forces for more agile network-based capabilities the NRF rotation scheme provides an opportunity to cycle those forces through a period of training readiness and stand-down one unit at a time After two years it is hoped that the Europeans will provide the NRF with the ldquoenablersrdquo (lift C4ISR and logistics) currently supplied by the United States Training European forces for agile fl exible operations and equipping them with the enablers they need including networked C4ISR could over time convert existing European military capabilities to a more modern networked force For some supporters NRF constitutes an intense European upgrade program by stealth (Becher 2003 25)

It is not clear that all the allies agree with this vision of the NRF Not all are committed to cycle large elements of their land forces through the NRF and may choose instead to assign a smaller proportion of their forces to the NRF missions and cycle them at a higher rate Germany for example has decided to create three categories of forces only the most highly ready of which will cycle through for the NRF For some allies this approach avoids the expense of upgrading all forces to NRF missions and capabilities over time

For some European allies moreover the relationship between the NRF and the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) is unclear For some NRF is seen as a ldquolast chancerdquo to work with the US military on global military challenges and engage the United States with European defense planning For others investment

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

98

in the NRF is seen as competing with their commitment to the ERRF Though the Alliance view is that the two are compatible not all the allies agree This tension over rapid reaction force planning refl ects a broader uncertainty about the transatlantic defense planning relationship

There is also a difference of view over the role US forces will play in the NRF Europeans have a strong desire for the United States to participate directly in NRF training and exercising and for US forces to be fully integrated into the NRF American sources and initial exercises suggest that the US goal is for the NRF to become a predominantly European capability for rapid deployment which could link up with a separate interoperable American force However this lack of joint US training with the NRF could ultimately impede the ability of the United States and NATO Europe to operate together on the battlefi eld (Binnendijk 2004 3ndash8)

These differing views have implications for the C4ISR elements of the NRF In the all-European case C2 communications and sensoring assets could be entirely European as long as the technology allowed them to plug and play with the United States permitting the download of data interoperable communications and a common sense of the battlespace The US-engaged model could provide greater incentive for both forces to develop common equipment and software to ensure that the force could operate seamlessly

The NRF clearly constitutes a major new NATO commitment The fi rst test bed elements of the force were stood up only a year after Prague and have held several exercises Full NRF operating capability is expected by the summer of 2006 The early training and exercises will test C4ISR requirements and reveal shortfalls that could provide incentive for European investment in the C4ISR arena since the bulk of the C4ISR capability continues to be supplied by the US

The third Prague decision with important long-term implications for the transatlantic relationship in C4ISR is the restructuring of Alliance commands The NATO command structure has now been substantially revised with an Allied Command Operations in Europe and a new Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk VA with operations in Europe The creation of ACT combined with the change in NATO missions puts a premium on upgrades to NATOrsquos C2 and communications infrastructure (Barry 2003 4)

ACT is directly responsible for transformation activities in NATO It supports transformation planning provides lessons learned to national planners lobbies for NATO investment in network-centric programs writes doctrine for network-centric operations and develops educational materials for NATO training activities such as those conducted by the Joint Warfare Center in Norway It could play a central role in supporting and reviewing national investments in network-based capabilities and supporting the active C4I program of NC3A The commander of ACT is dual-hatted as the Joint Forces Commander of the United States positioning ACT as a bridge between US transformation and network-centric thinking and experimentation and European efforts (Forbes 2003 4) European military sources have shown a high degree of interest in ACT programs and activities seeking a high degree of participation ACT is positioned to be an important player in NATOrsquos planning processes It leads the Defense Planning Process

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

99

including the development of the Defense Requirements Review a classifi ed analytic assessment of the minimum military capabilities needed to meet the Alliancersquos goal of carrying out up to three major joint operations simultaneously ACT has also developed some 30 generic scenarios used to inventory capabilities ACTrsquos focus on qualitative force goals could help member nations develop crucial capabilities or force attributes rather than merely reaching quantitative goals

ACT also assesses national contributions to NATO in coordination with national military authorities In addition it has developed a Strategic Vision for transformation and is developing concepts for Allied Future Joint Operations As a part of its goal of driving transformation in the Alliance ACT has worked to establish relationships with other NATO agencies including the NC3A the NATO Undersea Research Center the Research and Technology Organization and the NATO Standardization Agency as well as NATOrsquos educational centers

ACT holds great promise provided its activities are given priority in Washington DC The priority the US plans to give to ACT remains to be tested In addition ACTrsquos role in the allied and US defense planning along with its ability to review national-level C4ISR programs is not yet clear It remains to be seen whether this institutional reform creates incentives both for European force transformation and for more intense transatlantic commitments to interoperability especially in C4ISR

NATO has taken steps since ACT to reinforce the commitment to network-based operations especially the creation of the NATO Network-Enabled Capabilities project In November 2002 the NC3B announced the intention of developing a NATO equivalent of the American NCW concept and the British NEC The fi rst step in this process will be a feasibility study examining the technical and organizational issues such a concept would involve in the NATO context Led by the NC3A with the support of ACT this feasibility study takes a European view of transformation using the terms ldquonetwork enabledrdquo and ldquocapabilitiesrdquo instead of the American ldquonetwork-centricrdquo and ldquowarfarerdquo

Rather than wait for a joint NATO agreement about the investment and organization of the NATO Network-Enabled Capabilities (NNEC) study nine NATO nations (Canada France Germany Italy the Netherlands Norway Spain the United Kingdom and the United States) agreed in November 2003 to jointly fund the study Each nation has agreed to contribute 150000 euros for a total of 1350000 euros The study has delivered a roadmap for NATO to guide the creation of a network-enabled capability for its 26 member nations This roadmap takes into account interoperability issues commercial and technology trends and relevant national assets (both existing and planned) The study covered how network-enabled capabilities can be deployed by the NRF and how national information ownership issues can be overcome With completion of the study in 2005 the NNEC concept was taken over by ACT and made part of the Commandrsquos long-term capability development requirements which in turn form the basis for future NATO procurement In addition ACT conducted two NNEC training courses in June and October of 2005 the second of which took place at the Commandrsquos new C2 Center of Excellence in the Netherlands

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

100

The 2004 Istanbul NATO Summit further stressed the Alliancersquos need to increase the deployability and usability of its forces and for continuing the transformation process already underway The fi nal communiqueacute mentioned in particular the streamlined command arrangements ndash including the establishment of ACT ndash the NRF and a commonly funded AGS program The summit also committed to a project to provide guidance on improving various NATO capabilities including operational planning and intelligence specifi cally for interoperable and deployable forces able to carry out operations and operate jointly in a complex security environment

Other multinational network programs

Outside of the NATO context several other international interoperability frameworks have been established with the aim of achieving better C4ISR coordination between the United States and its allies These are working toward common military standards for equipment fi elded by allied forces including some NATO countries as well as Australia and New Zealand They include the American British Canadian Australian Armiesrsquo Standardization Program (ABCA) the Air Standardization Coordinating Committee (ASCC) the Australian Canadian New Zealand United Kingdom and United States Naval C4 Organization (AUSCANNZUKUS) the Combined Communications Electronics Board (CCEB) the Multilateral Interoperability Program (MIP) and the Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) Another forum known as The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP) is not a military standardization forum but maintains close relationships with the other above-mentioned programs to coordinate the defense RampD efforts of Australia Canada New Zealand the United Kingdom and the United States Of all the above-mentioned interoperability entities the MIC and the MIP are the only ones to include European countries other than the United Kingdom

The Multinational Interoperability Council

In 1996 Australia Canada France Germany the United Kingdom and the United States create the MIC to provide oversight of coalition interoperability and stimulate improvements among the countries most likely and most capable of leading future coalitions Initially referred to as the Six Nation Council the name was changed to the MIC in 1999 Later the member states granted New Zealand and NATO ACT observer status and in 2005 accepted Italy as the Councilrsquos seventh member

The MIC is administered through the US Joint Staffrsquos Deputy Director for Global Operations (J3 DDGO) to provide a multinational senior level forum for addressing the core issues affecting information interoperability between coalition forces It is concerned with policies doctrines operational planning and networking capabilities relevant to the information sharing capabilities of member states It also serves as the senior coordinating body for the member nations in

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

101

resolving interoperability issues and promotes dialogue between operational planners C4ISR technology experts and defense policy analysts involved in coalition operations

MIC membership includes senior operations doctrine and C4ISR experts from each of the member nations It is divided into Multinational Interoperability Working Groups (MIWG) each of which explores specifi c problems in coalition interoperability and proposes solutions There is no fi xed number of MIWGs they are created when problems have been identifi ed and disbanded after their work is done Each MIWG is comprised of representatives from the member nations from various services and agencies according to the needs of the group An Executive Support Committee (EXECOM) assists the MIWGs in addressing actions in a timely fashion when it is not possible to convene a meeting of the entire MIWG The Committee includes a representative of each member nationrsquos defense attacheacute staff in Washington a member of the Working Group on National Correlation and the MIC Executive Secretary (a member of the US Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I)

Currently the MIC has MIWGs that focus on coalition warfare doctrine collabo-rative planning advanced C2 concepts requirements for information exchange and the sharing of classifi ed intelligence secure video- and tele-conferencing and the creation of a combined Wide Area Network known as GRIFFIN The fi ve existing MIWGs cover operations networking logistics doctrines plans and procedures and concept development and experimentation Additionally there is a Capstone MIWG in charge of formulating the MICrsquos strategic plan for the future

MIWGs generally meet twice a year Once they propose a solution it is passed on to the MIC which meets annually to respond and passes its recommendations on to the member nations The organization cannot do more than advise and report its recommendations may or may not eventually be accepted by the member nations The MIC also produces an annual report on policy doctrine and planning for warfi ghting interoperability NATOrsquos doctrine on coalition operations is an important guide for the MIC on this matter

MIC reports to date have concentrated on lessons learned from coalition warfare exercises specifi cally East Timor and Afghanistan on the need for better information sharing applications between the member countries including secure tele-conferencing video-conferencing and e-mail and on a Coalition-Building Guide The latter signed by the members in 2005 identifi es the notion of a coalition Lead Nation defi ned as ldquothat nation with the will and capability competence and infl uence to provide the essential elements of political consultation and military leadership to coordinate the planning mounting and execution of a coalition military operationrdquo (Multinational Interoperability Council 2005 v) France has expressed concern about this defi nition suggesting that circumstances may dictate the need for several Lead Nations in an operation It also requested with German support that the Guide state that only the United Nations can act to sanction coalition actions a request that is not yet refl ected in the fi nal version presented in 2002

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

102

The MIC has also coordinated four Multinational Experiments (MNE) intended to contribute to the interoperability between member nations The fi rst such exercise undertaken in 2001 examined how a combined joint force headquarters would conduct rapid decisive operations within a distributed collaborative information environment with coalition partners MNE2 examined the development of a multinational operational net assessment as well as coalition multinational information sharing MNE3 in February 2004 explored concepts and supporting tools for effects-based operations and to assist the development of future processes organizations and technologies at the operational and joint task force levels of command It also included NATO participation and evaluated the ability of the NRF to support the planning of a coalition effects-based campaign The fourth and fi nal MNE addresses effects-based operations and C2 issues While some view the MIC and its exercises as key tools for France Germany Italy and the United Kingdom to improve interoperability with the US it is not clear how other countries not involved in this forum will benefi t from its lessons (Boyer 2004)

The Combined Communications Electronics Board

The CCEB includes Australia Canada New Zealand the United Kingdom and the United States It coordinates issues related to military communications raised by a member nation Its origins date back to the Combined Communications Board created during the Second World War which defi ned combined UK-US communications policies with Canada Australia and New Zealand as observers Canada became a full member in 1951 Australia in 1969 and New Zealand in 1972 when it was renamed CCEB Germany and France recently sought membership in this organization but both were denied

The CCEBrsquos mission is to maximize the effectiveness of combined operations by defi ning a common environment in which users can share and apply collective information and know-how Although covering all C4 systems of the member nations the CCEB does not own any of them Rather it seeks to defi ne architectures standards and operational procedures that its members will adopt when designing and modifying their national systems As much as possible these will be based on commercial standards and products Over time implementing the CCEBrsquos recommendations should improve interoperability and eventually create a virtual single system used by all members Adopting these standards is voluntary however which means that interoperability will be advanced only if the nations make the decision to implement the CCEB-developed standards

The CCEBrsquos one permanent full-time member of staff the Permanent Secretary coordinates the organizationrsquos daily activities All other personnel are drawn from national organizations on a part-time temporary basis Member nations contribute resources individually to specifi c tasks The senior C4 offi cials or Principals appointed to the CCEB by the member nations are in charge of formulating the organizationrsquos broader goals and of bringing them into national decision-making bodies An Executive Group coordinates the development of policies and plans

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

103

formulated by the Principals and prioritizes tasks In addition the member nationrsquos representatives in Washington DC may be tasked individually to work on CCEB assignments as may staff members at national headquarters

The majority of the CCEBrsquos work is undertaken under the auspices of Working Groups which consider specifi c issues raised by member nations Currently Working Groups are in place to discuss information security frequency planning directory services wide area networks (specifi cally the GRIFFIN WAN) and communications publications In addition Task Forces may be established to address specifi c short-term issues one currently deals with secure military messaging

In September 2001 the CCEB and the MIC signed a Statement of Cooperation (SOC) under which the CCEB is recognized as the expert technical body on C4 systems while the MIC is recognized as responsible for providing leadership in joint and coalition warfare doctrine and requirements Since the CCEBrsquos aim is to defi ne a joint and combined C4 interoperability environment and to enhance interoperability among C4 systems the SOC ensures that this goal is coordinated with efforts for developing doctrines and solutions brought forward by the MIC for information sharing between countries Equally important the SOC enables non-CCEB members of the MIC ndash Germany Italy and France ndash to participate in those CCEB groups directly involved in MIC-directed activities and to receive status updates on CCEB activities at MIC meetings In addition the SOC has also led to some technical MIC work being subcontracted to the CCEB

The Multilateral Interoperability Program

In April 1998 Canada France Germany Italy the United Kingdom and the United States created the MIP merging two existing programs the BIP (Battlefi eld Interoperability Program) and the QIP (Quadrilateral Interoperability Program) both of which were aimed at improving interoperability between land C2 systems In 2002 the MIP merged with the Army Tactical Command and Control Information System (ATCCIS) program which had been working since 1980 on technical standards and specifi cations for NATO membersrsquo C2 systems to make them interoperable

In November 2003 24 nations (Canada Denmark France Germany Italy the Netherlands Norway Spain Turkey the United Kingdom and the United States as full members and Australia Austria Belgium Bulgaria the Czech Republic Finland Greece Hungary Lithuania Poland Romania Slovenia and Sweden as associate members) and two NATO commands (ACT and AFNORTH which today is Joint Force Command Brunssum) signed a Statement of Intent to advance international interoperability of land C2 systems at all levels from corps to battalion to support multinational combined and joint operations This goal is to be achieved through a technical interoperability solution or baseline that could be integrated into membersrsquo existing C2 infrastructures However the program would not actually develop a common C2 system leaving it to the membersrsquo discretion to accept the technical solution

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

104

The MIP solution has two technical aspects a common data model known as the Command and Control Information Exchange Data Model (C2IEDM) and a set of procedures and protocols that allow the replication of data among different C2 systems known as the MIP Data Exchange Mechanism (MIPDEM) Countries that incorporate this solution into their C2 systems can share any information they choose with other nationsrsquo C2 systems over any means of communication available The British Canadian Danish French German Italian Dutch Norwegian Portuguese Spanish and US armiesrsquo C2 systems have to date been certifi ed as MIP conformant and more are expected to follow

In 2004 NATO adopted the MIPrsquos C2IEDM data model which signifi ed the increasing importance and acceptation of the MIP as a standard-setting entity It seems increasingly likely that the MIP solution will have a signifi cant infl uence on the development and design of future national systems These solutions however are not ldquoplug-and-playrdquo solutions In order to ensure true semantic interoperability far-reaching modifi cations to the core of national C2 information systems are necessary rather than just the addition of mapping adapters as new interfaces to the existing systems (Schmitt 2005 2)

The Combined Endeavor exercises

As another multilateral effort the Headquarters of the US European Command (EUCOM) sponsors and coordinates a multinational command control communications and computer (C4) exercise known as Combined Endeavor Its aim is to develop C2 and communications interoperability in preparation for crisis response operations by testing and documenting solutions that may then be integrated into national systems The exercise has been held every year since 1995 each builds on the capabilities demonstrated and lessons learned during the previous one The exercises also include demonstrations of emerging C4 technologies developed by a nation or group of nations that may in the future contribute to coalition interoperability solutions

Combined Endeavor has grown from its fi rst exercise in 1995 That exercise included some 3300 interoperability tests conducted by 10 participating nations during a 2-week period in Germany and Austria In 2005 the exercise included 43 partner nations and 2 multinational organizations (NATO and the South East Europe Brigade) all testing advanced systems and networks The 2005 exercise included over 15000 interoperability tests including a 1-gigabyte core communications backbone between several nodes used to transmit voice video and data A Combined Joint Communications Coordination Center was stood up to demonstrate the effectiveness of network management procedures for multinational networks The 2005 exercise also put all participating nations through the US and NATO network security accreditation process prior to connecting to the network demonstrating the capability to build a protected coalition network a signifi cant achievement in the fi eld of information assurance

At the end of each exercise the results are documented in an interoperability guide that codifi es the results from all interoperability tests down to the level

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

105

of wiring diagrams for specifi c systems This information is crucial to planning future multinational network-based operations It enables forces to plug and play based on proven results Interoperability solutions that have emerged from past Combined Endeavor exercises have been used to support military peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations in the Balkans Kosovo Afghanistan Iraq Indonesia and Liberia

The Combined Endeavor exercise is an important tool for highlighting the benefi ts of networks in modern security operations Participants observe fi rst-hand how advanced C4 capabilities can make them more interoperable and thus more effective in a multinational environment By involving not only EU and NATO members but also allies from other regions such as South Africa and Central Asia the importance of networking C4 and coalition interoperability is conveyed to a wide array of potential coalition partners

Conclusion

As an organization NATO has clearly moved strongly to advance the Alliancersquos C4ISR capabilities into the twenty-fi rst century and has taken multiple steps to incentivize its members to move in this direction While the traditional NATO force planning methods do not yet fully support this effort the decision to create the NRF could constitute a major step toward a transformed capability NATO common programs for C2 and communications including space communications are being modernized Several new RampT investment programs hold promise for a move toward a more integrated C2 communications and sensor data architecture including ACCS AGS TMD and CAESAR Finally the Prague decisions (PCC NRF and ACT) all could help redefi ne alliance capabilities and restructure European member state investments

This is however a more fragile trend than it appears Should US force planning and investment continue to be largely unilateral conducted outside the Alliance framework the transatlantic C4ISR gap will be harder to bridge In 2002 for example John Stenbit then Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command Control Communications and Intelligence suggested this might be a preferred US policy noting that interoperability is ldquobest thought of in bilateral and multilateral relations not alliancesrdquo He added that ldquothe dynamics of how these communities of interest are going to form and un-form and around which changing sets of parameters are quicker than the processes that NATO considers when looking forwardrdquo (Stenbit 2002 85ndash92)

For NATO to continue to play a key role in the process of reshaping European C4ISR capabilities the US will need to put interoperability at the center of its C4ISR planning process which is not currently the case NATO interoperability features in US equipment designs tend to be removed when programs are trimmed to meet budget constraints and the key performance parameter now included in most American systems is interoperability within US forces not with NATO (Barry 2003 9) The US will need to give ACT priority as the bridge to European capabilities US funding decisions with respect to ACCS AGS or TMD can either

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

106

strengthen or weaken efforts to create a common European C4ISR architecture The US staying at the margin of the NRF could also undermine European willingness to invest seriously in that effort A US decision to delay diminish or cancel the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter which has signifi cant transatlantic participation could have a major impact on the willingness of the European allies to commit to common programs Finally continuing US unwillingness to reform its export control and technology transfer rules will weaken the incentive European allies have to commit to transatlantic collaborative technology programs inside or outside NATO

There could also be trends in European policies that weaken the role of NATO in enhancing transatlantic C4ISR interoperability and the move toward networked capabilities While the European Unionrsquos defense activities (discussed in the next chapter) are not as advanced as the changes in NATO if the EU moves toward a vision and capabilities that are separate from NATO it could undermine the NATO effort There are important positive reasons for the Europeans to create more autonomous European capabilities but it will also be important to manage the evolution of the EU-NATO relationship so progress can continue in both frameworks Furthermore whether through the European Union or NATO a failure to provide adequate European investment in C4ISR or to continue funding for PCC priorities and ACCS AGS and TMD programs could weaken the NATO effort and interoperability in general Finally national investments in Europe need to give continued priority to interoperability within Europe and across the Atlantic for the effort to succeed

In addition to NATO the US and the Europeans need to be sure to rationalize and give appropriate attention to work in the other multinational frameworks that address specifi c areas of C4ISR interoperability All of the frameworks discussed in this chapter involve the United States as a key participant and place great emphasis on transatlantic interoperability issues However with the exception of the MIC and the MIP none involve European partners other than the United Kingdom The MIC analyzes policies doctrines and procedures for coalition interoperability and the MIP with a much broader membership base is limited to specifi c command and control solutions for land forces Neither deals with technical solutions to broad interoperability challenges Furthermore the denial of membership to France and Germany could set back transatlantic collaboration on standards architectures and protocols for interoperability between national C4ISR systems This leaves two of the three European militaries currently capable of executing out-of-area security operations outside the interoperability loop

107

5

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NETWORK-BASED

CAPABILITIES

Defense and security issues have emerged as a major concern for the European Union over the past decade stimulated and accelerated by the lessons Europeans have learned from the interoperability diffi culties experienced by European forces operating in the fi rst Gulf War Bosnia the Kosovo air campaign Afghanistan and Iraq Most of these lessons involve obstacles to achieving successful C4ISR interoperability

Increasingly major European militaries feel the need for a common rapid deployment military capability that can operate autonomously using its own dedicated equipment transport and C4ISR or borrowing NATO assets Slowly steps are being taken to make this intention a reality including internal developments in the European Union and the negotiation of the ldquoBerlin Plusrdquo agreement with NATO which gives the European Union recourse to NATO assets to carry out crisis management operations when NATO is not involved

During 2003ndash4 the European Union took signifi cant strides forward in developing operational capability and conducting strategic defense planning It conducted independent policing operations in Bosnia a military peacekeeping mission in Macedonia and a small peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Operation Artemis in the Congo became a model for the creation of the EU Battlegroups one year later (see below) In December 2004 the European Union Force (EUFOR) replaced the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) as the peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina

In the area of strategic defense planning the European Council decided in 2004 to focus on defense planning outside the framework of its Constitution discussion and accelerated the establishment of a European-level agency responsible for armaments policy and oversight on the capabilities process The European Union also announced the Headline Goal 2010 which builds on the Helsinki Headline Goal expanding and deepening EU commitments to strengthen its military and civilian capabilities with a strong emphasis on interoperability deployability and sustainability In the same year the Council announced a plan to create 13 EU Battlegroups at the Military Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels

The failure to ratify the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands has not impeded progress towards these improved European defense capabilities It seems clear the many of the EU members are seeking ways to participate more

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

108

effectively in overseas military operations including combat peacekeeping and post-confl ict reconstruction both autonomously and in coalition with the United States regardless of the uncertainties of the EU constitutional process Such operations will require new assets for rapid force deployment and especially systems that will enable these forces to collect intelligence share it amongst themselves and with headquarters and act upon it in a coordinated manner

EU strategic defense plans and capabilities

European-level strategic thinking and defense planning have made signifi cant strides since the Maastricht treaty was signed in 1991 (Adams 2001a) Initially European militaries and defense budgets shrank with the end of the Cold War as they did in the United States Several changes marked turning points for Europe The Maastricht Treaty committed the European Unionrsquos Members States to forging a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and created the Second Pillar in the European Union involving political and security issues The European Council ndash representing the Member States ndash would handle this on an intergovernmental basis The Treaty of Amsterdam which came into force in 1999 went a step further defi ning the CFSP as ldquoincluding the progressive framing of a common defense policy hellip which might lead to a common defenserdquo (European Union 2002 Article 1-12-4)

The European Rapid Reaction Force and the Battlegoups

In 1999 the European Council meeting in Cologne set a European Union goal of having the capacity for independent action in the form of capable military forces and the means to use these forces in response to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO That same year in Helsinki the European Council crafted an EU Headline Goal to create a force of 50000ndash60000 troops that could be deployed within 60 days and supported in theater for a year The mission of this force would be what was called the Petersberg tasks humanitarian and rescue missions peacekeeping and operations of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking This range of missions was defi ned at a WEU declaration made in Petersberg Germany in June 1992 and was codifi ed in the Amsterdam Treaty

To oversee this work the European Union created the Political and Security Committee The PSC would consider and act on foreign policy and security issues and manage crisis interventions The Union also created a Military Committee consisting of senior offi cers from the Member States which has responsibility for military planning and a Military Staff of roughly 150 based in Brussels to examine and shape military requirements for the Headline Goal force

The European Union then inventoried European national military capabilities relevant to the Headline Goal and set objectives to meet inventory shortfalls held Capability Improvement Conferences to track commitments and created the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) with nationally-led working groups

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

109

to develop strategies for meeting key shortfalls At the Laeken Belgium meeting in December 2002 the Council declared that the European Union had achieved the capability to conduct some crisis management operations The European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) that emerged from this Headline Goal process is committed to missions that are somewhat different from those defi ned for the NATO Response Force The NRF is intended to be lighter and more rapidly deployable for early arrival in out-of-area missions while the ERRF is largely intended for humanitarian and peacekeeping missions

This distinction between the Petersberg tasks and high-intensity combat has been a gray area in the European defense discussion To some supporters the European Unionrsquos ERRF was distinct from a European high-intensity network-based military capability while to others the higher end of the Petersberg tasks overlapped with high intensity combat and would require a network-based capability

With respect to C4ISR and network-based operations this distinction may not be signifi cant Any EU force that is intended to operate on a coalition basis will require C2 systems that cover the entire force Whether it is heavy and slow or light and mobile the utility of ISR systems for the total force is unarguable The European Unionrsquos review of capabilities and the goals being set clearly point toward more network-centric forces Moreover while the European Union can make use of both national (currently German British and French possibly Greek and Italian in the near future) and NATO operational headquarters (the latter under the Berlin Plus agreement) for controlling its missions these assets are not mobile European military planners are aware that a future ERRF would need dedicated mobile C2 and communications systems to deploy in the fi eld

The European Unionrsquos ability to deploy small and effective response forces has been further enhanced by a separate EU decision to create smaller mobile Battlegroups This decision began with a 2003 Franco-British agreement according to which they would encourage the European Union to develop a capability that could respond more rapidly than the emerging ERRF with particular attention to the readiness deployability interoperability and sustainability of such a force This goal was further elaborated in London in November 2003 the objective being a 1500-person EU force built on the model of Operation Artemis which could deploy in 15 days with appropriate transportation and sustainability

Increasingly offi cials working on the European Constitution realized that the Headline Goal force would only get part of the way toward the objective of rapid reaction and out-of-area operations (European Union 2003) The text of the European Unionrsquos draft constitution pointed toward a more ambitious European security strategy The fi nal report of the Conventionrsquos working group on defense called not only for the Headline Goal force but also for ldquosmaller rapid response elements with very high readinessrdquo including C2 intelligence and reconnaissance (European Convention Working Group ndash Defense 2002 5) The working group also recommended that the Petersberg tasks be updated and broadened to include confl ict prevention joint disarmament operations military advice and assistance post-confl ict stabilization and support for anti-terrorism operations in non-

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

110

European Union countries It urged Members States to implement more intense defense cooperation than that provided for in the Headline Goal force (European Convention Working Group ndash Defense 2002 23ndash4)

The 2004 Constitutional Treaty itself repeated many of these themes It amended the Petersberg tasks to include joint disarmament operations humanitarian and rescue missions provision of military advice and assistance confl ict prevention and peacekeeping crisis management peacemaking and post-confl ict stabilization It also tasked the proposed European Armaments Research and Military Capabilities Agency ndash todayrsquos European Defense Agency ndash with helping to identify the military capability objectives of the Member States and evaluate them (European Union 2004)

At the November 2004 EU Military Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels the members moved even further announcing the intention to create EU Battlegroups each numbering 1500 ground troops These will be smaller in scope than the ERRF but are intended to correct some of its shortcomings especially the need for more rapid deployment The Battlegroups are planned to reach the theater of operations in 15 days and sustain an operation for 30 days (120 days with rotation) France the UK and Italy each pledged to have one operational Battlegroup ready by the end of 2005 Ten other Battlegroups will be developed collaboratively by different combinations of EU Member States and one will include Norway a non-EU member These Battlegroups are intended to be operational by 2007 by which time the European Union should be able to undertake two concurrent Battlegroup-sized rapid response operations

The European Defense Agency

The constitutional discussion focused particular attention on the need for a more focused EU capability to deal with military requirements the evolution of capabilities to meet those requirements and the readiness of the European defense industrial and technology base to cope with those needs The Convention recommended the creation of a European Armaments and Strategic Research Agency to track progress toward the interoperability and force readiness necessary to accomplish the wider missions they were promoting (European Convention Working Group ndash Defense 2002 23ndash4) In 2003 this particular proposal was advanced on a separate track largely supported by French and British government policies The EU Council of Ministers decided to ask the Council staff to plan the implementation of the European Defense Agency well ahead of the schedule for ratifying and implementing the proposals for a new EU constitutional charter The mission of the agency was elaborated in detail in November 2003 including operational requirements strengthening the defense industrial and technological base defi ning a European capabilities and armaments policy and helping the Council evaluate the improvement of military capabilities

The Council decision created an Agency Establishment Team under High Representative Javier Solana to present proposals by April 2004 for decisions in June Those proposals were intended to move the EDA issue onto a fast track

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

111

covering the structure and organization of the agency its internal working methods its working relationship with the Council and the Commission ties with the Organization Conjoint pour la Cooperation en Matiere drsquoArmament (OCCAR) and the Western European Union (WEU) RampD programs (see below) its budget administration and staffi ng It was also to outline a fi rst operational program for the agency in the fi elds of capabilities development armaments cooperation industrial and technology base policy research promotion and potential plans for creating a European defense market

The Establishment Team of 12 led by British civil servant Nick Witney began work in February 2004 Its proposals moved toward creating a relatively small agency directed by a steering committee of ministers of defense and funded by joint contributions to an administrative fund They discussed creating a second funding arrangement in the European Union for defense RampT studies and only the gradual absorption of existing multilateral procurement activities such as OCCAR (Tigner 2004 4)

The Agency came into existence in the summer of 2004 Despite a modest 2005 budget of 25 million euros and a staff of 78 the EDA has made important progress in the fi rst year particularly in areas relevant to network-based operations Two ldquofl agship projectsrdquo have been initiated in the C4ISR realm The fi rst undertaken by the Agencyrsquos RampT Directorate funds projects related to long-endurance UAVs (described later in this chapter) The second headed by the Capabilities Directorate seeks to improve European capabilities and interoperability in command control and communications

Initially a joint EDA-EU Military Staff study identifi ed a wide range of C3I capability gaps Many were characterized as ldquoderiving from the absence of any detailed assessment of overall C3 requirements for ESDP or coherent architectures for satisfying themrdquo (Council of the European Union 2005 4) The study also highlighted the potential of software-defi ned radio for C3 interoperability and submitted a detailed proposal for pursuing additional C3 work to the Capabilities Steering Board While the overall direction of EDArsquos C3I agenda is still evolving it is likely to include specifi c problems in ongoing EU operations (such as Operation Althea in Bosnia) and the needs of the emerging Battlegroups In addition the agenda may explore improvements in EU procurement of satellite bandwidth for future operations (House of Lords 2005 21)

Focusing on capabilities

Despite these recent developments there is not currently a joint multinational force at the European level that can fi eld common C4ISR assets and carry out fully network-based operations It is not yet clear whether the Member States will commit the resources needed to upgrade and integrate the national capabilities already described Despite the budgetary constraints that make such a capability diffi cult there is an active process underway at the European level to give Member States the incentive to modernize and transform forces and equipment to make them more interoperable

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

112

The Headline Goal and the European Capabilities Action Plan have identifi ed capability shortfalls and set priorities for meeting them The initial Headline Goal and evaluation processes through 2001 identifi ed 19 critical shortfalls and a process for meeting shortfalls The ECAP panels each chaired by a Member State include eight capabilities relevant to network-based operations UAVs for surveillance and target acquisition deployable communications modules headquarters theater surveillance and reconnaissance air picture strategic ISR IMINT collection HALEMALE UAVs early warning and distant detection at the strategic level

This fi rst stage of the ECAP process led to reports submitted in March 2003 proposing changes to national contributions or new acquisitions to fi ll the capability gaps The May 2003 Capabilities Conference then identifi ed ten groups to develop strategies for fi lling key shortfalls through acquisition leasing multinational projects or role specialization three of which deal with C4ISR capabilities headquarters (United Kingdom lead) UAVs (French lead) and space-based assets (French lead)

The weakness of the ECAP process is that it is voluntary and not clearly linked to funding decisions or coordinated with the EU Military Staff The ECAP groups could not design long-term procurement plans as national planners and procurement specialists were not members Proposed acquisitions faced major political and fi nancial hurdles Moreover ECAP was designed in the context of the Headline Goal target and was not linked to the rapid deployment Battlegroups discussed above The European Council decided in November 2003 to tighten the process develop a clear roadmap and begin to identify objectives timelines and reporting procedures for each group

Progress has been made since with respect to headquarters medical treatment facilities and nuclear chemical and biological defenses However the ECAP process continues to lack clear leadership and coordination The ECAP approach leaves it up to the Member States to decide when and how additional capabilities should be acquired and makes it diffi cult to achieve results in areas that require signifi cant fi nancial investments such as strategic lift and air-to-air refueling

Pressure on the members was increased by requiring them to set goals and timelines and to publish their results in regular Capability Improvement Charts presented during each rotating EU Presidency Progress remains minimal however particularly in areas relevant for network-based operations There are currently no new or planned projects growing out of the ECAP process and a number of the ECAP Project Groups have indicated that they have reached or are close to reaching the maximum possible results within the current framework

In May 2005 the European Council approved an EDAEU Military Committee evaluation report on the ECAP The report included a detailed review of the ECAP Project Groups and suggested refocusing their work in the framework of the 2010 Headline Goal The Project Group on interoperability for humanitarian and evacuation operations will be discontinued while those on Special Forces and helicopters will continue in their present format All others will be incorporated into a new more integrated process coordinated by the European Defense Agency

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

113

in the framework of broader European Security and Defense Policy goals Under newly established Integrated Development Teams military technological and industrial representatives will generate specifi c projects to fulfi ll capability shortfalls Together with the newly outlined Headline Goal 2010 this revised process may provide incentives for Member States to reaffi rm their ECAP commitments

Industrial base planning

Over the past 15 years the national governments and Commission of the European Union have taken several steps to advance the issue of a Europe-wide armaments policy to match the emerging force requirements and to ensure a healthy industrial and technology base The creation of the EDArsquos Industry and Market Directorate is the latest such step

From the perspective of the defense industrial and technology base the Europeans have three options for arming national or cross-national forces with particular attention to their interoperability They could acquire advanced defense technology from the United States which was common during the Cold War Buying American however is increasingly unattractive to European governments given the lack of reciprocal access for European fi rms to the US defense market the diffi culties encountered with US export control and technology transfer regulations and processes and the negative impact it would have on the smaller European industrial and technology base (Adams 2001b 30ndash4)

The second option is to develop defense systems and technologies on a transatlantic basis US trade and technology transfer rules make this diffi cult though the European industry is pursuing this option as the strategic partnership of EADS and Northrop Grumman and the Thales Raytheon Systems joint venture suggest However European fi rms and governments have been concerned that their smaller fi rms could be swallowed up by larger American partners and about the risk that technology would fl ow only one way from Europe to the United States

The third option is for Europeans to strengthen their own defense industrial and technology base to be able to supply their own defense technology independently of the United States as well as to build partnerships with ndash and create competition for ndash US companies There has been growing support in Europe for this third option To sustain a European defense industrial and technology base however requires removing the intra-European barriers to industry relations technology transfer defense trade and cross-national acquisition The policy developments of the past decade at the European level are slowly defi ning a more trans-European defense market The most important change has been the development of multilateral institutions and processes that facilitate a trans-European defense market and cooperative defense procurement The creation of the European Defense Agency could be a critical breakthrough empowering the European Union to become a player in armaments policy a role previously constrained by the terms of the European Union treaties (Schmitt 2003a 2003b)

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

114

The emergence of a European armaments market and matching policy is likely to be critical to the prospects for success in the ECAP and in the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) The harmonization of military requirements the standardization of equipment to meet those requirements the elimination of acquisition and research redundancies budgetary savings and greater interoperability could all fl ow from this development Efforts to create a defense industrial policy at the EU level to harmonize rules governing requirements and defense trade to create a framework for cross-European defense acquisition programs and to create EU-level structures that can deal with arms market policies will all contribute to reaching these goals

This industrial and technology base process has been underway for nearly a decade but progress has been marked in recent years In 1996 France Germany Italy and the United Kingdom created a Joint Armaments Cooperation Organiza-tion (known by its French acronym OCCAR for Organization Conjoint pour la Cooperation en Matiere drsquoArmament) to manage specifi c cross-European defense programs including the HOT Roland and Milan missiles the Tiger helicopter and recently the A400M transport aircraft OCCAR is based on intergovernmental agreements and has been restricted to joint production programs not research and development Although OCCAR is not an EU entity as interest has grown in an EU-level armaments policy other European Union members have joined (Belgium) or intend to do so (Spain Netherlands Sweden) The organization achieved independent legal status in 2001

In 1998 the six largest arms producing countries (United Kingdom France Germany Sweden Italy and Spain) signed a Letter of Intent (LOI) to address jointly a number of areas of policy that would facilitate a more trans-European defense market for European industry The LOI process which follows a Framework Agreement announced in 2001 covers security of defense supply export control processes security of information military research and technology technical information and harmonization of military requirements This process is also outside the European Union framework and clearly intergovernmental it creates no new European-level structures or organizations The goal is to make national rules and procedures in these areas compatible with each other not to harmonize all standards or policies Though the process is slow and laborious it does put the national bureaucracies of six countries into a working process with each other in an effort to defi ne policies that will integrate the European defense market

Interest in armaments policy has also developed inside the European Union itself Article 296 of the Amsterdam Treaty provides that ldquoany Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or the trade in arms munitions and war materialrdquo (European Commission 2004 6) European Union members referred to this Article for years to protect national industrial and technology base decisions from being part of the EU agenda In 1995 however the EU Council of Ministers took a limited fi rst step toward addressing these concerns creating a working group on Armaments Policy (POLARM) POLARM

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

115

activity remained limited until the early 2000s when a broader interest in this policy area emerged in Europe (Schmitt 2003b 32)

The European Commission the EUrsquos supranational secretariat has also had an interest in armaments policy despite the reluctance of the members to become more active in this area Since 2000 the Commission has had direct authority over dual-use export controls in the European Union though national governments continue to defi ne the contents of the control list through negotiations and retain authority over purely military exports The Commission has also begun trying to shape broader armaments and defense market policies (European Commission 1997 2003a) and has also encouraged private sector activities that would support the emergence of a stronger European Union policy in this area (European Commission 2002) The Commission also plays a more direct role in the area of dual-use space programs such as Galileo as discussed in the next chapter

The Commission has been particularly concerned with the question of how to enhance interoperability The STAR 21 report sponsored by the Commission in 2002 focused on the goal of enhancing European interoperability both in the EU and NATO contexts and ensuring European autonomy from the United States if needed The report pointed out that to be interoperable with the US or act autonomously EU military requirements needed to he harmonized and RampD shared at a European level (European Commission 2002 29ndash30) The Commissionrsquos 2003 communication on armaments policy argued strongly for a ldquogenuine European Defense Equipment Marketrdquo to provide economies of scale greater acquisition bargaining power and especially to meet the needs of interoperability To achieve interoperability in a cost-effective way the Commission argued ldquothe solution would be to equip the national units that make up these forces increasingly with the same equipmentrdquo (European Commission 2003a 6)

Progress toward a coherent EU policy on armaments and greater interoperability and modern C4ISR across European forces will be slow at the European level The European Defense Agency will play a critical role defi ning capabilities goals more broadly than the Headline Goal devoting attention to network-centric C4ISR capabilities supporting research efforts to support those goals encouraging national governments to realign their budgets to acquire key technologies and systems coordinating national acquisitions and providing a central point for the realignment of the European defense market The EDA authority remains limited but over time it could develop the capabilities needed to perform these tasks at the European level as other EU-level policy institutions have done in the past

The EU process is largely an intergovernmental one and has led to relatively slow policy change The Member States will inevitably restrain EDArsquos activity To be fully effective it will need greater autonomy and a larger budget The linkages between its capabilities functions its evaluation functions its research support and its procurement functions will need to be clarifi ed The relationship with the Commission which manages its own armaments research policy process and has explicit responsibilities for industrial research competition and trade policy will need to be carefully defi ned Harmonizing its relationship with the

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

116

non-EU processes and organizations ndash OCCAR and the LOI ndash will be complex But the fi rst steps toward greater European-level responsibilities for defense and armaments policy have clearly been taken

Defense research and technology programs

The European defense research and technology investment and harmonization of national RampT investments will be key to achieving greater interoperability and networked forces without major additional budget expenditures The United States outspends the European NATO allies by a ratio of 51 on total defense RampD a ratio that has grown with the increases in US defense budgets in the early 2000s The United States RampT investment has also explicitly focused on network-centric technologies military transformation and C4ISR By contrast European RampT investments remain largely national duplicative and poorly coordinated across national boundaries making the total less than the sum of its parts

The general view in Europe is that most EU Member States underspend on research and development In 2002 the European Council set a goal of spending three per cent of GDP on RampD in each Member State by 2010 At current growth rates the EU average will reach only 23 per cent by that year Only two European countries Sweden and Finland currently spend above the 3 per cent target and the European Union average is still just under 2 per cent (compared to 27 per cent in the United States) (European Commission 2003c 48 52) In defense RampD the trend is even less promising In 2001 the Member States of the European Union spent slightly over $9 billion on defense-related RampD or 75 per cent of the average defense budget (compared with almost 14 per cent of the US defense budget in the same year) (Adams et al 2004 122)

Article 296 of the Amsterdam Treaty has made it diffi cult for the European Commission to address the RampD problem restricting Commission action to cases where trade policies or dual-use RampD investments distorted the operations of the civilian common market Moreover due to the sensitivity of the issue for some Member States the Commission intervened reluctantly and slowly As a result defense research and technology investments have remained a domain for the Member States with relatively little cooperation in the EU context (James and Gummett 1998)

The Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) program of the WEU has been a major exception at the European-level WEAG was created when the WEU absorbed the Independent European Program Group (IEPG) which between 1976 and 1992 had acted as an armaments procurement cooperation forum for all of the European NATO countries (except Iceland) Since its establishment WEAG which has 19 members has stimulated collaborative defense RampT programs among its member countries and has examined the harmonization of defense requirements and opening national defense markets to European-wide competition Separately an agreement the System Of Cooperation for Research And Technology in Europe (SOCRATE) was created in 1998 to enable Finland and Sweden ndash at that time not WEAG members ndash to participate in WEAG RampD projects Later SOCRATE

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

117

was amended to allow the participation of Austria the Czech Republic Hungary and Poland The annual WEAG budget has averaged about 100 million euros in recent years WEAG defense technology RampT is handled under Panel II of the organization (Panel I being concerned with cooperative equipment procurement and Panel II with policies and procedures to enhance collaboration) Under this panel there exist several instruments for collaborative RampT

WEAG Panel IIrsquos fi rst instrument formed in 1989 was European Cooperation for the Long Term in Defense (EUCLID) EUCLID supports projects proposed by government representatives that are jointly funded by the participating governments and the private sector The work is carried out by an industrial consortium including at least one company from each of the participating nations EUCLID covers 13 Common European Priority Areas (CEPA) of technology These include such network-oriented technologies as UAVs and robotics military space and advanced communications Each CEPA has its own Lead Nation appointed by WEAG Panel II responsible for reporting on its activities and an industrial team of leading companies

The second WEAG instrument is the Technology Arrangements for Laboratories for Defense European Science (THALES) Signed in November 1996 THALES facilitates cooperation between government-owned or sponsored defense research agencies although governments may choose to designate a private-sector entity to undertake work on specifi c projects The collaborative projects in the THALES framework are Joint Programs (JP) established within the EUCLID CEPAs in a manner identical to the way EUCLID collaborations are formed Each of the participants in the JP is responsible for placing contracts or making arrangements at the national level

A third mechanism EUROFINDER allows industry to propose RampD projects and receive co-funding for them Proposals need not be associated with any particular WEAG CEPA but since they address national defense RampT strategies they are often aligned with government technology priorities Once a year the WEAG members receive and evaluate proposals from industry Each EUROFINDER program is co-funded by the governments that wish to participate and by the industrial participants The work is carried out by industrial consortia including at least one company from each of the nations that take part in the program Since the start of the EUROFINDER program in 1996 188 proposals have been received of which about half were funded

The fi nal WEAG mechanism the European Understandings for Research Organization Programs and Activities (EUROPA) was created in May 2001 It enables any two or more signatories to propose the creation of a European Research Grouping (ERG) to carry out one or more individual or collaborative RampT projects with a relatively larger degree of fl exibility than that offered by the EUCLID or THALES The fi rst ERG was created by 14 countries in late 2001 but membership in ERGs varies EUROPA also requires WEAG members to provide regular information on the areas of defense RampT in which they are prepared to cooperate This information is then used by WEAG to identify opportunities for cooperation and to fl ag duplicative work being undertaken

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

118

WEAG has succeeded in providing a discussion forum on European armaments cooperation Since its Member States each have an equal vote countries with strong defense industries cannot impose their goals on the others In terms of actual RampT projects however WEAGrsquos accomplishments are more modest Its membership includes both producer and consumer countries with different requirements and technological capabilities and decisions must be taken by consensus Projects that benefi t only a small number of countries such as those related to power projection or technologies for out-of-theater operations do not have priority (Assembly of WEU 2002)

The Western European Armaments Organization (WEAO) also operates under the WEU framework Created in 1996 WEAO provides administrative support to the WEAO Board of Directors and WEAG Panel II and legal assistance for countries signing RampT collaboration agreements for specifi c WEAG projects WEAO can implement WEAG decisions on defense RampT because it has the authority and the necessary legal power to place contracts By 2001 it had facilitated the creation of 120 projects with a total of 500 million euros in funding (WEAG 2002)

In April 2005 the Steering Board of the European Defense Agency agreed that the EDA will gradually absorb the activities of the WEAG and WEAO in particular those covering RampT The hope is to make defense RampT more cost-effective and tie it more closely to the capabilities needed for the European Security and Defense Policy

At the same time the EDA Steering Board approved a set of principles governing the Agencyrsquos RampT functions including plans to establish networks of government research center industry and international experts bodies to collaborate in specifi c areas In July of 2005 the Agencyrsquos RampT Directorate announced that it had selected two critical technology areas involving long-endurance UAVs for which it intends to contract out initial technology demonstration studies with 2005 budget funds The two areas ndash survivability and digital data links ndash were chosen by national experts as covering critical gaps not addressed by ongoing European UAV programs In addition more than ten other critical technology areas identifi ed by national experts may be addressed separately as ad hoc cooperation projects by Member States by future EDA-funded studies or under industry initiatives

Despite the limitation in Article 296 the European Commission has also begun to be a major player in European-level RampD Since 1983 the Commission has managed its own civilian collaborative RampD program the Framework Program (FP) The FP is now in its sixth round of 4-year funding cycles with 175 billion euros committed to fund projects between 2003 and 2006

Firms universities or government agencies wishing to receive FP funding create RampD consortia (made up of a minimum of three partners at least two from European Member States) and submit joint project ideas in response to Commission calls for proposals The consortia may also include participants from various non-EU states (Associated States) such as Switzerland Norway and Israel which have signed collaboration agreements with the EC The Commission funds 50 per cent of the project costs FP projects can currently only cover civilian technologies though these very often include research with dual-use or military

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

119

applications such as aerospace energy (including nuclear energy) life sciences and information technologies

In the fi rst annual work program for FP6 announced in 2002 proposals were requested in intelligent vehicles and aircraft interoperable information and communications networks end-to-end SATCOM systems and data fusion among others It has been estimated that approximately one-third of the projects funded by FPs could be considered as dual-use projects (European Commission 1996) Thales EADS British Aerospace and many other European defense fi rms are active participants in these FP projects

In 2003 the Commission moved more directly into the defense-related research arena announcing the Preparatory Action on Security Research (PASR) as its contribution to the EU goal of addressing key security challenges Between 2004 and 2006 the PASR focused on bridging the gap between civilian research supported by the Framework Program and national and intergovernmental defense programs Funding for the PASR combined Commission funds national ministerial budgets (defense and non-defense) and industry contributions After two calls for proposals the Commission invested approximately 30 million euros in 24 security research projects covering border and coastal surveillance aviation security detection of biological and chemical agents situational awareness securing critical infrastructures and satellite intelligence

Though relatively modest in scope and size the PASR nevertheless represents an important fi rst step for the Commission as it begins to initiate and oversee multi-national security RampT activities and link them with its overall RampT activities With the seventh Framework Program starting in 2007 the Commission will include security space and homeland security research and development as parts of its portfolio for the fi rst time As in prior programs every Member State will contribute to the overall budget but the Commission will allocate funds for specifi c projects following the FP guidelines

FP7 may differ from its predecessors however in having a proposed duration of seven years and an annual budget of over 10 billion euros Moreover while there have been Commission investments in defense- and security-related research through dual-use and specifi c civilian projects setting aside specifi c funds (proposed at 570 million euros annually) for such fi elds as earth observation and detection of chemical and biological agents could be an important fi rst step in the development of a European-wide security capability

Conclusion

The European Union is starting to emerge as an increasingly important context for European planning with regard to expeditionary operations military capabilities defense procurement industrial policy and research and technology investment all with direct relevance to strengthening European C4ISR capabilities While the European-level agenda does not explicitly focus on C4ISR interoperability as a priority target the planning and investment choices being made point inexorably in that direction

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

120

The primary weaknesses of the ERRF ndash swift deployability and the capacity to conduct high-intensity operations ndash have been addressed through the creation of the Battlegroups which are coming into existence quickly C4ISR will be a critical element in the ability of these Battlegroups to operate either in coalition with or autonomously from the United States

The creation and rapid institutionalization of the European Defense Agency is a key development It reports directly to the European Council and has taken on critical functions in the emerging European defense identity The EDA promises to give more attention to a capabilities process that had begun to lag and is positioned to combine that process with its focus on the industrial and technology base It has singled out two critical C4ISR shortfalls ndash long-endurance UAVs and C3 systems ndash a decision that holds promise for Europersquos future ability to carry out network-based operations Moreover projects can move ahead in the EDA framework without requiring the agreement of all the Member States avoiding the problem of the ldquolowest common denominatorrdquo common to other European efforts

There has also been signifi cant progress at the European level in the areas of industrial policy and security-related research and technology investment The European Defense Agency and the European Commission have both initiated important collaborative security RampT programs involving key private sector actors The consolidation of WEAG and WEAO programs into the EDA will allow a tighter focus on the needs of the emerging European defense capability

Within this general strengthening of European-level institutions and planning processes related to defense C4ISR cannot help but emerge as a central issue and funding priority It will be critical to allowing the Europeans to mount a capability that can operate both in coalition with the United States and on its own

121

6

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS FOR

NETWORK-BASED OPERATIONS

From command and control through military communications and intelligence gathering to weapons targeting space-based systems have become a key part of a nationrsquos military capabilities Space systems are increasingly important for monitoring potential threats managing military forces and carrying out combat operations They are being closely integrated into the military C4ISR architecture both in Europe and the United States Furthermore military space capabilities are increasingly dependent on the private sector While the Cold War years were characterized by largely military activity in space the 1990s witnessed a surge of private sector pursuits and commercial space launches began to exceed national security missions Today government agencies worldwide are contracting space programs and services out to companies and multinational consortia and relying on multiple commercial contractors and sub-contractors for their space programs In addition many existing space assets and launch vehicles are now owned by private fi rms or international entities rather than by countries (Krepon 2003 8ndash9)

US military forces are highly dependent on space assets for pre-confl ict global awareness and planning for communications and for combat operations Increasingly European countries are also relying on space assets and are researching testing and deploying them as central ingredients of national and trans-European military capabilities In addition European space programs are increasingly based on cross-national cooperation achieving a degree of interoperability through non-NATO agreements and arrangements Space is a signifi cant European security and dual-use investment that could over time enhance European autonomy from US defense operations and increase trans-European interoperability while providing nodes for transatlantic interoperability as well It is not clear however whether the trans-national European capability will be Europe-wide or be restricted to a few dominant players in the European space arena

The role of space systems

Space-based assets are able to provide unimpeded continuous and persistent coverage of large areas of the globe This provides a signifi cant advantage when undertaking expeditionary warfare combating terrorism WMD counter-

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

122

proliferation and disaster management Embedding space assets in a joint and networked manner can link headquarters and units both at home and in the fi eld without geographical limitations

The fi rst key defense role for satellites has been communications In the 1950s Arthur C Clarke was the fi rst to recognize that three satellites in geosynchronous orbit spaced equidistant along the equator could provide worldwide communications coverage between the latitudes of approximately 60ordmN and 60ordmS while remaining relatively secure from attack Since the fi rst geosynchronous satellites were launched in the 1960s communications satellites have proliferated and become a staple of the global communications industry They provide a redundant network that is largely independent from terrestrial communications systems and can deliver broadband communications anywhere within their area of coverage via increasingly smaller and lighter terminals and handheld phones (DalBello 2003 217) In the 1990s Iridium the fi rst fully functional polar-orbiting satellite communication system was launched Polar-orbiting satellites provide communications at high latitudes but compared to geosynchronous systems they are extremely complex and expensive to build launch and operate The Iridium constellation of 66 satellites was a technical success but a commercial failure and its major customer today is the US Department of Defense

As discussed earlier France the United Kingdom Italy and Spain operate dedicated or partially dedicated military geosynchronous satellites for military communications Germany leases time on commercial satellites and is planning for dedicated military satellites in the future However no European country currently operates the necessary trio of dedicated military communications satellites to achieve full global coverage Only the United States has such coverage obtained through the low-earth orbit Iridium series and through its geosynchronous satellites

Many countries including the United States lease commercial satellite capacity for non-sensitive communications relying on dedicated military satellite communications for secure transmissions However commercial systems are not as secure as the ones dedicated to military use and commercial business practices may confl ict with military objectives making their use for military communications uncertain (Baker et al 2001)

Reconnaissance and surveillance is the second area where space offers signifi cant advantages for military and security operations The United States and the Soviet Union fi rst orbited reconnaissance satellites during the height of the Cold War in the 1960s these fi rst ldquospy satellitesrdquo used panchromatic and infrared fi lm dropped to earth in sealed containers from satellites for processing and analysis In the mid-1970s digital electro-optical systems fl ying in polar orbits allowed operators to image any place on Earth and return the images by means of electronic transmission thereby increasing satellite fl exibility and longevity In the civilian world NASA led the way in the development of such satellites with the building and launching of the Landsat series of satellites beginning in July 1972 However clouds and dark of night hamper the highly sophisticated digital cameras placed on these satellites Hence more recently synthetic aperture radar systems

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

123

operating at microwave frequencies have been developed Although synthetic aperture radar satellites provide imagery with reduced sharpness compared to the best electro-optical systems they can pierce through cloud cover and darkness

In Europe only France currently operates dedicated earth observation satellites Helios 1 and 2 However France Germany Italy and the United Kingdom are all developing electro-optical and synthetic aperture radar reconnaissance satellites The United States operates highly sophisticated reconnaissance satellite systems the exact technological capabilities of which remain highly classifi ed The United States and other countries also rely on high-resolution commercial remote sensing satellites to satisfy part of their need for routine reconnaissance data

Early warning and signals intelligence are still other areas where satellites can be used for military and security purposes The United States operates a series of surveillance satellites that monitors the globe for signs of a missile launch as well as signals intelligence satellites for monitoring communications and electronic transmissions around the world The latter have been reportedly put to use to detect communications from would-be terrorists No European countries currently operate such systems though French defense planners are in the early stages of developing their own signals intelligence and missile early warning systems including several pilot projects already in orbit

Digital technologies have revolutionized the handling of data and information from space systems allowing analysts to merge digital imagery maps with data from UAVs AWACS aircraft and other sources to create powerful information products that give fi eld commanders improved awareness of the battlefi eld and enhanced capabilities for defeating the adversary All of this information can now be sent quickly and effi ciently regionally or globally via modern communications infrastructures including communications satellites

The sophistication and quality of European space technology is very high and growing fast driven primarily by civil and commercial needs Ultimately the development of space systems to support network-based operations will depend on how much funding the European countries are willing to direct toward space systems On the European level it will also depend on the extent to which the individual countries are willing to cooperate and share resources As noted below the initial signs are encouraging particularly in satellite communications and earth observation underscored by the robust attempt to create a resilient space policy between the European Union and the European Space Agency along with the Member States Nevertheless funding constraints and the burden of legacy systems may limit investment in space systems

Changing attitudes toward European military space systems

Until recently Europe was not expected to build or deploy systems that allowed them to use space for defense purposes and most European militaries have been reluctant to include dedicated space systems in their budgets Europeans have focused more on civilian uses of space benefi ting from the defense applications

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

124

of civilian systems For example only the United Kingdom Italy and France have launched dedicated military communications satellite systems and Francersquos Helios electro-optical earth observation system is still the only dedicated military reconnaissance satellite deployed by a European country Most of Europersquos 5 billion euro annual expenditure on space goes to civilian programs compared to about 50 per cent of the $40 billion annual US investment The European space industry though employing some 40000 people and generating a turnover of roughly 55 billion euros is much more dependent on the commercial market than its US counterparts (Keohane 2004 3)

Europersquos existing and planned security space programs are generally being initiated as dual-use programs The dual-use approach especially if initiated as a commercial investment has the advantage of saving defense euros for other air- ground- or sea-based military systems Francersquos Syracuse-3 communications satellites ndash its fi rst dedicated military communications satellite ndash and Helios satellites were both preceded by civilian programs The same is true for the United Kingdomrsquos Skynet communication satellite systems as well as the Spanish Hispasat and the Italian SICRAL systems Germany Italy and Spain are also developing dedicated military communications satellites after earlier investments in dual-use systems Francersquos Helios system is based on technology originally developed for the civilian SPOT series of satellites The French Pleiades electro-optical system and the Italian COSMO Skymed synthetic aperture radar system both currently under development are intentionally dual-purpose in nature Both are elements of a cooperative program between France and Italy Germanyrsquos SAR-Lupe dedicated military radar satellite is possible in large part because of the substantial investment the European Space Agency and the German Aerospace Center have made in basic synthetic aperture radar technology Nevertheless some systems such as early warning and electronic surveillance have no clear-cut civilian counterparts and need to be pursued for their own sake though they use subsystems and technologies developed under civil budgets

More recently European interest in the security uses of space has grown signifi cantly and leadership in this area has begun to shift from France toward the European Union Events both internal and external to Europe have contributed to this changing perspective on the uses of space for military purposes

The recent confl icts that the US military was involved in have signifi cantly contributed to changing Europersquos approach to military space Policymakers and military commanders witnessed on a daily basis the considerable advantage the United States drew from space systems combined with new UAVs and the ability to fuse geospatial data (satellite remote sensing signals from GPS satellites and digital maps) with real-time video The US militaryrsquos ability to integrate space capabilities into its network of systems was a critical catalyst of change in European military space policy Infl uential military theorists primarily in France began to press for greater European attention to the development of pan-European security space systems (Hancart 2003 Gavoty 2003a 2003b) These include satellite communications remote sensing and military enhancements to Galileo Europersquos

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

125

major aerospace companies including EADS Alcatel Snecma and Thales have been supportive of these calls to increased investments in security space

The fi rst example of a major European space program with considerable security implications is the Galileo Positioning Navigation and Timing (PNT) system Driven in its inception almost entirely by a political desire for greater commercial autonomy and reliability Europe has pressed forward with this independent system which will duplicate the capability of the US Global Positioning System (GPS) Galileo will be very much a dual-use and trans-European capability Its development is led jointly by the European Commissionrsquos Directorate General for Transportation and the European Space Agency which is by charter civilian in character

The military utility of Galileo has not gone unnoticed by Europersquos defense departments which now depend heavily on the US GPS system for positioning and navigation services The French military especially has funded research on the potential military capabilities of Galileo and plans to use both Galileo and GPS in future operations Other European countries are also considering similar policies and are likely to follow suit The European Union is also planning to use Galileo in support of the European Security and Defense Policy

The Galileo system is currently designed to include 30 satellites and begin offering its services in 2008 The European Commission and the European Space Agency have invested a total of 11 billion euros in the development of initial technologies and in the building of experimental satellites Another 23 billion euros will be spent on building and launching the full constellation of satellites and to prepare for commercial operations To date the building and launching of the fi rst four satellites has been awarded to Galileo Industries a company co-owned by Alcatel Space of France Alenia Spazio of Italy EADS Astrium of Germany Thales and a Spanish consortium of seven companies These four satellites are expected to be launched by the end of 2008 at which point the European Commission and the European Space Agency will award the contract for building the additional 26 satellites and for operating the complete system Europe has also opened participation in the Galileo program to non-European countries China Israel India and Ukraine have joined the program since its inception and negotiations are underway with several other countries

The Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) program which is essentially a strategy for organizing and utilizing Europersquos many already existing and planned earth observation systems represents a second important Europe-wide space initiative with defense implications The GMES program focuses primarily on sustainable development and environmental management and is part of Europersquos efforts to obtain the ability to track regional as well as global environmental trends Like Galileo GMES was initially conceived as a civil program with security considerations added later Like Galileo GMES is managed jointly by the European Commission and the European Space Agency with participation from various other European organizations and fi rms If successful GMES will provide sharply improved better-coordinated European

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

126

capabilities to observe and analyze the environment and human activities on Earth using both new and existing earth observation systems

The GMES program is being undertaken in two phases The fi rst period completed in 2002ndash3 examined the current strengths and weaknesses of the European capacity for space-based environmental and security monitoring and identifi ed the areas that required further investment and research The second or implementation period runs from 2004ndash8 and involves the initial development of infrastructures and capabilities that were identifi ed in the initial period Thus in the near term GMES will develop new information systems and techniques to exploit Europersquos existing space-based earth observation capabilities more effi ciently In the longer term it will serve as a guiding program for planning new earth observation systems

Although focused primarily on European environmental and security concerns the satellite contributions to GMES will be global in scope Most remote sensing satellites orbit in polar orbits taking them over the entire earth as it turns beneath them Europe is still working out the detailed focus and scope of the security aspects of GMES but discussions are tending toward a more activist interpretation of the Petersberg tasks humanitarian relief rescue peacekeeping and crisis management Some of the capabilities developed in the global GMES program could be used for example to enhance Europersquos warfi ghting efforts far from its borders In particular the broader earth observation and analysis capabilities provided by GMES will prove extremely useful for the European military and intelligence community especially when combined with reconnaissance information provided by both the dedicated security and the explicitly dual-use earth observation space systems currently underway

Parallel to Galileo and GMES a European Space Policy has begun to emerge under the auspices of the European Union Starting in the late 1990s the European Union particularly the European Commission began to have increased infl uence in European civil space affairs The EC supplements national space investments by funding research and operation of space systems in support of EU programs and policies and while the European Union continues to depend on the indigenous space programs of individual Member States and on the European Space Agency to provide the technological capabilities for EU programs it is increasingly using its political and economic authority to set the overall direction of Europersquos space efforts

In January 2003 the European Commission published a draft policy paper on space for discussion revision and adoption by the Member States and the European Space Agency After a series of formal consultations the paper was fi nalized in November 2003 as a White Paper laying out a proposed European space policy including defense uses of space

Europe needs an extended space policy driven by demand able to exploit the special benefi ts space technologies can deliver in support of the Unionrsquos policies and objectives faster economic growth job creation and industrial

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

127

competitiveness enlargement and cohesion sustainable development and security and defence

(European Commission 2003b 5 [Emphasis in original])

The White Paper refers explicitly to the uses of space systems to support the European Unionrsquos Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defense Policy Further the very existence of a successful project such as Galileo usable by the entire world is seen as a visible symbol both of growing strategic independence from US policies and also of a more unifi ed Europe offering the prospect of future European success in space (Bescond 2003 40ndash3) A successful GMES program will also strengthen the visibility and acceptability of the European commitment to space systems

In November 2003 the European Commission and the European Space Agency also signed a formal Framework Agreement on Space intended to support ldquothe coherent and progressive development of an overall European Space Policyrdquo (Council of the European Union 2003 5) This agreement further underscored the growing infl uence of the European Union in European space affairs and provides the framework for potential expansion of Europersquos investment in space It focuses cooperation between the two organizations on securing Europersquos independent and cost-effective access to space so that it can continue to be self-reliant in the application and use of space technologies and on ensuring that space activities are undertaken in line with EU policies in particular those supporting sustainable development economic growth and employment The Framework Agreement on Space is intended to consolidate European knowledge of space in a network of centers of excellence thereby achieving greater Europe-wide coherence and synergy between national efforts Specifi c technology areas singled out for initial collaboration include launchers communications satellites earth observation and navigation

Space and space technologies were also included in the EU Constitutional Treaty Article III-254 reads

1 To promote scientifi c and technical progress industrial competitiveness and the implementation of its policies the Union shall draw up a European space policy To this end it may promote joint initiatives support research and technological development and coordinate the efforts needed for the exploration and exploitation of space2 To contribute to attaining the objectives referred to in paragraph 1 European laws or framework laws shall establish the necessary measures which may take the form of a European space program

(European Union 2004 117ndash18)

Elsewhere in the Treaty in Article I-14 covering areas of shared competence space is called out as a shared competence between the European Union and other European entities

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

128

In the areas of research technological development and space the Union shall have competence to carry out actions in particular to defi ne and implement programs however the exercise of that competence may not result in Member States being prevented from exercising theirs

(European Union 2004 22)

Although the Treaty does not include any reference to security space it generally boosts the profi le of space technologies in Europe and European promotion of investment in space systems This will assist proponents of increased emphasis on the use of space in military and security operations and especially in network-based ones

The road to integrated European space systems

These promising European moves toward advanced space-based assets face numerous challenges before they become integral parts of a trans-European network or fully interoperable with the United States One challenge will be integrating space systems into existing European air ground and sea-based command control communications and intelligence capabilities US experience suggests this will be a diffi cult task However the less developed European capability to conduct network-based operations may prove a blessing in disguise allowing the Europeans to learn from the mistakes the United States has made European learning through interaction with the United States in NATO and in coalition operations could reduce the time and expenditure for the European integration effort

A second challenge will be the competition for EU resources especially following enlargement of the Union in May 2004 to include Cyprus the Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Malta Poland Slovakia and Slovenia The expansion will likely add complexity to advancing and coordinating European security space capabilities The new countries will most likely wish to join the space efforts underway in the more technologically advanced partner countries since these provide them with the opportunity to participate in space systems development without starting from scratch The new partners may also bring additional resources to this effort but their relatively weaker economies could slow progress More fundamentally EU enlargement is a costly process Space investments at the trans-European level are likely to compete with other priorities such as regional development and agriculture making it diffi cult to fulfi ll the White Paperrsquos call for increased funding for space systems

A third challenge will be legitimizing the use of space assets for defense purposes given the politics of space in the European context The European Space Agencyrsquos Convention expressly limits its participation to peaceful space efforts though the space programs of the individual countries generally have no such prohibition This could complicate the integration of Galileo into defense planning Furthermore security uses of GMES are currently still limited to supporting the Petersberg Tasks Because of these limitations pressure grew in 2003 and 2004 to

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

129

redefi ne the term ldquopeacefulrdquo As a result technologies that contribute to defensive strategies and that can have supportive roles in warfi ghting may in the future fall under the ldquopeacefulrdquo category Reshaping the defi nition would explicitly allow the European Space Agency to take on security-related tasks and to expand the scope of GMES into the gray areas between peacekeeping and peacemaking allowing closer integration with national and European network-based strategies

Under the leadership of its director Jacques Dordin the European Space Agency recently re-evaluated its Convention concluding that it does not restrict the agencyrsquos ability to engage in programs aimed at defense and security for national or international security and defense institutions The Agency also established a security clearance system that enables it to handle classifi ed information In addition the neutral members of the European Space Agency have signaled that they are willing to have the Agency take on a more active space security role for Europe as a whole Lastly a recent study led by the Instituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) has recommended that the European Space Agency engage in dual-use RampD for space technologies and suggested that the European Union might benefi t by setting up a European Security and Defense Advanced Projects Agency with a small non-permanent staff and fl exible mission-based activity Like the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) this agency would provide a framework for pursuing a strategic approach to developing the applied technologies of the future combining a well-defi ned vision with highly responsive structures and methods (Silvestri 2003 6ndash7)

Just how far Europe will go to emphasize development of dual-use space systems or to create an agency such as this remains to be seen The European Commissionrsquos Preparatory Action on Security Research (PASR) has already funded collaborative projects on using geospatial data for increased situational awareness and on uses of advanced space technologies for expeditionary and crisis management operations It remains to be seen however whether this initial effort can be expanded as part of the Thematic Priority on Security and Space under the European Commissionrsquos seventh research and technology Framework Program

A fi nal challenge will be to coordinate the defense-related space assets currently deployed by EU Member States In earth observation satellites as with civilian space activities France has taken a lead shifting its national strategy from autonomous national systems to promoting multilateral cooperation at the European level French leadership has brought together Germany Italy Spain Belgium and Greece in a joint program ndash the Common Operational Requirements (know by its French name Besoins Opeacuterationnels Communs or BOC) ndash to develop common requirements for security-related earth observation Through the BOC participants are developing a federation of data providers and users that will collect and distribute earth observations data among its members Each member brings different but largely complementary capabilities to the table The BOC is an expansion of cooperative arrangements already underway between France and Italy on Pleiades and COSMO-Skymed and between France and Germany on Pleiades and SAR-Lupe Linking electro-optical and synthetic aperture radar observation satellites will create a very powerful reconnaissance tool

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

130

The EU Satellite Center (EUSC) in Torrejoacuten Spain has also contributed to coordinating European activities related to earth observation It was established in 1991 as the WEU Satellite Center and transferred to the European Union in 2002 It provides the European Union with an analysis of earth observation space imagery to support decision-making in foreign and security policy issues It currently handles space imagery received from the French SPOT the US Landsat 4 and 5 and Indian IRS-1C and D satellites as well as from Russian commercial satellites Within the next few years it will also begin collecting and analyzing data from additional space-based systems including Helios 2 and SAR-Lupe Some imagery from these systems will be delivered free of charge others will have to be paid for In any case the Satellite Center EU offi cials will not be allowed to task the satellites directly

The picture of European collaboration on communications satellites is slightly less clear Though France and the United Kingdom have previously cooperated on satellite communications programs it remains to be seen whether or not the other main players in European space development ndash Germany Italy and Spain ndash will participate In the 1990s France sought to interest Germany and Italy in contributing to the development of Helios 2 but those arrangements fell through in large part as a result of German reluctance to tie itself too tightly to a French initiative In the 1990s French planners also sought to broaden cooperation in military satellite communications through Trimilsatcom a system that was to be co-developed with the United Kingdom and Germany This communications satellite program was intended to meet the common military needs of the proposed partners However the Trimilsatcom effort failed because the partners were unable to integrate their requirements into a common program and agree on a schedule for meeting them (Nardon 2001)

European cooperation on communications satellites has however extended to the NATO framework As noted earlier the Alliance selected a European solution for its next generation satellite communications capability In May 2004 NATO announced that a Joint Consortium of France Italy and the United Kingdom would provide the new constellation of communications satellites which will replace the two existing NATO-owned communications satellites and provide NATO with an improved capability This expanded coverage will include ships at sea and NATOrsquos AWACS early warning aircraft

Beyond intra-European collaboration looms the challenge of transatlantic collaboration While the emerging European security space policies hold some promise for enhanced transatlantic interoperability strong US resistance to more fl exible rules for transatlantic technology transfer is likely to make this diffi cult In response to this problem European companies have begun to use fewer US components in space systems A recent agreement between the European Commission and the European Space Agency calls for a technology development program to assist in insulating European fi rms from US technology export rules and for greater cooperation in this area with such countries as China and India However it also calls for closer cooperation with the US Air Force Furthermore it is to be hoped that the United States and Europe can forge a workable agreement

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

131

on the relationship between Galileo and GPS which could spill over into other forms of space cooperation

There has been considerable progress on European space in the past decade and a growing realization that space will play a role in European defense planning The results remain mixed however While space may play a greater role in the future there are a number of countervailing pressures and challenges budgetary and political which will slow the rate at which this trend emerges

132

7

THE EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

FOR NETWORK-BASED CAPABILITIES

Though the pace of transformation is uneven the major European defense powers have been developing and fi elding state-of-the-art capabilities for conducting network-based operations One important source they have been drawing on for this effort is the European defense industrial and technology base In 2001 the total revenues for the European C4ISR market were estimated at close to $7 billion with a compound annual growth rate of 47 per cent (Frost and Sullivan 2002 1ndash1) Advances in technology and changes in military doctrines have contributed to the marketrsquos growth and are expected to continue to do so in the coming years While this chapter does not provide a comprehensive survey of this market it discusses in some detail the industrial organizations and capabilities that have been most important to the emerging European C4ISR technologies A broad review suggests the European industrial and technology base contains signifi cant capacity for C4ISR work including a number of leading companies engaged in critical development and production work in the areas of C2 communications and ISR In addition much of this work is collaborative both across European countries and across the Atlantic

Overview

The term ldquodefense industrial baserdquo is in reality a misnomer in the area of European C4ISR Several of the countries under discussion in this study are using networking technologies in areas that go beyond defense ndash to commercial communication homeland security and civilian space operations Moreover the technology base on which C4ISR programs draw is increasingly dual-use or entirely commercial as is especially the case for information and communications technologies A review of the industrial and technology base then requires examining not only defense suppliers but commercial fi rms providing these technologies for commercial civilian and defense applications

Communications command and control sensors and advanced materials are only a few of the technologies commercial fi rms can provide for military applications Military sensors for example will integrate technologies in electro-optics and biotechnology that are commercial in origin It remains true however that with the ministries of defense as the principal market for these technologies

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

133

more traditional defense suppliers may enjoy advantageous access having experience of doing business with the defense customer and a track record of military-specifi c products

The fi rms most relevant to C4ISR technologies are as might be expected concentrated in the more militarily advanced members of the EU ndash France Germany Italy Spain and the United Kingdom ndash as well as in Sweden which developed a relatively autonomous base to support its strategy of neutrality However given the role of commercial technology in C4ISR there are also signifi cant capabilities in other smaller countries that make a contribution Firms with strong research development and manufacturing capacity in biotechnology robotics nanotechnology information and telecommunications technologies can be found throughout Europe Finland is home to Nokia and a host of other mobile telecommunications companies with cutting-edge technologies at the core of the nationrsquos networking efforts Barco a global leader in display visualization and simulation technologies is Belgian Moreover these highly innovative commercial companies have been supported for decades by European government investment in civilian RampD so are not newcomers when it comes to doing business with national governments and with the European Union

There are both advantages and disadvantages to having such a widespread industrial and technology base for C4ISR The advantage is that public funds can be spent in ways that strengthen an existing national industrial base and national technologies The disadvantage is that developing and networking advanced C4ISR systems requires a broad range of expertise in designing developing integrating and operating complex systems and expertise that is rarely available solely from the industry within one country European governments typically spend defense resources with the goal of supporting local industry but such a policy approach does not always provide forces with the most advanced or capable technology In the C4ISR area greater effi ciency and deeper transformation may depend on a strategy that uses the most global industrial base pooling technological capabilities sharing costs and reducing risks

The evolution of the European industrial technology base which is becoming more networked and global is likely to encourage such a trend making the domestic political tradeoffs more diffi cult Over the past decade there has been a pronounced move toward consolidation of the European industrial base and extensive mergers and acquisitions involving several major defense companies Moreover large defense-related fi rms have begun to merge with acquire or form partnerships with companies that have expertise in such areas as electro-optics and communications often in the commercial market arena Combining capabilities across borders can sometimes help overcome the ldquolocal buyingrdquo preference of governments as a trans-national fi rm or partnership can move workshares around to accommodate local needs Much of the expertise required for C4ISR and network-based capabilities is to be found in such trans-national companies and partnerships

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

134

The big three Thales EADS and BAE Systems

Thales

Thales is one of the worldrsquos largest defense and consumer electronics corporations and a European leader in the C4ISR market In addition to being a lead contractor for many French C4ISR programs it has as a company with many nationalities signifi cant operations in a number of other countries It has built and deployed a complete C4ISR system integrating US- and French-made legacy systems in the United Arab Emirates It has provided elements of C4ISR systems in a number of other countries Through acquisitions outside of France ndash Tacal Quintec Pilkington Signaal ndash Thales has positioned itself to participate in key programs in other countries including the UK

Thales has created a new division Land and Joint Systems which fuses its optronics and communications businesses as part of a strategic push into the C4ISR market This division offers a wide variety of communications products including the family of PR4G radios which are sold in 25 countries around the world including Spain the Netherlands Denmark Greece Switzerland Poland and Egypt and the RITA 2000 system based on ATMIP architecture and deployed by the French and Belgian armed forces The most recent PR4G version ndash VS4-IP ndash has IP frequency-hopping encryption a built-in GPS and advanced multiplexing features The next generation of PR4G radios will include software radio products The Land and Joint Systems division also has an operational analysis and architecture group that is focused on developing interoperable technologies

Thales has a strong presence in the command and control market with the Cooperative Fighting System (a tactical C2 system) the LCC mobile C2 network and the e-CIS army-level C2 system designed according to NATO STANAGs As prime contractor for the Atlas Martha and SICF programs the company is a key supplier of C2 systems to the French armed forces Future developments include the RITA Local Area System for strategic C2 In naval systems the company has made signifi cant investments in naval C2 systems as well

In surveillance and reconnaissance technologies Thales produces several ground-based systems for surveillance target acquisition and ground-based air defense Squire developed most recently is a man-portable surveillance radar system for ground surveillance and bomb damage assessment and has been deployed by the Dutch army and marines Through its Netherlands branch the company is a global supplier of naval surveillance weapon control and combat management systems Key products include the TAVITAC naval combat management system on the French Lafayette frigates and in Belgium Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and the APAR weapons control system co-developed with EADS and Raytheon and deployed on Canadian Dutch and German frigates More recently Thales has moved into the UAV market leading the international consortium developing the British Watchkeeper UAV system Thales also offers a number of products in the intelligence technologies market and plays an important role in several programs

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

135

including the US Prophet program for vehicle-mounted SIGINT systems and the future British terrestrial SIGINT system Soothsayer In France Thales is the supplier of the SGEA SARIGUE MINREM and SAIM systems as well as of airborne ISR pods to various services of the armed forces

EADS

The European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company ndash EADS ndash was created in 2000 as a merger of the German DaimlerChrysler Aerospace Francersquos Aerospatiale Matra and Spainrsquos CASA Since then EADS has gained a strong market presence in C4ISR technologies and become a lead contractor in many European countries notably France and Germany EADS is becoming a signifi cant presence in the UAV market through a number of collaborative RampD programs These include the sensor package for the EuroHawk HALE UAV co-developed with Northrop Grumman tactical- and operations-level UAVs (the Hunter Eagle-1 and Eagle-2) with Israeli Aircraft Industries several tactical UAVs (the CL-289 with France and Canada the Brevel and the LUNA) the Pointer hand-launched tactical UAV in collaboration with Aerovironment and a maritime rotor wing reconnaissance UAV (SEAMOS terminated in early 2002 when the German navy canceled funding) EADS is also developing a UCAV demonstrator ndash Barracuda ndash with Germany as the fi rst potential customer Since 2004 the company has been at the center of the two largest collaborative European UAV programs It is the prime contractor for the EuroMALE program and a partner in the Neuron UCAV program both funded by the French Ministry of Defense The companyrsquos goal is to ultimately control some 10-15 per cent of the global UAV and UCAV market (Hegmann 2005)

EADS also has strong capabilities in the C2 and in the sensor technologies fi elds In C2 the company is working on the HEROS FAUST and FuumlInfoSys H systems for the German army the SIR and SICA systems for the French army and on systems for the Belgian army and several Persian Gulf states In sensor technologies EADS with Rheinmetall Defense Electronics has developed the ISR platform for the Fennek reconnaissance vehicle deployed by the German and Dutch armed forces It has also developed the APAR weapons control system jointly with Thales and Raytheon deployed on Canadian Dutch and German frigates It is also supplying the maritime sensor platform Fully Integrated Tactical System (FITS) to Mexico Brazil the United Arab Emirates Spain and the US Coast Guard In addition the company offers a combined system of SAR and MTIs that can be placed on UAVs marine reconnaissance and NH-90 helicopters

EADS also offers imagery analysis products to be linked to a number of platforms including satellites OCAPI (Optimizing Controlling and Automating the Processing of Images) and TIPI3D products An EADS mobile satellite ground station ndash Eagle Vision ndash collects imagery from SPOT Landsat IRS RADARSAT and QUICKBIRD satellites Four such stations are operational with US forces and at least one with the French army EADS is also a lead partner in the German

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

136

GAST project to develop a common system for the dissemination of technical intelligence

Several recent acquisitions have made EADS a major player in the European defense communications market In July 2001 the company acquired Cogent Defense and Security Networks from Nortel Networks and with it the contract for supplying the United Kingdom with a deployable communications system for expeditionary forces In May 2003 EADS purchased BAE Systemsrsquo share in the Astrium space joint venture gaining full control of Paradigm Secure Communications and its Skynet 5 program for Britainrsquos military satellite communications In the summer of 2005 EADS acquired the Personal Mobile Radio business of Nokia which allows it to provide a range of mobile radio solutions for defense and homeland security

BAE Systems

BAE Systems was created in 1999 through the merger of British Aerospace with Marconi Electronic Systems BAE Systems is one of the worldrsquos largest suppliers for the aerospace and defense markets with prime contractor capabilities for naval platforms aircraft and electronics It is also a presence in several sectors of the C4ISR market and has acquired important system engineering and integration experience BAE Systems has a signifi cant presence in the US defense market and has a central position as a supplier to the British and Australian armed forces The fi rm was chosen by the British Ministry of Defense to lead the NITEworks partnership aimed at assessing and demonstrating the benefi ts of NEC and the options for its effective and timely delivery In December 2003 BAE Systems announced it would provide the Kuwaiti military with a complete C4I suite These two programs confi rm BAE Systemsrsquo commitment to the C4ISR market

BAE Systems has been particularly present in the market for tactical communications systems with signifi cant involvement in such British programs as Ptarmigan and Falcon and a full line of Multi-Role Switch (MRS) 2000 equipment It has also been a participant in US military communications programs notably JTRS and the Future Combat Systems vehiclesrsquo communications package BAE Systems also provides the British armed forces with satellite terminals the Talon (man-portable) and Dagger (vehicle-mounted) terminals linked to Skynet 4 satellites

BAE Systems possesses only limited capabilities in the UAV market having produced the Phoenix and SkyEye tactical UAVs Both proved unreliable in the operational environments and are not competitive It is investing in the UCAV market however marketing its Nightjar program Together with the British fi rm QinetiQ BAE Systems is one of the few European defense companies with expertise in Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV) through the British Marlin project Other BAE capabilities in ISR are found mainly through the companyrsquos involvement in the now disbanded Alenia Marconi Systems venture and in Atlas Elektronik the naval systems portion of STN-Atlas Elektronik retained by BAE when it split the company with Rheinmetall These have given BAE Systems

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

137

a dominant position in radar and sensor technology BAErsquos involvement in the ASTOR program and Nimrod upgrades have also been valuable

The company has not been deeply involved in either the intelligence or the space markets having sold its SIGINT business in 2002

In July 2003 BAE Systems and Finmeccanica signed an agreement to collaborate on C4ISR technologies through a joint venture BAErsquos Avionics Ltdwas merged with Finmeccanicarsquos Galileo Avionica to form Eurosystems an avionics company of which Finmeccanica owns 75 per cent and BAE Systems 25 per cent Under an option Finmeccanica can require BAE Systems to sell its 25 per cent interest in the new Avionics business to Finmeccanica at any time and BAE Systems may require Finmeccanica to purchase its 25 per cent interest after 25 months Eurosystems has capabilities in sensor systems airborne radars mission systems electro-optics and electronic warfare systems At the same time Alenia Marconi Systems a 50-50 joint venture of BAE Systems with Finmeccanica was dissolved with BAE Systems acquiring AMSrsquos UK operations and Finmeccanica acquiring all of the Italian operations of AMS BAE Systems will merge the UK operations of AMS and BAE Systemsrsquo C4ISR Networked Systems and Solutions business to form a wholly owned systems integration business The Eurosystems transaction also created Selenia Communications Limited a wholly owned subsidiary of Finmeccanica whose Marconi Selenia Communications acquired BAE Systemsrsquo UK Communications business The Eurosystems transaction was fi nalized in May 2005

Second tier defense companies

There are a number of smaller second tier defense companies in Europe that are also active in the C4ISR market Some such as the German fi rm Rhode and Schwarz have C4ISR at the core of their business strategy Others such as Saab have been platform and weapons suppliers and have only recently moved into developing and producing C4ISR systems In most cases the smaller participants in the C4ISR market retain a largely national focus and rely on contracts from their home governments

Rheinmetall Defence Electronics is one such company In the summer of 2003 BAE Systems and the German fi rm Rheinmetall Detec joint owners of STN-Atlas Elektronik divided the fi rm into two separate companies The new companies are Rheinmetall Defense Electronics wholly owned by Rheinmetall Detec and specializing in technologies for air and land forces and Atlas Elektronik wholly owned by BAE Systems and specializing in maritime technologies Rheinmetall Defense Electronics is one of Europersquos leading developers of ISR solutions It collaborates with EADS on the development of the ISR suite for the Fennek reconnaissance vehicle to be deployed by the German and Dutch armies This suite includes a sensor platform with a camera a thermal imager and a laser rangefi nder for each vehicle

Rheinmetall Defense Electronics may have signifi cant potential in unmanned aerial systems provided it can expand beyond the German market The company

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

138

offers a wide range of reconnaissance target acquisition electronic warfare and combat UAVs including the KZOBrevel target acquisition UAV (also confi gurable for electronic warfare missions) co-developed with EADS It is also working on the Tactical Advanced ReconnaissanceStrike System (TADRES) UCAV previously known as the Taifun for the German Ministry of Defense The vehicle is now being designed to carry an electro-optic sensor for target identifi cation and a synthetic aperture radar for target acquisition A procurement for TADRES is expected before 2009 In 2003 the company signed an MoU (a Memorandum of Understanding) with Francersquos Safran Group to develop the technologies to make the KZO and TADRES vehicles interoperable with the French Sperwer UAV

The company also has capabilities in tactical command and control systems for land forces It has participated in the Battlefi eld Command System (Gefechstfeldfuumlhrungssystem or GeFuumlSys) C2 program for the German army (currently upgraded to FAUST) and provided the Swedish army with the C2 system deployed on its tanks and combat vehicles In 2003 it was awarded a contract to upgrade the C2 systems on Spainrsquos Leopard-2 tanks

Rhode and Schwarz is another company with a key position in the German national market for C4ISR which has yet to become a trans-national player Rhode and Schwarz has cutting-edge technology in the military communications fi eld specifi cally in digitally reprogrammable software radios Its family of multimode multirole multiband (M3) radios offers solutions for aerial naval and land platforms all meeting NATO encryption STANAGs Early in 2003 the company received a contract to supply the Brazilian army with the tactical radio version of the M3 and in 2004 the Swiss Army signed a contract to purchase the VHFUHF version of the M3 In 2005 it received a contract to outfi t the A400M aircraft with M3ARs (Airborne Radios) through 2022 The radios will feature the Second Generation of Anti-Jam Tactical UHF Radio for NATO (SATURN) frequency hopping function The company was also awarded a sole-source contract to develop a fully JTRS- and SCA-compliant version of a Software Defi ned Radio (SDR) for the German military The company is also a supplier of SIGINT technologies specifi cally those for direction fi nding and signals monitoring and analysis The German and Danish militaries have been customers for these products

In 2001 the British Ministry of Defensersquos Defense Evaluation and Research Agency privatized part of its work into a new fi rm ndash QinetiQ ndash as a public-private partnership Today QinetiQ uses the experience gained as a government RampD agency to provide advanced defense solutions including several in the C4ISR domain In the command and control fi eld QinetiQ specializes in maritime C2 offering two major systems the Intelligent Advisor Capability Demonstrator (IACD) and the All Environment Real-Time Interoperability Simulator (AERIS) The IACD has been demonstrated on the Royal Navy aircraft carrier Illustrious

In the ISR area QinetiQ does work on battlespace digitization multi-source information fusion and innovative ISR architectures Through its participation in the British TOPSAT program and other international efforts QinetiQ also has expertise in space-based reconnaissance In the UAV arena QinetiQ focuses on man-portable UAVs for infantry sections It is also one of the few large European

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

139

defense companies to have expertise on Unmanned Underwater Vehicles having worked for the British Ministry of Defense on the development of the Marlin UUV intended for launch and recovery from submarines Additionally company projects are underway to develop new sensor suites for UAVs particularly for thermal imaging

Francersquos Sagem ndash now part of Safran Group ndash has increased its involvement in the C4ISR domain Its defense technology group Sagem Deacutefense Securiteacute has been particularly successful in the UAV market its line of tactical UAVs is deployed by several European militaries The Crecerelle is used by the French army and variants are deployed by the Dutch (Sperwer) Danish (Taarnfalk) Swedish (Ugglan) and most recently the Greek armies Two new versions of the Sperwer are under development to fl y at higher altitudes and faster speeds for longer periods of time The fi rst the Sperwer HV (High Velocity) is a MALE UAV featuring a real-time data link synthetic aperture radar day-night imager or laser target designator and possibly at a later stage radar-jamming payload The second is the Sperwer LE (Long Endurance) also a MALE vehicle whose payload may include a day-night imaging system a Samir missile warning system and a high-speed radio frequency (RF )data link for communications with other UAVs as well as with its ground control station The French government has not yet given full support to these programs though the company anticipates prototypes by the end of 2006 The next generation of Crecerelle ndash SDTI ndash is also in the fi nal stages of development and testing for the French army based on the Sperwer UAV Sagem has also had some success in the tactical command and control sector and is the prime contractor for the French armyrsquos SIT system for linking small units and armored vehicles

Sagem has also engaged in international collaboration on RampD projects In July 2003 Sagem and STN Atlas (now Rheinmetall Defence Electronics) signed a memorandum of understanding to begin an RampD program that will make Sagemrsquos Sperwer UAV interoperable with STN Atlasrsquos KZO and TADRES UAVs This program will develop a common C2 infrastructure to enable the exchange of data and intelligence gathered by these unmanned platforms Sagem also collaborates with General Atomics (US) on the Horus-SD UAV a European version of the Predator and with Dassault on UAV RampD programs Most recently the company announced it has fi tted the Sperwer B UAV with the Israeli Spike long-range precision strike missile weaponizing an existing UAV platform with an off-the-shelf missile similar to the US arming of a Predator UAV with Hellfi re missiles

Though by no means a small fi rm Finmeccanica in Italy is a relatively minor largely national participant in the European C4ISR market Recent decisions such as the Eurosystems transaction described earlier in this chapter may change this reality over time For now the companyrsquos main business is still the construction of platforms but some subsidiaries are beginning to gain a strong foothold in the Italian C4ISR market especially in C2 and ISR Restrictive bid practices of the Italian government facilitate this process and they have provided Finmeccanica with growing expertise in most C4ISR-related technologies The company is increasingly profi cient in developing and producing low- and medium-altitude

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

140

UAVs initially through the tactical Mirach-26 and the Mirach-150 programs for the Italian armed forces The Falco tactical UAV is a more recent addition designed to replace the Mirach-26 A faster version of the Mirach-150 Nibbio is also under development In 2003 Finmeccanica signed a contract with Alenia Aeronautica to co-develop a UAV demonstrator that could become a marketable UAV or UCAV product The Sky-X ndash formerly called the Integrated Technology Vehicle (ITV) ndash will carry different payloads including weapons SAR electro-optical and infrared sensors and electronic sensors It will also be equipped with a broadband satellite data link 5 Trials began in 2004 (Kington 2004 9) The newly created Eurosystems avionics company the acquisition of BAE Systemsrsquo military and secure communications assets and the dissolving of Alenia Marconi Systems could give Finmeccanica a stronger position as a participant in the global C4ISR market

Saab long a manufacturer of cars and fi ghter aircraft is another platform producer that is moving into the C4ISR market It created a new division SaabTech which specializes solely in C4ISR and in July 2005 merged it with Avitronicsformerly part of the South African fi rm Gintek to create Saab Avitronics The companyrsquos C4ISR expertise is focused largely on command and control systems for land air and sea Its 9LV Mark 3E naval C3 combat system fuses data from sonar radar and electro-optic systems to create a complete picture of the seascape and is in service with the Royal Swedish Navy as well as with the Australian New Zealand and Singapore navies Another command and control product under development is the Wide Area Situation Picture (WASP) consisting of an air force C2 system adaptable for other services as well Saab also produces terrestrial C2 systems including the Vehicle Command and Control System (VCCS) which provides a single display unit for tactical information and sensor images as overlays on a background digital map and the Battlefi eld Command Support System (BCSS) a land forces C2 system for brigade and lower level units BCSS is deployed by the Australian armed forces Saab has also moved into the UAV market having the experience of the SHARC UCAV project and has signed an MoU with Francersquos Dassault Aviation to co-develop the Neuron UCAV

Saab and Ericsson have created a joint venture Saab Ericsson Network Based Defense Innovation splitting ownership 60-40 respectively In October 2003 this company was awarded a contract from the Swedish Defense Materiel Administration (FMV) to develop the technological foundations for the future Swedish Network-Based Defense Initially this will involve work on design rules and technical specifi cations for the future system The fi rm is partnering with IBM and Boeing on this project

Non-defense companies in the European C4ISR market

As already noted technologies for C4ISR requirements are frequently found in the commercial sector making commercial companies an important element in building European C4ISR capabilities Several of the more signifi cant fi rms are in Scandinavia with technologies that are useful in C4ISR systems with little

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

141

modifi cation Ericsson has been very successful in the global ISR market with products such as air defense surveillance radars (Giraffe for both land and sea units sold to the French air force) artillery hunting radars (ARTHUR sold to the Danish army and the British Royal Marines) and airborne early warning systems (Erieye radar deployed by Sweden Brazil and Greece) It is also the only major company in the Swedish C4ISR market that is still wholly Swedish-owned

With a strong civilian technology base especially in mobile communications Ericsson has been able to penetrate the military communications market on a global basis In collaboration with Kongsberg-Ericsson of Norway and Crypto of Switzerland it produces state-of-the-art tactical military communications products ndash EriTac ndash including switches radio relays and bulk encryption units that can be fi tted together according to user requirements to build tactical area networks air defense networks and command post communication networks The system has been sold to fi ve NATO countries as well as to other military customers worldwide including Kuwait and Oman

Nokia has also applied its core competency to the military market for C4ISR technology In 2002 Finnish forces taking part in peacekeeping operations in Kosovo were the fi rst to be outfi tted with the companyrsquos TETRA communications equipment A year later the fi rst Finnish-led KFOR brigade was outfi tted with a similar system less than two months after the decision to procure it The European Unionrsquos forces in Kosovo (EUFOR) use a Nokia system based on the one used by Finnish forces In Finland a complete communications system for the countryrsquos defense and fi rst responder forces was built using TETRA technology The deployable communications networks of the Danish and Swedish armies were based on a similar technology as were the Belgian and Kuwaiti public safety networks and the communications network used by the Irish police

Industry collaboration on C4ISR interoperability

Several collaborative industry frameworks have been created to address interoperability between C4ISR systems Companies involved in these agreements have realized that governments are demanding increasingly complex and advanced systems and systems-of-systems that require industry collaboration

The Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium (NCOIC) is a forum for fi rms involved in the development of C4ISR systems Companies in NCOIC share knowledge about customer requirements for network-centric and network-based operations and discuss strategies and approaches to enhancing system delivery to customers In addition the organization seeks to develop open interoperable C4ISR systems using common best practices and systems engineering techniques On the technology side this is done by analyzing the relevant C4ISR architectures defi ned by governments developing a secure information management model to discuss open standards and identifying open standards-based product types The NCOIC is also developing educational programs on network-centric operations and developing strategies for creating collaborative engineering environments (Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium 2005 14) The consortium

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

142

is made up of international aerospace defense information technology and professional services companies in the United States and Europe all with experience in network-based technologies As of 2005 there were 66 members in the NCOIC with another 68 inquiries by potential members The Consortiumrsquos Advisory Council includes prominent US Department of Defense offi cials as well as representatives from NATOrsquos C3 Agency the NATO Headquarters C3 Staff and the Swedish Defense Materiel Agency

Firms in some European countries are seeking to create similar networks In Germany for example an interest group known as the Open Community has been created to coordinate the development of standards and open architectures The member companies of the community have agreed to implement a policy of interoperability based on recognized open commercial and military standards adopting a full spectrum approach Members of Open Community include Atos Origin Diehl BGT Defense CONET CSC Ploumlnzke ESG IBM Deutschland Rheinmetall Defense Electronics Thales Defense Deutschland and Unilog Systems (Rheinmetall Defense Electronics 2005) While valuable national collaborative initiatives such as Open Community will not necessarily address the challenges of international interoperability and cross-national acquisitions

Conclusion

The European industrial base is clearly capable of undertaking signifi cant work on C4ISR programs and technologies not only at the national level but also at the transnational level There are several transatlantic projects in the fi eld These include the Active Phased Array Radar (APAR) project co-developed by Thales EADS and Raytheon and deployed by the German Dutch and Canadian navies (the system enables the tracking and controlling of missiles fi red from various sources by a single ship) MIDS (which enables interoperability between United States British German Italian French and Spanish ships aircraft and missiles) and the Raytheon-Thales jointly-owned fi rm Thales-Raytheon Systems (TRS) working on C2 systems for air defense and tactical communications for Special Forces

Increasingly European companies are initiating intra-European collaborations as opposed to transatlantic programs In the post-Cold War era European defense fi rms have been almost twice as likely to pursue co-production and co-development projects with each other as with US fi rms and over three times more likely than with defense fi rms from other regions (Jones 2005 3) One motivation could be the sense that Americarsquos globally dominant defense industry forces the Europeans to combine efforts in order to compete internationally as well as to avoid excessive dependence on the United States There is a risk in this approach as it will add competitors in the international market and increase the challenge to ensure adequate transatlantic interoperability

For the Europeans regional cooperation does hold many benefi ts Regional collaboration in research and development production and procurement of C4ISR technologies and systems is clearly an important route toward developing

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

143

the capabilities needed to conduct network-based operations The European companies are likely to provide pressure from bottom-up for greater collaboration distributing technologies and demonstrators to several European countries They can also promote collaborative approaches to technology development Smaller more local companies can complement the larger ones with niche expertise and experience from national programs Such discussions could enhance interoperability across European military capabilities

Firms in the European industrial and technology base have recognized that developing the C4ISR technologies and systems required to conduct network-based operations will be important to their competitive position both in defense and commercial markets Unmanned vehicles sensor payloads deployable and mobile communications network infrastructures and data analysis technologies are all growth markets in both arenas European fi rms have been quick to grasp this reality and are investing in applications for defense and security customers with cutting-edge technologies While European C4ISR and network strategies are still being developed the industrial and technology base on which Europe will rely to implement strategies is amply capable of supplying them

144

8

EUROPEAN NETWORK-BASED

CAPABILITIES

Policy recommendations

The major European defense powers clearly possess the technology capabilities to research build and deploy modern C4ISR capabilities and move down the road toward military capabilities that are more network-based Many of these countries this survey reveals have made explicit decisions to move in that direction The Europeans face two signifi cant challenges in reaching this goal creating cross-national capabilities that take advantage of C4ISR to increase their ability to operate with each other in autonomous ways and enhancing transatlantic interoperability with the United States There are a number of policy steps the Europeans can take and steps the United States needs to take to realize this twofold objective

While the European allies have in many cases made a national commitment to enhanced networking the commitment to the trans-European and transatlantic goals is less clear At the trans-European level the European countries need to do much more than they do today to develop common standards and equipment Greater European interaction especially in the framework of the EU is needed for progress to be made in achieving trans-European interoperability The new Battlegroups are an important step in the right direction but more needs to be done

With respect to transatlantic interoperability it is clear that the Europeans are not likely to create the extensive network of C4ISR capabilities the United States plans nor need they do so A ldquoplug and playrdquo approach makes more sense for Europe using a US or NATO network backbone and selecting the points in that backbone where connectivity will ensure interoperability Such interoperability is most critical with respect to the timely transmission of voice data and images which will enable networked operations A plug and play strategy depends on common standards and capabilities and on ensuring that these are shared commonly deployed and secure Parallel to European actions the US needs to develop a stronger grasp of European strategic perspectives take European C4ISR technology and interoperability capabilities and intentions seriously work through NATO to enhance the opportunities for greater connectivity and in particular transform the US regime for defense trade to incentivize interoperability decisions transatlantic technology collaboration and industry effi ciency

Network thinking and interoperability are clearly important objectives in todayrsquos security environment The era of large static armored forces that

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

145

confront deter and defeat the adversaryrsquos massed formations has ended So too have the days when NATO forces trained and exercised together but were rarely used Today smaller more agile forces are being used regularly in a wide range of coalition operations both within and outside NATO as an organization and primarily outside Europe as a theater of operations

The question of out-of-area operations for NATO has been answered Europeans have clearly made the decision to use their forces in regions they have stayed away from for decades Coalition operations too seem more likely Iraq may be answering the question of whether the US will deploy forces on a largely unilateral basis for contingencies in other regions Coalition operations are now a ldquofact of liferdquo in Bosnia Kosovo Afghanistan and even in Iraq Connectivity between coalition forces will be necessary lack thereof is an obstacle to effective operations

This connectivity cannot be easily created at the point of deployment its absence is likely to lead to decisions to carve out separate zones of operation as seen in Iraq Sustained interoperability will require sustained planning cooperation and investment within Europe and across the Atlantic using military-to-military cooperation and the full panoply of institutions that connect the relevant nations

There are other reasons to push forward on greater cooperation with respect to C4ISR and network-based capabilities within Europe and across the Atlantic Technological effi ciency is one Unconstrained the technologies relevant to network-based operations would fl ow freely between countries many of them are drawn from a global commercial market for information and communications technology There are technological capabilities the Europeans bring to C4ISR from which the US military could benefi t and clear benefi ts to Europe from a less-constrained fl ow of C4ISR technology in the other direction

These same technologies are subject however to dual-use and military technology transfer rules making ineffi ciencies and redundancies inevitable Companies in the United States and Europe complain that even the European and American business units of the same fi rm cannot maximize technological synergies because the regulatory regimes get in the way As a result the same or similar technologies are sometimes being developed separately on both sides of the Atlantic and technological synergies cannot be exploited Similarly the absence of a coordinated strategy in Europe is leading to separate investments on expensive and duplicative programs

There is an economic cost to this ineffi ciency As each nation buys what it needs from its own suppliers each is paying a higher than necessary price and budget resources are being wasted in duplication This is especially a problem in Europe one slowly being responded to in such areas as UAVs and space where cross-national investments are becoming more common It is also a problem for the US which fails to reap the economies that might fl ow from tapping into the European technology base A more fl exible transatlantic technology market has potential benefi ts both for US and European defense investments and defense budgets A more open transatlantic regime for these technologies could also bring greater competition with advantageous results both in terms of price and technological innovation

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

146

European policies and actions

There has been increasingly rapid change in the European approach to C4ISR and network-based capabilities The number of militaries and defense ministries working on formulating and implementing C4ISR doctrines has grown as has the intensity of these efforts There remains much to be done however before all major European forces are adequately transformed for coalition operations outside the NATO area A number of actions can be suggested some at the national level and some within the framework of multilateral institutions

The trans-European commitment to multinational network-based operations is still not entirely clear This goal is not yet centrally embedded in European defense planning for all the progress that has been made over the past decade There remains an inadequate European commitment to joint force planning common requirements and coordinated RampT investment And the European defense market is still not fully open to the benefi ts and effi ciencies that could be realized by more fl exible movement of technology and greater competition among suppliers

European defense planning

At the level of defense and force planning the European allies need to make a clear commitment to the goal of intra-European and transatlantic C4ISR connectivity both in NATO and in the EU European national governments have recognized the importance of connectivity in some areas In the air (fi ghter communications) and at sea (naval communications and fi re control and targeting) the interoperability challenge is being met and collaborative efforts have resulted in a fair degree of connectivity The same cannot be said for land forces even within national militaries let alone at the trans-European or NATO levels All nations are working on this problem as the British Bowman the Dutch TITAAN and the Swedish HF-2000 programs indicate

Most countries are developing C4 systems to conform to NATO STANAGs yet few are moving beyond this level testing interoperability or moving toward the higher standards that prevail today Conforming to NATO STANAGs will not solve the inter-European or transatlantic interoperability problem The pace of some countriesrsquo C4ISR innovation goes well beyond NATO STANAGs However NATO remains an important context for addressing this issue systematically European governments need to work to accelerate the NATO STANAG process and broaden its coverage to also include surveillance and reconnaissance system standards The new Allied Command Transformation provides another important context for this effort one in which the Europeans need to engage fully

An equally strong commitment needs to be made in the European Union in the framework of the Headline Goal and ECAP processes and the European Defense Agency While C4ISR interoperability issues are on the table in the EU both in ECAP and the EDArsquos Capabilities Directorate they do not appear to have received priority attention and they should have it Interoperability requirements will be

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

147

driven by the missions the Europeans plan to undertake and the capabilities needed to network the command and control communications and intelligence need for those missions

Both NATO and the EU have formulated broad defense strategies that dictate when and how the military forces made available to them can be deployed Both have designated specifi c branches to integrate doctrines for network-based operations into their respective strategies NATO through its Command Control and Consultation Agency the European Union through the European Defense Agencyrsquos Capabilities Directorate These offi ces can be an important focus of assistance for nations formulating national doctrines and planning the acquisition of systems If undertaken in a coordinated manner by both NATO and the European Union national migration towards network-based doctrines and capabilities can be achieved more swiftly and effi ciently sharing workload avoiding redundancies and pooling resources NATO and European Union oversight of this transition can help ensure that the goal of intra-European and transatlantic interoperability remains the focus of national planners

The Europeans do not need to adopt US global missions and goals to achieve this interoperability for networked operations Too often the US critique of the Europeans is that their roles missions and forces need to look like those of the US to be interoperable or useful in coalition operations However the Europeans are unlikely to undertake large high intensity combat operations at a global level and unlikely to invest in building the resources required for these With a different strategic ambition but a comparable view of the important threats the Europeans will not need forces that are carbon copies of the US The United Kingdom has taken a different approach developing network-enabled capabilities by testing and modifying existing equipment and evaluating new systems against this network requirement rather than building an entire global network-centric architecture from the ground up ndash evolution as opposed to revolution

The policy challenge is how to ensure connectivity where the European and US force capabilities must meet in coalition deployments inside or outside the NATO framework or for the missions of the NATO Response Force outside the NATO area Given the strategic and resource gap it is critical for the Europeans in cooperation with the United States and in the NATO context to defi ne the critical nodes in the US C4ISR system into which European capabilities need to plug in order to play

Given the difference in resources strategic ambitions and roles and missions a plug and play strategy makes sense for Europe The model would be for the United States or NATO or both to provide the backbone for a network and for the Europeans to select the points in the grid that are critical to ensure the needed interoperability Interoperability will need to focus on the timely transmission of voice data and images the information that will enable networked operations The plug and play strategy relies on common software standards and capabilities Ensuring that software standards are shared commonly deployed and secure will facilitate the communication of voice data and imagery among more complex (US) and less intricate (European) networks

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

148

The Europeans will not need all the satellites the United States possesses in order to shape operations that use the intelligence those satellites deliver They will not require all the UAVs the US deploys though their systems will need to be able to disseminate data to and from the US If the Europeans wish to operate autonomously from the United States or from NATO assets available through the Berlin Plus arrangements they will have to decide how much autonomous C4ISR they require to do so European ambitions can be tailored to European requirements and European resources and interoperability in the Alliance can be reinforced at the same time

The NATO Response Force could provide a useful test-bed for C4ISR inter-operability issues US policy sees the NRF as a European force to which it will provide important logistical and C4 support in the near term Eventually in the US view this force is to provide such capabilities without US support The goal from the US perspective is to create incentives for the Europeans to develop integral C4ISR that is interoperable with US forces While the issue of continued US participation in the force remains on the table it provides a useful opportunity for the Europeans to test out their own emerging C4ISR capabilities with potential payoff for the more autonomous capabilities that might emerge in the EU context

Working through the NRF might help address the large uncertainty about the European commitment to both transatlantic and intra-European interoperability There is not yet a clear common view in Europe about the goal of interoperability The British tend to focus on the need for interoperability with the US but less on the goal of interoperability with their European partners The French are committed to greater internal interoperability among their national services but do not focus priority attention on C4ISR interoperability with Britain or Germany Where interoperability exists ndash in the air and at sea ndash it is largely the result of NATO requirements and the acquisition of US systems not from addressing interoperability at the European level

The lack of clear priority attention to this issue stems in part from the absence of cross-European interaction on strategic force and requirement planning among the European defense ministries The Headline Goal and ECAP processes both of which are important do not constitute joint strategic force and requirements planning These processes focus on a particular set of forces and capabilities not on overall defense goals There is a gap between the discussions in Brussels and the day-to-day planning and priority setting in national capitals These latter processes are not coordinated at the European level leaving each nation focused largely on its own national military capabilities A purely national process forces C4ISR and interoperability requirements to compete for funding with commitments to legacy and modernization programs Engaging this dialogue at the level of the European Defense Agencyrsquos Capabilities Directorate and the EU Military Staff could provide important leverage to change these priorities

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

149

Investment in research and technology

The absence of trans-European coordination is particularly telling at the level of research and technology investments Overall the level of European defense-related RampT investment is low and RampT priorities and programs are poorly coordinated across the EU The result is weak spending in the C4ISR arena and redundancies between the major defense countries Low funding moreover combined with major commitment of limited procurement resources to legacy and modernization programs means that RampT projects that reach the prototype or demonstrator stage often do not enter into production

RampT coordination across EU countries is uncommon While the French and British devote signifi cant sums to defense RampT especially in the C4ISR arena they engage in little bilateral coordination on these programs Others such as Italy and Germany which have set a goal of creating more networked forces engage in little trans-European collaboration in these plans or investments Given the overall limitation on defense resources greater coordination and the elimination of duplication in effort would be an important way to obtain the resources needed for interoperability

An important contribution to the trans-European RampT effort may emerge from the European Commissionrsquos 7th Framework Program (FP7) and the EDArsquos RampT programs The Commissionrsquos FP7 that begins in 2007 will include security space and homeland security research and development for the fi rst time with proposed funding of 4ndash7 billion euros for such fi elds as earth observation and detection of chemical and biological agents It will be critical for the Commission to maintain a wide scope for this funding resist efforts to reduce the overall amount and ensure that at least some of it is directed toward dual-use network-based capabilities including UAVs large communications networks and advanced sensors

The EDA RampT programs will have an even more specifi c focus on defense needs The fi rst cluster of investments initiated in the summer of 2005 focuses on technologies for long-endurance UAVs However EDArsquos current RampT budget of some 3 million euros is small As the EDA experience with this program grows so should its budget and its involvement in more complex development and demonstration programs

A truly trans-European system for strategic force and requirements planning is still some way ahead in the future Ultimately for the European Union to meet interoperability and C4ISR requirements such a system will be needed It is the only way to end redundancies and make the force structure changes needed to release budgetary resources for interoperability investments

A cross-European market for dual-use and defense technologies

The focus on interoperability in C4ISR and greater integration of planning and investment activities will only pay off if a cross-European market for dual-use and defense technology comes into being Policies and institutions at the European level are still not adequate to take full advantage of the widespread privatization

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

150

and trans-European consolidation of defense industry and technology capabilities that has occurred over the past decade

Because requirements are defi ned nationally national defense industry policies vary widely and the rules and regulations for acquisition differ also the incentives for industry to collaborate or compete across borders are weak The rules are not standardized budgets are not coordinated the politics of local procurement tend to weigh heavily in investment decisions and defense technology transfer across European borders remains constrained an increasingly global industry is not matched by a regional defense market

The Letter of Intent OCCAR EDA and Commission collaborative research programs all point in the right direction in terms of creating such a market but progress is slow The Commissionrsquos communiqueacutes ndash the latest of which was adopted in 2003 ndash to encourage industrial restructuring and greater effi ciency in the European Defense Equipment Market while praiseworthy have had modest effect Nor have collaborative procurements broken through this logjam Collaborative European defense programs still focus funding on platforms such as the A400 airlifter Tiger helicopter and Eurofi ghter When it comes to network-based capabilities national technology assets and producers tend to be favored and international competition or collaboration resisted

The UK is changing its approach creating a potentially useful precedent Overall British defense procurement policy has moved sharply away from protecting national monopolies and toward transnational competition and teaming Despite what has been a dominant position for BAE Systems in the UK defense market the Ministry of Defense has sent an unambiguous signal that procurements are open to European and transatlantic competitors This has led to a growing position in the British defense market especially that for C4ISR technologies for such fi rms as Thales Raytheon EADS General Dynamics and EDS The explicit goal of this policy change was to reap the advantages of competition and international teaming and ensure that the broadest array of technology was available In return non-British fi rms are expected to bring a substantial portion of work share into the United Kingdom strengthening and broadening the domestic defense technology industry at the same time

Overcoming the weight of the European defense industrial legacy will not be easy but the British model may provide useful lessons for European-level market policy A more open market could provide substantial effi ciency savings through competition with important payoff for European and transatlantic interoperability For these advantages to be reached the Letter of Intent OCCAR EDA and EC research processes would need to be coordinated with the development of an open-market policy resisting efforts to protect that market from competition

American actions

The future of transatlantic interoperability for networked operations will depend on American policy changes as well as on European actions The US has a clear interest in advancing such interoperability based on a history of security

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

151

cooperation and the demands of coalition operations in the twenty-fi rst century (Serfaty 2005 87ndash8) Neither Europe nor the United States can meet the new security challenges alone Addressed through the Alliance the defense capabilities for meeting these challenges would be greatly enhanced by a more effective networked European force If the US wishes not to become involved in a particular situation an effective European capability will provide a valuable policy option for the US

A US policy that encourages and incentivizes the existing trends toward more sophisticated C4ISR investments in Europe needs to focus on three dimensions greater common understanding with respect to strategic perspectives a serious engagement with European efforts currently underway and reforming the US regime for transatlantic defense trade to allow a discussion of technology requirements transatlantic technology collaboration and greater industry effi ciency

Understanding European strategic perspectives

The changes in the world of global security since the end of the Cold War have forced a discussion of how institutions and national strategies need to change to refl ect new international security realities To some degree this dialogue has already led to signifi cant changes including the enlargement of NATO to include the former Warsaw Pact reassuring them about the dramatic change that had taken place The extension of NATOrsquos mission to restore order to the Balkans was also a major change for the Alliance and its fi rst involvement in actual combat in the wider European theater These operations also created stresses in the Alliance and played a role in the US decision to choose coalitions of the willing for the initial military operations in Afghanistan and for the war in Iraq Growing dangers of terrorist strikes and nuclear proliferation have further altered the security agenda for the transatlantic partners

When it comes to the use of military forces the two most recent confl icts may well represent the future trend smaller expeditionary forces deployed at some distance from the homeland operating in relatively spare environments moving with agility and focus to strike adversary targets effectively and terminate combat operations quickly Clearly these twenty-fi rst century wars will rely more than ever on networked operations integrating sensors data communications and the measurement of effects

These military deployments may not always operate in coalition and may not always involve NATO or all the major European powers Disagreements over Iraq and the diffi culties in the execution of Balkan operations both had the effect of giving the Europeans an incentive to accelerate the development of more autonomous capabilities in part to refl ect a different European view of strategic requirements Similarly these disagreements and problems convinced some in the US that the Europeans might be an unreliable partner for such operations both because of differing strategic views and a less advanced military capability

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

152

Given these tensions NATO continues to provide an important context for dialogue at the military and technical level European and American forces will continue to operate together both inside and outside the Alliance and interoperability will be an important tool in conducting such operations successfully The NATO Prague summit of November 2002 made signifi cant progress with respect the transformation of Alliance forces for the new missions and technologies of the twenty-fi rst century by reshaping the NATO command structure with a new transformation command setting new capabilities objectives and endorsing the NRF

NATO has provided one context for a higher level of strategic dialogue as well Critical changes have included the willingness of the European allies to commit the Alliance to out-of-area operations and to stand up the NRF It has not been the only context however The EU has also begun to emerge as a growing player in the security dialogue defi ning a broad strategy document creating a pillar in the Council on this subject pushing through the Headline Goal and ECAP processes and most recently moving forward with the European Defense Agency and the Battlegroups

None of these developments however constitutes a sustained strategic dialogue between the United States and its European allies The US government should take the initiative to begin such a dialogue either in the NATO context or as a higher level discussion among the allied countries This engagement should also involve bringing the European allies into an ongoing discussion in the framework of the quadrennial defense reviews in the United States a process that has largely excluded sustained interaction with the allies

Engaging European programs and capabilities

For the strategic dialogue to have meaning with respect to force and acquisition decisions the US will need to take a serious look at the capabilities the Europeans are putting in place today There is a tendency in the US to discount European investments in C4ISR and network solutions as inadequate The lesson some US policymakers have drawn over the past fi ve decades and especially over the past ten years is that European forces are heavy on manpower and equipment light on new network-centric planning and technology and overall inadequately transformed to refl ect post-Cold War realities In this view the fi rst Gulf War and the Kosovo air war indicated that European land forces lacked the real-time information and C4ISR capabilities necessary for agile expeditionary operations and European air forces could not ensure secure real-time interoperability for air interdiction missions

This study suggests that the European commitment to C4ISR and greater networking is stronger than this view suggests In part in reaction to the lessons of the Gulf War and the Balkans a number of European countries are stepping up to the investments and planning required to acquire advanced C4ISR and achieve greater interoperability In addition there is little doubt that the industrial and technology base available in Europe is both competitive to that of the United

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

153

States and adequate to deliver the capabilities a modern more networked force requires

US policymakers and even NATO leaders have suggested that the way to close the ldquogaprdquo is for the Europeans to increase defense spending Clearly greater spending focused on networking as a priority would help solve the interoperability dilemma However the reality is that overall defense budgets in Europe are unlikely to rise at the rate necessary to provide that capability

A more fruitful US approach would be to make a virtue of this reality by urging a restructuring of European defense investments with a priority on the forces and technologies needed for twenty-fi rst century operations This emphasis could bear fruit While Germany for example may not be able to increase its defense budget overall given domestic German commitments and problems the focus of the German defense program is already shifting toward expeditionary capabilities incorporating modern C4ISR A US message consistent with this internal trend could prove more productive than repeated demands that the Germans spend more overall on defense

US policymakers have argued the priorities case with respect to specifi c acquisitions notably the A400M and Galileo which are sometimes criticized as the ldquowrongrdquo priorities for European defense investment US criticism however has provided an incentive for both projects to move forward Again this policy approach may be counterproductive Both programs are clearly intended by the Europeans to meet European defense (and civil) needs Both provide capabilities the Americans have long sought ndash a more modern European air transport capability and the ability to provide location data for precision-guided munitions The solutions are European and responsive to the needs of a European industrial and technology base as well as the desire to possess some autonomous European capabilities in these areas

ldquoBuy Americanrdquo is not an answer however much US policymakers may think it the most effi cient solution The Europeans are no more likely to satisfy their equipment and technology needs by buying exclusively in the US market than the US Department of Defense is likely to satisfy its needs entirely from European providers Again to make a virtue of this political-economic reality it may make more sense for the US to explore the opportunities to combine technologies and industrial capabilities through collaboration

US concerns about the gap and about European capabilities have led to minimal US effort to involve the Europeans in US planning for network-centric capabilities or to include European technologies in the process of developing these capabilities for the US military

A general skepticism about European capabilities has been combined with a preference in the US defense establishment to work with known US processes and suppliers Extending the research and acquisition process to include European suppliers is a step into the less-known US suppliers moreover are under-standably uneasy about bringing European fi rms into the US market as potential competitors

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

154

Overcoming the transatlantic C4ISR interoperability challenge and implementing a plug and play approach will require overcoming these prevailing attitudes and engaging the Europeans directly with respect to plans and technologies Here too NATO could provide an important context for a multilateral dialogue through collaboration on transatlantic RampD programs for example The NATO-led CAESAR advanced concept technology demonstratr (ACTD) discussed earlier has already proven that sharing data between various national airborne ground surveillance capabilities is possible Other technology areas are ripe for collaborative initiatives

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for both surveillance and combat and their sensor payloads are one such area As already noted many European countries possess substantial technological knowledge and experience in this area including engines airframe design and stealth technology and have expertise in active electronically scanned array radar hyperspectral imaging lightweight synthetic aperture radar and ground moving target indicators relevant for sensor payloads Multinational European programs such as the EuroMALE UAV and the Neuron combat UAV are already under way Cooperation in this area would have not only military and budgetary advantages for participants but could open opportunities for industrial cooperation

Another potentially fruitful arena for transatlantic collaboration is data-sharing of space imagery Europe has underway several multinational efforts to link data gathered by Earth observation systems The Optical and Radar Federated Earth Observation program will link the existing Francersquos SPOT 5 and Helios 2 satellites with systems currently under development the two French Pleiades high-resolution optical satellites the four Italian COSMO-Skymed X-band radar satellites (with a resolution of less than 1 meter for military images) and possibly the fi ve German SAR-Lupe synthetic aperture radar satellites The fi rst satellites in these programs will be operational between 2005 and 2007 and Sweden Spain Austria and Belgium have already secured their industrial cooperation on Pleiades and the sharing of data acquired by the system (Adams and Ben-Ari 2005 21) A transatlantic discussion of how to integrate these platforms and share data including the sensitive issue of intelligence-sharing might be fruitful

Transforming the US defense trade regime

The US regime for export controls and technology transfer may be the ldquolong pole in the tentrdquo for transatlantic collaboration and interoperability (Center for Strategic and International Studies 2001) Policy and industry analysts have noted for some years that the US National Disclosure Process (NDP) International Traffi c in Arms Regulations (ITAR) Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) and Special Security Arrangements (SSA) all of which regulate the transfer and export of US defense technologies and the process of direct foreign investment in the US market pose major obstacles to the technology transfers that will be needed to close the interoperability gap between the United States and its European allies (Adams 2001c)

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

155

Transfers of defense technologies from the US to the European allies go through intensive scrutiny in the Department of Defense and an interagency discussion before a decision is made to approve the deal This has often led to a decision to share parts of hardware with allied collaborators but not software codes that govern the operation of the system leaving allies in possession of only part of the information they would need to operate repair overhaul or adapt systems purchased from or built in collaboration with the United States The US-German-Italian Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) for example has faced this black box problem for some time

US export control rules compound the problem All military technology exports and transfers including the exchange of oral or written expertise on such technology require a license from the Offi ce of Defense Trade Controls in the Department of State after interagency coordination (including the Department of Defense and the armed services) The slowness and complexity of the US export control process and the large number of items on the Munitions List have been a constant irritant in the transatlantic defense relationship US fi rms wishing to collaborate with European counterparts encounter delays European fi rms seeking to acquire US components for European systems fi nd the system unpredictable The US operations of European defense fi rms cannot cross-fertilize with their European branches as such communications require an export license to take place This system has created incentives for the Europeans to build technologies in Europe which are no longer subject to US controls rather than buy technology from the United States

US regulations with respect to the scrutiny and structure of foreign direct investment in the US defense market have further complicated the dialogue about interoperability Direct investments and joint ventures by Europeans (and others) in the US defense market are subject to intensive scrutiny through the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) interagency process While very few such investments have been rejected many are withdrawn or not attempted given the complexities and uncertainties in the US process Successful investments and collaborations such as the BAE Systems acquisition of Lockheed Martinrsquos electronic warfare assets in 2000 and the creation of Thales Raytheon Systems (an air defense joint venture) take years to execute and are diffi cult to operate effi ciently

These diffi culties are compounded by the complexities of the SSA requirements which effectively separate the work and workforce of American business units from those of the European parent company The requirements are designed and enforced to prevent the fl ow of sensitive technologies across the Atlantic They also make effi cient cross-corporate collaboration and economic effi ciencies diffi cult

C4ISR interoperability is at the very heart of coalition operations and the US rules of the road are a disincentive to achieving that goal Major reforms of the US technology transfer export control and investment rules would be needed for transatlantic interoperability and network issues to be solved It will be important for Washington to realize that these rules which seem technical and receive

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

156

lower priority attention are strategic issues for the European allies Technical discussions that leave the current rules and processes in place will not solve the problem they need to be addressed at the higher policy level

Conclusion

Solving the interoperability problems particularly with respect to networked operations and C4ISR is clearly critical to the long-term future of the transatlantic relationship Both the Europeans and the United States will need to take major policy decisions to move this agenda forward The issue is not a technological one the obstacles to a solution are at the level of policy and budgets The Europeans need to focus their priorities clarify strategy work to eliminate redundancies and build institutions and policies at the European level that address C4ISR as a priority The United States needs to engage in a more systematic strategic dialogue with Europe engage the Europeans at the military and technical levels and reform the regulatory regimes and processes that inhibit technology fl ows Neither set of tasks is easy completing them could make a substantial difference in strengthening transatlantic interoperability for coalition operations

157

9

CONCLUSIONS

Recognizing that the changed threats of the twenty-fi rst century demanded a different strategic response and military capability the United States moved relatively swiftly during the 1990s to transform its military Over the past 15 years this has made the US military increasingly more effi cient and effective at carrying out expeditionary combat missions involving air sea and ground forces operating jointly From a force largely trained and equipped for platform-intensive land battles in Western Europe versus a Soviet threat Americarsquos armed forces have become adept at conducting small expeditionary operations anywhere in the world The increased fl exibility maneuverability and lethality of the US military has included substantial investment in emerging technologies for gathering intelligence distributing it rapidly to all relevant decision makers and users and acting upon it Linked together into a network that ties command to warfi ghting these technologies are a critical tool for modern military operations

The conventional wisdom about the Atlantic Alliance is that the Europeans have not gone through a similar adjustment spend far too little on defense and are left with forces that cannot engage in similar operations alone or in coalition with the United States This study demonstrates that this wisdom is a vast oversimplifi cation As a perception of European military capabilities especially in the arena of networked operations this view condemns both sides of the Atlantic to an unnecessary crisis of confi dence There is indeed some truth to the view that a ldquogaprdquo separates the US and its NATO allies in Europe especially in the arena of networked capabilities But there are important nuances to that gap that need to be understood for interoperability to be achieved

This study shows that a number of European allies already possess or are seriously developing important elements even a full spectrum of modern C4ISR doctrines and capabilities The major European defense powers ndash especially the United Kingdom and France ndash experienced the Gulf War and the Kosovo air war as a serious wakeup call with respect to C4ISR and interoperability with the United States Within available means these countries along with the Netherlands Finland and Sweden are investing in cross-service C2 upgraded communications gear with new radio programs and IP-based capabilities are researching testing or deploying UAV platforms with modern sensors and are tackling issues of cross-service interoperability

CONCLUSIONS

158

The United Kingdom is probably the most advanced in developing network doctrine investing in the range of capabilities required and coordinating its activities with the United States France invests across an even more broad range of capabilities than the United Kingdom (including space systems for example) but has a more diffi cult time coordinating with the United States and is still at the early stages of developing a network doctrine Sweden Finland and the Netherlands have laid out plans for achieving a networked C4ISR capability and are moving slowly forward though interoperability is constrained by national policy Germany Italy and Spain have all made policy statements that commit them to a greater focus on C4ISR networked capabilities and interoperability but actual doctrines and deployed capabilities are still thin

Although progress on C4ISR and networking is uneven in Europe there does not appear to be a signifi cant technology gap between the US and its major European allies At the level of basic technological inputs ndash information communications equipment and sensor systems ndash Europe possesses ample and competitive technology both in the defense and the civilian sector and the know-how to cooperate with the producers of US technology to develop systems and capabilities that can interoperate with US defense systems

It is also an oversimplifi cation to argue that there is a capabilities gap between the US and European militaries There clearly are mismatches in capabilities but they are not at the extreme of saying that the US is moving toward a full network-centric capability while the Europeans are irretrievably mired in the last generation of military technology The leading European nations are developing network-based doctrines and integrating them into their broader defense strategies Many nations are developing and deploying systems in such areas as cross-service C2 upgraded communications systems UAV platforms with modern sensors and cross-service interoperability

NATO has underway a number of programs to create greater interoperability between European and American forces with promise of signifi cant progress in the next decade The EU is also beginning to focus on such capabilities under the framework of the ECAP the Battlegroups and the emerging European Defense Agency There are clear persuasive reasons for making investments in network-based capabilities and transatlantic interoperability a high priority on both sides of the Atlantic NATO the EU and various international forums and industrial collaborations are effective mechanisms for making this happen

There clearly are differences in doctrine and deployment across the Atlantic No NATO ally intends to build or deploy the full global set of networked capabilities projected by the United States Only France has invested in virtually all of the elements of such a capability but no nation has the individual resources to build a capability comparable to that of the United States nor does there appear to be a strategic necessity to do so Only a handful of European allies have formulated doctrines for networked operations however based on their understanding of the uses of C4ISR technology in warfare and of the campaigns they foresee themselves conducting in the near future Networking is not yet at the core of

CONCLUSIONS

159

European military planning nor is the role of multilateral institutions such as the EU entirely clear

This transatlantic ldquodoctrine gaprdquo will need to be bridged if future coalition operations are to succeed This is less a technological issue than it is a policy problem C4ISR technologies and expertise of comparable quality exist within companies and national forces on both sides of the Atlantic Several joint US-European programs have proven that these technologies can be linked The NATO-led advanced concept technology demonstrator CAESAR has proven that sharing data between various national airborne ground surveillance capabilities is possible The six-nation Multinational Interoperability Council program has enabled the sharing of classifi ed information using a combined wide area network The co-development of the Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) has resulted in an encrypted jam-resistant interoperable tactical data communications network In 2005 two other advanced concept technology demonstrators were linked to demonstrate how data from various national collection systems can be posted on a common military website and made available for coalition operations in near real time down to the brigade and platoon levels That same year 43 nations conducted over 15000 interoperability tests in the eleventh consecutive Combined Endeavor exercise These programs demonstrate that interoperability ndash with all of its operational advantages ndash can be achieved without requiring individual countries to relinquish certain military capabilities or parts of their industrial base

For the Europeans one priority for European defense planners will be to develop doctrine that can guide the restructuring of their militaries toward a more expeditionary capability using networked systems France for example develops and procures a wide range of state-of-the-art C4ISR assets but does so without a clearly formulated doctrine for expeditionary network-based operations Such doctrine will make it easier to shift spending from older systems such as main battle tanks and armored personnel carriers into network-based systems such as airborne ground surveillance and space assets Other European defense ministries need to follow suit taking maximum advantage of the contribution that networked capabilities can bring to the level of expeditionary and coalition operations to which they choose to commit

The pace of such a change will have important implications for defense investments A substantial share of European national-level investment in C4ISR and networked capabilities is still at the research technology exploration and development stage The investments of the past decade are now beginning to pay off with deployments taking place over the next ten years from now There is a mismatch in timing with the US pace that needs to be tended to

Policy is again on a critical part of the answer As a common European commitment to out-of-area operations and agile and mobile forces emerges it will create a strong incentive for a redirection of national and trans-European defense investments A Europe uncertain about its military roles and missions will enhance the ldquodrag effectrdquo of legacy forces and investments at the national defense planning level This drag is visible in some of the countries under study notably

CONCLUSIONS

160

Germany and Italy which have substantial investments in legacy forces and the industry that provides their platforms

Resources are the other part of the equation Given the major non-defense commitments of many of the European countries and the unclear defi nition of defense priorities it is enormously diffi cult to redirect public resources to defense Defense resources are unlikely to rise in the near term but this does not mean that resources dedicated to C4ISR cannot grow The diffi cult but necessary decision which some have made and others are coming to involves the tradeoff between legacy forces and equipment and the expeditionary networked forces of the future A doctrine that makes network-based forces more central to overall capability will help reshape budget priorities providing resources for C4ISR investment

The doctrine and deployment gaps are at the heart of current interoperability shortfalls within Europe and across the Atlantic While many European militaries are developing or will soon deploy C2 systems that cross service lines and common communications are the focus of some (the United Kingdomrsquos Bowman system is probably the most ambitious and comprehensive) the results are still uneven across countries The question of cross-European interoperability also needs to be addressed as these changes are made The cross-European gap needs to be closed at the same time the transatlantic gap is being bridged

US policymakers who tend to view transformation network-centric operations and interoperability either solely within the US context or at the fringe as a NATO issue need to keep in mind the cross-European level of activity Recent EU developments suggest that the Europeans do not intend to remain behind will see autonomous networked capabilities and will want to apply their own technology to their needs Europe possesses a technological base adequate to meet this requirement and the European intention of developing such capabilities is becoming more clear The emerging strategic vision in Europe while different from that of the United States clearly includes the desire for increased network-based security capabilities and the ability to operate both autonomously and in coalition with the US Policymakers in the United States need to be aware of these cross-European developments as they are starting to shape European attitudes toward strategic missions the development of rapid reaction capabilities technological investments and cooperation across the Atlantic Over time the rise of a defense-capable European Union will change the context within which these issues are discussed

161

GLOSSARY

Airborne Ground Surveillance (AGS) a radar system ndash mounted on an aircraft or helicopter ndash used for mapping friendly and enemy elements on the ground on a continuous basis and for passing information of their location to commanders for command and control intelligence and strike purposes The use of such a system provides strategic and tactical theater surveillance and target acquisition capabilities and thus reduces both the time and mass required to execute operations AGS systems consist of a radar that can operate in synthetic aperture radar (SAR) mode providing broad area imaging at high resolutions ground moving target indicator (GMTI) mode for tracking moving objects or both

Command Control Communications Computers Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) a range of systems grouped for their relevance to network-centric warfare and network-based operations (see below) When these systems are interconnected they can form a network (or a series of networks) on which operators can exchange information and coordinate activities

Galileo Joint European Commission and European Space Agency program for a space-based positioning navigation and timing system similar to the US Global Positioning System Galileo will include 30 satellites and begin offering services in 2008

Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) Joint European Commission and European Space Agency program for the development of new information systems and techniques to exploit Europersquos existing space-based earth observation capabilities more effi ciently and to plan Europersquos next-generation earth observation systems

Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) a joint project of the US air force and army providing an airborne stand-off range surveillance and target acquisition radar and C2 center Sixteen such aircraft are operational providing ground situation information through communication via secure data links with air force command posts army mobile ground stations and other command centers

Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) a high-capacity electronic counter measure resistant communications link designed for all

GLOSSARY

162

services (air surface and land) and all platform types Operates on the UHF band and supports three message standards Link-16 the Interim JTIDS Message Standard (IJMS) and Variable Message Format (VMF)

Link-11 tactical data link used by the US navy and several other allied navies Its ability to operate on high frequency waves enables the system to communicate beyond line of sight making it ideal for maritime communications Link-11 can also operate in the UHF band but is then limited to line-of-sight ranges

Link-16 tactical data link supporting the exchange of surveillance data EW data mission tasking weapons assignments and control data over MIDS and JTIDS equipment

Link-22 next-generation NATO tactical data link also referred to as NATO Improved Link Eleven (NILE)

Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) A fi ve-nation (United States France Italy Germany and Spain) cooperative program created to develop a third-generation Link-16 system

Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) multinational body providing oversight of coalition interoperability and assisting in implementing actions for its improvement The six member countries (Australia Canada France Germany the United Kingdom and the United States) were chosen as most likely and most capable of leading future coalitions

NATO Air Alliance Ground Surveillance (NATO AGS) NATO research development and procurement program currently in the design phase which will provide the Alliance with an aerial battlefi eld surveillance capability through radar and the fusing of information gathered by other sensors Initially the system was to be deployed on manned aircraft only but it has been redesigned for deployment on both manned and unmanned aircraft

Network-Based Operations (NBO) operations (military and non-military) where elements of command control and communications systems are linked to intelligence-gathering and situation awareness systems Unlike network-centric warfare (see below) the term network-based operations does not imply a single unifi ed network into which all forces are linked Rather several disparate networks ndash possibly deployed by forces from different countries ndash are linked This enables better sharing of information and utilization of forces which in turn means that smaller forces can effectively undertake more complex missions in larger areas of operations

Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) the use of interconnected communications and information systems to create a single network that forms the core of information sharing and strategic operational and tactical decision-making The network gives warfi ghters a shared awareness of the battlespace which in turn enables more effi cient command and control of deployed assets better decision-making for commanders and shorter sensor-to-shooter loops

Precision Guided Munitions (PGM) also known as ldquosmart weaponsrdquo PGMs are a key capability in modern warfi ghting They can be specifi cally designed or regular munitions with an added-on guidance system but in either form maximize destruction of the target while reducing the overall amount of

GLOSSARY

163

munitions required to hit it and minimizing collateral damage While the older less accurate visually-guided munitions are still in use more modern versions are laser- or satellite-guided These include the US Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) and the European Storm Shadow and Scalp missiles

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) remotely piloted aircraft used for a variety of military and civilian tasks Usually categorized into tactical UAV (TUAV) which are used for short-range low-altitude missions medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) used for longer more elaborate missions and high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) used for long-term missions at operational and strategic levels In recent years smaller man-portable and hand-launched mini- and micro-UAVs have been developed and deployed for short-term missions as well as combat UAVs (UCAVs) for strike purposes

164

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adams G (2001a) ldquoStrength in Numbers the European allies and American defense planningrdquo in Williams C (ed) Holding the Line US Defense Alternatives for the Early 21st Century Cambridge MA MIT Press

mdashmdash (2001b) ldquoTaking Europe Seriouslyrdquo in Center for International and Strategic Studies European Defense Industrial Consolidation Implications for US Industry and PolicyWashington DC Center for International and Strategic Studies

mdashmdash (2001c) ldquoFortress America in a Changing Transatlantic Defense Marketrdquo in Schmitt B (ed) Between Cooperation and Competition The Transatlantic Defense MarketParis Institute for Security Studies of the European Union

Adams G and Ben-Ari G (2005) ldquoTransatlantic Revival technology cooperation could offer new startrdquo Defense News 208 21

Adams G Ben-Ari G Logsdon J and Williamson R (2004) European C4ISR Capabilities and Transatlantic Interoperability Washington DC Center for Technology and National Security Policy

Aguumlera M (2003) ldquoDecline in German Research Continuesrdquo Defense News 1837 32Assembly of WEU (2002) Arms Cooperation in Europe WEAG and EU Activities

Brussels Assembly of WEUBaker JC Williamson RA and Johnson B (2001) ldquoUS Security Interests and Dual-

Purpose Satellite Technologiesrdquo in Williamson RA (ed) Dual-Purpose Space Technologies Opportunities and Challenges for US Policymaking Washington DC Space Policy Institute

Barry CL (2002) ldquoCoordinating with NATOrdquo in Binnendijk H (ed) Transforming Americarsquos Military Washington DC Center for Technology and National Security Policy

mdashmdash (2003) ldquoTransforming NATO Command and Control for Future Missionsrdquo DefenseHorizons No 28 Washington DC Center for Technology and National Security Policy

Becher K (2003) ldquoTowards Strategic Dialogue in NATO Europersquos conditionrdquo in Nelson CR and Purcell J (eds) Transforming NATO Forces European PerspectivesWashington DC Atlantic Council of the United States

Bescond B (2003) ldquoGalileo un produit Europeacuteen de souveraineteacuterdquo Defense 105 40ndash3Binnendijk H (2004) ldquoNeeded A NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Forcerdquo Defense

Horizons No 45 Washington DC National Defense UniversityBinnendijk H and Kugler R (2002) ldquoTransforming European Forcesrdquo Survival 44

117ndash32

BIBLIOGRAPHY

165

Boulesteix C (2004) Overview of the French Defense Market 2004 online Available at httpstrategisicgccaepicinternetinimr-rinsfengr125657ehtml (accessed 17 September 2005)

Boyer Y (2004) ldquoThe Consequences of US and NATO Transformation for the European Union a European viewrdquo in Hamilton D (ed) Transatlantic Transformations Equipping NATO for the 21st Century Washington DC Center for Transatlantic Relations

Center for Strategic and International Studies (2001) Technology and Security in the Twenty-fi rst Century US Military Export Control Reform Washington DC Center for Strategic and International Studies

Chuter A (2003a) ldquoUK Strike Chief Notes UAVsrsquo Shortcomingsrdquo Defense News 1830 8

mdashmdash (2003b) ldquoFrench-Dutch UAV Draws Interest In Europerdquo Defense News 1838 4mdashmdash (2005a) ldquoUK May Look to Europe for UCAVsrdquo Defense News 2025 1 8mdashmdash (2005b) ldquoUK Seeks to Expand its UAV Capabilitiesrdquo Defense News 2028 4Council of the European Union (2003) Framework Agreement Between the European

Commission and the European Space Agency Brussels Council of the European Union

mdashmdash (2005) Report by the Head of the European Defense Agency to the Council Brussels Council of the European Union

CPM Forum (2005) ldquoThe Bundeswehr today and tomorrowrdquo in CPM Forum (eds) Defenseand Transformation in Germany St Augustin CPM

DalBello R (2003) ldquoCommercial Communication Satellites assessing vulnerability in a changing worldrdquo in Logsdon J and Adams G (eds) Space Weapons Are They Needed Washington DC The George Washington University

Deacuteleacutegation Geacuteneacuterale pour lrsquoArmement (2003) ldquoLes Deacutemonstrateurs Aeacuteronautiques et Spatiauxrdquo DGA Dossier Paris Deacuteleacutegation Geacuteneacuterale pour lrsquoArmement

De Selding P (2003a) ldquoFrench Defense Ministry Considers Commercial Model for Syracuse 3rdquo Space News 1447 6

mdashmdash (2003b) ldquoSkynet 5 Contract Has Built-in Safeguardsrdquo Space News 1447 10Deutch J Kanter A and Scowcroft B (1999) ldquoSaving NATOrsquos foundationrdquo Foreign

Affairs 786 54ndash67De Wijk R (2004) ldquoThe Implications of Force Transformation the small country

perspectiverdquo in Hamilton DS (ed) Transatlantic Transformation Equipping NATO for the 21st Century Washington DC Center for Transatlantic Relations

European Commission (1996) The Challenges Facing the European Defense-Related Industry A Contribution for Action at European Level Brussels European Commission

mdashmdash (1997) Communication from the Commission Implementing European Union Strategy on Defense-Related Industries Brussels European Commission

mdashmdash (2002) STAR 21 Strategic Aerospace Review for the 21st Century Creating a Coherent Market and Policy Framework for a Vital European Industry Brussels European Commission

mdashmdash (2003a) Communication from the Commission European Defense ndash Industrial and Market Issues ndash Towards an EU Defense Equipment Policy Brussels European Commission

mdashmdash (2003b) Space A New European Frontier for an Expanding Union Brussels European Commission

BIBLIOGRAPHY

166

mdashmdash (2003c) Third European Report on Science and Technology Indicators Brussels European Commission

mdashmdash (2004) Green Paper on Defense Procurement Brussels European CommissionEuropean Convention Working Group ndash Defense (2002) Final Report of Working Group

VIII ndash Defense Brussels European Convention Working Group ndash DefenseEuropean Union (2002) Consolidated Version Of The Treaty On European Union Brussels

European Unionmdashmdash (2003) A Secure Europe in a Better World European Security Strategy Brussels

European Unionmdashmdash (2004) Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe Brussels European UnionFinnish Prime Ministerrsquos Offi ce (2004) Finnish Security and Defense Policy 2004 Helsinki

Prime Ministerrsquos Offi ceFiorenza N (2003a) ldquoNATO Battlefi eld Watchdogrdquo Intelligence Surveillance and

Reconnaissance Journal 26 20ndash2mdashmdash (2003b) ldquoUKrsquos Leap Into UAVsrdquo Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance

Journal 23 37ndash9mdashmdash (2004) ldquoInterview with Franccedilois Naville General Manager of the NATO Air Command

and Control System Management Agencyrdquo Defense News 1948 38mdashmdash (2005a) ldquoHelios 2 Boosts French Satellite Intelligencerdquo C4ISR The Journal of Net-

Centric Warfare 42 34mdashmdash (2005b) ldquoNATOrsquos SATCOM Vrdquo C4ISR The Journal of Net-Centric Warfare 42

32ndash4Forbes I (2003) ldquoTransforming NATO Forcesrdquo in Nelson CR and Purcell J (eds)

Transforming NATO Forces European Perspectives Washington DC Atlantic Council of the United States

Frost and Sullivan (2002) European Command Control Communications Computers and Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Market London Frost and Sullivan

Gavoty D (2003a) ldquoLe PPSM une politique spatiale ambitieuserdquo Deacutefense 105 25ndash8mdashmdash ldquoEuropean Global Space Metasystem for Security and Defenserdquo paper presented at

the Athens Green Paper Consultation on Security and Defense Aspects of Space the challenges for the EU to the Green Paper consultation process Athens May 2003

Gompert DC and Nerlich U (2002) Shoulder to Shoulder The Road to US-European Military Cooperability A German-American Analysis Santa Monica CA RAND

Gompert DC Kugler RL and Libicki MC (1999) Mind the Gap Promoting a Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs Washington DC National Defense University Press

Grapin J (2002) Transatlantic Interoperability in Defense Industries How the US and Europe Could Better Cooperate in Coalition Military Operations Washington DC The European Institute

Hancart B (2003) ldquoLe Domaine Spatial dans la Prospective de Deacutefenserdquo Deacutefense 105 21ndash4

Hegmann G (2005) ldquoEADS baut unbemannten Kampffl iegerrdquo Financial Times Deutschland 22 June 2005

House of Lords ndash European Union Committee (2005) European Defense Agency Report With Evidence London The Stationary Offi ce

Hura M McLeod G Larson E Schneider J Gonzales D Norton D Jacobs J OrsquoConnell K Little W Mesic R and Jamison L (2000) Interoperability a Continuous Challenge in Coalition Air Operations Washington DC RAND

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International Institute for Strategic Studies (1998) The Military Balance 1998ndash99 London International Institute for Strategic Studies

James AD (2004) ldquoDefense Industry and Transformation a European perspectiverdquo in Hamilton D (ed) Transatlantic Transformations Equipping NATO for the 21st Century Washington DC Center for Transatlantic Relations

James AD and Gummett P (1998) European Defense RTD in Context ManchesterUniversity of Manchester

Joint Chiefs of Staff (2000) Joint Vision 2020 Washington DC Department of DefenseJoint Chiefs of Staff

Jones SG (2005) The Rise of Europersquos Defense Industry Washington DC The Brookings Institution US-Europe Analysis Series

Keohane D (2004) ldquoIntroductionrdquo in Bildt C Dillon M Keohane D and Valasek T (eds) Europe in Space London Center for European Reform

Kington T (2004) ldquoItalyrsquos Sky-X Demonstrator Explores Artifi cial Intelligencerdquo C4ISR The Journal of Net-Centric Warfare 33 9

Krepon M (2003) Space Assurance or Space Dominance The Case Against Weaponizing Space Washington DC The Henry L Stimson Center

Laurent C (2001) ldquoSyracuse 3 a new generation of military satellitesrdquo CNES Magazine12 30

Multinational Interoperability Council (2005) MIC Coalition Building Guide Washington DC Multinational Interoperability Council

Nardon L (2001) France Cedes Leading Role in Space to Europe Washington DC Brookings Institution Center on the United States and France

Naumlsstroumlm S (2004) ldquoSwedenrsquos Approach to Defense Research and Transformationrdquo in Bialos JP and Koehl SL (eds) European Defense Research and Development New Visions and Prospects for Cooperative Engagement Washington DC Center for Transatlantic Relations

Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium An Introduction to the Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium Washington DC Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium

Nicoll A (2005) ldquoConsolidating Europersquos Defense Industries big rewards big obstaclesrdquo IISS Strategic Comments 114

Nilsson P (2003) ldquoOpportunities and Risks in a Network Based Defenserdquo Swedish Journal of Military Technology 3 6ndash11

Nilsson J Oumlqvist A and Oumlfjaumlll P (2004) ldquoInformation Fusion at Battalion Levelrdquo Swedish Journal of Military Technology 2 24ndash8

Norwegian Ministry of Defense (2002) Focus on Restructuring of Norwayrsquos Armed Forces 2002 Oslo Norwegian Ministry of Defense

mdashmdash (2004) Proposition to Parliament No 42 (2003ndash2004) The Continued Modernisation of the Norwegian Armed Forces in the Period 2005ndash2008 Oslo Norwegian Ministry of Defense

Picavet F (2003) ldquoConsultation Command and Control Support in NATOrdquo presentation to the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association The Hague February

Quast KH (2003) ldquoFAUST und HEROS Die Saumlulen des Fuumlhrungs- und Informationssystems des Heeresrdquo Wehrtechnik 1 66ndash7

Reder H (2005) ldquoSatellitengestuumltzte Multimediaplatformenrdquo IT Report 2005 2 47ndash50Rehnstroumlm F (2002) ldquoMoving Towards Network Centric Warfarerdquo Swedish Journal of

Military Technology 26 11ndash12

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168

Rheinmetall Defense Electronics (2005) International Companies Network their Competencies ldquoOpen Communityrdquo Promotes Open Interfaces online Available at httpwwwrheinmetall-detecdeindexphplang=3ampfi d=3132 (accessed 25 August 2005)

Schmitt B (2003a) European Armaments Cooperation Core Documents Chaillot Paper No 59 Paris Institute for Security Studies of the European Union

mdashmdash (2003b) The European Union and Armaments Getting a Bigger Bang for the euroChaillot Paper No 63 Paris Institute for Security Studies of the European Union

Schmitt M (2005) ldquoIntegration of the MIP Command and Control Information Exchange Data Model into National Systemsrdquo paper presented at 10th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium McLean VA June

Serfaty S (2005) ldquoTerms of Estrangement French-American relations in perspectiverdquo Survival 473 73ndash92

Silvestri S (2003) Space and Security Policy in Europe Brussels European Union Institute for Security Studies

Stenbit J (2002) lsquoThe New Challenges of Network-Centric Warfarersquo in Grapin J (ed) Transatlantic Interoperability in Defense Industries How the US and Europe Could Better Cooperate in Coalition Military Operations Washington DC The European Institute

Thiele R (2005) ldquoVerbesserte Einsatzfaumlhigkeit zur Transformation der Bundeswehrrdquo in CPM Forum (eds) Defense and Transformation in Germany St Augustin CPM

Thomas JP (2000) The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalitions Adelphi Paper 333 London International Institute for Strategic Studies

Tigner B (2004) ldquoEU Acquisition Central Agency would coordinate arms buysrdquo DefenseNews 195 4

Tran P (2004) ldquoEyes on Smart Procurement French to restructure industry defense ministryrdquo Defense News 193 4

United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (2003) Delivering Security in a Changing World defence white paper Norwich HM Stationery Offi ce

mdashmdash (2005) Network Enabled Capability Handbook London Ministry of DefenseUnited States Department of Defense (2001) Quadrennial Defense Review Report

Washington DC Department of DefenseUnited States Department of Defense Offi ce of Defense Transformation (2003) Military

Transformation A Strategic Report Washington DC Department of DefenseUnited States National Security Council (2002) The National Security Strategy of the

United States of America Washington DC National Security CouncilWestern European Armaments Group (2002) WEAG Rome Declaration online Available

at httpwwwassembly-weuorgendocumentsdiscoursdis2002weag_rome_declarationhtml (accessed 18 August 2005)

169

INDEX

An asterisk following a page number refers to an entry in the Glossary

911 attacks 95

ACCS (Air Command and Control System NATO) 10 27 64 84 87ndash8

ACT (Allied Command Transformation) 7 25 96ndash7 98ndash100 146

ACTDs (Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrators) 91ndash2 154 159

Afghanistan 25 95 96 105 107 145 German forces in 54 UAVs in 56ndash7 US networked global capacity demonstrated in 3 9

AGS (Alliance Ground Surveillance NATO) 64 92ndash3 161

Air Command and Control System (ACCS) 10 27 64 84 87ndash8

airlift see liftAlliance Ground Surveillance (AGS

NATO) 64 92ndash3 161Allied Command Transformation 7 25

96ndash7 98ndash100 146Amsterdam Treaty of 108ARISTOTE broadband communications

system 20 28armamentsdefense market 114 149ndash50

see also industrial technology baseASTOR (Airborne Stand Off Radar) 40

46 92ATM (asynchronous transfer mode)

technology 20 27 55 134Australia 100 102Austria 30 117AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control

System) 31 43 46 91 123 130

BAE Systems 8 83 136ndash7 155Balkans 3 9 31 94 95 105 NATO

implementation and stabilization forces in 86 see also Bosnia Herzegovina Serbia

Baltic States 54Battlegroups 25 53 64 74 109ndash10 120Belgium 30 114BIGSTAF (German communications

infrastructure) program 20 55BOC (Besoins Opeacuterationnels Communs)

129Bosnia-Herzegovina 3 53 89 94 107

145Bowman network 11 20 40 42ndash3 146

160broadband communications 14 20 28 55

122 140

C4ISR (command control communications computers intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance) needed in changing security environment 1ndash2 defi nition 161 European reluctance to elevate technologies of 10 industrial technology base see industrial technology base NATO Prague summit commitments 94ndash8 perceived gap between United States and Europe in 4ndash6 9 96 157ndash8 see also individualcountries

CAESAR (Coalition Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance) 91 154 159

Canada 92 100 102CATRIN (Italian C2 program) 20 64CBRN (chemical biological radiological

and nuclear) defense 96

INDEX

170

CCEB (Combined Communications Electronics Board) 102ndash3

Central Asia 105Centre National drsquoEtudes Spatiales

(CNES) 24ndash5CJTF (Combined Joint Task Forces

NATO) 86 97CNES (Centre National drsquoEtudes

Spatiales) 24ndash5Coalition Aerial Surveillance and

Reconnaissance (CAESAR) 91 154Combined Communications Electronics

Board (CCEB) 102ndash3Combined Endeavor 104ndash5 159Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF

NATO) 86 97command and control (C2) systems

center of excellence for 88 99 in France 26ndash7 in Germany 53ndash4 interoperability 20 27 103ndash5 seealso interoperability in Italy 64 in NATO 87ndash8 see also Air Command and Control System in Netherlands 69ndash70 see also Netherlands NATO C2 center of excellence in Spain 73 74 in Sweden 78 in United Kingdom 41ndash2 see also C4ISR

communications and computers broadband communications 14 20 28 55 122 140 in France 20 27ndash9 in Germany 20 54ndash6 interoperability 30 42 104ndash5 see also interoperability in Italy 20 65 NATO communications and information programs 89ndash90 NEC systems 11ndash12 in Netherlands 20 70 overview of European digital communications systems 20 in Spain 74 in Sweden 20 79 in United Kingdom 11ndash12 20 42ndash3 see alsoC4ISR satellites

computers see communications and computers

COMSATs (communications satellites) 20 28 122 see also satellites

Cormorant network 11 20 42ndash3COSMO-Skymed (Italian imagery satellite

program) satellite system 30 66 124COTS (Commercial Off The Shelf)

equipment 47 54 55ndash6 78 87 Deployable COTS Network (DCN) 14

CRONOS (Crisis Response Operations in NATO Open Sytems) 89 95

Czech Republic 117

DABINETT program 43ndash4DCI (Defense Capabilities Initiative) 10

96defense budgets Dutch 69 European

4 6 9ndash10 25 95 106 French 24 German defense investment 153 159ndash60 Italian defense investment 159ndash60 RampD investment see research and development (RampD) investment Spanish 73 United States 3 US policy recommendations regarding Europersquos investments 153

Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) 10 96defense market see armamentsdefense

marketdefense strategy European defense

planning recommendations 146ndash8 European focus at nation level 9 10ndash11 Europersquos lack of long-term doctrinal vision on 10 EU strategic defense planning 107ndash11 119ndash20 seealso European Capabilities Action Plan French organizational changes for 21ndash5

Deployable COTS Network (DCN) 14Desert Shield 3Desert Storm 3DGA (Deacuteleacutegation Geacuteneacuterale pour

lrsquoArmement) 21ndash5 33disaster management 122 see also relief

operationsdual-use technologies 8 132 145 149ndash50

space programs 123ndash4 125

EADS (European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company) 8 29 113 125 135ndash6 EADS Astrium 30 43 58 125 EADS CASA 32 Framework Program participation 119 HRM-7000 tactical radio 57 73 Paradigm Secure Communications 43

early warning systems 33ndash40 79ndash83 seealso AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System)

earth observation satellites 3 29ndash30 33 66 123ndash4 see also satellites

ECAP (European Capabilities Action Plan) 108 112 114

INDEX

171

EDA (European Defense Agency) 110ndash11 115ndash16 118 120 149 Industry and Market Directorate 113 RampT Directorate 118

Ericsson 79ndash83 Saab Ericsson Network Based Defense Innovation 140

ERRF (European Rapid Reaction Force) 97ndash8 108ndash9 120

EUCLID (European Cooperation for the Long Term in Defense) 117

Euro Hawk (German (UAV program) 36EUROFINDER 117EuroMALE unmanned aerial vehicles 32

73 83European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP)

108 112ndash13 146European Commission 115 120 125

126ndash7 129 130 encouragement of regional defense market 150 involvement in European RampD 118

European Defense Agency (EDA) 110ndash11 115ndash16 118 120 149

European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) 97ndash8 108ndash9 120

European Space Agency 123 126 127 129 130

European Union armaments policy 107 110 113ndash16 Battlegroups 25 53 64 74 109ndash10 120 defense cooperation with France 25 defense research and technology programs 116ndash19 Headline Goal 5 107 108ndash9 112 146 industrial base planning 113ndash16 space policy in Constitutional Treaty 127ndash8 strategic defense planning 107ndash11 119ndash20 seealso European Capabilities Action Plan

European Union Force (EUFOR) 14

Falcon network 11 43 163FAUST (German C2 system) (Tactical

Command Provision) system 53 54Finland industrial technology base 133

network-based defense (NBD) 13ndash14Finmeccanica 137 139ndash40Framework Programs (FPs) 118ndash19 149France command and control systems

26ndash7 communications and computers 20 27ndash9 defense cooperation with EU and NATO 25 defense doctrine 16 Deacuteleacutegation Geacuteneacuterale pour lrsquoArmement(DGA) 21ndash5 33 as European leader

in space 26 29 123 124 129 French air force 31 32 33 French army 26 30ndash1 33 French navy 25 26ndash7 33 increasing importance of C4ISR capabilities 21ndash6 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 29ndash33 92 interoperability in French forces 25ndash7 NBO capability table 34ndash9 organizational changes for defense strategy 21ndash5 satellites 29 33 122 123 124 Systegraveme drsquoInformation et de Commandement des Armeacutees(SICA) 20

Galileo satellites 4ndash5 124 125 128 131Germany adoption of transformation

policies 16ndash17 command and control (C2) 53ndash4 communications and computers 20 54ndash6 defense investments 153 159ndash60 development of C4ISR capabilities 47 53 German air force 54 55 German army 53ndash4 56ndash7 58 German navy 54 55 57 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 56ndash8 92 limited cycling of forces for NRF 97 NBO capability table 59ndash63 satellites 122 123 124

Global Hawk (US UAV program) 44 52 57 63 91 93

Global Positioning System (GPS) 125 131GMES (Global Monitoring for

Environment and Security) 125ndash7 128ndash9 161

Greece 30 32Griffi n wide area network 47 101 103ground surveillance airborne 21 30

91 154 159 Alliance Ground Surveillance NATO 64 92ndash3 161 earth observation satellites see earth observation satellites seealso intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance radar

Gulf War fi rst 1 6 military lessons of 2 107 152 US networked global capacity demonstrated in 9

Headline Goal 5 107 108ndash9 112 146Helios (French-led imagery satellite

program) earth observation system 29ndash30 33 77 123 124

INDEX

172

HEROS C2 system 53 54Hispasat (Spanish communications

satellite program) satellite system 124humanitarian relief 1 13 105 108ndash10Hungary 117

imagery intelligence (IMINT) 32ndash3 57Indonesia 105industrial technology base European

overview 8 132ndash4 142ndash3 European second tier defense companies 137ndash40 Europersquos largest corporation systems see BAE Systems EADS Thales (corporation) industrial base planning 8 113ndash16 Letter of Intent to facilitate trans-European defense market 114 150 non-defense European C4ISR market 140ndash1 recommendations for a cross-European market 149ndash50 US export control 93 106 154ndash6

intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrators for 91ndash2 154 159 in France 29ndash33 92 in Germany 56ndash8 92 imagery intelligence 32ndash3 57 in Italy 65ndash6 92 in NATO 91ndash3 see also Alliance Ground Surveillance in Netherlands 73 92 satellites 122ndash3 see alsosatellites in Spain 29 77 92 in Sweden 79ndash83 in United Kingdom 43ndash7 see also C4ISR sensors

internet 14 28 42 86 87 see alsobroadband communications

Internet Protocol (IP) Europersquos communication programs increasingly based on 20 IP-network-based infrastructure 53 54 IP-networked radios 27ndash8 55 134 see also tactical radio systems STANAGS for IP-based communications 79

interoperability between British and American forces 12 40 43 Combined Endeavor exercises 104ndash5 of communications and computer networks 42 effects of transatlantic doctrine and deployment differences 158ndash60 between European C2 systems 20 27 European RampT investment as a key to enhancing 116 see alsoresearch and technology (RampT)

programs of French forces 25ndash7 of ground surveillance systems 91ndash3 of imagery intelligence analysis systems 32ndash3 123 Multilateral Interoperability Program 103ndash4 106 Multinational Interoperability Council see MIC multinational network programs (outside NATO context) 100 Multi-sensor Aerospace-ground Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition 92 between NATO and United States 84 94ndash9 105ndash6 154 NATO Prague summit commitments 7 10 94ndash8 through NATO STANAGS 32 79 84 91 93ndash4 146 platform strategy effect on 25 lsquoplug and playrsquo approach 144 147 154 road to integrated European space systems 128ndash31 between satellite systems 30 US concerns about European capabilities of 4ndash5 US export control as disincentive for 93 106 154ndash6

Iraq 3 9 96 105 107 145 UAV performance in 44

Iridium satellite communications system 122Italy collaboration with Spain 64 73

command and control systems 64 communications and computers 20 65 defense investments 159ndash60 gradual deployment of network-based capabilities 58 64 industrial collaboration with United States 58 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 65ndash6 92 NBO capability table 67ndash8 satellites 29 30 66 122 124 see also Helios earth observation system Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force 64 73

JOCS (UK C2 system) (Joint Operational Command System) 27 40 41

Joint Command System (JCS) (UK C2 system) 20 41

JSTARS (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System) 3 33 92 161

JTIDS (Joint Tactical Information Distribution System) 43 46 89 161ndash2 see also MIDS

Kosovo 3 94 95 105 107 145 German forces in 53 54 57 shortfalls revealed

INDEX

173

in European capability 88 152 UAVs in 44 56

Liberia 105lift 1 5 96Link-11 tactical data link 27 28 43 55

65 70 162Link-16 tactical data link 28 29 65

70 79 162 with JTIDS 43 MIDS upgrade of 84 see also MIDS transatlantic interoperability through 25 27

Link-22 tactical data link 28 55 65 74 162

logistics 1 5 96

Maastricht Treaty 108MAJIIC (Multi-sensor Aerospace-ground

Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition) 92

MIC (Multinational Interoperability Council) 42 53 100ndash2 103 106 159 defi nition 162

MIDS (Multifunctional Information Distribution System) 28 74 84 89ndash90 142 159 defi nition 162

MIP (Multilateral Interoperability Program) 103ndash4 106

missiles Surface-Air-Missile Operations Centre (SAMOC) 54 surveillance 123 theatre missile defense 88 95

Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) 28 74 84 89ndash90 142 159

Multilateral Interoperability Program (MIP) 103ndash4 106

Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) 42 53 100ndash2 103 106 159

Multi-sensor Aerospace-ground Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition (MAJIIC) 92

NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) 122

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Air Command and Control System 10 27 64 84 87ndash8 Allied Command Transformation 7 25 88 96ndash7 98ndash100 C2 center of excellence 88 99 Combined Joint Task Forces 86 command

and control programs 87ndash8 seealso Air Command and Control System (ACCS) communications and information programs 89ndash90 General Purpose Communications System 89 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 91ndash3 see alsoAGS interoperability 84 94ndash9 105ndash6 154 see also PCC Istanbul summit 100 NATO Air Alliance Ground Surveillance (NATO AGS) 64 92ndash3 162 NATO Network-Enabled Capabilities (NNEC) project 99 NATO Response Force (NRF) 7 25 88 96 97ndash8 148 Prague summit commitments 7 10 94ndash8 152 as principle transatlantic context for C4ISR issues 84ndash5 105ndash6 progress towards networked C4ISR 9ndash10 roles and capabilities 85ndash7 Satcom V project 90 standardization agreements (STANAGs) 32 79 84 91 93ndash4 146 Washington summit 96

NCOIC (Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium) 141ndash2

NCW (network-centric warfare) 3 9 162NEC (network-enabled capabilities)

11ndash12 40 NATO Network-Enabled Capabilities (NNEC) project 99

Netherlands C4ISR interoperability 66 69 command and control systems 69ndash70 communications and computers 20 70 defense budget 69 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 73 92 NATO C2 center of excellence 88 99 NBO capability table 71ndash2 NBO strategy 14ndash15 support centres 15

network-based defense (NBD) 12ndash14 17network-based operations (NBO) in

a changing security environment 1ndash4 144ndash5 151 defi nition 162 European national capability overview 20ndash3 see also individual countriesEuropean strategies 9ndash18 policy recommendations for Europe regarding European network-based capabilities 144ndash50 policy recommendations for United States regarding European network-based capabilities 150ndash6

Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium (NCOIC) 141ndash2

INDEX

174

network-centric warfare (NCW) 3 9 162network-enabled capabilities (NEC)

11ndash12 40 NATO Network-Enabled Capabilities (NNEC) project 99

Neuron (European UCAV program) 32 39 45 66 67 76 82ndash3 135 140 154

New Zealand 100 102NGCS (NATO General Purpose

Communications System) 89Nokia 136 141Northrop Grumman ISS International Inc

44 57 77 92 113 135Norway network-based defense (NBD)

11 17 participation in MAJIIC 92NRF (NATO Response Force) 7 25 88

96 97ndash8 148nuclear proliferation 151 see also CBRN

(chemical biological radiological and nuclear) defense

OCCAR (Organization Conjoint pour la Cooperation en Matiere drsquoArmament)111 114 116 150

ORFEO (Optical and Radar Federated Earth Observation) 30 66 154

Paradigm Secure Communications (subsidiary of EADS) 43

PASR (Preparatory Action on Security Research) 119

PCC (Prague Capabilities Commitments) 7 10 96

peacemakingpeacekeeping 94 95 105 107 108ndash10 129

Petersberg tasks 108ndash10Phoenix (UK UAV program) 40 44 136Pleiades (French-led imagery satellite

program) earth observation system 30 66 124

Poland 117Prague summit 2002 94ndash8 Prague

Capabilities Commitments (PCC) 7 10 96

Predator (US UAV program) 3 32 45 58 65

Preparatory Action on Security Research (PASR) 119

QinetiQ 138ndash9

radar 30ndash1 79 92ndash3 134 Active Phased Array Radar (APAR) project 142 see

also ASTOR JSTARS ORFEO SAR-Lupe radar satellite

radios see tactical radio systemsRAKEL (Swedish C4 infrastructure) 79

81reconnaissance see intelligence

surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)relief operations 1 13 105 108ndash10research and development (RampD)

investment 6 8 10 26 116 118 German cuts in 53

research and technology (RampT) programs 24 47 105 111 116ndash19 recommendations for investment 149

Rheinmetall Defence Electronics 137ndash8Rhode and Schwarz 138RITA 2000 (French communications

infrastructure) (Reacuteseau Inteacutegreacute de Transmissions Automatiques 2000) 20 27 134

Saab 32 83 140 Saab Ericsson Network Based Defense Innovation 140

Sagem 139SAR-Lupe (German imagery satellite

program) radar satellite 58 124SATCOM-BW satellite communications

program 56Satcom V (NATO communications satellite

program) project 90satellites Common Operational

Requirements (BOC) 129 for communications (COMSATs) 20 28 122 COSMO-Skymed 30 66 124 EU Satellite Center (EUSC) 130 Galileo 4ndash5 124 125 128 131 in geosynchronous orbit 122 Helios 29ndash30 33 77 123 124 Hispasat 124 interoperability 30 Iridium 122 micro-satellites 33 40 in NEC doctrine 11 overview of European developments regarding 20 Pleiades 30 66 124 for reconnaissance and surveillance 122ndash3 SAR-Lupe radar satellite 58 124 SATCOM-BW 56 Satcom V project 90 SICRAL 124 Skynet 11 20 43 124 Spainsat program 74 122 124 Syracuse 20 28 124 see also space programs

sealift see liftsecurity environment international 1ndash4

144ndash5 151

INDEX

175

sensors 1 2 3 5 11 33 British investment 40 dual-use technology 132 see also dual-use technologies interoperability 91ndash3 Multi-sensor Aerospace-ground Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition 92

Serbia 4 94 see also Balkans KosovoSIAF (Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force)

64 73SICA (French C2 system) (Systegraveme

drsquoInformation et de Commandement des Armeacutees) 20

SICRAL (Italian communications satellite program) satellite system 124

signals intelligence (SIGINT) 33 57Skynet satellites 11 20 43 124SOCRATE (French communications

infrastructure) (Systegraveme Opeacuterationnel Constitueacute des Reacuteseaux des Armeacutees pour les Teacuteleacutecommunications) 20 27 116ndash17

South Africa 105space programs CNES 24ndash5 European

collaboration on 121ndash31 France as European leader in space 26 29 123 124 129 role of space programs NBO 121ndash3 see also satellites

Spain command and control systems 73 74 communications and computers 74 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 29 77 92 modernization program 73 NBO capability table 75ndash6 satellites 74 77 122 124 Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force 64 73

SPIRALE (French early warning satellite program) early warning system 33ndash40

STANAGs (NATO standardization agreements) 32 79 84 91 93ndash4 146

support centres 15surveillance see ground surveillance

intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)

Sweden command and control systems 78 communications and computers 20 79 industrial technology base 133 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 79ndash83 NBO capability table 80ndash2 network-based defense (NBD) 12ndash13 77 rapid reaction units 77ndash8

Switzerland 30 32Syracuse (French satellite communications

program) programs 20 28 124

tactical radio systems 17 27ndash8 42ndash3 55 56ndash7 Bowman network 11 20 40 42ndash3 146 160 of Dutch army 70 Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) 28 42 43 45 90 of Swedish services 78 79 by Thalesrsquo Land and Joint Systems 134

terrorism 1 2 95 121 151Thales (corporation) 8 79 134ndash5

Framework Program participation 119 French communications and computer systems 27ndash8 support for increased investments in security space 125 Thales Netherlands 70 Thales Raytheon Systems 88 113 135 142 155 Think Tank 24

THALES (Technology Arrangements for Laboratories for Defense European Science) framework 117

theatre missile defense (TMD) 88 95TIPS (Transatlantic Industry Proposed

Solution) 92ndash3TITAAN (Dutch communications

infrastructure) 23 53 66 69 70 71 146

TOPSAT (UK imagery satellite program) 47 52 138

Turkey 30

UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) 3 31ndash2 44ndash5 56ndash7 73 163

United Kingdom British Army 12 41 42 command and control systems 41ndash2 communications and computers 11ndash12 20 42ndash3 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 43ndash7 92 interoperability with United States 12 40 43 investment in C4ISR systems 40 Joint Command System (JCS) 20 41 Joint Operational Command System (JOCS) 27 40 41 Ministry of Defense restructuring 12 40 NBO capability table 48ndash52 network-enabled capabilities (NEC) 11ndash12 40 Royal Air Force 12 41 43 46 Royal Navy 12 41 43 satellites 122 124

United States export control regulations 93 106 154ndash6 global satellite coverage 122 123 125 interoperability

INDEX

176

with NATO 84 94ndash9 105ndash6 154 seealso interoperability interoperability with United Kingdom 12 40 43 non-compliance with NATO STANAGs 94 perceived gap between United States and European militaries 4ndash6 9 96 153 157ndash8 policy recommendations for United States regarding European network-based capabilities 150ndash6 role in NRF 98 transformation process 2ndash3 9 157 US Navy 25

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) 3 31ndash2 44ndash5 56ndash7 73 163 Advanced Joint Communications Node (AJCN) 44ndash5 digital technology and 123 French linking with manned platforms and space-based assets 26 29 interoperability 44ndash5 56 154 micro-UAVs 45 58 mini-UAVs 31 45 56ndash7

UCAV (combat) technology 32 57ndash8 83 versatility of 20ndash1 99

unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) 45 139

VIRVE (Finnish national C4 infrastructure) 14

Watchkeeper program 40 44ndash5 134WEAG (Western European Armaments

Group) 116ndash18WEAO (Western European Armaments

Organization) 118 120weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

operations 1 2 95 121ndash2wide area networks (WANs) 41 47 86

101 103

ZODIAC (Dutch tactical communications system) 70 71

1313

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wwweBookstoretandfcouk

• BOOK COVER
• HALF-TITLE
• SERIES-TITLE
• TITLE
• COPYRIGHT
• CONTENTS
• LIST OF TABLES
• ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
• ABBREVIATIONS
• 1 INTRODUCTION Networked operations and European capabilities
• 2 EUROPEAN STRATEGIES FOR NETWORK-BASED OPERATIONS
• 3 EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES FOR NETWORK-BASED OPERATIONS
• 4 NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NETWORK-BASED CAPABILITIES
• 5 THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NETWORK-BASED CAPABILITIES
• 6 EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS FOR NETWORK-BASED OPERATIONS
• 7 THE EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE FOR NETWORK-BASED CAPABILITIES
• 8 EUROPEAN NETWORK-BASED CAPABILITIES Policy recommendations
• 9 CONCLUSIONS
• GLOSSARY
• BIBLIOGRAPHY
• INDEX

TRANSFORMING EUROPEAN

MILITARIES

This book addresses Europersquos ability to be a key actor in the new international security environment by assessing its capability to respond to threats in a networked manner If the risk of a Soviet invasion of Europe has now disappeared new security threats have emerged and the military has taken on a new range of responsibilities including peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations As military operations are increasingly undertaken within the framework of international coalitions their success depends largely on the degree to which national forces can work in a coordinated way in the fi eld

Written by two experts in the fi eld of defense technologies and European security this book takes an in-depth look at European capabilities to conduct Network-Based Operations (NBO) and their implications for intra-European and transatlantic interoperability in the future It examines national NATO and EU capabilities and analyses the three technology areas most crucial for interoperability ndash command and control communications and intelligence gathering and dissemination ndash as well as looking at the doctrinal and strategic commitment to NBO The book also examines the technology and industrial bases supporting European NBO It concludes that although there exist adequate European know-how and strong industries to supply the relevant capabilities much remains to be done to do so more rapidly and effi ciently Finally the book makes recommendations for policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic on ways to improve interoperability in future coalition operations

This book will be of great interest to students of security studies European politics and international relations as well as to US and European policymakers

Gordon Adams is Professor of International Affairs and Director of Security Policy Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs The George Washington University He has written extensively on US and European defense budgeting and planning and on transatlantic defense policyGuy Ben-Ari is a Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies where he researches issues related to the US and European technology and industrial bases supporting defense He regularly serves as an expert evaluator to the European Commissionrsquos research and technology Framework Program

CONTEMPORARY SECURITY STUDIES

NATOrsquoS SECRET ARMYOperation Gladio and terrorism in western Europe

Daniel Ganser

THE US NATO AND MILITARY BURDEN-SHARINGPeter Kent Forster and Stephen J Cimbala

RUSSIAN GOVERNANCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURYGeo-strategy geopolitics and new governance

Irina Isakova

THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND FINLAND 1938ndash1940 Diplomatic sideshow

Craig Gerrard

RETHINKING THE NATURE OF WAREdited by Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom

PERCEPTION AND REALITY IN THE MODERN YUGOSLAV CONFLICT

Myth falsehood and deceit 1991ndash1995Brendan OrsquoShea

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PEACEBUILDING IN POST-DAYTON BOSNIA

Tim Donais

THE DISTRACTED EAGLEThe rift between America and Old Europe

Peter H Merkl

THE IRAQ WAREuropean perspectives on politics strategy and operations

Edited by Jan Hallenberg and Haringkan Karlsson

STRATEGIC CONTESTWeapons proliferation and war in the greater Middle East

Richard L Russell

PROPAGANDA THE PRESS AND CONFLICTThe Gulf War and Kosovo

David R Willcox

MISSILE DEFENCEInternational regional and national implications

Edited by Bertel Heurlin and Sten Rynning

GLOBALISING JUSTICE FOR MASS ATROCITIESA revolution in accountability

Chandra Lekha Sriram

ETHNIC CONFLICT AND TERRORISMThe origins and dynamics of civil wars

Joseph L Soeters

GLOBALISATION AND THE FUTURE OF TERRORISM Patterns and predictions

Brynjar Lia

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND STRATEGYThe evolution of American nuclear policy

Stephen J Cimbala

NASSER AND THE MISSILE AGE IN THE MIDDLE EASTOwen L Sirrs

WAR AS RISK MANAGEMENTStrategy and confl ict in an age of globalised risks

Yee-Kuang Heng

MILITARY NANOTECHNOLOGYPotential applications and preventive arms control

Jurgen Altmann

NATO AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTIONRegional alliance global threats

Eric R Terzuolo

EUROPEANISATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY IDENTITYThe EU and the changing security identities of the Nordic states

Pernille Rieker

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACE-BUILDING

Sustaining the peace in post confl ict societiesEdited by T David Mason and James D Meernik

CONTROLLING THE WEAPONS OF WARPolitics persuasion and the prohibition of inhumanity

Brian Rappert

CHANGING TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY RELATIONSDo the US the EU and Russia form a new strategic triangle

Edited by Jan Hallenberg and Haringkan Karlsson

THEORETICAL ROOTS OF US FOREIGN POLICYMachiavelli and American unilateralism

Thomas M Kane

CORPORATE SOLDIERS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITYThe rise of private military companies

Christopher Kinsey

TRANSFORMING EUROPEAN MILITARIESCoalition operations and the technology gap

Gordon Adams and Guy Ben-Ari

GLOBALIZATION AND CONFLICTNational security in a lsquonewrsquo strategic era

Edited by Robert G Patman

TRANSFORMING EUROPEAN MILITARIES

Coalition operations and the technology gap

Gordon Adams and Guy Ben-Ari

First published 2006 by Routledge

2 Park Square Milton Park Abingdon Oxon OX14 4RN

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canadaby Routledge

270 Madison Ave New York NY 10016

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor amp Francis Group an informa business

copy 2006 Gordon Adams and Guy Ben-Ari

All rights reserved No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic mechanical or other means now known or hereafter invented including photocopying and recording or in any information storage or retrieval system without permission in writing

from the publishers

British Library Cataloguing in Publication DataA catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataA catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN10 0ndash415ndash39264ndash0 (hbk)ISBN10 0ndash203ndash96910ndash3 (ebook)

ISBN13978ndash0ndash415ndash39264ndash8 (hbk)ISBN13 978ndash0ndash203ndash96910ndash6 (ebk)

This edition published in the Taylor amp Francis e-Library 2006

ldquoTo purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor amp Francis or Routledgersquos

collection of thousands of eBooks please go to wwweBookstoretandfcoukrdquo

vii

CONTENTS

List of tables viiiAcknowledgements ixList of abbreviations x

1 Introduction networked operations and European capabilities 1

2 European strategies for network-based operations 9

3 European national capabilities for network-based operations 19

4 NATO and other multilateral network-based capabilities 84

5 The European Union and network-based capabilities 107

6 European collaboration on space assets for network-based operations 121

7 The European industrial and technology base for network-based capabilities 132

8 European network-based capabilities policy recommendations 144

9 Conclusions 157

Glossary 161Bibliography 164Index 169

vii i

TABLES

31 Principal European national capabilities for network-based operations 2232 French capabilities for network-based operations 3433 United Kingdom capabilities for network-based operations 4834 German capabilities for network-based operations 5935 Italian capabilities for network-based operations 6736 Dutch capabilities for network-based operations 7137 Spanish capabilities for network-based operations 7538 Swedish capabilities for network-based operations 80

ix

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors would like to acknowledge the support and assistance of many offi cial and private sector sources in the United States Britain France and at NATO and the European Union whom we interviewed for this study Most of them remain necessarily anonymous but their assistance was clearly essential to the study Several specifi c individuals deserve special mention and thanks Christine Bernot Adm (ret) Jean Betermier Henri Conze Christophe Cornu Emmanuel Germond Michel Iagolnitzer Erol Levy Xavier Pasco Diego Ruiz Palmer and Burkard Schmitt

Special thanks go to Professor John Logsdon and to Professor Ray Williamson of the Space Policy Institute at the George Washington University in Washington DC who were participants in the research and writing process for the original monograph which was the starting point for this book Their knowledge of European space policies and of the national and multinational space programs in Europe were a signifi cant contribution to the space chapter in the book and their comments overall were very helpful

Finally this book is based on a monograph ldquoBridging the Gap European C4ISR Capabilities and Transatlantic Interoperabilityrdquo published by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy of the National Defense University in Washington DC The Center sponsored and funded the research on which the monograph and much of this book is based and we are grateful for their support We particularly want to thank the Centerrsquos Director Hans Binnendijk and staff members Stuart Johnson Elihu Zimet Charles Barry and Richard Kugler for their assistance and excellent comments

x

ABBREVIATIONS

ABCA American British Canadian Australian Armiesrsquo Standardization Program

ACCIS Automated Command and Control Information SystemACCS Air Command and Control SystemACE Allied Command EuropeACLANT Allied Command AtlanticACO Allied Command OperationsACT Allied Command TransformationACTD Advanced Concept Technology DemonstratorADGE Air Defense Ground EnvironmentAEHF Advanced Extremely High FrequencyAERIS All Environment Real-Time Interoperability SimulatorAEW Airborne Early WarningAEWampC Airborne Early Warning and ControlAGS Alliance Ground SurveillanceAirborne Ground

SurveillanceAJCN Advanced Joint Communications NodeAMS Alenia Marconi SystemsAPAR Active Phased Array RadarASCC Air Standardization Coordinating CommitteeASTOR Airborne Stand Off RadarATM Asynchronous Transfer ModeAUSCANNZUKUS Australian Canadian New Zealand United Kingdom

and United States Naval C4 OrganizationAWACS Airborne Warning and Control SystemBACCS Backbone Air Command and Control SystemBCSS Battlefi eld Command Support SystemBi-SCAIS Bi-Strategic Command Automated Information SystemBLD Battlefi eld Land DigitizationBMS Battlefi eld Management SystemCS Collaboration at SeaC2 Command and ControlC3 Command Control and Communications

ABBREVIATIONS

xi

C3I Command Control Communications and IntelligenceC4ISR Command Control Communications Computers

Intelligence Surveillance and ReconnaissanceCAESAR Coalition Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance CCEB Combined Communications Electronics BoardCCIS Command Control and Information SystemCEC Cooperative Engagement CapabilityCEPA Common European Priority AreaCFIUS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United StatesCFSP Common Foreign and Security PolicyCIS Communications and Information SystemsCJTF Combined Joint Task ForcesCOMINT Communications IntelligenceCOMSAT Communications SatelliteCOTS Commercial Off The ShelfCRONOS Crisis Response Operations in NATO Open SystemsCSABM Collaborative System for Air Battlespace ManagementCSS Command Support SystemCTAS Cooperative Transatlantic AGS SystemDARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects AgencyDCI Defense Capabilities InitiativesDCN Deployable COTS NetworkDERA Defense Evaluation and Research AgencyDGA Deacuteleacutegation Geacuteneacuterale pour lrsquoArmement (French armament

agency)DII Defense Information InfrastructureDSCS Defense Satellite Communications SystemEADS European Aeronautic Defense and Space CompanyEC European CommissionECAP European Capabilities Action PlanEDA European Defense AgencyEHF Extremely High FrequencyERG European Research GroupingERRF European Rapid Reaction ForceESA European Space AgencyESDP European Security and Defense PolicyESM Electronic Support MeasuresEUCLID European Cooperation for the Long Term in DefenseEUFOR European Union Force [in Bosnia and Herzegovina]EUROPA European Understandings for Research Organization

Programs and ActivitiesEUSC EU Satellite CentreEW Electronic WarfareEXECOM Executive Support CommitteeFADR Fixed Air Defense Radar

ABBREVIATIONS

xi i

FLIR Forward-Looking Infrared FOCSLE Fleet Operational Command SystemFP Framework ProgramGMES Global Monitoring for Environment and Security GPS Global Positioning SystemHALE High-Altitude Long-EnduranceHF High FrequencyIACD Intelligent Advisor Capability DemonstratorIBS Integrated Broadcast ServiceIEPG Independent European Program GroupIFF Identifi cation Friend or FoeIFOR [NATO] Implementation Force [in Bosnia and

Herzegovina]IJMS Interim JTIDS Message StandardIMINT Imagery IntelligenceINMARSAT International Maritime SatelliteINTA Instituto Nacional de Teacutecnica AeroespacialIP Internet ProtocolISAF International Security Assistance ForceISR Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance ISTAR Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and

ReconnaissanceITAR International Traffi c in Arms RegulationsITV Integrated Technology VehicleJCS Joint Command SystemJFHQ Joint Forces HeadquartersJOCS Joint Operational Command SystemJRRF Joint Rapid Reaction ForceJRRP Jaguar Replacement Reconnaissance PodJSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar SystemJTIDS Joint Tactical Information Distribution SystemJTRS Joint Tactical Radio SystemJUEP Joint Service UAV Experimentation ProgramKFOR [NATO] Kosovo ForceLCS Littoral Combat ShipLEO Low Earth OrbitLOI Letter of IntentM3 Multimode Multi-role Multi-bandMAJIIC Multi-sensor Aerospace-ground Joint ISR Interoperability

CoalitionMALE Medium-Altitude Long-EnduranceMASC Maritime Airborne Surveilllance and ControlMCCIS Maritime Command and Control Information SystemMCCS Mobile Command and Control SystemMIC Multinational Interoperability Council

ABBREVIATIONS

xi i i

MIDS Multifunctional Information Distribution SystemMILSATCOM Military Satellite CommunicationsMIP Multilateral Interoperability ProgramMIWG Multinational Interoperability Working GroupMMA Multi-mission Maritime AircraftMNE Multinational ExperimentMP-RTIP Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion ProgramMRS Multi-Role SwitchMTI Moving Target IndicatorNAC North Atlantic CouncilNACMO NATO ACCS Management OrganizationNACOSA NATO Communications and Information Systems

Operating and Support AgencyNBC Nuclear Biological ChemicalNBD Network-Based DefenseNBO Network-Based OperationsNC3A NATO Command Control and Consultation AgencyNC3B NATO C3 BoardNC3O NATO Consultation Command and Control OrganizationNC3TA NATO C3 Technical ArchitectureNCOIC Network-Centric Operations Industry ConsortiumNCW Network-Centric WarfareNDP National Disclosure ProcessNEC Network-Enabled CapabilitiesNGCS NATO General Purpose Communication SystemNILE NATO Improved Link ElevenNMS NATO Messaging SystemNNEC NATO Network-Enabled CapabilitiesNRF NATO Response ForceOCCAR Organization Conjoint pour la Cooperation en Matiere

drsquoArmamentORFEO Optical and Radar Federated Earth ObservationPASR Preparatory Action on Security ResearchPCC Prague Capabilities CommitmentsPFI Private Finance InitiativePJHQ Permanent Joint HeadquartersPNT Position Navigation and TimingPRT Provisional Reconstruction TeamRampD Research and DevelopmentRampT Research and TechnologyRAPTOR Reconnaissance Airborne Pod for TornadoSACEUR Supreme Allied Commander EuropeSAMOC Surface-Air-Missile Operations CenterSAR Synthetic Aperture RadarSATCOM Satellite Communications

ABBREVIATIONS

xiv

SCA Software Communications ArchitectureSDR Software Defi ned RadioSFOR [NATO] Stabilization Force [in Bosnia and Herzegovina]SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers EuropeSHARC Swedish Highly Advanced Research Confi gurationSHF Super High FrequencySIGINT Signals IntelligenceSLAR Side Looking Airborne RadarSOC Statement of CooperationSOSTAR Standoff Surveillance Target Acquisition RadarSPOT Systegraveme Pour lrsquoObeservation de la TerreSSA Special Security ArrangementSTANAG Standardization AgreementTCAR Transatlantic Cooperative AGS RadarTCDL Tactical Common Data LinkTCPIP Transmission Control ProtocolInternet ProtocolTETRA Terrestrial Trunked RadioTHALES Technology Arrangements for Laboratories for Defense

European ScienceTIPS Transatlantic Industry Proposed SolutionTMD Theater Missile Defense TOPSAT Tactical Optical SatelliteTR TransmitReceiveTTCP The Technical Cooperation ProgramTUAV Tactical Unmanned Aerial VehicleUAV Unmanned Aerial VehicleUCAV Unmanned Combat Aerial VehicleUHF Ultra High FrequencyUUV Unmanned Underwater VehicleVCCS Vehicle Command and Control SystemVHF Very High FrequencyVMF Variable Message FormatVOIP Voice Over Internet ProtocolWAN Wide Area NetworkWASP Wide Area Situation PictureWEAG Western European Armaments GroupWEAO Western European Armaments OrganizationWEU Western European UnionZODIAC Zone Digital Automated and Encrypted Communication

1

1

INTRODUCTION

Networked operations and European capabilities

Network-based operations and the twenty-fi rst century security environment

The international security environment has changed dramatically over the past decade for both the United States and Europe This has meant profound changes for national security strategy and for military capabilities Before 1990 strategy was based on the assumption that the principal tension was between an alliance of democracies led by the United States and the Soviet Union and its allies For the military this meant that both deterrence and victory on the battlefi eld would go to the side with the more capable land air and sea forces massed in formation fi elding heavy weapons produced in substantial numbers by a strong defense industrial base Though this confrontation never occurred in Europe wars elsewhere such as Vietnam tended to be fought using that model

Today both the nature of the strategic threat and the required military capability to meet it have changed Although the fi rst Gulf War involved a more traditional type of threat and massed formations were critical to the response subsequent crises and confl icts have involved more shadowy and asymmetrical opponents and a different range of security challenges The need to fi ght large-scale wars has been replaced by the need to address a wide range of challenges from international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to failed or failing states escalating regional confl icts and humanitarian crises

Military operations to deal with these threats demand different capabilities strategic airlift and sealift deployable logistics precision-guided munitions and force protection elements Most important they require deployable command control communications computers intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities ndash collectively known as C4ISR ndash that are both networked and interoperable National governments and coalitions need the capability to survey large areas of the globe and share and jointly analyze the intelligence they gather in order to make informed decisions on when and where to deploy their forces Once forces have been committed intelligence-gathering assets and sensors are needed to provide the information for operations They also require command and control systems capable of processing the information and providing networked forces with a real-time digitized picture of the situation Reliable and interoperable

INTRODUCTION

2

communication systems need to carry this information across forces and back to command centers in the fi eld and the nationrsquos capital A network of all these capabilities enables more effective and effi cient operations

Even for more traditional operations the evolution of military and dual-use technology has changed the face of combat The fi rst Gulf War suggested that large armies and heavy weaponry were no longer a guarantee of success information dominance proved critical Destroying the adversary had become less important than disrupting his lines of communication and supply Today it is widely accepted in the US military that advanced sensors communications and information technologies networked together to distribute the results are a key ingredient of military success especially for the high intensity operations for which they are planning These technologies and the doctrine that accompanies them allow warfi ghters to see better and further orient themselves on the battlefi eld decide faster strike more accurately and assess the results of their actions more quickly

Changes in US forces and doctrine lead the way

US military planning has been the most responsive to the changing security conditions and the revolution in C4ISR technologies At the strategic level with the end of the Soviet threat US security concerns have focused away from Europe toward the Middle East and Persian Gulf North Asia and the Pacifi c and toward such global security problems as failed states terrorism ethnic and religious confl ict and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction NATO Europe became a secondary concern As a result the US military evolved toward a capability that could operate globally through near-continuous presence or expeditionary operations The focus was no longer on a specifi c theater but looked to reassure all friends and allies dissuade potential military competitors anywhere on the globe deter adversaries and defeat any of them decisively (United States Department of Defense 2003 4ndash5)

US military doctrine began to move away from giving priority to major land battles of massed armies and toward a doctrine that would ensure US ability to be ldquodominant across the full spectrum of military operationsrdquo through a combination of ldquodominant maneuver precision engagement focused logistics and full dimensional protectionrdquo (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2000 2ndash3) This change in doctrine has begun to transform operational concepts training and technology Global forces need to be able to move rapidly and their communications command and control and sensors need to be networked together This requirement has come to be know as ldquotransformationrdquo defi ned by the Defense Department as

A process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts capabilities people and organizations that exploit our nationrsquos advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position which helps underpin peace and stability in the world

(United States Department of Defense 2003 8)

INTRODUCTION

3

To put such forces in place the US relies on a technological revolution that has been taking place for at least 25 years Rapid changes in information and communications technologies made it possible to imagine develop and deploy equipment that supported the process of ldquotransformationrdquo Despite shrinking defense budgets in the 1990s the US military began to move in the direction of what it called network-centric warfare (NCW) As defi ned by the Department of Defense network-centric warfare refers to ldquothe combination of emerging tactics techniques and technologies that a networked force employs to create a decisive warfi ghting advantagerdquo Network-centric warfare ldquoaccelerates our ability to know decide and act linking sensors communications systems and weapons systems in an interconnected gridrdquo (United States Department of Defense 2003 13) Analysts have described NCW this way

The United States hellip is poised to harness key information technologies ndash microelectronics data networking and software programming ndash to create a networked force using weapons capable of pinpoint accuracy launched from platforms beyond range of enemy weapons utilizing the integrated data from all-seeing sensors managed by intelligent command nodes By distributing its forces while still being able to concentrate fi res the US military is improving its mobility speed potency and invulnerability to enemy attack

(Gompert et al 1999 8)

This increasingly networked global capability has been displayed since the fi rst Gulf War in the Balkans and most recently in combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq Desert Shield and Desert Storm revealed the military advantages of networking such capabilities as the Pioneer UAV earth observation satellites and the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) Advanced sensors on manned and unmanned platforms provided real-time intelligence to commanders on the ground via a state-of-the-art command control and communications network In Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo the US used a more advanced UAV ndash the Predator ndash that provided its operators with gigabytes of high-resolution imagery in support of missions The ldquosensor-to-shooterrdquo loop ndash the time between identifi cation of a target and its destruction ndash was reduced from hours to minutes

This rapid change in military capabilities has far-reaching implications for the transatlantic security community Although European militaries have participated in expeditionary operations in the last 15 years their forces ndash structured to defend the European heartland ndash did not adjust as quickly to the expeditionary requirements and asymmetries of the post-Cold War international security environment Throughout the 1990s Europersquos armed forces suffered from a kind of ldquoidentity crisisrdquo While the task of defending the homeland remained a central focus for some of them the new challenges were emerging in every dimension demanding new or transformed capabilities European governments had not yet shaped a strategy and doctrine to deal with this emerging reality nor was the message yet entirely clear as to how military forces were to be used or how the

INTRODUCTION

4

capabilities they need were to be created Equally important uneven attention was paid in the 1990s to how European forces could or should link up with the rapidly changing American military capability For many European countries forces shrank in the 1990s along with defense budgets and the transformation underway in the US was not matched by a similar investment in Europe As a result it became increasingly diffi cult for US and European forces to operate in coalition as the fi rst Gulf War and especially combat operations in the Kosovo and Serbia air war demonstrated (Adams 2001a)

Is there a gap

The emerging sense in the 1990s that European forces were lagging behind the Americans even declining led to an atmosphere of judgment and criticism in the late 1990s From the American perspective this gap was technological and budgetary and had a direct and negative consequence for the ability of the US to operate in coalition with the Europeans either in NATO or coalition operations facing the new security threats of the twenty-fi rst century A common view in the US was that the US military had become so far advanced compared to its European counterparts that military interoperability was increasingly impossible the Europeans would simply never ldquocatch uprdquo

Some of this perception was not new the history of the NATO alliance is riddled with debates about the ldquogaprdquo between the United States and European militaries American policymakers have rarely felt that the European allies produced an adequate capability even to meet the requirements of traditional Central Front war plans If this was true to some degree it did not matter NATO forces were in static positions as a defending force not engaged in active combat testing the reality of the proposition

The new international security environment is different The military forces of the allies have been repeatedly tested in combat and military operations from the Gulf War to the Balkans to the Middle East Combining the more active use of the forces with the presumed ldquogaprdquo in technologies and capability has made the transatlantic interoperability issue a central problem for NATO particularly with respect to C4ISR capabilities and the problem of ldquonetworkingrdquo US defense planners have regularly expressed concern about the extent to which European forces were ldquointeroperablerdquo with the networked capabilities of the US While their contribution in the Balkans and the Middle East were welcome the inability to ldquoconnectrdquo the forces led to operational problems The disparity between the military capabilities of the United States and the European members of NATO came to be known as ldquothe gaprdquo This ldquogaprdquo became so large in the view of some analysts that it threatened the very ability of the Alliance to function as a military partnership (Gompert et al 1999)

Rising concern about this gap led American defense planners to become increasingly critical of European defense efforts Aside from the differences in strategic outlook and expeditionary doctrine the criticism focused on the lag in overall defense investment and especially a low European commitment to the

INTRODUCTION

5

C4ISR technologies that make network-centric operations possible According to this view European defense technologies have fallen signifi cantly behind Gompert et al captured the essence of this critique

The use of transformation technology is far more extensive in US forces than in European forces The quality of US precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and C4ISR (command control communications computers intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance) has improved greatly since the Gulf War whereas European forces still remain incapable even of the type of operations that the US force conducted in 1991

(Gompert et al 1999 4)

According to the critique this gap is most obvious in information and communications technologies the core of C4ISR The United States can gather and fuse data from a wide variety of sensors and integrate them into military operations in ways Europeans cannot Europeans lack the C4ISR capabilities that link target intelligence to shooters in a secure real-time manner What technologies the Europeans do possess it is argued cannot connect smoothly to US technologies making coalition operations diffi cult or even dangerous Some US critics have suggested that European information technologies lag behind the United States making their application to defense needs and interoperability even more problematic (Gompert et al 1999 74ndash7 Deutch et al 1999 54ndash67)

European efforts to improve on current capabilities are greeted with skepticism The European Union ldquoHeadline Goalrdquo process it is argued will not bring into being forces capable of conducting twenty-fi rst century combat missions or being interoperable with US forces European decisions to acquire new equipment such as the A400M transport and Galileo satellites are viewed as redundant even wasteful of scarce defense resources As a result in this view European forces even in a multinational mode will continue to rely on the United States (via NATO) for lift logistics and communications and will continue to pose communications and information distribution problems

This study set out to examine the reality behind this critique The result of a three-year research process it examines European C4ISR capabilities both in national settings and as they are refl ected in the work of NATO and the EU (Adams et al 2004) As such it is the fi rst in-depth view of the extent to which major European defense powers have begun to adapt their forces by integrating advanced C4ISR technology into their force planning and acquisition strategies It focuses on the technologies at the heart of network-based operations information and communications capabilities that are integrated into military systems allowing national and coalition forces to be networked from sensor to shooter and back In effect the study takes a close look at the claim that European forces have fallen hopelessly behind those of the United States and cannot close the technology gap with the United States

The results are inevitably complex It is clear that important European military partners of the United States are actually making signifi cant investments

INTRODUCTION

6

in C4ISR technologies and working to integrate them into military systems While European defense budgets and especially European investment in military research and development (RampD) have declined over the past 15 years many European countries are researching developing and deploying advanced C4ISR capabilities While efforts to develop these systems vary from country to country there is no denying the overall trend in Europe including activity in NATO and the European Union towards obtaining improved capabilities for conducting network-based operations

The conventional wisdom about the ldquogaprdquo is not entirely wrong but it is not entirely right either as this study shows As such this study provides a corrective to the standard view based on hard data well beyond general impressions of the ldquogaprdquo If the practical realities of interoperability in networked operations is to be achieved it will be important to move beyond the rhetoric of the gap and work with actual developments and real technology

Overview

This study has a specifi c focus It is not a general examination of defense transformation in Europe thus does not examine force reductions or restructurings power projection and expeditionary capabilities or precision strike weaponry All of these are worthy of study and a comprehensive understanding of European military capabilities requires such an investigation Networking and C4ISR are however at the heart of effective force transformation Hence this study focuses specifi cally on the investment and deployment of C4ISR within European militaries

The study provides an overview of the strategies and doctrines of major European countries with respect to network-based operations No European country plans to create a fully networked force built around a unifi ed command control and communications architecture and few are planning for the kind of ldquonetwork-centric warfarerdquo capabilities the US seeks to create Europersquos militaries are quite aware of the utility of C4ISR and networking however and see it as a way of linking their forces and equipment through more effective digital communications European militaries and defense planners avoid such terms as ldquonetwork-centricrdquo and ldquowarfarerdquo refl ecting both a different view of the role of C4ISR technologies and of the purposes for which they are prepared to commit military force For many Europeans networking is a utility that enhances their capability not a goal in itself Moreover the purposes of their forces extend well beyond the range of warfare to encompass a wide array of military missions including post-war stability and reconstruction

The most advanced European militaries with respect to C4ISR and network thinking are the UK Sweden Finland and the Netherlands whose doctrines are discussed in some depth France Germany and Norway have yet to formulate a complete in-depth network-based doctrine but are clearly rethinking the ways in which they foresee their militaries operating in the future The doctrines of two European defense powers ndash Italy and Spain ndash are not discussed as they were

INTRODUCTION

7

found to deal little with C4ISR or network-based operations though both possess relevant deployed technologies

There is of course a difference between doctrine and deployment The study examines systematically the actual deployed and developing capabilities for networked operations of seven European countries six of them NATO allies ndash France the United Kingdom Germany Italy Spain and the Netherlands ndash and one non-NATO Sweden These seven were chosen as they are the NATO allies with the largest overall defense investments the largest and most modern forces and in varying degrees have the strongest commitment to deploying advanced C4ISR and being interoperable with the United States

The study explores in some depth the actual C4ISR capabilities of each country including current deployments and programs that are being researched and developed The focus is both on the advanced character of the technology and on the attention being paid to building in interoperability The examination is somewhat arbitrarily divided into discussions of C2 communications and computers and ISR In reality these technologies are and should be integrated as part of a networked capability The capabilities discussion also examines the extent to which national capabilities are being contributed to coalition operations with other countries as well as the countryrsquos involvement in current or planned bi- and multinational expeditionary military frameworks such as the NATO Response Force or the EU Battlegroups To the extent possible the discussion explores interoperability in three dimensions interoperability across a nationrsquos military services with other Europeans (NATO and EU) and with the United States

Because so much of the C4ISR and networking efforts are taking place at a level above single nations the study examines network-based doctrine capabilities and interoperability in multinational frameworks NATO is the key multilateral setting in which networking issues are formally addressed and joint programs most fully developed NATOrsquos networking and C4ISR efforts are signifi cantly more advanced than those of the EU for example Moreover recent initiatives in NATO ndash the Prague Capabilities Commitments the NATO Response Force and Allied Command Transformation ndash all give specifi c priority to developing interoperable network-based capabilities NATO is probably the most important context for focusing on what needs to be done to close the gap with respect to C4ISR The efforts of other multinational entities ndash the Multinational Interoperability Council the Combined Communications-Electronics Board the Multilateral Interoperability Program and the Combined Endeavor exercises ndash arealso important and examined here

While European Union defense planning is at an initial stage it is also becoming an increasingly important context for C4ISR investment and networking discussions and commitments Because the EU effort is both serious and long-term it deserves discussion The trend toward a more common defense capability in Europe autonomous to some extent from the NATO alliance will have important implications for future joint military operations European defense planners are already well aware that such a capability will require autonomous dedicated C4ISR capabilities

INTRODUCTION

8

European programs and activities in the defense fi eld are worthy of separate discussion Space systems are increasingly important to C2 communications and ISR While national space capabilities are reviewed within the discussion of each country there is also a growing network of European-level programs Some of these capabilities are being developed outside the defense context but have important and recognized implications for defense planning In addition the attention paid to cross-European interoperability in space is even more advanced than for other C4ISR activities and hence deserves a more in-depth analysis

The European industrial and technology base is an important part of the emerging capability in C4ISR Europeans have chosen to rely extensively on domestic industrial and technology suppliers for their C4ISR needs and the European capability to respond to such demands is quite extensive Many C4ISR systems are based on civilian or dual-use technologies leading European militaries like their American counterparts to make use of a broad and innovative commercial sector In the European case this sector has been encouraged for decades through public investments in RampD activities The recent emergence of several multinational fi rms ndash EADS Thales and BAE Systems ndash has further strengthened European technological capabilities Europeans argue that their dual-use technology sectors in information sensoring guidance and communications for example are fully competitive with the United States and like American fi rms draw on and participate in a truly global marketplace At the sub-system level it is clear that a substantial two-way street for such technologies applied to defense needs already exists (International Institute for Strategic Studies 1998 273)

Based on this detailed analysis the study makes a number of recommendations for policy changes both in Europe and the United States that would accelerate the pace at which the Europeans invest in and deploy C4ISR and networked capabilities and would substantially enhance transatlantic interoperability While there clearly is some truth to the ldquogaprdquo argument it is also based on a misperception Only the United States has set for itself the twin goals of global operations and a fully network-centric military force to conduct those operations European agendas are more modest with respect to geographic reach and the creation of a fully networked force This does not mean however that American and European military forces cannot be interoperable as they function in NATO or coalition operations There are increasingly clear ways in which they can be connected but a good deal of work remains to be done on both sides of the Atlantic to achieve this goal This study suggests what the elements of a work agenda could be

9

2

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES FOR NETWORK-BASED OPERATIONS

To date thinking and planning for network-based operations has been most advanced in the United States Technological advances over the past 25 years have enabled the US to begin creating the network that is at the heart of this twenty-fi rst century requirement Despite shrinking defense budgets in the 1990s the US Department of Defense began to focus on the ldquotransformationrdquo of its forces pushing towards network-centric warfare (NCW) NCW combined innovative tactics and technologies to give the military a decisive warfi ghting advantage and included linking command and control communications and intelligence gathering systems with weapons systems in an interconnected grid Americarsquos military has demonstrated this increasingly networked global capability in the fi rst Gulf War the Balkans and more recently in combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq

The European militaries have not moved as swiftly to create comparable capabilities With the end of the Soviet threat European defense strategies remained focused on regional security which did not seem to demand advanced networked capabilities European defense budgets declined through the 1990s and were largely focused on hardware inherited from the Cold War era ndash fi ghter aircraft main battle tanks and large ships ndash and on maintaining the existing military force structure European governments were concerned about the potential costs of pursuing a doctrine of network-centric warfare and the impact of such an investment on other defense requirements (James 2004 167)

European thinking began to evolve with the Gulf War of 1991 but especially as a result of the campaigns in the Balkans where Europeans were struck by the disparities between their deployed capabilities and those of the United States This stimulated greater interest in transforming European militaries to acquire similar capabilities that could be interoperable with the US A number of European militaries have made signifi cant progress since then As will be discussed in the next chapter several countries notably France the UK Germany Italy the Netherlands Spain and Sweden are researching developing procuring and deploying signifi cant networked capabilities and the trend is accelerating These include unifi ed digital communications infrastructures cross-service command and control systems and various ISR platforms manned unmanned and space-based Moreover European countries are discovering that these capabilities are

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

10

not as costly as initially perceived and that the European industrial and technology base is capable of providing them The overall trend in a networked direction is clear though progress is uneven across European countries Programs have also been initiated in NATO and the European Union to expedite the use of networked advanced C4ISR in existing and planned forces In NATO the European allies agreed to the Defense Capabilities Initiatives (DCI) in 1999 and to the Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC) in 2002 which include substantial commitments to advanced C4ISR NATO C4ISR programs now include SATCOM V Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) and Air Command and Control System (ACCS) In the EU there is an effort to create expeditionary ldquoBattlegroupsrdquo and to explore C3 jointly between the new European Defense Agency and the EU Military Staff

Only a few European countries however have begun to formulate doctrines for networked operations based on the uses of these technologies in warfare and their views on likely military operations over the coming decades Countries that have begun to explore such doctrine also shy away from the use of such terms as ldquocentricrdquo and ldquowarfarerdquo refl ecting different views both on the importance of C4ISR technologies and on the purposes for which they would commit military force There is no European country planning to create a fully networked force built around a unifi ed command control and communications architecture and few which are willing to place C4ISR technologies at the heart of warfi ghting capabilities in the way the United States has Moreover Europeans foresee a much broader range of military operations than the word ldquowarfarerdquo suggests As a result Europeans tend to use different terms to address planned capabilities such as Network-Enabled Capabilities (NEC) in the UK Networked Operational Command (Vernetzte Operationsfuumlhrung or NetOpFuuml) in Germany and Network-Based Defense in Sweden and Finland NATO has also designated its doctrine differently as NATO Network-Enabled Capabilities (NNEC)

The limitations of European military transformation are not the result of an inadequate technology base Local and multinational suppliers are readily available and largely as technologically advanced as American suppliers Analysts suggest that inadequate investment is the constraint Certainly the signifi cantly lower European defense research and technology investment limits the speed at which such technologies could be acquired and these budgets are unlikely to grow quickly However C4ISR systems are generally more affordable than large defense platforms and as force multipliers can provide a bigger ldquobang for the eurordquo One of the most important constraints on the Europeans is the absence of a long-term strategy and doctrine on the use of force which would integrate networked C4ISR into a strategic design Without clear well-defi ned strategic and doctrinal visions European militaries have hesitated to commit funding to a transformation effort

Such strategies and doctrines as exist moreover remain largely at the national level The United Kingdom Sweden Finland and the Netherlands have all been European pioneers in formulating and implementing network thinking and capabilities into their military doctrines but have done so largely based on specifi c national defense strategies and requirements Others including France

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

11

Germany and Norway are still in the process of formulating national doctrines for network-based operations but have yet to connect this planning to national RampD and acquisition plans Thinking and planning at the European level is still at a very early and tentative stage

This chapter fi rst discusses the C4ISR doctrines of those European countries that have most advanced their thinking about defense transformation and network-based operations the United Kingdom Sweden Finland and the Netherlands It then considers developments in other European countries ndash France Germany and Norway ndash that are at a more initial stage in considering their network-enabled doctrines Two of the larger European defense powers ndash Italy and Spain ndash are not discussed as their defense doctrines deal little with C4ISR or network-based operations though both possess relevant deployed technologies While Italy is undertaking signifi cant change in its military based on a strategy review C4ISR investments do not play a major role in this transformation process There do not appear to be major efforts in Spain to integrate capabilities for network-based operations into national defense planning

United Kingdom

The British Ministry of Defense has moved the most swiftly among the Europeans to embrace the concept of integrating sensors weapons systems support capabilities and decision-makers developing its own doctrine Network-Enabled Capabilities (NEC) It is not the goal of NEC to create a universal network via a single technical solution Nor indeed is the doctrine extremely technically focused Rather than view networks in a centric role it prefers to see them in a more underpinning and supporting role It perceives networks as enabling forces to better exploit the information carried on them to make better and timelier decisions on more agile and appropriate actions that result in effects more closely aligned to strategic aims and objectives

In the NEC doctrine a network of networks is envisioned in which a number of nodes carried by deployed operational assets are interlinked The NEC emphasis is on ldquothe ability to collect fuse and analyze relevant information in near real-time so as to allow rapid decision-making and the rapid delivery of the most appropriate military force to achieve the desired effectrdquo (UK Ministry of Defense 2003 11) NEC will exploit the current and future sensors that gather information ensure that the information is better managed fused and exploited to support decisions and link the network to strike assets that can act upon the information collected As an investment priority NEC compatibility will be built into current and future military platforms

Using this network of networks concept some parts of the battlespace will be linked through a C4ISR backbone using the Skynet satellite constellation and the Bowman Cormorant and Falcon networks In other parts the network will be made up of different communications systems optimized for operating in particular environments (eg air to air communications land communications) While all assets will have to possess some communications capability only a few

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

12

will need to be a permanent and integral part of the network the rest will plug into it via specifi c permanent nodes

Interoperability both technical and non-technical is a critical element of the British NEC concept A key challenge for NEC is to keep abreast of other transformation processes occurring within the armed forces of potential allies most notably the United States Through relatively frequent upgrading of C2 and communications technologies somewhat easier procurement procedures and constant participation in US defense RampD programs the British armed forces today have the highest level in Europe of interoperability with American forces The Royal Navy and Royal Air Force however have a higher level of interoperability with their American and European counterparts than does the British Army

In the near term delivering NEC means identifying options to modify existing systems Delivery in the medium term will require intervening in programmed equipment to ensure that delivered systems are capable of exploiting the information they collect andor receive Over the long term the procurement program is to deliver platforms and systems that are net-ready

In January 2005 the British Ministry of Defense published the NetworkEnabled Capability Handbook designed to introduce the concept of NEC to the larger UK defense community and to outline key programs that will be undertaken to implement the concept The Handbook which will be updated annually describes how NEC will contribute to the strategic operational and tactical levels of command as well as its links with the Command and Battlespace Management program and the Joint High Level Operational Concept (Jt HLOC) being formulated by the Ministry of Defense (UK Ministry of Defense 2005)

Britain restructured the Ministry of Defense to emphasize its commitment to NEC NEC policy and coherence now falls under the Ministry of Defensersquos Directorate of Command and Battlespace Management (CBMJ6) which works closely with the directorate responsible for the equipment in the Directorate for Equipment Capability ndash Command Control and Information Infrastructure (DEC-CCII) headed by a one-star general DEC-CCII is the largest equipment capability area in the Ministry of Defense (the other Core Capability DECs being DEC ISTAR responsible for Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance DEC TA responsible for Air Enablers and DEC CBRN responsible for chemical biological radiological and nuclear warfare) It is responsible for delivering solutions to C2 and information technology gaps in British military capability DEC-CCII is able to balance funding across programs and between other DECs to deliver operational capability

Sweden

Urged by the Swedish parliament the Swedish armed forces moved quickly to rethink defense strategy after the Cold War In addition to their traditional role of territorial defense they are now also required to collaborate with other national security elements such as police and emergency management units as well as

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

13

with the forces of other countries within international coalitions Swedenrsquos long-standing policy of neutrality and non-participation in alliances and its defense strategy of border defense are both evolving rapidly As its new roles and missions emerge the Swedish military is evolving a doctrine of Network-Based Defense (NBD) NBD will facilitate joint operations in defense of the borders as well as in international coalitions at all levels of command using information technology to create a system of systems infrastructure with different platforms linked into it

Once in place NBD will allow the combination of different resources to provide task forces for specifi c operations These task forces will be able to interoperate with other participants The doctrine seeks to obtain the greatest possible effect by combining inputs and outputs from all systems regardless of their organizational affi liation (Nilsson 2003 8) The transition to NBD is expected to take twenty years or so however the fi rst steps are underway including developing and purchasing advanced C2 and communications capabilities for aircraft ships and land vehicles and the initial design of a Network-Based Defense architecture The Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI) and the Swedish Defense Materiel Administration (FMV) play a key role in shaping this vision (Rehnstroumlm 2002 11ndash12)

The Swedes conducted major experimental demonstrations of the key elements of the NBD doctrine between 2002ndash6 The experiments focused on secure information service-oriented architectures and the demonstration of dominant battlespace awareness and C2 elements for rapid reaction forces They also included the demonstration of methods and techniques for effects-based operations The demonstrations brought together units from different services each with its own functional systems and included simulations of a system of systems (Naumlsstroumlm 2004 152ndash3) The demonstrations were undertaken in a special NBD Laboratory in Enkoumlping near Stockholm built and operated by FMV for the Swedish armed forces The implementation phase of the NBD doctrine is planned to begin in 2010

Finland

Since the end of the Cold War Finlandrsquos national security strategy has changed dramatically The 1000 km border with Russia remains a security issue but the Finns are focused on participation in international security and relief operations as the central national security goal As a result of this two-pronged defense strategy Finland is making international defense interoperability a priority to enhance both its ability to receive outside aid for national emergencies as well as the effectiveness of its contributions to multinational operations overseas

A key part of the new strategy is to formulate and implement a doctrine that networks all elements of the nationrsquos defense and security forces using international standards Finland decided that its various forces could be much more effective if connected via a single command control and communications network that would enable seamless coordination and deployment of all of them The planned network would connect all military security police and other emergency and fi rst-

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

14

responder forces Though the Finnish doctrine is called Network-Based Defense it implements a truly network-centric vision plugging in all relevant users

Finland began installing this network ndash VIRVE (the Finnish acronym for Common Network for Authorities) ndash in 1999 and it became operational that same year It was fi rst used in live operations in 2000 and completed in 2002 Today VIRVE is the worldrsquos only fully operational IP-based nationwide command control and communications network for security and rescue forces It is owned by the Finnish Ministry of the Interior and operated by Suomen Erillisverkot an entity owned by the Finnish government and Sonera Finlandrsquos largest telecommunications service provider It currently serves some 30000 users from 20 different agencies and organizations including the Finnish Defense Forces police border security paramedics and fi refi ghters providing them with secure voice and data communications A related system is the basis for Finlandrsquos contribution of a deployable command control and communications network to the European Unionrsquos forces in the Balkans (EUFOR) Co-developed by Finnish companies and the Finnish Defense Forces and known as the Deployable COTS Network (DCN) it is a data transfer network that uses microwave links fi ber optic cables and broadband information services to transfer speech and data and provide Internet access between headquarters and troops in the fi eld

VIRVE is an example of how a national doctrine for network-based defense is taking the fi rst steps towards creating a common joint interoperable C4I system linking all government agencies The architecture structures and datafl ow of this network will be operated together allowing the sharing of information and resources according to specifi c needs It will include an integrated data transfer processing and management environment that covers all services and branches of the Finnish Defense Forces Initial focus will be on the strategic and operational levels but foundations will also be built for tactical level cross-service interoperability (Finnish Prime Ministerrsquos Offi ce 2004 107) By 2012 the army air force and navy are expected to be integrated into the national C4I network developed and able to conduct network-based operations both in Finland and overseas

While the Finnish military strongly supports this capability (the Finnish Chief of Defense Admiral Juhani Kaskeala has clearly prioritized integrated C4I systems as one of the militaryrsquos top development programs) other parts of the Finnish government face a challenge in developing their parts of the network Organizational cultures and operational procedures differ signifi cantly and most agencies lack the capacity for long-term planning and capabilities development However interagency cooperation is strong and there is signifi cant public support for improving both homeland defense and expeditionary capabilities

Netherlands

During the Cold War the Dutch armed forces saw one of their major roles as being able to provide C2 and communications capabilities to the theater of operations Over several decades they built up a C2 and communications capability through

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

15

investment in signals brigades With the end of the Soviet threat sustaining of a massive C3 capability became unnecessary At the same time the revolution in commercial information and communications technologies led to a ldquobrain drainrdquo away from the armed forces into the private sector Dutch defense planners wished to maintain some C2 capacity within the armed forces and to develop the C2 requirements of the future To this end they created three Support Centers in 2001 one for each service to bring together engineers and operational commanders for research development testing and evaluation on C2 systems that could serve the Netherlands armed forces in their new mission Unable to match the salary levels of the private sector the Dutch military compensated by offering the Support Center personnel a free hand in the use of their budget included total fl exibility for acquisition and program management

As the Dutch Ministry of Defense began to move toward a doctrine of expedi-tionary warfare the ability of the C2 Support Centers to provide the customer with deployable and fl exible systems became more important The armyrsquos C2 Support Center was tasked with developing C2 systems for all ground-based operations and is now the largest of the three Support Centers employing some 200 people half of whom are civilians The Center also develops technologies used by the marines the navyrsquos landing platform dock ships and helicopters attached to an airmobile brigade It is responsible for building a common open C2 architecture allowing both old and new systems to work together As of 1 January 2005 the Center was integrated into the newly created joint Defense Materiel Organization

This model of support centers while not a doctrine for network-based operations per se is an important contribution to European strategies for C4ISR Such centers bring together expertise from industry and defense ensuring that user needs and requirements are balanced with an understanding of what technology can support Competitive salaries and a free hand to experiment with the latest technologies and participate in groundbreaking research draw the best and brightest employees from the private sector and the military Finally the technology development strategy of ldquoplan a little build a little fi eld a little and learn a lotrdquo (similar to the US ldquospiral developmentrdquo) will be of interest to many European countries Instead of setting down complex requirements packages in advance and then developing and producing a turnkey product systems are designed in manageable parts that are then gradually developed and tested Along each step of the way the product is evaluated in accordance with overall specifi cations Only then is a prototype built and tested with the end-user While many European companies use this development strategy doing so in a setting with industry the military and end-users has the advantage of making it easier to identify and fi x problems swiftly

Other European countries

Encouraged by the success of the United Kingdom Sweden Finland and the Netherlands other European nations are beginning to formulate strategy and doctrine for network-based operations Rather than create distinct network-based doctrines C4ISR or networked capabilities tend to be included in broader defense

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

16

planning documents alongside plans for refocusing the militaryrsquos roles from territorial defense to expeditionary operations downsizing forces improving training for individual soldiers reorganizing the military command structure and reallocating resources from large platforms to more easily deployable capabilities Most of these efforts are still at an early stage however

France is a signifi cant example of this trend As is discussed in the next chapter France is a European leader in researching developing testing and deploying state-of-the-art C4ISR technologies The broad French technology investment does not however emerge from a comprehensive networking or transformational strategy and doctrine This strategy is not yet in place though use of the concept of network-centric operations (opeacuterations reacuteseaux-centreacutees or ORC) is becoming more widespread within the French armed forces Rather the commitment to obtaining advanced C4ISR is part of an overall French desire to remain self-suffi cient in military capabilities across the board For decades France has pursued a defense doctrine and procurement strategy that would provide its armed forces with independent autonomous capabilities The deployment of a broad arsenal and the avoidance of military specialization in the view of French defense planners make the countryrsquos military more fl exible and less dependent upon others More recently French strategy and doctrine have begun to emphasize military cooperation in the European context recognizing that total autonomy is militarily and fi nancially unachievable

Recent military planning in Germany suggests a growing focus on achieving expeditionary and network-centric capabilities Germany is one of the few European countries to have adopted the concept of transformation in the broadest US sense defi ning it as ldquothe forming of an ongoing forward-looking process of adaptation to a changing security environment in order to improve the Bundeswehrrsquos ability to operaterdquo (Thiele 2005 7) The German government announced in 2003 that it would downsize the armed forces to 211000 troops and to 392 bases by 2010 from the current 252000 troops and 621 bases (CPM Forum 2005 29ndash30) Moving away from a massive land warfare capability and toward an expeditionary capability the German military force will be divided into three categories The fi rst category some 35000 troops will become response forces (Eingreifkraumlfte)capable of participating in high-intensity combat operations These forces will fi eld state-of-the art C4ISR technologies for network-centric operations and interoperability with coalitions and allies The second category approximately 70000 troops will be stabilization forces (Stabilisierungskraumlfte) for medium- to low-intensity operations and will be only partially networked The third category will be support forces (Unterstuumltzungskraumlfte) some 145000 troops which will provide support for the fi rst two and be responsible for basic operations of the Bundeswehr While there are no planned procurement cancellations the funds saved by downsizing forces and the change in defense doctrine are promising for Germanyrsquos future C4ISR capabilities and its interoperability with allies Germany has also formulated a network-centric doctrine that is very similar to the US strategy of Network-Centric Warfare Named Networked Operational

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

17

Command (Vernetzte Operationsfuumlhrung or NetOpFuuml in German) the strategy calls for linking new and existing sensors and weapons platforms on a common information network

Norway which is not in the EU but is a NATO member sees network-based defense as crucial for remaining relevant as a NATO partner and as a contributor to multilateral operations and has made this strategy an important part of the broader restructuring of its armed forces In 2001 the Norwegian parliament approved a major military reform between 2002ndash5 As in Sweden and in other countries this reform was initiated by a shift in the roles assigned to the Norwegian armed forces from primarily territorial defense to expeditionary operations

As a result of this shift the command structure of the military was reorganized the Headquarters Defense Command Norway was disbanded and the Chief of Defense together with his strategic functions was integrated with the Ministry of Defense A new Defense Staff consisting of representatives of the three services and an Inspector General was established to support the Chief of Defense in his role as head of the armed forces In addition the size of the military reduced by approximately 5000 The savings generated from this restructuring would be invested in advanced capabilities and systems These investments have included upgrading the national Defense Data Network (known as FDN) and procuring locally developed advanced multi-role tactical radios (Norwegian Ministry of Defense 2002) In the next cycle 2005ndash8 the Norwegians plan to create a joint Information and Communications Infrastructure unit to support Norwegian forces deployed overseas and an ISTAR unit focused primarily on reconnaissance missions using special forces and UAVs that can operate within multinational coalitions (Norwegian Ministry of Defense 2004)

Conclusion

There is not yet a consistent approach in Europe to Network-Based Operations Some countries still view territorial defense as the principal mission for their armed forces and see stovepiped C4ISR systems as suffi cient for fulfi lling their current and future defense requirements Still a growing number of European nations have learned important lessons from studying US Network-Centric Warfare doctrine and observing such capabilities in action on the battlefi eld in coalition operations Some including Germany France and Norway are beginning to include language about C4ISR networks in their defense modernization plans but have yet to create specifi c detailed doctrines discussing how these networks will be linked with existing military doctrine tactics and technologies Other European countries particularly the United Kingdom Sweden Finland and the Netherlands have developed detailed doctrines and strategies for creating advanced capabilities based on linking communications intelligence gathering and weapons systems into a network capable of distributing information

It is not always true that countries that have worked through doctrine in detail have also deployed the most advanced technology consistent with that doctrine As

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

18

the French case suggests doctrinal leaders are not always the same as technology leaders Over time the two will need to develop together if the Europeans are to obtain a network-based capability that is interoperable within Europe as well as across the Atlantic

19

3

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES FOR NETWORK-

BASED OPERATIONS

Efforts are well underway in many European countries to develop and acquire national and in some cases multinational capabilities for network-based operations As already noted no country has fully embraced the concept of network-centric operations to the extent the American military has None are seeking to create a full single infrastructure fusing all existing and future assets Most have opted at least for some integration and upgrading of existing capabilities toward greater networking Major procurement programs focus particular attention on cross-service C2 systems digital communications and ISR platforms (tactical operational and strategic) In all of these countries rapid advances in commercial communication and information technology have created a wealth of products applicable to military C4ISR at a relatively low unit cost As a result for many of these countries expensive weapons platforms can be improved through C4ISR-related upgrades thereby increasing capability at an affordable cost

This chapter focuses on actual deployed and planned C4ISR capabilities in seven European countries France the United Kingdom Germany Italy the Netherlands Spain and Sweden As noted doctrines for network-based capabilities are unevenly developed among these countries However these seven countries are clearly the most advanced in Europe both in terms of overall military capability and in the deployment of C4ISR technologies Not surprisingly with the exception of the Netherlands they are also the countries with the highest defense budgets in Europe They are also the most likely partners of the US in coalition operations either individually or as members of NATO and the EU

An overview of the trends in C4ISR-related acquisition and RampT programs in Europe identifi es developments that have been observed in several ndash if not the majority ndash of EU and NATO countries This chapter then reviews developments relevant to network-based operations in each of the seven key countries summarizing major national capabilities both deployed and projected and examining in some detail each countryrsquos network-based systems in terms of C2 communications (including computers) and ISR

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

20

Overview

Signifi cant efforts are already underway in most European countries to connect existing C2 systems across services Several countries are creating a new cross-service C2 infrastructure including the United Kingdom (the Joint Command System) France (SICA) and Italy (CATRIN) Interoperability among these C2 systems is signifi cantly less advanced especially for ground forces The French army for example has three command levels while most other European armies ndash including the United Kingdom Germany and Italy ndash have two which makes the creation of a common C2 architecture among them a challenge

All of the countries reviewed believe that a common digital communications backbone for their services is crucial Several countries fi eld tactical systems based on asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) switches many others have integrated digital switches capable of interfacing with high-speed data networks and complying with European and NATO standards Many of them are at advanced stages in upgrading their communications infrastructure whether through terrestrial networks satellite systems or a combination of both including the British Bowman and Skynet programs the German AUTOKO-90 and BIGSTAF programs and the French SOCRATE RITA 2000 and Syracuse programs Sweden the Netherlands and Italy are also making signifi cant progress in the military communications fi eld

For communications in general the civilian industry is the main driver of innovation and therefore the main standard setter It is not surprising that while different companies are working on communications programs for Europersquos militaries the systems being put in place share attributes they are digital increasingly based on the Internet Protocol (IP) capable of handling voice as well as data and use ATM switching equipment and widespread transmission technologies (satellite radio and fi ber optics)

In addition to space-based military communications many European countries are turning to space for future surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities While military communications satellites (COMSAT) usually are built and operated by individual countries earth observation programs have become increasingly multinational Furthermore intra-European agreements are being put in place to link national space assets In the not-so-distant future data collected by satellites owned by different countries will be disseminated between partners through sharing agreements and communications satellites will carry military transmissions from countries that lease their bandwidth from others A growing number of militaries are acquiring the capability to link their headquarters with their expeditionary forces using broadband mobile communications The French ARISTOTE the German KINTOP the British Cormorant and the Swedish KV90 are examples of such systems already in place

Finally the Europeans are making increased use of unmanned platforms especially aerial ones to fulfi ll the tactical and in some cases operational and strategic intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance requirements While most European countries possess manned platforms for this purpose particularly for

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

21

aerial reconnaissance these are either in need of upgrading or are nearing the end of their service lives All the militaries discussed in this chapter as well as those of several other European countries have begun to experiment with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) ndash often developed by their indigenous technology and industrial base ndash and most have used them in military operations They are viewed as affordable versatile and dependable options for future surveillance and reconnaissance missions Several countries notably the United Kingdom France and Germany are looking to UAVs for other operational needs including signals intelligence (SIGINT) electronic warfare airborne ground surveillance and strike missions However unlike what is often the case in communications and C2 different ISR standards are set by each country which makes interoperability a diffi cult challenge

France

France invests in almost all areas of defense technology relevant to network-based operations However as was explained in the previous chapter the broad French investment in C4ISR capabilities does not yet grow out of a comprehensive network-centric strategy Although the concept of network-centric operations (opeacuterations reacuteseaux-centreacutees or ORC) is widespread within the French armed forces only a handful of offi cers within the French Joint Staff are currently working on network-centric doctrines Nevertheless between 1991 and 1993 several new organizational frameworks were created to review and modernize French doctrine and strategy in this direction The single joint Directorate of Military Intelligence (Direction du Renseignement Militaire or DRM) replaced a variety of existing services and reports to the chief of the defense staff A joint planning staff the Etat-Major Interarmeacutees (EMIA) was created to plan operations in and out of Europe and the Centre Opeacuterationnel Interarmeacutees (COIA) became the joint operations center France also put in place a joint theater C2 structure (Poste de Commandement Interarmeacutee de Theacuteacirctre or PCIAT) and the space bureau in the French Joint Chiefs of Staff was folded into the Command Control Communications and Intelligence (C3I) staff (Thomas 2000 20) The initial purpose of these organizational changes was to facilitate force projection and expeditionary warfare operations However these new organizational structures could provide a setting for developing a military doctrine increasingly focused on transformation and coordination across services

Because force projection expeditionary forces and out-of-theater operations require among other things advanced C2 systems communications networks and real-time intelligence the C4ISR systems that provide this are playing an increasingly important role in French military plans The French defense procurement agency (Deacuteleacutegation Geacuteneacuterale pour lrsquoArmement or DGA) has set up a task force of capability managers (architectes des systegravemes de force) in charge of future issues for defense RampD and procurement and their cross-service applications The areas covered are deterrence C3I force projection deep strike and maintaining operational capability The task force meets regularly

Stra

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Pre

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stem

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ty

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C2

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ited

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Arg

us a

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aft)

bull U

AV

and

UC

AV

pro

gram

s

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

24

with representatives of the French defense industry to coordinate government requirements with private-sector projects and planning In fact several of the larger defense contractors in Europe have set up new groups to act as permanent liaison with members of the task force for this purpose such as the Thales Think Tank (T3)

In 2004 there were still more changes in Francersquos defense organizations The DGA was restructured to include expanded and improved in-house technical capabilities for research technology and testing The French Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Offi ce of the Secretary-General of the Defense Ministry are beginning to assume responsibility for monitoring the development and demonstration of defense programs a responsibility currently held by the DGA These changes are seen as a way to bring industry closer to its client the French military (Tran 2004 4)

The importance of C4ISR for current and future military capabilities has also been refl ected in Francersquos defense budget planning C2 systems space technologies and interoperability enablers have received priority for RampD investment in the 2003ndash8 fi ve year defense plan (the Loi de Programmation Militaire) During the fi rst two years DGA planners focused on space-based SIGINT assets a space-based early warning system demonstrator integrated C2 systems for the army and navy and advanced navigation technologies For 2005ndash6 UAVs and the interlinking of European space assets are the priority By the end of the fi ve year plan France hopes to raise its defense RampT budget to some 12 billion euros (out of a total 15 billion euros) up from 800 million euros in 2004 (Boulesteix 2004) For all C4ISR requirements DGArsquos Directorate of Force Systems and Prospective Systems Analysis (Direction des Systegravemes de force et de la Prospective or DSP) has been replaced by the Directorate of Force Systems and Industrial Technological and Cooperation Strategies or Direction des Sytegravemes de Force et des Strateacutegies Industrielles Technologique et de Coopeacuteration (D4S) which decides on the best and most affordable solutions without prejudice toward any specifi c technology

The DGA is also working on two plans to assess the future C4ISR needs of the French armed forces The fi rst is a technological capabilities plan of systems including C4ISR systems to be acquired by the year 2015 The second is the Prospective Plan for 30 Years (Plan Prospectif agrave Trente Ans or PP30) which looks specifi cally at longer-term needs and solutions for meeting them mainly in the fi elds of telecommunications intelligence networking C2 sensors and UAV technologies The latter fi rst unveiled at the 2005 Paris Air Show (although circulated within the French Ministry of Defense for several years prior to that) is groundbreaking in that it provides a 30 year draft acquisition plan for the French military based on an analysis of expected threats uses of force and technology developments Both plans are updated periodically to guide RampT investments and procurement plans in collaboration with the European Defense Agency other allies ndash most notably the UK ndash and with industry

Working closely with the Joint Planning Staff (EMIA) and with DGA on network-based capabilities is the French space agency known as the Center for

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

25

National Space Studies (Centre National drsquoEtudes Spatiales) or CNES This collaboration refl ects the French governmentrsquos recognition that space has major strategic operational and tactical advantages for networking and intelligence collection purposes As a result CNES has begun overseeing some military space programs on behalf of the Ministry of Defense The French Chief of Staff chairs the space coordination group (Groupe de Coordination Espacendash GCE) which includes representatives from EMIA DGA and other military institutions CNES has also created a team dedicated to military space projects Its members who can either be CNES employees or Ministry of Defense staff seconded to CNES report to the president of CNES as well as to the relevant program managers at the Ministry of Defense The team works on four major areas future planning ongoing projects implementation of dual-use space programs and RampT

More broadly recognizing the costs of an autonomous French defense strategy France is continuing its defense cooperation with the EU and NATO In addition to its Eurocorps commitments France will commit a whole Battlegroup to the EU Battlegroup effort and participate in two others one with Germany Belgium and Luxembourg the other with Belgium France is also committed to participating in the NATO Response Force despite viewing it as duplicative of the EU Rapid Reaction Force It is unlikely however that France will periodically rotate the same forces through the NRF it would be more interested in NRF experience for different kinds of troops drawn from various services While the French understand that smaller countries will participate in the NRF in a specialized manner they prefer to rotate different types of forces through and maintain autonomy

France also views the Allied Command Transformation as an important development and a target for closer cooperation which might provide a window for the EU into US transformation However within the EU the French strongly believe that there needs to be a European fl ag on European military capabilities At this point it is unclear whether the French expect EU capabilities to be able to complement US capabilities to be oriented principally toward autonomous operations or both This issue has major implications for interoperability require-ments and capabilities Currently France is very supportive of the plan to give the European Defense Agency increasingly greater RampT and procurement responsibilities However France also believes that the European national investments in major platforms stand in the way of greater interoperability between European C4ISR systems In the French view European defense budgets include a major commitment to a platform strategy which leaves little funding for C4ISR and interoperability

At the transatlantic level major French platforms such as the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier have good tactical interoperability with the US Navy using Link-16 technology In Afghanistan for example French E-2C aircraft from the Charles de Gaulle guided American fi ghters toward their targets when US E-2C aircraft were overtaxed or unavailable French Special Operations Forces also have good interoperability with their US counterparts At the European level French naval and air forces are fairly interoperable with most European forces but French

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

26

ground forces are not The French Army still fi elds communications systems for example that are not fully interoperable with its allies The coordination of French RampD efforts is focused for now totally on achieving jointness at the national level

As a European leader in space France also seeks greater cooperation with the United States especially for earth observation communications and navigation programs France also views itself as a potential intermediary between the United States and the space-related activities of other European nations and organizations including the European Space Agency and the European Commission (Hura et al2000 64ndash5)

France has arguably the most advanced operational battlespace digitization program in Europe both deployed and planned While there is not yet full interoperability between all French military services the initial investment in cross-service systems has been made and deployment is well underway The major building blocks are a cross-service C2 system a digital communications infrastructure and a network linking national HQs and expeditionary forces In 2004ndash5 two laboratories for demonstrating network-based concepts were created Bulle Opeacuterationelle Aeacuteroterrestre (BOA) demonstrates the ability to fuse information from UAVs and land-based sensors in real time to create a common battlespace picture for land forces and enable a coordinated engagement of targets The second laboratory will focus on linking data collected by ISR assets from all services Since France has also invested heavily across the board in ISR capabilities it is important to demonstrate the ability to link UAVs manned air- and ship-borne platforms and space-based assets

Command and control

France has operational C2 systems in every service The army has four fully operational digital C2 programs the Force Command and Information System (Systegraveme drsquoInformation et de Commandement des Forces or SICF) for division-level C2 (including C2 for overseas task forces) the Regimental Information System (Systegraveme drsquoInformation Reacutegimentaire or SIR) originally for regimental-level C2 but redirected to company level in 2001 the Final Information System (Systegraveme drsquoInformation Terminal or SIT) for tactical-level C2 and armored vehicles and the Automated Surface-to-Surface Artillery Fire and Liaison System (Automatisation des Tirs et des Liaisons de lrsquoArtillerie Sol-sol or ATLAS) Some 750 SIR vehicles 650 SIT systems and nine ATLAS systems are deployed

Other operational digital C2 systems are the armyrsquos Martha air defense system the air forcersquos Aerial Operations Command and Control System (Systegravemede Commandement et de Controcircle des Opeacuterations Aeacuteriennes or SCCOA) and the navyrsquos SIC21 system The French navy also deploys several Naval Tactical Information Exploitation Systems (Systegraveme drsquoExploitation Navale des Informations Tactiques or SENIT) Ships equipped with SENIT can operate as single distributed anti-aircraft systems In addition the French navy in 2004 initiated the Multi-Platform Engagement Capability (Capaciteacute drsquoEngagement

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

27

Multi Plate-formes or CEMP) demonstrator as a possible locally developed counterpart to the US Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) to provide air and naval assets with additional cooperative engagement capability France initially sought to develop CEMP as a collaborative program offering Italy Germany and the Netherlands participation but the offer was not accepted Initial operational capability is expected in 2006

These C2 systems are only partially interoperable with each other or with allied capabilities though SICF and SIR are both compliant with NATO STANAGs The SIR and SIT systems can both be linked to French combat and C2 helicopters and ATLAS and SIR both interface with the French Rapsodie surveillance system ATLAS is currently interoperable with United States United Kingdom Italian and German surface-to-surface fi ring systems as well as with SIR and SCCOA is planned to be interoperable with the NATO Air Command and Control System (ACCS) The French SENIT system is also interoperable with the C2 of the United States Navy and the British Royal Navy through Link-16 and Link-11 which allows interoperability in naval air defense

France is now in the fi nal stages of deploying the next generation C2 system in the form of a strategic-level system called the Joint Information and Command System (Systegraveme drsquoInformation et de Commandement des Armeacutees or SICA) This system which will link the armyrsquos SICF the navyrsquos SIC21 and the air forcersquos SCCOA systems is already installed on various weapons platforms and headquarters It is linked to the SOCRATE and the Syracuse 3 communications systems (see below) and interoperable with the British JOCS and the German Rubin systems

Communications and computers

The Operational System of Joint Telecommunications Networks (SystegravemeOpeacuterationnel Constitueacute des Reacuteseaux des Armeacutees pour les Teacuteleacutecommunicationsor SOCRATE) is the current communications infrastructure linking all of Francersquos services Its 120 ATM switching sites in France cover all military communications including radio fi ber optic and satellite and connect the system to civilian and allied communications networks In addition a more advanced tactical communications system for the French army will enter into service around 2004ndash5 It will be based on IP-networked PR4G (Programme Radio 4egraveme Geacuteneacuteration or 4th Generation Radio Program VHF tactical radios used in man-portable vehicle-mounted or aircraft-mounted confi gurations) and the Automatic Transmission Integrated Network (Reacuteseau Inteacutegreacute de Transmissions Automatiques 2000 or RITA 2000) switching platform both supplied by Thales The RITA 2000 project was initiated in 1993 and has progressively upgraded the French tactical communications infrastructure to facilitate interoperability with allied networks and expeditionary forces and increase bandwidth Its link into the armed forcesrsquo C2 network management is known as the Command Network Center (Centre de Commandement du Reacuteseau or CECOR) In August 2003 the French defense procurement agency announced a 100 million euro plan to upgrade

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

28

the RITA 2000 system with new hardware and software to provide state-of-the-art tactical Internet and mobile communications services

For tactical communications France currently uses older versions of the PR4G radios which nevertheless include features such as frequency hopping encryption Since 2005 however several units have begun using newer versions that include a built-in Global Positioning System (GPS) and tactical Internet capabilities A total of 7050 PR4G-IP radios will be delivered to the French military by 2009 at a cost of 235 million euros In addition the tactical Local Area System (LAS) developed by Thales provides a tactical command post in the fi eld with digital communications capabilities through a vehicle-mounted IP-based system In the French navy several platforms including some E-2C aircraft the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle and several anti-air frigates possess Tactical Digital Information Link technology of the Link-11 and Link-16 types This technology is now installed in aircraft of the French air force as well The Link-11 systems will be replaced by Link-22 (also known as NATO Inproved Link Eleven or NILE) systems in the near future France also procures MIDS terminals and is a partner in the US navy-led MIDS JTRS program to make MIDS terminals compliant with the US JTRS software defi ned tactical radios

French military satellite communications capabilities are also at quite an advanced stage with the Syracuse satellite constellation The previous operational system Syracuse 2 used the military payloads of four Teacuteleacutecom 2 commercial satellites launched between December 1991 and August 1996 and was operated jointly by France Teacuteleacutecom and the French armed forces The system did not provide global coverage but did cover all of Europe and reached the United States to the west and India to the east Its satellites began to reach the end of their lives in 2004 and while most are still available as backup a new system Syracuse 3 was put in orbit to replace them Syracuse 3A was launched in October 2005 and the second satellite is scheduled for launch in 2006 total costs for both are estimated at around 3 billion euros including roughly 600 airborne terrestrial and ship-borne terminals A third satellite to be launched around 2010 is under study The satellites have both SHF and EHF channels Syracuse 3A has nine SHF channels and six EHF channels The Syracuse constellation belongs to the French government though the French Ministry of Defense is considering the possibility of turning management of the third satellite over to a private consortium using the model of Britainrsquos Skynet 5 (De Selding 2003a 6) The Syracuse 3 satellites will form part of the British-French-Italian solution for NATOrsquos future satellite communication needs and France has additional agreements with Germany Belgium and Spain to share Syracuse 3 capacity (Laurent 2001 30)

Since 2002 France also has a deployed system (ARISTOTE) to provide end-to-end communications between operational units in external theaters of operation and their commanders in France ARISTOTE uses the Syracuse constellation and other available allied and commercial COMSATs to provide a broadband architecture based on the latest commercial standards The system supports voice video teleconferencing telegraph fax and data (including tactical Internet)

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

29

Future communications projects include a naval intranet system (RIFAN) a secure e-mail system for the French Ministry of Defense (Universal Secure Messaging or Messagerie Universelle Seacutecuriseacutee or MUSE) and the Airborne Laser Optical Link (Liaison Optique Laser Aeacuteroporteacutee or LOLA) a 2006 test of a 50 million euro demonstrator to explore the feasibility of high-rate laser optical links between an ARTEMIS civilian communications satellite and a UAV in fl ight The Airborne Communication Node (Noeud de Communication Aeacuteroporteacuteor NCA) a UAV-borne high-bandwidth hub capable of linking up to 50 mobile ground or maritime gateways is also under advanced stages of development with a fi rst demonstration expected in 2006 France also plans to procure additional Link-16 equipment for its Rafale aircraft and for some naval platforms

Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance

France is the European leader in deployed space-based ISR capabilities and the operator of Helios the only European military earth observation system currently in orbit Despite the cancellation of the Horus radar satellite program in 1998 France continued its earth observation efforts with the development of two Helios 1 satellites The fi rst was launched in July 1995 and remains operational the second was launched in December 1999 but failed in October 2004 A joint French Italian and Spanish project Helios 1 satellites carry optical imagers with approximately one-meter resolution and are capable of imaging any point on earth within 24 hours providing a dozen images a day They do not have infrared capability Each participating nation can control the onboard imaging system on a pro rata basis based on its fi nancial contribution to the program (France 789 per cent Italy 141 per cent and Spain 7 per cent) The Helios 1 system allows each of the co-owners to maintain strict secrecy from each other regarding the use they make of it However to make optimum use of the imaging capacity the three partner nations have agreed on certain common needs and program the satellite accordingly More than 30 per cent of the imagery taken by Helios 1 is shared between the partners In addition to fi xed ground stations to receive Helios 1 imagery France possesses at least one mobile ground station built by EADS

Helios 2A the fi rst in the next generation of French earth observation satellites was launched in December 2004 and began operating in April 2005 The second satellite will probably be launched in late 2008 Helios 2A carries two sensors operating in the visible and infrared spectrums One is a medium-resolution sensor with a wide fi eld of view and is capable of producing images with a resolution of approximately 1 meter the other has a narrower fi eld of view but is capable of producing images with a 50 cm resolution The satellite has a contractual service life of fi ve years during which it will produce roughly 100 images per day (Fiorenza 2005a)

The ground segment of the Helios 2 system has an open architecture allowing for interoperability with other imagery sources including other satellites reconnaissance aircraft and drones Users whether in Europe or in an overseas theater of operations will have access to a workstation connected to the main

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

30

ground segments from which they will be able to request specifi c tasking perform analysis or access an imagery archive Overall costs for the Helios 2 program are approximately 2 billion euros Belgium and Spain each have a 25 per cent stake in the program and Greece will join it in the future with a small ownership share Helios 2 imagery will also be shared with other EU Member States through the EU satellite center in Torrejoacuten

France is also working on a dual-use satellite system ndash Pleiades ndash a constellation of earth observation satellites able to cover both military and civilian requirements The constellation to be built by EADS Astrium of France will include two new French high-resolution optical satellites capable of resolutions of about 60 cm Other satellites linked to the constellation will be the four Italian COSMO-Skymed X-band radar satellites designed for a resolution of less than one meter for military images and one meter for commercial ones The Pleiades-HR satellite is expected to be launched in 2008 with the other French contribution to the constellation being launched approximately one year later The Italian satellites are expected to be operational by 2007

Pursuant to an agreement signed between France and Italy in January 2001 the Italian system will be linked to the French via Optical and Radar Federated Earth Observation (ORFEO) which will ensure interoperability and information sharing between the two systems France will also give Italy access to SPOT (Systegraveme Pour lrsquoObservation de la Terre) 5 and to Helios 2 imagery The Swedish National Space Board signed an agreement with the French Space Agency in April 2001 guaranteeing its participation in the civilian aspects of the program as well as providing access to some of the data The most recent additions to the Pleiades program in 2002 and 2003 are Spainrsquos defense RampD agency INTA and the civilian space agencies of Austria and Belgium all of which secured their industrial cooperation on Pleiades and the sharing of data acquired by the system The total non-French role on the Pleiades program however is not likely to exceed 15 per cent An information-sharing agreement between France and Germany is also expected

France also has its own limited airborne ground surveillance capabilities The On-Site Radar and Investigation Observation Helicopter (Helicoptre drsquoObservation Radar et drsquoInvestigation sur Zone or HORIZON) is a heliborne ground surveillance radar that operates in moving target indicator mode but not in a synthetic aperture radar mode Operational in the French army since 2002 the system consists of four radars mounted on AS-532 Cougar helicopters and two ground stations It provides ISR capabilities for the tactical and operational levels A similar system was sold to the Swiss army and Turkey has shown an interest Maritime ISR capabilities take the form of the Breguet Atlantic manned aircraft Additional manned aerial ISR is provided by Mirage F1-CR aircraft outfi tted with the Raphael Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) pod an infrared pod and the Stand-Off Reconnaissance Pod (Pod de REconnaissance STand Off or PRESTO) digital camera pod and by the navyrsquos Super Etendard 4 aircraft carrying a camera and infrared and radar pods In land ISR systems the Rapsodie ground radar system is under development with full operational capability expected in 2008ndash9

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

31

It will be interoperable with the SIR command and control system and with the ATLAS fi re control system

In addition France deploys four Boeing Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) E-3 aircraft delivered to the French air force between 1991 and 1992 In 1998 France began upgrading these aircraft to outfi t them with Boeingrsquos Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system and the new Radar System Improvement Program (RSIP) kit Upgrade of the fi rst aircraft was completed in 2005 and the other three will be completed by the end of 2006 The ESM system provides the E-3 with passive listening and detection capabilities which enable it to detect identify and track electronic transmissions from ground airborne and maritime sources The RSIP kit will improve the aircraftrsquos ability to detect and track smaller targets

France has also taken the European lead with respect to surveillance and reconnaissance UAVs Some like the 12 Crecerelle (Kestrel) TUAVs operational with the artillery corps and the four Hunter MALE UAVs tested by the air force have been operational for many years and are approaching the end of their lifetimes The Hunter UAV is a version co-developed by Israeli Aircraft Industries and EADS The Crecerelle has been deployed by the army since 1995 and has been successfully used as part of French NATO operations in the Balkans A communications-jamming version is also in service Each Crecerelle is outfi tted with a TV camera and optical and infrared sensors and the systems were fully operational until 2004

Other TUAVs continue to be operational The army has 54 CL-289 UAVs for tactical reconnaissance missions at the corps and division levels Co-developed with Germany and Canada and successfully deployed in the Balkans it has been operational since 1993 Its payload was initially limited to black and white cameras and infrared sensors but it has been upgraded to include a synthetic aperture radar and its fl ight software and navigation system have also been improved A separate program known as Reconnaissance Vehicle Programming Interpreting and Displaying (Programmation Interpreacutetation Visualisation drsquoEngins de Reconnaissance or PIVER) was undertaken to develop ground stations for this program In addition the French army is purchasing man-portable mini-UAVs for very close range reconnaissance and surveillance These include several Pointer hand-launched UAV systems similar to those in use with the US army marines and special forces which received an export license by the United States in 2001 and the DRAC (Drone de Reconnaissance Au Contact or Drone for Reconnaissance Upon Contact) of which 160 systems (consisting of two UAVs each) are being procured

For its future MALE missions the air force is fi eld-testing the Eagle-1 system as part of the Intermediary MALE Drone System (Systegraveme Inteacuterimaire de Drone MALE or SIDM) This UAV system is based on the Heron UAV produced by Israeli Aircraft Industries modifi ed by EADS Several of these systems are currently being tested with air vehicles carrying synthetic aperture radar moving target indicator radar TV cameras Forward-Looking Infrared (FLIR) and a satellite data link

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

32

The French air force has also begun work on the next generation of MALE UAVs under project EuroMALE planned for deployment between 2008 and 2010 In May 2002 the Netherlands air force announced that it would collaborate on EuroMALE and by 2004 Sweden Italy Switzerland the United Kingdom and Spain had also expressed their interest in joining Out of an estimated cost of 300 million euros the French Ministry of Defense will invest 75 million the rest will be contributed by other governments and industry

The French army is planning the next generation of tactical UAVs The armyrsquos Intermediary Tactical Drone System project (Systegraveme de Drone Tactique Intermediaire or SDTI) for the replacement of the Crecerelle UAVs began in February 2003 with the development of a UAV derived from the Safran Grouprsquos Sperwer The fi rst trial fl ights were undertaken in December 2003 Eighteen vehicles outfi tted with a black-and-white camera and an infrared sensor and four ground stations are expected and will be able to interoperate with the French ATLAS Martha and SICF C2 systems The system became fully operational in 2005

For longer-term needs the Multi-Collector Multi-Mission program (MultiCapteurs Multi Missions or MCMM) has been underway since September 2002 MCMM will provide for the armyrsquos TUAV needs beyond the year 2008 when the CL-289 and SDTI systems will go out of service In addition a tactical rotor-wing UAV built by ECT Industries of France is currently under development for the French navy The fi rst prototype of this project Helicopter Operated from Afar (Heacutelicoptegravere Teacuteleacuteopeacutereacute or HETEL) was fl own in December 2002 and trials began in 2005 Plans are also in place for the development of a long-endurance maritime UAV known as the Long Endurance On-Board Drone (Drone Embarqueacute Longue Endurance or DELE)

France has also begun to develop unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) with two major projects The fi rst outfi ts Sperwer B TUAVs with Israeli-made Spike ER (extended range) precision strike missiles First unveiled in the summer of 2005 this project is similar to the US success with armed Predator UAVs using Hellfi re missiles The second is RampD on a new UCAV Neuron to be operational by 2009 Led by Dassault Aviation which holds a 50 per cent share the program has drawn interest from several European governments and fi rms Alenia Aeronautica of Italy is the second largest industrial partner with a 22 per cent stake In addition EADS CASA of Spain Saab of Sweden Greecersquos Hellenic Aerospace Industry and Switzerlandrsquos RUAG have all signed on as partners and further government-to-government agreements are likely The French Ministry of Defense has set aside some 400 million euros for this program The use of NATO STANAGs in choosing the datalink will ensure its interoperability with other alliance ISR systems using the same standard

To manage mission and support data from geographical and intelligence sources and databases France has deployed the Multi-Source Interpretation Assistance System (Systegraveme drsquoAide agrave Interpreacutetation Multicapteur ndash SAIM) This imagery intelligence analysis system uses data fusion techniques to create an all-digital

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

33

image chain for imagery from sensors (satellites air sea and ground radars) and has some interoperability with national and allied intelligence systems It is in service with the French air force army and navy and was used during recent confl icts and multinational exercises where it proved its interoperability with the Canadian observation satellite Radarsat-1 the US JSTARS system and the French HORIZON system A separate system TIPI3D exists for the exploitation of available imagery for special operations and missile targeting TIPI3D two of which are deployed translates imagery into 3D graphic models

In addition France possesses a number of collection and analysis capabilities for other types of intelligence Airborne SIGINT gathering and analysis capabilities (for both communications and electronic intelligence) have existed since the 1980s Two Gabriel systems mounted on C-160 transport aircraft are currently deployed More recently airborne SIGINT capabilities have been upgraded with the introduction of the Airborne Electronic Warfare Information Collection System (Systegraveme Aeacuteroporteacute de Recueil drsquoInformations de Guerre Electronique or SARIGUE) in 2001 Currently one such system carried by a DC-8 airplane is known to be operational

The French armed forces also deploy terrestrial and naval SIGINT and electronic warfare capabilities The French army deploys the Forward Electronic Warfare System (Systegraveme de Guerre Electronique de lrsquoAvant or SGEA) as well as other mobile electronic warfare and SIGINT collection systems The French navy possesses several vessels carrying SIGINT equipment and deployed its newest one the Dupuy de Locircme under the Joint Forces Electromagnetic Research program (Moyen Interarmeacutees de Recherches Electromagneacutetiques or MINREM) in 2005

France has also deployed military space SIGINT systems since the 1990s Initially two micro-satellites Cerise (Cherry) and Clementine were piggybacked on each of the two Helios 1 satellites launched in 1995 and 1999 An additional signals interception system Euracom was also piggybacked on the fi rst Helios 1 satellite These systems which were intended mainly as pilot projects were complemented in late 2004 by a cluster of four Essaim (Swarm) micro-satellites specializing in COMINT These were piggybacked on the fi rst Helios 2 satellite and began their planned three years of operations in May 2005 Design of two satellites for the monitoring of radar communications from low orbit was initiated in early 2005 under the ELINT program A joint DGA-CNES demonstrator with some 170 million euros in funding the satellites will be in orbit around 2008ndash9 by which time France hopes to persuade other European governments to join in developing a fully operational intelligence collection capability in space

The DGA has initiated the design and production of a space based optical early warning system demonstrator the Preparatory Infrared Alert System (Systegraveme Preacuteparatoire Infra-Rouge pour lrsquoAlerte or SPIRALE) This 124 million euro demonstrator will be a complete system capable of collecting and analyzing infrared imagery against a land background in order to detect ballistic missiles as they are launched It could also be used for other operational missions such as monitoring of weapons proliferation SPIRALE will consist of two micro-

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mon

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llit

es

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

40

satellites to be launched in 2008 and a ground segment This project will be the fi rst space early warning system in Europe and may pave the way for a future European early warning space program

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom also has an extensive investment in C4ISR systems and the creation of sensor networks The UK has developed a program to integrate the British C2 and communications infrastructures into a single Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) DII will incorporate the Joint Operational Command System (JOCS) C2 system the Bowman communications system and other individual information systems into a single infrastructure Following a prequalifi cation stage during which four industry teams were invited by the Ministry of Defense to submit outline proposals in March 2005 a team led by EDS and including Fujitsu EADS General Dynamics and LogicaCMG was chosen The contract will be worth some pound3 billion over 10 years Initially DII will provide a fully networked and managed service to around 70000 desktops in Whitehall and in forward deployed headquarters around the world Delivery of the DII system is expected to begin around 2007

As part of the effort to implement the NEC doctrine the British Ministry of Defense is also making considerable investment in new sensors systems The largest and most recent ISR RampD and acquisition programs include the Watchkeeper UAV the Airborne Stand Off Radar (ASTOR) airborne battlefi eld surveillance system and the Soothsayer electronic warfare system In addition several sensor platforms already operational such as the Phoenix UAVs and the Jaguar and Tornado reconnaissance aircraft are being upgraded to include more advanced and integrated ISR suites

In addition the Ministry of Defense created the Network Integration Test and Experimentation organization (NITEworks) in partnership with industry in 2003 to provide an environment to assess and demonstrate the potential applications of the NEC concepts In industry the NITEworks partnership includes BAE Systems QinetiQ Alenia Marconi Systems (AMS) EDS UK Thales UK General Dynamics UK and Raytheon UK Key system integration and interoperability issues will be resolved through testing experimentation and evaluation of various NEC options Eventually NITEworks will identify opportunities for changes in defense RampD and procurement programs

In general the British have paid close attention to interoperability and networking with the United States and somewhat less with its EU partners On the other hand the recent British decision to participate in the EU Battlegroups with one British and a second British-Dutch group opens new possibilities for exploring interoperability in the EU context

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

41

Command and Control

The Royal Navy Royal Air Force and Army deploy separate C2 systems that are not for the most part interoperable Since 1995 the Army has deployed the Joint Operations Command Systems (JOCS) designed to pass information between the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) the Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ) the Joint Rapid Reaction Force (JRRF) headquarters and other headquarters of joint and potentially joint operations It thereby allows the PJHQ to maintain a joint operations picture of deployed forces comprising maritime land and air activities within certain areas The system is deployable and can operate over wide area network connections provided by the Ministry of Defense as well as a range of civilian infrastructures employing the appropriate cryptography JOCS is also synchronized with the US Global Command and Control System

Today JOCS has become the basis for defi ning and developing a more capable system the Joint Command System (JCS) Under JCS plans are in place to integrate the Armyrsquos C2 system with those of the other services ndash most importantly the Royal Navyrsquos Command Support System (CSS) and the Royal Air Forcersquos Command Control and Information System (CCIS) (described below) ndash using state-of-the-art commercial technologies under the Defense Information Infrastructure project

The Royal Air Force deploys the CCIS for aerial C2 and the Air Defense Ground Environment (ADGE) system for tactical control of air defense operations A deployable system for the support of RAF missions both in the United Kingdom and overseas the Collaborative System for Air Battlespace Management (CSABM) is currently under development it is expected to be fi elded by the year 2008 In addition the Backbone Air Command and Control System (BACCS) is currently under development as the British air defense system of the future although the design concept requires it to be fully interoperable with NATO air defense capabilities (the NATO Air Command and Control System will provide the core BACCS software and infrastructure on which the system capability will be based) BACCS is due to enter operational service with the RAF from 2009

The Royal Navy possesses the CSS which replaced the more outdated Fleet Operational Command System (FOCSLE) and provides C2 information to the Command Teams of ships submarines and the Royal Marines 3rd Commando Brigade The system supports situation awareness data message handling and several decision and planning aids for amphibious operations In addition the navy is currently working to install CEC systems on Type 45 destroyers and the Type 23 frigates This system will allow units to exchange radar information delivering a single composite and coherent air picture and allowing units to engage targets on the basis of information from other units In the future CEC may be extended to other air and land platforms but this is not envisioned before 2010 The Royal Navy has also installed the American Collaboration at Sea (CS) tactical maritime C2 system on several vessels This system uses leased bandwidth on commercial satellites (mainly INMARSAT) to transmit a common battlespace picture to all vessels and the naval headquarters to which it is linked

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

42

On the international level the United Kingdom is working with the United States Canada Australia and New Zealand to link their respective C2 systems via a coalition WAN and web server This collaborative program is being carried out in the Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) framework and will most likely be broadened to include France and Germany (discussed in the NATO chapter)

Communications and computers

The British Army currently fi elds Ptarmigan a tactical trunk network linking all headquarters in the fi eld The system was upgraded in early 2003 with the introduction of 30 vehicle-mounted units providing improved data access to mobile subscribers and enabling deployment independent of main Ptarmigan trunk networks Ptarmigan is interoperable with US and NATO forces through interfaces with specifi c systems Beginning in 2008 it will be replaced by Falcon a fully digital air-portable Falcon battlefi eld communications infrastructure Falcon will permit the transmission of data between army headquarters including real-time video and is planned to be interoperable with various NATO communications systems

The British began to deploy Bowman the next-generation tactical combat HFVHFUHF radio network for all British services in July 2003 This capability is being delivered incrementally and the initial capability (secure HFVHF voice and data) was accepted into service by the Ministry of Defense in March 2004 This new infrastructure replaces the 20-year-old Clansman system and the Headquarters infrastructure element of the Ptarmigan trunk communications system It provides Britain with an integrated network supporting digital voice and data for radio telephone intercom and tactical Internet information in a single system As part of the Command and Battlespace Management (Land) (CBM(L)) program ndash battlefi eld information systems being developed for armored fi ghting vehicles artillery fi re control air and nuclear biological and chemical defense ndash Bowman will be used as a communications and C2 infrastructure from fi ghting platform up to divisional level Full deployment is expected by 2006ndash7 when some 20000 military vehicles 156 ships and 276 aircraft will be outfi tted with more than 47000 radios and 26000 computer terminals In December 2004 some 300 Bowman radios were deployed with British forces in Iraq However Bowman will face bandwidth limitations as well as the problem of being digital but lacking a software communications architecture (SCA) Since this would make it hard to interoperate with the US Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) the US program is being adapted to enable it to handle the Bowman waveform

A fully transportable United Kingdom operational-level communications network ndash Cormorant ndash exists for expeditionary forces linking them back to head-quarters in Britain The Cormorant system is provided by EADS and is intended to meet the communications requirements of the United Kingdomrsquos JRRF headquarters in any theater of operations Cormorant can interface with Ptarmigan

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

43

and will be able to interface with its successor Falcon It will also be able to pass data to and from the Bowman network once Bowman is fully fi elded

Military satellite communications capabilities are currently based on the Skynet 4 constellation Two of the fi rst three satellites launched between 1988 and 1990 remain in service These support three newer spacecraft launched between 1998 and 2001 In October 2003 the British Ministry of Defense concluded arrangements to transfer operation of the Skynet 4 system to Paradigm Secure Communications a subsidiary of EADS Under this Private Finance Initiative (PFI) Paradigm was also to upgrade by 2005 the two main Skynet 4 ground stations and to supply new ground stations and a network control center in order to increase bandwidth and refresh technology Paradigm will also manage the leasing of commercial SATCOM bandwidth for the Ministry of Defense The arrangement which is to run until 2019 assures delivery for Ministry of Defense needs while permitting Paradigm to resell unused bandwidth to the governments and militaries of other nations under commercial terms To maintain services to the Ministry of Defense and to its other customers Paradigm will develop launch and operate two to three new satellites built by Astrium also an EADS subsidiary (De Selding 2003b 10) The fi rst of the new Skynet 5 satellites is expected to enter service in 2007 Both the existing and new Skynet satellites remain accessible via the Ministry of Defensersquos existing fl eet of terminals Higher bandwidths are possible with the new Talon (man-portable) and Dagger (vehicle-mounted) mobile terminals Some 50 new Reacher mobile land terminals will also be delivered under the Skynet 5 contract arrangements

The Royal Air Force and Navy have installed the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) Link-16 communications system on most aircraft and helicopters (including Tornado F3s Nimrods Sea Kings and E-3D AWACS) and on several vessels (including carriers frigates and destroyers) providing these and their US counterparts with a common air picture The Royal Navyrsquos Sea Harriers were outfi tted with Link-16 equipment in 2004 Many Royal Navy ships and RAF E-3D AWACS and Nimrods are also equipped with the Link-11 tactical data link system

Finally since interoperability with US forces is still a major concern for British warfi ghters the United Kingdom will most likely buy American JTRS radios and install them on various other aerial maritime and terrestrial platforms as an interim solution for current and upcoming coalition operations

Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance

Britain has initiated a program to fi ll capability gaps identifi ed in the Strategic Defense Reviewrsquos New Chapter in the area of persistent ISR collection and target acquisition deep within the battlespace The DABINETT program will provide information to be used to gather strategic operational and tactical intelligence answer commandersrsquo requests for information provide targeting information to systems in all environments support Special Forces and manage intelligence data The initial phase of the program will address current Management Tasking

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

44

Processing Exploitation and Dissemination (MTPED) shortfalls in the current UK system Once completed DABINETT will comprise a system of systems that provides access to archive data as well as the ability to collect persistently process and disseminate near real time intelligence This capability will offer rapid deployment long reach standoff deep penetration loiter and interoperability with coalition forces in network-based operations It will form an integral part of the British networked-enabled capability enabling precision geo-location for targeting including time sensitive targeting which will be delivered via a Network Centric Collaborative Targeting (NCCT) system Initial deployment is expected by the end of 2006

British UAV capabilities consist primarily of the Phoenix tactical short-range UAV in service since 1998 with the Royal Artillery for reconnaissance and target acquisition Though Phoenix cannot currently share the information it collects directly with other British systems improved data modems currently being developed could make it interoperable with Skynet 4 RAF Tornados and army Apaches However its performance recently tested in Kosovo and Iraq is somewhat limited even at the tactical level including an inability to operate in high-temperature environments a payload consisting solely of a thermal imaging sensor and a slow data link In both the Kosovo and Iraq campaigns these limitations led to the loss of a high number of Phoenix UAVs Twenty-three were lost in Iraq all due to technical failures ndash a ratio of one in six fl ights undertaken ndash and the program was restricted to nighttime operations However the Phoenix was involved in what was probably the fi rst joint close air support operation coordinated by a UAV mission controller it was able to relay imagery and geographical details on Iraqi tank movements to US fi ghters via its ground station (Chuter 2003a 8)

Watchkeeper the British long-endurance operational-level UAV program was completed with two consortia one led by Thales UK and the other by Northrop Grumman ISS International Inc The initial program requirement called for an A and B vehicle the former for battlefi eld surveillance targeting and bomb damage assessment and the latter for close-in surveillance and target identifi cation Following the selection of the Thales-led consortium in July 2004 it was announced that the Hermes 450 and Hermes 180 ndash manufactured by Elbit Systems of Israel ndash would be the A and B vehicles respectively However during contract negotiations in 2005 the smaller Hermes 180 was removed from the requirement and broader roles were assigned to the larger Hermes 450 Its payloads will include electro-optical sensors infrared sensors laser target designators synthetic aperture radar and moving target indicators The Watchkeeper in-service date was also pushed back to 2010 The system will be operated and deployed by the Royal Artillery Corps

To complement the Watchkeeper program the United Kingdom is collaborating with the United States to develop the Advanced Joint Communications Node (AJCN) Once integrated into Watchkeeper it will provide a communications and electronic warfare system that can be reprogrammed in fl ight Based on software radio technology the AJCN will be linked to the UAV ground stations via a

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

45

Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL) This will create a network comprising the different types of Watchkeeper UAVs and tactical radios ndash such as the American JTRS ndash that are also reprogrammable

In early 2004 pending Watchkeeper development the British Ministry of Defense began discussing an Urgent Operation Requirement (UOR) for another UAV system to be fi elded within a shorter timeframe and to be usable by British troops in Iraq The Ministry of Defense reviewed purchasing or leasing the Thales-IAI Hermes systems as well as several micro-UAV systems To date several Desert Hawk and one Buster micro-UAV system (comprising two vehicles and one ground control station) have been acquired and are deployed with British forces in Iraq for very short-range reconnaissance missions In addition the success of the British cooperation with the Combined Joint Predator Task Force in Iraq has led the Ministry of Defense to examine the possibilities of purchasing Predator B UAVs for operations in Afghanistan (Chuter 2005b 4)

In addition to the Urgent Operation Requirement and Watchkeeper the United Kingdom is exploring other future UAV initiatives The Joint Service UAV Experimentation Program (JUEP) was the fi rst step of this process In 2003ndash5 JUEP assessed the wider operational use of UAVs in the tri-service battle environment mainly for maritime and urban operations JUEP involved developing viable concepts of operations for UAVs and assessing the possibilities for exploiting new types of UAV payloads including those giving the vehicle offensive capabilities (Fiorenza 2003b 37ndash9) The program included a demonstration of the Eagle MALE UAV carrying a high defi nition synthetic aperture radar electro-optic and infrared sensors and laser target marking and designation systems It also demonstrated the capability to control a ScanEagle maritime surveillance UAV from a British warship to integrate a British RAPTOR ISR pod (see below) on an American Predator UAV and the utility of several mini-UAV systems Demonstrations of the Global Hawk HALE UAV system and of the use of UCAVs were also planned under JUEP but were not undertaken

The United Kingdom initially envisioned an unmanned combat aerial vehicle program as part of the Future Offensive Air System (FOAS) program However the FOAS was terminated in 2005 and UCAV research was made part of an international collaborative program the Strategic Unmanned Air Vehicle (Experiment) or SUAV(E) An agreement was signed in December 2004 with the United States to participate in the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) program focusing on Boeingrsquos X-45 UCAV However uncertainties about technology transfer and the location of production in the UK led the Ministry of Defense to look to Europe to fulfi ll some of its needs in this area The French-led Neuron program was considered but no decisions have been made on Britainrsquos participation in it (Chuter 2005a 1 8)

The United Kingdom also possesses unmanned underwater ISR capabilities with the deployment in 2002 of the Marlin Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) an electrically powered vehicle intended to be launched from a submarine torpedo tube It is fi tted with seabed imaging sensors but the design is modular and allowing for alternative future payloads

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

46

Britain also currently deploys several manned aerial ISR platforms including four Canberra PR-9 aircraft for photoreconnaissance missions and eighteen Nimrod MR2 maritime patrol aircraft Most Nimrods are equipped with magnetic and acoustic detection equipment (three are outfi tted for SIGINT collection missions) and are interoperable with US Rivet Joint aircraft An upgrade (Nimrod MRA4) will mean some are capable of both maritime and land surveillance missions The upgraded Nimrod aircraft are due to enter into service around 2006 at which point those that were not upgraded will be taken out of service

The Royal Air Forcersquos Jaguar and Tornado GR4 fi ghters provide additional ISR capabilities Since 2000 the Jaguars have been outfi tted with the Jaguar Replacement Reconnaissance Pod (JRRP) containing both electro-optic and infrared sensors that can record digital images onto videotape Several of the latter have been fi tted with the Reconnaissance Airborne Pod for Tornado (RAPTOR) operational since the fall of 2002 This new technology provides an electro-optical and infrared camera system that can capture high-resolution digital imagery day or night and transmit the data to ground stations in near real time It features on-board recording and near real time data link transmission to ground stations The system consists of eight pods and two cabin-based ground stations and has been in use since fall 2002 It made its operational debut during Operation Iraqi Freedom in early 2003 and performed extremely well

The United Kingdom is developing the Airborne Stand Off Radar (ASTOR) system for air-ground surveillance ASTOR will provide strategic long-range all-weather theater surveillance and target acquisition capabilities Raytheon the prime contractor for ASTOR is producing fi ve systems to be deployed on modifi ed Bombardier Global Express business jets as well as two portable ground sites and six tactical ground stations mounted on trucks The radar is a dual-mode system capable of operating in both synthetic aperture radar and moving target indicator mode The aircraft known as the Sentinel R Mk 1 are also outfi tted with operator workstations where the mission management and imagery can be processed and transmitted to the various brigade divisional or joint level ASTOR ground stations Initial deployment is expected to begin in 2006 with the delivery of the fi rst two fl ight-tested aircraft and their ground stations and full operational capability is expected in 2008 Data will be disseminated to allied forces via United Kingdom headquarters only and few direct links to allied systems are anticipated (though an interim solution for interoperability with the US JSTARS system may be through deploying JTRS on the ASTOR platform) ASTOR was the basis for one of the two proposed NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) solutions presented by British Aerospace and Raytheon an option rejected by NATO

In addition the United Kingdom deploys seven E-3D Sentry AEW-1 AWACS aircraft for air-picture management The Sentry aircraft are all equipped with the US JTIDS and are interoperable with US and NATO AWACS systems with Rivet Joint and E-P3 aircraft and with the British Nimrod aircraft Project Eagle currently in the assessment phase is intended to provide an air battle management and combat ID-enabling capability for the E-3D to coordinate air operations and

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

47

to direct forces during operations The in-service date defi ned as the fi rst platform fi tted with the Eagle capability is scheduled for June 2012

As of 2006 when the Canberra planes leave service the United Kingdom will have no assets that can loiter over the battlefi eld and deliver a constant stream of data for extended timeframes nor does the United Kingdom have a program to obtain such persistent surveillance capabilities The Ministry of Defense is considering various options including high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) UAVs satellites and manned platforms In 2004 the Tactical Optical Satellite (TOPSAT) earth observation micro-satellite led by Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd was initiated as part of a pilot program to demonstrate space-based ISR capabilities and their link to commanders on the ground via stationary as well as mobile ground stations The one-year program involved the launching of one 120 kg satellite capable of producing 25 meter resolution optical imagery The success of TOPSAT may lead to the launching of a constellation of satellites in the future

For future maritime surveillance the Maritime Airborne Surveillance and Control (MASC) program will provide an assured airborne surveillance and control capability The options being considered under MASC include the continuation of the capability currently provided by the Sea King Mk 7 Airborne Surveillance and Control (ASaC) system other ship-optimized rotary wing platforms and possible contributions from UAVs although the latter currently form only a peripheral component of the MASC activities The MASC program has recently moved into the assessment phase

The British intelligence analysis and dissemination systems in place include the RAFrsquos Lychgate system ndash which connects intelligence staffs at HQ RAF Strike Command the Ministry of Defense other services and front-line squadrons ndash and the intelligence communityrsquos web-based UKINTELWEB Neither is interoperable with allied systems However the United Kingdom is part of the Integrated Broadcast Service (IBS) network which uses commercial off the shelf (COTS) hardware to exchange information with the intelligence dissemination systems of the United States Canada and Australia In addition the Griffi n TCPIP-based WAN provides a classifi ed electronic information-sharing environment for collaborative planning activities between the strategic and operational level headquarters of Britain Canada Australia New Zealand and the United States In the future Germany and France may also be linked to Griffi n

Germany

The German military is beginning to move toward an advanced networked architecture and deploys a variety of C4ISR systems The German Ministry of Defense completed the formulation of its network-centric doctrine in 2005 and has begun the implementation of some of that doctrine in its acquisition and RampT programs However over the next decade previously planned hardware programs such as the Eurofi ghter Typhoon A400M transport Tiger and NH-90 helicopters will consume the lionrsquos share of German defense acquisition resources In

Tabl

e 3

3 U

nite

d K

ingd

om c

apab

ilit

ies

for

netw

ork-

base

d op

erat

ions

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

C2

Join

t Ope

rati

onal

C

omm

and

Sys

tem

(JO

CS

)S

trat

egic

- o

pera

tion

al-

and

tact

ical

-lev

el a

rmy

C2

syst

em

Lin

ks P

JHQ

JF

HQ

JR

RF

hea

dqua

rter

s

and

othe

r H

Qs

of jo

int

and

pote

ntia

lly

join

t op

erat

ions

wor

k is

un

derw

ay to

har

mon

ize

JOC

S w

ith

the

US

Glo

bal

Com

man

d an

d C

ontr

ol

Sys

tem

Com

man

d C

ontr

ol a

ndIn

form

atio

n S

yste

m

(CC

IS)

RA

F a

eria

l C2

syst

em

Air

Def

ense

Gro

und

Env

iron

men

t (A

DG

E)

Tact

ical

con

trol

of

air

defe

nse

oper

atio

ns

Com

man

d S

uppo

rt S

yste

m

(CS

S)

C2

for

Com

man

d Te

ams

of s

hips

sub

mar

ines

and

th

e R

oyal

Mar

ines

3rd

Com

man

do B

riga

de

Coo

pera

tive

Eng

agem

ent

Cap

abil

ity

(CE

C)

Nav

al a

ir-d

efen

se a

nd

fi re

con

trol

C2

syst

em

depl

oyed

on

seve

ral U

K

frig

ates

Inte

rope

rabl

e w

ith

US

sy

stem

Col

labo

rati

on a

t Sea

(C

S

)Ta

ctic

al m

arit

ime

C2

syst

emE

nabl

es in

tero

pera

bili

ty

wit

h U

S v

esse

ls

Join

t Com

man

d S

yste

m

(JC

S)

Inte

grat

ion

of th

e C

2 sy

stem

s of

all

thre

e se

rvic

es

All

3 s

ervi

ces

at n

atio

nal

leve

l

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

Col

labo

rativ

e S

yste

m

for A

ir B

attl

espa

ce

Man

agem

ent (

CS

AB

M)

Dep

loya

ble

syst

em to

su

ppor

t RA

F m

issi

on b

oth

in th

e U

nite

d K

ingd

om

and

over

seas

dep

loye

d by

200

8

Wil

l be

inte

rope

rabl

e w

ith

othe

r U

K s

yste

ms

Bac

kbon

e A

ir C

omm

and

and

Con

trol

Sys

tem

(B

AC

CS

)

Fut

ure

Air

Def

ense

C2

de

ploy

ed b

y 20

09F

ull i

nter

oper

abil

ity

wit

h N

AT

O a

ir d

efen

se s

yste

ms

Com

mun

icat

ions

and

C

ompu

ters

Pta

rmig

an

Tact

ical

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k co

mm

unic

atio

ns s

yste

m

for

arm

y H

Qs

in th

e fi

eld

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

wit

h so

me

US

and

NA

TO

sys

tem

s

Sky

net 4

MIL

SA

TC

OM

sys

tem

Ta

lon

(man

-por

tabl

e) a

nd

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ger

(veh

icle

-mou

nted

) m

obil

e sa

tell

ite

term

inal

s

Cor

mor

ant

Tra

nspo

rtab

le s

ecur

e te

leco

mm

unic

atio

nsne

twor

k li

nkin

g ta

sk f

orce

H

Q w

ith

UK

HQ

Lin

ked

to P

tarm

igan

and

B

owm

an u

nits

fi el

ded

by

JRF

F

Join

t Tac

tica

l Inf

orm

atio

n D

istr

ibut

ion

Sys

tem

(J

TID

S)

Lin

k-16

Inst

alle

d on

RA

F T

orna

do

F3s

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rods

Sea

Kin

gs

and

AW

AC

S a

nd o

n R

N c

arri

ers

fri

gate

s

dest

roye

rs a

nd S

ea

Har

rier

s

Ena

bles

com

mon

air

pi

ctur

e w

ith

US

air

craf

t an

d ve

ssel

s

cont

inue

dhellip

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

Bow

man

Tact

ical

com

bat r

adio

s ne

twor

k fo

r al

l ser

vice

s

fi rs

t uni

ts te

sted

Jul

y 20

03 f

ull d

eplo

ymen

t by

2006

ndash8

Inte

rope

rabl

e ac

ross

se

rvic

es (

any

mil

itar

y V

HF

rad

io)

only

in

unen

cryp

ted

mod

e p

artl

y in

tero

pera

ble

wit

h U

S

JTR

S

Sky

net 5

Fut

ure

MIL

SA

TC

OM

sy

stem

lea

sed

capa

city

fr

om 3

com

mer

cial

sa

tell

ites

ent

ry in

to

serv

ice

in 2

007

Falc

onF

utur

e (r

epla

cing

P

tarm

igan

) U

K-t

o-ca

mpa

ign

thea

ter

tact

ical

tr

unk

com

mun

icat

ions

sy

stem

pla

nned

for

de

ploy

men

t in

2008

Inte

rope

rabl

e w

ith

Bow

man

Cor

mor

ant

Sky

net 5

NA

TO

co

mm

unic

atio

ns s

yste

ms

ISR

Pho

enix

Tact

ical

targ

et a

cqui

siti

on

UA

V f

or th

e ar

my

(art

ille

ry c

orps

)

Lit

tle

inte

rope

rabi

lity

wit

h ot

her

syst

ems

pos

sibl

e up

grad

es w

ill m

ake

it

inte

rope

rabl

e w

ith

Sky

net

4 an

d w

ith

RA

F T

orna

dos

and

arm

y A

pach

es

Des

ert H

awk

Bus

ter

Mic

ro-U

AV

sys

tem

s fo

r A

rmy

Sam

e as

thos

e de

ploy

ed

by U

S a

rmy

Mar

lin

UU

V

Tabl

e 3

3 co

ntin

ued

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

Can

berr

a ai

rcra

ftTa

ctic

al a

eria

l ph

otor

econ

nais

sanc

e

Nim

rod

Mar

itim

e S

ampR

and

S

IGIN

T a

ircr

aft

Inte

rope

rabl

e w

ith

US

AF

R

ivet

Joi

nt a

ircr

aft

Jagu

ar a

nd T

orna

do

fi gh

ters

Equ

ippe

d w

ith

JRR

P a

nd

RA

PT

OR

IS

R p

ods

E-3

D S

entr

y (A

WA

CS

)In

tero

pera

ble

wit

h U

S a

nd

NA

TO

AW

AC

S s

yste

ms

U

S R

ivet

Joi

nt a

nd E

-P3

airc

raft

and

Bri

tish

N

imro

d ai

rcra

ft

Lyc

hgat

eIn

tell

igen

ce a

naly

sis

syst

em f

or R

AF

Con

nect

s in

tell

igen

ce

staf

fs a

t HQ

RA

F S

trik

e C

omm

and

the

MO

D

othe

r se

rvic

es a

nd f

ront

li

ne s

quad

rons

UK

INT

ELW

EB

Web

-bas

ed in

tell

igen

ce

diss

emin

atio

n sy

stem

at

vari

ous

secu

rity

leve

ls i

n su

ppor

t of

the

inte

llig

ence

com

mun

ity

Bri

tish

inte

llig

ence

co

mm

unit

y on

ly n

ot

inte

rope

rabl

e w

ith

othe

r co

untr

ies

Inte

grat

ed B

road

cast

S

ervi

ce (

IBS

)In

tell

igen

ce d

ata

diss

emin

atio

n sy

stem

for

up

to T

op S

ecre

t mat

eria

l

Inte

rope

rabl

e w

ith

sim

ilar

sy

stem

s in

US

Can

ada

an

d A

ustr

alia

as

wel

l as

wit

h ot

her

Bri

tish

in

tell

igen

ce s

yste

ms

cont

inue

dhellip

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

GR

IFF

INT

CP

IP

-bas

ed W

AN

fo

r in

tell

igen

ce d

ata

shar

ing

betw

een

stra

tegi

c an

d op

erat

iona

l lev

el

head

quar

ters

Lin

ks U

nite

d K

ingd

om

Can

ada

Aus

tral

ia N

ew

Zea

land

and

US

in

the

futu

re G

erm

any

and

Fra

nce

wil

l als

o be

link

ed

Air

born

e S

tand

Off

Rad

ar

(AS

TO

R)

Str

ateg

ic lo

ng-r

ange

al

l-w

eath

er th

eate

r su

rvei

llan

ce a

nd ta

rget

ac

quis

itio

n ca

pabi

liti

es

begi

n de

ploy

men

t in

2005

May

be

inte

rope

rabl

e w

ith

US

JS

TAR

S

diss

emin

atio

n of

dat

a in

itia

lly

via

Uni

ted

Kin

gdom

onl

y

Tact

ical

Opt

ical

Sat

elli

te

(TO

PS

AT

)S

ampR

mic

ro-s

atel

lite

for

re

mot

e se

nsin

g la

unch

pl

anne

d fo

r 20

03ndash4

Wat

chke

eper

Fut

ure

oper

atio

ns-l

evel

U

AV

to

be d

eplo

yed

in

2006

A T

CD

L w

ill e

nabl

e in

tero

pera

bili

ty b

etw

een

the

two

type

s of

W

atch

keep

er U

AV

s

Join

t Ser

vice

UA

V

Exp

erim

enta

tion

Pro

gram

(J

UE

P)

Wid

er o

pera

tion

al u

se

(inc

ludi

ng w

eapo

niza

tion

) of

UA

Vs

in th

e tr

i-se

rvic

e ba

ttle

env

iron

men

t

May

als

o in

clud

e de

mon

stra

tion

of

Glo

bal

Haw

k H

AL

E U

AV

Mar

itim

e A

irbo

rne

Sur

veil

lanc

e an

d C

ontr

ol

(MA

SC

)

Fut

ure

airb

orne

mar

itim

e su

rvei

llan

ce p

rogr

am

Tabl

e 3

3 co

ntin

ued

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

53

addition Germanyrsquos defense RampD spending has been declining a trend expected to continue through 2010 (Aguumlera 2003 32) Both of these budgetary realities will affect the pace at which Germany develops networked C4ISR capabilities Nevertheless several large-scale C4ISR expenditures are expected the most signifi cant being new C2 and computer networking programs a HALE UAV and advanced communications systems (CPM Forum 2005 33)

German forces do not have a cross-service C2 architecture nor have broadband communications systems been widely deployed Germany has begun embracing the use of UAVs especially since the Balkan and Afghanistan campaigns The German military is currently equipped with several UAVs for tactical and operational missions and funding for a major UAV program the HALE EuroHawk has been approved Once the fi rst UAV comes into service in 2009 outdated manned platforms for ISR will gradually be scrapped and Germany will become increasingly reliant on unmanned ISR capabilities

Germany has been a member of the bi-national German-Netherlands Corps since 1995 Between 2000 and 2002 the Corps became a NATO High Response Force under operational command of SACEUR This Corps has more advanced C4ISR capabilities including the German HEROS C2 system the Dutch TITAAN communications infrastructure (VoIP WAN with SATCOM and HF radio) and French-made tactical Sperwer UAVs Germany is also a member of the Multinational Interoperability Council and will contribute to four of the European Unionrsquos Battlegroups one with France Belgium and Luxembourg one with the Netherlands and Finland one with Austria and the Czech Republic and one with Poland Slovakia Latvia and Lithuania

Command and control

The Bundeswehr C2 systems serve the individual services but lack a common infrastructure The German army is beginning to deploy the HEROS (Heeres-Fuumlhrungsinformationssystem fuumlr die rechnerunterstuumltzte Operationsfuumlhrung in Staumlben or Army Command and Control System for Digitally-supported Command of Operations in Staffs) system that provides C2 for corps division and brigade levels HEROS is an IP-network-based infrastructure for data transmission and can be fi xed or mobile It has been fi elded in one army division with a second still to be fi elded HEROS is also deployed with EUROKORPS and with the German-Netherlands Corps

For battalion-level C2 and below the German army operates the FAUST (Fuumlhrungsausstattung taktisch or Tactical Command Provision) system which includes mobile modules mounted on armored personnel carriers Initially fi elded only in small numbers with German forces in Bosnia Kosovo and Afghanistan FAUST is now being deployed across the German army (Quast 2003 66ndash7) The system is mounted on various command reconnaissance and support vehicles at the platoon squad and section level In addition the armyrsquos tanks and armored vehicles designated for overseas deployment are outfi tted with the Mobile Command and Control System (MCCS) MCCS hardware is based on a

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

54

COTS notebook with integrated communication interfaces GPS and compass unit as well as C2 software developed by STN Atlas (now Rheinmetall Defence Electronics) Several such systems are operational with the German forces in Kosovo and Afghanistan

The German navy uses a C2 system called MHQ (marine headquarters) This IBM mainframe-based infrastructure links all headquarters into a single network In addition all ships in the German navy use the Maritime Command and Control Information System (MCCIS) and the CS tactical C2 system purchased from the United States This enables all German navy vessels to be fully linked between each other and with their various headquarters as well as interoperable with many ships in the US navy

The German air force uses the Eifel C2 system an IP-based infrastructure that has been upgraded to incorporate the whole service (the system is also known as the GAFCCIS ndash German Air Force Command and Control Information System) Other C2 networks that are unique to specifi c units of the German armed forces include the artillery corpsrsquo ADLER (Artillerie- Daten- Lage- und Einsatz-Rechnungsverbund or Integrated Artillery Computer System) and the air defense systemsrsquo Hfl aAFuumlSys (Heeres-Flugabwehr- Aufklaumlrungs- und Fuumlhrungssystemor Army Air Defense Surveillance andd Command System) Finally the armed forces command is linked to the German Ministry of Defense via Rubin an IP-based stationary system for high-level C2

The German army is planning to deploy a more network-oriented C2 infrastructure Known as FuumlInfoSys H (Fuumlhrungsinformationssystem des Heeresor Army Command System or Army Command System) this system will integrate the FAUST and HEROS systems which are not interoperable today Initial testing is scheduled for 2008 Other efforts to upgrade German C2 capabilities include development of the next generation of air defense system through the Surface-Air-Missile Operations Center (SAMOC) project expected to be operational by the end of 2004 A C2 system integrating all services is planned through the project known as FuumlInfoSys der Streitkraumlfte or C2 System of the Armed Forces This project still in its initial stages will eventually integrate the Rubin HEROS FuumlInfoSys H GAFCCIS MHQ and MCCIS systems and connect all military staffs

In 2001 the German Ministry of Defense began to create a common C2 system for the armed forces of the Baltic States (Latvia Lithuania and Estonia) that would be interoperable with Germanyrsquos C2 systems and comply with NATO STANAGs Known as BALTCCIS the project is managed by the German air force in collaboration with BAE Systems and is still in the development stage

Communications and computers

The main tactical communications infrastructure of the German army is the digital Automated Corps Network (Automatisiertes Korpsstammnetz 90 or AUTOKO-90) built by Siemens and deployed since 2000 This network can deliver only limited bandwidth cannot handle IP traffi c and uses EUROCOM a

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

55

communications standard developed in Western Europe in the 1970s as an effort to make all tactical military communications systems interoperable but not widely deployed outside Germany As a complement to AUTOKO-90 the army has added the BIGSTAF (Breitbandiges integriertes Gefechtsstand-Fernmeldesystem or Integrated Broadband System for Command Posts Communications) system to its communications infrastructure Built using Thales and EADS IP and ATM technologies BIGSTAF provides broadband communications (voice and data) for command posts at brigade division and corps levels However BIGSTAF also uses EUROCOM and is therefore not interoperable with most other systems In an effort to move away from EUROCOM Germany has initiated the 420 million euro MobKommSysBw (Mobiles Kommunikationssystem der Bundeswehr or Armed Forces Mobile Communications System) project to develop the Bundeswehrrsquos future mobile communications network Together with the SATCOM-BW network (see below) it will link all fi eld radio communications systems in theaters of operations with communications bases in Germany Service introduction will start in 2007

The German navy has deployed its own communications network the IP-based Tactical Mobile Radio Network on all vessels In addition many navy ships are outfi tted with Link-11 ndash soon to be replaced by Link-22 systems ndash and other communications equipment that were a quick method to achieve interoperability with the US navy The German air force has deployed AutoFuuml (Automatisches Fuumlhrungsfernmeldenetz der Luftwaffe or Air Force Automatic Command Communications Network) a communications infrastructure on all its bases This system is also IP-based with medium bandwidth capabilities For tactical communications some of the Luftwaffersquos Tornados and NH-90 helicopters carry or are being outfi tted with the Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) which will be carried on all 180 new Eurofi ghters The German navy has also equipped two Class 123 frigates with MIDS systems As a partner in the MIDS JTRS program Germany is helping migrate MIDS to a JTRS software communications compliant architecture In addition the German Ministry of Defense has awarded Rohde amp Schwarz a 170 million euro contract for a joint networked family of Software Defi ned Radio (SDR) systems These radios will be fully JTRS and SCA compliant and will be introduced into service in 2009

A cross-service digital communications network the ISDN-BW has been deployed since the mid-1990s carrying voice and data to all central commands The navy and air force have both successfully integrated their own communications infrastructures with ISDN-BW but the army integration is incomplete

To link expeditionary forces with allied forces the local telecommunications infra-structure and headquarters Germany initiated a program known as Interoperability for Crisis Reaction Forces (Krisenreaktionskraumlfte-Interoperabilitaumlt or KINTOP) It involved the development and acquisition of mobile communications gateways based on the TETRAPOL (TErrestrial Trunked RAdio POLice) standard The program was discontinued and the current communications solution for linking expeditionary forces with headquarters is the KommServer-BW a low-tech COTS

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

56

technology linking mobile communications systems such as tactical radios to fi xed communications networks

Germany is also undertaking a satellite communications program known as SATCOM-BW The fi rst phase of the project includes leasing C- and Ku-band capacity from commercial satellites and procuring 40 single- and multi-channel ground stations Expeditionary forces can deploy several relatively large mobile ground stations and communicate with one or both fi xed ground stations in Germany The second phase which is still in the planning stage will build and orbit one X-band and one UHF-band satellite both operated by the private sector Phase 2 is expected to begin in 2005 with at least one satellite in orbit by 2008 and progressive introduction continuing until 2013 Once completed Germanyrsquos expeditionary forces will be able to deploy a larger number of small mobile ground stations giving them more fl exibility and agility in the fi eld (Reder 2005 48ndash9)

Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance

Germany is reassessing its ISR capabilities and planning future research and procurement The major issues are the replacement of the Breguet Atlantic fl eet for maritime patrol the acquisition of land-based ISR assets and the development of an unmanned aerial battlefi eld surveillance capability

Germany is making signifi cant use of UAVs given the expertise in this technology to be found in German industry For tactical reconnaissance and target acquisition missions at the corps and division level the German army uses CL-289 UAVs a tri-national project between France Germany and Canada equipped with a camera and infrared sensor The system has been used successfully in the Balkans since 1993 and has been upgraded recently to improve the on-board navigation system and fl ight software and to enable the outfi tting of the UAV with a SAR payload The Germans use the KZO (Kleinfl uggeraumlt fuumlr Zielortungor Small Device for Target Acquisition) for shorter-range reconnaissance which carries infrared and SAR or laser range fi nder and target designator payloads Six such systems each consisting of ten aircraft are in service Rheinmetall DeTec the manufacturers of the KZO system are making it interoperable with the Safran Grouprsquos Crecerelle and Sperwer UAVs currently in use by France the Netherlands Denmark Sweden and Greece The armed forces of these six countries will in the future be able to exchange tactical and battlefi eld intelligence and target data collected by all of their systems and will have access to a common command and control infrastructure

The German armyrsquos LUNA (Luftgestuumltzte Nahaufklaumlrungsausstattung or Airborne Close-range Reconnaissance System) tactical UAV initially designed for the artillery corps has been fl own over Kosovo ndash carrying video cameras only ndash and in Afghanistan ndash carrying infrared and video cameras as well as SAR Eight systems have been procured It can also be outfi tted with a miniature SAR system and used for NBC detection and electronic warfare missions The hand-launched ALADIN (Abbildende Luftgestuumltzte Aufklaumlrungsdrohne im Naumlchstbereich or Imaging Airborne Close-Range Reconnaissance Drone) mini-UAV which carries

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

57

television and infrared was successfully deployed in Afghanistan and some 155 systems each consisting of two aircraft have been ordered

Germanyrsquos army and navy also deploy manned airborne ISR capabilities including reconnaissance pods fi tted onto Germanyrsquos Tornado aircraft outfi tted with a camera and infrared system The Breguet Atlantic 1150 fl eet performs maritime ISR missions using 11 aircraft carrying MTIs sonars and magnetic detectors and 4 aircraft carrying SIGINT and electronic warfare suites The fl eet has been operational since 1965 Although the aircraft have experienced several upgrades they are scheduled for replacement in 2010 A project to develop the next generation of maritime patrol aircraft initially to be conducted with the Italian armed forces was cancelled Instead Germany is moving toward long endurance unmanned platforms For maritime missions these may consist of UAVs deployed by the German navy on their new corvettes with Northrop Grummanrsquos Fire Scout and Bell Helicopter Textronrsquos Eagle Eye as possible alternatives In the interim Germany bought eight upgraded PC-3 aircraft from the Netherlands in late 2004

For ground-based ISR the German army began deploying the Fennek vehicle in 2004 produced by Krauss-Maffei Wegmann of Germany and SP Aerospace and Vehicle Systems BV of the Netherlands The Fennek is equipped with a sensor platform that includes a camera a thermal imager and a laser rangefi nder co-developed by EADS and Rheinmetall Defence Electronics and the HRM-7000 tactical radio produced by EADS Maritime ISR capabilities include three OsteClass 423 ships that have been deployed since the late 1980s for SIGINT and electronic warfare missions

Germany has several future ISR programs underway The lesson of the Kosovo air campaign was that Germany could not rely on timely sharing of imagery intelligence data from the United States and hence needed to acquire its own intelligence-gathering capability The most important result of this decision is the plan to buy fi ve Global Hawk HALE UAVs from Northrop Grumman and working with EADS install German synthetic aperture radar and signals intelligence collection and analysis suites This 600 million euro project was initiated in 2000 and received the approval of the US air force and the German Ministry of Defense in 2001 A number of successful trial fl ights were conducted in California and Germany during 2003ndash4 and the fi rst prototype delivery is scheduled for 2009 All fi ve systems are expected to be delivered and operational by 2013 The C2 and the crypto technologies will be the same as those mounted on the Global Hawk making the EuroHawk interoperable with its US counterpart EuroHawk is also planned to be interoperable with other ISR capabilities of the German armed forces as well as with NATO EuroHawk UAVs will be the German contribution to the NATO AGS program

Germany is also investing in UCAV technology though the program is still at an early phase Initially known as Taifun (Typhoon) and recently re-named the Tactical Advanced ReconnaissanceStrike System (TADRES) it is being designed to carry an electro-optic sensor for target identifi cation and a synthetic aperture radar for target acquisition Development will continue until 2009 when

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

58

a procurement decision will be made In addition the German army is formulating requirements for micro-UAVs

German security space observation capabilities are also an important development also infl uenced by the Kosovo data-sharing issue The leading program is SAR-Lupe a satellite-based synthetic aperture radar to be deployed by 2007 SAR-Lupe will consist of fi ve Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites the fi rst to be launched in 2006 and a ground segment Total cost of the project is approximately 300 million euros A European consortium led by OHB Systems of Germany is undertaking the project Once SAR-Lupe is operational Germany plans to exchange the data it provides with data collected from the French Helios 2 and Pleiades and the Italian COSMO-Skymed satellites The German Space Agency and EADS Astrium are also working on a commercial synthetic aperture radar satellite named TerraSAR-X which will begin providing image products with a resolution of up to one meter in mid-2006

Intelligence collected from Germanyrsquos surveillance and reconnaissance assets is disseminated to warfi ghters in several ways The German army uses is the LBAA-BW (Luftbild-Auswerteanlage der Bundeswehr or Aerial Picture Analysis Station for the Armed Forces) system designed for the exploitation of intelligence (still images and fi lm) collected by manned or unmanned aerial reconnaissance systems It can be deployed in both stationary and mobile (vehicle-mounted) stations Originally designed for the CL-289 tactical UAV it has been in operation since 1991 An extension program was launched in 1999 to upgrade the system to a common aerial image exploitation station The LBAA-BW can work with imagery collected by CL-289 UAVs as well as by Tornado and Breguet Atlantic aircraft More than 50 units have been deployed In 2007 the GAST (GemeinsamesAuswerte-System or Common Analysis System) project begun in 2003 will create a common system for the dissemination of all intelligence collected via technical means through a single database

Italy

Italy is moving at a slower pace toward a network-oriented defense strategy deployment of advanced C4ISR systems and inter-service interoperability Much of the countryrsquos defense budget over the next few years will be spent on weapons platforms most notably 121 Eurofi ghter aircraft Much-needed C4ISR assets such as early warning aircraft and MIDS data links for aircraft may not be purchased in the near term

ItalianndashUS industrial collaboration is seen as one way of advancing the deployment of network-based capabilities and achieving interoperability with the United States Italy is prepared to buy US technologies as interim solutions to operational problems as seen in the recent procurement of four Predator UAV systems and several Link-16 terminals and in the interest shown in the US Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) project Some Italian defense policymakers have argued that American C4ISR standards will lead the way and that Italy should work toward those standards For now Italy intends to ensure that all

Tabl

e 3

4 G

erm

an c

apab

ilit

ies

for

netw

ork-

base

d op

erat

ions

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

C2

Hee

res-

Fuumlh

rung

sinf

orm

atio

ns-

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em f

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ie

rech

neru

nter

stuumlt

zte

Ope

rati

onsf

uumlhru

ng in

S

taumlbe

n (H

ER

OS

)

Cor

ps-

div

isio

n- a

nd

brig

ade-

leve

l C2

syst

em

incl

udes

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ile

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ents

Als

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ploy

ed w

ith

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RO

KO

RP

S a

nd th

e G

erm

an-D

utch

Cor

ps

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tung

takt

isch

(FA

US

T)

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imen

t-le

vel a

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stem

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lude

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e A

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veh

icle

-ba

sed

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ents

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ile

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man

d an

d C

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ol S

yste

m (

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2 sy

stem

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igna

ted

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loym

ent

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ine

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rter

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ime

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d C

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ol

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rmat

ion

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tem

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t S

ea (

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ical

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al C

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stem

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ncl

link

s to

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s)C

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bles

in

tero

pera

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ty w

ith

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S s

hips

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man

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ce

Com

man

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d C

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tem

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ce C

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stem

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ps C

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Air

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ntin

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loye

d to

day

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d by

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loye

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ter

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lity

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l C2

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Sur

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r (S

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h N

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se in

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ER

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l req

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Tabl

e 3

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loye

d to

day

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loye

d by

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loye

d af

ter

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rope

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rnad

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nd N

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rope

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ork

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al

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r-B

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ased

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y fo

rces

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-BW

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se 1

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capa

city

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nkin

g ex

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tion

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es b

ack

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Qs

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OM

-BW

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se 2

2 ne

w s

atel

lite

s fi

rst o

ne

in o

rbit

by

2008

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Kom

mS

ysB

wB

unde

sweh

rrsquos

futu

re

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ile

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mun

icat

ions

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twor

k li

nkin

g al

l fi e

ld

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o co

mm

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atio

ns

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ems

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e va

riou

s th

eate

rs o

f op

erat

ions

wit

h co

mm

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atio

ns b

ases

in

Ger

man

yco

ntin

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Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

ISR

CL

-289

Ta

ctic

al c

orps

- an

d di

visi

on-l

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rec

on a

nd

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et a

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siti

on U

AV

pa

yloa

ds in

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e co

lor

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amer

as a

nd S

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ge U

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h IR

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r la

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nder

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et

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gnat

or p

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ads

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gram

is u

nder

way

to

mak

e K

ZO

TA

DR

ES

and

F

renc

h C

rece

rell

e (a

lso

used

by

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herl

ands

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enm

ark

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eden

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reec

e) in

tero

pera

ble

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ery

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nge

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i-U

AV

wit

h co

lor

and

IR

cam

eras

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loye

d in

Afg

hani

stan

LU

NA

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ium

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ge U

AV

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yloa

ds in

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e co

lor

and

IR c

amer

a m

ini-

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R

NB

C d

etec

tors

and

EW

su

ite

Dep

loye

d in

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kans

and

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fgha

nist

an

Bre

guet

Atl

anti

c 11

50M

anne

d ai

rcra

ft f

or

mar

itim

e S

ampR

and

S

IGIN

TE

W m

issi

ons

Fen

nek

ISR

veh

icle

Sim

ilar

veh

icle

s de

ploy

ed

by R

oyal

Net

herl

ands

A

rmy

Tabl

e 3

4 co

ntin

ued

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

Ost

e S

IGIN

T a

nd E

W s

hips

Luf

tbil

d-A

usw

erte

anla

gede

r B

unde

sweh

r (L

BA

A-

BW

)

Com

mon

aer

ial i

mag

e ex

ploi

tati

on s

tati

on f

or a

ll

Ger

man

def

ense

for

ces

Exp

loit

s im

ages

fro

m C

L-

289

nav

y To

rnad

os a

nd

Bre

guet

Atl

anti

c ai

rcra

ft

Tact

ical

Adv

ance

d R

econ

nais

sanc

eS

trik

e S

yste

m (

TAD

RE

S)

UC

AV

pro

gram

(fo

rmer

ly

know

n as

Tai

fun)

wit

h ta

rget

iden

tifi

cati

on a

nd

enga

gem

ent c

apab

ilit

ies

in

itia

l dep

loym

ent

expe

cted

in 2

009

Pro

gram

is u

nder

way

to

mak

e K

ZO

TA

DR

ES

and

F

renc

h C

rece

rell

e (a

lso

used

by

Net

herl

ands

D

enm

ark

Sw

eden

G

reec

e) in

tero

pera

ble

Eur

oHaw

kH

AL

E U

AV

sys

tem

w

ill i

nclu

de in

tell

igen

ce

coll

ecti

ng a

nd p

roce

ssin

g ca

pabi

liti

es i

niti

al

depl

oym

ent i

n 20

09

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

wit

h di

ffer

ent I

SR

sys

tem

s of

th

e G

erm

an a

rmed

for

ces

N

AT

O a

nd E

U is

pla

nned

as

wel

l as

wit

h U

S G

loba

l H

awk

SA

R-L

upe

5 L

EO

sat

elli

tes

and

a gr

ound

seg

men

t in

itia

l op

erat

iona

l cap

abil

ity

in

2007

Ger

man

y w

ill h

ave

acce

ss

to I

taly

rsquos C

OS

MO

and

F

ranc

ersquos

Hel

ios

2 im

ager

y in

exc

hang

e fo

r S

AR

-Lup

e im

ager

y

Gem

eins

ames

Aus

wer

te-

Sys

tem

(G

AS

T)

Com

mon

sys

tem

for

di

ssem

inat

ion

of a

ll

inte

llig

ence

col

lect

ed v

ia

tech

nica

l mea

ns

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

64

communications systems and information databases are compliant with NATO STANAGs while purchasing additional modules from the United States when these can solve specifi c interoperability needs especially for the navy and air force

Italy also seeks active participation in European RampD programs as a way to defi ne common European requirements and standards at an early stage as well as participation in such NATO programs as AGS and ACCS Italy has also begun deployment of UAV-based ISR capabilities Having developed independent capabilities in satellite communications Italy is also committed to greater intra-European cooperation in the development of future space assets

Italian troops participate in the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force (SIAF) and have good interoperability with their Spanish counterparts In addition Italy will create one of the European Unionrsquos Battlegroups and participate in two others one with Hungary and Slovenia the other with Spain Greece and Portugal It remains to be seen how interoperability issues will be addressed in the latter two Battlegroups

Command and control

Each of Italyrsquos services has its own C2 The air force system is SICCAM (Sistema di Comando e Controllo dellrsquoAeronautica Militare or C2 System for Military Aviation) and the navyrsquos is Leonardo The army has the SIACCON (Systema Automatizzato di Commando e Controllo or Automated Command and Control System) which provides automated support for military units at corps division brigade and battalion level and is compliant with NATO STANAGs The SIACCON land system is fused with the air defense C2 system into a single network under the CATRIN (sistema CAmpale di TRasmissioni ed INformazionior Battlefi eld Information System) program as of July 2000 CATRIN is made up of three different functional subsystems The SORAO (sottosistema di SORveglianza e Acquisizione Obiettivi or Target Surveillance and Acquisition subsystem) subsystem controls ground surveillance and provides battlefi eld awareness target acquisition and information from meteorological and NBC sensors The SOATCC (SOttosistema di Trasmissione Integrate or Integrated Transmission Subsystem) subsystem is responsible for air surveillance and provides C2 over army air defense units and army aviation units The third subsystem SOTRIN (SOttosistema di Trasmissione Integrate or Integrated Transmission Subsystem) ensures the communication fl ow between the various command centers

The most important future C2 system will be the Command Control and Navigation System (Sistemi di Comando Controllo e Navigazione ndash SICCONA) a C2 system that will link all the armyrsquos armored vehicles and provide them with access to the existing SIACCON system Fifty units of the SICCONA system are expected to be deployed sometime in 2006ndash7

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

65

Communications and computers

Most of the communications systems deployed by the Italian armed forces were designed to meet NATO STANAGs Some Link-16 systems purchased from the United States have been installed on Tornado F3 aircraft and Italy is a partner in the MIDS consortium and the MIDS JTRS program In addition the Italian navy has installed Link-11 systems on several of its ships which will be replaced with Link-22 However the tactical digital communications infrastructure of the Italian armed forces is still in its early stages An intranet backbone for the Ministry of Defense called DIFENET based on fi ber optic links is currently under development A military digital information network (Rete Numerica Interforzendash RNI) is also under discussion

Italyrsquos terrestrial communications system is reinforced by the SICRAL (SistemaItaliano per Comunicazioni Riservate ed Allarmi or Italian System for Reserved Communications and Warning) military satellite communications system The fi rst satellite SICRAL 1A was launched in 2001 carrying the fi rst operational EHF communications capacity produced in Europe as well as SHF and UHF However SICRAL does not include onboard processing and therefore cannot be fully interoperable with US systems or compatible with recently approved NATO EHF STANAGs However SICRAL is interoperable with the British Skynet 4 and with most of the channels of the French Syracuse and the Spanish Hispasat systems The system includes over 100 fi xed and mobile terminals including several to be deployed on Italian fi ghter aircraft SICRAL 1B is scheduled to begin service in 2006 and once operational will contribute all of Italyrsquos NATO SATCOM commitments as well as serving as backup for SICRAL 1A It too has UHF SHF and EHF capability The constellation will have coverage from the United States to the Middle East for NATO use The next generation of satellites in this series SICRAL 2 is still being planned but is scheduled for launch around 2010 It will replace SICRAL 1A and is expected to include onboard SHF processing and frequency-hopping capabilities

Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance

Italyrsquos unmanned ISR capabilities are based largely on non-Italian technologies although eight domestically developed Mirach-26 and Mirach-150 tactical UAVs were introduced to the Italian army in 2002 Italy acquired four Predator MALE UAVs intended mainly for reconnaissance missions which became fully operational in 2005 In addition twenty CL-289 tactical UAVs were purchased from EADS in 2002 Italy also possesses manned ISR assets including eighteen Breguet Atlantic aircraft for maritime reconnaissance and one Alenia G-222VS aircraft for airborne SIGINT operations (the latter was used successfully in Kosovo but is scheduled to be replaced by two new C-130J aircraft in 2005 or 2006)

A battlefi eld surveillance system called CRESO (Complesso Radar Eliportato per la Sorveglianga or Combined Heliborne Surveillance Radar) is deployed

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

66

for operational and tactical missions The system carried onboard Agusta-Bell 412 helicopters includes a moving target indicator and forward-looking infrared sensor Four such systems are currently operational all designed to meet NATO STANAGs and to link with other systems via MIDS and the Italian SICRAL system In addition the Italian air force fl ies several Tornado fi ghter-bombers (ECR Electronic Combat Reconnaissance version) equipped with forward-looking infrared sensors and an infrared line scanner for reconnaissance missions

Italyrsquos space-based observation capabilities are in the advanced development stage Having participated in the French Helios 1 and Franco-German Horus satellite programs (the latter was discontinued in 1998) Italy is seeking independent earth observation capabilities Under the COSMO-Skymed project (COnstellation of Satellites for Mediterranean basin Observation) Italy will deploy a constellation of four radar-imaging satellites The X-band radar satellites would feature a SAR payload capable of less than one-meter resolution for the military and of approximately one-meter resolution for images sold commercially The COSMO-Skymed system is managed by the Italian Space Agency and Alenia Spazio is the prime contractor The Italian Ministry of Defense has committed funds to the project in exchange for 20 per cent of the satellitesrsquo viewing time COSMO-Skymed is expected to be fully deployed and operational by 2007 Once all satellites are in place the constellation will be able to take images of any location on the earthrsquos surface with a revisit time of 6ndash12 hours

As a result of an agreement signed between France and Italy in January 2001 COSMO-Skymed will be linked to the French Pleiades constellation via ORFEO a program designed to ensure interoperability and information sharing As part of this agreement Italy will receive access to SPOT 5 and to Helios 2 imagery from France Italy is also negotiating with Argentina regarding the possibility of integrating two Argentinian radar satellites into the COSMO-Skymed system

Future ISR capabilities were also expected through the Italo-German maritime patrol aircraft program This program now canceled would have provided Italy with 14 aircraft by the year 2010 It is currently unclear if Italy will continue with an independent program for the deployment of next-generation manned maritime ISR capabilities There has been talk of Italy joining the US MMA project or acquiring patrol aircraft made by ATR as well as leasing American P-3 Orion aircraft to replace the ageing fl eet of Atlantics jointly operated by the Italian navy and air force In addition Italy is a partner in the French-led Neuron UCAV program

The Netherlands

The Dutch armed forces place a high priority on C4ISR interoperability with NATO and all new Dutch equipment is required to be compatible with NATO STANAGs The armyrsquos C2 Support Center is also the core of a new NATO C2 Center of Excellence (see the NATO chapter) The Royal Netherlands Army Navy and Air Force are increasingly interoperable with each other and with other European services With recent upgrades to the ISIS and TITAAN projects the air

Tabl

e 3

5 It

alia

n ca

pabi

liti

es f

or n

etw

ork-

base

d op

erat

ions

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

C2

Sys

tem

a A

utom

atiz

zato

di

Com

man

do e

Con

trol

lo

(SIA

CC

ON

)

Arm

y C

2 sy

stem

Mee

ts N

AT

O S

TAN

AG

s

SIC

CA

MA

ir F

orce

C2

syst

em

LE

ON

AR

DO

Nav

y C

2 sy

stem

CA

TR

INA

rmy

and

air

defe

nse

C2

com

mun

icat

ion

and

inte

llig

ence

sys

tem

SIC

CO

NA

Inte

grat

ion

of a

ll C

2 sy

stem

s to

be

depl

oyed

by

2006

ndash7

Com

mun

icat

ions

and

co

mpu

ters

Lin

k-11

16

MID

SD

eplo

yed

on s

ever

al

airc

raft

and

shi

psL

inks

to a

llie

d L

ink-

111

6 sy

stem

s

DIF

EN

ET

MO

D in

tran

et b

ased

on

fi be

r op

tic

link

s

Sat

elli

te I

tali

ano

per

Com

unic

azio

ne R

iser

vate

(S

ICR

AL

1)

MIL

SA

TC

OM

sys

tem

Part

ly (

only

SH

F a

nd U

HF

ca

pabi

liti

es)

mee

ts N

AT

O

STA

NA

Gs

inte

rope

rabl

e w

ith

Sky

net 4

and

wit

h m

ost o

f th

e ch

anne

ls o

f th

e S

yrac

use

and

His

pasa

t sy

stem

s

cont

inue

dhellip

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

SIC

RA

L 2

Onb

oard

SH

F p

roce

ssin

g ca

pabi

lity

and

fre

quen

cy-

hopp

ing

prot

ocol

s

Com

pati

ble

wit

h N

AT

O

and

Sky

net 4

but

not

wit

h U

S

Ret

e N

umer

ica

Inte

rfor

ze

(RN

I)M

ilit

ary

digi

tal

info

rmat

ion

netw

ork

ISR

Mir

ach-

261

50Ta

ctic

al U

AV

s us

ed b

y ar

my

Pre

dato

rM

AL

E U

AV

s P

urch

ased

fro

m U

S

CL

-289

Tact

ical

UA

Vs

CR

ES

OH

elib

orne

SA

R s

yste

m f

or

oper

atio

nal a

nd ta

ctic

al

ISR

Mee

ts N

AT

O S

TAN

AG

s

link

s to

all

ied

syst

ems

via

MID

S a

nd S

ICR

AL

Torn

ado

EC

RF

LIR

sen

sor

and

IR

scan

ner

for

reco

n m

issi

ons

Hel

ios

1Ju

nior

par

tner

in F

renc

h op

tica

l sat

elli

te p

rogr

am

Bre

guet

Atl

anti

cM

arit

ime

ISR

Ale

nia

G-2

221

SIG

INT

air

craf

tU

sed

duri

ng th

e K

osov

o cr

isis

C-1

30J

SIG

INT

air

craf

t

CO

SM

O-S

kym

edC

onst

ella

tion

of

four

SA

R

sate

llit

esA

cces

s to

Fre

nch

Hel

ios

2 an

d G

erm

an S

AR

-Lup

e im

ager

y in

exc

hang

e fo

r C

OS

MO

imag

ery

Neu

ron

Part

ner

in F

renc

h-le

d U

CA

V p

rogr

am

Tabl

e 3

5 co

ntin

ued

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

69

force and army will share the same C2 system and communications infrastructure and the navy will link into it in the future

The Netherlands military cannot afford to acquire C4ISR across the full spec-trum of capabilities They have focused instead on several major high-technology programs such as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and Patriot anti-aircraft batteries and on ensuring that deployed C4ISR assets are built to NATO STANAGs Defense budget cuts for 2003 and 2004 put further in doubt the ability of the Netherlands military to carry out a full transformation of the armed forces In these two budget years the reduction in force element size targeted traditional platforms including the navyrsquos frigates which were reduced from 14 to 10 as well as in C4ISR assets such as maritime patrol aircraft all of which are being sold (De Wijk 2004 124ndash5)

The bi-national German-Netherlands Corps created in 1995 became a NATO High Readiness Force between 2000 and 2002 It is under operational command of SACEUR but can also carry out EU-led operations Its C4ISR assets include the German HEROS C2 system the Dutch ISIS battlefi eld awareness and TITAAN communications systems and French Sperwer tactical UAVs In addition the Netherlands will participate in two European Union Battlegroups one with Germany and the other with the United Kingdom

Following the NATO Prague summit the Netherlands army announced that it would build an Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) battalion that will be able to operate with other NATO allies In addition the TITAAN and ISIS systems were successfully deployed as part of the Dutch-led fourth NATO Response Force exercise (NRF-4) including battalion headquarters from Germany France Denmark and Norway

Command and control

The Netherlands has invested signifi cantly in state-of-the-art C2 systems For the Royal Netherlands Army and Air Force the most important of these is the ISIS (Integrated Staff Information System) for mobile headquarters from the brigade level up The program was initiated in 1996 and the latest version ISIS-3 became operational in early 2004 It provides commanders with an advanced PC-based situation awareness tool at the tactical level The Royal Netherlands Air Force the Belgian army and the GermanNetherlands High Readiness Forces Headquarters also have the ISIS system and it has been successfully deployed in Iraq Afghanistan and Liberia as well as with the Dutch contingent of the NRF

Other Dutch C2 programs include the armyrsquos OSIRIS Battlefi eld Management System (BMS) for lower command levels (battalion-level and below) the navy LCF frigates C2 systems the artillery corpsrsquo VUIST system the armyrsquos Advanced Fire Support Information System (AFSIS) for mortar teams at the battalion and brigade level and the armor corpsrsquo Target Information Command and Control System(TICCS) All are compliant with NATO STANAGs and in a short time all of the operational stand-alone C2 applications in use by the artillery will be brought under the AFSIS program However it is not yet clear that a full integration

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

70

of all C2 systems (navy air force and army) is planned Future programs currently being evaluated include C2 systems for logistics engineering and intelligence processes and for individual soldiers and vehicles as well as the interoperability of Dutch C2 systems with those of other nations

Communications and computers

The Dutch militaryrsquos digital communications infrastructure is the Netherlands Armed Forces Integrated Network (NAFIN) supplied by Nortel Networks Fully operational NAFIN supersedes the previous leased public line systems with a secure high-speed network linking more than 250 military installations in the land sea and air services

The Dutch army deploys a mobile tactical digital communications system Its backbone the ZODIAC (ZOne DIgital Automated and enCrypted Communication) system supplied by Thales Netherlands is based on the EUROCOM standard making it interoperable with a few NATO allies principally Germany The radios deployed are Single Channel Radio Access units by Thales Netherlands as well as HF EZB systems In addition the Royal Netherlands Air Force is currently in the process of procuring some 120 MIDS terminals for its F-16s and a few aircraft are already equipped with this technology

The new generation of military communications for the Royal Netherlands armed forces is the TITAAN (Theater Independent Tactical Army and Air Force Network) that brings together legacy and new systems into a converged network It provides the Netherlands army and air force with voice (via IP telephony) and video as well as network management and security In 2002 the army began replacing the ZODIAC system with the fi rst TITAAN modules In 2004 the air force began deploying the TITAAN system for mobile communications TITAAN will eventually also link to the navyrsquos communication network It has been used successfully in operations in Iraq Afghanistan and Liberia and deployed at the Land Component Command level and at the brigade and below levels as part of the Dutch-led fourth NATO Response Force exercise (NRF-4) There are plans to upgrade the TITAAN system to support tactical data links such as Link-11 and Link-16

In 2002 the Dutch Ministry of Defense launched the fi rst phase of its MILSATCOM program The German company ND Satcom was awarded a contract to deliver a turnkey SATCOM network to the Dutch armed forces consisting of one ground station with two C-band one Ku-band and one X-band terminal (plans for a second X-band terminal are being drafted) To date the project has allowed the Satellite Ground Segment at Lauwersmeer to interconnect with NAFIN the communications backbone of the Netherlands armed forces Two new Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) terminals should be operational by 2009 The Dutch have also offered to fi ll part of NATOrsquos future MILSATCOM needs through their system

Tabl

e 3

6 D

utch

cap

abil

itie

s fo

r ne

twor

k-ba

sed

oper

atio

ns

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

C2

Inte

grat

ed S

taff

In

form

atio

n S

yste

m (

ISIS

)A

rmy

and

air

forc

e m

obil

e he

adqu

arte

rs C

2 sy

stem

Mee

ts N

AT

O S

TAN

AG

s

OS

IRIS

Bat

tlefi

eld

M

anag

emen

t Sys

tem

(B

MS

)

Low

er a

rmy

com

man

d le

vels

(ba

ttal

ion

and

belo

w)

Mee

ts N

AT

O S

TAN

AG

s

LC

F f

riga

tes

C2

syst

ems

Nav

y C

2 sy

stem

Mee

ts N

AT

O S

TAN

AG

s

VU

IST

Art

ille

ry C

2 sy

stem

Mee

ts N

AT

O S

TAN

AG

s

Targ

et I

nfor

mat

ion

Com

man

d an

d C

ontr

ol

Sys

tem

(TIC

CS

)

Arm

or C

2 sy

stem

Mee

ts N

AT

O S

TAN

AG

s

Com

mun

icat

ions

and

C

ompu

ters

Net

herl

ands

Arm

ed

Forc

es I

nteg

rate

d N

etw

ork

(NA

FIN

)

Dig

ital

com

mun

icat

ions

in

fras

truc

ture

link

ing

all

thre

e se

rvic

es

ZO

DIA

CA

rmy

mob

ile

tact

ical

di

gita

l com

mun

icat

ions

in

fras

truc

ture

Inte

rope

rabl

e w

ith

thos

e N

AT

O f

orce

s us

ing

the

EU

RO

CO

M s

tand

ard

TIT

AA

N (

The

ater

In

depe

nden

t Tac

tica

l A

rmy

and

Air

For

ce

Net

wor

k)

Nex

t gen

erat

ion

VoI

P-

base

d ar

my

and

air

forc

e m

obil

e di

gita

l net

wor

k

wil

l eve

ntua

lly

repl

ace

ZO

DIA

C a

nd a

lso

be

depl

oyed

by

navy

CO

TS

-bas

ed

cont

inue

dhellip

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

MIL

SA

TC

OM

pro

gram

1 gr

ound

sta

tion

and

4

term

inal

s 2

AE

HF

te

rmin

als

to b

e ad

ded

by

2009

Con

nect

ed to

NA

FIN

ne

twor

k

ISR

Spe

rwer

Tact

ical

UA

Vs

used

fo

r S

ampR

and

targ

et

acqu

isit

ion

mis

sion

s

Sim

ilar

sys

tem

s ar

e de

ploy

ed b

y F

ranc

e

Den

mar

k S

wed

en G

reec

e

Fen

nek

Rec

onna

issa

nce

vehi

cle

wit

h ca

mer

a a

ther

mal

im

ager

and

a la

ser

rang

efi n

der

Co-

deve

lope

d w

ith

Ger

man

y

Squ

ire

Man

-por

tabl

e su

rvei

llan

ce

rada

rs fi

elde

d by

Roy

al

Net

herl

ands

Arm

y an

d M

arin

e C

orps

Eur

oMA

LE

Co-

deve

lope

d w

ith

Fra

nce

Tabl

e 3

6 co

ntin

ued

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

73

Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance

Dutch unmanned ISR capabilities expanded considerably with the procurement of 38 Sperwer UAVs from France Deployed since mid-2000 they are chiefl y used for tactical ISR and target acquisition missions The Dutch are also interested in UAV systems that can perform more elaborate missions and are collaborating with France in the development of EuroMALE (Chuter 2003b 4)

For ground-based ISR the Royal Netherlands Army began deploying the Fennek vehicle in 2004 Produced by Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW) of Germany and Dutch Defense Vehicle Systems of the Netherlands the Fennek is equipped with a sensor platform that includes a camera a thermal imager a laser rangefi nder and HRM-7000 tactical radios

For maritime reconnaissance the Netherlands navy has relied on its fl eet of thirteen Orion P-3C aircraft ten of whose ground surveillance capabilities have recently been upgraded The upgraded planes delivered in November 2003 possess new electronic support measures more advanced radar and acoustic sensors and improved mission systems The upgrades also make the P-3C aircraft more interoperable with those of the US navy However eight of these aircraft will be sold to Germany and the remainder to Portugal thereby eliminating a critical C4ISR element of the Dutch navy

Ground ISR capabilities include 62 recently acquired and deployed Squire man-portable surveillance radars for the Royal Netherlands Army and Marine Corps The radars provide MTI as well as bomb damage assessment capabilities

Spain

Spain has been slower to integrate cross-service C2 and communications infra-structures in its armed forces Army and air force C2 systems were fully deployed only recently SATCOM fi lls much of the militaryrsquos communications needs There is a limited budget for ISR systems for which Spain relies heavily on locally developed products (principally UAVs and SIGINT systems) Few of the Spanish systems are interoperable across services or internationally

Spain is however one of the few Western European countries to have signifi cantly increased its defense budget in recent years The 2004 increase of 45 per cent was focused on a 15-year modernization program which principally involves acquisition of major platforms such as the Eurofi ghter Typhoon A400M airlifter Leopard tank and Pizzaro infantry fi ghting vehicle Few large C4ISR procurement or RampD programs are expected in the near future

Spain has participated in coalition expeditionary operations through its membership in the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force (SIAF) created in 1997 SIAF is a bi-national amphibious force with Italy its fi rst exercise was in 1998 It is activated on call by common agreement and can be called on for Multinational Amphibious Task Force operations under NATO the EUrsquos European Marine Force (EUROMARFOR) or for national missions SIAF command rotates every 12 or 24 months between the two member nations Spain is also creating one

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

74

of the European Unionrsquos Battlegroups and will participate in another with Italy Greece and Portugal

Command and control

The main C2 system for the Spanish army is the Army Command and Control Information System (Sistema de Informacioacuten para Mando y Control del Ejeacutercito de Tierra ndash SIMACET) which provides a common battlefi eld picture for all command centers It covers all operational echelons from army corps division brigade and battalion and independent units (eg expeditionary forces groups of armored vehicles) The Aerial Command and Control System (Sistema de Mando y Control Aeacutereo ndash SIMCA) has been deployed by the Spanish air force since 2001 and is compliant with NATO standards There is no plan for the integration of the Spanish C2 system across services

Communications and computers

The Spanish tactical communications infrastructure consists of PR4G digital radios deployed through the ARGOS project There is little funding for further network integration of communications systems except for the procurement of several MIDS systems for aircraft and the upgrading of Link-11 systems to Link-22 on some ships Spain is also a partner in the MIDS JTRS program that will make its MIDS systems compliant with the JTRS waveforms

Military communications are carried through Hispasat civilian telecom-munications satellites and the XTAR-EUR X-band satellite Four Hispasat satellites are currently in orbit the most recent launched in 2002 However only the two oldest satellites launched in 1992 and 1993 carry military communications payloads The Hispasat system is compatible with Francersquos Syracuse 2 Britainrsquos Skynet 4 and the NATO 4 system The XTAR-EUR satellite operated since April 2005 by Space Systems Loral and Hisdesat is the worldrsquos fi rst satellite developed for commercial X-band services The Spanish Ministry of Defense is its fi rst customer It provides Spain with coverage from Eastern Brazil and the Atlantic Ocean across all of Europe Africa and the Middle East to South East Asia The satellite features on-board switching and multiple steerable beams allowing users access to X-band capacity The XTAR-EUR satellite will be accessible to all existing and future X-band terminals used by the United States and NATO

Future military satellite capabilities are under development through the Spainsat program (XTAR-LANT) undertaken by Hisdesat and Space Systems Loral This satellite will operate in the X-band and possess an anti-jamming system The Spanish Defense Ministry will lease fi ve of Spainsatrsquos thirteen transponders the rest are expected to be leased by the United States and other NATO allies The satellite will cover the region between the Middle East and the Midwestern United States and be fully operational in 2006 It will also be fully interoperable with all existing and future US and NATO X-band terminals

Tabl

e 3

7 S

pani

sh c

apab

ilit

ies

for

netw

ork-

base

d op

erat

ions

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

C2

Sis

tem

a de

Inf

orm

acioacute

n pa

ra M

ando

y C

ontr

ol

del E

jeacuterc

ito

de T

ierr

a (S

IMA

CE

T)

Com

mon

bat

tlefi

eld

pi

ctur

e fo

r al

l arm

y co

mm

and

cent

ers

in

clud

ing

mob

ile

ones

Sis

tem

a de

Man

do y

C

ontr

ol A

eacutereo

(S

IMC

A)

Air

for

ce C

2 sy

stem

Com

plie

s w

ith

NA

TO

S

TAN

AG

s

Com

mun

icat

ions

and

co

mpu

ters

AR

GO

SP

R4G

rad

io-b

ased

tact

ical

di

gita

l com

mun

icat

ions

in

fras

truc

ture

MID

SIn

stal

led

on s

ever

al

airc

raft

and

nav

y sh

ips

Lin

ks to

oth

er M

IDS

sy

stem

s in

all

ied

nati

ons

His

pasa

t C

omm

erci

al S

AT

CO

Ms

from

ear

ly 1

990s

wit

h so

me

tran

spon

ders

leas

ed

to S

pani

sh m

ilit

ary

Part

ly in

tero

pera

ble

wit

h th

e S

yrac

use

(Fra

nce)

S

kyne

t (U

K)

and

NA

TO

4

syst

ems

Spa

insa

tM

ILS

AT

CO

M ndash

UH

F a

nd

SH

F c

apab

ilit

y al

ong

wit

h so

me

EH

F c

apac

ity

and

an

anti

-jam

min

g sy

stem

ISR

Sis

tem

a In

tegr

ado

de

Vig

ilan

cia

Aeacuter

ea (

SIV

A)

Tact

ical

UA

V f

or s

hort

-ra

nge

reco

nnai

ssan

ce

surv

eill

ance

and

targ

et

acqu

isit

ion

cont

inue

dhellip

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

Ori

on P

-3B

Upg

rade

d in

200

3 to

in

clud

e F

ITS

mis

sion

sy

stem

an

elec

tron

ic

war

fare

sys

tem

new

rad

ar

acou

stic

sys

tem

IF

F

VU

HF

and

HF

rad

ios

da

ta li

nk a

nd s

atel

lite

and

in

erti

al n

avig

atio

n sy

stem

s

San

tiag

oB

oein

g 70

7-35

1C

confi

gur

ed f

or C

OM

INT

E

LIN

T o

pera

tion

s

Falc

on-2

02

airc

raft

for

CO

MIN

T

mis

sion

s

Hel

ios

1 +

2Ju

nior

par

tner

in F

renc

h ea

rth

obse

rvat

ion

sate

llit

es I

R a

nd o

ptic

al

IMIN

T c

apab

ilit

ies

Neu

ron

Part

ner

in F

renc

h-le

d U

CA

V p

rogr

am

Tabl

e 3

7 co

ntin

ued

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

77

Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance

For unmanned ISR Spain relies on the locally manufactured SIVA (SistemaIntegrado de Vigilancia Aeacuterea or Integrated System for Aerial Surveillance) a tactical UAV for reconnaissance surveillance and target acquisition Spain has also expressed an interest in Northrop Grummanrsquos Fire Scout vertical take-off and landing tactical UAV for maritime SampR capabilities Manned ISR assets include fi ve Orion P-3B aircraft upgraded in 2003 by EADS to include the Fully Integrated Tactical Mission System (FITS) data fusion system an electronic warfare system new radar acoustic system ID friend-or-foe interrogator VUHF and HF radios a data link and satellite and inertial navigation systems

Spainrsquos space observation capabilities originally depended on the Ishtar optical earth observation satellite but the project did not go forward Instead Spain became a junior partner in the French Helios 1 and Helios 2 satellite programs of which it owns 7 and 25 per cent respectively The Spanish Ministry of Defense has recently revived its plans for an independent earth observation capability discussing a high-resolution synthetic aperture radar satellite possibly with civil security applications

Since March 1998 Spain has operated a single Boeing 707 (the Santiago) confi gured for SIGINT and ISR missions Two Falcon-20 aircraft are also in operation for COMINT missions

Sweden

Although there has been signifi cant progress in formulating a Swedish doctrine for Network-Based Defense (NBD) the Swedish armed forces today are still only partially interoperable across services Infrastructure is currently being put in place for a mobile joint C2 function since all the services are now under a single national command This command is part of the process of transforming the Swedish military into a contingency organization with a mobile high-quality force able to operate in expeditionary mode Many of the new systems procured by the Swedish military are compliant with NATO STANAGs and US military specifi cations (MILSPECS) giving them a good basis for interoperability However most of the older Swedish systems were not designed with international interoperability in mind

Each of the services has its own rapid reaction unit created in 1998ndash9 The army has SWERAP (Swedish Rapid Reaction Unit) the air force has SWAFRAP (Swedish Air Force Rapid Reaction Unit) and the navy has SWENRAP (Swedish Navy Rapid Reaction Unit) Four air force C-130s provide air insertion capability for ground units SWAFRAP is comprised of JAS-39 Gripen aircraft which carry out airborne surveillance and combat search and rescue missions SWENRAP missions are principally mine clearing and peacekeeping operations Swedish rapid reaction forces have been deployed to Liberia as part of the UN force and Swedish Special Forces have operated in the Congo and Afghanistan By January 2008 Sweden intends for its rapid reaction units to be part of the European Unionrsquos Nordic Battlegroup together with Finland Norway and Estonia

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

78

The SWERAP units use a commercial satellite system to link with national headquarters and the KV90 high frequency radio system ndash with two stations in the mission area and two redundant stations in Sweden ndash as a backup Tactical communications in-theater rely on the armyrsquos TS-9000 system Based on the EUROCOM standard this system uses a Thales tactical switchboard an Ericsson tactical radio link system and Cisco routers that form the backbone of a tactical Intranet The TS-9000 also includes radio access points for VHF Ericsson Starcom radios as well as HF-radios

The C4ISR capabilities of the Swedish rapid reaction units do not use groundbreaking or unique technology solutions instead they rely on COTS equipment adapted for their specifi c requirements The Swedish deployment to Kosovo in 1999 needed to be equipped rapidly and within a relatively short period SWERAP became the fi rst battalion in the Swedish armed forces to fi eld advanced C2 and communications systems relying on this COTS approach

Command and control

Current C2 systems in the Swedish armed forces include the 9LV system in service with the navy and the StriC-90 system deployed since 1998 for command and control of attack aircraft and air defense systems StriC-90 is connected to the Giraffe 3D and the Erieye radars and includes data links with Gripen attack aircraft Swedish air force systems are tied into a single network named Airforce 2000 which enables a tactical C2 loop for all the servicersquos units The Swedish army uses the demonstrator IS-Mark information system for mobile and non-mobile ground based headquarters and the SLB (Stridsledningssystem Bataljon or Battalion C2 System) system at the battalion level The two are not interoperable however and data must be manually transferred between them (Nilsson et al2004 24ndash5) Sweden began to integrate all the servicesrsquo C2 systems at all levels in 2005 under the name of SWECCIS (SWEdish C2 Information System)

In October 1995 the Swedish Armed Forces Headquartersrsquo Department of Operations tasked the Defense Research Establishment (Foumlrsvarets Forskningsanstalt or FOA) the Defense Materiel Administration (Foumlrsvarets Materielverk or FMV) and the National Defense College (Foumlrsvarshoumlgskolanor FHS) to propose a vision for a mobile military joint C2 system for the year 2010 This project ndash Mobile Joint Command and Control Function for 2010 (Roumlrlig Operativ Lednings Funktion or ROLF 2010) ndash has been expanded to include civilian C2 elements relevant to national security The goal is a single C2 environment for Swedenrsquos national defense and fi rst responder services in 10ndash15 years The vision calls for the creation of an ldquoaquariumrdquo (Visionarium) a device to present crisis situations in a three-dimensional environment fusing information from many sources Once deployed Visionarium will enable informed and timely decision-making and the dissemination of decisions to security forces

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

79

Communications and computers

For the past ten years the tactical communications infrastructure of the Swedish armed forces has been based on a digital network the TS-9000 The system uses Thales switches and Ericsson radios and relay equipment and has recently been upgraded to include tactical Intranet However it will encounter problems of data capacity once the new information system SWECCIS is introduced The requirement for more bandwidth will be fi lled through satellite communications and the procurement of the HF-2000 radio communications network to be fully deployed by 2008 This system will provide all services with a fully automated data text and voice communications network that can be used from fi xed and mobile stations

Only a few of Swedenrsquos tactical communications systems are interoperable outside Sweden All were designed and deployed under a strategy of Swedish neutrality which ruled out coalition operations Sweden has now participated in several of the Combined Endeavor annual exercises which have tested and proven the interoperability of its tactical communications systems with those of other countries at the non-secure level In the near future Sweden is expected to join the successor of the Tactical Communications (TACOMS) Post 2000 project a NATO initiative to develop STANAGs for IP-based communications between different tactical communications systems

With the change in Swedish strategy the need for interoperable commu nica-tions systems has grown As a result Sweden expects to procure Link-16 terminals and IFF systems Link-16 will fi rst be introduced in the air force and navy with an army deployment to follow Initially it will be installed as stand-alone terminals with limited capacity Sweden has also recently launched a program known as GTRS to acquire a Software Defi ned Radio system built on SCA standards The goal is to introduce the new system to the armed forces after 2008

In 2005 Sweden also began to deploy its national radio communications infrastructure for public safety authorities including the armed forces police coast guard customs service local crisis management and rescue services and emergency healthcare and ambulance services RAKEL (Radio Kommunikation foumlr Effektiv Ledning or Radio Communication for Effi cient Command) based on the TETRA (TErrestrial Trunked RAdio) standard will be supplied by a consortium of Saab Nokia and Eltel Networks and will be owned by the Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) Deployment will start in the south of Sweden and fi nish in the north of the country by 2010 RAKEL is part of the Network-Based Defense doctrine aimed at connecting the Swedish military and the fi rst responders in one network

Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance

The Argus system has been Swedenrsquos principal manned airborne ISR capability since 1997 Argus is based on six Saab 340 aircraft outfi tted with Ericssonrsquos Erieye PS-890 radar along with four ground stations It performs mostly airborne early

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EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

83

warning and maritime surveillance and reconnaissance missions Other manned ISR assets include two Gulfstream IV-SP aircraft deployed since 1997 for SIGINT missions The Ericsson Giraffe radar recently deployed provides land-based ISR capabilities though its principal mission is air defense The Swedish navy also deploys a maritime version the Sea Giraffe The Swedish ARTHUR (Artillery Hunting Radar) system is fully operational and has been used in Afghanistan

Sweden has only a limited unmanned aerial ISR capability Three Ugglan (Owl) tactical UAV systems were procured from France in 1999ndash2000 based on the Sperwer UAV modifi ed to be able to take off in severe winter conditions As part of the Swedish armed forces long-term vision a number of advanced UAV concepts are currently being studied Gladen is one candidate a HALE UAV equipped with a SAR electro-optic and infrared sensors and able to carry an early warning suite Also under discussion are two combat UAVs the Swedish Highly Advanced Research Confi guration (SHARC) and Skuadern a stealthy MALE reconnaissance and strike UAV both being developed by Saab the latter in collaboration with BAE Systems Sweden is also a partner in the French-led EuroMALE UAV and Neuron UCAV programs

84

4

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL

NETWORK-BASED CAPABILITIES

NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization provides the most important and broad-reaching setting in which the transatlantic allies can address C4ISR technology and interoperability issues Military planning in the European Union though moving forward rapidly is at too early a stage and insuffi ciently comprehensive to resolve interoperability problems today In any case the United States is not an EU member making NATO the most important institutional setting in which transatlantic C4ISR issues can be discussed and resolved

During the Cold War NATO force planning was the setting for allied discussions on C2 communications air defense air operations and air-to-air surveillance Although this review of national network-based capabilities suggests that national systems are imperfectly interoperable at the national level and not always interoperable within the NATO framework the intent to make them NATO interoperable is clear Moreover a number of capabilities developed in the NATO context remain important tools for coalition interoperability even when the Alliance is not formally involved For the purposes of this discussion we will use the defi nition of interoperability common in NATO as described by Major General Picavet Director of the NATO HQ C3 Staff ldquothe ability of alliance forces and when appropriate forces of partner and other nations to train exercise and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasksrdquo (Picavet 2003 34)

NATO has dedicated common C2 and communications capabilities The MIDS upgrade of the US Link-16 system connecting allied aircraft was developed through NATO and NATOrsquos naval communications are largely interoperable through Link-11 technology The AWACS air-to-air surveillance system is a common NATO capability As an organization NATO defi nes and issues Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) for many weapons systems including C3I which set targets for planning national C2 and communications systems among the member nations NATO continues to provide an important setting for future common programs that are part of the C4ISR universe such as the Air Command and Control System (ACCS) program the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) program theater missile defense (TMD) research and the Coalition Aerial Surveillance and

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

85

Reconnaissance (CAESAR) advanced concept technology demonstration NATO will be a driving force for future transformations of European military forces and their links to the US defense as a result of three key decisions made at the November 2002 Prague Summit the Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC) the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the creation of the new Allied Command Transformation (ACT)

While NATO remains the principal transatlantic context for C4ISR discussions and planning the future evolution of the Alliancersquos role is unclear The European allies are increasingly committed to doing parallel planning in the European Union context whose military missions and commitments are growing In addition the future of the US role in coalition operations under a NATO fl ag is somewhat uncertain The US National Security Strategy (2002) and the Quadrennial Defense Review of 2001 both give preference to ad hoc coalitions over a systematic use of NATO for out-of-area operations

NATO roles and capabilities

Throughout the Cold War the allies used the NATO context for common C2 capability planning NATO strategy and force planning and military exercises set the expectations and goals for NATO membersrsquo military forces Based in part on Alliance needs members set goals for their own national defense investment which in turn infl uenced the requirements for equipment including Command Control Communications and Computers (C4) Past practices in the Alliance however may not be an adequate incentive for defi ning and meeting C4ISR requirements today NATO force planning goals are not obligatory and have often not been met in national defense budgets and plans Moreover because they have been developed through negotiation goals and targets developed in the NATO context tend to be incremental while defense technology and mission need to move ahead more quickly As a result as Gompert and Nerlich note the NATO force planning process since the end of the Cold War has become increasingly disconnected from the US national force transformation process

Adjustments in NATOrsquos military plans are worked out through tedious diplomatic negotiations among professionals trained to avoid abrupt change Consequently the United States and the lead European allies do not presently rely on the NATO planning process to guide their force planning and they cannot count on it to organize and guide their effort to create cooperable transformed forces

(Gompert and Nerlich 2002 64)

Nevertheless NATO has served as an important context for allied C4ISR planning The Alliance breaks down network-based capabilities and C4ISR into three categories Command Control and Consultation (C3) Communications and Information Systems (CIS) and ISR Over time separate NATO organizations

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

86

have been created to deal with the fi rst two areas (C3 and CIS) while ISR has been further broken down into specifi c programs and organizations

The NATO concept of C3 covers planning and architecture design of systems while that of CIS covers the management and operation of systems For C3 the Alliance has developed specifi c packages ndash Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) headquarters ndash that play a central role in planning and implementing specifi c Alliance operations such as IFOR and SFOR in the Balkans Since the mid-1990s CJTF core staffs have been established on a permanent basis within selected parent headquarters in the NATO military command structure When the need arises for a CJTF to be deployed the core staff is assembled and augmented as necessary forming a CJTF headquarters specifi cally structured to meet the requirements of the operation in question These CJTF headquarters receive C2 and communications capabilities both from the Alliance and from national forces They will also provide the new NATO Response Force with the joint headquarters it requires to operate (see below)

The Alliance has developed its own dedicated C2 and communications capability for military operations involving senior levels of military and political decision making (Barry 2003) NATO hardware and software can reach across the entire NATO territory connecting land air and maritime forces and political decision makers in national capitals and Brussels including voice data messaging and video teleconferencing This capability uses wireless networks satellites landlines optical fi ber and digital radio and includes local area and wide area networks A signifi cant volume of the traffi c is carried on the Internet and uses commercial equipment including satellites

These C3 and CIS infrastructures are overseen by the NATO Consultation Command and Control Organization (NC3O) The NC3Orsquos mission is to develop the technical architectures standards protocols and overall design for all systems from the tactical military level to the strategicpolitical one Since its reorganization in 1996 the NC3O is linked to three organizations The NATO C3 Board (NC3B) is the senior CIS planning and policymaking body in the Alliance It is composed of representatives of all member nations the strategic military commands and other relevant NATO organizations It reports directly to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the Defense Planning Committee and acts as the oversight board for all NC3O activities The Board has subcommittees on joint requirements and concepts frequency management information systems identifi cation systems interoperability information security communication networks and navigation systems (Picavet 2003)

The NATO Command Control and Consultation Agency (NC3A) is directly responsible for CIS issues within the Alliance It carries out the policies of the Board procures systems and conducts fi eld trials of prototypes NC3Arsquos goal is to create architecture for a common operating environment into which member states can plug in their own C3 networks Lastly the NATO systems are operated by the NATO Communications and Information Systems Operating and Support Agency (NACOSA) It manages CIS conducts joint training and monitors the quality of service both in static and forward deployed locations Over time the Board and

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

87

the NC3A are pushing NATO toward a command and information system with greater mobility and interoperability increasingly based on commercial products and systems The Alliance goal is to create a ready-made architecture that member nations can plug into and to provide a test bed for communications and Internet technologies (Barry 2002 253)

NATO C2 programs

The current NATO C2 systems and related communications capabilities have their limitations The systems have not been mobile though deployability is going to be critical for future out-of-area operations Moreover the current capability is stove-piped Horizontal communications between forces and between governments are not systematically possible Thus the current NATO systems are not yet a network-based capability that would allow all sources of data voice and video (including sensor data) to be brought together vertically and horizontally in real time to provide coherent real-time awareness of the battlefi eld across forces

NATO has however been upgrading this C2 capability with a number of major programs underway or recently completed which will allow Alliance operations to be more network-based The Allied Command Europe (ACE) Automated Command and Control Information System (ACCIS) is intended to be a strategic-level system providing decision support software and a combined operational picture It is currently being given a common hardware and software baseline that will form the core of a future bi-Strategic Command (ACE and ACLANT) automated information system (Bi-SCAIS) the Alliancersquos future C2 system The core services of the Maritime Command and Control Information System (MCCIS) an Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) strategic-level COTS-based information system will be implemented in the ACE ACCIS architecture The NATO C3 Technical Architecture (NC3TA) a new open systems approach for the Alliancersquos C2 infrastructure was initiated in December 2000 and addresses the near-term interoperability requirements of NATO C2 systems setting down technical requirements and guidelines for their implementation

There are additional NATO programs addressing future Alliance C2 require-ments More than a decade ago the Alliance initiated a program to upgrade and expand NATOrsquos air defense net the Air Command and Control System (ACCS) a commonly funded development and procurement program ACCS is intended to be an open architecture program using off-the-shelf components Given the decline in the European theater air threat the ACCS program could have been terminated However ACCS has been designed not only to detect and defend against air attack but also for air tasking and carrying out the tactical planning tasking and execution of all air defense offensive air and air support operations It is intended as a multi-mission simultaneous planning capability coordinating fl ight paths of various aircraft integrating the AWACS air picture preparing offensive operations and coordinating a combined air operations center along with reconnaissance squadrons and fi ghter wings It will include both fi xed sites and deployable components

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

88

Air operations over Kosovo revealed shortfalls in the Alliancersquos capability to coordinate combined air attack and support giving new impetus to the need for the ACCS capability Moreover it became clear that ACCS could provide a vehicle for communications and C2 involving air operations as part of a broader network-based system linked to air-ground surveillance and conceivably even to theater missile defense systems (TMD) As a result the Alliance decided to continue the ACCS effort In 1999 NATO signed a $500 million contract for the initial development effort with Air Command Systems International part of the Thales Raytheon Systems joint venture

Over fi ve years the ACCS system core software was developed and tested concluding the fi rst phase of the program The next phase of the ACCS from 2004 to roughly 2008 includes software integration incremental testing and the introduction of ACCS into national forces The goal is to create ACCS sites in 18 NATO member nations NATO members without an ACCS site will interface with the system via their national airdefense and operations centers (Fiorenza 2004 38)

Theater missile defense is not generally seen as an element of C2 However the NATO TMD effort is relevant to overall C2 capabilities as missile defense can be closely linked to the air defense and air operations capability provided by the ACCS program Moreover a TMD architecture could include mobile tactical missile and air defense capabilities which Alliance forces may require in out-of-area deployments including the NATO Respose Force (NRF) The Alliance has issued two contracts for studies of an Alliance TMD architecture and there is growing consensus that it may be appropriate to develop such a system

NATO introduced still another C2-related program in the summer of 2005 creating a new C2 Center of Excellence based on the model of the Dutch C2 Support Center (described in the previous chapter) Under the auspices of Allied Command Transformation this joint Center is to provide the Alliance with a framework for the exchange of C2 knowledge and lessons learned in order to improve interoperability The initial staff is composed of 15 Dutch Belgian Norwegian and US exchange or liaison offi cers but will expand to include other nationalities The Center will undertake training and education activities related to C2 interoperability including the analysis of case studies and the production of ldquolessons learnedrdquo reports As part of its work the Center will assess the value of the NRF as a stimulus for NATO network-enabled capabilities assist member states in synchronizing their national C2 programs to make them more interoperable and validate network-centric and C4ISR concepts and doctrines developed in other NATO organizations such as the NC3A

The Center was also offered to the European Union as part of the Dutch contribution to the European Strategic Defense Initiative (ESDI) It will collaborate with the European Defense Agency and make its expertise and facilities available to the European Battlegroups (see Chapter 5 on EU capabilities) Though a relatively new addition to the Alliancersquos C4ISR effort the Center of Excellence could become an important arena for NATOrsquos efforts

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

89

NATO communications and information programs

NATOrsquos communications and information networks have also been evolving toward more networked capabilities The NATO General Purpose Communications System (NGCS) is a communications backbone tying all military C2 (data and voice) together with semi-permanent bandwidth on demand using secure and non-secure telephone message wireless and satellite links NGCS is being deployed to replace the obsolete NATO Integrated Communications System The NATO Messaging System (NMS) will provide Alliance commands with e-mail and secure military message handing capability Crisis Response Operations in NATO Open Systems (CRONOS) a Windows NT-based information system initially developed for Bosnia provides secure connectivity (up to NATO Secret) between NATO and several national and coalition systems

Increasingly NATO platforms are also being equipped with the Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) a modernized version of the US Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) The development of MIDS illustrates the increase in Alliance telecommunications interoperability It was designed as a tactical data communications network linking NATO alliesrsquo aircraft (fi ghters and bombers) and air-based ground-based and ship-based C2 centers (Hura et al 2000) As it is deployed across alliance platforms MIDS will also enable better aircraft Identifi cation Friend or Foe (IFF) information The United States France Germany Italy and Spain signed the project memorandum of understanding in 1991 MIDS development has been led by the United States with France acting as deputy program leader (refl ecting the cost shares of the two major program partners)

MIDS like the US JTIDS is based on Link-16 a tactical digital network of encrypted jam-resistant data links and terminals Budget pressures and the desire to gain access to US military technology led the Europeans to support an international program but almost all were unwilling to simply buy JTIDS off the shelf For the United States the need for international collaboration was operational a common tactical communications network would increase interoperability with European allies and increase effectiveness in coalition warfare

A modular open terminal architecture was developed for MIDS followed by an affordable terminal that could be tailored to fi t various military platforms MIDS terminals were developed fi rst for integration into a specifi c set of platforms then modifi ed to accommodate others Finally interoperable jam-resistant data links between US and allied platforms were developed The member nations participating in the program were prohibited from developing competing systems to MIDS

A US chartered international joint venture MIDSCO was awarded the RampD phase of the program in 1994 The JV included GEC-Marconi (UK) Hazeltine (United States) Thomson (France) Marconi Italtel Defense (Italy) Siemens (Germany) and ENOSA (Empresa Nacional de Optica SA Spain) The RampD phase was concluded in 2000 followed by an acquisition phase that included two US vendors (Data Link Solutions and ViaSat Inc) and one European vendor for production and sale of the terminals The European vendor is EuroMIDS a

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

90

consortium comprising Thales (France) Marconi Mobile (Italy) Indra (Spain) and EADS (Germany)

In 2004 the US navy initiated a program within the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) program that would enable it to communicate with MIDS terminals The MIDS JTRS program will transition the existing MIDS Link-16 terminal to a Software Communications Architecture (SCA) compliant with JTRS radio The MIDS JTRS radio will provide three additional programmable channels that will be able to run any of the JTRS approved waveforms The United States France Italy Spain and Germany all participate in the program which will enable them to receive copies of the technical data package for MIDS JTRS and produce terminals to meet their national needs Eventually all US French German Italian and Spanish platforms outfi tted with MIDS JTRS radios will be able to communicate and share a common picture of the battlefi eld

NATOrsquos Satcom V project is also underway intended to provide global wideband video voice and data links to the Alliance Satellite communications have been an important element of the Alliancersquos common communications capability since 1970 when the fi rst NATO satellite was launched The NATO IV satellite system consisted of one active satellite one backup satellite 27 satellite ground terminals and two control centers Operational since 1991 it provided communications in both the UHF and SHF bands NATO has retired the last remaining NATO IV satellite Instead of purchasing and operating the next generation of satellites the Satcom V program ndash previously known as NATO Satcom Post-2000 ndash will purchase capacity from existing European satellites and upgrade existing ground stations The NATO C3 Agency leads the Satcom V program

The United Kingdom France and Italy submitted a joint bid to supply SHF and UHF capacity from existing and planned national programs (Skynet in the United Kingdom Syracuse in France and SICRAL in Italy) The US Department of Defense also submitted a bid offering SHF capacity on its Wideband Gapfi ller satellite system and the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) and UHF capacity on the UHF Follow-On system and the Mobile User Objective System The United States also proposed selling NATO EHF capacity on its Advanced Extremely High Frequency system while France proposed EHF capacity on one of its Syracuse 3 satellites

In May 2004 the NATO C3 Agency selected the joint British-French-Italian bid for the SHF and UHF parts of the Satcom Post-2000 program The 15-year contract includes establishing a NATO Mission Access Center that will route all NATO satellite communications via satellites in the Skynet 5 Syracuse 3 and SICRAL systems Beginning in 2007 the NATO system will be based on two Skynet 5 two Syracuse 3 and two SICRAL satellites A selection for the EHF part of the program is expected soon although EHF capacity is not expected to be needed before 2010 (Fiorenza 2005b)

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

91

NATO intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance programs

NATOrsquos current major ISR program is the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and the Alliance is in the process of acquiring additional ISR capabilities through the NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance program (AGS) The NATO AWACS fl eet is composed of 17 aircraft with dedicated common air-to-air surveillance capability and provides an important sensor input to understanding the battlefi eld Purchased during the late 1980s this NATO E-3A fl eet is currently being improved through modernization programs managed by the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEWampC) Program Management Organization In 2004 the upgrading of the missions systems on board the NATO aircraft was begun and the process will be completed in 2008 The upgrades will enable the AWACS aircraft to receive mission orders and updates via satellite allow the integration of data collected by other platforms with that gathered by the aircraftrsquos sensors increase the number of targets it can track and improve its interoperability with other platforms The United Kingdom France and the United States all possess the AWACS systems giving the Alliance good interoperability in air-to-air surveillance

In 2000 NATO began a research and testing program with direct bearing on the integration of sensor data collected by various different platforms operated by member nations The Coalition Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance (CAESAR) program is unprecedented an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrator (ACTD) funded by the US Defense Department but carried out by NATO The premise of CAESAR is that the NATO interoperability challenge is about information what is needed who needs it and where it comes from The objective of CAESAR is to test national and NATO air- and space-based ground surveillance systems and develop ways to integrate them ultimately leading to a new STANAG for the Alliance

To achieve this objective the CAESAR program is testing tactics techniques and procedures for linking together independent national air reconnaissance and surveillance systems currently deployed on a variety of platforms including the British ASTOR the French Horizon JSTARS Global Hawk RADARSAT (Canada) Predator CRESO (Italian helicopter-based) and others In the future it could be extended to other platforms including the British CEC network and ultimately ACCS and AGS

If the data emerging from CAESAR leads to investments and operational planning it could make a valuable contribution to the NATO effort to network sensor data into its C2 and communications systems It could also make it easier for coalition forces to rely on a variety of national air ground surveillance systems in the absence of a common NATO AGS asset

In addition CAESAR may demonstrate the benefi ts of funding technology demonstrators at the international level ACTDs a result of acquisition reform by the US Defense Department and designed to move technology more quickly into the forces have normally been restricted to US participants More multinational ACTDs in the C4ISR arena could stimulate transatlantic efforts to address the

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

92

interoperability dilemmas in network-based operations For example as a complement to the CAESAR program the United States could increase NATO participation in the Multi-sensor Aerospace-ground Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition (MAJIIC) program This is a 5-year technology demonstrator initiated in 2004 by US Joint Forces Command Its objective is to enhance the interoperability of ISR systems fi elded within a coalition framework via a common military website and made available for coalition operations in near real time Canada France Germany Italy the Netherlands Norway Spain and the United Kingdom already participate in MAJIIC

The most signifi cant NATO program for future ISR capabilities is the NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) project which has been an active RampD program for over a decade It will provide NATO with an aerial battlefi eld surveillance capability using a radar suite with both MTI and SAR modes fusing information gathered by other sensors into a combined digital picture The United States currently fi elds such a capability in the JSTARS (a modifi ed Boeing 707 carrying a communications surveillance reconnaissance and intelligence suite) The system is expected to cost some 4 billion euros which will be shared by all participating nations with initial operational capability targeted for 2010 The United Kingdom is the only NATO nation not taking part in the AGS program

The AGS program has evolved over several years as a number of alternatives were considered and rejected The United States proposed that the Alliance simply buy JSTARS which few allied nations were willing to do The United Kingdom decided to proceed independently with ASTOR and pulled out of the NATO planning effort Competing US and European solutions emerged the Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP an upgrade of the system deployed on JSTARS) and the Standoff Surveillance Target Acquisition Radar (SOSTAR)

In 2003 NATO issued a Request for Proposals for a two-year design and development phase This RFP called for the design and development phase to begin in late 2004 leading to a full program of six aircraft plus UAV systems by 2010 Two transatlantic strategic consortia responded to this Request for Proposals both offering the same radar solution the Transatlantic Cooperative AGS Radar (TCAR) which would fuse MP-RTIP and SOSTAR One consortium was the Transatlantic Industry Proposed Solution (TIPS) led by Northrop Grumman Thales EADS Galileo Avionica General Dynamics Canada Indra and some 70 other companies from all 19 NATO member nations The other was the Cooperative Transatlantic AGS System (CTAS) proposed by Raytheon and British Aerospace Systems based on the United Kingdom ASTOR system (Fiorenza 2003b) In the spring of 2004 the NATO AGS Steering Committee and the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors selected the TIPS consortium as the winner

The AGS system was initially to be deployed solely on manned aircraft However in response to German urgings the program was redesigned for both manned and unmanned aircraft It is not yet clear which version will be deployed fi rst The TIPS-based mixed fl eet is based on manned medium-size aircraft ndash the

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

93

Airbus A321 ndash and the German EuroHawk HALE UAVs a version of Northrop Grummanrsquos Global Hawk

Developing the radar posed a problem for both consortia since US export regulators indicated that they would forbid the export of some crucial technologies such as the TransmitReceive (TR) modules Frustrated by this problem the European partners have spent time and resources to duplicate existing US TR modules creating a capability that downstream will compete with the American technology The TCAR solution offered by the TIPS consortium faces other signifi cant technology transfer issues as the radar is to be co-developed by several European countries ndash France Germany Italy the Netherlands and Spain ndash as well as the United States

The ultimate fate of the AGS system is unclear given the signifi cant additional costs required for full deployment and uncertainty that some key NATO members ndash France the United Kingdom and Germany ndash will continue to participate over the long term A commitment to deploy AGS would involve a considerable increase in common NATO investments and an increase in the NATO common budget ceiling AGS spending might compete with other national defense priorities On the other hand a deployed AGS would give the Alliance a signifi cantly enhanced sensoring capability for operational deployments outside the NATO area and relieve the overload on the US JSTARS currently much in demand

As this discussion suggests there is substantial NATO investment in the elements of common C2 communications and ISR capabilities for the Alliance What is lacking is a clear vision of what the Alliance needs to link sensor and other information into the decision-making and command structures and down to the tactical war fi ghter NC3A is working on such a vision trying to defi ne the linkage between the many NATO systems and standards and achieve the incorporation of common programs such as MCCIS ACCIS ACCS and AGS into a joint system and the integration of that system with the national systems of the member states This C2 and communications architecture needs to be accompanied by a NATO-wide vision of the sensor architecture to which it might be linked NATO does not yet have clear standards for the ISR elements of network-centric operations nor an agreed view on the way in which they should be networked with each other

NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAGs)

NATO has worked for decades to set common standards for defense equipment including C4ISR systems Working groups in the NATO Military Agency for Standardization in conjunction with NATOrsquos Committee of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) have negotiated more than 1700 such STANAGs which set out the standards members should seek to reach when acquiring new equipment Roughly 300 of these standards relate to C4 technology (Grapin 2002 37)

The NC3TA proposes such standards for C2 and communications equipment and information architecture Their guidance should make it possible for nationally procured systems to link up with or plug into the C2 and communications architecture being put together by the Alliance (Barry 2003 10) As noted in the

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

94

review of national programs in this study many C4 items in national inventories are said to be compliant with NATO STANAGs which in theory enhances Alliance interoperability

The STANAG process has not however been fully successful in reaching this goal STANAG compliance is not mandatory but voluntary and there is no institutional process in NATO for validating membersrsquo compliance with the STANAGs As a result many NATO member nations including the United States have developed equipment that does not enhance interoperability as was the case with the German land force communications protocol As one analyst has noted ldquoMost European countries including France are willing to use NATO standards but it is not a usual practice in US procurement for military services to refer (and defer) to themrdquo (Grapin 2002 3)

Non-compliance with STANAGs is linked to the desire in some countries notably the United States to move forward quickly toward a network-based capability The STANAG process tends to be long tedious and bureaucratic often taking several years and resulting in a standard that is a lowest common denominator Once a STANAG has been ratifi ed it is often well behind the evolution of modern technology As a result the process does not have high-level attention and tends not to be viewed as a part of the strategic evolution of the Alliance

In the case of C2 and CIS technologies the pace of innovation is particularly fast and heavily reliant on the commercial sector As some countries move down the road toward networked capabilities they are inclined to set STANAGs aside and move to the best available and most up-to-date technology One analyst estimated that US defense technology is 80 per cent compliant with NATO STANAGs but the remaining 20 per cent includes the technologies critical to the development of network-centric capabilities (Grapin 2002 3) Moreover in the critical area of ISR there are few agreed STANAGs and none as yet for UAVs (Grapin 2002 77)

New NATO commitments to network-based operations

The Alliance took a major step forward toward a commitment to network-centric capabilities with the Prague summit of November 2002 First and most important the NATO agenda moved from a focus on Article 5 missions involving the defense of the NATO member countries to a clear focus on Article 6 out-of-area missions This shift in focus had been emerging since the 50th anniversary Washington summit of 1999 Though the European allies initially resisted efforts to focus on out-of-area missions this change emerged for three reasons First NATOrsquos experience in Bosnia Serbia and Kosovo ndash the fi rst war conducted by NATO as an alliance ndash made it clear that the European defense mission had been superseded by responsibilities for peacemaking and peacekeeping at Europersquos Balkan fringe Balkan operations also exposed a number of weaknesses and gaps in Alliance capabilities

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

95

Moreover 911 the war on terrorism and the war in Afghanistan all involved a new adversary whose transnational character made it a potential threat to all but whose global location necessitated action outside the NATO area While NATO invoked Article 5 for the fi rst time in its history the day after the 911 attacks on the United States the Alliance was not initially involved in the war in Afghanistan However NATO has been directly involved in post-war security operations around Kabul and at the request of the UN took complete control of the security operation around Kabul in August 2003 The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been commanded by the SACEUR and conducted by Allied Command Operations (ACO) ever since and is in the process of deploying to locations outside of Kabul in the form of Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT) This was a signifi cant new out-of-area deployment for many European countries and for the Alliance

Third the 911 attacks and what was presumed at the time to be a potential threat of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq both focused NATO attention more squarely on the risk that hostile states or terrorist organizations might acquire such weapons and the means to deliver them on NATO territory As a result new impetus was given to the Alliancersquos planning for WMD operations and TMD programs

These major security developments brought renewed attention to defense spending and force planning in most of the major NATO allies including the new members from the former Warsaw Pact Persistent US and NATO pressure on allied defense budgets led to a small but important reversal of course in the trend toward declining budgets in the United Kingdom France Italy and the Netherlands and considerable soul-searching about defense budgets and plans in Germany

The new security issues have also intensifi ed European concern about acquiring more modern defense technology particularly transportation logistics and especially relevant to this study C4ISR Balkans operations stimulated the Europeans to engage in more European-level planning for peacekeeping and peacemaking operations as they exposed severe European shortcomings in communications equipment sensors for surveillance and reconnaissance and data fusion CRONOS NATOrsquos Windows-based information-sharing network developed for IFOR in Bosnia was infected with viruses While the United States and the United Kingdom could connect to CRONOS digitally the French and Germans had to use an analog interface which meant slower data rates Secure communications especially at the tactical level were also a problem while communications between aircraft had to be transmitted in the clear Interoperability was problematic a number of ISR systems were used including JSTARS Nimrod Breguet Atlantic Horizon and C-160 aircraft but they could not cross-transmit data ndash thus could not provide all allies with a common picture of the battlespace or transmit directly to strike aircraft Finally Europeans depended on intelligence derived from US surveillance and reconnaissance assets The United States met 95 per cent of the allied intelligence requirements in Kosovo but was slow to release data to coalition partners (Thomas 2000 43ndash53)

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

96

Combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have intensifi ed this need for greater European network-centric capability The progress made by the US since the fi rst Gulf War in agility mobility and information networking of its forces is increasingly clear European C4ISR capabilities are signifi cantly less capable Moreover despite having more than 2 million men and women under arms the European allies still have only a small expeditionary capability largely British and French forces The military missions of the future whether national European or transatlantic depend on a high state of readiness advanced logistics networked C4ISR and a high degree of fl exibility and agility Only US forces came close to meeting this test with the British and French trailing and the other allies far behind

The Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) was agreed on at the 1999 NATO Washington Summit with the goal of addressing these capability shortfalls The DCI identifi ed 58 key capability shortfalls needing investment and multi-national cooperation The shortfalls were divided into fi ve core areas mobility and deployability sustainability effective engagement (the ability to engage an adversary in all types of operations from high to low intensity) survivability (ability to protect forces and infrastructure against future threats) and interoperable communications However the DCI lacked a common strategic orientation provided few doctrinal and institutional links to the US force-transformation process set no priorities and failed to stimulate allied investment in force modernization (Gompert and Nerlich 2002 10)

The 2002 Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC) were adopted to address the DCIrsquos failure Initially PCC goals numbered more than 450 including over 100 commitments related to C2 and information systems far higher than the DCI number However NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson identifi ed eight as a priority focus given their link to expeditionary operations including in particular C3I The PCC particularly targeted the lack of deployable C2 facilities reconnaissance and surveillance assets common interoperable intelligence mechanisms and systems architecture and the shortfalls in the communications arena to link them together PCC were intended to provide a more measurable and reachable target for European force planning and acquisition Some progress has been made notably in strategic airlift and sealift Survivability has been improved with the creation of a chemical biological radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defense battalion under the leadership of the Czech Republic However in many areas related to network-based operations results have been more modest Even the highly successful Czech-led CBRN battalion is still struggling with problems related to communications and deployment

The Alliance took two other signifi cant actions in Prague with major implications for the future of the Alliance in the area of network-based capabilities the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the creation of Allied Command Transformation as part of a major restructuring of the NATO command structure NATOrsquos new command structure is built around a single Strategic Command for Operations at SHAPE in Belgium and three subordinate operational-level joint commands in the Netherlands Naples and Lisbon which are intended to be the parent

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

97

headquarters of three deployable CJTFs two land-based and one sea-based Both of these actions could provide signifi cant incentive for the Europeans to move toward enhanced C4ISR capabilities and greater interoperability with the United States military

Although NATO has a number of common force packages and headquarters under the CJTF label until Prague the Alliance lacked the capability to deploy a small agile and light intervention force with the dedicated transport logistics and communications capabilities such a force needs to sustain itself The NRF is intended to fi ll this gap This force would be highly ready available for out-of-area missions on short notice capable of forcible entry and able to establish a foothold as the point of the spear for a larger NATO ground force to follow In addition the force could do non-combatant evacuations support counterterrorism and assist with post-confl ict management

The NRF will consist of roughly 20000 troops plus naval and air capabilities drawn from the High Readiness Forces of the NATO members With lift logistics and network-capable equipment it could deploy within 5 days and be self-sustaining for 30 The NRF-designated forces would remain actively committed to this mission for a six-month period at which time a new set of forces would become the NRF package while the fi rst group stood down and returned to a lower state of readiness The force would train and exercise together during the highly ready period Because of its high state of readiness the Alliance could use the NRF more often than it might deploy its massive heavier slower capabilities (Binnendijk and Kugler 2002 117ndash32)

The NRF capability has a deeper signifi cance While it would be time-consuming and costly to overhaul all of European NATOrsquos current forces for more agile network-based capabilities the NRF rotation scheme provides an opportunity to cycle those forces through a period of training readiness and stand-down one unit at a time After two years it is hoped that the Europeans will provide the NRF with the ldquoenablersrdquo (lift C4ISR and logistics) currently supplied by the United States Training European forces for agile fl exible operations and equipping them with the enablers they need including networked C4ISR could over time convert existing European military capabilities to a more modern networked force For some supporters NRF constitutes an intense European upgrade program by stealth (Becher 2003 25)

It is not clear that all the allies agree with this vision of the NRF Not all are committed to cycle large elements of their land forces through the NRF and may choose instead to assign a smaller proportion of their forces to the NRF missions and cycle them at a higher rate Germany for example has decided to create three categories of forces only the most highly ready of which will cycle through for the NRF For some allies this approach avoids the expense of upgrading all forces to NRF missions and capabilities over time

For some European allies moreover the relationship between the NRF and the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) is unclear For some NRF is seen as a ldquolast chancerdquo to work with the US military on global military challenges and engage the United States with European defense planning For others investment

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

98

in the NRF is seen as competing with their commitment to the ERRF Though the Alliance view is that the two are compatible not all the allies agree This tension over rapid reaction force planning refl ects a broader uncertainty about the transatlantic defense planning relationship

There is also a difference of view over the role US forces will play in the NRF Europeans have a strong desire for the United States to participate directly in NRF training and exercising and for US forces to be fully integrated into the NRF American sources and initial exercises suggest that the US goal is for the NRF to become a predominantly European capability for rapid deployment which could link up with a separate interoperable American force However this lack of joint US training with the NRF could ultimately impede the ability of the United States and NATO Europe to operate together on the battlefi eld (Binnendijk 2004 3ndash8)

These differing views have implications for the C4ISR elements of the NRF In the all-European case C2 communications and sensoring assets could be entirely European as long as the technology allowed them to plug and play with the United States permitting the download of data interoperable communications and a common sense of the battlespace The US-engaged model could provide greater incentive for both forces to develop common equipment and software to ensure that the force could operate seamlessly

The NRF clearly constitutes a major new NATO commitment The fi rst test bed elements of the force were stood up only a year after Prague and have held several exercises Full NRF operating capability is expected by the summer of 2006 The early training and exercises will test C4ISR requirements and reveal shortfalls that could provide incentive for European investment in the C4ISR arena since the bulk of the C4ISR capability continues to be supplied by the US

The third Prague decision with important long-term implications for the transatlantic relationship in C4ISR is the restructuring of Alliance commands The NATO command structure has now been substantially revised with an Allied Command Operations in Europe and a new Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk VA with operations in Europe The creation of ACT combined with the change in NATO missions puts a premium on upgrades to NATOrsquos C2 and communications infrastructure (Barry 2003 4)

ACT is directly responsible for transformation activities in NATO It supports transformation planning provides lessons learned to national planners lobbies for NATO investment in network-centric programs writes doctrine for network-centric operations and develops educational materials for NATO training activities such as those conducted by the Joint Warfare Center in Norway It could play a central role in supporting and reviewing national investments in network-based capabilities and supporting the active C4I program of NC3A The commander of ACT is dual-hatted as the Joint Forces Commander of the United States positioning ACT as a bridge between US transformation and network-centric thinking and experimentation and European efforts (Forbes 2003 4) European military sources have shown a high degree of interest in ACT programs and activities seeking a high degree of participation ACT is positioned to be an important player in NATOrsquos planning processes It leads the Defense Planning Process

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

99

including the development of the Defense Requirements Review a classifi ed analytic assessment of the minimum military capabilities needed to meet the Alliancersquos goal of carrying out up to three major joint operations simultaneously ACT has also developed some 30 generic scenarios used to inventory capabilities ACTrsquos focus on qualitative force goals could help member nations develop crucial capabilities or force attributes rather than merely reaching quantitative goals

ACT also assesses national contributions to NATO in coordination with national military authorities In addition it has developed a Strategic Vision for transformation and is developing concepts for Allied Future Joint Operations As a part of its goal of driving transformation in the Alliance ACT has worked to establish relationships with other NATO agencies including the NC3A the NATO Undersea Research Center the Research and Technology Organization and the NATO Standardization Agency as well as NATOrsquos educational centers

ACT holds great promise provided its activities are given priority in Washington DC The priority the US plans to give to ACT remains to be tested In addition ACTrsquos role in the allied and US defense planning along with its ability to review national-level C4ISR programs is not yet clear It remains to be seen whether this institutional reform creates incentives both for European force transformation and for more intense transatlantic commitments to interoperability especially in C4ISR

NATO has taken steps since ACT to reinforce the commitment to network-based operations especially the creation of the NATO Network-Enabled Capabilities project In November 2002 the NC3B announced the intention of developing a NATO equivalent of the American NCW concept and the British NEC The fi rst step in this process will be a feasibility study examining the technical and organizational issues such a concept would involve in the NATO context Led by the NC3A with the support of ACT this feasibility study takes a European view of transformation using the terms ldquonetwork enabledrdquo and ldquocapabilitiesrdquo instead of the American ldquonetwork-centricrdquo and ldquowarfarerdquo

Rather than wait for a joint NATO agreement about the investment and organization of the NATO Network-Enabled Capabilities (NNEC) study nine NATO nations (Canada France Germany Italy the Netherlands Norway Spain the United Kingdom and the United States) agreed in November 2003 to jointly fund the study Each nation has agreed to contribute 150000 euros for a total of 1350000 euros The study has delivered a roadmap for NATO to guide the creation of a network-enabled capability for its 26 member nations This roadmap takes into account interoperability issues commercial and technology trends and relevant national assets (both existing and planned) The study covered how network-enabled capabilities can be deployed by the NRF and how national information ownership issues can be overcome With completion of the study in 2005 the NNEC concept was taken over by ACT and made part of the Commandrsquos long-term capability development requirements which in turn form the basis for future NATO procurement In addition ACT conducted two NNEC training courses in June and October of 2005 the second of which took place at the Commandrsquos new C2 Center of Excellence in the Netherlands

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

100

The 2004 Istanbul NATO Summit further stressed the Alliancersquos need to increase the deployability and usability of its forces and for continuing the transformation process already underway The fi nal communiqueacute mentioned in particular the streamlined command arrangements ndash including the establishment of ACT ndash the NRF and a commonly funded AGS program The summit also committed to a project to provide guidance on improving various NATO capabilities including operational planning and intelligence specifi cally for interoperable and deployable forces able to carry out operations and operate jointly in a complex security environment

Other multinational network programs

Outside of the NATO context several other international interoperability frameworks have been established with the aim of achieving better C4ISR coordination between the United States and its allies These are working toward common military standards for equipment fi elded by allied forces including some NATO countries as well as Australia and New Zealand They include the American British Canadian Australian Armiesrsquo Standardization Program (ABCA) the Air Standardization Coordinating Committee (ASCC) the Australian Canadian New Zealand United Kingdom and United States Naval C4 Organization (AUSCANNZUKUS) the Combined Communications Electronics Board (CCEB) the Multilateral Interoperability Program (MIP) and the Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) Another forum known as The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP) is not a military standardization forum but maintains close relationships with the other above-mentioned programs to coordinate the defense RampD efforts of Australia Canada New Zealand the United Kingdom and the United States Of all the above-mentioned interoperability entities the MIC and the MIP are the only ones to include European countries other than the United Kingdom

The Multinational Interoperability Council

In 1996 Australia Canada France Germany the United Kingdom and the United States create the MIC to provide oversight of coalition interoperability and stimulate improvements among the countries most likely and most capable of leading future coalitions Initially referred to as the Six Nation Council the name was changed to the MIC in 1999 Later the member states granted New Zealand and NATO ACT observer status and in 2005 accepted Italy as the Councilrsquos seventh member

The MIC is administered through the US Joint Staffrsquos Deputy Director for Global Operations (J3 DDGO) to provide a multinational senior level forum for addressing the core issues affecting information interoperability between coalition forces It is concerned with policies doctrines operational planning and networking capabilities relevant to the information sharing capabilities of member states It also serves as the senior coordinating body for the member nations in

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

101

resolving interoperability issues and promotes dialogue between operational planners C4ISR technology experts and defense policy analysts involved in coalition operations

MIC membership includes senior operations doctrine and C4ISR experts from each of the member nations It is divided into Multinational Interoperability Working Groups (MIWG) each of which explores specifi c problems in coalition interoperability and proposes solutions There is no fi xed number of MIWGs they are created when problems have been identifi ed and disbanded after their work is done Each MIWG is comprised of representatives from the member nations from various services and agencies according to the needs of the group An Executive Support Committee (EXECOM) assists the MIWGs in addressing actions in a timely fashion when it is not possible to convene a meeting of the entire MIWG The Committee includes a representative of each member nationrsquos defense attacheacute staff in Washington a member of the Working Group on National Correlation and the MIC Executive Secretary (a member of the US Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I)

Currently the MIC has MIWGs that focus on coalition warfare doctrine collabo-rative planning advanced C2 concepts requirements for information exchange and the sharing of classifi ed intelligence secure video- and tele-conferencing and the creation of a combined Wide Area Network known as GRIFFIN The fi ve existing MIWGs cover operations networking logistics doctrines plans and procedures and concept development and experimentation Additionally there is a Capstone MIWG in charge of formulating the MICrsquos strategic plan for the future

MIWGs generally meet twice a year Once they propose a solution it is passed on to the MIC which meets annually to respond and passes its recommendations on to the member nations The organization cannot do more than advise and report its recommendations may or may not eventually be accepted by the member nations The MIC also produces an annual report on policy doctrine and planning for warfi ghting interoperability NATOrsquos doctrine on coalition operations is an important guide for the MIC on this matter

MIC reports to date have concentrated on lessons learned from coalition warfare exercises specifi cally East Timor and Afghanistan on the need for better information sharing applications between the member countries including secure tele-conferencing video-conferencing and e-mail and on a Coalition-Building Guide The latter signed by the members in 2005 identifi es the notion of a coalition Lead Nation defi ned as ldquothat nation with the will and capability competence and infl uence to provide the essential elements of political consultation and military leadership to coordinate the planning mounting and execution of a coalition military operationrdquo (Multinational Interoperability Council 2005 v) France has expressed concern about this defi nition suggesting that circumstances may dictate the need for several Lead Nations in an operation It also requested with German support that the Guide state that only the United Nations can act to sanction coalition actions a request that is not yet refl ected in the fi nal version presented in 2002

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

102

The MIC has also coordinated four Multinational Experiments (MNE) intended to contribute to the interoperability between member nations The fi rst such exercise undertaken in 2001 examined how a combined joint force headquarters would conduct rapid decisive operations within a distributed collaborative information environment with coalition partners MNE2 examined the development of a multinational operational net assessment as well as coalition multinational information sharing MNE3 in February 2004 explored concepts and supporting tools for effects-based operations and to assist the development of future processes organizations and technologies at the operational and joint task force levels of command It also included NATO participation and evaluated the ability of the NRF to support the planning of a coalition effects-based campaign The fourth and fi nal MNE addresses effects-based operations and C2 issues While some view the MIC and its exercises as key tools for France Germany Italy and the United Kingdom to improve interoperability with the US it is not clear how other countries not involved in this forum will benefi t from its lessons (Boyer 2004)

The Combined Communications Electronics Board

The CCEB includes Australia Canada New Zealand the United Kingdom and the United States It coordinates issues related to military communications raised by a member nation Its origins date back to the Combined Communications Board created during the Second World War which defi ned combined UK-US communications policies with Canada Australia and New Zealand as observers Canada became a full member in 1951 Australia in 1969 and New Zealand in 1972 when it was renamed CCEB Germany and France recently sought membership in this organization but both were denied

The CCEBrsquos mission is to maximize the effectiveness of combined operations by defi ning a common environment in which users can share and apply collective information and know-how Although covering all C4 systems of the member nations the CCEB does not own any of them Rather it seeks to defi ne architectures standards and operational procedures that its members will adopt when designing and modifying their national systems As much as possible these will be based on commercial standards and products Over time implementing the CCEBrsquos recommendations should improve interoperability and eventually create a virtual single system used by all members Adopting these standards is voluntary however which means that interoperability will be advanced only if the nations make the decision to implement the CCEB-developed standards

The CCEBrsquos one permanent full-time member of staff the Permanent Secretary coordinates the organizationrsquos daily activities All other personnel are drawn from national organizations on a part-time temporary basis Member nations contribute resources individually to specifi c tasks The senior C4 offi cials or Principals appointed to the CCEB by the member nations are in charge of formulating the organizationrsquos broader goals and of bringing them into national decision-making bodies An Executive Group coordinates the development of policies and plans

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

103

formulated by the Principals and prioritizes tasks In addition the member nationrsquos representatives in Washington DC may be tasked individually to work on CCEB assignments as may staff members at national headquarters

The majority of the CCEBrsquos work is undertaken under the auspices of Working Groups which consider specifi c issues raised by member nations Currently Working Groups are in place to discuss information security frequency planning directory services wide area networks (specifi cally the GRIFFIN WAN) and communications publications In addition Task Forces may be established to address specifi c short-term issues one currently deals with secure military messaging

In September 2001 the CCEB and the MIC signed a Statement of Cooperation (SOC) under which the CCEB is recognized as the expert technical body on C4 systems while the MIC is recognized as responsible for providing leadership in joint and coalition warfare doctrine and requirements Since the CCEBrsquos aim is to defi ne a joint and combined C4 interoperability environment and to enhance interoperability among C4 systems the SOC ensures that this goal is coordinated with efforts for developing doctrines and solutions brought forward by the MIC for information sharing between countries Equally important the SOC enables non-CCEB members of the MIC ndash Germany Italy and France ndash to participate in those CCEB groups directly involved in MIC-directed activities and to receive status updates on CCEB activities at MIC meetings In addition the SOC has also led to some technical MIC work being subcontracted to the CCEB

The Multilateral Interoperability Program

In April 1998 Canada France Germany Italy the United Kingdom and the United States created the MIP merging two existing programs the BIP (Battlefi eld Interoperability Program) and the QIP (Quadrilateral Interoperability Program) both of which were aimed at improving interoperability between land C2 systems In 2002 the MIP merged with the Army Tactical Command and Control Information System (ATCCIS) program which had been working since 1980 on technical standards and specifi cations for NATO membersrsquo C2 systems to make them interoperable

In November 2003 24 nations (Canada Denmark France Germany Italy the Netherlands Norway Spain Turkey the United Kingdom and the United States as full members and Australia Austria Belgium Bulgaria the Czech Republic Finland Greece Hungary Lithuania Poland Romania Slovenia and Sweden as associate members) and two NATO commands (ACT and AFNORTH which today is Joint Force Command Brunssum) signed a Statement of Intent to advance international interoperability of land C2 systems at all levels from corps to battalion to support multinational combined and joint operations This goal is to be achieved through a technical interoperability solution or baseline that could be integrated into membersrsquo existing C2 infrastructures However the program would not actually develop a common C2 system leaving it to the membersrsquo discretion to accept the technical solution

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

104

The MIP solution has two technical aspects a common data model known as the Command and Control Information Exchange Data Model (C2IEDM) and a set of procedures and protocols that allow the replication of data among different C2 systems known as the MIP Data Exchange Mechanism (MIPDEM) Countries that incorporate this solution into their C2 systems can share any information they choose with other nationsrsquo C2 systems over any means of communication available The British Canadian Danish French German Italian Dutch Norwegian Portuguese Spanish and US armiesrsquo C2 systems have to date been certifi ed as MIP conformant and more are expected to follow

In 2004 NATO adopted the MIPrsquos C2IEDM data model which signifi ed the increasing importance and acceptation of the MIP as a standard-setting entity It seems increasingly likely that the MIP solution will have a signifi cant infl uence on the development and design of future national systems These solutions however are not ldquoplug-and-playrdquo solutions In order to ensure true semantic interoperability far-reaching modifi cations to the core of national C2 information systems are necessary rather than just the addition of mapping adapters as new interfaces to the existing systems (Schmitt 2005 2)

The Combined Endeavor exercises

As another multilateral effort the Headquarters of the US European Command (EUCOM) sponsors and coordinates a multinational command control communications and computer (C4) exercise known as Combined Endeavor Its aim is to develop C2 and communications interoperability in preparation for crisis response operations by testing and documenting solutions that may then be integrated into national systems The exercise has been held every year since 1995 each builds on the capabilities demonstrated and lessons learned during the previous one The exercises also include demonstrations of emerging C4 technologies developed by a nation or group of nations that may in the future contribute to coalition interoperability solutions

Combined Endeavor has grown from its fi rst exercise in 1995 That exercise included some 3300 interoperability tests conducted by 10 participating nations during a 2-week period in Germany and Austria In 2005 the exercise included 43 partner nations and 2 multinational organizations (NATO and the South East Europe Brigade) all testing advanced systems and networks The 2005 exercise included over 15000 interoperability tests including a 1-gigabyte core communications backbone between several nodes used to transmit voice video and data A Combined Joint Communications Coordination Center was stood up to demonstrate the effectiveness of network management procedures for multinational networks The 2005 exercise also put all participating nations through the US and NATO network security accreditation process prior to connecting to the network demonstrating the capability to build a protected coalition network a signifi cant achievement in the fi eld of information assurance

At the end of each exercise the results are documented in an interoperability guide that codifi es the results from all interoperability tests down to the level

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

105

of wiring diagrams for specifi c systems This information is crucial to planning future multinational network-based operations It enables forces to plug and play based on proven results Interoperability solutions that have emerged from past Combined Endeavor exercises have been used to support military peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations in the Balkans Kosovo Afghanistan Iraq Indonesia and Liberia

The Combined Endeavor exercise is an important tool for highlighting the benefi ts of networks in modern security operations Participants observe fi rst-hand how advanced C4 capabilities can make them more interoperable and thus more effective in a multinational environment By involving not only EU and NATO members but also allies from other regions such as South Africa and Central Asia the importance of networking C4 and coalition interoperability is conveyed to a wide array of potential coalition partners

Conclusion

As an organization NATO has clearly moved strongly to advance the Alliancersquos C4ISR capabilities into the twenty-fi rst century and has taken multiple steps to incentivize its members to move in this direction While the traditional NATO force planning methods do not yet fully support this effort the decision to create the NRF could constitute a major step toward a transformed capability NATO common programs for C2 and communications including space communications are being modernized Several new RampT investment programs hold promise for a move toward a more integrated C2 communications and sensor data architecture including ACCS AGS TMD and CAESAR Finally the Prague decisions (PCC NRF and ACT) all could help redefi ne alliance capabilities and restructure European member state investments

This is however a more fragile trend than it appears Should US force planning and investment continue to be largely unilateral conducted outside the Alliance framework the transatlantic C4ISR gap will be harder to bridge In 2002 for example John Stenbit then Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command Control Communications and Intelligence suggested this might be a preferred US policy noting that interoperability is ldquobest thought of in bilateral and multilateral relations not alliancesrdquo He added that ldquothe dynamics of how these communities of interest are going to form and un-form and around which changing sets of parameters are quicker than the processes that NATO considers when looking forwardrdquo (Stenbit 2002 85ndash92)

For NATO to continue to play a key role in the process of reshaping European C4ISR capabilities the US will need to put interoperability at the center of its C4ISR planning process which is not currently the case NATO interoperability features in US equipment designs tend to be removed when programs are trimmed to meet budget constraints and the key performance parameter now included in most American systems is interoperability within US forces not with NATO (Barry 2003 9) The US will need to give ACT priority as the bridge to European capabilities US funding decisions with respect to ACCS AGS or TMD can either

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

106

strengthen or weaken efforts to create a common European C4ISR architecture The US staying at the margin of the NRF could also undermine European willingness to invest seriously in that effort A US decision to delay diminish or cancel the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter which has signifi cant transatlantic participation could have a major impact on the willingness of the European allies to commit to common programs Finally continuing US unwillingness to reform its export control and technology transfer rules will weaken the incentive European allies have to commit to transatlantic collaborative technology programs inside or outside NATO

There could also be trends in European policies that weaken the role of NATO in enhancing transatlantic C4ISR interoperability and the move toward networked capabilities While the European Unionrsquos defense activities (discussed in the next chapter) are not as advanced as the changes in NATO if the EU moves toward a vision and capabilities that are separate from NATO it could undermine the NATO effort There are important positive reasons for the Europeans to create more autonomous European capabilities but it will also be important to manage the evolution of the EU-NATO relationship so progress can continue in both frameworks Furthermore whether through the European Union or NATO a failure to provide adequate European investment in C4ISR or to continue funding for PCC priorities and ACCS AGS and TMD programs could weaken the NATO effort and interoperability in general Finally national investments in Europe need to give continued priority to interoperability within Europe and across the Atlantic for the effort to succeed

In addition to NATO the US and the Europeans need to be sure to rationalize and give appropriate attention to work in the other multinational frameworks that address specifi c areas of C4ISR interoperability All of the frameworks discussed in this chapter involve the United States as a key participant and place great emphasis on transatlantic interoperability issues However with the exception of the MIC and the MIP none involve European partners other than the United Kingdom The MIC analyzes policies doctrines and procedures for coalition interoperability and the MIP with a much broader membership base is limited to specifi c command and control solutions for land forces Neither deals with technical solutions to broad interoperability challenges Furthermore the denial of membership to France and Germany could set back transatlantic collaboration on standards architectures and protocols for interoperability between national C4ISR systems This leaves two of the three European militaries currently capable of executing out-of-area security operations outside the interoperability loop

107

5

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NETWORK-BASED

CAPABILITIES

Defense and security issues have emerged as a major concern for the European Union over the past decade stimulated and accelerated by the lessons Europeans have learned from the interoperability diffi culties experienced by European forces operating in the fi rst Gulf War Bosnia the Kosovo air campaign Afghanistan and Iraq Most of these lessons involve obstacles to achieving successful C4ISR interoperability

Increasingly major European militaries feel the need for a common rapid deployment military capability that can operate autonomously using its own dedicated equipment transport and C4ISR or borrowing NATO assets Slowly steps are being taken to make this intention a reality including internal developments in the European Union and the negotiation of the ldquoBerlin Plusrdquo agreement with NATO which gives the European Union recourse to NATO assets to carry out crisis management operations when NATO is not involved

During 2003ndash4 the European Union took signifi cant strides forward in developing operational capability and conducting strategic defense planning It conducted independent policing operations in Bosnia a military peacekeeping mission in Macedonia and a small peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Operation Artemis in the Congo became a model for the creation of the EU Battlegroups one year later (see below) In December 2004 the European Union Force (EUFOR) replaced the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) as the peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina

In the area of strategic defense planning the European Council decided in 2004 to focus on defense planning outside the framework of its Constitution discussion and accelerated the establishment of a European-level agency responsible for armaments policy and oversight on the capabilities process The European Union also announced the Headline Goal 2010 which builds on the Helsinki Headline Goal expanding and deepening EU commitments to strengthen its military and civilian capabilities with a strong emphasis on interoperability deployability and sustainability In the same year the Council announced a plan to create 13 EU Battlegroups at the Military Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels

The failure to ratify the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands has not impeded progress towards these improved European defense capabilities It seems clear the many of the EU members are seeking ways to participate more

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

108

effectively in overseas military operations including combat peacekeeping and post-confl ict reconstruction both autonomously and in coalition with the United States regardless of the uncertainties of the EU constitutional process Such operations will require new assets for rapid force deployment and especially systems that will enable these forces to collect intelligence share it amongst themselves and with headquarters and act upon it in a coordinated manner

EU strategic defense plans and capabilities

European-level strategic thinking and defense planning have made signifi cant strides since the Maastricht treaty was signed in 1991 (Adams 2001a) Initially European militaries and defense budgets shrank with the end of the Cold War as they did in the United States Several changes marked turning points for Europe The Maastricht Treaty committed the European Unionrsquos Members States to forging a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and created the Second Pillar in the European Union involving political and security issues The European Council ndash representing the Member States ndash would handle this on an intergovernmental basis The Treaty of Amsterdam which came into force in 1999 went a step further defi ning the CFSP as ldquoincluding the progressive framing of a common defense policy hellip which might lead to a common defenserdquo (European Union 2002 Article 1-12-4)

The European Rapid Reaction Force and the Battlegoups

In 1999 the European Council meeting in Cologne set a European Union goal of having the capacity for independent action in the form of capable military forces and the means to use these forces in response to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO That same year in Helsinki the European Council crafted an EU Headline Goal to create a force of 50000ndash60000 troops that could be deployed within 60 days and supported in theater for a year The mission of this force would be what was called the Petersberg tasks humanitarian and rescue missions peacekeeping and operations of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking This range of missions was defi ned at a WEU declaration made in Petersberg Germany in June 1992 and was codifi ed in the Amsterdam Treaty

To oversee this work the European Union created the Political and Security Committee The PSC would consider and act on foreign policy and security issues and manage crisis interventions The Union also created a Military Committee consisting of senior offi cers from the Member States which has responsibility for military planning and a Military Staff of roughly 150 based in Brussels to examine and shape military requirements for the Headline Goal force

The European Union then inventoried European national military capabilities relevant to the Headline Goal and set objectives to meet inventory shortfalls held Capability Improvement Conferences to track commitments and created the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) with nationally-led working groups

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

109

to develop strategies for meeting key shortfalls At the Laeken Belgium meeting in December 2002 the Council declared that the European Union had achieved the capability to conduct some crisis management operations The European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) that emerged from this Headline Goal process is committed to missions that are somewhat different from those defi ned for the NATO Response Force The NRF is intended to be lighter and more rapidly deployable for early arrival in out-of-area missions while the ERRF is largely intended for humanitarian and peacekeeping missions

This distinction between the Petersberg tasks and high-intensity combat has been a gray area in the European defense discussion To some supporters the European Unionrsquos ERRF was distinct from a European high-intensity network-based military capability while to others the higher end of the Petersberg tasks overlapped with high intensity combat and would require a network-based capability

With respect to C4ISR and network-based operations this distinction may not be signifi cant Any EU force that is intended to operate on a coalition basis will require C2 systems that cover the entire force Whether it is heavy and slow or light and mobile the utility of ISR systems for the total force is unarguable The European Unionrsquos review of capabilities and the goals being set clearly point toward more network-centric forces Moreover while the European Union can make use of both national (currently German British and French possibly Greek and Italian in the near future) and NATO operational headquarters (the latter under the Berlin Plus agreement) for controlling its missions these assets are not mobile European military planners are aware that a future ERRF would need dedicated mobile C2 and communications systems to deploy in the fi eld

The European Unionrsquos ability to deploy small and effective response forces has been further enhanced by a separate EU decision to create smaller mobile Battlegroups This decision began with a 2003 Franco-British agreement according to which they would encourage the European Union to develop a capability that could respond more rapidly than the emerging ERRF with particular attention to the readiness deployability interoperability and sustainability of such a force This goal was further elaborated in London in November 2003 the objective being a 1500-person EU force built on the model of Operation Artemis which could deploy in 15 days with appropriate transportation and sustainability

Increasingly offi cials working on the European Constitution realized that the Headline Goal force would only get part of the way toward the objective of rapid reaction and out-of-area operations (European Union 2003) The text of the European Unionrsquos draft constitution pointed toward a more ambitious European security strategy The fi nal report of the Conventionrsquos working group on defense called not only for the Headline Goal force but also for ldquosmaller rapid response elements with very high readinessrdquo including C2 intelligence and reconnaissance (European Convention Working Group ndash Defense 2002 5) The working group also recommended that the Petersberg tasks be updated and broadened to include confl ict prevention joint disarmament operations military advice and assistance post-confl ict stabilization and support for anti-terrorism operations in non-

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

110

European Union countries It urged Members States to implement more intense defense cooperation than that provided for in the Headline Goal force (European Convention Working Group ndash Defense 2002 23ndash4)

The 2004 Constitutional Treaty itself repeated many of these themes It amended the Petersberg tasks to include joint disarmament operations humanitarian and rescue missions provision of military advice and assistance confl ict prevention and peacekeeping crisis management peacemaking and post-confl ict stabilization It also tasked the proposed European Armaments Research and Military Capabilities Agency ndash todayrsquos European Defense Agency ndash with helping to identify the military capability objectives of the Member States and evaluate them (European Union 2004)

At the November 2004 EU Military Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels the members moved even further announcing the intention to create EU Battlegroups each numbering 1500 ground troops These will be smaller in scope than the ERRF but are intended to correct some of its shortcomings especially the need for more rapid deployment The Battlegroups are planned to reach the theater of operations in 15 days and sustain an operation for 30 days (120 days with rotation) France the UK and Italy each pledged to have one operational Battlegroup ready by the end of 2005 Ten other Battlegroups will be developed collaboratively by different combinations of EU Member States and one will include Norway a non-EU member These Battlegroups are intended to be operational by 2007 by which time the European Union should be able to undertake two concurrent Battlegroup-sized rapid response operations

The European Defense Agency

The constitutional discussion focused particular attention on the need for a more focused EU capability to deal with military requirements the evolution of capabilities to meet those requirements and the readiness of the European defense industrial and technology base to cope with those needs The Convention recommended the creation of a European Armaments and Strategic Research Agency to track progress toward the interoperability and force readiness necessary to accomplish the wider missions they were promoting (European Convention Working Group ndash Defense 2002 23ndash4) In 2003 this particular proposal was advanced on a separate track largely supported by French and British government policies The EU Council of Ministers decided to ask the Council staff to plan the implementation of the European Defense Agency well ahead of the schedule for ratifying and implementing the proposals for a new EU constitutional charter The mission of the agency was elaborated in detail in November 2003 including operational requirements strengthening the defense industrial and technological base defi ning a European capabilities and armaments policy and helping the Council evaluate the improvement of military capabilities

The Council decision created an Agency Establishment Team under High Representative Javier Solana to present proposals by April 2004 for decisions in June Those proposals were intended to move the EDA issue onto a fast track

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

111

covering the structure and organization of the agency its internal working methods its working relationship with the Council and the Commission ties with the Organization Conjoint pour la Cooperation en Matiere drsquoArmament (OCCAR) and the Western European Union (WEU) RampD programs (see below) its budget administration and staffi ng It was also to outline a fi rst operational program for the agency in the fi elds of capabilities development armaments cooperation industrial and technology base policy research promotion and potential plans for creating a European defense market

The Establishment Team of 12 led by British civil servant Nick Witney began work in February 2004 Its proposals moved toward creating a relatively small agency directed by a steering committee of ministers of defense and funded by joint contributions to an administrative fund They discussed creating a second funding arrangement in the European Union for defense RampT studies and only the gradual absorption of existing multilateral procurement activities such as OCCAR (Tigner 2004 4)

The Agency came into existence in the summer of 2004 Despite a modest 2005 budget of 25 million euros and a staff of 78 the EDA has made important progress in the fi rst year particularly in areas relevant to network-based operations Two ldquofl agship projectsrdquo have been initiated in the C4ISR realm The fi rst undertaken by the Agencyrsquos RampT Directorate funds projects related to long-endurance UAVs (described later in this chapter) The second headed by the Capabilities Directorate seeks to improve European capabilities and interoperability in command control and communications

Initially a joint EDA-EU Military Staff study identifi ed a wide range of C3I capability gaps Many were characterized as ldquoderiving from the absence of any detailed assessment of overall C3 requirements for ESDP or coherent architectures for satisfying themrdquo (Council of the European Union 2005 4) The study also highlighted the potential of software-defi ned radio for C3 interoperability and submitted a detailed proposal for pursuing additional C3 work to the Capabilities Steering Board While the overall direction of EDArsquos C3I agenda is still evolving it is likely to include specifi c problems in ongoing EU operations (such as Operation Althea in Bosnia) and the needs of the emerging Battlegroups In addition the agenda may explore improvements in EU procurement of satellite bandwidth for future operations (House of Lords 2005 21)

Focusing on capabilities

Despite these recent developments there is not currently a joint multinational force at the European level that can fi eld common C4ISR assets and carry out fully network-based operations It is not yet clear whether the Member States will commit the resources needed to upgrade and integrate the national capabilities already described Despite the budgetary constraints that make such a capability diffi cult there is an active process underway at the European level to give Member States the incentive to modernize and transform forces and equipment to make them more interoperable

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

112

The Headline Goal and the European Capabilities Action Plan have identifi ed capability shortfalls and set priorities for meeting them The initial Headline Goal and evaluation processes through 2001 identifi ed 19 critical shortfalls and a process for meeting shortfalls The ECAP panels each chaired by a Member State include eight capabilities relevant to network-based operations UAVs for surveillance and target acquisition deployable communications modules headquarters theater surveillance and reconnaissance air picture strategic ISR IMINT collection HALEMALE UAVs early warning and distant detection at the strategic level

This fi rst stage of the ECAP process led to reports submitted in March 2003 proposing changes to national contributions or new acquisitions to fi ll the capability gaps The May 2003 Capabilities Conference then identifi ed ten groups to develop strategies for fi lling key shortfalls through acquisition leasing multinational projects or role specialization three of which deal with C4ISR capabilities headquarters (United Kingdom lead) UAVs (French lead) and space-based assets (French lead)

The weakness of the ECAP process is that it is voluntary and not clearly linked to funding decisions or coordinated with the EU Military Staff The ECAP groups could not design long-term procurement plans as national planners and procurement specialists were not members Proposed acquisitions faced major political and fi nancial hurdles Moreover ECAP was designed in the context of the Headline Goal target and was not linked to the rapid deployment Battlegroups discussed above The European Council decided in November 2003 to tighten the process develop a clear roadmap and begin to identify objectives timelines and reporting procedures for each group

Progress has been made since with respect to headquarters medical treatment facilities and nuclear chemical and biological defenses However the ECAP process continues to lack clear leadership and coordination The ECAP approach leaves it up to the Member States to decide when and how additional capabilities should be acquired and makes it diffi cult to achieve results in areas that require signifi cant fi nancial investments such as strategic lift and air-to-air refueling

Pressure on the members was increased by requiring them to set goals and timelines and to publish their results in regular Capability Improvement Charts presented during each rotating EU Presidency Progress remains minimal however particularly in areas relevant for network-based operations There are currently no new or planned projects growing out of the ECAP process and a number of the ECAP Project Groups have indicated that they have reached or are close to reaching the maximum possible results within the current framework

In May 2005 the European Council approved an EDAEU Military Committee evaluation report on the ECAP The report included a detailed review of the ECAP Project Groups and suggested refocusing their work in the framework of the 2010 Headline Goal The Project Group on interoperability for humanitarian and evacuation operations will be discontinued while those on Special Forces and helicopters will continue in their present format All others will be incorporated into a new more integrated process coordinated by the European Defense Agency

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

113

in the framework of broader European Security and Defense Policy goals Under newly established Integrated Development Teams military technological and industrial representatives will generate specifi c projects to fulfi ll capability shortfalls Together with the newly outlined Headline Goal 2010 this revised process may provide incentives for Member States to reaffi rm their ECAP commitments

Industrial base planning

Over the past 15 years the national governments and Commission of the European Union have taken several steps to advance the issue of a Europe-wide armaments policy to match the emerging force requirements and to ensure a healthy industrial and technology base The creation of the EDArsquos Industry and Market Directorate is the latest such step

From the perspective of the defense industrial and technology base the Europeans have three options for arming national or cross-national forces with particular attention to their interoperability They could acquire advanced defense technology from the United States which was common during the Cold War Buying American however is increasingly unattractive to European governments given the lack of reciprocal access for European fi rms to the US defense market the diffi culties encountered with US export control and technology transfer regulations and processes and the negative impact it would have on the smaller European industrial and technology base (Adams 2001b 30ndash4)

The second option is to develop defense systems and technologies on a transatlantic basis US trade and technology transfer rules make this diffi cult though the European industry is pursuing this option as the strategic partnership of EADS and Northrop Grumman and the Thales Raytheon Systems joint venture suggest However European fi rms and governments have been concerned that their smaller fi rms could be swallowed up by larger American partners and about the risk that technology would fl ow only one way from Europe to the United States

The third option is for Europeans to strengthen their own defense industrial and technology base to be able to supply their own defense technology independently of the United States as well as to build partnerships with ndash and create competition for ndash US companies There has been growing support in Europe for this third option To sustain a European defense industrial and technology base however requires removing the intra-European barriers to industry relations technology transfer defense trade and cross-national acquisition The policy developments of the past decade at the European level are slowly defi ning a more trans-European defense market The most important change has been the development of multilateral institutions and processes that facilitate a trans-European defense market and cooperative defense procurement The creation of the European Defense Agency could be a critical breakthrough empowering the European Union to become a player in armaments policy a role previously constrained by the terms of the European Union treaties (Schmitt 2003a 2003b)

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

114

The emergence of a European armaments market and matching policy is likely to be critical to the prospects for success in the ECAP and in the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) The harmonization of military requirements the standardization of equipment to meet those requirements the elimination of acquisition and research redundancies budgetary savings and greater interoperability could all fl ow from this development Efforts to create a defense industrial policy at the EU level to harmonize rules governing requirements and defense trade to create a framework for cross-European defense acquisition programs and to create EU-level structures that can deal with arms market policies will all contribute to reaching these goals

This industrial and technology base process has been underway for nearly a decade but progress has been marked in recent years In 1996 France Germany Italy and the United Kingdom created a Joint Armaments Cooperation Organiza-tion (known by its French acronym OCCAR for Organization Conjoint pour la Cooperation en Matiere drsquoArmament) to manage specifi c cross-European defense programs including the HOT Roland and Milan missiles the Tiger helicopter and recently the A400M transport aircraft OCCAR is based on intergovernmental agreements and has been restricted to joint production programs not research and development Although OCCAR is not an EU entity as interest has grown in an EU-level armaments policy other European Union members have joined (Belgium) or intend to do so (Spain Netherlands Sweden) The organization achieved independent legal status in 2001

In 1998 the six largest arms producing countries (United Kingdom France Germany Sweden Italy and Spain) signed a Letter of Intent (LOI) to address jointly a number of areas of policy that would facilitate a more trans-European defense market for European industry The LOI process which follows a Framework Agreement announced in 2001 covers security of defense supply export control processes security of information military research and technology technical information and harmonization of military requirements This process is also outside the European Union framework and clearly intergovernmental it creates no new European-level structures or organizations The goal is to make national rules and procedures in these areas compatible with each other not to harmonize all standards or policies Though the process is slow and laborious it does put the national bureaucracies of six countries into a working process with each other in an effort to defi ne policies that will integrate the European defense market

Interest in armaments policy has also developed inside the European Union itself Article 296 of the Amsterdam Treaty provides that ldquoany Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or the trade in arms munitions and war materialrdquo (European Commission 2004 6) European Union members referred to this Article for years to protect national industrial and technology base decisions from being part of the EU agenda In 1995 however the EU Council of Ministers took a limited fi rst step toward addressing these concerns creating a working group on Armaments Policy (POLARM) POLARM

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

115

activity remained limited until the early 2000s when a broader interest in this policy area emerged in Europe (Schmitt 2003b 32)

The European Commission the EUrsquos supranational secretariat has also had an interest in armaments policy despite the reluctance of the members to become more active in this area Since 2000 the Commission has had direct authority over dual-use export controls in the European Union though national governments continue to defi ne the contents of the control list through negotiations and retain authority over purely military exports The Commission has also begun trying to shape broader armaments and defense market policies (European Commission 1997 2003a) and has also encouraged private sector activities that would support the emergence of a stronger European Union policy in this area (European Commission 2002) The Commission also plays a more direct role in the area of dual-use space programs such as Galileo as discussed in the next chapter

The Commission has been particularly concerned with the question of how to enhance interoperability The STAR 21 report sponsored by the Commission in 2002 focused on the goal of enhancing European interoperability both in the EU and NATO contexts and ensuring European autonomy from the United States if needed The report pointed out that to be interoperable with the US or act autonomously EU military requirements needed to he harmonized and RampD shared at a European level (European Commission 2002 29ndash30) The Commissionrsquos 2003 communication on armaments policy argued strongly for a ldquogenuine European Defense Equipment Marketrdquo to provide economies of scale greater acquisition bargaining power and especially to meet the needs of interoperability To achieve interoperability in a cost-effective way the Commission argued ldquothe solution would be to equip the national units that make up these forces increasingly with the same equipmentrdquo (European Commission 2003a 6)

Progress toward a coherent EU policy on armaments and greater interoperability and modern C4ISR across European forces will be slow at the European level The European Defense Agency will play a critical role defi ning capabilities goals more broadly than the Headline Goal devoting attention to network-centric C4ISR capabilities supporting research efforts to support those goals encouraging national governments to realign their budgets to acquire key technologies and systems coordinating national acquisitions and providing a central point for the realignment of the European defense market The EDA authority remains limited but over time it could develop the capabilities needed to perform these tasks at the European level as other EU-level policy institutions have done in the past

The EU process is largely an intergovernmental one and has led to relatively slow policy change The Member States will inevitably restrain EDArsquos activity To be fully effective it will need greater autonomy and a larger budget The linkages between its capabilities functions its evaluation functions its research support and its procurement functions will need to be clarifi ed The relationship with the Commission which manages its own armaments research policy process and has explicit responsibilities for industrial research competition and trade policy will need to be carefully defi ned Harmonizing its relationship with the

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

116

non-EU processes and organizations ndash OCCAR and the LOI ndash will be complex But the fi rst steps toward greater European-level responsibilities for defense and armaments policy have clearly been taken

Defense research and technology programs

The European defense research and technology investment and harmonization of national RampT investments will be key to achieving greater interoperability and networked forces without major additional budget expenditures The United States outspends the European NATO allies by a ratio of 51 on total defense RampD a ratio that has grown with the increases in US defense budgets in the early 2000s The United States RampT investment has also explicitly focused on network-centric technologies military transformation and C4ISR By contrast European RampT investments remain largely national duplicative and poorly coordinated across national boundaries making the total less than the sum of its parts

The general view in Europe is that most EU Member States underspend on research and development In 2002 the European Council set a goal of spending three per cent of GDP on RampD in each Member State by 2010 At current growth rates the EU average will reach only 23 per cent by that year Only two European countries Sweden and Finland currently spend above the 3 per cent target and the European Union average is still just under 2 per cent (compared to 27 per cent in the United States) (European Commission 2003c 48 52) In defense RampD the trend is even less promising In 2001 the Member States of the European Union spent slightly over $9 billion on defense-related RampD or 75 per cent of the average defense budget (compared with almost 14 per cent of the US defense budget in the same year) (Adams et al 2004 122)

Article 296 of the Amsterdam Treaty has made it diffi cult for the European Commission to address the RampD problem restricting Commission action to cases where trade policies or dual-use RampD investments distorted the operations of the civilian common market Moreover due to the sensitivity of the issue for some Member States the Commission intervened reluctantly and slowly As a result defense research and technology investments have remained a domain for the Member States with relatively little cooperation in the EU context (James and Gummett 1998)

The Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) program of the WEU has been a major exception at the European-level WEAG was created when the WEU absorbed the Independent European Program Group (IEPG) which between 1976 and 1992 had acted as an armaments procurement cooperation forum for all of the European NATO countries (except Iceland) Since its establishment WEAG which has 19 members has stimulated collaborative defense RampT programs among its member countries and has examined the harmonization of defense requirements and opening national defense markets to European-wide competition Separately an agreement the System Of Cooperation for Research And Technology in Europe (SOCRATE) was created in 1998 to enable Finland and Sweden ndash at that time not WEAG members ndash to participate in WEAG RampD projects Later SOCRATE

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

117

was amended to allow the participation of Austria the Czech Republic Hungary and Poland The annual WEAG budget has averaged about 100 million euros in recent years WEAG defense technology RampT is handled under Panel II of the organization (Panel I being concerned with cooperative equipment procurement and Panel II with policies and procedures to enhance collaboration) Under this panel there exist several instruments for collaborative RampT

WEAG Panel IIrsquos fi rst instrument formed in 1989 was European Cooperation for the Long Term in Defense (EUCLID) EUCLID supports projects proposed by government representatives that are jointly funded by the participating governments and the private sector The work is carried out by an industrial consortium including at least one company from each of the participating nations EUCLID covers 13 Common European Priority Areas (CEPA) of technology These include such network-oriented technologies as UAVs and robotics military space and advanced communications Each CEPA has its own Lead Nation appointed by WEAG Panel II responsible for reporting on its activities and an industrial team of leading companies

The second WEAG instrument is the Technology Arrangements for Laboratories for Defense European Science (THALES) Signed in November 1996 THALES facilitates cooperation between government-owned or sponsored defense research agencies although governments may choose to designate a private-sector entity to undertake work on specifi c projects The collaborative projects in the THALES framework are Joint Programs (JP) established within the EUCLID CEPAs in a manner identical to the way EUCLID collaborations are formed Each of the participants in the JP is responsible for placing contracts or making arrangements at the national level

A third mechanism EUROFINDER allows industry to propose RampD projects and receive co-funding for them Proposals need not be associated with any particular WEAG CEPA but since they address national defense RampT strategies they are often aligned with government technology priorities Once a year the WEAG members receive and evaluate proposals from industry Each EUROFINDER program is co-funded by the governments that wish to participate and by the industrial participants The work is carried out by industrial consortia including at least one company from each of the nations that take part in the program Since the start of the EUROFINDER program in 1996 188 proposals have been received of which about half were funded

The fi nal WEAG mechanism the European Understandings for Research Organization Programs and Activities (EUROPA) was created in May 2001 It enables any two or more signatories to propose the creation of a European Research Grouping (ERG) to carry out one or more individual or collaborative RampT projects with a relatively larger degree of fl exibility than that offered by the EUCLID or THALES The fi rst ERG was created by 14 countries in late 2001 but membership in ERGs varies EUROPA also requires WEAG members to provide regular information on the areas of defense RampT in which they are prepared to cooperate This information is then used by WEAG to identify opportunities for cooperation and to fl ag duplicative work being undertaken

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

118

WEAG has succeeded in providing a discussion forum on European armaments cooperation Since its Member States each have an equal vote countries with strong defense industries cannot impose their goals on the others In terms of actual RampT projects however WEAGrsquos accomplishments are more modest Its membership includes both producer and consumer countries with different requirements and technological capabilities and decisions must be taken by consensus Projects that benefi t only a small number of countries such as those related to power projection or technologies for out-of-theater operations do not have priority (Assembly of WEU 2002)

The Western European Armaments Organization (WEAO) also operates under the WEU framework Created in 1996 WEAO provides administrative support to the WEAO Board of Directors and WEAG Panel II and legal assistance for countries signing RampT collaboration agreements for specifi c WEAG projects WEAO can implement WEAG decisions on defense RampT because it has the authority and the necessary legal power to place contracts By 2001 it had facilitated the creation of 120 projects with a total of 500 million euros in funding (WEAG 2002)

In April 2005 the Steering Board of the European Defense Agency agreed that the EDA will gradually absorb the activities of the WEAG and WEAO in particular those covering RampT The hope is to make defense RampT more cost-effective and tie it more closely to the capabilities needed for the European Security and Defense Policy

At the same time the EDA Steering Board approved a set of principles governing the Agencyrsquos RampT functions including plans to establish networks of government research center industry and international experts bodies to collaborate in specifi c areas In July of 2005 the Agencyrsquos RampT Directorate announced that it had selected two critical technology areas involving long-endurance UAVs for which it intends to contract out initial technology demonstration studies with 2005 budget funds The two areas ndash survivability and digital data links ndash were chosen by national experts as covering critical gaps not addressed by ongoing European UAV programs In addition more than ten other critical technology areas identifi ed by national experts may be addressed separately as ad hoc cooperation projects by Member States by future EDA-funded studies or under industry initiatives

Despite the limitation in Article 296 the European Commission has also begun to be a major player in European-level RampD Since 1983 the Commission has managed its own civilian collaborative RampD program the Framework Program (FP) The FP is now in its sixth round of 4-year funding cycles with 175 billion euros committed to fund projects between 2003 and 2006

Firms universities or government agencies wishing to receive FP funding create RampD consortia (made up of a minimum of three partners at least two from European Member States) and submit joint project ideas in response to Commission calls for proposals The consortia may also include participants from various non-EU states (Associated States) such as Switzerland Norway and Israel which have signed collaboration agreements with the EC The Commission funds 50 per cent of the project costs FP projects can currently only cover civilian technologies though these very often include research with dual-use or military

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

119

applications such as aerospace energy (including nuclear energy) life sciences and information technologies

In the fi rst annual work program for FP6 announced in 2002 proposals were requested in intelligent vehicles and aircraft interoperable information and communications networks end-to-end SATCOM systems and data fusion among others It has been estimated that approximately one-third of the projects funded by FPs could be considered as dual-use projects (European Commission 1996) Thales EADS British Aerospace and many other European defense fi rms are active participants in these FP projects

In 2003 the Commission moved more directly into the defense-related research arena announcing the Preparatory Action on Security Research (PASR) as its contribution to the EU goal of addressing key security challenges Between 2004 and 2006 the PASR focused on bridging the gap between civilian research supported by the Framework Program and national and intergovernmental defense programs Funding for the PASR combined Commission funds national ministerial budgets (defense and non-defense) and industry contributions After two calls for proposals the Commission invested approximately 30 million euros in 24 security research projects covering border and coastal surveillance aviation security detection of biological and chemical agents situational awareness securing critical infrastructures and satellite intelligence

Though relatively modest in scope and size the PASR nevertheless represents an important fi rst step for the Commission as it begins to initiate and oversee multi-national security RampT activities and link them with its overall RampT activities With the seventh Framework Program starting in 2007 the Commission will include security space and homeland security research and development as parts of its portfolio for the fi rst time As in prior programs every Member State will contribute to the overall budget but the Commission will allocate funds for specifi c projects following the FP guidelines

FP7 may differ from its predecessors however in having a proposed duration of seven years and an annual budget of over 10 billion euros Moreover while there have been Commission investments in defense- and security-related research through dual-use and specifi c civilian projects setting aside specifi c funds (proposed at 570 million euros annually) for such fi elds as earth observation and detection of chemical and biological agents could be an important fi rst step in the development of a European-wide security capability

Conclusion

The European Union is starting to emerge as an increasingly important context for European planning with regard to expeditionary operations military capabilities defense procurement industrial policy and research and technology investment all with direct relevance to strengthening European C4ISR capabilities While the European-level agenda does not explicitly focus on C4ISR interoperability as a priority target the planning and investment choices being made point inexorably in that direction

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

120

The primary weaknesses of the ERRF ndash swift deployability and the capacity to conduct high-intensity operations ndash have been addressed through the creation of the Battlegroups which are coming into existence quickly C4ISR will be a critical element in the ability of these Battlegroups to operate either in coalition with or autonomously from the United States

The creation and rapid institutionalization of the European Defense Agency is a key development It reports directly to the European Council and has taken on critical functions in the emerging European defense identity The EDA promises to give more attention to a capabilities process that had begun to lag and is positioned to combine that process with its focus on the industrial and technology base It has singled out two critical C4ISR shortfalls ndash long-endurance UAVs and C3 systems ndash a decision that holds promise for Europersquos future ability to carry out network-based operations Moreover projects can move ahead in the EDA framework without requiring the agreement of all the Member States avoiding the problem of the ldquolowest common denominatorrdquo common to other European efforts

There has also been signifi cant progress at the European level in the areas of industrial policy and security-related research and technology investment The European Defense Agency and the European Commission have both initiated important collaborative security RampT programs involving key private sector actors The consolidation of WEAG and WEAO programs into the EDA will allow a tighter focus on the needs of the emerging European defense capability

Within this general strengthening of European-level institutions and planning processes related to defense C4ISR cannot help but emerge as a central issue and funding priority It will be critical to allowing the Europeans to mount a capability that can operate both in coalition with the United States and on its own

121

6

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS FOR

NETWORK-BASED OPERATIONS

From command and control through military communications and intelligence gathering to weapons targeting space-based systems have become a key part of a nationrsquos military capabilities Space systems are increasingly important for monitoring potential threats managing military forces and carrying out combat operations They are being closely integrated into the military C4ISR architecture both in Europe and the United States Furthermore military space capabilities are increasingly dependent on the private sector While the Cold War years were characterized by largely military activity in space the 1990s witnessed a surge of private sector pursuits and commercial space launches began to exceed national security missions Today government agencies worldwide are contracting space programs and services out to companies and multinational consortia and relying on multiple commercial contractors and sub-contractors for their space programs In addition many existing space assets and launch vehicles are now owned by private fi rms or international entities rather than by countries (Krepon 2003 8ndash9)

US military forces are highly dependent on space assets for pre-confl ict global awareness and planning for communications and for combat operations Increasingly European countries are also relying on space assets and are researching testing and deploying them as central ingredients of national and trans-European military capabilities In addition European space programs are increasingly based on cross-national cooperation achieving a degree of interoperability through non-NATO agreements and arrangements Space is a signifi cant European security and dual-use investment that could over time enhance European autonomy from US defense operations and increase trans-European interoperability while providing nodes for transatlantic interoperability as well It is not clear however whether the trans-national European capability will be Europe-wide or be restricted to a few dominant players in the European space arena

The role of space systems

Space-based assets are able to provide unimpeded continuous and persistent coverage of large areas of the globe This provides a signifi cant advantage when undertaking expeditionary warfare combating terrorism WMD counter-

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

122

proliferation and disaster management Embedding space assets in a joint and networked manner can link headquarters and units both at home and in the fi eld without geographical limitations

The fi rst key defense role for satellites has been communications In the 1950s Arthur C Clarke was the fi rst to recognize that three satellites in geosynchronous orbit spaced equidistant along the equator could provide worldwide communications coverage between the latitudes of approximately 60ordmN and 60ordmS while remaining relatively secure from attack Since the fi rst geosynchronous satellites were launched in the 1960s communications satellites have proliferated and become a staple of the global communications industry They provide a redundant network that is largely independent from terrestrial communications systems and can deliver broadband communications anywhere within their area of coverage via increasingly smaller and lighter terminals and handheld phones (DalBello 2003 217) In the 1990s Iridium the fi rst fully functional polar-orbiting satellite communication system was launched Polar-orbiting satellites provide communications at high latitudes but compared to geosynchronous systems they are extremely complex and expensive to build launch and operate The Iridium constellation of 66 satellites was a technical success but a commercial failure and its major customer today is the US Department of Defense

As discussed earlier France the United Kingdom Italy and Spain operate dedicated or partially dedicated military geosynchronous satellites for military communications Germany leases time on commercial satellites and is planning for dedicated military satellites in the future However no European country currently operates the necessary trio of dedicated military communications satellites to achieve full global coverage Only the United States has such coverage obtained through the low-earth orbit Iridium series and through its geosynchronous satellites

Many countries including the United States lease commercial satellite capacity for non-sensitive communications relying on dedicated military satellite communications for secure transmissions However commercial systems are not as secure as the ones dedicated to military use and commercial business practices may confl ict with military objectives making their use for military communications uncertain (Baker et al 2001)

Reconnaissance and surveillance is the second area where space offers signifi cant advantages for military and security operations The United States and the Soviet Union fi rst orbited reconnaissance satellites during the height of the Cold War in the 1960s these fi rst ldquospy satellitesrdquo used panchromatic and infrared fi lm dropped to earth in sealed containers from satellites for processing and analysis In the mid-1970s digital electro-optical systems fl ying in polar orbits allowed operators to image any place on Earth and return the images by means of electronic transmission thereby increasing satellite fl exibility and longevity In the civilian world NASA led the way in the development of such satellites with the building and launching of the Landsat series of satellites beginning in July 1972 However clouds and dark of night hamper the highly sophisticated digital cameras placed on these satellites Hence more recently synthetic aperture radar systems

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

123

operating at microwave frequencies have been developed Although synthetic aperture radar satellites provide imagery with reduced sharpness compared to the best electro-optical systems they can pierce through cloud cover and darkness

In Europe only France currently operates dedicated earth observation satellites Helios 1 and 2 However France Germany Italy and the United Kingdom are all developing electro-optical and synthetic aperture radar reconnaissance satellites The United States operates highly sophisticated reconnaissance satellite systems the exact technological capabilities of which remain highly classifi ed The United States and other countries also rely on high-resolution commercial remote sensing satellites to satisfy part of their need for routine reconnaissance data

Early warning and signals intelligence are still other areas where satellites can be used for military and security purposes The United States operates a series of surveillance satellites that monitors the globe for signs of a missile launch as well as signals intelligence satellites for monitoring communications and electronic transmissions around the world The latter have been reportedly put to use to detect communications from would-be terrorists No European countries currently operate such systems though French defense planners are in the early stages of developing their own signals intelligence and missile early warning systems including several pilot projects already in orbit

Digital technologies have revolutionized the handling of data and information from space systems allowing analysts to merge digital imagery maps with data from UAVs AWACS aircraft and other sources to create powerful information products that give fi eld commanders improved awareness of the battlefi eld and enhanced capabilities for defeating the adversary All of this information can now be sent quickly and effi ciently regionally or globally via modern communications infrastructures including communications satellites

The sophistication and quality of European space technology is very high and growing fast driven primarily by civil and commercial needs Ultimately the development of space systems to support network-based operations will depend on how much funding the European countries are willing to direct toward space systems On the European level it will also depend on the extent to which the individual countries are willing to cooperate and share resources As noted below the initial signs are encouraging particularly in satellite communications and earth observation underscored by the robust attempt to create a resilient space policy between the European Union and the European Space Agency along with the Member States Nevertheless funding constraints and the burden of legacy systems may limit investment in space systems

Changing attitudes toward European military space systems

Until recently Europe was not expected to build or deploy systems that allowed them to use space for defense purposes and most European militaries have been reluctant to include dedicated space systems in their budgets Europeans have focused more on civilian uses of space benefi ting from the defense applications

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

124

of civilian systems For example only the United Kingdom Italy and France have launched dedicated military communications satellite systems and Francersquos Helios electro-optical earth observation system is still the only dedicated military reconnaissance satellite deployed by a European country Most of Europersquos 5 billion euro annual expenditure on space goes to civilian programs compared to about 50 per cent of the $40 billion annual US investment The European space industry though employing some 40000 people and generating a turnover of roughly 55 billion euros is much more dependent on the commercial market than its US counterparts (Keohane 2004 3)

Europersquos existing and planned security space programs are generally being initiated as dual-use programs The dual-use approach especially if initiated as a commercial investment has the advantage of saving defense euros for other air- ground- or sea-based military systems Francersquos Syracuse-3 communications satellites ndash its fi rst dedicated military communications satellite ndash and Helios satellites were both preceded by civilian programs The same is true for the United Kingdomrsquos Skynet communication satellite systems as well as the Spanish Hispasat and the Italian SICRAL systems Germany Italy and Spain are also developing dedicated military communications satellites after earlier investments in dual-use systems Francersquos Helios system is based on technology originally developed for the civilian SPOT series of satellites The French Pleiades electro-optical system and the Italian COSMO Skymed synthetic aperture radar system both currently under development are intentionally dual-purpose in nature Both are elements of a cooperative program between France and Italy Germanyrsquos SAR-Lupe dedicated military radar satellite is possible in large part because of the substantial investment the European Space Agency and the German Aerospace Center have made in basic synthetic aperture radar technology Nevertheless some systems such as early warning and electronic surveillance have no clear-cut civilian counterparts and need to be pursued for their own sake though they use subsystems and technologies developed under civil budgets

More recently European interest in the security uses of space has grown signifi cantly and leadership in this area has begun to shift from France toward the European Union Events both internal and external to Europe have contributed to this changing perspective on the uses of space for military purposes

The recent confl icts that the US military was involved in have signifi cantly contributed to changing Europersquos approach to military space Policymakers and military commanders witnessed on a daily basis the considerable advantage the United States drew from space systems combined with new UAVs and the ability to fuse geospatial data (satellite remote sensing signals from GPS satellites and digital maps) with real-time video The US militaryrsquos ability to integrate space capabilities into its network of systems was a critical catalyst of change in European military space policy Infl uential military theorists primarily in France began to press for greater European attention to the development of pan-European security space systems (Hancart 2003 Gavoty 2003a 2003b) These include satellite communications remote sensing and military enhancements to Galileo Europersquos

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

125

major aerospace companies including EADS Alcatel Snecma and Thales have been supportive of these calls to increased investments in security space

The fi rst example of a major European space program with considerable security implications is the Galileo Positioning Navigation and Timing (PNT) system Driven in its inception almost entirely by a political desire for greater commercial autonomy and reliability Europe has pressed forward with this independent system which will duplicate the capability of the US Global Positioning System (GPS) Galileo will be very much a dual-use and trans-European capability Its development is led jointly by the European Commissionrsquos Directorate General for Transportation and the European Space Agency which is by charter civilian in character

The military utility of Galileo has not gone unnoticed by Europersquos defense departments which now depend heavily on the US GPS system for positioning and navigation services The French military especially has funded research on the potential military capabilities of Galileo and plans to use both Galileo and GPS in future operations Other European countries are also considering similar policies and are likely to follow suit The European Union is also planning to use Galileo in support of the European Security and Defense Policy

The Galileo system is currently designed to include 30 satellites and begin offering its services in 2008 The European Commission and the European Space Agency have invested a total of 11 billion euros in the development of initial technologies and in the building of experimental satellites Another 23 billion euros will be spent on building and launching the full constellation of satellites and to prepare for commercial operations To date the building and launching of the fi rst four satellites has been awarded to Galileo Industries a company co-owned by Alcatel Space of France Alenia Spazio of Italy EADS Astrium of Germany Thales and a Spanish consortium of seven companies These four satellites are expected to be launched by the end of 2008 at which point the European Commission and the European Space Agency will award the contract for building the additional 26 satellites and for operating the complete system Europe has also opened participation in the Galileo program to non-European countries China Israel India and Ukraine have joined the program since its inception and negotiations are underway with several other countries

The Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) program which is essentially a strategy for organizing and utilizing Europersquos many already existing and planned earth observation systems represents a second important Europe-wide space initiative with defense implications The GMES program focuses primarily on sustainable development and environmental management and is part of Europersquos efforts to obtain the ability to track regional as well as global environmental trends Like Galileo GMES was initially conceived as a civil program with security considerations added later Like Galileo GMES is managed jointly by the European Commission and the European Space Agency with participation from various other European organizations and fi rms If successful GMES will provide sharply improved better-coordinated European

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

126

capabilities to observe and analyze the environment and human activities on Earth using both new and existing earth observation systems

The GMES program is being undertaken in two phases The fi rst period completed in 2002ndash3 examined the current strengths and weaknesses of the European capacity for space-based environmental and security monitoring and identifi ed the areas that required further investment and research The second or implementation period runs from 2004ndash8 and involves the initial development of infrastructures and capabilities that were identifi ed in the initial period Thus in the near term GMES will develop new information systems and techniques to exploit Europersquos existing space-based earth observation capabilities more effi ciently In the longer term it will serve as a guiding program for planning new earth observation systems

Although focused primarily on European environmental and security concerns the satellite contributions to GMES will be global in scope Most remote sensing satellites orbit in polar orbits taking them over the entire earth as it turns beneath them Europe is still working out the detailed focus and scope of the security aspects of GMES but discussions are tending toward a more activist interpretation of the Petersberg tasks humanitarian relief rescue peacekeeping and crisis management Some of the capabilities developed in the global GMES program could be used for example to enhance Europersquos warfi ghting efforts far from its borders In particular the broader earth observation and analysis capabilities provided by GMES will prove extremely useful for the European military and intelligence community especially when combined with reconnaissance information provided by both the dedicated security and the explicitly dual-use earth observation space systems currently underway

Parallel to Galileo and GMES a European Space Policy has begun to emerge under the auspices of the European Union Starting in the late 1990s the European Union particularly the European Commission began to have increased infl uence in European civil space affairs The EC supplements national space investments by funding research and operation of space systems in support of EU programs and policies and while the European Union continues to depend on the indigenous space programs of individual Member States and on the European Space Agency to provide the technological capabilities for EU programs it is increasingly using its political and economic authority to set the overall direction of Europersquos space efforts

In January 2003 the European Commission published a draft policy paper on space for discussion revision and adoption by the Member States and the European Space Agency After a series of formal consultations the paper was fi nalized in November 2003 as a White Paper laying out a proposed European space policy including defense uses of space

Europe needs an extended space policy driven by demand able to exploit the special benefi ts space technologies can deliver in support of the Unionrsquos policies and objectives faster economic growth job creation and industrial

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

127

competitiveness enlargement and cohesion sustainable development and security and defence

(European Commission 2003b 5 [Emphasis in original])

The White Paper refers explicitly to the uses of space systems to support the European Unionrsquos Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defense Policy Further the very existence of a successful project such as Galileo usable by the entire world is seen as a visible symbol both of growing strategic independence from US policies and also of a more unifi ed Europe offering the prospect of future European success in space (Bescond 2003 40ndash3) A successful GMES program will also strengthen the visibility and acceptability of the European commitment to space systems

In November 2003 the European Commission and the European Space Agency also signed a formal Framework Agreement on Space intended to support ldquothe coherent and progressive development of an overall European Space Policyrdquo (Council of the European Union 2003 5) This agreement further underscored the growing infl uence of the European Union in European space affairs and provides the framework for potential expansion of Europersquos investment in space It focuses cooperation between the two organizations on securing Europersquos independent and cost-effective access to space so that it can continue to be self-reliant in the application and use of space technologies and on ensuring that space activities are undertaken in line with EU policies in particular those supporting sustainable development economic growth and employment The Framework Agreement on Space is intended to consolidate European knowledge of space in a network of centers of excellence thereby achieving greater Europe-wide coherence and synergy between national efforts Specifi c technology areas singled out for initial collaboration include launchers communications satellites earth observation and navigation

Space and space technologies were also included in the EU Constitutional Treaty Article III-254 reads

1 To promote scientifi c and technical progress industrial competitiveness and the implementation of its policies the Union shall draw up a European space policy To this end it may promote joint initiatives support research and technological development and coordinate the efforts needed for the exploration and exploitation of space2 To contribute to attaining the objectives referred to in paragraph 1 European laws or framework laws shall establish the necessary measures which may take the form of a European space program

(European Union 2004 117ndash18)

Elsewhere in the Treaty in Article I-14 covering areas of shared competence space is called out as a shared competence between the European Union and other European entities

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

128

In the areas of research technological development and space the Union shall have competence to carry out actions in particular to defi ne and implement programs however the exercise of that competence may not result in Member States being prevented from exercising theirs

(European Union 2004 22)

Although the Treaty does not include any reference to security space it generally boosts the profi le of space technologies in Europe and European promotion of investment in space systems This will assist proponents of increased emphasis on the use of space in military and security operations and especially in network-based ones

The road to integrated European space systems

These promising European moves toward advanced space-based assets face numerous challenges before they become integral parts of a trans-European network or fully interoperable with the United States One challenge will be integrating space systems into existing European air ground and sea-based command control communications and intelligence capabilities US experience suggests this will be a diffi cult task However the less developed European capability to conduct network-based operations may prove a blessing in disguise allowing the Europeans to learn from the mistakes the United States has made European learning through interaction with the United States in NATO and in coalition operations could reduce the time and expenditure for the European integration effort

A second challenge will be the competition for EU resources especially following enlargement of the Union in May 2004 to include Cyprus the Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Malta Poland Slovakia and Slovenia The expansion will likely add complexity to advancing and coordinating European security space capabilities The new countries will most likely wish to join the space efforts underway in the more technologically advanced partner countries since these provide them with the opportunity to participate in space systems development without starting from scratch The new partners may also bring additional resources to this effort but their relatively weaker economies could slow progress More fundamentally EU enlargement is a costly process Space investments at the trans-European level are likely to compete with other priorities such as regional development and agriculture making it diffi cult to fulfi ll the White Paperrsquos call for increased funding for space systems

A third challenge will be legitimizing the use of space assets for defense purposes given the politics of space in the European context The European Space Agencyrsquos Convention expressly limits its participation to peaceful space efforts though the space programs of the individual countries generally have no such prohibition This could complicate the integration of Galileo into defense planning Furthermore security uses of GMES are currently still limited to supporting the Petersberg Tasks Because of these limitations pressure grew in 2003 and 2004 to

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

129

redefi ne the term ldquopeacefulrdquo As a result technologies that contribute to defensive strategies and that can have supportive roles in warfi ghting may in the future fall under the ldquopeacefulrdquo category Reshaping the defi nition would explicitly allow the European Space Agency to take on security-related tasks and to expand the scope of GMES into the gray areas between peacekeeping and peacemaking allowing closer integration with national and European network-based strategies

Under the leadership of its director Jacques Dordin the European Space Agency recently re-evaluated its Convention concluding that it does not restrict the agencyrsquos ability to engage in programs aimed at defense and security for national or international security and defense institutions The Agency also established a security clearance system that enables it to handle classifi ed information In addition the neutral members of the European Space Agency have signaled that they are willing to have the Agency take on a more active space security role for Europe as a whole Lastly a recent study led by the Instituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) has recommended that the European Space Agency engage in dual-use RampD for space technologies and suggested that the European Union might benefi t by setting up a European Security and Defense Advanced Projects Agency with a small non-permanent staff and fl exible mission-based activity Like the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) this agency would provide a framework for pursuing a strategic approach to developing the applied technologies of the future combining a well-defi ned vision with highly responsive structures and methods (Silvestri 2003 6ndash7)

Just how far Europe will go to emphasize development of dual-use space systems or to create an agency such as this remains to be seen The European Commissionrsquos Preparatory Action on Security Research (PASR) has already funded collaborative projects on using geospatial data for increased situational awareness and on uses of advanced space technologies for expeditionary and crisis management operations It remains to be seen however whether this initial effort can be expanded as part of the Thematic Priority on Security and Space under the European Commissionrsquos seventh research and technology Framework Program

A fi nal challenge will be to coordinate the defense-related space assets currently deployed by EU Member States In earth observation satellites as with civilian space activities France has taken a lead shifting its national strategy from autonomous national systems to promoting multilateral cooperation at the European level French leadership has brought together Germany Italy Spain Belgium and Greece in a joint program ndash the Common Operational Requirements (know by its French name Besoins Opeacuterationnels Communs or BOC) ndash to develop common requirements for security-related earth observation Through the BOC participants are developing a federation of data providers and users that will collect and distribute earth observations data among its members Each member brings different but largely complementary capabilities to the table The BOC is an expansion of cooperative arrangements already underway between France and Italy on Pleiades and COSMO-Skymed and between France and Germany on Pleiades and SAR-Lupe Linking electro-optical and synthetic aperture radar observation satellites will create a very powerful reconnaissance tool

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

130

The EU Satellite Center (EUSC) in Torrejoacuten Spain has also contributed to coordinating European activities related to earth observation It was established in 1991 as the WEU Satellite Center and transferred to the European Union in 2002 It provides the European Union with an analysis of earth observation space imagery to support decision-making in foreign and security policy issues It currently handles space imagery received from the French SPOT the US Landsat 4 and 5 and Indian IRS-1C and D satellites as well as from Russian commercial satellites Within the next few years it will also begin collecting and analyzing data from additional space-based systems including Helios 2 and SAR-Lupe Some imagery from these systems will be delivered free of charge others will have to be paid for In any case the Satellite Center EU offi cials will not be allowed to task the satellites directly

The picture of European collaboration on communications satellites is slightly less clear Though France and the United Kingdom have previously cooperated on satellite communications programs it remains to be seen whether or not the other main players in European space development ndash Germany Italy and Spain ndash will participate In the 1990s France sought to interest Germany and Italy in contributing to the development of Helios 2 but those arrangements fell through in large part as a result of German reluctance to tie itself too tightly to a French initiative In the 1990s French planners also sought to broaden cooperation in military satellite communications through Trimilsatcom a system that was to be co-developed with the United Kingdom and Germany This communications satellite program was intended to meet the common military needs of the proposed partners However the Trimilsatcom effort failed because the partners were unable to integrate their requirements into a common program and agree on a schedule for meeting them (Nardon 2001)

European cooperation on communications satellites has however extended to the NATO framework As noted earlier the Alliance selected a European solution for its next generation satellite communications capability In May 2004 NATO announced that a Joint Consortium of France Italy and the United Kingdom would provide the new constellation of communications satellites which will replace the two existing NATO-owned communications satellites and provide NATO with an improved capability This expanded coverage will include ships at sea and NATOrsquos AWACS early warning aircraft

Beyond intra-European collaboration looms the challenge of transatlantic collaboration While the emerging European security space policies hold some promise for enhanced transatlantic interoperability strong US resistance to more fl exible rules for transatlantic technology transfer is likely to make this diffi cult In response to this problem European companies have begun to use fewer US components in space systems A recent agreement between the European Commission and the European Space Agency calls for a technology development program to assist in insulating European fi rms from US technology export rules and for greater cooperation in this area with such countries as China and India However it also calls for closer cooperation with the US Air Force Furthermore it is to be hoped that the United States and Europe can forge a workable agreement

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

131

on the relationship between Galileo and GPS which could spill over into other forms of space cooperation

There has been considerable progress on European space in the past decade and a growing realization that space will play a role in European defense planning The results remain mixed however While space may play a greater role in the future there are a number of countervailing pressures and challenges budgetary and political which will slow the rate at which this trend emerges

132

7

THE EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

FOR NETWORK-BASED CAPABILITIES

Though the pace of transformation is uneven the major European defense powers have been developing and fi elding state-of-the-art capabilities for conducting network-based operations One important source they have been drawing on for this effort is the European defense industrial and technology base In 2001 the total revenues for the European C4ISR market were estimated at close to $7 billion with a compound annual growth rate of 47 per cent (Frost and Sullivan 2002 1ndash1) Advances in technology and changes in military doctrines have contributed to the marketrsquos growth and are expected to continue to do so in the coming years While this chapter does not provide a comprehensive survey of this market it discusses in some detail the industrial organizations and capabilities that have been most important to the emerging European C4ISR technologies A broad review suggests the European industrial and technology base contains signifi cant capacity for C4ISR work including a number of leading companies engaged in critical development and production work in the areas of C2 communications and ISR In addition much of this work is collaborative both across European countries and across the Atlantic

Overview

The term ldquodefense industrial baserdquo is in reality a misnomer in the area of European C4ISR Several of the countries under discussion in this study are using networking technologies in areas that go beyond defense ndash to commercial communication homeland security and civilian space operations Moreover the technology base on which C4ISR programs draw is increasingly dual-use or entirely commercial as is especially the case for information and communications technologies A review of the industrial and technology base then requires examining not only defense suppliers but commercial fi rms providing these technologies for commercial civilian and defense applications

Communications command and control sensors and advanced materials are only a few of the technologies commercial fi rms can provide for military applications Military sensors for example will integrate technologies in electro-optics and biotechnology that are commercial in origin It remains true however that with the ministries of defense as the principal market for these technologies

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

133

more traditional defense suppliers may enjoy advantageous access having experience of doing business with the defense customer and a track record of military-specifi c products

The fi rms most relevant to C4ISR technologies are as might be expected concentrated in the more militarily advanced members of the EU ndash France Germany Italy Spain and the United Kingdom ndash as well as in Sweden which developed a relatively autonomous base to support its strategy of neutrality However given the role of commercial technology in C4ISR there are also signifi cant capabilities in other smaller countries that make a contribution Firms with strong research development and manufacturing capacity in biotechnology robotics nanotechnology information and telecommunications technologies can be found throughout Europe Finland is home to Nokia and a host of other mobile telecommunications companies with cutting-edge technologies at the core of the nationrsquos networking efforts Barco a global leader in display visualization and simulation technologies is Belgian Moreover these highly innovative commercial companies have been supported for decades by European government investment in civilian RampD so are not newcomers when it comes to doing business with national governments and with the European Union

There are both advantages and disadvantages to having such a widespread industrial and technology base for C4ISR The advantage is that public funds can be spent in ways that strengthen an existing national industrial base and national technologies The disadvantage is that developing and networking advanced C4ISR systems requires a broad range of expertise in designing developing integrating and operating complex systems and expertise that is rarely available solely from the industry within one country European governments typically spend defense resources with the goal of supporting local industry but such a policy approach does not always provide forces with the most advanced or capable technology In the C4ISR area greater effi ciency and deeper transformation may depend on a strategy that uses the most global industrial base pooling technological capabilities sharing costs and reducing risks

The evolution of the European industrial technology base which is becoming more networked and global is likely to encourage such a trend making the domestic political tradeoffs more diffi cult Over the past decade there has been a pronounced move toward consolidation of the European industrial base and extensive mergers and acquisitions involving several major defense companies Moreover large defense-related fi rms have begun to merge with acquire or form partnerships with companies that have expertise in such areas as electro-optics and communications often in the commercial market arena Combining capabilities across borders can sometimes help overcome the ldquolocal buyingrdquo preference of governments as a trans-national fi rm or partnership can move workshares around to accommodate local needs Much of the expertise required for C4ISR and network-based capabilities is to be found in such trans-national companies and partnerships

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

134

The big three Thales EADS and BAE Systems

Thales

Thales is one of the worldrsquos largest defense and consumer electronics corporations and a European leader in the C4ISR market In addition to being a lead contractor for many French C4ISR programs it has as a company with many nationalities signifi cant operations in a number of other countries It has built and deployed a complete C4ISR system integrating US- and French-made legacy systems in the United Arab Emirates It has provided elements of C4ISR systems in a number of other countries Through acquisitions outside of France ndash Tacal Quintec Pilkington Signaal ndash Thales has positioned itself to participate in key programs in other countries including the UK

Thales has created a new division Land and Joint Systems which fuses its optronics and communications businesses as part of a strategic push into the C4ISR market This division offers a wide variety of communications products including the family of PR4G radios which are sold in 25 countries around the world including Spain the Netherlands Denmark Greece Switzerland Poland and Egypt and the RITA 2000 system based on ATMIP architecture and deployed by the French and Belgian armed forces The most recent PR4G version ndash VS4-IP ndash has IP frequency-hopping encryption a built-in GPS and advanced multiplexing features The next generation of PR4G radios will include software radio products The Land and Joint Systems division also has an operational analysis and architecture group that is focused on developing interoperable technologies

Thales has a strong presence in the command and control market with the Cooperative Fighting System (a tactical C2 system) the LCC mobile C2 network and the e-CIS army-level C2 system designed according to NATO STANAGs As prime contractor for the Atlas Martha and SICF programs the company is a key supplier of C2 systems to the French armed forces Future developments include the RITA Local Area System for strategic C2 In naval systems the company has made signifi cant investments in naval C2 systems as well

In surveillance and reconnaissance technologies Thales produces several ground-based systems for surveillance target acquisition and ground-based air defense Squire developed most recently is a man-portable surveillance radar system for ground surveillance and bomb damage assessment and has been deployed by the Dutch army and marines Through its Netherlands branch the company is a global supplier of naval surveillance weapon control and combat management systems Key products include the TAVITAC naval combat management system on the French Lafayette frigates and in Belgium Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and the APAR weapons control system co-developed with EADS and Raytheon and deployed on Canadian Dutch and German frigates More recently Thales has moved into the UAV market leading the international consortium developing the British Watchkeeper UAV system Thales also offers a number of products in the intelligence technologies market and plays an important role in several programs

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

135

including the US Prophet program for vehicle-mounted SIGINT systems and the future British terrestrial SIGINT system Soothsayer In France Thales is the supplier of the SGEA SARIGUE MINREM and SAIM systems as well as of airborne ISR pods to various services of the armed forces

EADS

The European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company ndash EADS ndash was created in 2000 as a merger of the German DaimlerChrysler Aerospace Francersquos Aerospatiale Matra and Spainrsquos CASA Since then EADS has gained a strong market presence in C4ISR technologies and become a lead contractor in many European countries notably France and Germany EADS is becoming a signifi cant presence in the UAV market through a number of collaborative RampD programs These include the sensor package for the EuroHawk HALE UAV co-developed with Northrop Grumman tactical- and operations-level UAVs (the Hunter Eagle-1 and Eagle-2) with Israeli Aircraft Industries several tactical UAVs (the CL-289 with France and Canada the Brevel and the LUNA) the Pointer hand-launched tactical UAV in collaboration with Aerovironment and a maritime rotor wing reconnaissance UAV (SEAMOS terminated in early 2002 when the German navy canceled funding) EADS is also developing a UCAV demonstrator ndash Barracuda ndash with Germany as the fi rst potential customer Since 2004 the company has been at the center of the two largest collaborative European UAV programs It is the prime contractor for the EuroMALE program and a partner in the Neuron UCAV program both funded by the French Ministry of Defense The companyrsquos goal is to ultimately control some 10-15 per cent of the global UAV and UCAV market (Hegmann 2005)

EADS also has strong capabilities in the C2 and in the sensor technologies fi elds In C2 the company is working on the HEROS FAUST and FuumlInfoSys H systems for the German army the SIR and SICA systems for the French army and on systems for the Belgian army and several Persian Gulf states In sensor technologies EADS with Rheinmetall Defense Electronics has developed the ISR platform for the Fennek reconnaissance vehicle deployed by the German and Dutch armed forces It has also developed the APAR weapons control system jointly with Thales and Raytheon deployed on Canadian Dutch and German frigates It is also supplying the maritime sensor platform Fully Integrated Tactical System (FITS) to Mexico Brazil the United Arab Emirates Spain and the US Coast Guard In addition the company offers a combined system of SAR and MTIs that can be placed on UAVs marine reconnaissance and NH-90 helicopters

EADS also offers imagery analysis products to be linked to a number of platforms including satellites OCAPI (Optimizing Controlling and Automating the Processing of Images) and TIPI3D products An EADS mobile satellite ground station ndash Eagle Vision ndash collects imagery from SPOT Landsat IRS RADARSAT and QUICKBIRD satellites Four such stations are operational with US forces and at least one with the French army EADS is also a lead partner in the German

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

136

GAST project to develop a common system for the dissemination of technical intelligence

Several recent acquisitions have made EADS a major player in the European defense communications market In July 2001 the company acquired Cogent Defense and Security Networks from Nortel Networks and with it the contract for supplying the United Kingdom with a deployable communications system for expeditionary forces In May 2003 EADS purchased BAE Systemsrsquo share in the Astrium space joint venture gaining full control of Paradigm Secure Communications and its Skynet 5 program for Britainrsquos military satellite communications In the summer of 2005 EADS acquired the Personal Mobile Radio business of Nokia which allows it to provide a range of mobile radio solutions for defense and homeland security

BAE Systems

BAE Systems was created in 1999 through the merger of British Aerospace with Marconi Electronic Systems BAE Systems is one of the worldrsquos largest suppliers for the aerospace and defense markets with prime contractor capabilities for naval platforms aircraft and electronics It is also a presence in several sectors of the C4ISR market and has acquired important system engineering and integration experience BAE Systems has a signifi cant presence in the US defense market and has a central position as a supplier to the British and Australian armed forces The fi rm was chosen by the British Ministry of Defense to lead the NITEworks partnership aimed at assessing and demonstrating the benefi ts of NEC and the options for its effective and timely delivery In December 2003 BAE Systems announced it would provide the Kuwaiti military with a complete C4I suite These two programs confi rm BAE Systemsrsquo commitment to the C4ISR market

BAE Systems has been particularly present in the market for tactical communications systems with signifi cant involvement in such British programs as Ptarmigan and Falcon and a full line of Multi-Role Switch (MRS) 2000 equipment It has also been a participant in US military communications programs notably JTRS and the Future Combat Systems vehiclesrsquo communications package BAE Systems also provides the British armed forces with satellite terminals the Talon (man-portable) and Dagger (vehicle-mounted) terminals linked to Skynet 4 satellites

BAE Systems possesses only limited capabilities in the UAV market having produced the Phoenix and SkyEye tactical UAVs Both proved unreliable in the operational environments and are not competitive It is investing in the UCAV market however marketing its Nightjar program Together with the British fi rm QinetiQ BAE Systems is one of the few European defense companies with expertise in Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV) through the British Marlin project Other BAE capabilities in ISR are found mainly through the companyrsquos involvement in the now disbanded Alenia Marconi Systems venture and in Atlas Elektronik the naval systems portion of STN-Atlas Elektronik retained by BAE when it split the company with Rheinmetall These have given BAE Systems

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

137

a dominant position in radar and sensor technology BAErsquos involvement in the ASTOR program and Nimrod upgrades have also been valuable

The company has not been deeply involved in either the intelligence or the space markets having sold its SIGINT business in 2002

In July 2003 BAE Systems and Finmeccanica signed an agreement to collaborate on C4ISR technologies through a joint venture BAErsquos Avionics Ltdwas merged with Finmeccanicarsquos Galileo Avionica to form Eurosystems an avionics company of which Finmeccanica owns 75 per cent and BAE Systems 25 per cent Under an option Finmeccanica can require BAE Systems to sell its 25 per cent interest in the new Avionics business to Finmeccanica at any time and BAE Systems may require Finmeccanica to purchase its 25 per cent interest after 25 months Eurosystems has capabilities in sensor systems airborne radars mission systems electro-optics and electronic warfare systems At the same time Alenia Marconi Systems a 50-50 joint venture of BAE Systems with Finmeccanica was dissolved with BAE Systems acquiring AMSrsquos UK operations and Finmeccanica acquiring all of the Italian operations of AMS BAE Systems will merge the UK operations of AMS and BAE Systemsrsquo C4ISR Networked Systems and Solutions business to form a wholly owned systems integration business The Eurosystems transaction also created Selenia Communications Limited a wholly owned subsidiary of Finmeccanica whose Marconi Selenia Communications acquired BAE Systemsrsquo UK Communications business The Eurosystems transaction was fi nalized in May 2005

Second tier defense companies

There are a number of smaller second tier defense companies in Europe that are also active in the C4ISR market Some such as the German fi rm Rhode and Schwarz have C4ISR at the core of their business strategy Others such as Saab have been platform and weapons suppliers and have only recently moved into developing and producing C4ISR systems In most cases the smaller participants in the C4ISR market retain a largely national focus and rely on contracts from their home governments

Rheinmetall Defence Electronics is one such company In the summer of 2003 BAE Systems and the German fi rm Rheinmetall Detec joint owners of STN-Atlas Elektronik divided the fi rm into two separate companies The new companies are Rheinmetall Defense Electronics wholly owned by Rheinmetall Detec and specializing in technologies for air and land forces and Atlas Elektronik wholly owned by BAE Systems and specializing in maritime technologies Rheinmetall Defense Electronics is one of Europersquos leading developers of ISR solutions It collaborates with EADS on the development of the ISR suite for the Fennek reconnaissance vehicle to be deployed by the German and Dutch armies This suite includes a sensor platform with a camera a thermal imager and a laser rangefi nder for each vehicle

Rheinmetall Defense Electronics may have signifi cant potential in unmanned aerial systems provided it can expand beyond the German market The company

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

138

offers a wide range of reconnaissance target acquisition electronic warfare and combat UAVs including the KZOBrevel target acquisition UAV (also confi gurable for electronic warfare missions) co-developed with EADS It is also working on the Tactical Advanced ReconnaissanceStrike System (TADRES) UCAV previously known as the Taifun for the German Ministry of Defense The vehicle is now being designed to carry an electro-optic sensor for target identifi cation and a synthetic aperture radar for target acquisition A procurement for TADRES is expected before 2009 In 2003 the company signed an MoU (a Memorandum of Understanding) with Francersquos Safran Group to develop the technologies to make the KZO and TADRES vehicles interoperable with the French Sperwer UAV

The company also has capabilities in tactical command and control systems for land forces It has participated in the Battlefi eld Command System (Gefechstfeldfuumlhrungssystem or GeFuumlSys) C2 program for the German army (currently upgraded to FAUST) and provided the Swedish army with the C2 system deployed on its tanks and combat vehicles In 2003 it was awarded a contract to upgrade the C2 systems on Spainrsquos Leopard-2 tanks

Rhode and Schwarz is another company with a key position in the German national market for C4ISR which has yet to become a trans-national player Rhode and Schwarz has cutting-edge technology in the military communications fi eld specifi cally in digitally reprogrammable software radios Its family of multimode multirole multiband (M3) radios offers solutions for aerial naval and land platforms all meeting NATO encryption STANAGs Early in 2003 the company received a contract to supply the Brazilian army with the tactical radio version of the M3 and in 2004 the Swiss Army signed a contract to purchase the VHFUHF version of the M3 In 2005 it received a contract to outfi t the A400M aircraft with M3ARs (Airborne Radios) through 2022 The radios will feature the Second Generation of Anti-Jam Tactical UHF Radio for NATO (SATURN) frequency hopping function The company was also awarded a sole-source contract to develop a fully JTRS- and SCA-compliant version of a Software Defi ned Radio (SDR) for the German military The company is also a supplier of SIGINT technologies specifi cally those for direction fi nding and signals monitoring and analysis The German and Danish militaries have been customers for these products

In 2001 the British Ministry of Defensersquos Defense Evaluation and Research Agency privatized part of its work into a new fi rm ndash QinetiQ ndash as a public-private partnership Today QinetiQ uses the experience gained as a government RampD agency to provide advanced defense solutions including several in the C4ISR domain In the command and control fi eld QinetiQ specializes in maritime C2 offering two major systems the Intelligent Advisor Capability Demonstrator (IACD) and the All Environment Real-Time Interoperability Simulator (AERIS) The IACD has been demonstrated on the Royal Navy aircraft carrier Illustrious

In the ISR area QinetiQ does work on battlespace digitization multi-source information fusion and innovative ISR architectures Through its participation in the British TOPSAT program and other international efforts QinetiQ also has expertise in space-based reconnaissance In the UAV arena QinetiQ focuses on man-portable UAVs for infantry sections It is also one of the few large European

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

139

defense companies to have expertise on Unmanned Underwater Vehicles having worked for the British Ministry of Defense on the development of the Marlin UUV intended for launch and recovery from submarines Additionally company projects are underway to develop new sensor suites for UAVs particularly for thermal imaging

Francersquos Sagem ndash now part of Safran Group ndash has increased its involvement in the C4ISR domain Its defense technology group Sagem Deacutefense Securiteacute has been particularly successful in the UAV market its line of tactical UAVs is deployed by several European militaries The Crecerelle is used by the French army and variants are deployed by the Dutch (Sperwer) Danish (Taarnfalk) Swedish (Ugglan) and most recently the Greek armies Two new versions of the Sperwer are under development to fl y at higher altitudes and faster speeds for longer periods of time The fi rst the Sperwer HV (High Velocity) is a MALE UAV featuring a real-time data link synthetic aperture radar day-night imager or laser target designator and possibly at a later stage radar-jamming payload The second is the Sperwer LE (Long Endurance) also a MALE vehicle whose payload may include a day-night imaging system a Samir missile warning system and a high-speed radio frequency (RF )data link for communications with other UAVs as well as with its ground control station The French government has not yet given full support to these programs though the company anticipates prototypes by the end of 2006 The next generation of Crecerelle ndash SDTI ndash is also in the fi nal stages of development and testing for the French army based on the Sperwer UAV Sagem has also had some success in the tactical command and control sector and is the prime contractor for the French armyrsquos SIT system for linking small units and armored vehicles

Sagem has also engaged in international collaboration on RampD projects In July 2003 Sagem and STN Atlas (now Rheinmetall Defence Electronics) signed a memorandum of understanding to begin an RampD program that will make Sagemrsquos Sperwer UAV interoperable with STN Atlasrsquos KZO and TADRES UAVs This program will develop a common C2 infrastructure to enable the exchange of data and intelligence gathered by these unmanned platforms Sagem also collaborates with General Atomics (US) on the Horus-SD UAV a European version of the Predator and with Dassault on UAV RampD programs Most recently the company announced it has fi tted the Sperwer B UAV with the Israeli Spike long-range precision strike missile weaponizing an existing UAV platform with an off-the-shelf missile similar to the US arming of a Predator UAV with Hellfi re missiles

Though by no means a small fi rm Finmeccanica in Italy is a relatively minor largely national participant in the European C4ISR market Recent decisions such as the Eurosystems transaction described earlier in this chapter may change this reality over time For now the companyrsquos main business is still the construction of platforms but some subsidiaries are beginning to gain a strong foothold in the Italian C4ISR market especially in C2 and ISR Restrictive bid practices of the Italian government facilitate this process and they have provided Finmeccanica with growing expertise in most C4ISR-related technologies The company is increasingly profi cient in developing and producing low- and medium-altitude

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

140

UAVs initially through the tactical Mirach-26 and the Mirach-150 programs for the Italian armed forces The Falco tactical UAV is a more recent addition designed to replace the Mirach-26 A faster version of the Mirach-150 Nibbio is also under development In 2003 Finmeccanica signed a contract with Alenia Aeronautica to co-develop a UAV demonstrator that could become a marketable UAV or UCAV product The Sky-X ndash formerly called the Integrated Technology Vehicle (ITV) ndash will carry different payloads including weapons SAR electro-optical and infrared sensors and electronic sensors It will also be equipped with a broadband satellite data link 5 Trials began in 2004 (Kington 2004 9) The newly created Eurosystems avionics company the acquisition of BAE Systemsrsquo military and secure communications assets and the dissolving of Alenia Marconi Systems could give Finmeccanica a stronger position as a participant in the global C4ISR market

Saab long a manufacturer of cars and fi ghter aircraft is another platform producer that is moving into the C4ISR market It created a new division SaabTech which specializes solely in C4ISR and in July 2005 merged it with Avitronicsformerly part of the South African fi rm Gintek to create Saab Avitronics The companyrsquos C4ISR expertise is focused largely on command and control systems for land air and sea Its 9LV Mark 3E naval C3 combat system fuses data from sonar radar and electro-optic systems to create a complete picture of the seascape and is in service with the Royal Swedish Navy as well as with the Australian New Zealand and Singapore navies Another command and control product under development is the Wide Area Situation Picture (WASP) consisting of an air force C2 system adaptable for other services as well Saab also produces terrestrial C2 systems including the Vehicle Command and Control System (VCCS) which provides a single display unit for tactical information and sensor images as overlays on a background digital map and the Battlefi eld Command Support System (BCSS) a land forces C2 system for brigade and lower level units BCSS is deployed by the Australian armed forces Saab has also moved into the UAV market having the experience of the SHARC UCAV project and has signed an MoU with Francersquos Dassault Aviation to co-develop the Neuron UCAV

Saab and Ericsson have created a joint venture Saab Ericsson Network Based Defense Innovation splitting ownership 60-40 respectively In October 2003 this company was awarded a contract from the Swedish Defense Materiel Administration (FMV) to develop the technological foundations for the future Swedish Network-Based Defense Initially this will involve work on design rules and technical specifi cations for the future system The fi rm is partnering with IBM and Boeing on this project

Non-defense companies in the European C4ISR market

As already noted technologies for C4ISR requirements are frequently found in the commercial sector making commercial companies an important element in building European C4ISR capabilities Several of the more signifi cant fi rms are in Scandinavia with technologies that are useful in C4ISR systems with little

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

141

modifi cation Ericsson has been very successful in the global ISR market with products such as air defense surveillance radars (Giraffe for both land and sea units sold to the French air force) artillery hunting radars (ARTHUR sold to the Danish army and the British Royal Marines) and airborne early warning systems (Erieye radar deployed by Sweden Brazil and Greece) It is also the only major company in the Swedish C4ISR market that is still wholly Swedish-owned

With a strong civilian technology base especially in mobile communications Ericsson has been able to penetrate the military communications market on a global basis In collaboration with Kongsberg-Ericsson of Norway and Crypto of Switzerland it produces state-of-the-art tactical military communications products ndash EriTac ndash including switches radio relays and bulk encryption units that can be fi tted together according to user requirements to build tactical area networks air defense networks and command post communication networks The system has been sold to fi ve NATO countries as well as to other military customers worldwide including Kuwait and Oman

Nokia has also applied its core competency to the military market for C4ISR technology In 2002 Finnish forces taking part in peacekeeping operations in Kosovo were the fi rst to be outfi tted with the companyrsquos TETRA communications equipment A year later the fi rst Finnish-led KFOR brigade was outfi tted with a similar system less than two months after the decision to procure it The European Unionrsquos forces in Kosovo (EUFOR) use a Nokia system based on the one used by Finnish forces In Finland a complete communications system for the countryrsquos defense and fi rst responder forces was built using TETRA technology The deployable communications networks of the Danish and Swedish armies were based on a similar technology as were the Belgian and Kuwaiti public safety networks and the communications network used by the Irish police

Industry collaboration on C4ISR interoperability

Several collaborative industry frameworks have been created to address interoperability between C4ISR systems Companies involved in these agreements have realized that governments are demanding increasingly complex and advanced systems and systems-of-systems that require industry collaboration

The Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium (NCOIC) is a forum for fi rms involved in the development of C4ISR systems Companies in NCOIC share knowledge about customer requirements for network-centric and network-based operations and discuss strategies and approaches to enhancing system delivery to customers In addition the organization seeks to develop open interoperable C4ISR systems using common best practices and systems engineering techniques On the technology side this is done by analyzing the relevant C4ISR architectures defi ned by governments developing a secure information management model to discuss open standards and identifying open standards-based product types The NCOIC is also developing educational programs on network-centric operations and developing strategies for creating collaborative engineering environments (Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium 2005 14) The consortium

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

142

is made up of international aerospace defense information technology and professional services companies in the United States and Europe all with experience in network-based technologies As of 2005 there were 66 members in the NCOIC with another 68 inquiries by potential members The Consortiumrsquos Advisory Council includes prominent US Department of Defense offi cials as well as representatives from NATOrsquos C3 Agency the NATO Headquarters C3 Staff and the Swedish Defense Materiel Agency

Firms in some European countries are seeking to create similar networks In Germany for example an interest group known as the Open Community has been created to coordinate the development of standards and open architectures The member companies of the community have agreed to implement a policy of interoperability based on recognized open commercial and military standards adopting a full spectrum approach Members of Open Community include Atos Origin Diehl BGT Defense CONET CSC Ploumlnzke ESG IBM Deutschland Rheinmetall Defense Electronics Thales Defense Deutschland and Unilog Systems (Rheinmetall Defense Electronics 2005) While valuable national collaborative initiatives such as Open Community will not necessarily address the challenges of international interoperability and cross-national acquisitions

Conclusion

The European industrial base is clearly capable of undertaking signifi cant work on C4ISR programs and technologies not only at the national level but also at the transnational level There are several transatlantic projects in the fi eld These include the Active Phased Array Radar (APAR) project co-developed by Thales EADS and Raytheon and deployed by the German Dutch and Canadian navies (the system enables the tracking and controlling of missiles fi red from various sources by a single ship) MIDS (which enables interoperability between United States British German Italian French and Spanish ships aircraft and missiles) and the Raytheon-Thales jointly-owned fi rm Thales-Raytheon Systems (TRS) working on C2 systems for air defense and tactical communications for Special Forces

Increasingly European companies are initiating intra-European collaborations as opposed to transatlantic programs In the post-Cold War era European defense fi rms have been almost twice as likely to pursue co-production and co-development projects with each other as with US fi rms and over three times more likely than with defense fi rms from other regions (Jones 2005 3) One motivation could be the sense that Americarsquos globally dominant defense industry forces the Europeans to combine efforts in order to compete internationally as well as to avoid excessive dependence on the United States There is a risk in this approach as it will add competitors in the international market and increase the challenge to ensure adequate transatlantic interoperability

For the Europeans regional cooperation does hold many benefi ts Regional collaboration in research and development production and procurement of C4ISR technologies and systems is clearly an important route toward developing

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

143

the capabilities needed to conduct network-based operations The European companies are likely to provide pressure from bottom-up for greater collaboration distributing technologies and demonstrators to several European countries They can also promote collaborative approaches to technology development Smaller more local companies can complement the larger ones with niche expertise and experience from national programs Such discussions could enhance interoperability across European military capabilities

Firms in the European industrial and technology base have recognized that developing the C4ISR technologies and systems required to conduct network-based operations will be important to their competitive position both in defense and commercial markets Unmanned vehicles sensor payloads deployable and mobile communications network infrastructures and data analysis technologies are all growth markets in both arenas European fi rms have been quick to grasp this reality and are investing in applications for defense and security customers with cutting-edge technologies While European C4ISR and network strategies are still being developed the industrial and technology base on which Europe will rely to implement strategies is amply capable of supplying them

144

8

EUROPEAN NETWORK-BASED

CAPABILITIES

Policy recommendations

The major European defense powers clearly possess the technology capabilities to research build and deploy modern C4ISR capabilities and move down the road toward military capabilities that are more network-based Many of these countries this survey reveals have made explicit decisions to move in that direction The Europeans face two signifi cant challenges in reaching this goal creating cross-national capabilities that take advantage of C4ISR to increase their ability to operate with each other in autonomous ways and enhancing transatlantic interoperability with the United States There are a number of policy steps the Europeans can take and steps the United States needs to take to realize this twofold objective

While the European allies have in many cases made a national commitment to enhanced networking the commitment to the trans-European and transatlantic goals is less clear At the trans-European level the European countries need to do much more than they do today to develop common standards and equipment Greater European interaction especially in the framework of the EU is needed for progress to be made in achieving trans-European interoperability The new Battlegroups are an important step in the right direction but more needs to be done

With respect to transatlantic interoperability it is clear that the Europeans are not likely to create the extensive network of C4ISR capabilities the United States plans nor need they do so A ldquoplug and playrdquo approach makes more sense for Europe using a US or NATO network backbone and selecting the points in that backbone where connectivity will ensure interoperability Such interoperability is most critical with respect to the timely transmission of voice data and images which will enable networked operations A plug and play strategy depends on common standards and capabilities and on ensuring that these are shared commonly deployed and secure Parallel to European actions the US needs to develop a stronger grasp of European strategic perspectives take European C4ISR technology and interoperability capabilities and intentions seriously work through NATO to enhance the opportunities for greater connectivity and in particular transform the US regime for defense trade to incentivize interoperability decisions transatlantic technology collaboration and industry effi ciency

Network thinking and interoperability are clearly important objectives in todayrsquos security environment The era of large static armored forces that

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145

confront deter and defeat the adversaryrsquos massed formations has ended So too have the days when NATO forces trained and exercised together but were rarely used Today smaller more agile forces are being used regularly in a wide range of coalition operations both within and outside NATO as an organization and primarily outside Europe as a theater of operations

The question of out-of-area operations for NATO has been answered Europeans have clearly made the decision to use their forces in regions they have stayed away from for decades Coalition operations too seem more likely Iraq may be answering the question of whether the US will deploy forces on a largely unilateral basis for contingencies in other regions Coalition operations are now a ldquofact of liferdquo in Bosnia Kosovo Afghanistan and even in Iraq Connectivity between coalition forces will be necessary lack thereof is an obstacle to effective operations

This connectivity cannot be easily created at the point of deployment its absence is likely to lead to decisions to carve out separate zones of operation as seen in Iraq Sustained interoperability will require sustained planning cooperation and investment within Europe and across the Atlantic using military-to-military cooperation and the full panoply of institutions that connect the relevant nations

There are other reasons to push forward on greater cooperation with respect to C4ISR and network-based capabilities within Europe and across the Atlantic Technological effi ciency is one Unconstrained the technologies relevant to network-based operations would fl ow freely between countries many of them are drawn from a global commercial market for information and communications technology There are technological capabilities the Europeans bring to C4ISR from which the US military could benefi t and clear benefi ts to Europe from a less-constrained fl ow of C4ISR technology in the other direction

These same technologies are subject however to dual-use and military technology transfer rules making ineffi ciencies and redundancies inevitable Companies in the United States and Europe complain that even the European and American business units of the same fi rm cannot maximize technological synergies because the regulatory regimes get in the way As a result the same or similar technologies are sometimes being developed separately on both sides of the Atlantic and technological synergies cannot be exploited Similarly the absence of a coordinated strategy in Europe is leading to separate investments on expensive and duplicative programs

There is an economic cost to this ineffi ciency As each nation buys what it needs from its own suppliers each is paying a higher than necessary price and budget resources are being wasted in duplication This is especially a problem in Europe one slowly being responded to in such areas as UAVs and space where cross-national investments are becoming more common It is also a problem for the US which fails to reap the economies that might fl ow from tapping into the European technology base A more fl exible transatlantic technology market has potential benefi ts both for US and European defense investments and defense budgets A more open transatlantic regime for these technologies could also bring greater competition with advantageous results both in terms of price and technological innovation

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

146

European policies and actions

There has been increasingly rapid change in the European approach to C4ISR and network-based capabilities The number of militaries and defense ministries working on formulating and implementing C4ISR doctrines has grown as has the intensity of these efforts There remains much to be done however before all major European forces are adequately transformed for coalition operations outside the NATO area A number of actions can be suggested some at the national level and some within the framework of multilateral institutions

The trans-European commitment to multinational network-based operations is still not entirely clear This goal is not yet centrally embedded in European defense planning for all the progress that has been made over the past decade There remains an inadequate European commitment to joint force planning common requirements and coordinated RampT investment And the European defense market is still not fully open to the benefi ts and effi ciencies that could be realized by more fl exible movement of technology and greater competition among suppliers

European defense planning

At the level of defense and force planning the European allies need to make a clear commitment to the goal of intra-European and transatlantic C4ISR connectivity both in NATO and in the EU European national governments have recognized the importance of connectivity in some areas In the air (fi ghter communications) and at sea (naval communications and fi re control and targeting) the interoperability challenge is being met and collaborative efforts have resulted in a fair degree of connectivity The same cannot be said for land forces even within national militaries let alone at the trans-European or NATO levels All nations are working on this problem as the British Bowman the Dutch TITAAN and the Swedish HF-2000 programs indicate

Most countries are developing C4 systems to conform to NATO STANAGs yet few are moving beyond this level testing interoperability or moving toward the higher standards that prevail today Conforming to NATO STANAGs will not solve the inter-European or transatlantic interoperability problem The pace of some countriesrsquo C4ISR innovation goes well beyond NATO STANAGs However NATO remains an important context for addressing this issue systematically European governments need to work to accelerate the NATO STANAG process and broaden its coverage to also include surveillance and reconnaissance system standards The new Allied Command Transformation provides another important context for this effort one in which the Europeans need to engage fully

An equally strong commitment needs to be made in the European Union in the framework of the Headline Goal and ECAP processes and the European Defense Agency While C4ISR interoperability issues are on the table in the EU both in ECAP and the EDArsquos Capabilities Directorate they do not appear to have received priority attention and they should have it Interoperability requirements will be

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

147

driven by the missions the Europeans plan to undertake and the capabilities needed to network the command and control communications and intelligence need for those missions

Both NATO and the EU have formulated broad defense strategies that dictate when and how the military forces made available to them can be deployed Both have designated specifi c branches to integrate doctrines for network-based operations into their respective strategies NATO through its Command Control and Consultation Agency the European Union through the European Defense Agencyrsquos Capabilities Directorate These offi ces can be an important focus of assistance for nations formulating national doctrines and planning the acquisition of systems If undertaken in a coordinated manner by both NATO and the European Union national migration towards network-based doctrines and capabilities can be achieved more swiftly and effi ciently sharing workload avoiding redundancies and pooling resources NATO and European Union oversight of this transition can help ensure that the goal of intra-European and transatlantic interoperability remains the focus of national planners

The Europeans do not need to adopt US global missions and goals to achieve this interoperability for networked operations Too often the US critique of the Europeans is that their roles missions and forces need to look like those of the US to be interoperable or useful in coalition operations However the Europeans are unlikely to undertake large high intensity combat operations at a global level and unlikely to invest in building the resources required for these With a different strategic ambition but a comparable view of the important threats the Europeans will not need forces that are carbon copies of the US The United Kingdom has taken a different approach developing network-enabled capabilities by testing and modifying existing equipment and evaluating new systems against this network requirement rather than building an entire global network-centric architecture from the ground up ndash evolution as opposed to revolution

The policy challenge is how to ensure connectivity where the European and US force capabilities must meet in coalition deployments inside or outside the NATO framework or for the missions of the NATO Response Force outside the NATO area Given the strategic and resource gap it is critical for the Europeans in cooperation with the United States and in the NATO context to defi ne the critical nodes in the US C4ISR system into which European capabilities need to plug in order to play

Given the difference in resources strategic ambitions and roles and missions a plug and play strategy makes sense for Europe The model would be for the United States or NATO or both to provide the backbone for a network and for the Europeans to select the points in the grid that are critical to ensure the needed interoperability Interoperability will need to focus on the timely transmission of voice data and images the information that will enable networked operations The plug and play strategy relies on common software standards and capabilities Ensuring that software standards are shared commonly deployed and secure will facilitate the communication of voice data and imagery among more complex (US) and less intricate (European) networks

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148

The Europeans will not need all the satellites the United States possesses in order to shape operations that use the intelligence those satellites deliver They will not require all the UAVs the US deploys though their systems will need to be able to disseminate data to and from the US If the Europeans wish to operate autonomously from the United States or from NATO assets available through the Berlin Plus arrangements they will have to decide how much autonomous C4ISR they require to do so European ambitions can be tailored to European requirements and European resources and interoperability in the Alliance can be reinforced at the same time

The NATO Response Force could provide a useful test-bed for C4ISR inter-operability issues US policy sees the NRF as a European force to which it will provide important logistical and C4 support in the near term Eventually in the US view this force is to provide such capabilities without US support The goal from the US perspective is to create incentives for the Europeans to develop integral C4ISR that is interoperable with US forces While the issue of continued US participation in the force remains on the table it provides a useful opportunity for the Europeans to test out their own emerging C4ISR capabilities with potential payoff for the more autonomous capabilities that might emerge in the EU context

Working through the NRF might help address the large uncertainty about the European commitment to both transatlantic and intra-European interoperability There is not yet a clear common view in Europe about the goal of interoperability The British tend to focus on the need for interoperability with the US but less on the goal of interoperability with their European partners The French are committed to greater internal interoperability among their national services but do not focus priority attention on C4ISR interoperability with Britain or Germany Where interoperability exists ndash in the air and at sea ndash it is largely the result of NATO requirements and the acquisition of US systems not from addressing interoperability at the European level

The lack of clear priority attention to this issue stems in part from the absence of cross-European interaction on strategic force and requirement planning among the European defense ministries The Headline Goal and ECAP processes both of which are important do not constitute joint strategic force and requirements planning These processes focus on a particular set of forces and capabilities not on overall defense goals There is a gap between the discussions in Brussels and the day-to-day planning and priority setting in national capitals These latter processes are not coordinated at the European level leaving each nation focused largely on its own national military capabilities A purely national process forces C4ISR and interoperability requirements to compete for funding with commitments to legacy and modernization programs Engaging this dialogue at the level of the European Defense Agencyrsquos Capabilities Directorate and the EU Military Staff could provide important leverage to change these priorities

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

149

Investment in research and technology

The absence of trans-European coordination is particularly telling at the level of research and technology investments Overall the level of European defense-related RampT investment is low and RampT priorities and programs are poorly coordinated across the EU The result is weak spending in the C4ISR arena and redundancies between the major defense countries Low funding moreover combined with major commitment of limited procurement resources to legacy and modernization programs means that RampT projects that reach the prototype or demonstrator stage often do not enter into production

RampT coordination across EU countries is uncommon While the French and British devote signifi cant sums to defense RampT especially in the C4ISR arena they engage in little bilateral coordination on these programs Others such as Italy and Germany which have set a goal of creating more networked forces engage in little trans-European collaboration in these plans or investments Given the overall limitation on defense resources greater coordination and the elimination of duplication in effort would be an important way to obtain the resources needed for interoperability

An important contribution to the trans-European RampT effort may emerge from the European Commissionrsquos 7th Framework Program (FP7) and the EDArsquos RampT programs The Commissionrsquos FP7 that begins in 2007 will include security space and homeland security research and development for the fi rst time with proposed funding of 4ndash7 billion euros for such fi elds as earth observation and detection of chemical and biological agents It will be critical for the Commission to maintain a wide scope for this funding resist efforts to reduce the overall amount and ensure that at least some of it is directed toward dual-use network-based capabilities including UAVs large communications networks and advanced sensors

The EDA RampT programs will have an even more specifi c focus on defense needs The fi rst cluster of investments initiated in the summer of 2005 focuses on technologies for long-endurance UAVs However EDArsquos current RampT budget of some 3 million euros is small As the EDA experience with this program grows so should its budget and its involvement in more complex development and demonstration programs

A truly trans-European system for strategic force and requirements planning is still some way ahead in the future Ultimately for the European Union to meet interoperability and C4ISR requirements such a system will be needed It is the only way to end redundancies and make the force structure changes needed to release budgetary resources for interoperability investments

A cross-European market for dual-use and defense technologies

The focus on interoperability in C4ISR and greater integration of planning and investment activities will only pay off if a cross-European market for dual-use and defense technology comes into being Policies and institutions at the European level are still not adequate to take full advantage of the widespread privatization

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

150

and trans-European consolidation of defense industry and technology capabilities that has occurred over the past decade

Because requirements are defi ned nationally national defense industry policies vary widely and the rules and regulations for acquisition differ also the incentives for industry to collaborate or compete across borders are weak The rules are not standardized budgets are not coordinated the politics of local procurement tend to weigh heavily in investment decisions and defense technology transfer across European borders remains constrained an increasingly global industry is not matched by a regional defense market

The Letter of Intent OCCAR EDA and Commission collaborative research programs all point in the right direction in terms of creating such a market but progress is slow The Commissionrsquos communiqueacutes ndash the latest of which was adopted in 2003 ndash to encourage industrial restructuring and greater effi ciency in the European Defense Equipment Market while praiseworthy have had modest effect Nor have collaborative procurements broken through this logjam Collaborative European defense programs still focus funding on platforms such as the A400 airlifter Tiger helicopter and Eurofi ghter When it comes to network-based capabilities national technology assets and producers tend to be favored and international competition or collaboration resisted

The UK is changing its approach creating a potentially useful precedent Overall British defense procurement policy has moved sharply away from protecting national monopolies and toward transnational competition and teaming Despite what has been a dominant position for BAE Systems in the UK defense market the Ministry of Defense has sent an unambiguous signal that procurements are open to European and transatlantic competitors This has led to a growing position in the British defense market especially that for C4ISR technologies for such fi rms as Thales Raytheon EADS General Dynamics and EDS The explicit goal of this policy change was to reap the advantages of competition and international teaming and ensure that the broadest array of technology was available In return non-British fi rms are expected to bring a substantial portion of work share into the United Kingdom strengthening and broadening the domestic defense technology industry at the same time

Overcoming the weight of the European defense industrial legacy will not be easy but the British model may provide useful lessons for European-level market policy A more open market could provide substantial effi ciency savings through competition with important payoff for European and transatlantic interoperability For these advantages to be reached the Letter of Intent OCCAR EDA and EC research processes would need to be coordinated with the development of an open-market policy resisting efforts to protect that market from competition

American actions

The future of transatlantic interoperability for networked operations will depend on American policy changes as well as on European actions The US has a clear interest in advancing such interoperability based on a history of security

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151

cooperation and the demands of coalition operations in the twenty-fi rst century (Serfaty 2005 87ndash8) Neither Europe nor the United States can meet the new security challenges alone Addressed through the Alliance the defense capabilities for meeting these challenges would be greatly enhanced by a more effective networked European force If the US wishes not to become involved in a particular situation an effective European capability will provide a valuable policy option for the US

A US policy that encourages and incentivizes the existing trends toward more sophisticated C4ISR investments in Europe needs to focus on three dimensions greater common understanding with respect to strategic perspectives a serious engagement with European efforts currently underway and reforming the US regime for transatlantic defense trade to allow a discussion of technology requirements transatlantic technology collaboration and greater industry effi ciency

Understanding European strategic perspectives

The changes in the world of global security since the end of the Cold War have forced a discussion of how institutions and national strategies need to change to refl ect new international security realities To some degree this dialogue has already led to signifi cant changes including the enlargement of NATO to include the former Warsaw Pact reassuring them about the dramatic change that had taken place The extension of NATOrsquos mission to restore order to the Balkans was also a major change for the Alliance and its fi rst involvement in actual combat in the wider European theater These operations also created stresses in the Alliance and played a role in the US decision to choose coalitions of the willing for the initial military operations in Afghanistan and for the war in Iraq Growing dangers of terrorist strikes and nuclear proliferation have further altered the security agenda for the transatlantic partners

When it comes to the use of military forces the two most recent confl icts may well represent the future trend smaller expeditionary forces deployed at some distance from the homeland operating in relatively spare environments moving with agility and focus to strike adversary targets effectively and terminate combat operations quickly Clearly these twenty-fi rst century wars will rely more than ever on networked operations integrating sensors data communications and the measurement of effects

These military deployments may not always operate in coalition and may not always involve NATO or all the major European powers Disagreements over Iraq and the diffi culties in the execution of Balkan operations both had the effect of giving the Europeans an incentive to accelerate the development of more autonomous capabilities in part to refl ect a different European view of strategic requirements Similarly these disagreements and problems convinced some in the US that the Europeans might be an unreliable partner for such operations both because of differing strategic views and a less advanced military capability

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152

Given these tensions NATO continues to provide an important context for dialogue at the military and technical level European and American forces will continue to operate together both inside and outside the Alliance and interoperability will be an important tool in conducting such operations successfully The NATO Prague summit of November 2002 made signifi cant progress with respect the transformation of Alliance forces for the new missions and technologies of the twenty-fi rst century by reshaping the NATO command structure with a new transformation command setting new capabilities objectives and endorsing the NRF

NATO has provided one context for a higher level of strategic dialogue as well Critical changes have included the willingness of the European allies to commit the Alliance to out-of-area operations and to stand up the NRF It has not been the only context however The EU has also begun to emerge as a growing player in the security dialogue defi ning a broad strategy document creating a pillar in the Council on this subject pushing through the Headline Goal and ECAP processes and most recently moving forward with the European Defense Agency and the Battlegroups

None of these developments however constitutes a sustained strategic dialogue between the United States and its European allies The US government should take the initiative to begin such a dialogue either in the NATO context or as a higher level discussion among the allied countries This engagement should also involve bringing the European allies into an ongoing discussion in the framework of the quadrennial defense reviews in the United States a process that has largely excluded sustained interaction with the allies

Engaging European programs and capabilities

For the strategic dialogue to have meaning with respect to force and acquisition decisions the US will need to take a serious look at the capabilities the Europeans are putting in place today There is a tendency in the US to discount European investments in C4ISR and network solutions as inadequate The lesson some US policymakers have drawn over the past fi ve decades and especially over the past ten years is that European forces are heavy on manpower and equipment light on new network-centric planning and technology and overall inadequately transformed to refl ect post-Cold War realities In this view the fi rst Gulf War and the Kosovo air war indicated that European land forces lacked the real-time information and C4ISR capabilities necessary for agile expeditionary operations and European air forces could not ensure secure real-time interoperability for air interdiction missions

This study suggests that the European commitment to C4ISR and greater networking is stronger than this view suggests In part in reaction to the lessons of the Gulf War and the Balkans a number of European countries are stepping up to the investments and planning required to acquire advanced C4ISR and achieve greater interoperability In addition there is little doubt that the industrial and technology base available in Europe is both competitive to that of the United

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153

States and adequate to deliver the capabilities a modern more networked force requires

US policymakers and even NATO leaders have suggested that the way to close the ldquogaprdquo is for the Europeans to increase defense spending Clearly greater spending focused on networking as a priority would help solve the interoperability dilemma However the reality is that overall defense budgets in Europe are unlikely to rise at the rate necessary to provide that capability

A more fruitful US approach would be to make a virtue of this reality by urging a restructuring of European defense investments with a priority on the forces and technologies needed for twenty-fi rst century operations This emphasis could bear fruit While Germany for example may not be able to increase its defense budget overall given domestic German commitments and problems the focus of the German defense program is already shifting toward expeditionary capabilities incorporating modern C4ISR A US message consistent with this internal trend could prove more productive than repeated demands that the Germans spend more overall on defense

US policymakers have argued the priorities case with respect to specifi c acquisitions notably the A400M and Galileo which are sometimes criticized as the ldquowrongrdquo priorities for European defense investment US criticism however has provided an incentive for both projects to move forward Again this policy approach may be counterproductive Both programs are clearly intended by the Europeans to meet European defense (and civil) needs Both provide capabilities the Americans have long sought ndash a more modern European air transport capability and the ability to provide location data for precision-guided munitions The solutions are European and responsive to the needs of a European industrial and technology base as well as the desire to possess some autonomous European capabilities in these areas

ldquoBuy Americanrdquo is not an answer however much US policymakers may think it the most effi cient solution The Europeans are no more likely to satisfy their equipment and technology needs by buying exclusively in the US market than the US Department of Defense is likely to satisfy its needs entirely from European providers Again to make a virtue of this political-economic reality it may make more sense for the US to explore the opportunities to combine technologies and industrial capabilities through collaboration

US concerns about the gap and about European capabilities have led to minimal US effort to involve the Europeans in US planning for network-centric capabilities or to include European technologies in the process of developing these capabilities for the US military

A general skepticism about European capabilities has been combined with a preference in the US defense establishment to work with known US processes and suppliers Extending the research and acquisition process to include European suppliers is a step into the less-known US suppliers moreover are under-standably uneasy about bringing European fi rms into the US market as potential competitors

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154

Overcoming the transatlantic C4ISR interoperability challenge and implementing a plug and play approach will require overcoming these prevailing attitudes and engaging the Europeans directly with respect to plans and technologies Here too NATO could provide an important context for a multilateral dialogue through collaboration on transatlantic RampD programs for example The NATO-led CAESAR advanced concept technology demonstratr (ACTD) discussed earlier has already proven that sharing data between various national airborne ground surveillance capabilities is possible Other technology areas are ripe for collaborative initiatives

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for both surveillance and combat and their sensor payloads are one such area As already noted many European countries possess substantial technological knowledge and experience in this area including engines airframe design and stealth technology and have expertise in active electronically scanned array radar hyperspectral imaging lightweight synthetic aperture radar and ground moving target indicators relevant for sensor payloads Multinational European programs such as the EuroMALE UAV and the Neuron combat UAV are already under way Cooperation in this area would have not only military and budgetary advantages for participants but could open opportunities for industrial cooperation

Another potentially fruitful arena for transatlantic collaboration is data-sharing of space imagery Europe has underway several multinational efforts to link data gathered by Earth observation systems The Optical and Radar Federated Earth Observation program will link the existing Francersquos SPOT 5 and Helios 2 satellites with systems currently under development the two French Pleiades high-resolution optical satellites the four Italian COSMO-Skymed X-band radar satellites (with a resolution of less than 1 meter for military images) and possibly the fi ve German SAR-Lupe synthetic aperture radar satellites The fi rst satellites in these programs will be operational between 2005 and 2007 and Sweden Spain Austria and Belgium have already secured their industrial cooperation on Pleiades and the sharing of data acquired by the system (Adams and Ben-Ari 2005 21) A transatlantic discussion of how to integrate these platforms and share data including the sensitive issue of intelligence-sharing might be fruitful

Transforming the US defense trade regime

The US regime for export controls and technology transfer may be the ldquolong pole in the tentrdquo for transatlantic collaboration and interoperability (Center for Strategic and International Studies 2001) Policy and industry analysts have noted for some years that the US National Disclosure Process (NDP) International Traffi c in Arms Regulations (ITAR) Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) and Special Security Arrangements (SSA) all of which regulate the transfer and export of US defense technologies and the process of direct foreign investment in the US market pose major obstacles to the technology transfers that will be needed to close the interoperability gap between the United States and its European allies (Adams 2001c)

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155

Transfers of defense technologies from the US to the European allies go through intensive scrutiny in the Department of Defense and an interagency discussion before a decision is made to approve the deal This has often led to a decision to share parts of hardware with allied collaborators but not software codes that govern the operation of the system leaving allies in possession of only part of the information they would need to operate repair overhaul or adapt systems purchased from or built in collaboration with the United States The US-German-Italian Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) for example has faced this black box problem for some time

US export control rules compound the problem All military technology exports and transfers including the exchange of oral or written expertise on such technology require a license from the Offi ce of Defense Trade Controls in the Department of State after interagency coordination (including the Department of Defense and the armed services) The slowness and complexity of the US export control process and the large number of items on the Munitions List have been a constant irritant in the transatlantic defense relationship US fi rms wishing to collaborate with European counterparts encounter delays European fi rms seeking to acquire US components for European systems fi nd the system unpredictable The US operations of European defense fi rms cannot cross-fertilize with their European branches as such communications require an export license to take place This system has created incentives for the Europeans to build technologies in Europe which are no longer subject to US controls rather than buy technology from the United States

US regulations with respect to the scrutiny and structure of foreign direct investment in the US defense market have further complicated the dialogue about interoperability Direct investments and joint ventures by Europeans (and others) in the US defense market are subject to intensive scrutiny through the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) interagency process While very few such investments have been rejected many are withdrawn or not attempted given the complexities and uncertainties in the US process Successful investments and collaborations such as the BAE Systems acquisition of Lockheed Martinrsquos electronic warfare assets in 2000 and the creation of Thales Raytheon Systems (an air defense joint venture) take years to execute and are diffi cult to operate effi ciently

These diffi culties are compounded by the complexities of the SSA requirements which effectively separate the work and workforce of American business units from those of the European parent company The requirements are designed and enforced to prevent the fl ow of sensitive technologies across the Atlantic They also make effi cient cross-corporate collaboration and economic effi ciencies diffi cult

C4ISR interoperability is at the very heart of coalition operations and the US rules of the road are a disincentive to achieving that goal Major reforms of the US technology transfer export control and investment rules would be needed for transatlantic interoperability and network issues to be solved It will be important for Washington to realize that these rules which seem technical and receive

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

156

lower priority attention are strategic issues for the European allies Technical discussions that leave the current rules and processes in place will not solve the problem they need to be addressed at the higher policy level

Conclusion

Solving the interoperability problems particularly with respect to networked operations and C4ISR is clearly critical to the long-term future of the transatlantic relationship Both the Europeans and the United States will need to take major policy decisions to move this agenda forward The issue is not a technological one the obstacles to a solution are at the level of policy and budgets The Europeans need to focus their priorities clarify strategy work to eliminate redundancies and build institutions and policies at the European level that address C4ISR as a priority The United States needs to engage in a more systematic strategic dialogue with Europe engage the Europeans at the military and technical levels and reform the regulatory regimes and processes that inhibit technology fl ows Neither set of tasks is easy completing them could make a substantial difference in strengthening transatlantic interoperability for coalition operations

157

9

CONCLUSIONS

Recognizing that the changed threats of the twenty-fi rst century demanded a different strategic response and military capability the United States moved relatively swiftly during the 1990s to transform its military Over the past 15 years this has made the US military increasingly more effi cient and effective at carrying out expeditionary combat missions involving air sea and ground forces operating jointly From a force largely trained and equipped for platform-intensive land battles in Western Europe versus a Soviet threat Americarsquos armed forces have become adept at conducting small expeditionary operations anywhere in the world The increased fl exibility maneuverability and lethality of the US military has included substantial investment in emerging technologies for gathering intelligence distributing it rapidly to all relevant decision makers and users and acting upon it Linked together into a network that ties command to warfi ghting these technologies are a critical tool for modern military operations

The conventional wisdom about the Atlantic Alliance is that the Europeans have not gone through a similar adjustment spend far too little on defense and are left with forces that cannot engage in similar operations alone or in coalition with the United States This study demonstrates that this wisdom is a vast oversimplifi cation As a perception of European military capabilities especially in the arena of networked operations this view condemns both sides of the Atlantic to an unnecessary crisis of confi dence There is indeed some truth to the view that a ldquogaprdquo separates the US and its NATO allies in Europe especially in the arena of networked capabilities But there are important nuances to that gap that need to be understood for interoperability to be achieved

This study shows that a number of European allies already possess or are seriously developing important elements even a full spectrum of modern C4ISR doctrines and capabilities The major European defense powers ndash especially the United Kingdom and France ndash experienced the Gulf War and the Kosovo air war as a serious wakeup call with respect to C4ISR and interoperability with the United States Within available means these countries along with the Netherlands Finland and Sweden are investing in cross-service C2 upgraded communications gear with new radio programs and IP-based capabilities are researching testing or deploying UAV platforms with modern sensors and are tackling issues of cross-service interoperability

CONCLUSIONS

158

The United Kingdom is probably the most advanced in developing network doctrine investing in the range of capabilities required and coordinating its activities with the United States France invests across an even more broad range of capabilities than the United Kingdom (including space systems for example) but has a more diffi cult time coordinating with the United States and is still at the early stages of developing a network doctrine Sweden Finland and the Netherlands have laid out plans for achieving a networked C4ISR capability and are moving slowly forward though interoperability is constrained by national policy Germany Italy and Spain have all made policy statements that commit them to a greater focus on C4ISR networked capabilities and interoperability but actual doctrines and deployed capabilities are still thin

Although progress on C4ISR and networking is uneven in Europe there does not appear to be a signifi cant technology gap between the US and its major European allies At the level of basic technological inputs ndash information communications equipment and sensor systems ndash Europe possesses ample and competitive technology both in the defense and the civilian sector and the know-how to cooperate with the producers of US technology to develop systems and capabilities that can interoperate with US defense systems

It is also an oversimplifi cation to argue that there is a capabilities gap between the US and European militaries There clearly are mismatches in capabilities but they are not at the extreme of saying that the US is moving toward a full network-centric capability while the Europeans are irretrievably mired in the last generation of military technology The leading European nations are developing network-based doctrines and integrating them into their broader defense strategies Many nations are developing and deploying systems in such areas as cross-service C2 upgraded communications systems UAV platforms with modern sensors and cross-service interoperability

NATO has underway a number of programs to create greater interoperability between European and American forces with promise of signifi cant progress in the next decade The EU is also beginning to focus on such capabilities under the framework of the ECAP the Battlegroups and the emerging European Defense Agency There are clear persuasive reasons for making investments in network-based capabilities and transatlantic interoperability a high priority on both sides of the Atlantic NATO the EU and various international forums and industrial collaborations are effective mechanisms for making this happen

There clearly are differences in doctrine and deployment across the Atlantic No NATO ally intends to build or deploy the full global set of networked capabilities projected by the United States Only France has invested in virtually all of the elements of such a capability but no nation has the individual resources to build a capability comparable to that of the United States nor does there appear to be a strategic necessity to do so Only a handful of European allies have formulated doctrines for networked operations however based on their understanding of the uses of C4ISR technology in warfare and of the campaigns they foresee themselves conducting in the near future Networking is not yet at the core of

CONCLUSIONS

159

European military planning nor is the role of multilateral institutions such as the EU entirely clear

This transatlantic ldquodoctrine gaprdquo will need to be bridged if future coalition operations are to succeed This is less a technological issue than it is a policy problem C4ISR technologies and expertise of comparable quality exist within companies and national forces on both sides of the Atlantic Several joint US-European programs have proven that these technologies can be linked The NATO-led advanced concept technology demonstrator CAESAR has proven that sharing data between various national airborne ground surveillance capabilities is possible The six-nation Multinational Interoperability Council program has enabled the sharing of classifi ed information using a combined wide area network The co-development of the Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) has resulted in an encrypted jam-resistant interoperable tactical data communications network In 2005 two other advanced concept technology demonstrators were linked to demonstrate how data from various national collection systems can be posted on a common military website and made available for coalition operations in near real time down to the brigade and platoon levels That same year 43 nations conducted over 15000 interoperability tests in the eleventh consecutive Combined Endeavor exercise These programs demonstrate that interoperability ndash with all of its operational advantages ndash can be achieved without requiring individual countries to relinquish certain military capabilities or parts of their industrial base

For the Europeans one priority for European defense planners will be to develop doctrine that can guide the restructuring of their militaries toward a more expeditionary capability using networked systems France for example develops and procures a wide range of state-of-the-art C4ISR assets but does so without a clearly formulated doctrine for expeditionary network-based operations Such doctrine will make it easier to shift spending from older systems such as main battle tanks and armored personnel carriers into network-based systems such as airborne ground surveillance and space assets Other European defense ministries need to follow suit taking maximum advantage of the contribution that networked capabilities can bring to the level of expeditionary and coalition operations to which they choose to commit

The pace of such a change will have important implications for defense investments A substantial share of European national-level investment in C4ISR and networked capabilities is still at the research technology exploration and development stage The investments of the past decade are now beginning to pay off with deployments taking place over the next ten years from now There is a mismatch in timing with the US pace that needs to be tended to

Policy is again on a critical part of the answer As a common European commitment to out-of-area operations and agile and mobile forces emerges it will create a strong incentive for a redirection of national and trans-European defense investments A Europe uncertain about its military roles and missions will enhance the ldquodrag effectrdquo of legacy forces and investments at the national defense planning level This drag is visible in some of the countries under study notably

CONCLUSIONS

160

Germany and Italy which have substantial investments in legacy forces and the industry that provides their platforms

Resources are the other part of the equation Given the major non-defense commitments of many of the European countries and the unclear defi nition of defense priorities it is enormously diffi cult to redirect public resources to defense Defense resources are unlikely to rise in the near term but this does not mean that resources dedicated to C4ISR cannot grow The diffi cult but necessary decision which some have made and others are coming to involves the tradeoff between legacy forces and equipment and the expeditionary networked forces of the future A doctrine that makes network-based forces more central to overall capability will help reshape budget priorities providing resources for C4ISR investment

The doctrine and deployment gaps are at the heart of current interoperability shortfalls within Europe and across the Atlantic While many European militaries are developing or will soon deploy C2 systems that cross service lines and common communications are the focus of some (the United Kingdomrsquos Bowman system is probably the most ambitious and comprehensive) the results are still uneven across countries The question of cross-European interoperability also needs to be addressed as these changes are made The cross-European gap needs to be closed at the same time the transatlantic gap is being bridged

US policymakers who tend to view transformation network-centric operations and interoperability either solely within the US context or at the fringe as a NATO issue need to keep in mind the cross-European level of activity Recent EU developments suggest that the Europeans do not intend to remain behind will see autonomous networked capabilities and will want to apply their own technology to their needs Europe possesses a technological base adequate to meet this requirement and the European intention of developing such capabilities is becoming more clear The emerging strategic vision in Europe while different from that of the United States clearly includes the desire for increased network-based security capabilities and the ability to operate both autonomously and in coalition with the US Policymakers in the United States need to be aware of these cross-European developments as they are starting to shape European attitudes toward strategic missions the development of rapid reaction capabilities technological investments and cooperation across the Atlantic Over time the rise of a defense-capable European Union will change the context within which these issues are discussed

161

GLOSSARY

Airborne Ground Surveillance (AGS) a radar system ndash mounted on an aircraft or helicopter ndash used for mapping friendly and enemy elements on the ground on a continuous basis and for passing information of their location to commanders for command and control intelligence and strike purposes The use of such a system provides strategic and tactical theater surveillance and target acquisition capabilities and thus reduces both the time and mass required to execute operations AGS systems consist of a radar that can operate in synthetic aperture radar (SAR) mode providing broad area imaging at high resolutions ground moving target indicator (GMTI) mode for tracking moving objects or both

Command Control Communications Computers Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) a range of systems grouped for their relevance to network-centric warfare and network-based operations (see below) When these systems are interconnected they can form a network (or a series of networks) on which operators can exchange information and coordinate activities

Galileo Joint European Commission and European Space Agency program for a space-based positioning navigation and timing system similar to the US Global Positioning System Galileo will include 30 satellites and begin offering services in 2008

Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) Joint European Commission and European Space Agency program for the development of new information systems and techniques to exploit Europersquos existing space-based earth observation capabilities more effi ciently and to plan Europersquos next-generation earth observation systems

Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) a joint project of the US air force and army providing an airborne stand-off range surveillance and target acquisition radar and C2 center Sixteen such aircraft are operational providing ground situation information through communication via secure data links with air force command posts army mobile ground stations and other command centers

Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) a high-capacity electronic counter measure resistant communications link designed for all

GLOSSARY

162

services (air surface and land) and all platform types Operates on the UHF band and supports three message standards Link-16 the Interim JTIDS Message Standard (IJMS) and Variable Message Format (VMF)

Link-11 tactical data link used by the US navy and several other allied navies Its ability to operate on high frequency waves enables the system to communicate beyond line of sight making it ideal for maritime communications Link-11 can also operate in the UHF band but is then limited to line-of-sight ranges

Link-16 tactical data link supporting the exchange of surveillance data EW data mission tasking weapons assignments and control data over MIDS and JTIDS equipment

Link-22 next-generation NATO tactical data link also referred to as NATO Improved Link Eleven (NILE)

Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) A fi ve-nation (United States France Italy Germany and Spain) cooperative program created to develop a third-generation Link-16 system

Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) multinational body providing oversight of coalition interoperability and assisting in implementing actions for its improvement The six member countries (Australia Canada France Germany the United Kingdom and the United States) were chosen as most likely and most capable of leading future coalitions

NATO Air Alliance Ground Surveillance (NATO AGS) NATO research development and procurement program currently in the design phase which will provide the Alliance with an aerial battlefi eld surveillance capability through radar and the fusing of information gathered by other sensors Initially the system was to be deployed on manned aircraft only but it has been redesigned for deployment on both manned and unmanned aircraft

Network-Based Operations (NBO) operations (military and non-military) where elements of command control and communications systems are linked to intelligence-gathering and situation awareness systems Unlike network-centric warfare (see below) the term network-based operations does not imply a single unifi ed network into which all forces are linked Rather several disparate networks ndash possibly deployed by forces from different countries ndash are linked This enables better sharing of information and utilization of forces which in turn means that smaller forces can effectively undertake more complex missions in larger areas of operations

Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) the use of interconnected communications and information systems to create a single network that forms the core of information sharing and strategic operational and tactical decision-making The network gives warfi ghters a shared awareness of the battlespace which in turn enables more effi cient command and control of deployed assets better decision-making for commanders and shorter sensor-to-shooter loops

Precision Guided Munitions (PGM) also known as ldquosmart weaponsrdquo PGMs are a key capability in modern warfi ghting They can be specifi cally designed or regular munitions with an added-on guidance system but in either form maximize destruction of the target while reducing the overall amount of

GLOSSARY

163

munitions required to hit it and minimizing collateral damage While the older less accurate visually-guided munitions are still in use more modern versions are laser- or satellite-guided These include the US Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) and the European Storm Shadow and Scalp missiles

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) remotely piloted aircraft used for a variety of military and civilian tasks Usually categorized into tactical UAV (TUAV) which are used for short-range low-altitude missions medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) used for longer more elaborate missions and high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) used for long-term missions at operational and strategic levels In recent years smaller man-portable and hand-launched mini- and micro-UAVs have been developed and deployed for short-term missions as well as combat UAVs (UCAVs) for strike purposes

164

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adams G (2001a) ldquoStrength in Numbers the European allies and American defense planningrdquo in Williams C (ed) Holding the Line US Defense Alternatives for the Early 21st Century Cambridge MA MIT Press

mdashmdash (2001b) ldquoTaking Europe Seriouslyrdquo in Center for International and Strategic Studies European Defense Industrial Consolidation Implications for US Industry and PolicyWashington DC Center for International and Strategic Studies

mdashmdash (2001c) ldquoFortress America in a Changing Transatlantic Defense Marketrdquo in Schmitt B (ed) Between Cooperation and Competition The Transatlantic Defense MarketParis Institute for Security Studies of the European Union

Adams G and Ben-Ari G (2005) ldquoTransatlantic Revival technology cooperation could offer new startrdquo Defense News 208 21

Adams G Ben-Ari G Logsdon J and Williamson R (2004) European C4ISR Capabilities and Transatlantic Interoperability Washington DC Center for Technology and National Security Policy

Aguumlera M (2003) ldquoDecline in German Research Continuesrdquo Defense News 1837 32Assembly of WEU (2002) Arms Cooperation in Europe WEAG and EU Activities

Brussels Assembly of WEUBaker JC Williamson RA and Johnson B (2001) ldquoUS Security Interests and Dual-

Purpose Satellite Technologiesrdquo in Williamson RA (ed) Dual-Purpose Space Technologies Opportunities and Challenges for US Policymaking Washington DC Space Policy Institute

Barry CL (2002) ldquoCoordinating with NATOrdquo in Binnendijk H (ed) Transforming Americarsquos Military Washington DC Center for Technology and National Security Policy

mdashmdash (2003) ldquoTransforming NATO Command and Control for Future Missionsrdquo DefenseHorizons No 28 Washington DC Center for Technology and National Security Policy

Becher K (2003) ldquoTowards Strategic Dialogue in NATO Europersquos conditionrdquo in Nelson CR and Purcell J (eds) Transforming NATO Forces European PerspectivesWashington DC Atlantic Council of the United States

Bescond B (2003) ldquoGalileo un produit Europeacuteen de souveraineteacuterdquo Defense 105 40ndash3Binnendijk H (2004) ldquoNeeded A NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Forcerdquo Defense

Horizons No 45 Washington DC National Defense UniversityBinnendijk H and Kugler R (2002) ldquoTransforming European Forcesrdquo Survival 44

117ndash32

BIBLIOGRAPHY

165

Boulesteix C (2004) Overview of the French Defense Market 2004 online Available at httpstrategisicgccaepicinternetinimr-rinsfengr125657ehtml (accessed 17 September 2005)

Boyer Y (2004) ldquoThe Consequences of US and NATO Transformation for the European Union a European viewrdquo in Hamilton D (ed) Transatlantic Transformations Equipping NATO for the 21st Century Washington DC Center for Transatlantic Relations

Center for Strategic and International Studies (2001) Technology and Security in the Twenty-fi rst Century US Military Export Control Reform Washington DC Center for Strategic and International Studies

Chuter A (2003a) ldquoUK Strike Chief Notes UAVsrsquo Shortcomingsrdquo Defense News 1830 8

mdashmdash (2003b) ldquoFrench-Dutch UAV Draws Interest In Europerdquo Defense News 1838 4mdashmdash (2005a) ldquoUK May Look to Europe for UCAVsrdquo Defense News 2025 1 8mdashmdash (2005b) ldquoUK Seeks to Expand its UAV Capabilitiesrdquo Defense News 2028 4Council of the European Union (2003) Framework Agreement Between the European

Commission and the European Space Agency Brussels Council of the European Union

mdashmdash (2005) Report by the Head of the European Defense Agency to the Council Brussels Council of the European Union

CPM Forum (2005) ldquoThe Bundeswehr today and tomorrowrdquo in CPM Forum (eds) Defenseand Transformation in Germany St Augustin CPM

DalBello R (2003) ldquoCommercial Communication Satellites assessing vulnerability in a changing worldrdquo in Logsdon J and Adams G (eds) Space Weapons Are They Needed Washington DC The George Washington University

Deacuteleacutegation Geacuteneacuterale pour lrsquoArmement (2003) ldquoLes Deacutemonstrateurs Aeacuteronautiques et Spatiauxrdquo DGA Dossier Paris Deacuteleacutegation Geacuteneacuterale pour lrsquoArmement

De Selding P (2003a) ldquoFrench Defense Ministry Considers Commercial Model for Syracuse 3rdquo Space News 1447 6

mdashmdash (2003b) ldquoSkynet 5 Contract Has Built-in Safeguardsrdquo Space News 1447 10Deutch J Kanter A and Scowcroft B (1999) ldquoSaving NATOrsquos foundationrdquo Foreign

Affairs 786 54ndash67De Wijk R (2004) ldquoThe Implications of Force Transformation the small country

perspectiverdquo in Hamilton DS (ed) Transatlantic Transformation Equipping NATO for the 21st Century Washington DC Center for Transatlantic Relations

European Commission (1996) The Challenges Facing the European Defense-Related Industry A Contribution for Action at European Level Brussels European Commission

mdashmdash (1997) Communication from the Commission Implementing European Union Strategy on Defense-Related Industries Brussels European Commission

mdashmdash (2002) STAR 21 Strategic Aerospace Review for the 21st Century Creating a Coherent Market and Policy Framework for a Vital European Industry Brussels European Commission

mdashmdash (2003a) Communication from the Commission European Defense ndash Industrial and Market Issues ndash Towards an EU Defense Equipment Policy Brussels European Commission

mdashmdash (2003b) Space A New European Frontier for an Expanding Union Brussels European Commission

BIBLIOGRAPHY

166

mdashmdash (2003c) Third European Report on Science and Technology Indicators Brussels European Commission

mdashmdash (2004) Green Paper on Defense Procurement Brussels European CommissionEuropean Convention Working Group ndash Defense (2002) Final Report of Working Group

VIII ndash Defense Brussels European Convention Working Group ndash DefenseEuropean Union (2002) Consolidated Version Of The Treaty On European Union Brussels

European Unionmdashmdash (2003) A Secure Europe in a Better World European Security Strategy Brussels

European Unionmdashmdash (2004) Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe Brussels European UnionFinnish Prime Ministerrsquos Offi ce (2004) Finnish Security and Defense Policy 2004 Helsinki

Prime Ministerrsquos Offi ceFiorenza N (2003a) ldquoNATO Battlefi eld Watchdogrdquo Intelligence Surveillance and

Reconnaissance Journal 26 20ndash2mdashmdash (2003b) ldquoUKrsquos Leap Into UAVsrdquo Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance

Journal 23 37ndash9mdashmdash (2004) ldquoInterview with Franccedilois Naville General Manager of the NATO Air Command

and Control System Management Agencyrdquo Defense News 1948 38mdashmdash (2005a) ldquoHelios 2 Boosts French Satellite Intelligencerdquo C4ISR The Journal of Net-

Centric Warfare 42 34mdashmdash (2005b) ldquoNATOrsquos SATCOM Vrdquo C4ISR The Journal of Net-Centric Warfare 42

32ndash4Forbes I (2003) ldquoTransforming NATO Forcesrdquo in Nelson CR and Purcell J (eds)

Transforming NATO Forces European Perspectives Washington DC Atlantic Council of the United States

Frost and Sullivan (2002) European Command Control Communications Computers and Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Market London Frost and Sullivan

Gavoty D (2003a) ldquoLe PPSM une politique spatiale ambitieuserdquo Deacutefense 105 25ndash8mdashmdash ldquoEuropean Global Space Metasystem for Security and Defenserdquo paper presented at

the Athens Green Paper Consultation on Security and Defense Aspects of Space the challenges for the EU to the Green Paper consultation process Athens May 2003

Gompert DC and Nerlich U (2002) Shoulder to Shoulder The Road to US-European Military Cooperability A German-American Analysis Santa Monica CA RAND

Gompert DC Kugler RL and Libicki MC (1999) Mind the Gap Promoting a Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs Washington DC National Defense University Press

Grapin J (2002) Transatlantic Interoperability in Defense Industries How the US and Europe Could Better Cooperate in Coalition Military Operations Washington DC The European Institute

Hancart B (2003) ldquoLe Domaine Spatial dans la Prospective de Deacutefenserdquo Deacutefense 105 21ndash4

Hegmann G (2005) ldquoEADS baut unbemannten Kampffl iegerrdquo Financial Times Deutschland 22 June 2005

House of Lords ndash European Union Committee (2005) European Defense Agency Report With Evidence London The Stationary Offi ce

Hura M McLeod G Larson E Schneider J Gonzales D Norton D Jacobs J OrsquoConnell K Little W Mesic R and Jamison L (2000) Interoperability a Continuous Challenge in Coalition Air Operations Washington DC RAND

BIBLIOGRAPHY

167

International Institute for Strategic Studies (1998) The Military Balance 1998ndash99 London International Institute for Strategic Studies

James AD (2004) ldquoDefense Industry and Transformation a European perspectiverdquo in Hamilton D (ed) Transatlantic Transformations Equipping NATO for the 21st Century Washington DC Center for Transatlantic Relations

James AD and Gummett P (1998) European Defense RTD in Context ManchesterUniversity of Manchester

Joint Chiefs of Staff (2000) Joint Vision 2020 Washington DC Department of DefenseJoint Chiefs of Staff

Jones SG (2005) The Rise of Europersquos Defense Industry Washington DC The Brookings Institution US-Europe Analysis Series

Keohane D (2004) ldquoIntroductionrdquo in Bildt C Dillon M Keohane D and Valasek T (eds) Europe in Space London Center for European Reform

Kington T (2004) ldquoItalyrsquos Sky-X Demonstrator Explores Artifi cial Intelligencerdquo C4ISR The Journal of Net-Centric Warfare 33 9

Krepon M (2003) Space Assurance or Space Dominance The Case Against Weaponizing Space Washington DC The Henry L Stimson Center

Laurent C (2001) ldquoSyracuse 3 a new generation of military satellitesrdquo CNES Magazine12 30

Multinational Interoperability Council (2005) MIC Coalition Building Guide Washington DC Multinational Interoperability Council

Nardon L (2001) France Cedes Leading Role in Space to Europe Washington DC Brookings Institution Center on the United States and France

Naumlsstroumlm S (2004) ldquoSwedenrsquos Approach to Defense Research and Transformationrdquo in Bialos JP and Koehl SL (eds) European Defense Research and Development New Visions and Prospects for Cooperative Engagement Washington DC Center for Transatlantic Relations

Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium An Introduction to the Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium Washington DC Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium

Nicoll A (2005) ldquoConsolidating Europersquos Defense Industries big rewards big obstaclesrdquo IISS Strategic Comments 114

Nilsson P (2003) ldquoOpportunities and Risks in a Network Based Defenserdquo Swedish Journal of Military Technology 3 6ndash11

Nilsson J Oumlqvist A and Oumlfjaumlll P (2004) ldquoInformation Fusion at Battalion Levelrdquo Swedish Journal of Military Technology 2 24ndash8

Norwegian Ministry of Defense (2002) Focus on Restructuring of Norwayrsquos Armed Forces 2002 Oslo Norwegian Ministry of Defense

mdashmdash (2004) Proposition to Parliament No 42 (2003ndash2004) The Continued Modernisation of the Norwegian Armed Forces in the Period 2005ndash2008 Oslo Norwegian Ministry of Defense

Picavet F (2003) ldquoConsultation Command and Control Support in NATOrdquo presentation to the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association The Hague February

Quast KH (2003) ldquoFAUST und HEROS Die Saumlulen des Fuumlhrungs- und Informationssystems des Heeresrdquo Wehrtechnik 1 66ndash7

Reder H (2005) ldquoSatellitengestuumltzte Multimediaplatformenrdquo IT Report 2005 2 47ndash50Rehnstroumlm F (2002) ldquoMoving Towards Network Centric Warfarerdquo Swedish Journal of

Military Technology 26 11ndash12

BIBLIOGRAPHY

168

Rheinmetall Defense Electronics (2005) International Companies Network their Competencies ldquoOpen Communityrdquo Promotes Open Interfaces online Available at httpwwwrheinmetall-detecdeindexphplang=3ampfi d=3132 (accessed 25 August 2005)

Schmitt B (2003a) European Armaments Cooperation Core Documents Chaillot Paper No 59 Paris Institute for Security Studies of the European Union

mdashmdash (2003b) The European Union and Armaments Getting a Bigger Bang for the euroChaillot Paper No 63 Paris Institute for Security Studies of the European Union

Schmitt M (2005) ldquoIntegration of the MIP Command and Control Information Exchange Data Model into National Systemsrdquo paper presented at 10th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium McLean VA June

Serfaty S (2005) ldquoTerms of Estrangement French-American relations in perspectiverdquo Survival 473 73ndash92

Silvestri S (2003) Space and Security Policy in Europe Brussels European Union Institute for Security Studies

Stenbit J (2002) lsquoThe New Challenges of Network-Centric Warfarersquo in Grapin J (ed) Transatlantic Interoperability in Defense Industries How the US and Europe Could Better Cooperate in Coalition Military Operations Washington DC The European Institute

Thiele R (2005) ldquoVerbesserte Einsatzfaumlhigkeit zur Transformation der Bundeswehrrdquo in CPM Forum (eds) Defense and Transformation in Germany St Augustin CPM

Thomas JP (2000) The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalitions Adelphi Paper 333 London International Institute for Strategic Studies

Tigner B (2004) ldquoEU Acquisition Central Agency would coordinate arms buysrdquo DefenseNews 195 4

Tran P (2004) ldquoEyes on Smart Procurement French to restructure industry defense ministryrdquo Defense News 193 4

United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (2003) Delivering Security in a Changing World defence white paper Norwich HM Stationery Offi ce

mdashmdash (2005) Network Enabled Capability Handbook London Ministry of DefenseUnited States Department of Defense (2001) Quadrennial Defense Review Report

Washington DC Department of DefenseUnited States Department of Defense Offi ce of Defense Transformation (2003) Military

Transformation A Strategic Report Washington DC Department of DefenseUnited States National Security Council (2002) The National Security Strategy of the

United States of America Washington DC National Security CouncilWestern European Armaments Group (2002) WEAG Rome Declaration online Available

at httpwwwassembly-weuorgendocumentsdiscoursdis2002weag_rome_declarationhtml (accessed 18 August 2005)

169

INDEX

An asterisk following a page number refers to an entry in the Glossary

911 attacks 95

ACCS (Air Command and Control System NATO) 10 27 64 84 87ndash8

ACT (Allied Command Transformation) 7 25 96ndash7 98ndash100 146

ACTDs (Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrators) 91ndash2 154 159

Afghanistan 25 95 96 105 107 145 German forces in 54 UAVs in 56ndash7 US networked global capacity demonstrated in 3 9

AGS (Alliance Ground Surveillance NATO) 64 92ndash3 161

Air Command and Control System (ACCS) 10 27 64 84 87ndash8

airlift see liftAlliance Ground Surveillance (AGS

NATO) 64 92ndash3 161Allied Command Transformation 7 25

96ndash7 98ndash100 146Amsterdam Treaty of 108ARISTOTE broadband communications

system 20 28armamentsdefense market 114 149ndash50

see also industrial technology baseASTOR (Airborne Stand Off Radar) 40

46 92ATM (asynchronous transfer mode)

technology 20 27 55 134Australia 100 102Austria 30 117AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control

System) 31 43 46 91 123 130

BAE Systems 8 83 136ndash7 155Balkans 3 9 31 94 95 105 NATO

implementation and stabilization forces in 86 see also Bosnia Herzegovina Serbia

Baltic States 54Battlegroups 25 53 64 74 109ndash10 120Belgium 30 114BIGSTAF (German communications

infrastructure) program 20 55BOC (Besoins Opeacuterationnels Communs)

129Bosnia-Herzegovina 3 53 89 94 107

145Bowman network 11 20 40 42ndash3 146

160broadband communications 14 20 28 55

122 140

C4ISR (command control communications computers intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance) needed in changing security environment 1ndash2 defi nition 161 European reluctance to elevate technologies of 10 industrial technology base see industrial technology base NATO Prague summit commitments 94ndash8 perceived gap between United States and Europe in 4ndash6 9 96 157ndash8 see also individualcountries

CAESAR (Coalition Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance) 91 154 159

Canada 92 100 102CATRIN (Italian C2 program) 20 64CBRN (chemical biological radiological

and nuclear) defense 96

INDEX

170

CCEB (Combined Communications Electronics Board) 102ndash3

Central Asia 105Centre National drsquoEtudes Spatiales

(CNES) 24ndash5CJTF (Combined Joint Task Forces

NATO) 86 97CNES (Centre National drsquoEtudes

Spatiales) 24ndash5Coalition Aerial Surveillance and

Reconnaissance (CAESAR) 91 154Combined Communications Electronics

Board (CCEB) 102ndash3Combined Endeavor 104ndash5 159Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF

NATO) 86 97command and control (C2) systems

center of excellence for 88 99 in France 26ndash7 in Germany 53ndash4 interoperability 20 27 103ndash5 seealso interoperability in Italy 64 in NATO 87ndash8 see also Air Command and Control System in Netherlands 69ndash70 see also Netherlands NATO C2 center of excellence in Spain 73 74 in Sweden 78 in United Kingdom 41ndash2 see also C4ISR

communications and computers broadband communications 14 20 28 55 122 140 in France 20 27ndash9 in Germany 20 54ndash6 interoperability 30 42 104ndash5 see also interoperability in Italy 20 65 NATO communications and information programs 89ndash90 NEC systems 11ndash12 in Netherlands 20 70 overview of European digital communications systems 20 in Spain 74 in Sweden 20 79 in United Kingdom 11ndash12 20 42ndash3 see alsoC4ISR satellites

computers see communications and computers

COMSATs (communications satellites) 20 28 122 see also satellites

Cormorant network 11 20 42ndash3COSMO-Skymed (Italian imagery satellite

program) satellite system 30 66 124COTS (Commercial Off The Shelf)

equipment 47 54 55ndash6 78 87 Deployable COTS Network (DCN) 14

CRONOS (Crisis Response Operations in NATO Open Sytems) 89 95

Czech Republic 117

DABINETT program 43ndash4DCI (Defense Capabilities Initiative) 10

96defense budgets Dutch 69 European

4 6 9ndash10 25 95 106 French 24 German defense investment 153 159ndash60 Italian defense investment 159ndash60 RampD investment see research and development (RampD) investment Spanish 73 United States 3 US policy recommendations regarding Europersquos investments 153

Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) 10 96defense market see armamentsdefense

marketdefense strategy European defense

planning recommendations 146ndash8 European focus at nation level 9 10ndash11 Europersquos lack of long-term doctrinal vision on 10 EU strategic defense planning 107ndash11 119ndash20 seealso European Capabilities Action Plan French organizational changes for 21ndash5

Deployable COTS Network (DCN) 14Desert Shield 3Desert Storm 3DGA (Deacuteleacutegation Geacuteneacuterale pour

lrsquoArmement) 21ndash5 33disaster management 122 see also relief

operationsdual-use technologies 8 132 145 149ndash50

space programs 123ndash4 125

EADS (European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company) 8 29 113 125 135ndash6 EADS Astrium 30 43 58 125 EADS CASA 32 Framework Program participation 119 HRM-7000 tactical radio 57 73 Paradigm Secure Communications 43

early warning systems 33ndash40 79ndash83 seealso AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System)

earth observation satellites 3 29ndash30 33 66 123ndash4 see also satellites

ECAP (European Capabilities Action Plan) 108 112 114

INDEX

171

EDA (European Defense Agency) 110ndash11 115ndash16 118 120 149 Industry and Market Directorate 113 RampT Directorate 118

Ericsson 79ndash83 Saab Ericsson Network Based Defense Innovation 140

ERRF (European Rapid Reaction Force) 97ndash8 108ndash9 120

EUCLID (European Cooperation for the Long Term in Defense) 117

Euro Hawk (German (UAV program) 36EUROFINDER 117EuroMALE unmanned aerial vehicles 32

73 83European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP)

108 112ndash13 146European Commission 115 120 125

126ndash7 129 130 encouragement of regional defense market 150 involvement in European RampD 118

European Defense Agency (EDA) 110ndash11 115ndash16 118 120 149

European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) 97ndash8 108ndash9 120

European Space Agency 123 126 127 129 130

European Union armaments policy 107 110 113ndash16 Battlegroups 25 53 64 74 109ndash10 120 defense cooperation with France 25 defense research and technology programs 116ndash19 Headline Goal 5 107 108ndash9 112 146 industrial base planning 113ndash16 space policy in Constitutional Treaty 127ndash8 strategic defense planning 107ndash11 119ndash20 seealso European Capabilities Action Plan

European Union Force (EUFOR) 14

Falcon network 11 43 163FAUST (German C2 system) (Tactical

Command Provision) system 53 54Finland industrial technology base 133

network-based defense (NBD) 13ndash14Finmeccanica 137 139ndash40Framework Programs (FPs) 118ndash19 149France command and control systems

26ndash7 communications and computers 20 27ndash9 defense cooperation with EU and NATO 25 defense doctrine 16 Deacuteleacutegation Geacuteneacuterale pour lrsquoArmement(DGA) 21ndash5 33 as European leader

in space 26 29 123 124 129 French air force 31 32 33 French army 26 30ndash1 33 French navy 25 26ndash7 33 increasing importance of C4ISR capabilities 21ndash6 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 29ndash33 92 interoperability in French forces 25ndash7 NBO capability table 34ndash9 organizational changes for defense strategy 21ndash5 satellites 29 33 122 123 124 Systegraveme drsquoInformation et de Commandement des Armeacutees(SICA) 20

Galileo satellites 4ndash5 124 125 128 131Germany adoption of transformation

policies 16ndash17 command and control (C2) 53ndash4 communications and computers 20 54ndash6 defense investments 153 159ndash60 development of C4ISR capabilities 47 53 German air force 54 55 German army 53ndash4 56ndash7 58 German navy 54 55 57 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 56ndash8 92 limited cycling of forces for NRF 97 NBO capability table 59ndash63 satellites 122 123 124

Global Hawk (US UAV program) 44 52 57 63 91 93

Global Positioning System (GPS) 125 131GMES (Global Monitoring for

Environment and Security) 125ndash7 128ndash9 161

Greece 30 32Griffi n wide area network 47 101 103ground surveillance airborne 21 30

91 154 159 Alliance Ground Surveillance NATO 64 92ndash3 161 earth observation satellites see earth observation satellites seealso intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance radar

Gulf War fi rst 1 6 military lessons of 2 107 152 US networked global capacity demonstrated in 9

Headline Goal 5 107 108ndash9 112 146Helios (French-led imagery satellite

program) earth observation system 29ndash30 33 77 123 124

INDEX

172

HEROS C2 system 53 54Hispasat (Spanish communications

satellite program) satellite system 124humanitarian relief 1 13 105 108ndash10Hungary 117

imagery intelligence (IMINT) 32ndash3 57Indonesia 105industrial technology base European

overview 8 132ndash4 142ndash3 European second tier defense companies 137ndash40 Europersquos largest corporation systems see BAE Systems EADS Thales (corporation) industrial base planning 8 113ndash16 Letter of Intent to facilitate trans-European defense market 114 150 non-defense European C4ISR market 140ndash1 recommendations for a cross-European market 149ndash50 US export control 93 106 154ndash6

intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrators for 91ndash2 154 159 in France 29ndash33 92 in Germany 56ndash8 92 imagery intelligence 32ndash3 57 in Italy 65ndash6 92 in NATO 91ndash3 see also Alliance Ground Surveillance in Netherlands 73 92 satellites 122ndash3 see alsosatellites in Spain 29 77 92 in Sweden 79ndash83 in United Kingdom 43ndash7 see also C4ISR sensors

internet 14 28 42 86 87 see alsobroadband communications

Internet Protocol (IP) Europersquos communication programs increasingly based on 20 IP-network-based infrastructure 53 54 IP-networked radios 27ndash8 55 134 see also tactical radio systems STANAGS for IP-based communications 79

interoperability between British and American forces 12 40 43 Combined Endeavor exercises 104ndash5 of communications and computer networks 42 effects of transatlantic doctrine and deployment differences 158ndash60 between European C2 systems 20 27 European RampT investment as a key to enhancing 116 see alsoresearch and technology (RampT)

programs of French forces 25ndash7 of ground surveillance systems 91ndash3 of imagery intelligence analysis systems 32ndash3 123 Multilateral Interoperability Program 103ndash4 106 Multinational Interoperability Council see MIC multinational network programs (outside NATO context) 100 Multi-sensor Aerospace-ground Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition 92 between NATO and United States 84 94ndash9 105ndash6 154 NATO Prague summit commitments 7 10 94ndash8 through NATO STANAGS 32 79 84 91 93ndash4 146 platform strategy effect on 25 lsquoplug and playrsquo approach 144 147 154 road to integrated European space systems 128ndash31 between satellite systems 30 US concerns about European capabilities of 4ndash5 US export control as disincentive for 93 106 154ndash6

Iraq 3 9 96 105 107 145 UAV performance in 44

Iridium satellite communications system 122Italy collaboration with Spain 64 73

command and control systems 64 communications and computers 20 65 defense investments 159ndash60 gradual deployment of network-based capabilities 58 64 industrial collaboration with United States 58 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 65ndash6 92 NBO capability table 67ndash8 satellites 29 30 66 122 124 see also Helios earth observation system Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force 64 73

JOCS (UK C2 system) (Joint Operational Command System) 27 40 41

Joint Command System (JCS) (UK C2 system) 20 41

JSTARS (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System) 3 33 92 161

JTIDS (Joint Tactical Information Distribution System) 43 46 89 161ndash2 see also MIDS

Kosovo 3 94 95 105 107 145 German forces in 53 54 57 shortfalls revealed

INDEX

173

in European capability 88 152 UAVs in 44 56

Liberia 105lift 1 5 96Link-11 tactical data link 27 28 43 55

65 70 162Link-16 tactical data link 28 29 65

70 79 162 with JTIDS 43 MIDS upgrade of 84 see also MIDS transatlantic interoperability through 25 27

Link-22 tactical data link 28 55 65 74 162

logistics 1 5 96

Maastricht Treaty 108MAJIIC (Multi-sensor Aerospace-ground

Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition) 92

MIC (Multinational Interoperability Council) 42 53 100ndash2 103 106 159 defi nition 162

MIDS (Multifunctional Information Distribution System) 28 74 84 89ndash90 142 159 defi nition 162

MIP (Multilateral Interoperability Program) 103ndash4 106

missiles Surface-Air-Missile Operations Centre (SAMOC) 54 surveillance 123 theatre missile defense 88 95

Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) 28 74 84 89ndash90 142 159

Multilateral Interoperability Program (MIP) 103ndash4 106

Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) 42 53 100ndash2 103 106 159

Multi-sensor Aerospace-ground Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition (MAJIIC) 92

NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) 122

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Air Command and Control System 10 27 64 84 87ndash8 Allied Command Transformation 7 25 88 96ndash7 98ndash100 C2 center of excellence 88 99 Combined Joint Task Forces 86 command

and control programs 87ndash8 seealso Air Command and Control System (ACCS) communications and information programs 89ndash90 General Purpose Communications System 89 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 91ndash3 see alsoAGS interoperability 84 94ndash9 105ndash6 154 see also PCC Istanbul summit 100 NATO Air Alliance Ground Surveillance (NATO AGS) 64 92ndash3 162 NATO Network-Enabled Capabilities (NNEC) project 99 NATO Response Force (NRF) 7 25 88 96 97ndash8 148 Prague summit commitments 7 10 94ndash8 152 as principle transatlantic context for C4ISR issues 84ndash5 105ndash6 progress towards networked C4ISR 9ndash10 roles and capabilities 85ndash7 Satcom V project 90 standardization agreements (STANAGs) 32 79 84 91 93ndash4 146 Washington summit 96

NCOIC (Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium) 141ndash2

NCW (network-centric warfare) 3 9 162NEC (network-enabled capabilities)

11ndash12 40 NATO Network-Enabled Capabilities (NNEC) project 99

Netherlands C4ISR interoperability 66 69 command and control systems 69ndash70 communications and computers 20 70 defense budget 69 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 73 92 NATO C2 center of excellence 88 99 NBO capability table 71ndash2 NBO strategy 14ndash15 support centres 15

network-based defense (NBD) 12ndash14 17network-based operations (NBO) in

a changing security environment 1ndash4 144ndash5 151 defi nition 162 European national capability overview 20ndash3 see also individual countriesEuropean strategies 9ndash18 policy recommendations for Europe regarding European network-based capabilities 144ndash50 policy recommendations for United States regarding European network-based capabilities 150ndash6

Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium (NCOIC) 141ndash2

INDEX

174

network-centric warfare (NCW) 3 9 162network-enabled capabilities (NEC)

11ndash12 40 NATO Network-Enabled Capabilities (NNEC) project 99

Neuron (European UCAV program) 32 39 45 66 67 76 82ndash3 135 140 154

New Zealand 100 102NGCS (NATO General Purpose

Communications System) 89Nokia 136 141Northrop Grumman ISS International Inc

44 57 77 92 113 135Norway network-based defense (NBD)

11 17 participation in MAJIIC 92NRF (NATO Response Force) 7 25 88

96 97ndash8 148nuclear proliferation 151 see also CBRN

(chemical biological radiological and nuclear) defense

OCCAR (Organization Conjoint pour la Cooperation en Matiere drsquoArmament)111 114 116 150

ORFEO (Optical and Radar Federated Earth Observation) 30 66 154

Paradigm Secure Communications (subsidiary of EADS) 43

PASR (Preparatory Action on Security Research) 119

PCC (Prague Capabilities Commitments) 7 10 96

peacemakingpeacekeeping 94 95 105 107 108ndash10 129

Petersberg tasks 108ndash10Phoenix (UK UAV program) 40 44 136Pleiades (French-led imagery satellite

program) earth observation system 30 66 124

Poland 117Prague summit 2002 94ndash8 Prague

Capabilities Commitments (PCC) 7 10 96

Predator (US UAV program) 3 32 45 58 65

Preparatory Action on Security Research (PASR) 119

QinetiQ 138ndash9

radar 30ndash1 79 92ndash3 134 Active Phased Array Radar (APAR) project 142 see

also ASTOR JSTARS ORFEO SAR-Lupe radar satellite

radios see tactical radio systemsRAKEL (Swedish C4 infrastructure) 79

81reconnaissance see intelligence

surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)relief operations 1 13 105 108ndash10research and development (RampD)

investment 6 8 10 26 116 118 German cuts in 53

research and technology (RampT) programs 24 47 105 111 116ndash19 recommendations for investment 149

Rheinmetall Defence Electronics 137ndash8Rhode and Schwarz 138RITA 2000 (French communications

infrastructure) (Reacuteseau Inteacutegreacute de Transmissions Automatiques 2000) 20 27 134

Saab 32 83 140 Saab Ericsson Network Based Defense Innovation 140

Sagem 139SAR-Lupe (German imagery satellite

program) radar satellite 58 124SATCOM-BW satellite communications

program 56Satcom V (NATO communications satellite

program) project 90satellites Common Operational

Requirements (BOC) 129 for communications (COMSATs) 20 28 122 COSMO-Skymed 30 66 124 EU Satellite Center (EUSC) 130 Galileo 4ndash5 124 125 128 131 in geosynchronous orbit 122 Helios 29ndash30 33 77 123 124 Hispasat 124 interoperability 30 Iridium 122 micro-satellites 33 40 in NEC doctrine 11 overview of European developments regarding 20 Pleiades 30 66 124 for reconnaissance and surveillance 122ndash3 SAR-Lupe radar satellite 58 124 SATCOM-BW 56 Satcom V project 90 SICRAL 124 Skynet 11 20 43 124 Spainsat program 74 122 124 Syracuse 20 28 124 see also space programs

sealift see liftsecurity environment international 1ndash4

144ndash5 151

INDEX

175

sensors 1 2 3 5 11 33 British investment 40 dual-use technology 132 see also dual-use technologies interoperability 91ndash3 Multi-sensor Aerospace-ground Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition 92

Serbia 4 94 see also Balkans KosovoSIAF (Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force)

64 73SICA (French C2 system) (Systegraveme

drsquoInformation et de Commandement des Armeacutees) 20

SICRAL (Italian communications satellite program) satellite system 124

signals intelligence (SIGINT) 33 57Skynet satellites 11 20 43 124SOCRATE (French communications

infrastructure) (Systegraveme Opeacuterationnel Constitueacute des Reacuteseaux des Armeacutees pour les Teacuteleacutecommunications) 20 27 116ndash17

South Africa 105space programs CNES 24ndash5 European

collaboration on 121ndash31 France as European leader in space 26 29 123 124 129 role of space programs NBO 121ndash3 see also satellites

Spain command and control systems 73 74 communications and computers 74 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 29 77 92 modernization program 73 NBO capability table 75ndash6 satellites 74 77 122 124 Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force 64 73

SPIRALE (French early warning satellite program) early warning system 33ndash40

STANAGs (NATO standardization agreements) 32 79 84 91 93ndash4 146

support centres 15surveillance see ground surveillance

intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)

Sweden command and control systems 78 communications and computers 20 79 industrial technology base 133 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 79ndash83 NBO capability table 80ndash2 network-based defense (NBD) 12ndash13 77 rapid reaction units 77ndash8

Switzerland 30 32Syracuse (French satellite communications

program) programs 20 28 124

tactical radio systems 17 27ndash8 42ndash3 55 56ndash7 Bowman network 11 20 40 42ndash3 146 160 of Dutch army 70 Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) 28 42 43 45 90 of Swedish services 78 79 by Thalesrsquo Land and Joint Systems 134

terrorism 1 2 95 121 151Thales (corporation) 8 79 134ndash5

Framework Program participation 119 French communications and computer systems 27ndash8 support for increased investments in security space 125 Thales Netherlands 70 Thales Raytheon Systems 88 113 135 142 155 Think Tank 24

THALES (Technology Arrangements for Laboratories for Defense European Science) framework 117

theatre missile defense (TMD) 88 95TIPS (Transatlantic Industry Proposed

Solution) 92ndash3TITAAN (Dutch communications

infrastructure) 23 53 66 69 70 71 146

TOPSAT (UK imagery satellite program) 47 52 138

Turkey 30

UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) 3 31ndash2 44ndash5 56ndash7 73 163

United Kingdom British Army 12 41 42 command and control systems 41ndash2 communications and computers 11ndash12 20 42ndash3 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 43ndash7 92 interoperability with United States 12 40 43 investment in C4ISR systems 40 Joint Command System (JCS) 20 41 Joint Operational Command System (JOCS) 27 40 41 Ministry of Defense restructuring 12 40 NBO capability table 48ndash52 network-enabled capabilities (NEC) 11ndash12 40 Royal Air Force 12 41 43 46 Royal Navy 12 41 43 satellites 122 124

United States export control regulations 93 106 154ndash6 global satellite coverage 122 123 125 interoperability

INDEX

176

with NATO 84 94ndash9 105ndash6 154 seealso interoperability interoperability with United Kingdom 12 40 43 non-compliance with NATO STANAGs 94 perceived gap between United States and European militaries 4ndash6 9 96 153 157ndash8 policy recommendations for United States regarding European network-based capabilities 150ndash6 role in NRF 98 transformation process 2ndash3 9 157 US Navy 25

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) 3 31ndash2 44ndash5 56ndash7 73 163 Advanced Joint Communications Node (AJCN) 44ndash5 digital technology and 123 French linking with manned platforms and space-based assets 26 29 interoperability 44ndash5 56 154 micro-UAVs 45 58 mini-UAVs 31 45 56ndash7

UCAV (combat) technology 32 57ndash8 83 versatility of 20ndash1 99

unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) 45 139

VIRVE (Finnish national C4 infrastructure) 14

Watchkeeper program 40 44ndash5 134WEAG (Western European Armaments

Group) 116ndash18WEAO (Western European Armaments

Organization) 118 120weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

operations 1 2 95 121ndash2wide area networks (WANs) 41 47 86

101 103

ZODIAC (Dutch tactical communications system) 70 71

1313

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wwweBookstoretandfcouk

• BOOK COVER
• HALF-TITLE
• SERIES-TITLE
• TITLE
• COPYRIGHT
• CONTENTS
• LIST OF TABLES
• ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
• ABBREVIATIONS
• 1 INTRODUCTION Networked operations and European capabilities
• 2 EUROPEAN STRATEGIES FOR NETWORK-BASED OPERATIONS
• 3 EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES FOR NETWORK-BASED OPERATIONS
• 4 NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NETWORK-BASED CAPABILITIES
• 5 THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NETWORK-BASED CAPABILITIES
• 6 EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS FOR NETWORK-BASED OPERATIONS
• 7 THE EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE FOR NETWORK-BASED CAPABILITIES
• 8 EUROPEAN NETWORK-BASED CAPABILITIES Policy recommendations
• 9 CONCLUSIONS
• GLOSSARY
• BIBLIOGRAPHY
• INDEX

CONTEMPORARY SECURITY STUDIES

NATOrsquoS SECRET ARMYOperation Gladio and terrorism in western Europe

Daniel Ganser

THE US NATO AND MILITARY BURDEN-SHARINGPeter Kent Forster and Stephen J Cimbala

RUSSIAN GOVERNANCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURYGeo-strategy geopolitics and new governance

Irina Isakova

THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND FINLAND 1938ndash1940 Diplomatic sideshow

Craig Gerrard

RETHINKING THE NATURE OF WAREdited by Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom

PERCEPTION AND REALITY IN THE MODERN YUGOSLAV CONFLICT

Myth falsehood and deceit 1991ndash1995Brendan OrsquoShea

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PEACEBUILDING IN POST-DAYTON BOSNIA

Tim Donais

THE DISTRACTED EAGLEThe rift between America and Old Europe

Peter H Merkl

THE IRAQ WAREuropean perspectives on politics strategy and operations

Edited by Jan Hallenberg and Haringkan Karlsson

STRATEGIC CONTESTWeapons proliferation and war in the greater Middle East

Richard L Russell

PROPAGANDA THE PRESS AND CONFLICTThe Gulf War and Kosovo

David R Willcox

MISSILE DEFENCEInternational regional and national implications

Edited by Bertel Heurlin and Sten Rynning

GLOBALISING JUSTICE FOR MASS ATROCITIESA revolution in accountability

Chandra Lekha Sriram

ETHNIC CONFLICT AND TERRORISMThe origins and dynamics of civil wars

Joseph L Soeters

GLOBALISATION AND THE FUTURE OF TERRORISM Patterns and predictions

Brynjar Lia

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND STRATEGYThe evolution of American nuclear policy

Stephen J Cimbala

NASSER AND THE MISSILE AGE IN THE MIDDLE EASTOwen L Sirrs

WAR AS RISK MANAGEMENTStrategy and confl ict in an age of globalised risks

Yee-Kuang Heng

MILITARY NANOTECHNOLOGYPotential applications and preventive arms control

Jurgen Altmann

NATO AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTIONRegional alliance global threats

Eric R Terzuolo

EUROPEANISATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY IDENTITYThe EU and the changing security identities of the Nordic states

Pernille Rieker

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACE-BUILDING

Sustaining the peace in post confl ict societiesEdited by T David Mason and James D Meernik

CONTROLLING THE WEAPONS OF WARPolitics persuasion and the prohibition of inhumanity

Brian Rappert

CHANGING TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY RELATIONSDo the US the EU and Russia form a new strategic triangle

Edited by Jan Hallenberg and Haringkan Karlsson

THEORETICAL ROOTS OF US FOREIGN POLICYMachiavelli and American unilateralism

Thomas M Kane

CORPORATE SOLDIERS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITYThe rise of private military companies

Christopher Kinsey

TRANSFORMING EUROPEAN MILITARIESCoalition operations and the technology gap

Gordon Adams and Guy Ben-Ari

GLOBALIZATION AND CONFLICTNational security in a lsquonewrsquo strategic era

Edited by Robert G Patman

TRANSFORMING EUROPEAN MILITARIES

Coalition operations and the technology gap

Gordon Adams and Guy Ben-Ari

First published 2006 by Routledge

2 Park Square Milton Park Abingdon Oxon OX14 4RN

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canadaby Routledge

270 Madison Ave New York NY 10016

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor amp Francis Group an informa business

copy 2006 Gordon Adams and Guy Ben-Ari

All rights reserved No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic mechanical or other means now known or hereafter invented including photocopying and recording or in any information storage or retrieval system without permission in writing

from the publishers

British Library Cataloguing in Publication DataA catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataA catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN10 0ndash415ndash39264ndash0 (hbk)ISBN10 0ndash203ndash96910ndash3 (ebook)

ISBN13978ndash0ndash415ndash39264ndash8 (hbk)ISBN13 978ndash0ndash203ndash96910ndash6 (ebk)

This edition published in the Taylor amp Francis e-Library 2006

ldquoTo purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor amp Francis or Routledgersquos

collection of thousands of eBooks please go to wwweBookstoretandfcoukrdquo

vii

CONTENTS

List of tables viiiAcknowledgements ixList of abbreviations x

1 Introduction networked operations and European capabilities 1

2 European strategies for network-based operations 9

3 European national capabilities for network-based operations 19

4 NATO and other multilateral network-based capabilities 84

5 The European Union and network-based capabilities 107

6 European collaboration on space assets for network-based operations 121

7 The European industrial and technology base for network-based capabilities 132

8 European network-based capabilities policy recommendations 144

9 Conclusions 157

Glossary 161Bibliography 164Index 169

vii i

TABLES

31 Principal European national capabilities for network-based operations 2232 French capabilities for network-based operations 3433 United Kingdom capabilities for network-based operations 4834 German capabilities for network-based operations 5935 Italian capabilities for network-based operations 6736 Dutch capabilities for network-based operations 7137 Spanish capabilities for network-based operations 7538 Swedish capabilities for network-based operations 80

ix

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors would like to acknowledge the support and assistance of many offi cial and private sector sources in the United States Britain France and at NATO and the European Union whom we interviewed for this study Most of them remain necessarily anonymous but their assistance was clearly essential to the study Several specifi c individuals deserve special mention and thanks Christine Bernot Adm (ret) Jean Betermier Henri Conze Christophe Cornu Emmanuel Germond Michel Iagolnitzer Erol Levy Xavier Pasco Diego Ruiz Palmer and Burkard Schmitt

Special thanks go to Professor John Logsdon and to Professor Ray Williamson of the Space Policy Institute at the George Washington University in Washington DC who were participants in the research and writing process for the original monograph which was the starting point for this book Their knowledge of European space policies and of the national and multinational space programs in Europe were a signifi cant contribution to the space chapter in the book and their comments overall were very helpful

Finally this book is based on a monograph ldquoBridging the Gap European C4ISR Capabilities and Transatlantic Interoperabilityrdquo published by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy of the National Defense University in Washington DC The Center sponsored and funded the research on which the monograph and much of this book is based and we are grateful for their support We particularly want to thank the Centerrsquos Director Hans Binnendijk and staff members Stuart Johnson Elihu Zimet Charles Barry and Richard Kugler for their assistance and excellent comments

x

ABBREVIATIONS

ABCA American British Canadian Australian Armiesrsquo Standardization Program

ACCIS Automated Command and Control Information SystemACCS Air Command and Control SystemACE Allied Command EuropeACLANT Allied Command AtlanticACO Allied Command OperationsACT Allied Command TransformationACTD Advanced Concept Technology DemonstratorADGE Air Defense Ground EnvironmentAEHF Advanced Extremely High FrequencyAERIS All Environment Real-Time Interoperability SimulatorAEW Airborne Early WarningAEWampC Airborne Early Warning and ControlAGS Alliance Ground SurveillanceAirborne Ground

SurveillanceAJCN Advanced Joint Communications NodeAMS Alenia Marconi SystemsAPAR Active Phased Array RadarASCC Air Standardization Coordinating CommitteeASTOR Airborne Stand Off RadarATM Asynchronous Transfer ModeAUSCANNZUKUS Australian Canadian New Zealand United Kingdom

and United States Naval C4 OrganizationAWACS Airborne Warning and Control SystemBACCS Backbone Air Command and Control SystemBCSS Battlefi eld Command Support SystemBi-SCAIS Bi-Strategic Command Automated Information SystemBLD Battlefi eld Land DigitizationBMS Battlefi eld Management SystemCS Collaboration at SeaC2 Command and ControlC3 Command Control and Communications

ABBREVIATIONS

xi

C3I Command Control Communications and IntelligenceC4ISR Command Control Communications Computers

Intelligence Surveillance and ReconnaissanceCAESAR Coalition Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance CCEB Combined Communications Electronics BoardCCIS Command Control and Information SystemCEC Cooperative Engagement CapabilityCEPA Common European Priority AreaCFIUS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United StatesCFSP Common Foreign and Security PolicyCIS Communications and Information SystemsCJTF Combined Joint Task ForcesCOMINT Communications IntelligenceCOMSAT Communications SatelliteCOTS Commercial Off The ShelfCRONOS Crisis Response Operations in NATO Open SystemsCSABM Collaborative System for Air Battlespace ManagementCSS Command Support SystemCTAS Cooperative Transatlantic AGS SystemDARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects AgencyDCI Defense Capabilities InitiativesDCN Deployable COTS NetworkDERA Defense Evaluation and Research AgencyDGA Deacuteleacutegation Geacuteneacuterale pour lrsquoArmement (French armament

agency)DII Defense Information InfrastructureDSCS Defense Satellite Communications SystemEADS European Aeronautic Defense and Space CompanyEC European CommissionECAP European Capabilities Action PlanEDA European Defense AgencyEHF Extremely High FrequencyERG European Research GroupingERRF European Rapid Reaction ForceESA European Space AgencyESDP European Security and Defense PolicyESM Electronic Support MeasuresEUCLID European Cooperation for the Long Term in DefenseEUFOR European Union Force [in Bosnia and Herzegovina]EUROPA European Understandings for Research Organization

Programs and ActivitiesEUSC EU Satellite CentreEW Electronic WarfareEXECOM Executive Support CommitteeFADR Fixed Air Defense Radar

ABBREVIATIONS

xi i

FLIR Forward-Looking Infrared FOCSLE Fleet Operational Command SystemFP Framework ProgramGMES Global Monitoring for Environment and Security GPS Global Positioning SystemHALE High-Altitude Long-EnduranceHF High FrequencyIACD Intelligent Advisor Capability DemonstratorIBS Integrated Broadcast ServiceIEPG Independent European Program GroupIFF Identifi cation Friend or FoeIFOR [NATO] Implementation Force [in Bosnia and

Herzegovina]IJMS Interim JTIDS Message StandardIMINT Imagery IntelligenceINMARSAT International Maritime SatelliteINTA Instituto Nacional de Teacutecnica AeroespacialIP Internet ProtocolISAF International Security Assistance ForceISR Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance ISTAR Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and

ReconnaissanceITAR International Traffi c in Arms RegulationsITV Integrated Technology VehicleJCS Joint Command SystemJFHQ Joint Forces HeadquartersJOCS Joint Operational Command SystemJRRF Joint Rapid Reaction ForceJRRP Jaguar Replacement Reconnaissance PodJSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar SystemJTIDS Joint Tactical Information Distribution SystemJTRS Joint Tactical Radio SystemJUEP Joint Service UAV Experimentation ProgramKFOR [NATO] Kosovo ForceLCS Littoral Combat ShipLEO Low Earth OrbitLOI Letter of IntentM3 Multimode Multi-role Multi-bandMAJIIC Multi-sensor Aerospace-ground Joint ISR Interoperability

CoalitionMALE Medium-Altitude Long-EnduranceMASC Maritime Airborne Surveilllance and ControlMCCIS Maritime Command and Control Information SystemMCCS Mobile Command and Control SystemMIC Multinational Interoperability Council

ABBREVIATIONS

xi i i

MIDS Multifunctional Information Distribution SystemMILSATCOM Military Satellite CommunicationsMIP Multilateral Interoperability ProgramMIWG Multinational Interoperability Working GroupMMA Multi-mission Maritime AircraftMNE Multinational ExperimentMP-RTIP Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion ProgramMRS Multi-Role SwitchMTI Moving Target IndicatorNAC North Atlantic CouncilNACMO NATO ACCS Management OrganizationNACOSA NATO Communications and Information Systems

Operating and Support AgencyNBC Nuclear Biological ChemicalNBD Network-Based DefenseNBO Network-Based OperationsNC3A NATO Command Control and Consultation AgencyNC3B NATO C3 BoardNC3O NATO Consultation Command and Control OrganizationNC3TA NATO C3 Technical ArchitectureNCOIC Network-Centric Operations Industry ConsortiumNCW Network-Centric WarfareNDP National Disclosure ProcessNEC Network-Enabled CapabilitiesNGCS NATO General Purpose Communication SystemNILE NATO Improved Link ElevenNMS NATO Messaging SystemNNEC NATO Network-Enabled CapabilitiesNRF NATO Response ForceOCCAR Organization Conjoint pour la Cooperation en Matiere

drsquoArmamentORFEO Optical and Radar Federated Earth ObservationPASR Preparatory Action on Security ResearchPCC Prague Capabilities CommitmentsPFI Private Finance InitiativePJHQ Permanent Joint HeadquartersPNT Position Navigation and TimingPRT Provisional Reconstruction TeamRampD Research and DevelopmentRampT Research and TechnologyRAPTOR Reconnaissance Airborne Pod for TornadoSACEUR Supreme Allied Commander EuropeSAMOC Surface-Air-Missile Operations CenterSAR Synthetic Aperture RadarSATCOM Satellite Communications

ABBREVIATIONS

xiv

SCA Software Communications ArchitectureSDR Software Defi ned RadioSFOR [NATO] Stabilization Force [in Bosnia and Herzegovina]SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers EuropeSHARC Swedish Highly Advanced Research Confi gurationSHF Super High FrequencySIGINT Signals IntelligenceSLAR Side Looking Airborne RadarSOC Statement of CooperationSOSTAR Standoff Surveillance Target Acquisition RadarSPOT Systegraveme Pour lrsquoObeservation de la TerreSSA Special Security ArrangementSTANAG Standardization AgreementTCAR Transatlantic Cooperative AGS RadarTCDL Tactical Common Data LinkTCPIP Transmission Control ProtocolInternet ProtocolTETRA Terrestrial Trunked RadioTHALES Technology Arrangements for Laboratories for Defense

European ScienceTIPS Transatlantic Industry Proposed SolutionTMD Theater Missile Defense TOPSAT Tactical Optical SatelliteTR TransmitReceiveTTCP The Technical Cooperation ProgramTUAV Tactical Unmanned Aerial VehicleUAV Unmanned Aerial VehicleUCAV Unmanned Combat Aerial VehicleUHF Ultra High FrequencyUUV Unmanned Underwater VehicleVCCS Vehicle Command and Control SystemVHF Very High FrequencyVMF Variable Message FormatVOIP Voice Over Internet ProtocolWAN Wide Area NetworkWASP Wide Area Situation PictureWEAG Western European Armaments GroupWEAO Western European Armaments OrganizationWEU Western European UnionZODIAC Zone Digital Automated and Encrypted Communication

1

1

INTRODUCTION

Networked operations and European capabilities

Network-based operations and the twenty-fi rst century security environment

The international security environment has changed dramatically over the past decade for both the United States and Europe This has meant profound changes for national security strategy and for military capabilities Before 1990 strategy was based on the assumption that the principal tension was between an alliance of democracies led by the United States and the Soviet Union and its allies For the military this meant that both deterrence and victory on the battlefi eld would go to the side with the more capable land air and sea forces massed in formation fi elding heavy weapons produced in substantial numbers by a strong defense industrial base Though this confrontation never occurred in Europe wars elsewhere such as Vietnam tended to be fought using that model

Today both the nature of the strategic threat and the required military capability to meet it have changed Although the fi rst Gulf War involved a more traditional type of threat and massed formations were critical to the response subsequent crises and confl icts have involved more shadowy and asymmetrical opponents and a different range of security challenges The need to fi ght large-scale wars has been replaced by the need to address a wide range of challenges from international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to failed or failing states escalating regional confl icts and humanitarian crises

Military operations to deal with these threats demand different capabilities strategic airlift and sealift deployable logistics precision-guided munitions and force protection elements Most important they require deployable command control communications computers intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities ndash collectively known as C4ISR ndash that are both networked and interoperable National governments and coalitions need the capability to survey large areas of the globe and share and jointly analyze the intelligence they gather in order to make informed decisions on when and where to deploy their forces Once forces have been committed intelligence-gathering assets and sensors are needed to provide the information for operations They also require command and control systems capable of processing the information and providing networked forces with a real-time digitized picture of the situation Reliable and interoperable

INTRODUCTION

2

communication systems need to carry this information across forces and back to command centers in the fi eld and the nationrsquos capital A network of all these capabilities enables more effective and effi cient operations

Even for more traditional operations the evolution of military and dual-use technology has changed the face of combat The fi rst Gulf War suggested that large armies and heavy weaponry were no longer a guarantee of success information dominance proved critical Destroying the adversary had become less important than disrupting his lines of communication and supply Today it is widely accepted in the US military that advanced sensors communications and information technologies networked together to distribute the results are a key ingredient of military success especially for the high intensity operations for which they are planning These technologies and the doctrine that accompanies them allow warfi ghters to see better and further orient themselves on the battlefi eld decide faster strike more accurately and assess the results of their actions more quickly

Changes in US forces and doctrine lead the way

US military planning has been the most responsive to the changing security conditions and the revolution in C4ISR technologies At the strategic level with the end of the Soviet threat US security concerns have focused away from Europe toward the Middle East and Persian Gulf North Asia and the Pacifi c and toward such global security problems as failed states terrorism ethnic and religious confl ict and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction NATO Europe became a secondary concern As a result the US military evolved toward a capability that could operate globally through near-continuous presence or expeditionary operations The focus was no longer on a specifi c theater but looked to reassure all friends and allies dissuade potential military competitors anywhere on the globe deter adversaries and defeat any of them decisively (United States Department of Defense 2003 4ndash5)

US military doctrine began to move away from giving priority to major land battles of massed armies and toward a doctrine that would ensure US ability to be ldquodominant across the full spectrum of military operationsrdquo through a combination of ldquodominant maneuver precision engagement focused logistics and full dimensional protectionrdquo (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2000 2ndash3) This change in doctrine has begun to transform operational concepts training and technology Global forces need to be able to move rapidly and their communications command and control and sensors need to be networked together This requirement has come to be know as ldquotransformationrdquo defi ned by the Defense Department as

A process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts capabilities people and organizations that exploit our nationrsquos advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position which helps underpin peace and stability in the world

(United States Department of Defense 2003 8)

INTRODUCTION

3

To put such forces in place the US relies on a technological revolution that has been taking place for at least 25 years Rapid changes in information and communications technologies made it possible to imagine develop and deploy equipment that supported the process of ldquotransformationrdquo Despite shrinking defense budgets in the 1990s the US military began to move in the direction of what it called network-centric warfare (NCW) As defi ned by the Department of Defense network-centric warfare refers to ldquothe combination of emerging tactics techniques and technologies that a networked force employs to create a decisive warfi ghting advantagerdquo Network-centric warfare ldquoaccelerates our ability to know decide and act linking sensors communications systems and weapons systems in an interconnected gridrdquo (United States Department of Defense 2003 13) Analysts have described NCW this way

The United States hellip is poised to harness key information technologies ndash microelectronics data networking and software programming ndash to create a networked force using weapons capable of pinpoint accuracy launched from platforms beyond range of enemy weapons utilizing the integrated data from all-seeing sensors managed by intelligent command nodes By distributing its forces while still being able to concentrate fi res the US military is improving its mobility speed potency and invulnerability to enemy attack

(Gompert et al 1999 8)

This increasingly networked global capability has been displayed since the fi rst Gulf War in the Balkans and most recently in combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq Desert Shield and Desert Storm revealed the military advantages of networking such capabilities as the Pioneer UAV earth observation satellites and the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) Advanced sensors on manned and unmanned platforms provided real-time intelligence to commanders on the ground via a state-of-the-art command control and communications network In Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo the US used a more advanced UAV ndash the Predator ndash that provided its operators with gigabytes of high-resolution imagery in support of missions The ldquosensor-to-shooterrdquo loop ndash the time between identifi cation of a target and its destruction ndash was reduced from hours to minutes

This rapid change in military capabilities has far-reaching implications for the transatlantic security community Although European militaries have participated in expeditionary operations in the last 15 years their forces ndash structured to defend the European heartland ndash did not adjust as quickly to the expeditionary requirements and asymmetries of the post-Cold War international security environment Throughout the 1990s Europersquos armed forces suffered from a kind of ldquoidentity crisisrdquo While the task of defending the homeland remained a central focus for some of them the new challenges were emerging in every dimension demanding new or transformed capabilities European governments had not yet shaped a strategy and doctrine to deal with this emerging reality nor was the message yet entirely clear as to how military forces were to be used or how the

INTRODUCTION

4

capabilities they need were to be created Equally important uneven attention was paid in the 1990s to how European forces could or should link up with the rapidly changing American military capability For many European countries forces shrank in the 1990s along with defense budgets and the transformation underway in the US was not matched by a similar investment in Europe As a result it became increasingly diffi cult for US and European forces to operate in coalition as the fi rst Gulf War and especially combat operations in the Kosovo and Serbia air war demonstrated (Adams 2001a)

Is there a gap

The emerging sense in the 1990s that European forces were lagging behind the Americans even declining led to an atmosphere of judgment and criticism in the late 1990s From the American perspective this gap was technological and budgetary and had a direct and negative consequence for the ability of the US to operate in coalition with the Europeans either in NATO or coalition operations facing the new security threats of the twenty-fi rst century A common view in the US was that the US military had become so far advanced compared to its European counterparts that military interoperability was increasingly impossible the Europeans would simply never ldquocatch uprdquo

Some of this perception was not new the history of the NATO alliance is riddled with debates about the ldquogaprdquo between the United States and European militaries American policymakers have rarely felt that the European allies produced an adequate capability even to meet the requirements of traditional Central Front war plans If this was true to some degree it did not matter NATO forces were in static positions as a defending force not engaged in active combat testing the reality of the proposition

The new international security environment is different The military forces of the allies have been repeatedly tested in combat and military operations from the Gulf War to the Balkans to the Middle East Combining the more active use of the forces with the presumed ldquogaprdquo in technologies and capability has made the transatlantic interoperability issue a central problem for NATO particularly with respect to C4ISR capabilities and the problem of ldquonetworkingrdquo US defense planners have regularly expressed concern about the extent to which European forces were ldquointeroperablerdquo with the networked capabilities of the US While their contribution in the Balkans and the Middle East were welcome the inability to ldquoconnectrdquo the forces led to operational problems The disparity between the military capabilities of the United States and the European members of NATO came to be known as ldquothe gaprdquo This ldquogaprdquo became so large in the view of some analysts that it threatened the very ability of the Alliance to function as a military partnership (Gompert et al 1999)

Rising concern about this gap led American defense planners to become increasingly critical of European defense efforts Aside from the differences in strategic outlook and expeditionary doctrine the criticism focused on the lag in overall defense investment and especially a low European commitment to the

INTRODUCTION

5

C4ISR technologies that make network-centric operations possible According to this view European defense technologies have fallen signifi cantly behind Gompert et al captured the essence of this critique

The use of transformation technology is far more extensive in US forces than in European forces The quality of US precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and C4ISR (command control communications computers intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance) has improved greatly since the Gulf War whereas European forces still remain incapable even of the type of operations that the US force conducted in 1991

(Gompert et al 1999 4)

According to the critique this gap is most obvious in information and communications technologies the core of C4ISR The United States can gather and fuse data from a wide variety of sensors and integrate them into military operations in ways Europeans cannot Europeans lack the C4ISR capabilities that link target intelligence to shooters in a secure real-time manner What technologies the Europeans do possess it is argued cannot connect smoothly to US technologies making coalition operations diffi cult or even dangerous Some US critics have suggested that European information technologies lag behind the United States making their application to defense needs and interoperability even more problematic (Gompert et al 1999 74ndash7 Deutch et al 1999 54ndash67)

European efforts to improve on current capabilities are greeted with skepticism The European Union ldquoHeadline Goalrdquo process it is argued will not bring into being forces capable of conducting twenty-fi rst century combat missions or being interoperable with US forces European decisions to acquire new equipment such as the A400M transport and Galileo satellites are viewed as redundant even wasteful of scarce defense resources As a result in this view European forces even in a multinational mode will continue to rely on the United States (via NATO) for lift logistics and communications and will continue to pose communications and information distribution problems

This study set out to examine the reality behind this critique The result of a three-year research process it examines European C4ISR capabilities both in national settings and as they are refl ected in the work of NATO and the EU (Adams et al 2004) As such it is the fi rst in-depth view of the extent to which major European defense powers have begun to adapt their forces by integrating advanced C4ISR technology into their force planning and acquisition strategies It focuses on the technologies at the heart of network-based operations information and communications capabilities that are integrated into military systems allowing national and coalition forces to be networked from sensor to shooter and back In effect the study takes a close look at the claim that European forces have fallen hopelessly behind those of the United States and cannot close the technology gap with the United States

The results are inevitably complex It is clear that important European military partners of the United States are actually making signifi cant investments

INTRODUCTION

6

in C4ISR technologies and working to integrate them into military systems While European defense budgets and especially European investment in military research and development (RampD) have declined over the past 15 years many European countries are researching developing and deploying advanced C4ISR capabilities While efforts to develop these systems vary from country to country there is no denying the overall trend in Europe including activity in NATO and the European Union towards obtaining improved capabilities for conducting network-based operations

The conventional wisdom about the ldquogaprdquo is not entirely wrong but it is not entirely right either as this study shows As such this study provides a corrective to the standard view based on hard data well beyond general impressions of the ldquogaprdquo If the practical realities of interoperability in networked operations is to be achieved it will be important to move beyond the rhetoric of the gap and work with actual developments and real technology

Overview

This study has a specifi c focus It is not a general examination of defense transformation in Europe thus does not examine force reductions or restructurings power projection and expeditionary capabilities or precision strike weaponry All of these are worthy of study and a comprehensive understanding of European military capabilities requires such an investigation Networking and C4ISR are however at the heart of effective force transformation Hence this study focuses specifi cally on the investment and deployment of C4ISR within European militaries

The study provides an overview of the strategies and doctrines of major European countries with respect to network-based operations No European country plans to create a fully networked force built around a unifi ed command control and communications architecture and few are planning for the kind of ldquonetwork-centric warfarerdquo capabilities the US seeks to create Europersquos militaries are quite aware of the utility of C4ISR and networking however and see it as a way of linking their forces and equipment through more effective digital communications European militaries and defense planners avoid such terms as ldquonetwork-centricrdquo and ldquowarfarerdquo refl ecting both a different view of the role of C4ISR technologies and of the purposes for which they are prepared to commit military force For many Europeans networking is a utility that enhances their capability not a goal in itself Moreover the purposes of their forces extend well beyond the range of warfare to encompass a wide array of military missions including post-war stability and reconstruction

The most advanced European militaries with respect to C4ISR and network thinking are the UK Sweden Finland and the Netherlands whose doctrines are discussed in some depth France Germany and Norway have yet to formulate a complete in-depth network-based doctrine but are clearly rethinking the ways in which they foresee their militaries operating in the future The doctrines of two European defense powers ndash Italy and Spain ndash are not discussed as they were

INTRODUCTION

7

found to deal little with C4ISR or network-based operations though both possess relevant deployed technologies

There is of course a difference between doctrine and deployment The study examines systematically the actual deployed and developing capabilities for networked operations of seven European countries six of them NATO allies ndash France the United Kingdom Germany Italy Spain and the Netherlands ndash and one non-NATO Sweden These seven were chosen as they are the NATO allies with the largest overall defense investments the largest and most modern forces and in varying degrees have the strongest commitment to deploying advanced C4ISR and being interoperable with the United States

The study explores in some depth the actual C4ISR capabilities of each country including current deployments and programs that are being researched and developed The focus is both on the advanced character of the technology and on the attention being paid to building in interoperability The examination is somewhat arbitrarily divided into discussions of C2 communications and computers and ISR In reality these technologies are and should be integrated as part of a networked capability The capabilities discussion also examines the extent to which national capabilities are being contributed to coalition operations with other countries as well as the countryrsquos involvement in current or planned bi- and multinational expeditionary military frameworks such as the NATO Response Force or the EU Battlegroups To the extent possible the discussion explores interoperability in three dimensions interoperability across a nationrsquos military services with other Europeans (NATO and EU) and with the United States

Because so much of the C4ISR and networking efforts are taking place at a level above single nations the study examines network-based doctrine capabilities and interoperability in multinational frameworks NATO is the key multilateral setting in which networking issues are formally addressed and joint programs most fully developed NATOrsquos networking and C4ISR efforts are signifi cantly more advanced than those of the EU for example Moreover recent initiatives in NATO ndash the Prague Capabilities Commitments the NATO Response Force and Allied Command Transformation ndash all give specifi c priority to developing interoperable network-based capabilities NATO is probably the most important context for focusing on what needs to be done to close the gap with respect to C4ISR The efforts of other multinational entities ndash the Multinational Interoperability Council the Combined Communications-Electronics Board the Multilateral Interoperability Program and the Combined Endeavor exercises ndash arealso important and examined here

While European Union defense planning is at an initial stage it is also becoming an increasingly important context for C4ISR investment and networking discussions and commitments Because the EU effort is both serious and long-term it deserves discussion The trend toward a more common defense capability in Europe autonomous to some extent from the NATO alliance will have important implications for future joint military operations European defense planners are already well aware that such a capability will require autonomous dedicated C4ISR capabilities

INTRODUCTION

8

European programs and activities in the defense fi eld are worthy of separate discussion Space systems are increasingly important to C2 communications and ISR While national space capabilities are reviewed within the discussion of each country there is also a growing network of European-level programs Some of these capabilities are being developed outside the defense context but have important and recognized implications for defense planning In addition the attention paid to cross-European interoperability in space is even more advanced than for other C4ISR activities and hence deserves a more in-depth analysis

The European industrial and technology base is an important part of the emerging capability in C4ISR Europeans have chosen to rely extensively on domestic industrial and technology suppliers for their C4ISR needs and the European capability to respond to such demands is quite extensive Many C4ISR systems are based on civilian or dual-use technologies leading European militaries like their American counterparts to make use of a broad and innovative commercial sector In the European case this sector has been encouraged for decades through public investments in RampD activities The recent emergence of several multinational fi rms ndash EADS Thales and BAE Systems ndash has further strengthened European technological capabilities Europeans argue that their dual-use technology sectors in information sensoring guidance and communications for example are fully competitive with the United States and like American fi rms draw on and participate in a truly global marketplace At the sub-system level it is clear that a substantial two-way street for such technologies applied to defense needs already exists (International Institute for Strategic Studies 1998 273)

Based on this detailed analysis the study makes a number of recommendations for policy changes both in Europe and the United States that would accelerate the pace at which the Europeans invest in and deploy C4ISR and networked capabilities and would substantially enhance transatlantic interoperability While there clearly is some truth to the ldquogaprdquo argument it is also based on a misperception Only the United States has set for itself the twin goals of global operations and a fully network-centric military force to conduct those operations European agendas are more modest with respect to geographic reach and the creation of a fully networked force This does not mean however that American and European military forces cannot be interoperable as they function in NATO or coalition operations There are increasingly clear ways in which they can be connected but a good deal of work remains to be done on both sides of the Atlantic to achieve this goal This study suggests what the elements of a work agenda could be

9

2

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES FOR NETWORK-BASED OPERATIONS

To date thinking and planning for network-based operations has been most advanced in the United States Technological advances over the past 25 years have enabled the US to begin creating the network that is at the heart of this twenty-fi rst century requirement Despite shrinking defense budgets in the 1990s the US Department of Defense began to focus on the ldquotransformationrdquo of its forces pushing towards network-centric warfare (NCW) NCW combined innovative tactics and technologies to give the military a decisive warfi ghting advantage and included linking command and control communications and intelligence gathering systems with weapons systems in an interconnected grid Americarsquos military has demonstrated this increasingly networked global capability in the fi rst Gulf War the Balkans and more recently in combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq

The European militaries have not moved as swiftly to create comparable capabilities With the end of the Soviet threat European defense strategies remained focused on regional security which did not seem to demand advanced networked capabilities European defense budgets declined through the 1990s and were largely focused on hardware inherited from the Cold War era ndash fi ghter aircraft main battle tanks and large ships ndash and on maintaining the existing military force structure European governments were concerned about the potential costs of pursuing a doctrine of network-centric warfare and the impact of such an investment on other defense requirements (James 2004 167)

European thinking began to evolve with the Gulf War of 1991 but especially as a result of the campaigns in the Balkans where Europeans were struck by the disparities between their deployed capabilities and those of the United States This stimulated greater interest in transforming European militaries to acquire similar capabilities that could be interoperable with the US A number of European militaries have made signifi cant progress since then As will be discussed in the next chapter several countries notably France the UK Germany Italy the Netherlands Spain and Sweden are researching developing procuring and deploying signifi cant networked capabilities and the trend is accelerating These include unifi ed digital communications infrastructures cross-service command and control systems and various ISR platforms manned unmanned and space-based Moreover European countries are discovering that these capabilities are

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

10

not as costly as initially perceived and that the European industrial and technology base is capable of providing them The overall trend in a networked direction is clear though progress is uneven across European countries Programs have also been initiated in NATO and the European Union to expedite the use of networked advanced C4ISR in existing and planned forces In NATO the European allies agreed to the Defense Capabilities Initiatives (DCI) in 1999 and to the Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC) in 2002 which include substantial commitments to advanced C4ISR NATO C4ISR programs now include SATCOM V Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) and Air Command and Control System (ACCS) In the EU there is an effort to create expeditionary ldquoBattlegroupsrdquo and to explore C3 jointly between the new European Defense Agency and the EU Military Staff

Only a few European countries however have begun to formulate doctrines for networked operations based on the uses of these technologies in warfare and their views on likely military operations over the coming decades Countries that have begun to explore such doctrine also shy away from the use of such terms as ldquocentricrdquo and ldquowarfarerdquo refl ecting different views both on the importance of C4ISR technologies and on the purposes for which they would commit military force There is no European country planning to create a fully networked force built around a unifi ed command control and communications architecture and few which are willing to place C4ISR technologies at the heart of warfi ghting capabilities in the way the United States has Moreover Europeans foresee a much broader range of military operations than the word ldquowarfarerdquo suggests As a result Europeans tend to use different terms to address planned capabilities such as Network-Enabled Capabilities (NEC) in the UK Networked Operational Command (Vernetzte Operationsfuumlhrung or NetOpFuuml) in Germany and Network-Based Defense in Sweden and Finland NATO has also designated its doctrine differently as NATO Network-Enabled Capabilities (NNEC)

The limitations of European military transformation are not the result of an inadequate technology base Local and multinational suppliers are readily available and largely as technologically advanced as American suppliers Analysts suggest that inadequate investment is the constraint Certainly the signifi cantly lower European defense research and technology investment limits the speed at which such technologies could be acquired and these budgets are unlikely to grow quickly However C4ISR systems are generally more affordable than large defense platforms and as force multipliers can provide a bigger ldquobang for the eurordquo One of the most important constraints on the Europeans is the absence of a long-term strategy and doctrine on the use of force which would integrate networked C4ISR into a strategic design Without clear well-defi ned strategic and doctrinal visions European militaries have hesitated to commit funding to a transformation effort

Such strategies and doctrines as exist moreover remain largely at the national level The United Kingdom Sweden Finland and the Netherlands have all been European pioneers in formulating and implementing network thinking and capabilities into their military doctrines but have done so largely based on specifi c national defense strategies and requirements Others including France

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

11

Germany and Norway are still in the process of formulating national doctrines for network-based operations but have yet to connect this planning to national RampD and acquisition plans Thinking and planning at the European level is still at a very early and tentative stage

This chapter fi rst discusses the C4ISR doctrines of those European countries that have most advanced their thinking about defense transformation and network-based operations the United Kingdom Sweden Finland and the Netherlands It then considers developments in other European countries ndash France Germany and Norway ndash that are at a more initial stage in considering their network-enabled doctrines Two of the larger European defense powers ndash Italy and Spain ndash are not discussed as their defense doctrines deal little with C4ISR or network-based operations though both possess relevant deployed technologies While Italy is undertaking signifi cant change in its military based on a strategy review C4ISR investments do not play a major role in this transformation process There do not appear to be major efforts in Spain to integrate capabilities for network-based operations into national defense planning

United Kingdom

The British Ministry of Defense has moved the most swiftly among the Europeans to embrace the concept of integrating sensors weapons systems support capabilities and decision-makers developing its own doctrine Network-Enabled Capabilities (NEC) It is not the goal of NEC to create a universal network via a single technical solution Nor indeed is the doctrine extremely technically focused Rather than view networks in a centric role it prefers to see them in a more underpinning and supporting role It perceives networks as enabling forces to better exploit the information carried on them to make better and timelier decisions on more agile and appropriate actions that result in effects more closely aligned to strategic aims and objectives

In the NEC doctrine a network of networks is envisioned in which a number of nodes carried by deployed operational assets are interlinked The NEC emphasis is on ldquothe ability to collect fuse and analyze relevant information in near real-time so as to allow rapid decision-making and the rapid delivery of the most appropriate military force to achieve the desired effectrdquo (UK Ministry of Defense 2003 11) NEC will exploit the current and future sensors that gather information ensure that the information is better managed fused and exploited to support decisions and link the network to strike assets that can act upon the information collected As an investment priority NEC compatibility will be built into current and future military platforms

Using this network of networks concept some parts of the battlespace will be linked through a C4ISR backbone using the Skynet satellite constellation and the Bowman Cormorant and Falcon networks In other parts the network will be made up of different communications systems optimized for operating in particular environments (eg air to air communications land communications) While all assets will have to possess some communications capability only a few

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

12

will need to be a permanent and integral part of the network the rest will plug into it via specifi c permanent nodes

Interoperability both technical and non-technical is a critical element of the British NEC concept A key challenge for NEC is to keep abreast of other transformation processes occurring within the armed forces of potential allies most notably the United States Through relatively frequent upgrading of C2 and communications technologies somewhat easier procurement procedures and constant participation in US defense RampD programs the British armed forces today have the highest level in Europe of interoperability with American forces The Royal Navy and Royal Air Force however have a higher level of interoperability with their American and European counterparts than does the British Army

In the near term delivering NEC means identifying options to modify existing systems Delivery in the medium term will require intervening in programmed equipment to ensure that delivered systems are capable of exploiting the information they collect andor receive Over the long term the procurement program is to deliver platforms and systems that are net-ready

In January 2005 the British Ministry of Defense published the NetworkEnabled Capability Handbook designed to introduce the concept of NEC to the larger UK defense community and to outline key programs that will be undertaken to implement the concept The Handbook which will be updated annually describes how NEC will contribute to the strategic operational and tactical levels of command as well as its links with the Command and Battlespace Management program and the Joint High Level Operational Concept (Jt HLOC) being formulated by the Ministry of Defense (UK Ministry of Defense 2005)

Britain restructured the Ministry of Defense to emphasize its commitment to NEC NEC policy and coherence now falls under the Ministry of Defensersquos Directorate of Command and Battlespace Management (CBMJ6) which works closely with the directorate responsible for the equipment in the Directorate for Equipment Capability ndash Command Control and Information Infrastructure (DEC-CCII) headed by a one-star general DEC-CCII is the largest equipment capability area in the Ministry of Defense (the other Core Capability DECs being DEC ISTAR responsible for Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance DEC TA responsible for Air Enablers and DEC CBRN responsible for chemical biological radiological and nuclear warfare) It is responsible for delivering solutions to C2 and information technology gaps in British military capability DEC-CCII is able to balance funding across programs and between other DECs to deliver operational capability

Sweden

Urged by the Swedish parliament the Swedish armed forces moved quickly to rethink defense strategy after the Cold War In addition to their traditional role of territorial defense they are now also required to collaborate with other national security elements such as police and emergency management units as well as

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

13

with the forces of other countries within international coalitions Swedenrsquos long-standing policy of neutrality and non-participation in alliances and its defense strategy of border defense are both evolving rapidly As its new roles and missions emerge the Swedish military is evolving a doctrine of Network-Based Defense (NBD) NBD will facilitate joint operations in defense of the borders as well as in international coalitions at all levels of command using information technology to create a system of systems infrastructure with different platforms linked into it

Once in place NBD will allow the combination of different resources to provide task forces for specifi c operations These task forces will be able to interoperate with other participants The doctrine seeks to obtain the greatest possible effect by combining inputs and outputs from all systems regardless of their organizational affi liation (Nilsson 2003 8) The transition to NBD is expected to take twenty years or so however the fi rst steps are underway including developing and purchasing advanced C2 and communications capabilities for aircraft ships and land vehicles and the initial design of a Network-Based Defense architecture The Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI) and the Swedish Defense Materiel Administration (FMV) play a key role in shaping this vision (Rehnstroumlm 2002 11ndash12)

The Swedes conducted major experimental demonstrations of the key elements of the NBD doctrine between 2002ndash6 The experiments focused on secure information service-oriented architectures and the demonstration of dominant battlespace awareness and C2 elements for rapid reaction forces They also included the demonstration of methods and techniques for effects-based operations The demonstrations brought together units from different services each with its own functional systems and included simulations of a system of systems (Naumlsstroumlm 2004 152ndash3) The demonstrations were undertaken in a special NBD Laboratory in Enkoumlping near Stockholm built and operated by FMV for the Swedish armed forces The implementation phase of the NBD doctrine is planned to begin in 2010

Finland

Since the end of the Cold War Finlandrsquos national security strategy has changed dramatically The 1000 km border with Russia remains a security issue but the Finns are focused on participation in international security and relief operations as the central national security goal As a result of this two-pronged defense strategy Finland is making international defense interoperability a priority to enhance both its ability to receive outside aid for national emergencies as well as the effectiveness of its contributions to multinational operations overseas

A key part of the new strategy is to formulate and implement a doctrine that networks all elements of the nationrsquos defense and security forces using international standards Finland decided that its various forces could be much more effective if connected via a single command control and communications network that would enable seamless coordination and deployment of all of them The planned network would connect all military security police and other emergency and fi rst-

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

14

responder forces Though the Finnish doctrine is called Network-Based Defense it implements a truly network-centric vision plugging in all relevant users

Finland began installing this network ndash VIRVE (the Finnish acronym for Common Network for Authorities) ndash in 1999 and it became operational that same year It was fi rst used in live operations in 2000 and completed in 2002 Today VIRVE is the worldrsquos only fully operational IP-based nationwide command control and communications network for security and rescue forces It is owned by the Finnish Ministry of the Interior and operated by Suomen Erillisverkot an entity owned by the Finnish government and Sonera Finlandrsquos largest telecommunications service provider It currently serves some 30000 users from 20 different agencies and organizations including the Finnish Defense Forces police border security paramedics and fi refi ghters providing them with secure voice and data communications A related system is the basis for Finlandrsquos contribution of a deployable command control and communications network to the European Unionrsquos forces in the Balkans (EUFOR) Co-developed by Finnish companies and the Finnish Defense Forces and known as the Deployable COTS Network (DCN) it is a data transfer network that uses microwave links fi ber optic cables and broadband information services to transfer speech and data and provide Internet access between headquarters and troops in the fi eld

VIRVE is an example of how a national doctrine for network-based defense is taking the fi rst steps towards creating a common joint interoperable C4I system linking all government agencies The architecture structures and datafl ow of this network will be operated together allowing the sharing of information and resources according to specifi c needs It will include an integrated data transfer processing and management environment that covers all services and branches of the Finnish Defense Forces Initial focus will be on the strategic and operational levels but foundations will also be built for tactical level cross-service interoperability (Finnish Prime Ministerrsquos Offi ce 2004 107) By 2012 the army air force and navy are expected to be integrated into the national C4I network developed and able to conduct network-based operations both in Finland and overseas

While the Finnish military strongly supports this capability (the Finnish Chief of Defense Admiral Juhani Kaskeala has clearly prioritized integrated C4I systems as one of the militaryrsquos top development programs) other parts of the Finnish government face a challenge in developing their parts of the network Organizational cultures and operational procedures differ signifi cantly and most agencies lack the capacity for long-term planning and capabilities development However interagency cooperation is strong and there is signifi cant public support for improving both homeland defense and expeditionary capabilities

Netherlands

During the Cold War the Dutch armed forces saw one of their major roles as being able to provide C2 and communications capabilities to the theater of operations Over several decades they built up a C2 and communications capability through

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

15

investment in signals brigades With the end of the Soviet threat sustaining of a massive C3 capability became unnecessary At the same time the revolution in commercial information and communications technologies led to a ldquobrain drainrdquo away from the armed forces into the private sector Dutch defense planners wished to maintain some C2 capacity within the armed forces and to develop the C2 requirements of the future To this end they created three Support Centers in 2001 one for each service to bring together engineers and operational commanders for research development testing and evaluation on C2 systems that could serve the Netherlands armed forces in their new mission Unable to match the salary levels of the private sector the Dutch military compensated by offering the Support Center personnel a free hand in the use of their budget included total fl exibility for acquisition and program management

As the Dutch Ministry of Defense began to move toward a doctrine of expedi-tionary warfare the ability of the C2 Support Centers to provide the customer with deployable and fl exible systems became more important The armyrsquos C2 Support Center was tasked with developing C2 systems for all ground-based operations and is now the largest of the three Support Centers employing some 200 people half of whom are civilians The Center also develops technologies used by the marines the navyrsquos landing platform dock ships and helicopters attached to an airmobile brigade It is responsible for building a common open C2 architecture allowing both old and new systems to work together As of 1 January 2005 the Center was integrated into the newly created joint Defense Materiel Organization

This model of support centers while not a doctrine for network-based operations per se is an important contribution to European strategies for C4ISR Such centers bring together expertise from industry and defense ensuring that user needs and requirements are balanced with an understanding of what technology can support Competitive salaries and a free hand to experiment with the latest technologies and participate in groundbreaking research draw the best and brightest employees from the private sector and the military Finally the technology development strategy of ldquoplan a little build a little fi eld a little and learn a lotrdquo (similar to the US ldquospiral developmentrdquo) will be of interest to many European countries Instead of setting down complex requirements packages in advance and then developing and producing a turnkey product systems are designed in manageable parts that are then gradually developed and tested Along each step of the way the product is evaluated in accordance with overall specifi cations Only then is a prototype built and tested with the end-user While many European companies use this development strategy doing so in a setting with industry the military and end-users has the advantage of making it easier to identify and fi x problems swiftly

Other European countries

Encouraged by the success of the United Kingdom Sweden Finland and the Netherlands other European nations are beginning to formulate strategy and doctrine for network-based operations Rather than create distinct network-based doctrines C4ISR or networked capabilities tend to be included in broader defense

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

16

planning documents alongside plans for refocusing the militaryrsquos roles from territorial defense to expeditionary operations downsizing forces improving training for individual soldiers reorganizing the military command structure and reallocating resources from large platforms to more easily deployable capabilities Most of these efforts are still at an early stage however

France is a signifi cant example of this trend As is discussed in the next chapter France is a European leader in researching developing testing and deploying state-of-the-art C4ISR technologies The broad French technology investment does not however emerge from a comprehensive networking or transformational strategy and doctrine This strategy is not yet in place though use of the concept of network-centric operations (opeacuterations reacuteseaux-centreacutees or ORC) is becoming more widespread within the French armed forces Rather the commitment to obtaining advanced C4ISR is part of an overall French desire to remain self-suffi cient in military capabilities across the board For decades France has pursued a defense doctrine and procurement strategy that would provide its armed forces with independent autonomous capabilities The deployment of a broad arsenal and the avoidance of military specialization in the view of French defense planners make the countryrsquos military more fl exible and less dependent upon others More recently French strategy and doctrine have begun to emphasize military cooperation in the European context recognizing that total autonomy is militarily and fi nancially unachievable

Recent military planning in Germany suggests a growing focus on achieving expeditionary and network-centric capabilities Germany is one of the few European countries to have adopted the concept of transformation in the broadest US sense defi ning it as ldquothe forming of an ongoing forward-looking process of adaptation to a changing security environment in order to improve the Bundeswehrrsquos ability to operaterdquo (Thiele 2005 7) The German government announced in 2003 that it would downsize the armed forces to 211000 troops and to 392 bases by 2010 from the current 252000 troops and 621 bases (CPM Forum 2005 29ndash30) Moving away from a massive land warfare capability and toward an expeditionary capability the German military force will be divided into three categories The fi rst category some 35000 troops will become response forces (Eingreifkraumlfte)capable of participating in high-intensity combat operations These forces will fi eld state-of-the art C4ISR technologies for network-centric operations and interoperability with coalitions and allies The second category approximately 70000 troops will be stabilization forces (Stabilisierungskraumlfte) for medium- to low-intensity operations and will be only partially networked The third category will be support forces (Unterstuumltzungskraumlfte) some 145000 troops which will provide support for the fi rst two and be responsible for basic operations of the Bundeswehr While there are no planned procurement cancellations the funds saved by downsizing forces and the change in defense doctrine are promising for Germanyrsquos future C4ISR capabilities and its interoperability with allies Germany has also formulated a network-centric doctrine that is very similar to the US strategy of Network-Centric Warfare Named Networked Operational

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

17

Command (Vernetzte Operationsfuumlhrung or NetOpFuuml in German) the strategy calls for linking new and existing sensors and weapons platforms on a common information network

Norway which is not in the EU but is a NATO member sees network-based defense as crucial for remaining relevant as a NATO partner and as a contributor to multilateral operations and has made this strategy an important part of the broader restructuring of its armed forces In 2001 the Norwegian parliament approved a major military reform between 2002ndash5 As in Sweden and in other countries this reform was initiated by a shift in the roles assigned to the Norwegian armed forces from primarily territorial defense to expeditionary operations

As a result of this shift the command structure of the military was reorganized the Headquarters Defense Command Norway was disbanded and the Chief of Defense together with his strategic functions was integrated with the Ministry of Defense A new Defense Staff consisting of representatives of the three services and an Inspector General was established to support the Chief of Defense in his role as head of the armed forces In addition the size of the military reduced by approximately 5000 The savings generated from this restructuring would be invested in advanced capabilities and systems These investments have included upgrading the national Defense Data Network (known as FDN) and procuring locally developed advanced multi-role tactical radios (Norwegian Ministry of Defense 2002) In the next cycle 2005ndash8 the Norwegians plan to create a joint Information and Communications Infrastructure unit to support Norwegian forces deployed overseas and an ISTAR unit focused primarily on reconnaissance missions using special forces and UAVs that can operate within multinational coalitions (Norwegian Ministry of Defense 2004)

Conclusion

There is not yet a consistent approach in Europe to Network-Based Operations Some countries still view territorial defense as the principal mission for their armed forces and see stovepiped C4ISR systems as suffi cient for fulfi lling their current and future defense requirements Still a growing number of European nations have learned important lessons from studying US Network-Centric Warfare doctrine and observing such capabilities in action on the battlefi eld in coalition operations Some including Germany France and Norway are beginning to include language about C4ISR networks in their defense modernization plans but have yet to create specifi c detailed doctrines discussing how these networks will be linked with existing military doctrine tactics and technologies Other European countries particularly the United Kingdom Sweden Finland and the Netherlands have developed detailed doctrines and strategies for creating advanced capabilities based on linking communications intelligence gathering and weapons systems into a network capable of distributing information

It is not always true that countries that have worked through doctrine in detail have also deployed the most advanced technology consistent with that doctrine As

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

18

the French case suggests doctrinal leaders are not always the same as technology leaders Over time the two will need to develop together if the Europeans are to obtain a network-based capability that is interoperable within Europe as well as across the Atlantic

19

3

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES FOR NETWORK-

BASED OPERATIONS

Efforts are well underway in many European countries to develop and acquire national and in some cases multinational capabilities for network-based operations As already noted no country has fully embraced the concept of network-centric operations to the extent the American military has None are seeking to create a full single infrastructure fusing all existing and future assets Most have opted at least for some integration and upgrading of existing capabilities toward greater networking Major procurement programs focus particular attention on cross-service C2 systems digital communications and ISR platforms (tactical operational and strategic) In all of these countries rapid advances in commercial communication and information technology have created a wealth of products applicable to military C4ISR at a relatively low unit cost As a result for many of these countries expensive weapons platforms can be improved through C4ISR-related upgrades thereby increasing capability at an affordable cost

This chapter focuses on actual deployed and planned C4ISR capabilities in seven European countries France the United Kingdom Germany Italy the Netherlands Spain and Sweden As noted doctrines for network-based capabilities are unevenly developed among these countries However these seven countries are clearly the most advanced in Europe both in terms of overall military capability and in the deployment of C4ISR technologies Not surprisingly with the exception of the Netherlands they are also the countries with the highest defense budgets in Europe They are also the most likely partners of the US in coalition operations either individually or as members of NATO and the EU

An overview of the trends in C4ISR-related acquisition and RampT programs in Europe identifi es developments that have been observed in several ndash if not the majority ndash of EU and NATO countries This chapter then reviews developments relevant to network-based operations in each of the seven key countries summarizing major national capabilities both deployed and projected and examining in some detail each countryrsquos network-based systems in terms of C2 communications (including computers) and ISR

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

20

Overview

Signifi cant efforts are already underway in most European countries to connect existing C2 systems across services Several countries are creating a new cross-service C2 infrastructure including the United Kingdom (the Joint Command System) France (SICA) and Italy (CATRIN) Interoperability among these C2 systems is signifi cantly less advanced especially for ground forces The French army for example has three command levels while most other European armies ndash including the United Kingdom Germany and Italy ndash have two which makes the creation of a common C2 architecture among them a challenge

All of the countries reviewed believe that a common digital communications backbone for their services is crucial Several countries fi eld tactical systems based on asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) switches many others have integrated digital switches capable of interfacing with high-speed data networks and complying with European and NATO standards Many of them are at advanced stages in upgrading their communications infrastructure whether through terrestrial networks satellite systems or a combination of both including the British Bowman and Skynet programs the German AUTOKO-90 and BIGSTAF programs and the French SOCRATE RITA 2000 and Syracuse programs Sweden the Netherlands and Italy are also making signifi cant progress in the military communications fi eld

For communications in general the civilian industry is the main driver of innovation and therefore the main standard setter It is not surprising that while different companies are working on communications programs for Europersquos militaries the systems being put in place share attributes they are digital increasingly based on the Internet Protocol (IP) capable of handling voice as well as data and use ATM switching equipment and widespread transmission technologies (satellite radio and fi ber optics)

In addition to space-based military communications many European countries are turning to space for future surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities While military communications satellites (COMSAT) usually are built and operated by individual countries earth observation programs have become increasingly multinational Furthermore intra-European agreements are being put in place to link national space assets In the not-so-distant future data collected by satellites owned by different countries will be disseminated between partners through sharing agreements and communications satellites will carry military transmissions from countries that lease their bandwidth from others A growing number of militaries are acquiring the capability to link their headquarters with their expeditionary forces using broadband mobile communications The French ARISTOTE the German KINTOP the British Cormorant and the Swedish KV90 are examples of such systems already in place

Finally the Europeans are making increased use of unmanned platforms especially aerial ones to fulfi ll the tactical and in some cases operational and strategic intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance requirements While most European countries possess manned platforms for this purpose particularly for

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

21

aerial reconnaissance these are either in need of upgrading or are nearing the end of their service lives All the militaries discussed in this chapter as well as those of several other European countries have begun to experiment with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) ndash often developed by their indigenous technology and industrial base ndash and most have used them in military operations They are viewed as affordable versatile and dependable options for future surveillance and reconnaissance missions Several countries notably the United Kingdom France and Germany are looking to UAVs for other operational needs including signals intelligence (SIGINT) electronic warfare airborne ground surveillance and strike missions However unlike what is often the case in communications and C2 different ISR standards are set by each country which makes interoperability a diffi cult challenge

France

France invests in almost all areas of defense technology relevant to network-based operations However as was explained in the previous chapter the broad French investment in C4ISR capabilities does not yet grow out of a comprehensive network-centric strategy Although the concept of network-centric operations (opeacuterations reacuteseaux-centreacutees or ORC) is widespread within the French armed forces only a handful of offi cers within the French Joint Staff are currently working on network-centric doctrines Nevertheless between 1991 and 1993 several new organizational frameworks were created to review and modernize French doctrine and strategy in this direction The single joint Directorate of Military Intelligence (Direction du Renseignement Militaire or DRM) replaced a variety of existing services and reports to the chief of the defense staff A joint planning staff the Etat-Major Interarmeacutees (EMIA) was created to plan operations in and out of Europe and the Centre Opeacuterationnel Interarmeacutees (COIA) became the joint operations center France also put in place a joint theater C2 structure (Poste de Commandement Interarmeacutee de Theacuteacirctre or PCIAT) and the space bureau in the French Joint Chiefs of Staff was folded into the Command Control Communications and Intelligence (C3I) staff (Thomas 2000 20) The initial purpose of these organizational changes was to facilitate force projection and expeditionary warfare operations However these new organizational structures could provide a setting for developing a military doctrine increasingly focused on transformation and coordination across services

Because force projection expeditionary forces and out-of-theater operations require among other things advanced C2 systems communications networks and real-time intelligence the C4ISR systems that provide this are playing an increasingly important role in French military plans The French defense procurement agency (Deacuteleacutegation Geacuteneacuterale pour lrsquoArmement or DGA) has set up a task force of capability managers (architectes des systegravemes de force) in charge of future issues for defense RampD and procurement and their cross-service applications The areas covered are deterrence C3I force projection deep strike and maintaining operational capability The task force meets regularly

Stra

tegy

C2

Com

mun

icat

ions

ISR

Fra

nce

bull A

cros

s-th

e-bo

ard

inve

stm

ents

in C

4IS

Rbull

Exp

edit

iona

ry f

orce

s

bull S

ICA

cro

ss-s

ervi

ce s

yste

mbull

SO

CR

AT

Ebull

Syr

acus

e M

ILS

AT

CO

M

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embull

AF

and

nav

y po

sses

s L

ink-

111

6

bull U

AV

s (i

ncl

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and

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AL

E)

bull H

elio

s 1

(Hel

ios

2 un

derw

ay)

bull L

imit

ed A

GS

(4

Hor

izon

he

lico

pter

s)bull

AW

AC

S (

4) a

ircr

aft

bull S

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(da

ta m

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emen

t in

tero

pera

ble

wit

h JS

TAR

S

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ON

sys

tem

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Uni

ted

Kin

gdom

bull N

etw

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led

capa

bili

ties

(N

EC

) do

ctri

nebull

Def

ense

Inf

orm

atio

n In

fras

truc

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(D

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in

tegr

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C4

syst

ems

bull E

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for

ces

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S c

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bull A

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(5)

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)bull

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ng

WA

N

Ger

man

ybull

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wor

ked

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rati

onal

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(Net

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nebull

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erni

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f fo

rces

bull E

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oSys

SK

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stil

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s)bull

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oko-

90bull

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avy

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ctic

al M

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AL

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UA

Vs

bull S

AR

-Lup

e sa

tell

ite

syst

embull

AG

S p

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via

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LE

(E

uro

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mon

sys

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for

IS

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ata

Tabl

e 3

1 P

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ipal

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opea

n na

tion

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ies

for

netw

ork-

base

d op

erat

ions

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tegy

C2

Com

mun

icat

ions

ISR

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ybull

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ectiv

e ac

quis

itio

n of

C

4IS

R a

sset

s (U

AV

s s

pace

)bull

Exp

edit

iona

ry f

orce

s

bull C

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bull S

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AL

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SA

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stem

bull L

ink-

111

6 an

d M

IDS

bull L

imit

ed A

GS

(4

CR

ES

O

heli

copt

ers)

bull U

AV

s (i

ncl

Pre

dato

r)bull

CO

SM

O-S

kym

ed s

atel

lite

sy

stem

Net

herl

ands

bull S

peci

aliz

ed tr

ansf

orm

atio

n (U

AV

s c

omm

unic

atio

ns)

bull E

xped

itio

nary

for

ces

bull IS

IS a

ir f

orce

and

arm

y C

2 sy

stem

bull T

ITA

AN

(ta

ctic

al I

P

netw

ork)

bull M

IDS

bull L

imit

ed M

ILS

AT

CO

M

capa

bili

ty

bull T

UA

Vs

Spa

inbull

Mod

est i

nves

tmen

tbull

Exp

edit

iona

ry f

orce

sbull

No

cros

s-se

rvic

e C

2 sy

stem

bull L

ink-

11 a

nd M

IDS

bull H

ispa

sat M

ILS

AT

CO

M

syst

em

bull L

imit

ed I

SR

cap

abil

itie

s

Sw

eden

bull N

etw

ork-

Bas

ed D

efen

se

(NB

D)

doct

rine

bull E

xped

itio

nary

for

ces

bull S

EW

CC

IS c

ross

-ser

vice

C2

syst

embull

HF

-200

0bull

Lim

ited

AE

W a

nd A

GS

(6

Arg

us a

ircr

aft)

bull U

AV

and

UC

AV

pro

gram

s

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

24

with representatives of the French defense industry to coordinate government requirements with private-sector projects and planning In fact several of the larger defense contractors in Europe have set up new groups to act as permanent liaison with members of the task force for this purpose such as the Thales Think Tank (T3)

In 2004 there were still more changes in Francersquos defense organizations The DGA was restructured to include expanded and improved in-house technical capabilities for research technology and testing The French Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Offi ce of the Secretary-General of the Defense Ministry are beginning to assume responsibility for monitoring the development and demonstration of defense programs a responsibility currently held by the DGA These changes are seen as a way to bring industry closer to its client the French military (Tran 2004 4)

The importance of C4ISR for current and future military capabilities has also been refl ected in Francersquos defense budget planning C2 systems space technologies and interoperability enablers have received priority for RampD investment in the 2003ndash8 fi ve year defense plan (the Loi de Programmation Militaire) During the fi rst two years DGA planners focused on space-based SIGINT assets a space-based early warning system demonstrator integrated C2 systems for the army and navy and advanced navigation technologies For 2005ndash6 UAVs and the interlinking of European space assets are the priority By the end of the fi ve year plan France hopes to raise its defense RampT budget to some 12 billion euros (out of a total 15 billion euros) up from 800 million euros in 2004 (Boulesteix 2004) For all C4ISR requirements DGArsquos Directorate of Force Systems and Prospective Systems Analysis (Direction des Systegravemes de force et de la Prospective or DSP) has been replaced by the Directorate of Force Systems and Industrial Technological and Cooperation Strategies or Direction des Sytegravemes de Force et des Strateacutegies Industrielles Technologique et de Coopeacuteration (D4S) which decides on the best and most affordable solutions without prejudice toward any specifi c technology

The DGA is also working on two plans to assess the future C4ISR needs of the French armed forces The fi rst is a technological capabilities plan of systems including C4ISR systems to be acquired by the year 2015 The second is the Prospective Plan for 30 Years (Plan Prospectif agrave Trente Ans or PP30) which looks specifi cally at longer-term needs and solutions for meeting them mainly in the fi elds of telecommunications intelligence networking C2 sensors and UAV technologies The latter fi rst unveiled at the 2005 Paris Air Show (although circulated within the French Ministry of Defense for several years prior to that) is groundbreaking in that it provides a 30 year draft acquisition plan for the French military based on an analysis of expected threats uses of force and technology developments Both plans are updated periodically to guide RampT investments and procurement plans in collaboration with the European Defense Agency other allies ndash most notably the UK ndash and with industry

Working closely with the Joint Planning Staff (EMIA) and with DGA on network-based capabilities is the French space agency known as the Center for

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

25

National Space Studies (Centre National drsquoEtudes Spatiales) or CNES This collaboration refl ects the French governmentrsquos recognition that space has major strategic operational and tactical advantages for networking and intelligence collection purposes As a result CNES has begun overseeing some military space programs on behalf of the Ministry of Defense The French Chief of Staff chairs the space coordination group (Groupe de Coordination Espacendash GCE) which includes representatives from EMIA DGA and other military institutions CNES has also created a team dedicated to military space projects Its members who can either be CNES employees or Ministry of Defense staff seconded to CNES report to the president of CNES as well as to the relevant program managers at the Ministry of Defense The team works on four major areas future planning ongoing projects implementation of dual-use space programs and RampT

More broadly recognizing the costs of an autonomous French defense strategy France is continuing its defense cooperation with the EU and NATO In addition to its Eurocorps commitments France will commit a whole Battlegroup to the EU Battlegroup effort and participate in two others one with Germany Belgium and Luxembourg the other with Belgium France is also committed to participating in the NATO Response Force despite viewing it as duplicative of the EU Rapid Reaction Force It is unlikely however that France will periodically rotate the same forces through the NRF it would be more interested in NRF experience for different kinds of troops drawn from various services While the French understand that smaller countries will participate in the NRF in a specialized manner they prefer to rotate different types of forces through and maintain autonomy

France also views the Allied Command Transformation as an important development and a target for closer cooperation which might provide a window for the EU into US transformation However within the EU the French strongly believe that there needs to be a European fl ag on European military capabilities At this point it is unclear whether the French expect EU capabilities to be able to complement US capabilities to be oriented principally toward autonomous operations or both This issue has major implications for interoperability require-ments and capabilities Currently France is very supportive of the plan to give the European Defense Agency increasingly greater RampT and procurement responsibilities However France also believes that the European national investments in major platforms stand in the way of greater interoperability between European C4ISR systems In the French view European defense budgets include a major commitment to a platform strategy which leaves little funding for C4ISR and interoperability

At the transatlantic level major French platforms such as the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier have good tactical interoperability with the US Navy using Link-16 technology In Afghanistan for example French E-2C aircraft from the Charles de Gaulle guided American fi ghters toward their targets when US E-2C aircraft were overtaxed or unavailable French Special Operations Forces also have good interoperability with their US counterparts At the European level French naval and air forces are fairly interoperable with most European forces but French

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

26

ground forces are not The French Army still fi elds communications systems for example that are not fully interoperable with its allies The coordination of French RampD efforts is focused for now totally on achieving jointness at the national level

As a European leader in space France also seeks greater cooperation with the United States especially for earth observation communications and navigation programs France also views itself as a potential intermediary between the United States and the space-related activities of other European nations and organizations including the European Space Agency and the European Commission (Hura et al2000 64ndash5)

France has arguably the most advanced operational battlespace digitization program in Europe both deployed and planned While there is not yet full interoperability between all French military services the initial investment in cross-service systems has been made and deployment is well underway The major building blocks are a cross-service C2 system a digital communications infrastructure and a network linking national HQs and expeditionary forces In 2004ndash5 two laboratories for demonstrating network-based concepts were created Bulle Opeacuterationelle Aeacuteroterrestre (BOA) demonstrates the ability to fuse information from UAVs and land-based sensors in real time to create a common battlespace picture for land forces and enable a coordinated engagement of targets The second laboratory will focus on linking data collected by ISR assets from all services Since France has also invested heavily across the board in ISR capabilities it is important to demonstrate the ability to link UAVs manned air- and ship-borne platforms and space-based assets

Command and control

France has operational C2 systems in every service The army has four fully operational digital C2 programs the Force Command and Information System (Systegraveme drsquoInformation et de Commandement des Forces or SICF) for division-level C2 (including C2 for overseas task forces) the Regimental Information System (Systegraveme drsquoInformation Reacutegimentaire or SIR) originally for regimental-level C2 but redirected to company level in 2001 the Final Information System (Systegraveme drsquoInformation Terminal or SIT) for tactical-level C2 and armored vehicles and the Automated Surface-to-Surface Artillery Fire and Liaison System (Automatisation des Tirs et des Liaisons de lrsquoArtillerie Sol-sol or ATLAS) Some 750 SIR vehicles 650 SIT systems and nine ATLAS systems are deployed

Other operational digital C2 systems are the armyrsquos Martha air defense system the air forcersquos Aerial Operations Command and Control System (Systegravemede Commandement et de Controcircle des Opeacuterations Aeacuteriennes or SCCOA) and the navyrsquos SIC21 system The French navy also deploys several Naval Tactical Information Exploitation Systems (Systegraveme drsquoExploitation Navale des Informations Tactiques or SENIT) Ships equipped with SENIT can operate as single distributed anti-aircraft systems In addition the French navy in 2004 initiated the Multi-Platform Engagement Capability (Capaciteacute drsquoEngagement

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

27

Multi Plate-formes or CEMP) demonstrator as a possible locally developed counterpart to the US Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) to provide air and naval assets with additional cooperative engagement capability France initially sought to develop CEMP as a collaborative program offering Italy Germany and the Netherlands participation but the offer was not accepted Initial operational capability is expected in 2006

These C2 systems are only partially interoperable with each other or with allied capabilities though SICF and SIR are both compliant with NATO STANAGs The SIR and SIT systems can both be linked to French combat and C2 helicopters and ATLAS and SIR both interface with the French Rapsodie surveillance system ATLAS is currently interoperable with United States United Kingdom Italian and German surface-to-surface fi ring systems as well as with SIR and SCCOA is planned to be interoperable with the NATO Air Command and Control System (ACCS) The French SENIT system is also interoperable with the C2 of the United States Navy and the British Royal Navy through Link-16 and Link-11 which allows interoperability in naval air defense

France is now in the fi nal stages of deploying the next generation C2 system in the form of a strategic-level system called the Joint Information and Command System (Systegraveme drsquoInformation et de Commandement des Armeacutees or SICA) This system which will link the armyrsquos SICF the navyrsquos SIC21 and the air forcersquos SCCOA systems is already installed on various weapons platforms and headquarters It is linked to the SOCRATE and the Syracuse 3 communications systems (see below) and interoperable with the British JOCS and the German Rubin systems

Communications and computers

The Operational System of Joint Telecommunications Networks (SystegravemeOpeacuterationnel Constitueacute des Reacuteseaux des Armeacutees pour les Teacuteleacutecommunicationsor SOCRATE) is the current communications infrastructure linking all of Francersquos services Its 120 ATM switching sites in France cover all military communications including radio fi ber optic and satellite and connect the system to civilian and allied communications networks In addition a more advanced tactical communications system for the French army will enter into service around 2004ndash5 It will be based on IP-networked PR4G (Programme Radio 4egraveme Geacuteneacuteration or 4th Generation Radio Program VHF tactical radios used in man-portable vehicle-mounted or aircraft-mounted confi gurations) and the Automatic Transmission Integrated Network (Reacuteseau Inteacutegreacute de Transmissions Automatiques 2000 or RITA 2000) switching platform both supplied by Thales The RITA 2000 project was initiated in 1993 and has progressively upgraded the French tactical communications infrastructure to facilitate interoperability with allied networks and expeditionary forces and increase bandwidth Its link into the armed forcesrsquo C2 network management is known as the Command Network Center (Centre de Commandement du Reacuteseau or CECOR) In August 2003 the French defense procurement agency announced a 100 million euro plan to upgrade

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

28

the RITA 2000 system with new hardware and software to provide state-of-the-art tactical Internet and mobile communications services

For tactical communications France currently uses older versions of the PR4G radios which nevertheless include features such as frequency hopping encryption Since 2005 however several units have begun using newer versions that include a built-in Global Positioning System (GPS) and tactical Internet capabilities A total of 7050 PR4G-IP radios will be delivered to the French military by 2009 at a cost of 235 million euros In addition the tactical Local Area System (LAS) developed by Thales provides a tactical command post in the fi eld with digital communications capabilities through a vehicle-mounted IP-based system In the French navy several platforms including some E-2C aircraft the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle and several anti-air frigates possess Tactical Digital Information Link technology of the Link-11 and Link-16 types This technology is now installed in aircraft of the French air force as well The Link-11 systems will be replaced by Link-22 (also known as NATO Inproved Link Eleven or NILE) systems in the near future France also procures MIDS terminals and is a partner in the US navy-led MIDS JTRS program to make MIDS terminals compliant with the US JTRS software defi ned tactical radios

French military satellite communications capabilities are also at quite an advanced stage with the Syracuse satellite constellation The previous operational system Syracuse 2 used the military payloads of four Teacuteleacutecom 2 commercial satellites launched between December 1991 and August 1996 and was operated jointly by France Teacuteleacutecom and the French armed forces The system did not provide global coverage but did cover all of Europe and reached the United States to the west and India to the east Its satellites began to reach the end of their lives in 2004 and while most are still available as backup a new system Syracuse 3 was put in orbit to replace them Syracuse 3A was launched in October 2005 and the second satellite is scheduled for launch in 2006 total costs for both are estimated at around 3 billion euros including roughly 600 airborne terrestrial and ship-borne terminals A third satellite to be launched around 2010 is under study The satellites have both SHF and EHF channels Syracuse 3A has nine SHF channels and six EHF channels The Syracuse constellation belongs to the French government though the French Ministry of Defense is considering the possibility of turning management of the third satellite over to a private consortium using the model of Britainrsquos Skynet 5 (De Selding 2003a 6) The Syracuse 3 satellites will form part of the British-French-Italian solution for NATOrsquos future satellite communication needs and France has additional agreements with Germany Belgium and Spain to share Syracuse 3 capacity (Laurent 2001 30)

Since 2002 France also has a deployed system (ARISTOTE) to provide end-to-end communications between operational units in external theaters of operation and their commanders in France ARISTOTE uses the Syracuse constellation and other available allied and commercial COMSATs to provide a broadband architecture based on the latest commercial standards The system supports voice video teleconferencing telegraph fax and data (including tactical Internet)

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

29

Future communications projects include a naval intranet system (RIFAN) a secure e-mail system for the French Ministry of Defense (Universal Secure Messaging or Messagerie Universelle Seacutecuriseacutee or MUSE) and the Airborne Laser Optical Link (Liaison Optique Laser Aeacuteroporteacutee or LOLA) a 2006 test of a 50 million euro demonstrator to explore the feasibility of high-rate laser optical links between an ARTEMIS civilian communications satellite and a UAV in fl ight The Airborne Communication Node (Noeud de Communication Aeacuteroporteacuteor NCA) a UAV-borne high-bandwidth hub capable of linking up to 50 mobile ground or maritime gateways is also under advanced stages of development with a fi rst demonstration expected in 2006 France also plans to procure additional Link-16 equipment for its Rafale aircraft and for some naval platforms

Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance

France is the European leader in deployed space-based ISR capabilities and the operator of Helios the only European military earth observation system currently in orbit Despite the cancellation of the Horus radar satellite program in 1998 France continued its earth observation efforts with the development of two Helios 1 satellites The fi rst was launched in July 1995 and remains operational the second was launched in December 1999 but failed in October 2004 A joint French Italian and Spanish project Helios 1 satellites carry optical imagers with approximately one-meter resolution and are capable of imaging any point on earth within 24 hours providing a dozen images a day They do not have infrared capability Each participating nation can control the onboard imaging system on a pro rata basis based on its fi nancial contribution to the program (France 789 per cent Italy 141 per cent and Spain 7 per cent) The Helios 1 system allows each of the co-owners to maintain strict secrecy from each other regarding the use they make of it However to make optimum use of the imaging capacity the three partner nations have agreed on certain common needs and program the satellite accordingly More than 30 per cent of the imagery taken by Helios 1 is shared between the partners In addition to fi xed ground stations to receive Helios 1 imagery France possesses at least one mobile ground station built by EADS

Helios 2A the fi rst in the next generation of French earth observation satellites was launched in December 2004 and began operating in April 2005 The second satellite will probably be launched in late 2008 Helios 2A carries two sensors operating in the visible and infrared spectrums One is a medium-resolution sensor with a wide fi eld of view and is capable of producing images with a resolution of approximately 1 meter the other has a narrower fi eld of view but is capable of producing images with a 50 cm resolution The satellite has a contractual service life of fi ve years during which it will produce roughly 100 images per day (Fiorenza 2005a)

The ground segment of the Helios 2 system has an open architecture allowing for interoperability with other imagery sources including other satellites reconnaissance aircraft and drones Users whether in Europe or in an overseas theater of operations will have access to a workstation connected to the main

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

30

ground segments from which they will be able to request specifi c tasking perform analysis or access an imagery archive Overall costs for the Helios 2 program are approximately 2 billion euros Belgium and Spain each have a 25 per cent stake in the program and Greece will join it in the future with a small ownership share Helios 2 imagery will also be shared with other EU Member States through the EU satellite center in Torrejoacuten

France is also working on a dual-use satellite system ndash Pleiades ndash a constellation of earth observation satellites able to cover both military and civilian requirements The constellation to be built by EADS Astrium of France will include two new French high-resolution optical satellites capable of resolutions of about 60 cm Other satellites linked to the constellation will be the four Italian COSMO-Skymed X-band radar satellites designed for a resolution of less than one meter for military images and one meter for commercial ones The Pleiades-HR satellite is expected to be launched in 2008 with the other French contribution to the constellation being launched approximately one year later The Italian satellites are expected to be operational by 2007

Pursuant to an agreement signed between France and Italy in January 2001 the Italian system will be linked to the French via Optical and Radar Federated Earth Observation (ORFEO) which will ensure interoperability and information sharing between the two systems France will also give Italy access to SPOT (Systegraveme Pour lrsquoObservation de la Terre) 5 and to Helios 2 imagery The Swedish National Space Board signed an agreement with the French Space Agency in April 2001 guaranteeing its participation in the civilian aspects of the program as well as providing access to some of the data The most recent additions to the Pleiades program in 2002 and 2003 are Spainrsquos defense RampD agency INTA and the civilian space agencies of Austria and Belgium all of which secured their industrial cooperation on Pleiades and the sharing of data acquired by the system The total non-French role on the Pleiades program however is not likely to exceed 15 per cent An information-sharing agreement between France and Germany is also expected

France also has its own limited airborne ground surveillance capabilities The On-Site Radar and Investigation Observation Helicopter (Helicoptre drsquoObservation Radar et drsquoInvestigation sur Zone or HORIZON) is a heliborne ground surveillance radar that operates in moving target indicator mode but not in a synthetic aperture radar mode Operational in the French army since 2002 the system consists of four radars mounted on AS-532 Cougar helicopters and two ground stations It provides ISR capabilities for the tactical and operational levels A similar system was sold to the Swiss army and Turkey has shown an interest Maritime ISR capabilities take the form of the Breguet Atlantic manned aircraft Additional manned aerial ISR is provided by Mirage F1-CR aircraft outfi tted with the Raphael Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) pod an infrared pod and the Stand-Off Reconnaissance Pod (Pod de REconnaissance STand Off or PRESTO) digital camera pod and by the navyrsquos Super Etendard 4 aircraft carrying a camera and infrared and radar pods In land ISR systems the Rapsodie ground radar system is under development with full operational capability expected in 2008ndash9

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

31

It will be interoperable with the SIR command and control system and with the ATLAS fi re control system

In addition France deploys four Boeing Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) E-3 aircraft delivered to the French air force between 1991 and 1992 In 1998 France began upgrading these aircraft to outfi t them with Boeingrsquos Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system and the new Radar System Improvement Program (RSIP) kit Upgrade of the fi rst aircraft was completed in 2005 and the other three will be completed by the end of 2006 The ESM system provides the E-3 with passive listening and detection capabilities which enable it to detect identify and track electronic transmissions from ground airborne and maritime sources The RSIP kit will improve the aircraftrsquos ability to detect and track smaller targets

France has also taken the European lead with respect to surveillance and reconnaissance UAVs Some like the 12 Crecerelle (Kestrel) TUAVs operational with the artillery corps and the four Hunter MALE UAVs tested by the air force have been operational for many years and are approaching the end of their lifetimes The Hunter UAV is a version co-developed by Israeli Aircraft Industries and EADS The Crecerelle has been deployed by the army since 1995 and has been successfully used as part of French NATO operations in the Balkans A communications-jamming version is also in service Each Crecerelle is outfi tted with a TV camera and optical and infrared sensors and the systems were fully operational until 2004

Other TUAVs continue to be operational The army has 54 CL-289 UAVs for tactical reconnaissance missions at the corps and division levels Co-developed with Germany and Canada and successfully deployed in the Balkans it has been operational since 1993 Its payload was initially limited to black and white cameras and infrared sensors but it has been upgraded to include a synthetic aperture radar and its fl ight software and navigation system have also been improved A separate program known as Reconnaissance Vehicle Programming Interpreting and Displaying (Programmation Interpreacutetation Visualisation drsquoEngins de Reconnaissance or PIVER) was undertaken to develop ground stations for this program In addition the French army is purchasing man-portable mini-UAVs for very close range reconnaissance and surveillance These include several Pointer hand-launched UAV systems similar to those in use with the US army marines and special forces which received an export license by the United States in 2001 and the DRAC (Drone de Reconnaissance Au Contact or Drone for Reconnaissance Upon Contact) of which 160 systems (consisting of two UAVs each) are being procured

For its future MALE missions the air force is fi eld-testing the Eagle-1 system as part of the Intermediary MALE Drone System (Systegraveme Inteacuterimaire de Drone MALE or SIDM) This UAV system is based on the Heron UAV produced by Israeli Aircraft Industries modifi ed by EADS Several of these systems are currently being tested with air vehicles carrying synthetic aperture radar moving target indicator radar TV cameras Forward-Looking Infrared (FLIR) and a satellite data link

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

32

The French air force has also begun work on the next generation of MALE UAVs under project EuroMALE planned for deployment between 2008 and 2010 In May 2002 the Netherlands air force announced that it would collaborate on EuroMALE and by 2004 Sweden Italy Switzerland the United Kingdom and Spain had also expressed their interest in joining Out of an estimated cost of 300 million euros the French Ministry of Defense will invest 75 million the rest will be contributed by other governments and industry

The French army is planning the next generation of tactical UAVs The armyrsquos Intermediary Tactical Drone System project (Systegraveme de Drone Tactique Intermediaire or SDTI) for the replacement of the Crecerelle UAVs began in February 2003 with the development of a UAV derived from the Safran Grouprsquos Sperwer The fi rst trial fl ights were undertaken in December 2003 Eighteen vehicles outfi tted with a black-and-white camera and an infrared sensor and four ground stations are expected and will be able to interoperate with the French ATLAS Martha and SICF C2 systems The system became fully operational in 2005

For longer-term needs the Multi-Collector Multi-Mission program (MultiCapteurs Multi Missions or MCMM) has been underway since September 2002 MCMM will provide for the armyrsquos TUAV needs beyond the year 2008 when the CL-289 and SDTI systems will go out of service In addition a tactical rotor-wing UAV built by ECT Industries of France is currently under development for the French navy The fi rst prototype of this project Helicopter Operated from Afar (Heacutelicoptegravere Teacuteleacuteopeacutereacute or HETEL) was fl own in December 2002 and trials began in 2005 Plans are also in place for the development of a long-endurance maritime UAV known as the Long Endurance On-Board Drone (Drone Embarqueacute Longue Endurance or DELE)

France has also begun to develop unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) with two major projects The fi rst outfi ts Sperwer B TUAVs with Israeli-made Spike ER (extended range) precision strike missiles First unveiled in the summer of 2005 this project is similar to the US success with armed Predator UAVs using Hellfi re missiles The second is RampD on a new UCAV Neuron to be operational by 2009 Led by Dassault Aviation which holds a 50 per cent share the program has drawn interest from several European governments and fi rms Alenia Aeronautica of Italy is the second largest industrial partner with a 22 per cent stake In addition EADS CASA of Spain Saab of Sweden Greecersquos Hellenic Aerospace Industry and Switzerlandrsquos RUAG have all signed on as partners and further government-to-government agreements are likely The French Ministry of Defense has set aside some 400 million euros for this program The use of NATO STANAGs in choosing the datalink will ensure its interoperability with other alliance ISR systems using the same standard

To manage mission and support data from geographical and intelligence sources and databases France has deployed the Multi-Source Interpretation Assistance System (Systegraveme drsquoAide agrave Interpreacutetation Multicapteur ndash SAIM) This imagery intelligence analysis system uses data fusion techniques to create an all-digital

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

33

image chain for imagery from sensors (satellites air sea and ground radars) and has some interoperability with national and allied intelligence systems It is in service with the French air force army and navy and was used during recent confl icts and multinational exercises where it proved its interoperability with the Canadian observation satellite Radarsat-1 the US JSTARS system and the French HORIZON system A separate system TIPI3D exists for the exploitation of available imagery for special operations and missile targeting TIPI3D two of which are deployed translates imagery into 3D graphic models

In addition France possesses a number of collection and analysis capabilities for other types of intelligence Airborne SIGINT gathering and analysis capabilities (for both communications and electronic intelligence) have existed since the 1980s Two Gabriel systems mounted on C-160 transport aircraft are currently deployed More recently airborne SIGINT capabilities have been upgraded with the introduction of the Airborne Electronic Warfare Information Collection System (Systegraveme Aeacuteroporteacute de Recueil drsquoInformations de Guerre Electronique or SARIGUE) in 2001 Currently one such system carried by a DC-8 airplane is known to be operational

The French armed forces also deploy terrestrial and naval SIGINT and electronic warfare capabilities The French army deploys the Forward Electronic Warfare System (Systegraveme de Guerre Electronique de lrsquoAvant or SGEA) as well as other mobile electronic warfare and SIGINT collection systems The French navy possesses several vessels carrying SIGINT equipment and deployed its newest one the Dupuy de Locircme under the Joint Forces Electromagnetic Research program (Moyen Interarmeacutees de Recherches Electromagneacutetiques or MINREM) in 2005

France has also deployed military space SIGINT systems since the 1990s Initially two micro-satellites Cerise (Cherry) and Clementine were piggybacked on each of the two Helios 1 satellites launched in 1995 and 1999 An additional signals interception system Euracom was also piggybacked on the fi rst Helios 1 satellite These systems which were intended mainly as pilot projects were complemented in late 2004 by a cluster of four Essaim (Swarm) micro-satellites specializing in COMINT These were piggybacked on the fi rst Helios 2 satellite and began their planned three years of operations in May 2005 Design of two satellites for the monitoring of radar communications from low orbit was initiated in early 2005 under the ELINT program A joint DGA-CNES demonstrator with some 170 million euros in funding the satellites will be in orbit around 2008ndash9 by which time France hopes to persuade other European governments to join in developing a fully operational intelligence collection capability in space

The DGA has initiated the design and production of a space based optical early warning system demonstrator the Preparatory Infrared Alert System (Systegraveme Preacuteparatoire Infra-Rouge pour lrsquoAlerte or SPIRALE) This 124 million euro demonstrator will be a complete system capable of collecting and analyzing infrared imagery against a land background in order to detect ballistic missiles as they are launched It could also be used for other operational missions such as monitoring of weapons proliferation SPIRALE will consist of two micro-

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nd

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ti C

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s (M

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y U

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gram

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d w

ith

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y

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in S

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nch

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y

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mon

itor

ing

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llit

es

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

40

satellites to be launched in 2008 and a ground segment This project will be the fi rst space early warning system in Europe and may pave the way for a future European early warning space program

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom also has an extensive investment in C4ISR systems and the creation of sensor networks The UK has developed a program to integrate the British C2 and communications infrastructures into a single Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) DII will incorporate the Joint Operational Command System (JOCS) C2 system the Bowman communications system and other individual information systems into a single infrastructure Following a prequalifi cation stage during which four industry teams were invited by the Ministry of Defense to submit outline proposals in March 2005 a team led by EDS and including Fujitsu EADS General Dynamics and LogicaCMG was chosen The contract will be worth some pound3 billion over 10 years Initially DII will provide a fully networked and managed service to around 70000 desktops in Whitehall and in forward deployed headquarters around the world Delivery of the DII system is expected to begin around 2007

As part of the effort to implement the NEC doctrine the British Ministry of Defense is also making considerable investment in new sensors systems The largest and most recent ISR RampD and acquisition programs include the Watchkeeper UAV the Airborne Stand Off Radar (ASTOR) airborne battlefi eld surveillance system and the Soothsayer electronic warfare system In addition several sensor platforms already operational such as the Phoenix UAVs and the Jaguar and Tornado reconnaissance aircraft are being upgraded to include more advanced and integrated ISR suites

In addition the Ministry of Defense created the Network Integration Test and Experimentation organization (NITEworks) in partnership with industry in 2003 to provide an environment to assess and demonstrate the potential applications of the NEC concepts In industry the NITEworks partnership includes BAE Systems QinetiQ Alenia Marconi Systems (AMS) EDS UK Thales UK General Dynamics UK and Raytheon UK Key system integration and interoperability issues will be resolved through testing experimentation and evaluation of various NEC options Eventually NITEworks will identify opportunities for changes in defense RampD and procurement programs

In general the British have paid close attention to interoperability and networking with the United States and somewhat less with its EU partners On the other hand the recent British decision to participate in the EU Battlegroups with one British and a second British-Dutch group opens new possibilities for exploring interoperability in the EU context

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

41

Command and Control

The Royal Navy Royal Air Force and Army deploy separate C2 systems that are not for the most part interoperable Since 1995 the Army has deployed the Joint Operations Command Systems (JOCS) designed to pass information between the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) the Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ) the Joint Rapid Reaction Force (JRRF) headquarters and other headquarters of joint and potentially joint operations It thereby allows the PJHQ to maintain a joint operations picture of deployed forces comprising maritime land and air activities within certain areas The system is deployable and can operate over wide area network connections provided by the Ministry of Defense as well as a range of civilian infrastructures employing the appropriate cryptography JOCS is also synchronized with the US Global Command and Control System

Today JOCS has become the basis for defi ning and developing a more capable system the Joint Command System (JCS) Under JCS plans are in place to integrate the Armyrsquos C2 system with those of the other services ndash most importantly the Royal Navyrsquos Command Support System (CSS) and the Royal Air Forcersquos Command Control and Information System (CCIS) (described below) ndash using state-of-the-art commercial technologies under the Defense Information Infrastructure project

The Royal Air Force deploys the CCIS for aerial C2 and the Air Defense Ground Environment (ADGE) system for tactical control of air defense operations A deployable system for the support of RAF missions both in the United Kingdom and overseas the Collaborative System for Air Battlespace Management (CSABM) is currently under development it is expected to be fi elded by the year 2008 In addition the Backbone Air Command and Control System (BACCS) is currently under development as the British air defense system of the future although the design concept requires it to be fully interoperable with NATO air defense capabilities (the NATO Air Command and Control System will provide the core BACCS software and infrastructure on which the system capability will be based) BACCS is due to enter operational service with the RAF from 2009

The Royal Navy possesses the CSS which replaced the more outdated Fleet Operational Command System (FOCSLE) and provides C2 information to the Command Teams of ships submarines and the Royal Marines 3rd Commando Brigade The system supports situation awareness data message handling and several decision and planning aids for amphibious operations In addition the navy is currently working to install CEC systems on Type 45 destroyers and the Type 23 frigates This system will allow units to exchange radar information delivering a single composite and coherent air picture and allowing units to engage targets on the basis of information from other units In the future CEC may be extended to other air and land platforms but this is not envisioned before 2010 The Royal Navy has also installed the American Collaboration at Sea (CS) tactical maritime C2 system on several vessels This system uses leased bandwidth on commercial satellites (mainly INMARSAT) to transmit a common battlespace picture to all vessels and the naval headquarters to which it is linked

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

42

On the international level the United Kingdom is working with the United States Canada Australia and New Zealand to link their respective C2 systems via a coalition WAN and web server This collaborative program is being carried out in the Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) framework and will most likely be broadened to include France and Germany (discussed in the NATO chapter)

Communications and computers

The British Army currently fi elds Ptarmigan a tactical trunk network linking all headquarters in the fi eld The system was upgraded in early 2003 with the introduction of 30 vehicle-mounted units providing improved data access to mobile subscribers and enabling deployment independent of main Ptarmigan trunk networks Ptarmigan is interoperable with US and NATO forces through interfaces with specifi c systems Beginning in 2008 it will be replaced by Falcon a fully digital air-portable Falcon battlefi eld communications infrastructure Falcon will permit the transmission of data between army headquarters including real-time video and is planned to be interoperable with various NATO communications systems

The British began to deploy Bowman the next-generation tactical combat HFVHFUHF radio network for all British services in July 2003 This capability is being delivered incrementally and the initial capability (secure HFVHF voice and data) was accepted into service by the Ministry of Defense in March 2004 This new infrastructure replaces the 20-year-old Clansman system and the Headquarters infrastructure element of the Ptarmigan trunk communications system It provides Britain with an integrated network supporting digital voice and data for radio telephone intercom and tactical Internet information in a single system As part of the Command and Battlespace Management (Land) (CBM(L)) program ndash battlefi eld information systems being developed for armored fi ghting vehicles artillery fi re control air and nuclear biological and chemical defense ndash Bowman will be used as a communications and C2 infrastructure from fi ghting platform up to divisional level Full deployment is expected by 2006ndash7 when some 20000 military vehicles 156 ships and 276 aircraft will be outfi tted with more than 47000 radios and 26000 computer terminals In December 2004 some 300 Bowman radios were deployed with British forces in Iraq However Bowman will face bandwidth limitations as well as the problem of being digital but lacking a software communications architecture (SCA) Since this would make it hard to interoperate with the US Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) the US program is being adapted to enable it to handle the Bowman waveform

A fully transportable United Kingdom operational-level communications network ndash Cormorant ndash exists for expeditionary forces linking them back to head-quarters in Britain The Cormorant system is provided by EADS and is intended to meet the communications requirements of the United Kingdomrsquos JRRF headquarters in any theater of operations Cormorant can interface with Ptarmigan

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

43

and will be able to interface with its successor Falcon It will also be able to pass data to and from the Bowman network once Bowman is fully fi elded

Military satellite communications capabilities are currently based on the Skynet 4 constellation Two of the fi rst three satellites launched between 1988 and 1990 remain in service These support three newer spacecraft launched between 1998 and 2001 In October 2003 the British Ministry of Defense concluded arrangements to transfer operation of the Skynet 4 system to Paradigm Secure Communications a subsidiary of EADS Under this Private Finance Initiative (PFI) Paradigm was also to upgrade by 2005 the two main Skynet 4 ground stations and to supply new ground stations and a network control center in order to increase bandwidth and refresh technology Paradigm will also manage the leasing of commercial SATCOM bandwidth for the Ministry of Defense The arrangement which is to run until 2019 assures delivery for Ministry of Defense needs while permitting Paradigm to resell unused bandwidth to the governments and militaries of other nations under commercial terms To maintain services to the Ministry of Defense and to its other customers Paradigm will develop launch and operate two to three new satellites built by Astrium also an EADS subsidiary (De Selding 2003b 10) The fi rst of the new Skynet 5 satellites is expected to enter service in 2007 Both the existing and new Skynet satellites remain accessible via the Ministry of Defensersquos existing fl eet of terminals Higher bandwidths are possible with the new Talon (man-portable) and Dagger (vehicle-mounted) mobile terminals Some 50 new Reacher mobile land terminals will also be delivered under the Skynet 5 contract arrangements

The Royal Air Force and Navy have installed the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) Link-16 communications system on most aircraft and helicopters (including Tornado F3s Nimrods Sea Kings and E-3D AWACS) and on several vessels (including carriers frigates and destroyers) providing these and their US counterparts with a common air picture The Royal Navyrsquos Sea Harriers were outfi tted with Link-16 equipment in 2004 Many Royal Navy ships and RAF E-3D AWACS and Nimrods are also equipped with the Link-11 tactical data link system

Finally since interoperability with US forces is still a major concern for British warfi ghters the United Kingdom will most likely buy American JTRS radios and install them on various other aerial maritime and terrestrial platforms as an interim solution for current and upcoming coalition operations

Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance

Britain has initiated a program to fi ll capability gaps identifi ed in the Strategic Defense Reviewrsquos New Chapter in the area of persistent ISR collection and target acquisition deep within the battlespace The DABINETT program will provide information to be used to gather strategic operational and tactical intelligence answer commandersrsquo requests for information provide targeting information to systems in all environments support Special Forces and manage intelligence data The initial phase of the program will address current Management Tasking

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

44

Processing Exploitation and Dissemination (MTPED) shortfalls in the current UK system Once completed DABINETT will comprise a system of systems that provides access to archive data as well as the ability to collect persistently process and disseminate near real time intelligence This capability will offer rapid deployment long reach standoff deep penetration loiter and interoperability with coalition forces in network-based operations It will form an integral part of the British networked-enabled capability enabling precision geo-location for targeting including time sensitive targeting which will be delivered via a Network Centric Collaborative Targeting (NCCT) system Initial deployment is expected by the end of 2006

British UAV capabilities consist primarily of the Phoenix tactical short-range UAV in service since 1998 with the Royal Artillery for reconnaissance and target acquisition Though Phoenix cannot currently share the information it collects directly with other British systems improved data modems currently being developed could make it interoperable with Skynet 4 RAF Tornados and army Apaches However its performance recently tested in Kosovo and Iraq is somewhat limited even at the tactical level including an inability to operate in high-temperature environments a payload consisting solely of a thermal imaging sensor and a slow data link In both the Kosovo and Iraq campaigns these limitations led to the loss of a high number of Phoenix UAVs Twenty-three were lost in Iraq all due to technical failures ndash a ratio of one in six fl ights undertaken ndash and the program was restricted to nighttime operations However the Phoenix was involved in what was probably the fi rst joint close air support operation coordinated by a UAV mission controller it was able to relay imagery and geographical details on Iraqi tank movements to US fi ghters via its ground station (Chuter 2003a 8)

Watchkeeper the British long-endurance operational-level UAV program was completed with two consortia one led by Thales UK and the other by Northrop Grumman ISS International Inc The initial program requirement called for an A and B vehicle the former for battlefi eld surveillance targeting and bomb damage assessment and the latter for close-in surveillance and target identifi cation Following the selection of the Thales-led consortium in July 2004 it was announced that the Hermes 450 and Hermes 180 ndash manufactured by Elbit Systems of Israel ndash would be the A and B vehicles respectively However during contract negotiations in 2005 the smaller Hermes 180 was removed from the requirement and broader roles were assigned to the larger Hermes 450 Its payloads will include electro-optical sensors infrared sensors laser target designators synthetic aperture radar and moving target indicators The Watchkeeper in-service date was also pushed back to 2010 The system will be operated and deployed by the Royal Artillery Corps

To complement the Watchkeeper program the United Kingdom is collaborating with the United States to develop the Advanced Joint Communications Node (AJCN) Once integrated into Watchkeeper it will provide a communications and electronic warfare system that can be reprogrammed in fl ight Based on software radio technology the AJCN will be linked to the UAV ground stations via a

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

45

Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL) This will create a network comprising the different types of Watchkeeper UAVs and tactical radios ndash such as the American JTRS ndash that are also reprogrammable

In early 2004 pending Watchkeeper development the British Ministry of Defense began discussing an Urgent Operation Requirement (UOR) for another UAV system to be fi elded within a shorter timeframe and to be usable by British troops in Iraq The Ministry of Defense reviewed purchasing or leasing the Thales-IAI Hermes systems as well as several micro-UAV systems To date several Desert Hawk and one Buster micro-UAV system (comprising two vehicles and one ground control station) have been acquired and are deployed with British forces in Iraq for very short-range reconnaissance missions In addition the success of the British cooperation with the Combined Joint Predator Task Force in Iraq has led the Ministry of Defense to examine the possibilities of purchasing Predator B UAVs for operations in Afghanistan (Chuter 2005b 4)

In addition to the Urgent Operation Requirement and Watchkeeper the United Kingdom is exploring other future UAV initiatives The Joint Service UAV Experimentation Program (JUEP) was the fi rst step of this process In 2003ndash5 JUEP assessed the wider operational use of UAVs in the tri-service battle environment mainly for maritime and urban operations JUEP involved developing viable concepts of operations for UAVs and assessing the possibilities for exploiting new types of UAV payloads including those giving the vehicle offensive capabilities (Fiorenza 2003b 37ndash9) The program included a demonstration of the Eagle MALE UAV carrying a high defi nition synthetic aperture radar electro-optic and infrared sensors and laser target marking and designation systems It also demonstrated the capability to control a ScanEagle maritime surveillance UAV from a British warship to integrate a British RAPTOR ISR pod (see below) on an American Predator UAV and the utility of several mini-UAV systems Demonstrations of the Global Hawk HALE UAV system and of the use of UCAVs were also planned under JUEP but were not undertaken

The United Kingdom initially envisioned an unmanned combat aerial vehicle program as part of the Future Offensive Air System (FOAS) program However the FOAS was terminated in 2005 and UCAV research was made part of an international collaborative program the Strategic Unmanned Air Vehicle (Experiment) or SUAV(E) An agreement was signed in December 2004 with the United States to participate in the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) program focusing on Boeingrsquos X-45 UCAV However uncertainties about technology transfer and the location of production in the UK led the Ministry of Defense to look to Europe to fulfi ll some of its needs in this area The French-led Neuron program was considered but no decisions have been made on Britainrsquos participation in it (Chuter 2005a 1 8)

The United Kingdom also possesses unmanned underwater ISR capabilities with the deployment in 2002 of the Marlin Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) an electrically powered vehicle intended to be launched from a submarine torpedo tube It is fi tted with seabed imaging sensors but the design is modular and allowing for alternative future payloads

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

46

Britain also currently deploys several manned aerial ISR platforms including four Canberra PR-9 aircraft for photoreconnaissance missions and eighteen Nimrod MR2 maritime patrol aircraft Most Nimrods are equipped with magnetic and acoustic detection equipment (three are outfi tted for SIGINT collection missions) and are interoperable with US Rivet Joint aircraft An upgrade (Nimrod MRA4) will mean some are capable of both maritime and land surveillance missions The upgraded Nimrod aircraft are due to enter into service around 2006 at which point those that were not upgraded will be taken out of service

The Royal Air Forcersquos Jaguar and Tornado GR4 fi ghters provide additional ISR capabilities Since 2000 the Jaguars have been outfi tted with the Jaguar Replacement Reconnaissance Pod (JRRP) containing both electro-optic and infrared sensors that can record digital images onto videotape Several of the latter have been fi tted with the Reconnaissance Airborne Pod for Tornado (RAPTOR) operational since the fall of 2002 This new technology provides an electro-optical and infrared camera system that can capture high-resolution digital imagery day or night and transmit the data to ground stations in near real time It features on-board recording and near real time data link transmission to ground stations The system consists of eight pods and two cabin-based ground stations and has been in use since fall 2002 It made its operational debut during Operation Iraqi Freedom in early 2003 and performed extremely well

The United Kingdom is developing the Airborne Stand Off Radar (ASTOR) system for air-ground surveillance ASTOR will provide strategic long-range all-weather theater surveillance and target acquisition capabilities Raytheon the prime contractor for ASTOR is producing fi ve systems to be deployed on modifi ed Bombardier Global Express business jets as well as two portable ground sites and six tactical ground stations mounted on trucks The radar is a dual-mode system capable of operating in both synthetic aperture radar and moving target indicator mode The aircraft known as the Sentinel R Mk 1 are also outfi tted with operator workstations where the mission management and imagery can be processed and transmitted to the various brigade divisional or joint level ASTOR ground stations Initial deployment is expected to begin in 2006 with the delivery of the fi rst two fl ight-tested aircraft and their ground stations and full operational capability is expected in 2008 Data will be disseminated to allied forces via United Kingdom headquarters only and few direct links to allied systems are anticipated (though an interim solution for interoperability with the US JSTARS system may be through deploying JTRS on the ASTOR platform) ASTOR was the basis for one of the two proposed NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) solutions presented by British Aerospace and Raytheon an option rejected by NATO

In addition the United Kingdom deploys seven E-3D Sentry AEW-1 AWACS aircraft for air-picture management The Sentry aircraft are all equipped with the US JTIDS and are interoperable with US and NATO AWACS systems with Rivet Joint and E-P3 aircraft and with the British Nimrod aircraft Project Eagle currently in the assessment phase is intended to provide an air battle management and combat ID-enabling capability for the E-3D to coordinate air operations and

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

47

to direct forces during operations The in-service date defi ned as the fi rst platform fi tted with the Eagle capability is scheduled for June 2012

As of 2006 when the Canberra planes leave service the United Kingdom will have no assets that can loiter over the battlefi eld and deliver a constant stream of data for extended timeframes nor does the United Kingdom have a program to obtain such persistent surveillance capabilities The Ministry of Defense is considering various options including high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) UAVs satellites and manned platforms In 2004 the Tactical Optical Satellite (TOPSAT) earth observation micro-satellite led by Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd was initiated as part of a pilot program to demonstrate space-based ISR capabilities and their link to commanders on the ground via stationary as well as mobile ground stations The one-year program involved the launching of one 120 kg satellite capable of producing 25 meter resolution optical imagery The success of TOPSAT may lead to the launching of a constellation of satellites in the future

For future maritime surveillance the Maritime Airborne Surveillance and Control (MASC) program will provide an assured airborne surveillance and control capability The options being considered under MASC include the continuation of the capability currently provided by the Sea King Mk 7 Airborne Surveillance and Control (ASaC) system other ship-optimized rotary wing platforms and possible contributions from UAVs although the latter currently form only a peripheral component of the MASC activities The MASC program has recently moved into the assessment phase

The British intelligence analysis and dissemination systems in place include the RAFrsquos Lychgate system ndash which connects intelligence staffs at HQ RAF Strike Command the Ministry of Defense other services and front-line squadrons ndash and the intelligence communityrsquos web-based UKINTELWEB Neither is interoperable with allied systems However the United Kingdom is part of the Integrated Broadcast Service (IBS) network which uses commercial off the shelf (COTS) hardware to exchange information with the intelligence dissemination systems of the United States Canada and Australia In addition the Griffi n TCPIP-based WAN provides a classifi ed electronic information-sharing environment for collaborative planning activities between the strategic and operational level headquarters of Britain Canada Australia New Zealand and the United States In the future Germany and France may also be linked to Griffi n

Germany

The German military is beginning to move toward an advanced networked architecture and deploys a variety of C4ISR systems The German Ministry of Defense completed the formulation of its network-centric doctrine in 2005 and has begun the implementation of some of that doctrine in its acquisition and RampT programs However over the next decade previously planned hardware programs such as the Eurofi ghter Typhoon A400M transport Tiger and NH-90 helicopters will consume the lionrsquos share of German defense acquisition resources In

Tabl

e 3

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l C2

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t (A

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oyal

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es in

tero

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ty

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h U

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ls

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t Com

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m

(JC

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e se

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3 s

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nal

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l

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loye

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loye

d by

200

6ndash7

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d af

ter

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Inte

rope

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lity

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e S

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m

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ce

Man

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ent (

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ble

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em to

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t RA

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on b

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in th

e U

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om

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dep

loye

d by

200

8

Wil

l be

inte

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e w

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r U

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e A

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ure

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ense

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y 20

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nter

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y H

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l Inf

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n R

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inue

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Dep

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d to

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d by

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d af

ter

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rope

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man

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ical

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t uni

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Jul

y 20

03 f

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ymen

t by

2006

ndash8

Inte

rope

rabl

e ac

ross

se

rvic

es (

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y V

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in

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ted

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e p

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y in

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ble

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h U

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S

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net 5

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ure

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stem

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sed

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city

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om 3

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cial

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ry in

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onF

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e (r

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cing

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igan

) U

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ign

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ter

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ical

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unk

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ions

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stem

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nned

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men

t in

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Inte

rope

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e w

ith

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man

Cor

mor

ant

Sky

net 5

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TO

co

mm

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atio

ns s

yste

ms

ISR

Pho

enix

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ical

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et a

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on

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V f

or th

e ar

my

(art

ille

ry c

orps

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tle

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lity

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h ot

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ems

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sibl

e up

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es w

ill m

ake

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rope

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e w

ith

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d w

ith

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orna

dos

and

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y A

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es

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ert H

awk

Bus

ter

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ro-U

AV

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tem

s fo

r A

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Sam

e as

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e de

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ed

by U

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rmy

Mar

lin

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V

Tabl

e 3

3 co

ntin

ued

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

Can

berr

a ai

rcra

ftTa

ctic

al a

eria

l ph

otor

econ

nais

sanc

e

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rod

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itim

e S

ampR

and

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IGIN

T a

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aft

Inte

rope

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e w

ith

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Joi

nt a

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aft

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ar a

nd T

orna

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ters

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ippe

d w

ith

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P a

nd

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OR

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R p

ods

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D S

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y (A

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)In

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ble

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h U

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nd

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TO

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S s

yste

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nt a

nd E

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airc

raft

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tish

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d ai

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ft

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eIn

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ce a

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em f

or R

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t HQ

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e C

omm

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r se

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es a

nd f

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ne s

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rons

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ed in

tell

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ce

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n sy

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ous

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ls i

n su

ppor

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ence

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ity

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tish

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ence

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ly n

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rope

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e w

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r co

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ies

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ed B

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ce (

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)In

tell

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n sy

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t mat

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l

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e w

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d A

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alia

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l as

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h ot

her

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tish

in

tell

igen

ce s

yste

ms

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inue

dhellip

Dep

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d to

day

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loye

d by

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Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

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rope

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lity

GR

IFF

INT

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IP

-bas

ed W

AN

fo

r in

tell

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ce d

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ing

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een

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tegi

c an

d op

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iona

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el

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ters

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ks U

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d K

ingd

om

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ada

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tral

ia N

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land

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re G

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nce

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l als

o be

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ed

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e S

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(AS

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ic lo

ng-r

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r su

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llan

ce a

nd ta

rget

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n ca

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liti

es

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n de

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men

t in

2005

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rope

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e w

ith

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atio

n of

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ted

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y

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ical

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te

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)S

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lite

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e se

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g la

unch

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d fo

r 20

03ndash4

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chke

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ure

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ns-l

evel

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AV

to

be d

eplo

yed

in

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L w

ill e

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e in

tero

pera

bili

ty b

etw

een

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type

s of

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atch

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er U

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t Ser

vice

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erim

enta

tion

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gram

(J

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P)

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er o

pera

tion

al u

se

(inc

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ng w

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niza

tion

) of

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e tr

i-se

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e ba

ttle

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iron

men

t

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o in

clud

e de

mon

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tion

of

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bal

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k H

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E U

AV

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e A

irbo

rne

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veil

lanc

e an

d C

ontr

ol

(MA

SC

)

Fut

ure

airb

orne

mar

itim

e su

rvei

llan

ce p

rogr

am

Tabl

e 3

3 co

ntin

ued

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

53

addition Germanyrsquos defense RampD spending has been declining a trend expected to continue through 2010 (Aguumlera 2003 32) Both of these budgetary realities will affect the pace at which Germany develops networked C4ISR capabilities Nevertheless several large-scale C4ISR expenditures are expected the most signifi cant being new C2 and computer networking programs a HALE UAV and advanced communications systems (CPM Forum 2005 33)

German forces do not have a cross-service C2 architecture nor have broadband communications systems been widely deployed Germany has begun embracing the use of UAVs especially since the Balkan and Afghanistan campaigns The German military is currently equipped with several UAVs for tactical and operational missions and funding for a major UAV program the HALE EuroHawk has been approved Once the fi rst UAV comes into service in 2009 outdated manned platforms for ISR will gradually be scrapped and Germany will become increasingly reliant on unmanned ISR capabilities

Germany has been a member of the bi-national German-Netherlands Corps since 1995 Between 2000 and 2002 the Corps became a NATO High Response Force under operational command of SACEUR This Corps has more advanced C4ISR capabilities including the German HEROS C2 system the Dutch TITAAN communications infrastructure (VoIP WAN with SATCOM and HF radio) and French-made tactical Sperwer UAVs Germany is also a member of the Multinational Interoperability Council and will contribute to four of the European Unionrsquos Battlegroups one with France Belgium and Luxembourg one with the Netherlands and Finland one with Austria and the Czech Republic and one with Poland Slovakia Latvia and Lithuania

Command and control

The Bundeswehr C2 systems serve the individual services but lack a common infrastructure The German army is beginning to deploy the HEROS (Heeres-Fuumlhrungsinformationssystem fuumlr die rechnerunterstuumltzte Operationsfuumlhrung in Staumlben or Army Command and Control System for Digitally-supported Command of Operations in Staffs) system that provides C2 for corps division and brigade levels HEROS is an IP-network-based infrastructure for data transmission and can be fi xed or mobile It has been fi elded in one army division with a second still to be fi elded HEROS is also deployed with EUROKORPS and with the German-Netherlands Corps

For battalion-level C2 and below the German army operates the FAUST (Fuumlhrungsausstattung taktisch or Tactical Command Provision) system which includes mobile modules mounted on armored personnel carriers Initially fi elded only in small numbers with German forces in Bosnia Kosovo and Afghanistan FAUST is now being deployed across the German army (Quast 2003 66ndash7) The system is mounted on various command reconnaissance and support vehicles at the platoon squad and section level In addition the armyrsquos tanks and armored vehicles designated for overseas deployment are outfi tted with the Mobile Command and Control System (MCCS) MCCS hardware is based on a

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

54

COTS notebook with integrated communication interfaces GPS and compass unit as well as C2 software developed by STN Atlas (now Rheinmetall Defence Electronics) Several such systems are operational with the German forces in Kosovo and Afghanistan

The German navy uses a C2 system called MHQ (marine headquarters) This IBM mainframe-based infrastructure links all headquarters into a single network In addition all ships in the German navy use the Maritime Command and Control Information System (MCCIS) and the CS tactical C2 system purchased from the United States This enables all German navy vessels to be fully linked between each other and with their various headquarters as well as interoperable with many ships in the US navy

The German air force uses the Eifel C2 system an IP-based infrastructure that has been upgraded to incorporate the whole service (the system is also known as the GAFCCIS ndash German Air Force Command and Control Information System) Other C2 networks that are unique to specifi c units of the German armed forces include the artillery corpsrsquo ADLER (Artillerie- Daten- Lage- und Einsatz-Rechnungsverbund or Integrated Artillery Computer System) and the air defense systemsrsquo Hfl aAFuumlSys (Heeres-Flugabwehr- Aufklaumlrungs- und Fuumlhrungssystemor Army Air Defense Surveillance andd Command System) Finally the armed forces command is linked to the German Ministry of Defense via Rubin an IP-based stationary system for high-level C2

The German army is planning to deploy a more network-oriented C2 infrastructure Known as FuumlInfoSys H (Fuumlhrungsinformationssystem des Heeresor Army Command System or Army Command System) this system will integrate the FAUST and HEROS systems which are not interoperable today Initial testing is scheduled for 2008 Other efforts to upgrade German C2 capabilities include development of the next generation of air defense system through the Surface-Air-Missile Operations Center (SAMOC) project expected to be operational by the end of 2004 A C2 system integrating all services is planned through the project known as FuumlInfoSys der Streitkraumlfte or C2 System of the Armed Forces This project still in its initial stages will eventually integrate the Rubin HEROS FuumlInfoSys H GAFCCIS MHQ and MCCIS systems and connect all military staffs

In 2001 the German Ministry of Defense began to create a common C2 system for the armed forces of the Baltic States (Latvia Lithuania and Estonia) that would be interoperable with Germanyrsquos C2 systems and comply with NATO STANAGs Known as BALTCCIS the project is managed by the German air force in collaboration with BAE Systems and is still in the development stage

Communications and computers

The main tactical communications infrastructure of the German army is the digital Automated Corps Network (Automatisiertes Korpsstammnetz 90 or AUTOKO-90) built by Siemens and deployed since 2000 This network can deliver only limited bandwidth cannot handle IP traffi c and uses EUROCOM a

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

55

communications standard developed in Western Europe in the 1970s as an effort to make all tactical military communications systems interoperable but not widely deployed outside Germany As a complement to AUTOKO-90 the army has added the BIGSTAF (Breitbandiges integriertes Gefechtsstand-Fernmeldesystem or Integrated Broadband System for Command Posts Communications) system to its communications infrastructure Built using Thales and EADS IP and ATM technologies BIGSTAF provides broadband communications (voice and data) for command posts at brigade division and corps levels However BIGSTAF also uses EUROCOM and is therefore not interoperable with most other systems In an effort to move away from EUROCOM Germany has initiated the 420 million euro MobKommSysBw (Mobiles Kommunikationssystem der Bundeswehr or Armed Forces Mobile Communications System) project to develop the Bundeswehrrsquos future mobile communications network Together with the SATCOM-BW network (see below) it will link all fi eld radio communications systems in theaters of operations with communications bases in Germany Service introduction will start in 2007

The German navy has deployed its own communications network the IP-based Tactical Mobile Radio Network on all vessels In addition many navy ships are outfi tted with Link-11 ndash soon to be replaced by Link-22 systems ndash and other communications equipment that were a quick method to achieve interoperability with the US navy The German air force has deployed AutoFuuml (Automatisches Fuumlhrungsfernmeldenetz der Luftwaffe or Air Force Automatic Command Communications Network) a communications infrastructure on all its bases This system is also IP-based with medium bandwidth capabilities For tactical communications some of the Luftwaffersquos Tornados and NH-90 helicopters carry or are being outfi tted with the Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) which will be carried on all 180 new Eurofi ghters The German navy has also equipped two Class 123 frigates with MIDS systems As a partner in the MIDS JTRS program Germany is helping migrate MIDS to a JTRS software communications compliant architecture In addition the German Ministry of Defense has awarded Rohde amp Schwarz a 170 million euro contract for a joint networked family of Software Defi ned Radio (SDR) systems These radios will be fully JTRS and SCA compliant and will be introduced into service in 2009

A cross-service digital communications network the ISDN-BW has been deployed since the mid-1990s carrying voice and data to all central commands The navy and air force have both successfully integrated their own communications infrastructures with ISDN-BW but the army integration is incomplete

To link expeditionary forces with allied forces the local telecommunications infra-structure and headquarters Germany initiated a program known as Interoperability for Crisis Reaction Forces (Krisenreaktionskraumlfte-Interoperabilitaumlt or KINTOP) It involved the development and acquisition of mobile communications gateways based on the TETRAPOL (TErrestrial Trunked RAdio POLice) standard The program was discontinued and the current communications solution for linking expeditionary forces with headquarters is the KommServer-BW a low-tech COTS

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

56

technology linking mobile communications systems such as tactical radios to fi xed communications networks

Germany is also undertaking a satellite communications program known as SATCOM-BW The fi rst phase of the project includes leasing C- and Ku-band capacity from commercial satellites and procuring 40 single- and multi-channel ground stations Expeditionary forces can deploy several relatively large mobile ground stations and communicate with one or both fi xed ground stations in Germany The second phase which is still in the planning stage will build and orbit one X-band and one UHF-band satellite both operated by the private sector Phase 2 is expected to begin in 2005 with at least one satellite in orbit by 2008 and progressive introduction continuing until 2013 Once completed Germanyrsquos expeditionary forces will be able to deploy a larger number of small mobile ground stations giving them more fl exibility and agility in the fi eld (Reder 2005 48ndash9)

Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance

Germany is reassessing its ISR capabilities and planning future research and procurement The major issues are the replacement of the Breguet Atlantic fl eet for maritime patrol the acquisition of land-based ISR assets and the development of an unmanned aerial battlefi eld surveillance capability

Germany is making signifi cant use of UAVs given the expertise in this technology to be found in German industry For tactical reconnaissance and target acquisition missions at the corps and division level the German army uses CL-289 UAVs a tri-national project between France Germany and Canada equipped with a camera and infrared sensor The system has been used successfully in the Balkans since 1993 and has been upgraded recently to improve the on-board navigation system and fl ight software and to enable the outfi tting of the UAV with a SAR payload The Germans use the KZO (Kleinfl uggeraumlt fuumlr Zielortungor Small Device for Target Acquisition) for shorter-range reconnaissance which carries infrared and SAR or laser range fi nder and target designator payloads Six such systems each consisting of ten aircraft are in service Rheinmetall DeTec the manufacturers of the KZO system are making it interoperable with the Safran Grouprsquos Crecerelle and Sperwer UAVs currently in use by France the Netherlands Denmark Sweden and Greece The armed forces of these six countries will in the future be able to exchange tactical and battlefi eld intelligence and target data collected by all of their systems and will have access to a common command and control infrastructure

The German armyrsquos LUNA (Luftgestuumltzte Nahaufklaumlrungsausstattung or Airborne Close-range Reconnaissance System) tactical UAV initially designed for the artillery corps has been fl own over Kosovo ndash carrying video cameras only ndash and in Afghanistan ndash carrying infrared and video cameras as well as SAR Eight systems have been procured It can also be outfi tted with a miniature SAR system and used for NBC detection and electronic warfare missions The hand-launched ALADIN (Abbildende Luftgestuumltzte Aufklaumlrungsdrohne im Naumlchstbereich or Imaging Airborne Close-Range Reconnaissance Drone) mini-UAV which carries

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

57

television and infrared was successfully deployed in Afghanistan and some 155 systems each consisting of two aircraft have been ordered

Germanyrsquos army and navy also deploy manned airborne ISR capabilities including reconnaissance pods fi tted onto Germanyrsquos Tornado aircraft outfi tted with a camera and infrared system The Breguet Atlantic 1150 fl eet performs maritime ISR missions using 11 aircraft carrying MTIs sonars and magnetic detectors and 4 aircraft carrying SIGINT and electronic warfare suites The fl eet has been operational since 1965 Although the aircraft have experienced several upgrades they are scheduled for replacement in 2010 A project to develop the next generation of maritime patrol aircraft initially to be conducted with the Italian armed forces was cancelled Instead Germany is moving toward long endurance unmanned platforms For maritime missions these may consist of UAVs deployed by the German navy on their new corvettes with Northrop Grummanrsquos Fire Scout and Bell Helicopter Textronrsquos Eagle Eye as possible alternatives In the interim Germany bought eight upgraded PC-3 aircraft from the Netherlands in late 2004

For ground-based ISR the German army began deploying the Fennek vehicle in 2004 produced by Krauss-Maffei Wegmann of Germany and SP Aerospace and Vehicle Systems BV of the Netherlands The Fennek is equipped with a sensor platform that includes a camera a thermal imager and a laser rangefi nder co-developed by EADS and Rheinmetall Defence Electronics and the HRM-7000 tactical radio produced by EADS Maritime ISR capabilities include three OsteClass 423 ships that have been deployed since the late 1980s for SIGINT and electronic warfare missions

Germany has several future ISR programs underway The lesson of the Kosovo air campaign was that Germany could not rely on timely sharing of imagery intelligence data from the United States and hence needed to acquire its own intelligence-gathering capability The most important result of this decision is the plan to buy fi ve Global Hawk HALE UAVs from Northrop Grumman and working with EADS install German synthetic aperture radar and signals intelligence collection and analysis suites This 600 million euro project was initiated in 2000 and received the approval of the US air force and the German Ministry of Defense in 2001 A number of successful trial fl ights were conducted in California and Germany during 2003ndash4 and the fi rst prototype delivery is scheduled for 2009 All fi ve systems are expected to be delivered and operational by 2013 The C2 and the crypto technologies will be the same as those mounted on the Global Hawk making the EuroHawk interoperable with its US counterpart EuroHawk is also planned to be interoperable with other ISR capabilities of the German armed forces as well as with NATO EuroHawk UAVs will be the German contribution to the NATO AGS program

Germany is also investing in UCAV technology though the program is still at an early phase Initially known as Taifun (Typhoon) and recently re-named the Tactical Advanced ReconnaissanceStrike System (TADRES) it is being designed to carry an electro-optic sensor for target identifi cation and a synthetic aperture radar for target acquisition Development will continue until 2009 when

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

58

a procurement decision will be made In addition the German army is formulating requirements for micro-UAVs

German security space observation capabilities are also an important development also infl uenced by the Kosovo data-sharing issue The leading program is SAR-Lupe a satellite-based synthetic aperture radar to be deployed by 2007 SAR-Lupe will consist of fi ve Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites the fi rst to be launched in 2006 and a ground segment Total cost of the project is approximately 300 million euros A European consortium led by OHB Systems of Germany is undertaking the project Once SAR-Lupe is operational Germany plans to exchange the data it provides with data collected from the French Helios 2 and Pleiades and the Italian COSMO-Skymed satellites The German Space Agency and EADS Astrium are also working on a commercial synthetic aperture radar satellite named TerraSAR-X which will begin providing image products with a resolution of up to one meter in mid-2006

Intelligence collected from Germanyrsquos surveillance and reconnaissance assets is disseminated to warfi ghters in several ways The German army uses is the LBAA-BW (Luftbild-Auswerteanlage der Bundeswehr or Aerial Picture Analysis Station for the Armed Forces) system designed for the exploitation of intelligence (still images and fi lm) collected by manned or unmanned aerial reconnaissance systems It can be deployed in both stationary and mobile (vehicle-mounted) stations Originally designed for the CL-289 tactical UAV it has been in operation since 1991 An extension program was launched in 1999 to upgrade the system to a common aerial image exploitation station The LBAA-BW can work with imagery collected by CL-289 UAVs as well as by Tornado and Breguet Atlantic aircraft More than 50 units have been deployed In 2007 the GAST (GemeinsamesAuswerte-System or Common Analysis System) project begun in 2003 will create a common system for the dissemination of all intelligence collected via technical means through a single database

Italy

Italy is moving at a slower pace toward a network-oriented defense strategy deployment of advanced C4ISR systems and inter-service interoperability Much of the countryrsquos defense budget over the next few years will be spent on weapons platforms most notably 121 Eurofi ghter aircraft Much-needed C4ISR assets such as early warning aircraft and MIDS data links for aircraft may not be purchased in the near term

ItalianndashUS industrial collaboration is seen as one way of advancing the deployment of network-based capabilities and achieving interoperability with the United States Italy is prepared to buy US technologies as interim solutions to operational problems as seen in the recent procurement of four Predator UAV systems and several Link-16 terminals and in the interest shown in the US Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) project Some Italian defense policymakers have argued that American C4ISR standards will lead the way and that Italy should work toward those standards For now Italy intends to ensure that all

Tabl

e 3

4 G

erm

an c

apab

ilit

ies

for

netw

ork-

base

d op

erat

ions

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

C2

Hee

res-

Fuumlh

rung

sinf

orm

atio

ns-

syst

em f

uumlr d

ie

rech

neru

nter

stuumlt

zte

Ope

rati

onsf

uumlhru

ng in

S

taumlbe

n (H

ER

OS

)

Cor

ps-

div

isio

n- a

nd

brig

ade-

leve

l C2

syst

em

incl

udes

mob

ile

elem

ents

Als

o de

ploy

ed w

ith

EU

RO

KO

RP

S a

nd th

e G

erm

an-D

utch

Cor

ps

Fuumlh

rung

saus

stat

tung

takt

isch

(FA

US

T)

Reg

imen

t-le

vel a

nd b

elow

C

2 sy

stem

inc

lude

s m

obil

e A

PC

veh

icle

-ba

sed

elem

ents

Mob

ile

Com

man

d an

d C

ontr

ol S

yste

m (

MC

CS

)C

2 sy

stem

for

arm

yrsquos

tank

s an

d ar

mor

ed

vehi

cles

des

igna

ted

for

over

seas

dep

loym

ent

Mar

ine

Hea

dqua

rter

s (M

HQ

)M

arit

ime

Com

man

d an

d C

ontr

ol

Info

rmat

ion

Sys

tem

(M

CC

IS)

Col

labo

rati

on a

t S

ea (

C

S)

Tact

ical

nav

al C

2 sy

stem

s (i

ncl

link

s to

HQ

s)C

S

ena

bles

in

tero

pera

bili

ty w

ith

som

e U

S s

hips

Ger

man

Air

For

ce

Com

man

d an

d C

ontr

ol

Info

rmat

ion

Sys

tem

(G

AF

CC

IS)

Air

for

ce C

2 sy

stem

AD

LE

RA

rtil

lery

cor

ps C

2 sy

stem

Hfl

aAF

uumlSys

Air

def

ense

C2

syst

emco

ntin

uedhellip

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

Rub

inH

igh-

leve

l C2

syst

em

link

ing

arm

ed f

orce

s co

mm

and

wit

h M

OD

Sur

face

-Air

-Mis

sile

O

pera

tion

s C

ente

r (S

AM

OC

)

Nex

t gen

erat

ion

mob

ile

air

defe

nse

C2

syst

emIn

tero

pera

ble

wit

h N

AT

O

nati

onsrsquo

air

def

ense

C

2 sy

stem

s f

or u

se in

m

ulti

nati

onal

dep

loym

ents

FuumlI

nfoS

ys H

Inte

grat

ion

of H

ER

OS

and

FA

US

T in

to s

ingl

e ar

my

C2

syst

em d

eplo

ymen

t ex

pect

ed in

200

6

FuumlI

nfoS

ys S

KIn

tegr

atio

n of

all

C2

(nav

y

air

forc

e a

rmy)

sys

tem

s

Com

mun

icat

ions

and

co

mpu

ters

Aut

omat

isie

rtes

Kor

psst

amm

netz

(A

UT

OK

O-9

0)

Arm

y ta

ctic

al

com

mun

icat

ions

dig

ital

in

fras

truc

ture

in

plac

e si

nce

2000

its

lim

ited

ba

ndw

idth

wil

l req

uire

a

seri

es o

f up

grad

es in

the

near

fut

ure

Can

not h

andl

e IP

traf

fi c

li

mit

ed in

tero

pera

bili

ty

due

to u

se o

f E

UR

OC

OM

st

anda

rd

Bre

itba

ndig

es i

nteg

rier

tes

Gef

echt

ssta

nd-

Fer

nmel

desy

stem

(BIG

STA

F)

Bro

adba

nd c

omm

and

post

co

mm

unic

atio

ns n

etw

ork

for

brig

ade

div

isio

nal a

nd

corp

s co

mm

and

post

s

inte

grat

ed in

to A

UT

OK

O-

90

Lim

ited

inte

rope

rabi

lity

du

e to

use

of

EU

RO

CO

M

stan

dard

Tabl

e 3

4 co

ntin

ued

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

Tact

ical

Mob

ile

Rad

io

Net

wor

kN

avy

com

mun

icat

ions

sy

stem

link

ing

all v

esse

ls

Aut

oFuuml

Com

mun

icat

ions

sys

tem

li

nkin

g al

l air

for

ce b

ases

Lin

k-11

MID

SE

quip

ped

on s

ome

navy

ve

ssel

s an

d L

uftw

affe

To

rnad

os a

nd N

H-9

0 he

lico

pter

s

Ena

bles

inte

rope

rabi

lity

w

ith

othe

r ve

ssel

s an

d ai

rcra

ft e

quip

ped

wit

h L

ink-

11

MID

S

ISD

N-B

WC

ross

-ser

vice

dig

ital

co

mm

unic

atio

ns n

etw

ork

link

ing

all c

entr

al

com

man

ds

Kom

mS

erve

r-B

WC

OT

S-b

ased

co

mm

unic

atio

ns li

nk f

or

expe

diti

onar

y fo

rces

SA

TC

OM

-BW

Pha

se 1

Lea

sing

of

com

mer

cial

sa

tell

ite

capa

city

for

li

nkin

g ex

pedi

tion

ary

forc

es b

ack

to H

Qs

SA

TC

OM

-BW

Pha

se 2

2 ne

w s

atel

lite

s fi

rst o

ne

in o

rbit

by

2008

Mob

Kom

mS

ysB

wB

unde

sweh

rrsquos

futu

re

mob

ile

com

mun

icat

ions

ne

twor

k li

nkin

g al

l fi e

ld

radi

o co

mm

unic

atio

ns

syst

ems

in th

e va

riou

s th

eate

rs o

f op

erat

ions

wit

h co

mm

unic

atio

ns b

ases

in

Ger

man

yco

ntin

uedhellip

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

ISR

CL

-289

Ta

ctic

al c

orps

- an

d di

visi

on-l

evel

rec

on a

nd

targ

et a

cqui

siti

on U

AV

pa

yloa

ds in

clud

e co

lor

and

IR c

amer

as a

nd S

AR

KZ

OS

hort

-ran

ge U

AV

wit

h IR

and

SA

R o

r la

ser

rang

e fi

nder

and

targ

et

desi

gnat

or p

aylo

ads

Pro

gram

is u

nder

way

to

mak

e K

ZO

TA

DR

ES

and

F

renc

h C

rece

rell

e (a

lso

used

by

Net

herl

ands

D

enm

ark

Sw

eden

G

reec

e) in

tero

pera

ble

AL

AD

INV

ery

shor

t-ra

nge

min

i-U

AV

wit

h co

lor

and

IR

cam

eras

Dep

loye

d in

Afg

hani

stan

LU

NA

Med

ium

-ran

ge U

AV

pa

yloa

ds in

clud

e co

lor

and

IR c

amer

a m

ini-

SA

R

NB

C d

etec

tors

and

EW

su

ite

Dep

loye

d in

Bal

kans

and

A

fgha

nist

an

Bre

guet

Atl

anti

c 11

50M

anne

d ai

rcra

ft f

or

mar

itim

e S

ampR

and

S

IGIN

TE

W m

issi

ons

Fen

nek

ISR

veh

icle

Sim

ilar

veh

icle

s de

ploy

ed

by R

oyal

Net

herl

ands

A

rmy

Tabl

e 3

4 co

ntin

ued

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

Ost

e S

IGIN

T a

nd E

W s

hips

Luf

tbil

d-A

usw

erte

anla

gede

r B

unde

sweh

r (L

BA

A-

BW

)

Com

mon

aer

ial i

mag

e ex

ploi

tati

on s

tati

on f

or a

ll

Ger

man

def

ense

for

ces

Exp

loit

s im

ages

fro

m C

L-

289

nav

y To

rnad

os a

nd

Bre

guet

Atl

anti

c ai

rcra

ft

Tact

ical

Adv

ance

d R

econ

nais

sanc

eS

trik

e S

yste

m (

TAD

RE

S)

UC

AV

pro

gram

(fo

rmer

ly

know

n as

Tai

fun)

wit

h ta

rget

iden

tifi

cati

on a

nd

enga

gem

ent c

apab

ilit

ies

in

itia

l dep

loym

ent

expe

cted

in 2

009

Pro

gram

is u

nder

way

to

mak

e K

ZO

TA

DR

ES

and

F

renc

h C

rece

rell

e (a

lso

used

by

Net

herl

ands

D

enm

ark

Sw

eden

G

reec

e) in

tero

pera

ble

Eur

oHaw

kH

AL

E U

AV

sys

tem

w

ill i

nclu

de in

tell

igen

ce

coll

ecti

ng a

nd p

roce

ssin

g ca

pabi

liti

es i

niti

al

depl

oym

ent i

n 20

09

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

wit

h di

ffer

ent I

SR

sys

tem

s of

th

e G

erm

an a

rmed

for

ces

N

AT

O a

nd E

U is

pla

nned

as

wel

l as

wit

h U

S G

loba

l H

awk

SA

R-L

upe

5 L

EO

sat

elli

tes

and

a gr

ound

seg

men

t in

itia

l op

erat

iona

l cap

abil

ity

in

2007

Ger

man

y w

ill h

ave

acce

ss

to I

taly

rsquos C

OS

MO

and

F

ranc

ersquos

Hel

ios

2 im

ager

y in

exc

hang

e fo

r S

AR

-Lup

e im

ager

y

Gem

eins

ames

Aus

wer

te-

Sys

tem

(G

AS

T)

Com

mon

sys

tem

for

di

ssem

inat

ion

of a

ll

inte

llig

ence

col

lect

ed v

ia

tech

nica

l mea

ns

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

64

communications systems and information databases are compliant with NATO STANAGs while purchasing additional modules from the United States when these can solve specifi c interoperability needs especially for the navy and air force

Italy also seeks active participation in European RampD programs as a way to defi ne common European requirements and standards at an early stage as well as participation in such NATO programs as AGS and ACCS Italy has also begun deployment of UAV-based ISR capabilities Having developed independent capabilities in satellite communications Italy is also committed to greater intra-European cooperation in the development of future space assets

Italian troops participate in the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force (SIAF) and have good interoperability with their Spanish counterparts In addition Italy will create one of the European Unionrsquos Battlegroups and participate in two others one with Hungary and Slovenia the other with Spain Greece and Portugal It remains to be seen how interoperability issues will be addressed in the latter two Battlegroups

Command and control

Each of Italyrsquos services has its own C2 The air force system is SICCAM (Sistema di Comando e Controllo dellrsquoAeronautica Militare or C2 System for Military Aviation) and the navyrsquos is Leonardo The army has the SIACCON (Systema Automatizzato di Commando e Controllo or Automated Command and Control System) which provides automated support for military units at corps division brigade and battalion level and is compliant with NATO STANAGs The SIACCON land system is fused with the air defense C2 system into a single network under the CATRIN (sistema CAmpale di TRasmissioni ed INformazionior Battlefi eld Information System) program as of July 2000 CATRIN is made up of three different functional subsystems The SORAO (sottosistema di SORveglianza e Acquisizione Obiettivi or Target Surveillance and Acquisition subsystem) subsystem controls ground surveillance and provides battlefi eld awareness target acquisition and information from meteorological and NBC sensors The SOATCC (SOttosistema di Trasmissione Integrate or Integrated Transmission Subsystem) subsystem is responsible for air surveillance and provides C2 over army air defense units and army aviation units The third subsystem SOTRIN (SOttosistema di Trasmissione Integrate or Integrated Transmission Subsystem) ensures the communication fl ow between the various command centers

The most important future C2 system will be the Command Control and Navigation System (Sistemi di Comando Controllo e Navigazione ndash SICCONA) a C2 system that will link all the armyrsquos armored vehicles and provide them with access to the existing SIACCON system Fifty units of the SICCONA system are expected to be deployed sometime in 2006ndash7

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

65

Communications and computers

Most of the communications systems deployed by the Italian armed forces were designed to meet NATO STANAGs Some Link-16 systems purchased from the United States have been installed on Tornado F3 aircraft and Italy is a partner in the MIDS consortium and the MIDS JTRS program In addition the Italian navy has installed Link-11 systems on several of its ships which will be replaced with Link-22 However the tactical digital communications infrastructure of the Italian armed forces is still in its early stages An intranet backbone for the Ministry of Defense called DIFENET based on fi ber optic links is currently under development A military digital information network (Rete Numerica Interforzendash RNI) is also under discussion

Italyrsquos terrestrial communications system is reinforced by the SICRAL (SistemaItaliano per Comunicazioni Riservate ed Allarmi or Italian System for Reserved Communications and Warning) military satellite communications system The fi rst satellite SICRAL 1A was launched in 2001 carrying the fi rst operational EHF communications capacity produced in Europe as well as SHF and UHF However SICRAL does not include onboard processing and therefore cannot be fully interoperable with US systems or compatible with recently approved NATO EHF STANAGs However SICRAL is interoperable with the British Skynet 4 and with most of the channels of the French Syracuse and the Spanish Hispasat systems The system includes over 100 fi xed and mobile terminals including several to be deployed on Italian fi ghter aircraft SICRAL 1B is scheduled to begin service in 2006 and once operational will contribute all of Italyrsquos NATO SATCOM commitments as well as serving as backup for SICRAL 1A It too has UHF SHF and EHF capability The constellation will have coverage from the United States to the Middle East for NATO use The next generation of satellites in this series SICRAL 2 is still being planned but is scheduled for launch around 2010 It will replace SICRAL 1A and is expected to include onboard SHF processing and frequency-hopping capabilities

Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance

Italyrsquos unmanned ISR capabilities are based largely on non-Italian technologies although eight domestically developed Mirach-26 and Mirach-150 tactical UAVs were introduced to the Italian army in 2002 Italy acquired four Predator MALE UAVs intended mainly for reconnaissance missions which became fully operational in 2005 In addition twenty CL-289 tactical UAVs were purchased from EADS in 2002 Italy also possesses manned ISR assets including eighteen Breguet Atlantic aircraft for maritime reconnaissance and one Alenia G-222VS aircraft for airborne SIGINT operations (the latter was used successfully in Kosovo but is scheduled to be replaced by two new C-130J aircraft in 2005 or 2006)

A battlefi eld surveillance system called CRESO (Complesso Radar Eliportato per la Sorveglianga or Combined Heliborne Surveillance Radar) is deployed

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

66

for operational and tactical missions The system carried onboard Agusta-Bell 412 helicopters includes a moving target indicator and forward-looking infrared sensor Four such systems are currently operational all designed to meet NATO STANAGs and to link with other systems via MIDS and the Italian SICRAL system In addition the Italian air force fl ies several Tornado fi ghter-bombers (ECR Electronic Combat Reconnaissance version) equipped with forward-looking infrared sensors and an infrared line scanner for reconnaissance missions

Italyrsquos space-based observation capabilities are in the advanced development stage Having participated in the French Helios 1 and Franco-German Horus satellite programs (the latter was discontinued in 1998) Italy is seeking independent earth observation capabilities Under the COSMO-Skymed project (COnstellation of Satellites for Mediterranean basin Observation) Italy will deploy a constellation of four radar-imaging satellites The X-band radar satellites would feature a SAR payload capable of less than one-meter resolution for the military and of approximately one-meter resolution for images sold commercially The COSMO-Skymed system is managed by the Italian Space Agency and Alenia Spazio is the prime contractor The Italian Ministry of Defense has committed funds to the project in exchange for 20 per cent of the satellitesrsquo viewing time COSMO-Skymed is expected to be fully deployed and operational by 2007 Once all satellites are in place the constellation will be able to take images of any location on the earthrsquos surface with a revisit time of 6ndash12 hours

As a result of an agreement signed between France and Italy in January 2001 COSMO-Skymed will be linked to the French Pleiades constellation via ORFEO a program designed to ensure interoperability and information sharing As part of this agreement Italy will receive access to SPOT 5 and to Helios 2 imagery from France Italy is also negotiating with Argentina regarding the possibility of integrating two Argentinian radar satellites into the COSMO-Skymed system

Future ISR capabilities were also expected through the Italo-German maritime patrol aircraft program This program now canceled would have provided Italy with 14 aircraft by the year 2010 It is currently unclear if Italy will continue with an independent program for the deployment of next-generation manned maritime ISR capabilities There has been talk of Italy joining the US MMA project or acquiring patrol aircraft made by ATR as well as leasing American P-3 Orion aircraft to replace the ageing fl eet of Atlantics jointly operated by the Italian navy and air force In addition Italy is a partner in the French-led Neuron UCAV program

The Netherlands

The Dutch armed forces place a high priority on C4ISR interoperability with NATO and all new Dutch equipment is required to be compatible with NATO STANAGs The armyrsquos C2 Support Center is also the core of a new NATO C2 Center of Excellence (see the NATO chapter) The Royal Netherlands Army Navy and Air Force are increasingly interoperable with each other and with other European services With recent upgrades to the ISIS and TITAAN projects the air

Tabl

e 3

5 It

alia

n ca

pabi

liti

es f

or n

etw

ork-

base

d op

erat

ions

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

C2

Sys

tem

a A

utom

atiz

zato

di

Com

man

do e

Con

trol

lo

(SIA

CC

ON

)

Arm

y C

2 sy

stem

Mee

ts N

AT

O S

TAN

AG

s

SIC

CA

MA

ir F

orce

C2

syst

em

LE

ON

AR

DO

Nav

y C

2 sy

stem

CA

TR

INA

rmy

and

air

defe

nse

C2

com

mun

icat

ion

and

inte

llig

ence

sys

tem

SIC

CO

NA

Inte

grat

ion

of a

ll C

2 sy

stem

s to

be

depl

oyed

by

2006

ndash7

Com

mun

icat

ions

and

co

mpu

ters

Lin

k-11

16

MID

SD

eplo

yed

on s

ever

al

airc

raft

and

shi

psL

inks

to a

llie

d L

ink-

111

6 sy

stem

s

DIF

EN

ET

MO

D in

tran

et b

ased

on

fi be

r op

tic

link

s

Sat

elli

te I

tali

ano

per

Com

unic

azio

ne R

iser

vate

(S

ICR

AL

1)

MIL

SA

TC

OM

sys

tem

Part

ly (

only

SH

F a

nd U

HF

ca

pabi

liti

es)

mee

ts N

AT

O

STA

NA

Gs

inte

rope

rabl

e w

ith

Sky

net 4

and

wit

h m

ost o

f th

e ch

anne

ls o

f th

e S

yrac

use

and

His

pasa

t sy

stem

s

cont

inue

dhellip

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

SIC

RA

L 2

Onb

oard

SH

F p

roce

ssin

g ca

pabi

lity

and

fre

quen

cy-

hopp

ing

prot

ocol

s

Com

pati

ble

wit

h N

AT

O

and

Sky

net 4

but

not

wit

h U

S

Ret

e N

umer

ica

Inte

rfor

ze

(RN

I)M

ilit

ary

digi

tal

info

rmat

ion

netw

ork

ISR

Mir

ach-

261

50Ta

ctic

al U

AV

s us

ed b

y ar

my

Pre

dato

rM

AL

E U

AV

s P

urch

ased

fro

m U

S

CL

-289

Tact

ical

UA

Vs

CR

ES

OH

elib

orne

SA

R s

yste

m f

or

oper

atio

nal a

nd ta

ctic

al

ISR

Mee

ts N

AT

O S

TAN

AG

s

link

s to

all

ied

syst

ems

via

MID

S a

nd S

ICR

AL

Torn

ado

EC

RF

LIR

sen

sor

and

IR

scan

ner

for

reco

n m

issi

ons

Hel

ios

1Ju

nior

par

tner

in F

renc

h op

tica

l sat

elli

te p

rogr

am

Bre

guet

Atl

anti

cM

arit

ime

ISR

Ale

nia

G-2

221

SIG

INT

air

craf

tU

sed

duri

ng th

e K

osov

o cr

isis

C-1

30J

SIG

INT

air

craf

t

CO

SM

O-S

kym

edC

onst

ella

tion

of

four

SA

R

sate

llit

esA

cces

s to

Fre

nch

Hel

ios

2 an

d G

erm

an S

AR

-Lup

e im

ager

y in

exc

hang

e fo

r C

OS

MO

imag

ery

Neu

ron

Part

ner

in F

renc

h-le

d U

CA

V p

rogr

am

Tabl

e 3

5 co

ntin

ued

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

69

force and army will share the same C2 system and communications infrastructure and the navy will link into it in the future

The Netherlands military cannot afford to acquire C4ISR across the full spec-trum of capabilities They have focused instead on several major high-technology programs such as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and Patriot anti-aircraft batteries and on ensuring that deployed C4ISR assets are built to NATO STANAGs Defense budget cuts for 2003 and 2004 put further in doubt the ability of the Netherlands military to carry out a full transformation of the armed forces In these two budget years the reduction in force element size targeted traditional platforms including the navyrsquos frigates which were reduced from 14 to 10 as well as in C4ISR assets such as maritime patrol aircraft all of which are being sold (De Wijk 2004 124ndash5)

The bi-national German-Netherlands Corps created in 1995 became a NATO High Readiness Force between 2000 and 2002 It is under operational command of SACEUR but can also carry out EU-led operations Its C4ISR assets include the German HEROS C2 system the Dutch ISIS battlefi eld awareness and TITAAN communications systems and French Sperwer tactical UAVs In addition the Netherlands will participate in two European Union Battlegroups one with Germany and the other with the United Kingdom

Following the NATO Prague summit the Netherlands army announced that it would build an Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) battalion that will be able to operate with other NATO allies In addition the TITAAN and ISIS systems were successfully deployed as part of the Dutch-led fourth NATO Response Force exercise (NRF-4) including battalion headquarters from Germany France Denmark and Norway

Command and control

The Netherlands has invested signifi cantly in state-of-the-art C2 systems For the Royal Netherlands Army and Air Force the most important of these is the ISIS (Integrated Staff Information System) for mobile headquarters from the brigade level up The program was initiated in 1996 and the latest version ISIS-3 became operational in early 2004 It provides commanders with an advanced PC-based situation awareness tool at the tactical level The Royal Netherlands Air Force the Belgian army and the GermanNetherlands High Readiness Forces Headquarters also have the ISIS system and it has been successfully deployed in Iraq Afghanistan and Liberia as well as with the Dutch contingent of the NRF

Other Dutch C2 programs include the armyrsquos OSIRIS Battlefi eld Management System (BMS) for lower command levels (battalion-level and below) the navy LCF frigates C2 systems the artillery corpsrsquo VUIST system the armyrsquos Advanced Fire Support Information System (AFSIS) for mortar teams at the battalion and brigade level and the armor corpsrsquo Target Information Command and Control System(TICCS) All are compliant with NATO STANAGs and in a short time all of the operational stand-alone C2 applications in use by the artillery will be brought under the AFSIS program However it is not yet clear that a full integration

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

70

of all C2 systems (navy air force and army) is planned Future programs currently being evaluated include C2 systems for logistics engineering and intelligence processes and for individual soldiers and vehicles as well as the interoperability of Dutch C2 systems with those of other nations

Communications and computers

The Dutch militaryrsquos digital communications infrastructure is the Netherlands Armed Forces Integrated Network (NAFIN) supplied by Nortel Networks Fully operational NAFIN supersedes the previous leased public line systems with a secure high-speed network linking more than 250 military installations in the land sea and air services

The Dutch army deploys a mobile tactical digital communications system Its backbone the ZODIAC (ZOne DIgital Automated and enCrypted Communication) system supplied by Thales Netherlands is based on the EUROCOM standard making it interoperable with a few NATO allies principally Germany The radios deployed are Single Channel Radio Access units by Thales Netherlands as well as HF EZB systems In addition the Royal Netherlands Air Force is currently in the process of procuring some 120 MIDS terminals for its F-16s and a few aircraft are already equipped with this technology

The new generation of military communications for the Royal Netherlands armed forces is the TITAAN (Theater Independent Tactical Army and Air Force Network) that brings together legacy and new systems into a converged network It provides the Netherlands army and air force with voice (via IP telephony) and video as well as network management and security In 2002 the army began replacing the ZODIAC system with the fi rst TITAAN modules In 2004 the air force began deploying the TITAAN system for mobile communications TITAAN will eventually also link to the navyrsquos communication network It has been used successfully in operations in Iraq Afghanistan and Liberia and deployed at the Land Component Command level and at the brigade and below levels as part of the Dutch-led fourth NATO Response Force exercise (NRF-4) There are plans to upgrade the TITAAN system to support tactical data links such as Link-11 and Link-16

In 2002 the Dutch Ministry of Defense launched the fi rst phase of its MILSATCOM program The German company ND Satcom was awarded a contract to deliver a turnkey SATCOM network to the Dutch armed forces consisting of one ground station with two C-band one Ku-band and one X-band terminal (plans for a second X-band terminal are being drafted) To date the project has allowed the Satellite Ground Segment at Lauwersmeer to interconnect with NAFIN the communications backbone of the Netherlands armed forces Two new Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) terminals should be operational by 2009 The Dutch have also offered to fi ll part of NATOrsquos future MILSATCOM needs through their system

Tabl

e 3

6 D

utch

cap

abil

itie

s fo

r ne

twor

k-ba

sed

oper

atio

ns

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

C2

Inte

grat

ed S

taff

In

form

atio

n S

yste

m (

ISIS

)A

rmy

and

air

forc

e m

obil

e he

adqu

arte

rs C

2 sy

stem

Mee

ts N

AT

O S

TAN

AG

s

OS

IRIS

Bat

tlefi

eld

M

anag

emen

t Sys

tem

(B

MS

)

Low

er a

rmy

com

man

d le

vels

(ba

ttal

ion

and

belo

w)

Mee

ts N

AT

O S

TAN

AG

s

LC

F f

riga

tes

C2

syst

ems

Nav

y C

2 sy

stem

Mee

ts N

AT

O S

TAN

AG

s

VU

IST

Art

ille

ry C

2 sy

stem

Mee

ts N

AT

O S

TAN

AG

s

Targ

et I

nfor

mat

ion

Com

man

d an

d C

ontr

ol

Sys

tem

(TIC

CS

)

Arm

or C

2 sy

stem

Mee

ts N

AT

O S

TAN

AG

s

Com

mun

icat

ions

and

C

ompu

ters

Net

herl

ands

Arm

ed

Forc

es I

nteg

rate

d N

etw

ork

(NA

FIN

)

Dig

ital

com

mun

icat

ions

in

fras

truc

ture

link

ing

all

thre

e se

rvic

es

ZO

DIA

CA

rmy

mob

ile

tact

ical

di

gita

l com

mun

icat

ions

in

fras

truc

ture

Inte

rope

rabl

e w

ith

thos

e N

AT

O f

orce

s us

ing

the

EU

RO

CO

M s

tand

ard

TIT

AA

N (

The

ater

In

depe

nden

t Tac

tica

l A

rmy

and

Air

For

ce

Net

wor

k)

Nex

t gen

erat

ion

VoI

P-

base

d ar

my

and

air

forc

e m

obil

e di

gita

l net

wor

k

wil

l eve

ntua

lly

repl

ace

ZO

DIA

C a

nd a

lso

be

depl

oyed

by

navy

CO

TS

-bas

ed

cont

inue

dhellip

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

MIL

SA

TC

OM

pro

gram

1 gr

ound

sta

tion

and

4

term

inal

s 2

AE

HF

te

rmin

als

to b

e ad

ded

by

2009

Con

nect

ed to

NA

FIN

ne

twor

k

ISR

Spe

rwer

Tact

ical

UA

Vs

used

fo

r S

ampR

and

targ

et

acqu

isit

ion

mis

sion

s

Sim

ilar

sys

tem

s ar

e de

ploy

ed b

y F

ranc

e

Den

mar

k S

wed

en G

reec

e

Fen

nek

Rec

onna

issa

nce

vehi

cle

wit

h ca

mer

a a

ther

mal

im

ager

and

a la

ser

rang

efi n

der

Co-

deve

lope

d w

ith

Ger

man

y

Squ

ire

Man

-por

tabl

e su

rvei

llan

ce

rada

rs fi

elde

d by

Roy

al

Net

herl

ands

Arm

y an

d M

arin

e C

orps

Eur

oMA

LE

Co-

deve

lope

d w

ith

Fra

nce

Tabl

e 3

6 co

ntin

ued

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

73

Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance

Dutch unmanned ISR capabilities expanded considerably with the procurement of 38 Sperwer UAVs from France Deployed since mid-2000 they are chiefl y used for tactical ISR and target acquisition missions The Dutch are also interested in UAV systems that can perform more elaborate missions and are collaborating with France in the development of EuroMALE (Chuter 2003b 4)

For ground-based ISR the Royal Netherlands Army began deploying the Fennek vehicle in 2004 Produced by Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW) of Germany and Dutch Defense Vehicle Systems of the Netherlands the Fennek is equipped with a sensor platform that includes a camera a thermal imager a laser rangefi nder and HRM-7000 tactical radios

For maritime reconnaissance the Netherlands navy has relied on its fl eet of thirteen Orion P-3C aircraft ten of whose ground surveillance capabilities have recently been upgraded The upgraded planes delivered in November 2003 possess new electronic support measures more advanced radar and acoustic sensors and improved mission systems The upgrades also make the P-3C aircraft more interoperable with those of the US navy However eight of these aircraft will be sold to Germany and the remainder to Portugal thereby eliminating a critical C4ISR element of the Dutch navy

Ground ISR capabilities include 62 recently acquired and deployed Squire man-portable surveillance radars for the Royal Netherlands Army and Marine Corps The radars provide MTI as well as bomb damage assessment capabilities

Spain

Spain has been slower to integrate cross-service C2 and communications infra-structures in its armed forces Army and air force C2 systems were fully deployed only recently SATCOM fi lls much of the militaryrsquos communications needs There is a limited budget for ISR systems for which Spain relies heavily on locally developed products (principally UAVs and SIGINT systems) Few of the Spanish systems are interoperable across services or internationally

Spain is however one of the few Western European countries to have signifi cantly increased its defense budget in recent years The 2004 increase of 45 per cent was focused on a 15-year modernization program which principally involves acquisition of major platforms such as the Eurofi ghter Typhoon A400M airlifter Leopard tank and Pizzaro infantry fi ghting vehicle Few large C4ISR procurement or RampD programs are expected in the near future

Spain has participated in coalition expeditionary operations through its membership in the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force (SIAF) created in 1997 SIAF is a bi-national amphibious force with Italy its fi rst exercise was in 1998 It is activated on call by common agreement and can be called on for Multinational Amphibious Task Force operations under NATO the EUrsquos European Marine Force (EUROMARFOR) or for national missions SIAF command rotates every 12 or 24 months between the two member nations Spain is also creating one

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

74

of the European Unionrsquos Battlegroups and will participate in another with Italy Greece and Portugal

Command and control

The main C2 system for the Spanish army is the Army Command and Control Information System (Sistema de Informacioacuten para Mando y Control del Ejeacutercito de Tierra ndash SIMACET) which provides a common battlefi eld picture for all command centers It covers all operational echelons from army corps division brigade and battalion and independent units (eg expeditionary forces groups of armored vehicles) The Aerial Command and Control System (Sistema de Mando y Control Aeacutereo ndash SIMCA) has been deployed by the Spanish air force since 2001 and is compliant with NATO standards There is no plan for the integration of the Spanish C2 system across services

Communications and computers

The Spanish tactical communications infrastructure consists of PR4G digital radios deployed through the ARGOS project There is little funding for further network integration of communications systems except for the procurement of several MIDS systems for aircraft and the upgrading of Link-11 systems to Link-22 on some ships Spain is also a partner in the MIDS JTRS program that will make its MIDS systems compliant with the JTRS waveforms

Military communications are carried through Hispasat civilian telecom-munications satellites and the XTAR-EUR X-band satellite Four Hispasat satellites are currently in orbit the most recent launched in 2002 However only the two oldest satellites launched in 1992 and 1993 carry military communications payloads The Hispasat system is compatible with Francersquos Syracuse 2 Britainrsquos Skynet 4 and the NATO 4 system The XTAR-EUR satellite operated since April 2005 by Space Systems Loral and Hisdesat is the worldrsquos fi rst satellite developed for commercial X-band services The Spanish Ministry of Defense is its fi rst customer It provides Spain with coverage from Eastern Brazil and the Atlantic Ocean across all of Europe Africa and the Middle East to South East Asia The satellite features on-board switching and multiple steerable beams allowing users access to X-band capacity The XTAR-EUR satellite will be accessible to all existing and future X-band terminals used by the United States and NATO

Future military satellite capabilities are under development through the Spainsat program (XTAR-LANT) undertaken by Hisdesat and Space Systems Loral This satellite will operate in the X-band and possess an anti-jamming system The Spanish Defense Ministry will lease fi ve of Spainsatrsquos thirteen transponders the rest are expected to be leased by the United States and other NATO allies The satellite will cover the region between the Middle East and the Midwestern United States and be fully operational in 2006 It will also be fully interoperable with all existing and future US and NATO X-band terminals

Tabl

e 3

7 S

pani

sh c

apab

ilit

ies

for

netw

ork-

base

d op

erat

ions

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

C2

Sis

tem

a de

Inf

orm

acioacute

n pa

ra M

ando

y C

ontr

ol

del E

jeacuterc

ito

de T

ierr

a (S

IMA

CE

T)

Com

mon

bat

tlefi

eld

pi

ctur

e fo

r al

l arm

y co

mm

and

cent

ers

in

clud

ing

mob

ile

ones

Sis

tem

a de

Man

do y

C

ontr

ol A

eacutereo

(S

IMC

A)

Air

for

ce C

2 sy

stem

Com

plie

s w

ith

NA

TO

S

TAN

AG

s

Com

mun

icat

ions

and

co

mpu

ters

AR

GO

SP

R4G

rad

io-b

ased

tact

ical

di

gita

l com

mun

icat

ions

in

fras

truc

ture

MID

SIn

stal

led

on s

ever

al

airc

raft

and

nav

y sh

ips

Lin

ks to

oth

er M

IDS

sy

stem

s in

all

ied

nati

ons

His

pasa

t C

omm

erci

al S

AT

CO

Ms

from

ear

ly 1

990s

wit

h so

me

tran

spon

ders

leas

ed

to S

pani

sh m

ilit

ary

Part

ly in

tero

pera

ble

wit

h th

e S

yrac

use

(Fra

nce)

S

kyne

t (U

K)

and

NA

TO

4

syst

ems

Spa

insa

tM

ILS

AT

CO

M ndash

UH

F a

nd

SH

F c

apab

ilit

y al

ong

wit

h so

me

EH

F c

apac

ity

and

an

anti

-jam

min

g sy

stem

ISR

Sis

tem

a In

tegr

ado

de

Vig

ilan

cia

Aeacuter

ea (

SIV

A)

Tact

ical

UA

V f

or s

hort

-ra

nge

reco

nnai

ssan

ce

surv

eill

ance

and

targ

et

acqu

isit

ion

cont

inue

dhellip

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

Ori

on P

-3B

Upg

rade

d in

200

3 to

in

clud

e F

ITS

mis

sion

sy

stem

an

elec

tron

ic

war

fare

sys

tem

new

rad

ar

acou

stic

sys

tem

IF

F

VU

HF

and

HF

rad

ios

da

ta li

nk a

nd s

atel

lite

and

in

erti

al n

avig

atio

n sy

stem

s

San

tiag

oB

oein

g 70

7-35

1C

confi

gur

ed f

or C

OM

INT

E

LIN

T o

pera

tion

s

Falc

on-2

02

airc

raft

for

CO

MIN

T

mis

sion

s

Hel

ios

1 +

2Ju

nior

par

tner

in F

renc

h ea

rth

obse

rvat

ion

sate

llit

es I

R a

nd o

ptic

al

IMIN

T c

apab

ilit

ies

Neu

ron

Part

ner

in F

renc

h-le

d U

CA

V p

rogr

am

Tabl

e 3

7 co

ntin

ued

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

77

Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance

For unmanned ISR Spain relies on the locally manufactured SIVA (SistemaIntegrado de Vigilancia Aeacuterea or Integrated System for Aerial Surveillance) a tactical UAV for reconnaissance surveillance and target acquisition Spain has also expressed an interest in Northrop Grummanrsquos Fire Scout vertical take-off and landing tactical UAV for maritime SampR capabilities Manned ISR assets include fi ve Orion P-3B aircraft upgraded in 2003 by EADS to include the Fully Integrated Tactical Mission System (FITS) data fusion system an electronic warfare system new radar acoustic system ID friend-or-foe interrogator VUHF and HF radios a data link and satellite and inertial navigation systems

Spainrsquos space observation capabilities originally depended on the Ishtar optical earth observation satellite but the project did not go forward Instead Spain became a junior partner in the French Helios 1 and Helios 2 satellite programs of which it owns 7 and 25 per cent respectively The Spanish Ministry of Defense has recently revived its plans for an independent earth observation capability discussing a high-resolution synthetic aperture radar satellite possibly with civil security applications

Since March 1998 Spain has operated a single Boeing 707 (the Santiago) confi gured for SIGINT and ISR missions Two Falcon-20 aircraft are also in operation for COMINT missions

Sweden

Although there has been signifi cant progress in formulating a Swedish doctrine for Network-Based Defense (NBD) the Swedish armed forces today are still only partially interoperable across services Infrastructure is currently being put in place for a mobile joint C2 function since all the services are now under a single national command This command is part of the process of transforming the Swedish military into a contingency organization with a mobile high-quality force able to operate in expeditionary mode Many of the new systems procured by the Swedish military are compliant with NATO STANAGs and US military specifi cations (MILSPECS) giving them a good basis for interoperability However most of the older Swedish systems were not designed with international interoperability in mind

Each of the services has its own rapid reaction unit created in 1998ndash9 The army has SWERAP (Swedish Rapid Reaction Unit) the air force has SWAFRAP (Swedish Air Force Rapid Reaction Unit) and the navy has SWENRAP (Swedish Navy Rapid Reaction Unit) Four air force C-130s provide air insertion capability for ground units SWAFRAP is comprised of JAS-39 Gripen aircraft which carry out airborne surveillance and combat search and rescue missions SWENRAP missions are principally mine clearing and peacekeeping operations Swedish rapid reaction forces have been deployed to Liberia as part of the UN force and Swedish Special Forces have operated in the Congo and Afghanistan By January 2008 Sweden intends for its rapid reaction units to be part of the European Unionrsquos Nordic Battlegroup together with Finland Norway and Estonia

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

78

The SWERAP units use a commercial satellite system to link with national headquarters and the KV90 high frequency radio system ndash with two stations in the mission area and two redundant stations in Sweden ndash as a backup Tactical communications in-theater rely on the armyrsquos TS-9000 system Based on the EUROCOM standard this system uses a Thales tactical switchboard an Ericsson tactical radio link system and Cisco routers that form the backbone of a tactical Intranet The TS-9000 also includes radio access points for VHF Ericsson Starcom radios as well as HF-radios

The C4ISR capabilities of the Swedish rapid reaction units do not use groundbreaking or unique technology solutions instead they rely on COTS equipment adapted for their specifi c requirements The Swedish deployment to Kosovo in 1999 needed to be equipped rapidly and within a relatively short period SWERAP became the fi rst battalion in the Swedish armed forces to fi eld advanced C2 and communications systems relying on this COTS approach

Command and control

Current C2 systems in the Swedish armed forces include the 9LV system in service with the navy and the StriC-90 system deployed since 1998 for command and control of attack aircraft and air defense systems StriC-90 is connected to the Giraffe 3D and the Erieye radars and includes data links with Gripen attack aircraft Swedish air force systems are tied into a single network named Airforce 2000 which enables a tactical C2 loop for all the servicersquos units The Swedish army uses the demonstrator IS-Mark information system for mobile and non-mobile ground based headquarters and the SLB (Stridsledningssystem Bataljon or Battalion C2 System) system at the battalion level The two are not interoperable however and data must be manually transferred between them (Nilsson et al2004 24ndash5) Sweden began to integrate all the servicesrsquo C2 systems at all levels in 2005 under the name of SWECCIS (SWEdish C2 Information System)

In October 1995 the Swedish Armed Forces Headquartersrsquo Department of Operations tasked the Defense Research Establishment (Foumlrsvarets Forskningsanstalt or FOA) the Defense Materiel Administration (Foumlrsvarets Materielverk or FMV) and the National Defense College (Foumlrsvarshoumlgskolanor FHS) to propose a vision for a mobile military joint C2 system for the year 2010 This project ndash Mobile Joint Command and Control Function for 2010 (Roumlrlig Operativ Lednings Funktion or ROLF 2010) ndash has been expanded to include civilian C2 elements relevant to national security The goal is a single C2 environment for Swedenrsquos national defense and fi rst responder services in 10ndash15 years The vision calls for the creation of an ldquoaquariumrdquo (Visionarium) a device to present crisis situations in a three-dimensional environment fusing information from many sources Once deployed Visionarium will enable informed and timely decision-making and the dissemination of decisions to security forces

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

79

Communications and computers

For the past ten years the tactical communications infrastructure of the Swedish armed forces has been based on a digital network the TS-9000 The system uses Thales switches and Ericsson radios and relay equipment and has recently been upgraded to include tactical Intranet However it will encounter problems of data capacity once the new information system SWECCIS is introduced The requirement for more bandwidth will be fi lled through satellite communications and the procurement of the HF-2000 radio communications network to be fully deployed by 2008 This system will provide all services with a fully automated data text and voice communications network that can be used from fi xed and mobile stations

Only a few of Swedenrsquos tactical communications systems are interoperable outside Sweden All were designed and deployed under a strategy of Swedish neutrality which ruled out coalition operations Sweden has now participated in several of the Combined Endeavor annual exercises which have tested and proven the interoperability of its tactical communications systems with those of other countries at the non-secure level In the near future Sweden is expected to join the successor of the Tactical Communications (TACOMS) Post 2000 project a NATO initiative to develop STANAGs for IP-based communications between different tactical communications systems

With the change in Swedish strategy the need for interoperable commu nica-tions systems has grown As a result Sweden expects to procure Link-16 terminals and IFF systems Link-16 will fi rst be introduced in the air force and navy with an army deployment to follow Initially it will be installed as stand-alone terminals with limited capacity Sweden has also recently launched a program known as GTRS to acquire a Software Defi ned Radio system built on SCA standards The goal is to introduce the new system to the armed forces after 2008

In 2005 Sweden also began to deploy its national radio communications infrastructure for public safety authorities including the armed forces police coast guard customs service local crisis management and rescue services and emergency healthcare and ambulance services RAKEL (Radio Kommunikation foumlr Effektiv Ledning or Radio Communication for Effi cient Command) based on the TETRA (TErrestrial Trunked RAdio) standard will be supplied by a consortium of Saab Nokia and Eltel Networks and will be owned by the Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) Deployment will start in the south of Sweden and fi nish in the north of the country by 2010 RAKEL is part of the Network-Based Defense doctrine aimed at connecting the Swedish military and the fi rst responders in one network

Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance

The Argus system has been Swedenrsquos principal manned airborne ISR capability since 1997 Argus is based on six Saab 340 aircraft outfi tted with Ericssonrsquos Erieye PS-890 radar along with four ground stations It performs mostly airborne early

Tabl

e 3

8 S

wed

ish

capa

bili

ties

for

net

wor

k-ba

sed

oper

atio

ns

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

C2

Str

iCA

ir d

efen

se C

2 sy

stem

Inte

rope

rabl

e w

ith

the

Sw

edis

h A

rgus

air

born

e ra

dar

syst

em

9LV

Mar

k 3E

Nav

al C

2 sy

stem

IS-M

ark

Arm

y C

2 sy

stem

de

mon

stra

tor

for

mob

ile

and

non-

mob

ile

head

quar

ters

SL

BA

rmy

C2

syst

em f

or

batt

alio

n le

vel

9LV

CE

TR

ISN

aval

C2

syst

em f

or n

ext-

gene

rati

on V

isby

-cla

ss

corv

ette

s

SW

EC

CIS

Inte

grat

ion

of a

ll C

2 (n

avy

air

for

ce a

nd a

rmy)

sy

stem

s a

t all

leve

ls

RO

LF

201

0M

obil

e Jo

int C

omm

and

and

Con

trol

Fun

ctio

nIn

tero

pera

bili

ty is

sues

m

ay b

e sa

crifi

ced

to

rem

ain

on s

ched

ule

Com

mun

icat

ions

and

co

mpu

ters

TS

-900

0A

rmy

tact

ical

co

mm

unic

atio

nsin

fras

truc

ture

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EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

83

warning and maritime surveillance and reconnaissance missions Other manned ISR assets include two Gulfstream IV-SP aircraft deployed since 1997 for SIGINT missions The Ericsson Giraffe radar recently deployed provides land-based ISR capabilities though its principal mission is air defense The Swedish navy also deploys a maritime version the Sea Giraffe The Swedish ARTHUR (Artillery Hunting Radar) system is fully operational and has been used in Afghanistan

Sweden has only a limited unmanned aerial ISR capability Three Ugglan (Owl) tactical UAV systems were procured from France in 1999ndash2000 based on the Sperwer UAV modifi ed to be able to take off in severe winter conditions As part of the Swedish armed forces long-term vision a number of advanced UAV concepts are currently being studied Gladen is one candidate a HALE UAV equipped with a SAR electro-optic and infrared sensors and able to carry an early warning suite Also under discussion are two combat UAVs the Swedish Highly Advanced Research Confi guration (SHARC) and Skuadern a stealthy MALE reconnaissance and strike UAV both being developed by Saab the latter in collaboration with BAE Systems Sweden is also a partner in the French-led EuroMALE UAV and Neuron UCAV programs

84

4

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL

NETWORK-BASED CAPABILITIES

NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization provides the most important and broad-reaching setting in which the transatlantic allies can address C4ISR technology and interoperability issues Military planning in the European Union though moving forward rapidly is at too early a stage and insuffi ciently comprehensive to resolve interoperability problems today In any case the United States is not an EU member making NATO the most important institutional setting in which transatlantic C4ISR issues can be discussed and resolved

During the Cold War NATO force planning was the setting for allied discussions on C2 communications air defense air operations and air-to-air surveillance Although this review of national network-based capabilities suggests that national systems are imperfectly interoperable at the national level and not always interoperable within the NATO framework the intent to make them NATO interoperable is clear Moreover a number of capabilities developed in the NATO context remain important tools for coalition interoperability even when the Alliance is not formally involved For the purposes of this discussion we will use the defi nition of interoperability common in NATO as described by Major General Picavet Director of the NATO HQ C3 Staff ldquothe ability of alliance forces and when appropriate forces of partner and other nations to train exercise and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasksrdquo (Picavet 2003 34)

NATO has dedicated common C2 and communications capabilities The MIDS upgrade of the US Link-16 system connecting allied aircraft was developed through NATO and NATOrsquos naval communications are largely interoperable through Link-11 technology The AWACS air-to-air surveillance system is a common NATO capability As an organization NATO defi nes and issues Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) for many weapons systems including C3I which set targets for planning national C2 and communications systems among the member nations NATO continues to provide an important setting for future common programs that are part of the C4ISR universe such as the Air Command and Control System (ACCS) program the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) program theater missile defense (TMD) research and the Coalition Aerial Surveillance and

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

85

Reconnaissance (CAESAR) advanced concept technology demonstration NATO will be a driving force for future transformations of European military forces and their links to the US defense as a result of three key decisions made at the November 2002 Prague Summit the Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC) the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the creation of the new Allied Command Transformation (ACT)

While NATO remains the principal transatlantic context for C4ISR discussions and planning the future evolution of the Alliancersquos role is unclear The European allies are increasingly committed to doing parallel planning in the European Union context whose military missions and commitments are growing In addition the future of the US role in coalition operations under a NATO fl ag is somewhat uncertain The US National Security Strategy (2002) and the Quadrennial Defense Review of 2001 both give preference to ad hoc coalitions over a systematic use of NATO for out-of-area operations

NATO roles and capabilities

Throughout the Cold War the allies used the NATO context for common C2 capability planning NATO strategy and force planning and military exercises set the expectations and goals for NATO membersrsquo military forces Based in part on Alliance needs members set goals for their own national defense investment which in turn infl uenced the requirements for equipment including Command Control Communications and Computers (C4) Past practices in the Alliance however may not be an adequate incentive for defi ning and meeting C4ISR requirements today NATO force planning goals are not obligatory and have often not been met in national defense budgets and plans Moreover because they have been developed through negotiation goals and targets developed in the NATO context tend to be incremental while defense technology and mission need to move ahead more quickly As a result as Gompert and Nerlich note the NATO force planning process since the end of the Cold War has become increasingly disconnected from the US national force transformation process

Adjustments in NATOrsquos military plans are worked out through tedious diplomatic negotiations among professionals trained to avoid abrupt change Consequently the United States and the lead European allies do not presently rely on the NATO planning process to guide their force planning and they cannot count on it to organize and guide their effort to create cooperable transformed forces

(Gompert and Nerlich 2002 64)

Nevertheless NATO has served as an important context for allied C4ISR planning The Alliance breaks down network-based capabilities and C4ISR into three categories Command Control and Consultation (C3) Communications and Information Systems (CIS) and ISR Over time separate NATO organizations

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

86

have been created to deal with the fi rst two areas (C3 and CIS) while ISR has been further broken down into specifi c programs and organizations

The NATO concept of C3 covers planning and architecture design of systems while that of CIS covers the management and operation of systems For C3 the Alliance has developed specifi c packages ndash Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) headquarters ndash that play a central role in planning and implementing specifi c Alliance operations such as IFOR and SFOR in the Balkans Since the mid-1990s CJTF core staffs have been established on a permanent basis within selected parent headquarters in the NATO military command structure When the need arises for a CJTF to be deployed the core staff is assembled and augmented as necessary forming a CJTF headquarters specifi cally structured to meet the requirements of the operation in question These CJTF headquarters receive C2 and communications capabilities both from the Alliance and from national forces They will also provide the new NATO Response Force with the joint headquarters it requires to operate (see below)

The Alliance has developed its own dedicated C2 and communications capability for military operations involving senior levels of military and political decision making (Barry 2003) NATO hardware and software can reach across the entire NATO territory connecting land air and maritime forces and political decision makers in national capitals and Brussels including voice data messaging and video teleconferencing This capability uses wireless networks satellites landlines optical fi ber and digital radio and includes local area and wide area networks A signifi cant volume of the traffi c is carried on the Internet and uses commercial equipment including satellites

These C3 and CIS infrastructures are overseen by the NATO Consultation Command and Control Organization (NC3O) The NC3Orsquos mission is to develop the technical architectures standards protocols and overall design for all systems from the tactical military level to the strategicpolitical one Since its reorganization in 1996 the NC3O is linked to three organizations The NATO C3 Board (NC3B) is the senior CIS planning and policymaking body in the Alliance It is composed of representatives of all member nations the strategic military commands and other relevant NATO organizations It reports directly to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the Defense Planning Committee and acts as the oversight board for all NC3O activities The Board has subcommittees on joint requirements and concepts frequency management information systems identifi cation systems interoperability information security communication networks and navigation systems (Picavet 2003)

The NATO Command Control and Consultation Agency (NC3A) is directly responsible for CIS issues within the Alliance It carries out the policies of the Board procures systems and conducts fi eld trials of prototypes NC3Arsquos goal is to create architecture for a common operating environment into which member states can plug in their own C3 networks Lastly the NATO systems are operated by the NATO Communications and Information Systems Operating and Support Agency (NACOSA) It manages CIS conducts joint training and monitors the quality of service both in static and forward deployed locations Over time the Board and

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

87

the NC3A are pushing NATO toward a command and information system with greater mobility and interoperability increasingly based on commercial products and systems The Alliance goal is to create a ready-made architecture that member nations can plug into and to provide a test bed for communications and Internet technologies (Barry 2002 253)

NATO C2 programs

The current NATO C2 systems and related communications capabilities have their limitations The systems have not been mobile though deployability is going to be critical for future out-of-area operations Moreover the current capability is stove-piped Horizontal communications between forces and between governments are not systematically possible Thus the current NATO systems are not yet a network-based capability that would allow all sources of data voice and video (including sensor data) to be brought together vertically and horizontally in real time to provide coherent real-time awareness of the battlefi eld across forces

NATO has however been upgrading this C2 capability with a number of major programs underway or recently completed which will allow Alliance operations to be more network-based The Allied Command Europe (ACE) Automated Command and Control Information System (ACCIS) is intended to be a strategic-level system providing decision support software and a combined operational picture It is currently being given a common hardware and software baseline that will form the core of a future bi-Strategic Command (ACE and ACLANT) automated information system (Bi-SCAIS) the Alliancersquos future C2 system The core services of the Maritime Command and Control Information System (MCCIS) an Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) strategic-level COTS-based information system will be implemented in the ACE ACCIS architecture The NATO C3 Technical Architecture (NC3TA) a new open systems approach for the Alliancersquos C2 infrastructure was initiated in December 2000 and addresses the near-term interoperability requirements of NATO C2 systems setting down technical requirements and guidelines for their implementation

There are additional NATO programs addressing future Alliance C2 require-ments More than a decade ago the Alliance initiated a program to upgrade and expand NATOrsquos air defense net the Air Command and Control System (ACCS) a commonly funded development and procurement program ACCS is intended to be an open architecture program using off-the-shelf components Given the decline in the European theater air threat the ACCS program could have been terminated However ACCS has been designed not only to detect and defend against air attack but also for air tasking and carrying out the tactical planning tasking and execution of all air defense offensive air and air support operations It is intended as a multi-mission simultaneous planning capability coordinating fl ight paths of various aircraft integrating the AWACS air picture preparing offensive operations and coordinating a combined air operations center along with reconnaissance squadrons and fi ghter wings It will include both fi xed sites and deployable components

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

88

Air operations over Kosovo revealed shortfalls in the Alliancersquos capability to coordinate combined air attack and support giving new impetus to the need for the ACCS capability Moreover it became clear that ACCS could provide a vehicle for communications and C2 involving air operations as part of a broader network-based system linked to air-ground surveillance and conceivably even to theater missile defense systems (TMD) As a result the Alliance decided to continue the ACCS effort In 1999 NATO signed a $500 million contract for the initial development effort with Air Command Systems International part of the Thales Raytheon Systems joint venture

Over fi ve years the ACCS system core software was developed and tested concluding the fi rst phase of the program The next phase of the ACCS from 2004 to roughly 2008 includes software integration incremental testing and the introduction of ACCS into national forces The goal is to create ACCS sites in 18 NATO member nations NATO members without an ACCS site will interface with the system via their national airdefense and operations centers (Fiorenza 2004 38)

Theater missile defense is not generally seen as an element of C2 However the NATO TMD effort is relevant to overall C2 capabilities as missile defense can be closely linked to the air defense and air operations capability provided by the ACCS program Moreover a TMD architecture could include mobile tactical missile and air defense capabilities which Alliance forces may require in out-of-area deployments including the NATO Respose Force (NRF) The Alliance has issued two contracts for studies of an Alliance TMD architecture and there is growing consensus that it may be appropriate to develop such a system

NATO introduced still another C2-related program in the summer of 2005 creating a new C2 Center of Excellence based on the model of the Dutch C2 Support Center (described in the previous chapter) Under the auspices of Allied Command Transformation this joint Center is to provide the Alliance with a framework for the exchange of C2 knowledge and lessons learned in order to improve interoperability The initial staff is composed of 15 Dutch Belgian Norwegian and US exchange or liaison offi cers but will expand to include other nationalities The Center will undertake training and education activities related to C2 interoperability including the analysis of case studies and the production of ldquolessons learnedrdquo reports As part of its work the Center will assess the value of the NRF as a stimulus for NATO network-enabled capabilities assist member states in synchronizing their national C2 programs to make them more interoperable and validate network-centric and C4ISR concepts and doctrines developed in other NATO organizations such as the NC3A

The Center was also offered to the European Union as part of the Dutch contribution to the European Strategic Defense Initiative (ESDI) It will collaborate with the European Defense Agency and make its expertise and facilities available to the European Battlegroups (see Chapter 5 on EU capabilities) Though a relatively new addition to the Alliancersquos C4ISR effort the Center of Excellence could become an important arena for NATOrsquos efforts

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

89

NATO communications and information programs

NATOrsquos communications and information networks have also been evolving toward more networked capabilities The NATO General Purpose Communications System (NGCS) is a communications backbone tying all military C2 (data and voice) together with semi-permanent bandwidth on demand using secure and non-secure telephone message wireless and satellite links NGCS is being deployed to replace the obsolete NATO Integrated Communications System The NATO Messaging System (NMS) will provide Alliance commands with e-mail and secure military message handing capability Crisis Response Operations in NATO Open Systems (CRONOS) a Windows NT-based information system initially developed for Bosnia provides secure connectivity (up to NATO Secret) between NATO and several national and coalition systems

Increasingly NATO platforms are also being equipped with the Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) a modernized version of the US Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) The development of MIDS illustrates the increase in Alliance telecommunications interoperability It was designed as a tactical data communications network linking NATO alliesrsquo aircraft (fi ghters and bombers) and air-based ground-based and ship-based C2 centers (Hura et al 2000) As it is deployed across alliance platforms MIDS will also enable better aircraft Identifi cation Friend or Foe (IFF) information The United States France Germany Italy and Spain signed the project memorandum of understanding in 1991 MIDS development has been led by the United States with France acting as deputy program leader (refl ecting the cost shares of the two major program partners)

MIDS like the US JTIDS is based on Link-16 a tactical digital network of encrypted jam-resistant data links and terminals Budget pressures and the desire to gain access to US military technology led the Europeans to support an international program but almost all were unwilling to simply buy JTIDS off the shelf For the United States the need for international collaboration was operational a common tactical communications network would increase interoperability with European allies and increase effectiveness in coalition warfare

A modular open terminal architecture was developed for MIDS followed by an affordable terminal that could be tailored to fi t various military platforms MIDS terminals were developed fi rst for integration into a specifi c set of platforms then modifi ed to accommodate others Finally interoperable jam-resistant data links between US and allied platforms were developed The member nations participating in the program were prohibited from developing competing systems to MIDS

A US chartered international joint venture MIDSCO was awarded the RampD phase of the program in 1994 The JV included GEC-Marconi (UK) Hazeltine (United States) Thomson (France) Marconi Italtel Defense (Italy) Siemens (Germany) and ENOSA (Empresa Nacional de Optica SA Spain) The RampD phase was concluded in 2000 followed by an acquisition phase that included two US vendors (Data Link Solutions and ViaSat Inc) and one European vendor for production and sale of the terminals The European vendor is EuroMIDS a

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

90

consortium comprising Thales (France) Marconi Mobile (Italy) Indra (Spain) and EADS (Germany)

In 2004 the US navy initiated a program within the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) program that would enable it to communicate with MIDS terminals The MIDS JTRS program will transition the existing MIDS Link-16 terminal to a Software Communications Architecture (SCA) compliant with JTRS radio The MIDS JTRS radio will provide three additional programmable channels that will be able to run any of the JTRS approved waveforms The United States France Italy Spain and Germany all participate in the program which will enable them to receive copies of the technical data package for MIDS JTRS and produce terminals to meet their national needs Eventually all US French German Italian and Spanish platforms outfi tted with MIDS JTRS radios will be able to communicate and share a common picture of the battlefi eld

NATOrsquos Satcom V project is also underway intended to provide global wideband video voice and data links to the Alliance Satellite communications have been an important element of the Alliancersquos common communications capability since 1970 when the fi rst NATO satellite was launched The NATO IV satellite system consisted of one active satellite one backup satellite 27 satellite ground terminals and two control centers Operational since 1991 it provided communications in both the UHF and SHF bands NATO has retired the last remaining NATO IV satellite Instead of purchasing and operating the next generation of satellites the Satcom V program ndash previously known as NATO Satcom Post-2000 ndash will purchase capacity from existing European satellites and upgrade existing ground stations The NATO C3 Agency leads the Satcom V program

The United Kingdom France and Italy submitted a joint bid to supply SHF and UHF capacity from existing and planned national programs (Skynet in the United Kingdom Syracuse in France and SICRAL in Italy) The US Department of Defense also submitted a bid offering SHF capacity on its Wideband Gapfi ller satellite system and the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) and UHF capacity on the UHF Follow-On system and the Mobile User Objective System The United States also proposed selling NATO EHF capacity on its Advanced Extremely High Frequency system while France proposed EHF capacity on one of its Syracuse 3 satellites

In May 2004 the NATO C3 Agency selected the joint British-French-Italian bid for the SHF and UHF parts of the Satcom Post-2000 program The 15-year contract includes establishing a NATO Mission Access Center that will route all NATO satellite communications via satellites in the Skynet 5 Syracuse 3 and SICRAL systems Beginning in 2007 the NATO system will be based on two Skynet 5 two Syracuse 3 and two SICRAL satellites A selection for the EHF part of the program is expected soon although EHF capacity is not expected to be needed before 2010 (Fiorenza 2005b)

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

91

NATO intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance programs

NATOrsquos current major ISR program is the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and the Alliance is in the process of acquiring additional ISR capabilities through the NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance program (AGS) The NATO AWACS fl eet is composed of 17 aircraft with dedicated common air-to-air surveillance capability and provides an important sensor input to understanding the battlefi eld Purchased during the late 1980s this NATO E-3A fl eet is currently being improved through modernization programs managed by the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEWampC) Program Management Organization In 2004 the upgrading of the missions systems on board the NATO aircraft was begun and the process will be completed in 2008 The upgrades will enable the AWACS aircraft to receive mission orders and updates via satellite allow the integration of data collected by other platforms with that gathered by the aircraftrsquos sensors increase the number of targets it can track and improve its interoperability with other platforms The United Kingdom France and the United States all possess the AWACS systems giving the Alliance good interoperability in air-to-air surveillance

In 2000 NATO began a research and testing program with direct bearing on the integration of sensor data collected by various different platforms operated by member nations The Coalition Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance (CAESAR) program is unprecedented an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrator (ACTD) funded by the US Defense Department but carried out by NATO The premise of CAESAR is that the NATO interoperability challenge is about information what is needed who needs it and where it comes from The objective of CAESAR is to test national and NATO air- and space-based ground surveillance systems and develop ways to integrate them ultimately leading to a new STANAG for the Alliance

To achieve this objective the CAESAR program is testing tactics techniques and procedures for linking together independent national air reconnaissance and surveillance systems currently deployed on a variety of platforms including the British ASTOR the French Horizon JSTARS Global Hawk RADARSAT (Canada) Predator CRESO (Italian helicopter-based) and others In the future it could be extended to other platforms including the British CEC network and ultimately ACCS and AGS

If the data emerging from CAESAR leads to investments and operational planning it could make a valuable contribution to the NATO effort to network sensor data into its C2 and communications systems It could also make it easier for coalition forces to rely on a variety of national air ground surveillance systems in the absence of a common NATO AGS asset

In addition CAESAR may demonstrate the benefi ts of funding technology demonstrators at the international level ACTDs a result of acquisition reform by the US Defense Department and designed to move technology more quickly into the forces have normally been restricted to US participants More multinational ACTDs in the C4ISR arena could stimulate transatlantic efforts to address the

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

92

interoperability dilemmas in network-based operations For example as a complement to the CAESAR program the United States could increase NATO participation in the Multi-sensor Aerospace-ground Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition (MAJIIC) program This is a 5-year technology demonstrator initiated in 2004 by US Joint Forces Command Its objective is to enhance the interoperability of ISR systems fi elded within a coalition framework via a common military website and made available for coalition operations in near real time Canada France Germany Italy the Netherlands Norway Spain and the United Kingdom already participate in MAJIIC

The most signifi cant NATO program for future ISR capabilities is the NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) project which has been an active RampD program for over a decade It will provide NATO with an aerial battlefi eld surveillance capability using a radar suite with both MTI and SAR modes fusing information gathered by other sensors into a combined digital picture The United States currently fi elds such a capability in the JSTARS (a modifi ed Boeing 707 carrying a communications surveillance reconnaissance and intelligence suite) The system is expected to cost some 4 billion euros which will be shared by all participating nations with initial operational capability targeted for 2010 The United Kingdom is the only NATO nation not taking part in the AGS program

The AGS program has evolved over several years as a number of alternatives were considered and rejected The United States proposed that the Alliance simply buy JSTARS which few allied nations were willing to do The United Kingdom decided to proceed independently with ASTOR and pulled out of the NATO planning effort Competing US and European solutions emerged the Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP an upgrade of the system deployed on JSTARS) and the Standoff Surveillance Target Acquisition Radar (SOSTAR)

In 2003 NATO issued a Request for Proposals for a two-year design and development phase This RFP called for the design and development phase to begin in late 2004 leading to a full program of six aircraft plus UAV systems by 2010 Two transatlantic strategic consortia responded to this Request for Proposals both offering the same radar solution the Transatlantic Cooperative AGS Radar (TCAR) which would fuse MP-RTIP and SOSTAR One consortium was the Transatlantic Industry Proposed Solution (TIPS) led by Northrop Grumman Thales EADS Galileo Avionica General Dynamics Canada Indra and some 70 other companies from all 19 NATO member nations The other was the Cooperative Transatlantic AGS System (CTAS) proposed by Raytheon and British Aerospace Systems based on the United Kingdom ASTOR system (Fiorenza 2003b) In the spring of 2004 the NATO AGS Steering Committee and the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors selected the TIPS consortium as the winner

The AGS system was initially to be deployed solely on manned aircraft However in response to German urgings the program was redesigned for both manned and unmanned aircraft It is not yet clear which version will be deployed fi rst The TIPS-based mixed fl eet is based on manned medium-size aircraft ndash the

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

93

Airbus A321 ndash and the German EuroHawk HALE UAVs a version of Northrop Grummanrsquos Global Hawk

Developing the radar posed a problem for both consortia since US export regulators indicated that they would forbid the export of some crucial technologies such as the TransmitReceive (TR) modules Frustrated by this problem the European partners have spent time and resources to duplicate existing US TR modules creating a capability that downstream will compete with the American technology The TCAR solution offered by the TIPS consortium faces other signifi cant technology transfer issues as the radar is to be co-developed by several European countries ndash France Germany Italy the Netherlands and Spain ndash as well as the United States

The ultimate fate of the AGS system is unclear given the signifi cant additional costs required for full deployment and uncertainty that some key NATO members ndash France the United Kingdom and Germany ndash will continue to participate over the long term A commitment to deploy AGS would involve a considerable increase in common NATO investments and an increase in the NATO common budget ceiling AGS spending might compete with other national defense priorities On the other hand a deployed AGS would give the Alliance a signifi cantly enhanced sensoring capability for operational deployments outside the NATO area and relieve the overload on the US JSTARS currently much in demand

As this discussion suggests there is substantial NATO investment in the elements of common C2 communications and ISR capabilities for the Alliance What is lacking is a clear vision of what the Alliance needs to link sensor and other information into the decision-making and command structures and down to the tactical war fi ghter NC3A is working on such a vision trying to defi ne the linkage between the many NATO systems and standards and achieve the incorporation of common programs such as MCCIS ACCIS ACCS and AGS into a joint system and the integration of that system with the national systems of the member states This C2 and communications architecture needs to be accompanied by a NATO-wide vision of the sensor architecture to which it might be linked NATO does not yet have clear standards for the ISR elements of network-centric operations nor an agreed view on the way in which they should be networked with each other

NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAGs)

NATO has worked for decades to set common standards for defense equipment including C4ISR systems Working groups in the NATO Military Agency for Standardization in conjunction with NATOrsquos Committee of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) have negotiated more than 1700 such STANAGs which set out the standards members should seek to reach when acquiring new equipment Roughly 300 of these standards relate to C4 technology (Grapin 2002 37)

The NC3TA proposes such standards for C2 and communications equipment and information architecture Their guidance should make it possible for nationally procured systems to link up with or plug into the C2 and communications architecture being put together by the Alliance (Barry 2003 10) As noted in the

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

94

review of national programs in this study many C4 items in national inventories are said to be compliant with NATO STANAGs which in theory enhances Alliance interoperability

The STANAG process has not however been fully successful in reaching this goal STANAG compliance is not mandatory but voluntary and there is no institutional process in NATO for validating membersrsquo compliance with the STANAGs As a result many NATO member nations including the United States have developed equipment that does not enhance interoperability as was the case with the German land force communications protocol As one analyst has noted ldquoMost European countries including France are willing to use NATO standards but it is not a usual practice in US procurement for military services to refer (and defer) to themrdquo (Grapin 2002 3)

Non-compliance with STANAGs is linked to the desire in some countries notably the United States to move forward quickly toward a network-based capability The STANAG process tends to be long tedious and bureaucratic often taking several years and resulting in a standard that is a lowest common denominator Once a STANAG has been ratifi ed it is often well behind the evolution of modern technology As a result the process does not have high-level attention and tends not to be viewed as a part of the strategic evolution of the Alliance

In the case of C2 and CIS technologies the pace of innovation is particularly fast and heavily reliant on the commercial sector As some countries move down the road toward networked capabilities they are inclined to set STANAGs aside and move to the best available and most up-to-date technology One analyst estimated that US defense technology is 80 per cent compliant with NATO STANAGs but the remaining 20 per cent includes the technologies critical to the development of network-centric capabilities (Grapin 2002 3) Moreover in the critical area of ISR there are few agreed STANAGs and none as yet for UAVs (Grapin 2002 77)

New NATO commitments to network-based operations

The Alliance took a major step forward toward a commitment to network-centric capabilities with the Prague summit of November 2002 First and most important the NATO agenda moved from a focus on Article 5 missions involving the defense of the NATO member countries to a clear focus on Article 6 out-of-area missions This shift in focus had been emerging since the 50th anniversary Washington summit of 1999 Though the European allies initially resisted efforts to focus on out-of-area missions this change emerged for three reasons First NATOrsquos experience in Bosnia Serbia and Kosovo ndash the fi rst war conducted by NATO as an alliance ndash made it clear that the European defense mission had been superseded by responsibilities for peacemaking and peacekeeping at Europersquos Balkan fringe Balkan operations also exposed a number of weaknesses and gaps in Alliance capabilities

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

95

Moreover 911 the war on terrorism and the war in Afghanistan all involved a new adversary whose transnational character made it a potential threat to all but whose global location necessitated action outside the NATO area While NATO invoked Article 5 for the fi rst time in its history the day after the 911 attacks on the United States the Alliance was not initially involved in the war in Afghanistan However NATO has been directly involved in post-war security operations around Kabul and at the request of the UN took complete control of the security operation around Kabul in August 2003 The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been commanded by the SACEUR and conducted by Allied Command Operations (ACO) ever since and is in the process of deploying to locations outside of Kabul in the form of Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT) This was a signifi cant new out-of-area deployment for many European countries and for the Alliance

Third the 911 attacks and what was presumed at the time to be a potential threat of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq both focused NATO attention more squarely on the risk that hostile states or terrorist organizations might acquire such weapons and the means to deliver them on NATO territory As a result new impetus was given to the Alliancersquos planning for WMD operations and TMD programs

These major security developments brought renewed attention to defense spending and force planning in most of the major NATO allies including the new members from the former Warsaw Pact Persistent US and NATO pressure on allied defense budgets led to a small but important reversal of course in the trend toward declining budgets in the United Kingdom France Italy and the Netherlands and considerable soul-searching about defense budgets and plans in Germany

The new security issues have also intensifi ed European concern about acquiring more modern defense technology particularly transportation logistics and especially relevant to this study C4ISR Balkans operations stimulated the Europeans to engage in more European-level planning for peacekeeping and peacemaking operations as they exposed severe European shortcomings in communications equipment sensors for surveillance and reconnaissance and data fusion CRONOS NATOrsquos Windows-based information-sharing network developed for IFOR in Bosnia was infected with viruses While the United States and the United Kingdom could connect to CRONOS digitally the French and Germans had to use an analog interface which meant slower data rates Secure communications especially at the tactical level were also a problem while communications between aircraft had to be transmitted in the clear Interoperability was problematic a number of ISR systems were used including JSTARS Nimrod Breguet Atlantic Horizon and C-160 aircraft but they could not cross-transmit data ndash thus could not provide all allies with a common picture of the battlespace or transmit directly to strike aircraft Finally Europeans depended on intelligence derived from US surveillance and reconnaissance assets The United States met 95 per cent of the allied intelligence requirements in Kosovo but was slow to release data to coalition partners (Thomas 2000 43ndash53)

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

96

Combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have intensifi ed this need for greater European network-centric capability The progress made by the US since the fi rst Gulf War in agility mobility and information networking of its forces is increasingly clear European C4ISR capabilities are signifi cantly less capable Moreover despite having more than 2 million men and women under arms the European allies still have only a small expeditionary capability largely British and French forces The military missions of the future whether national European or transatlantic depend on a high state of readiness advanced logistics networked C4ISR and a high degree of fl exibility and agility Only US forces came close to meeting this test with the British and French trailing and the other allies far behind

The Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) was agreed on at the 1999 NATO Washington Summit with the goal of addressing these capability shortfalls The DCI identifi ed 58 key capability shortfalls needing investment and multi-national cooperation The shortfalls were divided into fi ve core areas mobility and deployability sustainability effective engagement (the ability to engage an adversary in all types of operations from high to low intensity) survivability (ability to protect forces and infrastructure against future threats) and interoperable communications However the DCI lacked a common strategic orientation provided few doctrinal and institutional links to the US force-transformation process set no priorities and failed to stimulate allied investment in force modernization (Gompert and Nerlich 2002 10)

The 2002 Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC) were adopted to address the DCIrsquos failure Initially PCC goals numbered more than 450 including over 100 commitments related to C2 and information systems far higher than the DCI number However NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson identifi ed eight as a priority focus given their link to expeditionary operations including in particular C3I The PCC particularly targeted the lack of deployable C2 facilities reconnaissance and surveillance assets common interoperable intelligence mechanisms and systems architecture and the shortfalls in the communications arena to link them together PCC were intended to provide a more measurable and reachable target for European force planning and acquisition Some progress has been made notably in strategic airlift and sealift Survivability has been improved with the creation of a chemical biological radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defense battalion under the leadership of the Czech Republic However in many areas related to network-based operations results have been more modest Even the highly successful Czech-led CBRN battalion is still struggling with problems related to communications and deployment

The Alliance took two other signifi cant actions in Prague with major implications for the future of the Alliance in the area of network-based capabilities the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the creation of Allied Command Transformation as part of a major restructuring of the NATO command structure NATOrsquos new command structure is built around a single Strategic Command for Operations at SHAPE in Belgium and three subordinate operational-level joint commands in the Netherlands Naples and Lisbon which are intended to be the parent

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

97

headquarters of three deployable CJTFs two land-based and one sea-based Both of these actions could provide signifi cant incentive for the Europeans to move toward enhanced C4ISR capabilities and greater interoperability with the United States military

Although NATO has a number of common force packages and headquarters under the CJTF label until Prague the Alliance lacked the capability to deploy a small agile and light intervention force with the dedicated transport logistics and communications capabilities such a force needs to sustain itself The NRF is intended to fi ll this gap This force would be highly ready available for out-of-area missions on short notice capable of forcible entry and able to establish a foothold as the point of the spear for a larger NATO ground force to follow In addition the force could do non-combatant evacuations support counterterrorism and assist with post-confl ict management

The NRF will consist of roughly 20000 troops plus naval and air capabilities drawn from the High Readiness Forces of the NATO members With lift logistics and network-capable equipment it could deploy within 5 days and be self-sustaining for 30 The NRF-designated forces would remain actively committed to this mission for a six-month period at which time a new set of forces would become the NRF package while the fi rst group stood down and returned to a lower state of readiness The force would train and exercise together during the highly ready period Because of its high state of readiness the Alliance could use the NRF more often than it might deploy its massive heavier slower capabilities (Binnendijk and Kugler 2002 117ndash32)

The NRF capability has a deeper signifi cance While it would be time-consuming and costly to overhaul all of European NATOrsquos current forces for more agile network-based capabilities the NRF rotation scheme provides an opportunity to cycle those forces through a period of training readiness and stand-down one unit at a time After two years it is hoped that the Europeans will provide the NRF with the ldquoenablersrdquo (lift C4ISR and logistics) currently supplied by the United States Training European forces for agile fl exible operations and equipping them with the enablers they need including networked C4ISR could over time convert existing European military capabilities to a more modern networked force For some supporters NRF constitutes an intense European upgrade program by stealth (Becher 2003 25)

It is not clear that all the allies agree with this vision of the NRF Not all are committed to cycle large elements of their land forces through the NRF and may choose instead to assign a smaller proportion of their forces to the NRF missions and cycle them at a higher rate Germany for example has decided to create three categories of forces only the most highly ready of which will cycle through for the NRF For some allies this approach avoids the expense of upgrading all forces to NRF missions and capabilities over time

For some European allies moreover the relationship between the NRF and the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) is unclear For some NRF is seen as a ldquolast chancerdquo to work with the US military on global military challenges and engage the United States with European defense planning For others investment

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

98

in the NRF is seen as competing with their commitment to the ERRF Though the Alliance view is that the two are compatible not all the allies agree This tension over rapid reaction force planning refl ects a broader uncertainty about the transatlantic defense planning relationship

There is also a difference of view over the role US forces will play in the NRF Europeans have a strong desire for the United States to participate directly in NRF training and exercising and for US forces to be fully integrated into the NRF American sources and initial exercises suggest that the US goal is for the NRF to become a predominantly European capability for rapid deployment which could link up with a separate interoperable American force However this lack of joint US training with the NRF could ultimately impede the ability of the United States and NATO Europe to operate together on the battlefi eld (Binnendijk 2004 3ndash8)

These differing views have implications for the C4ISR elements of the NRF In the all-European case C2 communications and sensoring assets could be entirely European as long as the technology allowed them to plug and play with the United States permitting the download of data interoperable communications and a common sense of the battlespace The US-engaged model could provide greater incentive for both forces to develop common equipment and software to ensure that the force could operate seamlessly

The NRF clearly constitutes a major new NATO commitment The fi rst test bed elements of the force were stood up only a year after Prague and have held several exercises Full NRF operating capability is expected by the summer of 2006 The early training and exercises will test C4ISR requirements and reveal shortfalls that could provide incentive for European investment in the C4ISR arena since the bulk of the C4ISR capability continues to be supplied by the US

The third Prague decision with important long-term implications for the transatlantic relationship in C4ISR is the restructuring of Alliance commands The NATO command structure has now been substantially revised with an Allied Command Operations in Europe and a new Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk VA with operations in Europe The creation of ACT combined with the change in NATO missions puts a premium on upgrades to NATOrsquos C2 and communications infrastructure (Barry 2003 4)

ACT is directly responsible for transformation activities in NATO It supports transformation planning provides lessons learned to national planners lobbies for NATO investment in network-centric programs writes doctrine for network-centric operations and develops educational materials for NATO training activities such as those conducted by the Joint Warfare Center in Norway It could play a central role in supporting and reviewing national investments in network-based capabilities and supporting the active C4I program of NC3A The commander of ACT is dual-hatted as the Joint Forces Commander of the United States positioning ACT as a bridge between US transformation and network-centric thinking and experimentation and European efforts (Forbes 2003 4) European military sources have shown a high degree of interest in ACT programs and activities seeking a high degree of participation ACT is positioned to be an important player in NATOrsquos planning processes It leads the Defense Planning Process

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

99

including the development of the Defense Requirements Review a classifi ed analytic assessment of the minimum military capabilities needed to meet the Alliancersquos goal of carrying out up to three major joint operations simultaneously ACT has also developed some 30 generic scenarios used to inventory capabilities ACTrsquos focus on qualitative force goals could help member nations develop crucial capabilities or force attributes rather than merely reaching quantitative goals

ACT also assesses national contributions to NATO in coordination with national military authorities In addition it has developed a Strategic Vision for transformation and is developing concepts for Allied Future Joint Operations As a part of its goal of driving transformation in the Alliance ACT has worked to establish relationships with other NATO agencies including the NC3A the NATO Undersea Research Center the Research and Technology Organization and the NATO Standardization Agency as well as NATOrsquos educational centers

ACT holds great promise provided its activities are given priority in Washington DC The priority the US plans to give to ACT remains to be tested In addition ACTrsquos role in the allied and US defense planning along with its ability to review national-level C4ISR programs is not yet clear It remains to be seen whether this institutional reform creates incentives both for European force transformation and for more intense transatlantic commitments to interoperability especially in C4ISR

NATO has taken steps since ACT to reinforce the commitment to network-based operations especially the creation of the NATO Network-Enabled Capabilities project In November 2002 the NC3B announced the intention of developing a NATO equivalent of the American NCW concept and the British NEC The fi rst step in this process will be a feasibility study examining the technical and organizational issues such a concept would involve in the NATO context Led by the NC3A with the support of ACT this feasibility study takes a European view of transformation using the terms ldquonetwork enabledrdquo and ldquocapabilitiesrdquo instead of the American ldquonetwork-centricrdquo and ldquowarfarerdquo

Rather than wait for a joint NATO agreement about the investment and organization of the NATO Network-Enabled Capabilities (NNEC) study nine NATO nations (Canada France Germany Italy the Netherlands Norway Spain the United Kingdom and the United States) agreed in November 2003 to jointly fund the study Each nation has agreed to contribute 150000 euros for a total of 1350000 euros The study has delivered a roadmap for NATO to guide the creation of a network-enabled capability for its 26 member nations This roadmap takes into account interoperability issues commercial and technology trends and relevant national assets (both existing and planned) The study covered how network-enabled capabilities can be deployed by the NRF and how national information ownership issues can be overcome With completion of the study in 2005 the NNEC concept was taken over by ACT and made part of the Commandrsquos long-term capability development requirements which in turn form the basis for future NATO procurement In addition ACT conducted two NNEC training courses in June and October of 2005 the second of which took place at the Commandrsquos new C2 Center of Excellence in the Netherlands

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

100

The 2004 Istanbul NATO Summit further stressed the Alliancersquos need to increase the deployability and usability of its forces and for continuing the transformation process already underway The fi nal communiqueacute mentioned in particular the streamlined command arrangements ndash including the establishment of ACT ndash the NRF and a commonly funded AGS program The summit also committed to a project to provide guidance on improving various NATO capabilities including operational planning and intelligence specifi cally for interoperable and deployable forces able to carry out operations and operate jointly in a complex security environment

Other multinational network programs

Outside of the NATO context several other international interoperability frameworks have been established with the aim of achieving better C4ISR coordination between the United States and its allies These are working toward common military standards for equipment fi elded by allied forces including some NATO countries as well as Australia and New Zealand They include the American British Canadian Australian Armiesrsquo Standardization Program (ABCA) the Air Standardization Coordinating Committee (ASCC) the Australian Canadian New Zealand United Kingdom and United States Naval C4 Organization (AUSCANNZUKUS) the Combined Communications Electronics Board (CCEB) the Multilateral Interoperability Program (MIP) and the Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) Another forum known as The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP) is not a military standardization forum but maintains close relationships with the other above-mentioned programs to coordinate the defense RampD efforts of Australia Canada New Zealand the United Kingdom and the United States Of all the above-mentioned interoperability entities the MIC and the MIP are the only ones to include European countries other than the United Kingdom

The Multinational Interoperability Council

In 1996 Australia Canada France Germany the United Kingdom and the United States create the MIC to provide oversight of coalition interoperability and stimulate improvements among the countries most likely and most capable of leading future coalitions Initially referred to as the Six Nation Council the name was changed to the MIC in 1999 Later the member states granted New Zealand and NATO ACT observer status and in 2005 accepted Italy as the Councilrsquos seventh member

The MIC is administered through the US Joint Staffrsquos Deputy Director for Global Operations (J3 DDGO) to provide a multinational senior level forum for addressing the core issues affecting information interoperability between coalition forces It is concerned with policies doctrines operational planning and networking capabilities relevant to the information sharing capabilities of member states It also serves as the senior coordinating body for the member nations in

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

101

resolving interoperability issues and promotes dialogue between operational planners C4ISR technology experts and defense policy analysts involved in coalition operations

MIC membership includes senior operations doctrine and C4ISR experts from each of the member nations It is divided into Multinational Interoperability Working Groups (MIWG) each of which explores specifi c problems in coalition interoperability and proposes solutions There is no fi xed number of MIWGs they are created when problems have been identifi ed and disbanded after their work is done Each MIWG is comprised of representatives from the member nations from various services and agencies according to the needs of the group An Executive Support Committee (EXECOM) assists the MIWGs in addressing actions in a timely fashion when it is not possible to convene a meeting of the entire MIWG The Committee includes a representative of each member nationrsquos defense attacheacute staff in Washington a member of the Working Group on National Correlation and the MIC Executive Secretary (a member of the US Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I)

Currently the MIC has MIWGs that focus on coalition warfare doctrine collabo-rative planning advanced C2 concepts requirements for information exchange and the sharing of classifi ed intelligence secure video- and tele-conferencing and the creation of a combined Wide Area Network known as GRIFFIN The fi ve existing MIWGs cover operations networking logistics doctrines plans and procedures and concept development and experimentation Additionally there is a Capstone MIWG in charge of formulating the MICrsquos strategic plan for the future

MIWGs generally meet twice a year Once they propose a solution it is passed on to the MIC which meets annually to respond and passes its recommendations on to the member nations The organization cannot do more than advise and report its recommendations may or may not eventually be accepted by the member nations The MIC also produces an annual report on policy doctrine and planning for warfi ghting interoperability NATOrsquos doctrine on coalition operations is an important guide for the MIC on this matter

MIC reports to date have concentrated on lessons learned from coalition warfare exercises specifi cally East Timor and Afghanistan on the need for better information sharing applications between the member countries including secure tele-conferencing video-conferencing and e-mail and on a Coalition-Building Guide The latter signed by the members in 2005 identifi es the notion of a coalition Lead Nation defi ned as ldquothat nation with the will and capability competence and infl uence to provide the essential elements of political consultation and military leadership to coordinate the planning mounting and execution of a coalition military operationrdquo (Multinational Interoperability Council 2005 v) France has expressed concern about this defi nition suggesting that circumstances may dictate the need for several Lead Nations in an operation It also requested with German support that the Guide state that only the United Nations can act to sanction coalition actions a request that is not yet refl ected in the fi nal version presented in 2002

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

102

The MIC has also coordinated four Multinational Experiments (MNE) intended to contribute to the interoperability between member nations The fi rst such exercise undertaken in 2001 examined how a combined joint force headquarters would conduct rapid decisive operations within a distributed collaborative information environment with coalition partners MNE2 examined the development of a multinational operational net assessment as well as coalition multinational information sharing MNE3 in February 2004 explored concepts and supporting tools for effects-based operations and to assist the development of future processes organizations and technologies at the operational and joint task force levels of command It also included NATO participation and evaluated the ability of the NRF to support the planning of a coalition effects-based campaign The fourth and fi nal MNE addresses effects-based operations and C2 issues While some view the MIC and its exercises as key tools for France Germany Italy and the United Kingdom to improve interoperability with the US it is not clear how other countries not involved in this forum will benefi t from its lessons (Boyer 2004)

The Combined Communications Electronics Board

The CCEB includes Australia Canada New Zealand the United Kingdom and the United States It coordinates issues related to military communications raised by a member nation Its origins date back to the Combined Communications Board created during the Second World War which defi ned combined UK-US communications policies with Canada Australia and New Zealand as observers Canada became a full member in 1951 Australia in 1969 and New Zealand in 1972 when it was renamed CCEB Germany and France recently sought membership in this organization but both were denied

The CCEBrsquos mission is to maximize the effectiveness of combined operations by defi ning a common environment in which users can share and apply collective information and know-how Although covering all C4 systems of the member nations the CCEB does not own any of them Rather it seeks to defi ne architectures standards and operational procedures that its members will adopt when designing and modifying their national systems As much as possible these will be based on commercial standards and products Over time implementing the CCEBrsquos recommendations should improve interoperability and eventually create a virtual single system used by all members Adopting these standards is voluntary however which means that interoperability will be advanced only if the nations make the decision to implement the CCEB-developed standards

The CCEBrsquos one permanent full-time member of staff the Permanent Secretary coordinates the organizationrsquos daily activities All other personnel are drawn from national organizations on a part-time temporary basis Member nations contribute resources individually to specifi c tasks The senior C4 offi cials or Principals appointed to the CCEB by the member nations are in charge of formulating the organizationrsquos broader goals and of bringing them into national decision-making bodies An Executive Group coordinates the development of policies and plans

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

103

formulated by the Principals and prioritizes tasks In addition the member nationrsquos representatives in Washington DC may be tasked individually to work on CCEB assignments as may staff members at national headquarters

The majority of the CCEBrsquos work is undertaken under the auspices of Working Groups which consider specifi c issues raised by member nations Currently Working Groups are in place to discuss information security frequency planning directory services wide area networks (specifi cally the GRIFFIN WAN) and communications publications In addition Task Forces may be established to address specifi c short-term issues one currently deals with secure military messaging

In September 2001 the CCEB and the MIC signed a Statement of Cooperation (SOC) under which the CCEB is recognized as the expert technical body on C4 systems while the MIC is recognized as responsible for providing leadership in joint and coalition warfare doctrine and requirements Since the CCEBrsquos aim is to defi ne a joint and combined C4 interoperability environment and to enhance interoperability among C4 systems the SOC ensures that this goal is coordinated with efforts for developing doctrines and solutions brought forward by the MIC for information sharing between countries Equally important the SOC enables non-CCEB members of the MIC ndash Germany Italy and France ndash to participate in those CCEB groups directly involved in MIC-directed activities and to receive status updates on CCEB activities at MIC meetings In addition the SOC has also led to some technical MIC work being subcontracted to the CCEB

The Multilateral Interoperability Program

In April 1998 Canada France Germany Italy the United Kingdom and the United States created the MIP merging two existing programs the BIP (Battlefi eld Interoperability Program) and the QIP (Quadrilateral Interoperability Program) both of which were aimed at improving interoperability between land C2 systems In 2002 the MIP merged with the Army Tactical Command and Control Information System (ATCCIS) program which had been working since 1980 on technical standards and specifi cations for NATO membersrsquo C2 systems to make them interoperable

In November 2003 24 nations (Canada Denmark France Germany Italy the Netherlands Norway Spain Turkey the United Kingdom and the United States as full members and Australia Austria Belgium Bulgaria the Czech Republic Finland Greece Hungary Lithuania Poland Romania Slovenia and Sweden as associate members) and two NATO commands (ACT and AFNORTH which today is Joint Force Command Brunssum) signed a Statement of Intent to advance international interoperability of land C2 systems at all levels from corps to battalion to support multinational combined and joint operations This goal is to be achieved through a technical interoperability solution or baseline that could be integrated into membersrsquo existing C2 infrastructures However the program would not actually develop a common C2 system leaving it to the membersrsquo discretion to accept the technical solution

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

104

The MIP solution has two technical aspects a common data model known as the Command and Control Information Exchange Data Model (C2IEDM) and a set of procedures and protocols that allow the replication of data among different C2 systems known as the MIP Data Exchange Mechanism (MIPDEM) Countries that incorporate this solution into their C2 systems can share any information they choose with other nationsrsquo C2 systems over any means of communication available The British Canadian Danish French German Italian Dutch Norwegian Portuguese Spanish and US armiesrsquo C2 systems have to date been certifi ed as MIP conformant and more are expected to follow

In 2004 NATO adopted the MIPrsquos C2IEDM data model which signifi ed the increasing importance and acceptation of the MIP as a standard-setting entity It seems increasingly likely that the MIP solution will have a signifi cant infl uence on the development and design of future national systems These solutions however are not ldquoplug-and-playrdquo solutions In order to ensure true semantic interoperability far-reaching modifi cations to the core of national C2 information systems are necessary rather than just the addition of mapping adapters as new interfaces to the existing systems (Schmitt 2005 2)

The Combined Endeavor exercises

As another multilateral effort the Headquarters of the US European Command (EUCOM) sponsors and coordinates a multinational command control communications and computer (C4) exercise known as Combined Endeavor Its aim is to develop C2 and communications interoperability in preparation for crisis response operations by testing and documenting solutions that may then be integrated into national systems The exercise has been held every year since 1995 each builds on the capabilities demonstrated and lessons learned during the previous one The exercises also include demonstrations of emerging C4 technologies developed by a nation or group of nations that may in the future contribute to coalition interoperability solutions

Combined Endeavor has grown from its fi rst exercise in 1995 That exercise included some 3300 interoperability tests conducted by 10 participating nations during a 2-week period in Germany and Austria In 2005 the exercise included 43 partner nations and 2 multinational organizations (NATO and the South East Europe Brigade) all testing advanced systems and networks The 2005 exercise included over 15000 interoperability tests including a 1-gigabyte core communications backbone between several nodes used to transmit voice video and data A Combined Joint Communications Coordination Center was stood up to demonstrate the effectiveness of network management procedures for multinational networks The 2005 exercise also put all participating nations through the US and NATO network security accreditation process prior to connecting to the network demonstrating the capability to build a protected coalition network a signifi cant achievement in the fi eld of information assurance

At the end of each exercise the results are documented in an interoperability guide that codifi es the results from all interoperability tests down to the level

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

105

of wiring diagrams for specifi c systems This information is crucial to planning future multinational network-based operations It enables forces to plug and play based on proven results Interoperability solutions that have emerged from past Combined Endeavor exercises have been used to support military peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations in the Balkans Kosovo Afghanistan Iraq Indonesia and Liberia

The Combined Endeavor exercise is an important tool for highlighting the benefi ts of networks in modern security operations Participants observe fi rst-hand how advanced C4 capabilities can make them more interoperable and thus more effective in a multinational environment By involving not only EU and NATO members but also allies from other regions such as South Africa and Central Asia the importance of networking C4 and coalition interoperability is conveyed to a wide array of potential coalition partners

Conclusion

As an organization NATO has clearly moved strongly to advance the Alliancersquos C4ISR capabilities into the twenty-fi rst century and has taken multiple steps to incentivize its members to move in this direction While the traditional NATO force planning methods do not yet fully support this effort the decision to create the NRF could constitute a major step toward a transformed capability NATO common programs for C2 and communications including space communications are being modernized Several new RampT investment programs hold promise for a move toward a more integrated C2 communications and sensor data architecture including ACCS AGS TMD and CAESAR Finally the Prague decisions (PCC NRF and ACT) all could help redefi ne alliance capabilities and restructure European member state investments

This is however a more fragile trend than it appears Should US force planning and investment continue to be largely unilateral conducted outside the Alliance framework the transatlantic C4ISR gap will be harder to bridge In 2002 for example John Stenbit then Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command Control Communications and Intelligence suggested this might be a preferred US policy noting that interoperability is ldquobest thought of in bilateral and multilateral relations not alliancesrdquo He added that ldquothe dynamics of how these communities of interest are going to form and un-form and around which changing sets of parameters are quicker than the processes that NATO considers when looking forwardrdquo (Stenbit 2002 85ndash92)

For NATO to continue to play a key role in the process of reshaping European C4ISR capabilities the US will need to put interoperability at the center of its C4ISR planning process which is not currently the case NATO interoperability features in US equipment designs tend to be removed when programs are trimmed to meet budget constraints and the key performance parameter now included in most American systems is interoperability within US forces not with NATO (Barry 2003 9) The US will need to give ACT priority as the bridge to European capabilities US funding decisions with respect to ACCS AGS or TMD can either

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

106

strengthen or weaken efforts to create a common European C4ISR architecture The US staying at the margin of the NRF could also undermine European willingness to invest seriously in that effort A US decision to delay diminish or cancel the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter which has signifi cant transatlantic participation could have a major impact on the willingness of the European allies to commit to common programs Finally continuing US unwillingness to reform its export control and technology transfer rules will weaken the incentive European allies have to commit to transatlantic collaborative technology programs inside or outside NATO

There could also be trends in European policies that weaken the role of NATO in enhancing transatlantic C4ISR interoperability and the move toward networked capabilities While the European Unionrsquos defense activities (discussed in the next chapter) are not as advanced as the changes in NATO if the EU moves toward a vision and capabilities that are separate from NATO it could undermine the NATO effort There are important positive reasons for the Europeans to create more autonomous European capabilities but it will also be important to manage the evolution of the EU-NATO relationship so progress can continue in both frameworks Furthermore whether through the European Union or NATO a failure to provide adequate European investment in C4ISR or to continue funding for PCC priorities and ACCS AGS and TMD programs could weaken the NATO effort and interoperability in general Finally national investments in Europe need to give continued priority to interoperability within Europe and across the Atlantic for the effort to succeed

In addition to NATO the US and the Europeans need to be sure to rationalize and give appropriate attention to work in the other multinational frameworks that address specifi c areas of C4ISR interoperability All of the frameworks discussed in this chapter involve the United States as a key participant and place great emphasis on transatlantic interoperability issues However with the exception of the MIC and the MIP none involve European partners other than the United Kingdom The MIC analyzes policies doctrines and procedures for coalition interoperability and the MIP with a much broader membership base is limited to specifi c command and control solutions for land forces Neither deals with technical solutions to broad interoperability challenges Furthermore the denial of membership to France and Germany could set back transatlantic collaboration on standards architectures and protocols for interoperability between national C4ISR systems This leaves two of the three European militaries currently capable of executing out-of-area security operations outside the interoperability loop

107

5

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NETWORK-BASED

CAPABILITIES

Defense and security issues have emerged as a major concern for the European Union over the past decade stimulated and accelerated by the lessons Europeans have learned from the interoperability diffi culties experienced by European forces operating in the fi rst Gulf War Bosnia the Kosovo air campaign Afghanistan and Iraq Most of these lessons involve obstacles to achieving successful C4ISR interoperability

Increasingly major European militaries feel the need for a common rapid deployment military capability that can operate autonomously using its own dedicated equipment transport and C4ISR or borrowing NATO assets Slowly steps are being taken to make this intention a reality including internal developments in the European Union and the negotiation of the ldquoBerlin Plusrdquo agreement with NATO which gives the European Union recourse to NATO assets to carry out crisis management operations when NATO is not involved

During 2003ndash4 the European Union took signifi cant strides forward in developing operational capability and conducting strategic defense planning It conducted independent policing operations in Bosnia a military peacekeeping mission in Macedonia and a small peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Operation Artemis in the Congo became a model for the creation of the EU Battlegroups one year later (see below) In December 2004 the European Union Force (EUFOR) replaced the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) as the peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina

In the area of strategic defense planning the European Council decided in 2004 to focus on defense planning outside the framework of its Constitution discussion and accelerated the establishment of a European-level agency responsible for armaments policy and oversight on the capabilities process The European Union also announced the Headline Goal 2010 which builds on the Helsinki Headline Goal expanding and deepening EU commitments to strengthen its military and civilian capabilities with a strong emphasis on interoperability deployability and sustainability In the same year the Council announced a plan to create 13 EU Battlegroups at the Military Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels

The failure to ratify the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands has not impeded progress towards these improved European defense capabilities It seems clear the many of the EU members are seeking ways to participate more

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

108

effectively in overseas military operations including combat peacekeeping and post-confl ict reconstruction both autonomously and in coalition with the United States regardless of the uncertainties of the EU constitutional process Such operations will require new assets for rapid force deployment and especially systems that will enable these forces to collect intelligence share it amongst themselves and with headquarters and act upon it in a coordinated manner

EU strategic defense plans and capabilities

European-level strategic thinking and defense planning have made signifi cant strides since the Maastricht treaty was signed in 1991 (Adams 2001a) Initially European militaries and defense budgets shrank with the end of the Cold War as they did in the United States Several changes marked turning points for Europe The Maastricht Treaty committed the European Unionrsquos Members States to forging a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and created the Second Pillar in the European Union involving political and security issues The European Council ndash representing the Member States ndash would handle this on an intergovernmental basis The Treaty of Amsterdam which came into force in 1999 went a step further defi ning the CFSP as ldquoincluding the progressive framing of a common defense policy hellip which might lead to a common defenserdquo (European Union 2002 Article 1-12-4)

The European Rapid Reaction Force and the Battlegoups

In 1999 the European Council meeting in Cologne set a European Union goal of having the capacity for independent action in the form of capable military forces and the means to use these forces in response to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO That same year in Helsinki the European Council crafted an EU Headline Goal to create a force of 50000ndash60000 troops that could be deployed within 60 days and supported in theater for a year The mission of this force would be what was called the Petersberg tasks humanitarian and rescue missions peacekeeping and operations of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking This range of missions was defi ned at a WEU declaration made in Petersberg Germany in June 1992 and was codifi ed in the Amsterdam Treaty

To oversee this work the European Union created the Political and Security Committee The PSC would consider and act on foreign policy and security issues and manage crisis interventions The Union also created a Military Committee consisting of senior offi cers from the Member States which has responsibility for military planning and a Military Staff of roughly 150 based in Brussels to examine and shape military requirements for the Headline Goal force

The European Union then inventoried European national military capabilities relevant to the Headline Goal and set objectives to meet inventory shortfalls held Capability Improvement Conferences to track commitments and created the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) with nationally-led working groups

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

109

to develop strategies for meeting key shortfalls At the Laeken Belgium meeting in December 2002 the Council declared that the European Union had achieved the capability to conduct some crisis management operations The European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) that emerged from this Headline Goal process is committed to missions that are somewhat different from those defi ned for the NATO Response Force The NRF is intended to be lighter and more rapidly deployable for early arrival in out-of-area missions while the ERRF is largely intended for humanitarian and peacekeeping missions

This distinction between the Petersberg tasks and high-intensity combat has been a gray area in the European defense discussion To some supporters the European Unionrsquos ERRF was distinct from a European high-intensity network-based military capability while to others the higher end of the Petersberg tasks overlapped with high intensity combat and would require a network-based capability

With respect to C4ISR and network-based operations this distinction may not be signifi cant Any EU force that is intended to operate on a coalition basis will require C2 systems that cover the entire force Whether it is heavy and slow or light and mobile the utility of ISR systems for the total force is unarguable The European Unionrsquos review of capabilities and the goals being set clearly point toward more network-centric forces Moreover while the European Union can make use of both national (currently German British and French possibly Greek and Italian in the near future) and NATO operational headquarters (the latter under the Berlin Plus agreement) for controlling its missions these assets are not mobile European military planners are aware that a future ERRF would need dedicated mobile C2 and communications systems to deploy in the fi eld

The European Unionrsquos ability to deploy small and effective response forces has been further enhanced by a separate EU decision to create smaller mobile Battlegroups This decision began with a 2003 Franco-British agreement according to which they would encourage the European Union to develop a capability that could respond more rapidly than the emerging ERRF with particular attention to the readiness deployability interoperability and sustainability of such a force This goal was further elaborated in London in November 2003 the objective being a 1500-person EU force built on the model of Operation Artemis which could deploy in 15 days with appropriate transportation and sustainability

Increasingly offi cials working on the European Constitution realized that the Headline Goal force would only get part of the way toward the objective of rapid reaction and out-of-area operations (European Union 2003) The text of the European Unionrsquos draft constitution pointed toward a more ambitious European security strategy The fi nal report of the Conventionrsquos working group on defense called not only for the Headline Goal force but also for ldquosmaller rapid response elements with very high readinessrdquo including C2 intelligence and reconnaissance (European Convention Working Group ndash Defense 2002 5) The working group also recommended that the Petersberg tasks be updated and broadened to include confl ict prevention joint disarmament operations military advice and assistance post-confl ict stabilization and support for anti-terrorism operations in non-

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

110

European Union countries It urged Members States to implement more intense defense cooperation than that provided for in the Headline Goal force (European Convention Working Group ndash Defense 2002 23ndash4)

The 2004 Constitutional Treaty itself repeated many of these themes It amended the Petersberg tasks to include joint disarmament operations humanitarian and rescue missions provision of military advice and assistance confl ict prevention and peacekeeping crisis management peacemaking and post-confl ict stabilization It also tasked the proposed European Armaments Research and Military Capabilities Agency ndash todayrsquos European Defense Agency ndash with helping to identify the military capability objectives of the Member States and evaluate them (European Union 2004)

At the November 2004 EU Military Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels the members moved even further announcing the intention to create EU Battlegroups each numbering 1500 ground troops These will be smaller in scope than the ERRF but are intended to correct some of its shortcomings especially the need for more rapid deployment The Battlegroups are planned to reach the theater of operations in 15 days and sustain an operation for 30 days (120 days with rotation) France the UK and Italy each pledged to have one operational Battlegroup ready by the end of 2005 Ten other Battlegroups will be developed collaboratively by different combinations of EU Member States and one will include Norway a non-EU member These Battlegroups are intended to be operational by 2007 by which time the European Union should be able to undertake two concurrent Battlegroup-sized rapid response operations

The European Defense Agency

The constitutional discussion focused particular attention on the need for a more focused EU capability to deal with military requirements the evolution of capabilities to meet those requirements and the readiness of the European defense industrial and technology base to cope with those needs The Convention recommended the creation of a European Armaments and Strategic Research Agency to track progress toward the interoperability and force readiness necessary to accomplish the wider missions they were promoting (European Convention Working Group ndash Defense 2002 23ndash4) In 2003 this particular proposal was advanced on a separate track largely supported by French and British government policies The EU Council of Ministers decided to ask the Council staff to plan the implementation of the European Defense Agency well ahead of the schedule for ratifying and implementing the proposals for a new EU constitutional charter The mission of the agency was elaborated in detail in November 2003 including operational requirements strengthening the defense industrial and technological base defi ning a European capabilities and armaments policy and helping the Council evaluate the improvement of military capabilities

The Council decision created an Agency Establishment Team under High Representative Javier Solana to present proposals by April 2004 for decisions in June Those proposals were intended to move the EDA issue onto a fast track

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

111

covering the structure and organization of the agency its internal working methods its working relationship with the Council and the Commission ties with the Organization Conjoint pour la Cooperation en Matiere drsquoArmament (OCCAR) and the Western European Union (WEU) RampD programs (see below) its budget administration and staffi ng It was also to outline a fi rst operational program for the agency in the fi elds of capabilities development armaments cooperation industrial and technology base policy research promotion and potential plans for creating a European defense market

The Establishment Team of 12 led by British civil servant Nick Witney began work in February 2004 Its proposals moved toward creating a relatively small agency directed by a steering committee of ministers of defense and funded by joint contributions to an administrative fund They discussed creating a second funding arrangement in the European Union for defense RampT studies and only the gradual absorption of existing multilateral procurement activities such as OCCAR (Tigner 2004 4)

The Agency came into existence in the summer of 2004 Despite a modest 2005 budget of 25 million euros and a staff of 78 the EDA has made important progress in the fi rst year particularly in areas relevant to network-based operations Two ldquofl agship projectsrdquo have been initiated in the C4ISR realm The fi rst undertaken by the Agencyrsquos RampT Directorate funds projects related to long-endurance UAVs (described later in this chapter) The second headed by the Capabilities Directorate seeks to improve European capabilities and interoperability in command control and communications

Initially a joint EDA-EU Military Staff study identifi ed a wide range of C3I capability gaps Many were characterized as ldquoderiving from the absence of any detailed assessment of overall C3 requirements for ESDP or coherent architectures for satisfying themrdquo (Council of the European Union 2005 4) The study also highlighted the potential of software-defi ned radio for C3 interoperability and submitted a detailed proposal for pursuing additional C3 work to the Capabilities Steering Board While the overall direction of EDArsquos C3I agenda is still evolving it is likely to include specifi c problems in ongoing EU operations (such as Operation Althea in Bosnia) and the needs of the emerging Battlegroups In addition the agenda may explore improvements in EU procurement of satellite bandwidth for future operations (House of Lords 2005 21)

Focusing on capabilities

Despite these recent developments there is not currently a joint multinational force at the European level that can fi eld common C4ISR assets and carry out fully network-based operations It is not yet clear whether the Member States will commit the resources needed to upgrade and integrate the national capabilities already described Despite the budgetary constraints that make such a capability diffi cult there is an active process underway at the European level to give Member States the incentive to modernize and transform forces and equipment to make them more interoperable

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

112

The Headline Goal and the European Capabilities Action Plan have identifi ed capability shortfalls and set priorities for meeting them The initial Headline Goal and evaluation processes through 2001 identifi ed 19 critical shortfalls and a process for meeting shortfalls The ECAP panels each chaired by a Member State include eight capabilities relevant to network-based operations UAVs for surveillance and target acquisition deployable communications modules headquarters theater surveillance and reconnaissance air picture strategic ISR IMINT collection HALEMALE UAVs early warning and distant detection at the strategic level

This fi rst stage of the ECAP process led to reports submitted in March 2003 proposing changes to national contributions or new acquisitions to fi ll the capability gaps The May 2003 Capabilities Conference then identifi ed ten groups to develop strategies for fi lling key shortfalls through acquisition leasing multinational projects or role specialization three of which deal with C4ISR capabilities headquarters (United Kingdom lead) UAVs (French lead) and space-based assets (French lead)

The weakness of the ECAP process is that it is voluntary and not clearly linked to funding decisions or coordinated with the EU Military Staff The ECAP groups could not design long-term procurement plans as national planners and procurement specialists were not members Proposed acquisitions faced major political and fi nancial hurdles Moreover ECAP was designed in the context of the Headline Goal target and was not linked to the rapid deployment Battlegroups discussed above The European Council decided in November 2003 to tighten the process develop a clear roadmap and begin to identify objectives timelines and reporting procedures for each group

Progress has been made since with respect to headquarters medical treatment facilities and nuclear chemical and biological defenses However the ECAP process continues to lack clear leadership and coordination The ECAP approach leaves it up to the Member States to decide when and how additional capabilities should be acquired and makes it diffi cult to achieve results in areas that require signifi cant fi nancial investments such as strategic lift and air-to-air refueling

Pressure on the members was increased by requiring them to set goals and timelines and to publish their results in regular Capability Improvement Charts presented during each rotating EU Presidency Progress remains minimal however particularly in areas relevant for network-based operations There are currently no new or planned projects growing out of the ECAP process and a number of the ECAP Project Groups have indicated that they have reached or are close to reaching the maximum possible results within the current framework

In May 2005 the European Council approved an EDAEU Military Committee evaluation report on the ECAP The report included a detailed review of the ECAP Project Groups and suggested refocusing their work in the framework of the 2010 Headline Goal The Project Group on interoperability for humanitarian and evacuation operations will be discontinued while those on Special Forces and helicopters will continue in their present format All others will be incorporated into a new more integrated process coordinated by the European Defense Agency

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

113

in the framework of broader European Security and Defense Policy goals Under newly established Integrated Development Teams military technological and industrial representatives will generate specifi c projects to fulfi ll capability shortfalls Together with the newly outlined Headline Goal 2010 this revised process may provide incentives for Member States to reaffi rm their ECAP commitments

Industrial base planning

Over the past 15 years the national governments and Commission of the European Union have taken several steps to advance the issue of a Europe-wide armaments policy to match the emerging force requirements and to ensure a healthy industrial and technology base The creation of the EDArsquos Industry and Market Directorate is the latest such step

From the perspective of the defense industrial and technology base the Europeans have three options for arming national or cross-national forces with particular attention to their interoperability They could acquire advanced defense technology from the United States which was common during the Cold War Buying American however is increasingly unattractive to European governments given the lack of reciprocal access for European fi rms to the US defense market the diffi culties encountered with US export control and technology transfer regulations and processes and the negative impact it would have on the smaller European industrial and technology base (Adams 2001b 30ndash4)

The second option is to develop defense systems and technologies on a transatlantic basis US trade and technology transfer rules make this diffi cult though the European industry is pursuing this option as the strategic partnership of EADS and Northrop Grumman and the Thales Raytheon Systems joint venture suggest However European fi rms and governments have been concerned that their smaller fi rms could be swallowed up by larger American partners and about the risk that technology would fl ow only one way from Europe to the United States

The third option is for Europeans to strengthen their own defense industrial and technology base to be able to supply their own defense technology independently of the United States as well as to build partnerships with ndash and create competition for ndash US companies There has been growing support in Europe for this third option To sustain a European defense industrial and technology base however requires removing the intra-European barriers to industry relations technology transfer defense trade and cross-national acquisition The policy developments of the past decade at the European level are slowly defi ning a more trans-European defense market The most important change has been the development of multilateral institutions and processes that facilitate a trans-European defense market and cooperative defense procurement The creation of the European Defense Agency could be a critical breakthrough empowering the European Union to become a player in armaments policy a role previously constrained by the terms of the European Union treaties (Schmitt 2003a 2003b)

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

114

The emergence of a European armaments market and matching policy is likely to be critical to the prospects for success in the ECAP and in the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) The harmonization of military requirements the standardization of equipment to meet those requirements the elimination of acquisition and research redundancies budgetary savings and greater interoperability could all fl ow from this development Efforts to create a defense industrial policy at the EU level to harmonize rules governing requirements and defense trade to create a framework for cross-European defense acquisition programs and to create EU-level structures that can deal with arms market policies will all contribute to reaching these goals

This industrial and technology base process has been underway for nearly a decade but progress has been marked in recent years In 1996 France Germany Italy and the United Kingdom created a Joint Armaments Cooperation Organiza-tion (known by its French acronym OCCAR for Organization Conjoint pour la Cooperation en Matiere drsquoArmament) to manage specifi c cross-European defense programs including the HOT Roland and Milan missiles the Tiger helicopter and recently the A400M transport aircraft OCCAR is based on intergovernmental agreements and has been restricted to joint production programs not research and development Although OCCAR is not an EU entity as interest has grown in an EU-level armaments policy other European Union members have joined (Belgium) or intend to do so (Spain Netherlands Sweden) The organization achieved independent legal status in 2001

In 1998 the six largest arms producing countries (United Kingdom France Germany Sweden Italy and Spain) signed a Letter of Intent (LOI) to address jointly a number of areas of policy that would facilitate a more trans-European defense market for European industry The LOI process which follows a Framework Agreement announced in 2001 covers security of defense supply export control processes security of information military research and technology technical information and harmonization of military requirements This process is also outside the European Union framework and clearly intergovernmental it creates no new European-level structures or organizations The goal is to make national rules and procedures in these areas compatible with each other not to harmonize all standards or policies Though the process is slow and laborious it does put the national bureaucracies of six countries into a working process with each other in an effort to defi ne policies that will integrate the European defense market

Interest in armaments policy has also developed inside the European Union itself Article 296 of the Amsterdam Treaty provides that ldquoany Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or the trade in arms munitions and war materialrdquo (European Commission 2004 6) European Union members referred to this Article for years to protect national industrial and technology base decisions from being part of the EU agenda In 1995 however the EU Council of Ministers took a limited fi rst step toward addressing these concerns creating a working group on Armaments Policy (POLARM) POLARM

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

115

activity remained limited until the early 2000s when a broader interest in this policy area emerged in Europe (Schmitt 2003b 32)

The European Commission the EUrsquos supranational secretariat has also had an interest in armaments policy despite the reluctance of the members to become more active in this area Since 2000 the Commission has had direct authority over dual-use export controls in the European Union though national governments continue to defi ne the contents of the control list through negotiations and retain authority over purely military exports The Commission has also begun trying to shape broader armaments and defense market policies (European Commission 1997 2003a) and has also encouraged private sector activities that would support the emergence of a stronger European Union policy in this area (European Commission 2002) The Commission also plays a more direct role in the area of dual-use space programs such as Galileo as discussed in the next chapter

The Commission has been particularly concerned with the question of how to enhance interoperability The STAR 21 report sponsored by the Commission in 2002 focused on the goal of enhancing European interoperability both in the EU and NATO contexts and ensuring European autonomy from the United States if needed The report pointed out that to be interoperable with the US or act autonomously EU military requirements needed to he harmonized and RampD shared at a European level (European Commission 2002 29ndash30) The Commissionrsquos 2003 communication on armaments policy argued strongly for a ldquogenuine European Defense Equipment Marketrdquo to provide economies of scale greater acquisition bargaining power and especially to meet the needs of interoperability To achieve interoperability in a cost-effective way the Commission argued ldquothe solution would be to equip the national units that make up these forces increasingly with the same equipmentrdquo (European Commission 2003a 6)

Progress toward a coherent EU policy on armaments and greater interoperability and modern C4ISR across European forces will be slow at the European level The European Defense Agency will play a critical role defi ning capabilities goals more broadly than the Headline Goal devoting attention to network-centric C4ISR capabilities supporting research efforts to support those goals encouraging national governments to realign their budgets to acquire key technologies and systems coordinating national acquisitions and providing a central point for the realignment of the European defense market The EDA authority remains limited but over time it could develop the capabilities needed to perform these tasks at the European level as other EU-level policy institutions have done in the past

The EU process is largely an intergovernmental one and has led to relatively slow policy change The Member States will inevitably restrain EDArsquos activity To be fully effective it will need greater autonomy and a larger budget The linkages between its capabilities functions its evaluation functions its research support and its procurement functions will need to be clarifi ed The relationship with the Commission which manages its own armaments research policy process and has explicit responsibilities for industrial research competition and trade policy will need to be carefully defi ned Harmonizing its relationship with the

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

116

non-EU processes and organizations ndash OCCAR and the LOI ndash will be complex But the fi rst steps toward greater European-level responsibilities for defense and armaments policy have clearly been taken

Defense research and technology programs

The European defense research and technology investment and harmonization of national RampT investments will be key to achieving greater interoperability and networked forces without major additional budget expenditures The United States outspends the European NATO allies by a ratio of 51 on total defense RampD a ratio that has grown with the increases in US defense budgets in the early 2000s The United States RampT investment has also explicitly focused on network-centric technologies military transformation and C4ISR By contrast European RampT investments remain largely national duplicative and poorly coordinated across national boundaries making the total less than the sum of its parts

The general view in Europe is that most EU Member States underspend on research and development In 2002 the European Council set a goal of spending three per cent of GDP on RampD in each Member State by 2010 At current growth rates the EU average will reach only 23 per cent by that year Only two European countries Sweden and Finland currently spend above the 3 per cent target and the European Union average is still just under 2 per cent (compared to 27 per cent in the United States) (European Commission 2003c 48 52) In defense RampD the trend is even less promising In 2001 the Member States of the European Union spent slightly over $9 billion on defense-related RampD or 75 per cent of the average defense budget (compared with almost 14 per cent of the US defense budget in the same year) (Adams et al 2004 122)

Article 296 of the Amsterdam Treaty has made it diffi cult for the European Commission to address the RampD problem restricting Commission action to cases where trade policies or dual-use RampD investments distorted the operations of the civilian common market Moreover due to the sensitivity of the issue for some Member States the Commission intervened reluctantly and slowly As a result defense research and technology investments have remained a domain for the Member States with relatively little cooperation in the EU context (James and Gummett 1998)

The Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) program of the WEU has been a major exception at the European-level WEAG was created when the WEU absorbed the Independent European Program Group (IEPG) which between 1976 and 1992 had acted as an armaments procurement cooperation forum for all of the European NATO countries (except Iceland) Since its establishment WEAG which has 19 members has stimulated collaborative defense RampT programs among its member countries and has examined the harmonization of defense requirements and opening national defense markets to European-wide competition Separately an agreement the System Of Cooperation for Research And Technology in Europe (SOCRATE) was created in 1998 to enable Finland and Sweden ndash at that time not WEAG members ndash to participate in WEAG RampD projects Later SOCRATE

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

117

was amended to allow the participation of Austria the Czech Republic Hungary and Poland The annual WEAG budget has averaged about 100 million euros in recent years WEAG defense technology RampT is handled under Panel II of the organization (Panel I being concerned with cooperative equipment procurement and Panel II with policies and procedures to enhance collaboration) Under this panel there exist several instruments for collaborative RampT

WEAG Panel IIrsquos fi rst instrument formed in 1989 was European Cooperation for the Long Term in Defense (EUCLID) EUCLID supports projects proposed by government representatives that are jointly funded by the participating governments and the private sector The work is carried out by an industrial consortium including at least one company from each of the participating nations EUCLID covers 13 Common European Priority Areas (CEPA) of technology These include such network-oriented technologies as UAVs and robotics military space and advanced communications Each CEPA has its own Lead Nation appointed by WEAG Panel II responsible for reporting on its activities and an industrial team of leading companies

The second WEAG instrument is the Technology Arrangements for Laboratories for Defense European Science (THALES) Signed in November 1996 THALES facilitates cooperation between government-owned or sponsored defense research agencies although governments may choose to designate a private-sector entity to undertake work on specifi c projects The collaborative projects in the THALES framework are Joint Programs (JP) established within the EUCLID CEPAs in a manner identical to the way EUCLID collaborations are formed Each of the participants in the JP is responsible for placing contracts or making arrangements at the national level

A third mechanism EUROFINDER allows industry to propose RampD projects and receive co-funding for them Proposals need not be associated with any particular WEAG CEPA but since they address national defense RampT strategies they are often aligned with government technology priorities Once a year the WEAG members receive and evaluate proposals from industry Each EUROFINDER program is co-funded by the governments that wish to participate and by the industrial participants The work is carried out by industrial consortia including at least one company from each of the nations that take part in the program Since the start of the EUROFINDER program in 1996 188 proposals have been received of which about half were funded

The fi nal WEAG mechanism the European Understandings for Research Organization Programs and Activities (EUROPA) was created in May 2001 It enables any two or more signatories to propose the creation of a European Research Grouping (ERG) to carry out one or more individual or collaborative RampT projects with a relatively larger degree of fl exibility than that offered by the EUCLID or THALES The fi rst ERG was created by 14 countries in late 2001 but membership in ERGs varies EUROPA also requires WEAG members to provide regular information on the areas of defense RampT in which they are prepared to cooperate This information is then used by WEAG to identify opportunities for cooperation and to fl ag duplicative work being undertaken

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

118

WEAG has succeeded in providing a discussion forum on European armaments cooperation Since its Member States each have an equal vote countries with strong defense industries cannot impose their goals on the others In terms of actual RampT projects however WEAGrsquos accomplishments are more modest Its membership includes both producer and consumer countries with different requirements and technological capabilities and decisions must be taken by consensus Projects that benefi t only a small number of countries such as those related to power projection or technologies for out-of-theater operations do not have priority (Assembly of WEU 2002)

The Western European Armaments Organization (WEAO) also operates under the WEU framework Created in 1996 WEAO provides administrative support to the WEAO Board of Directors and WEAG Panel II and legal assistance for countries signing RampT collaboration agreements for specifi c WEAG projects WEAO can implement WEAG decisions on defense RampT because it has the authority and the necessary legal power to place contracts By 2001 it had facilitated the creation of 120 projects with a total of 500 million euros in funding (WEAG 2002)

In April 2005 the Steering Board of the European Defense Agency agreed that the EDA will gradually absorb the activities of the WEAG and WEAO in particular those covering RampT The hope is to make defense RampT more cost-effective and tie it more closely to the capabilities needed for the European Security and Defense Policy

At the same time the EDA Steering Board approved a set of principles governing the Agencyrsquos RampT functions including plans to establish networks of government research center industry and international experts bodies to collaborate in specifi c areas In July of 2005 the Agencyrsquos RampT Directorate announced that it had selected two critical technology areas involving long-endurance UAVs for which it intends to contract out initial technology demonstration studies with 2005 budget funds The two areas ndash survivability and digital data links ndash were chosen by national experts as covering critical gaps not addressed by ongoing European UAV programs In addition more than ten other critical technology areas identifi ed by national experts may be addressed separately as ad hoc cooperation projects by Member States by future EDA-funded studies or under industry initiatives

Despite the limitation in Article 296 the European Commission has also begun to be a major player in European-level RampD Since 1983 the Commission has managed its own civilian collaborative RampD program the Framework Program (FP) The FP is now in its sixth round of 4-year funding cycles with 175 billion euros committed to fund projects between 2003 and 2006

Firms universities or government agencies wishing to receive FP funding create RampD consortia (made up of a minimum of three partners at least two from European Member States) and submit joint project ideas in response to Commission calls for proposals The consortia may also include participants from various non-EU states (Associated States) such as Switzerland Norway and Israel which have signed collaboration agreements with the EC The Commission funds 50 per cent of the project costs FP projects can currently only cover civilian technologies though these very often include research with dual-use or military

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

119

applications such as aerospace energy (including nuclear energy) life sciences and information technologies

In the fi rst annual work program for FP6 announced in 2002 proposals were requested in intelligent vehicles and aircraft interoperable information and communications networks end-to-end SATCOM systems and data fusion among others It has been estimated that approximately one-third of the projects funded by FPs could be considered as dual-use projects (European Commission 1996) Thales EADS British Aerospace and many other European defense fi rms are active participants in these FP projects

In 2003 the Commission moved more directly into the defense-related research arena announcing the Preparatory Action on Security Research (PASR) as its contribution to the EU goal of addressing key security challenges Between 2004 and 2006 the PASR focused on bridging the gap between civilian research supported by the Framework Program and national and intergovernmental defense programs Funding for the PASR combined Commission funds national ministerial budgets (defense and non-defense) and industry contributions After two calls for proposals the Commission invested approximately 30 million euros in 24 security research projects covering border and coastal surveillance aviation security detection of biological and chemical agents situational awareness securing critical infrastructures and satellite intelligence

Though relatively modest in scope and size the PASR nevertheless represents an important fi rst step for the Commission as it begins to initiate and oversee multi-national security RampT activities and link them with its overall RampT activities With the seventh Framework Program starting in 2007 the Commission will include security space and homeland security research and development as parts of its portfolio for the fi rst time As in prior programs every Member State will contribute to the overall budget but the Commission will allocate funds for specifi c projects following the FP guidelines

FP7 may differ from its predecessors however in having a proposed duration of seven years and an annual budget of over 10 billion euros Moreover while there have been Commission investments in defense- and security-related research through dual-use and specifi c civilian projects setting aside specifi c funds (proposed at 570 million euros annually) for such fi elds as earth observation and detection of chemical and biological agents could be an important fi rst step in the development of a European-wide security capability

Conclusion

The European Union is starting to emerge as an increasingly important context for European planning with regard to expeditionary operations military capabilities defense procurement industrial policy and research and technology investment all with direct relevance to strengthening European C4ISR capabilities While the European-level agenda does not explicitly focus on C4ISR interoperability as a priority target the planning and investment choices being made point inexorably in that direction

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

120

The primary weaknesses of the ERRF ndash swift deployability and the capacity to conduct high-intensity operations ndash have been addressed through the creation of the Battlegroups which are coming into existence quickly C4ISR will be a critical element in the ability of these Battlegroups to operate either in coalition with or autonomously from the United States

The creation and rapid institutionalization of the European Defense Agency is a key development It reports directly to the European Council and has taken on critical functions in the emerging European defense identity The EDA promises to give more attention to a capabilities process that had begun to lag and is positioned to combine that process with its focus on the industrial and technology base It has singled out two critical C4ISR shortfalls ndash long-endurance UAVs and C3 systems ndash a decision that holds promise for Europersquos future ability to carry out network-based operations Moreover projects can move ahead in the EDA framework without requiring the agreement of all the Member States avoiding the problem of the ldquolowest common denominatorrdquo common to other European efforts

There has also been signifi cant progress at the European level in the areas of industrial policy and security-related research and technology investment The European Defense Agency and the European Commission have both initiated important collaborative security RampT programs involving key private sector actors The consolidation of WEAG and WEAO programs into the EDA will allow a tighter focus on the needs of the emerging European defense capability

Within this general strengthening of European-level institutions and planning processes related to defense C4ISR cannot help but emerge as a central issue and funding priority It will be critical to allowing the Europeans to mount a capability that can operate both in coalition with the United States and on its own

121

6

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS FOR

NETWORK-BASED OPERATIONS

From command and control through military communications and intelligence gathering to weapons targeting space-based systems have become a key part of a nationrsquos military capabilities Space systems are increasingly important for monitoring potential threats managing military forces and carrying out combat operations They are being closely integrated into the military C4ISR architecture both in Europe and the United States Furthermore military space capabilities are increasingly dependent on the private sector While the Cold War years were characterized by largely military activity in space the 1990s witnessed a surge of private sector pursuits and commercial space launches began to exceed national security missions Today government agencies worldwide are contracting space programs and services out to companies and multinational consortia and relying on multiple commercial contractors and sub-contractors for their space programs In addition many existing space assets and launch vehicles are now owned by private fi rms or international entities rather than by countries (Krepon 2003 8ndash9)

US military forces are highly dependent on space assets for pre-confl ict global awareness and planning for communications and for combat operations Increasingly European countries are also relying on space assets and are researching testing and deploying them as central ingredients of national and trans-European military capabilities In addition European space programs are increasingly based on cross-national cooperation achieving a degree of interoperability through non-NATO agreements and arrangements Space is a signifi cant European security and dual-use investment that could over time enhance European autonomy from US defense operations and increase trans-European interoperability while providing nodes for transatlantic interoperability as well It is not clear however whether the trans-national European capability will be Europe-wide or be restricted to a few dominant players in the European space arena

The role of space systems

Space-based assets are able to provide unimpeded continuous and persistent coverage of large areas of the globe This provides a signifi cant advantage when undertaking expeditionary warfare combating terrorism WMD counter-

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

122

proliferation and disaster management Embedding space assets in a joint and networked manner can link headquarters and units both at home and in the fi eld without geographical limitations

The fi rst key defense role for satellites has been communications In the 1950s Arthur C Clarke was the fi rst to recognize that three satellites in geosynchronous orbit spaced equidistant along the equator could provide worldwide communications coverage between the latitudes of approximately 60ordmN and 60ordmS while remaining relatively secure from attack Since the fi rst geosynchronous satellites were launched in the 1960s communications satellites have proliferated and become a staple of the global communications industry They provide a redundant network that is largely independent from terrestrial communications systems and can deliver broadband communications anywhere within their area of coverage via increasingly smaller and lighter terminals and handheld phones (DalBello 2003 217) In the 1990s Iridium the fi rst fully functional polar-orbiting satellite communication system was launched Polar-orbiting satellites provide communications at high latitudes but compared to geosynchronous systems they are extremely complex and expensive to build launch and operate The Iridium constellation of 66 satellites was a technical success but a commercial failure and its major customer today is the US Department of Defense

As discussed earlier France the United Kingdom Italy and Spain operate dedicated or partially dedicated military geosynchronous satellites for military communications Germany leases time on commercial satellites and is planning for dedicated military satellites in the future However no European country currently operates the necessary trio of dedicated military communications satellites to achieve full global coverage Only the United States has such coverage obtained through the low-earth orbit Iridium series and through its geosynchronous satellites

Many countries including the United States lease commercial satellite capacity for non-sensitive communications relying on dedicated military satellite communications for secure transmissions However commercial systems are not as secure as the ones dedicated to military use and commercial business practices may confl ict with military objectives making their use for military communications uncertain (Baker et al 2001)

Reconnaissance and surveillance is the second area where space offers signifi cant advantages for military and security operations The United States and the Soviet Union fi rst orbited reconnaissance satellites during the height of the Cold War in the 1960s these fi rst ldquospy satellitesrdquo used panchromatic and infrared fi lm dropped to earth in sealed containers from satellites for processing and analysis In the mid-1970s digital electro-optical systems fl ying in polar orbits allowed operators to image any place on Earth and return the images by means of electronic transmission thereby increasing satellite fl exibility and longevity In the civilian world NASA led the way in the development of such satellites with the building and launching of the Landsat series of satellites beginning in July 1972 However clouds and dark of night hamper the highly sophisticated digital cameras placed on these satellites Hence more recently synthetic aperture radar systems

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

123

operating at microwave frequencies have been developed Although synthetic aperture radar satellites provide imagery with reduced sharpness compared to the best electro-optical systems they can pierce through cloud cover and darkness

In Europe only France currently operates dedicated earth observation satellites Helios 1 and 2 However France Germany Italy and the United Kingdom are all developing electro-optical and synthetic aperture radar reconnaissance satellites The United States operates highly sophisticated reconnaissance satellite systems the exact technological capabilities of which remain highly classifi ed The United States and other countries also rely on high-resolution commercial remote sensing satellites to satisfy part of their need for routine reconnaissance data

Early warning and signals intelligence are still other areas where satellites can be used for military and security purposes The United States operates a series of surveillance satellites that monitors the globe for signs of a missile launch as well as signals intelligence satellites for monitoring communications and electronic transmissions around the world The latter have been reportedly put to use to detect communications from would-be terrorists No European countries currently operate such systems though French defense planners are in the early stages of developing their own signals intelligence and missile early warning systems including several pilot projects already in orbit

Digital technologies have revolutionized the handling of data and information from space systems allowing analysts to merge digital imagery maps with data from UAVs AWACS aircraft and other sources to create powerful information products that give fi eld commanders improved awareness of the battlefi eld and enhanced capabilities for defeating the adversary All of this information can now be sent quickly and effi ciently regionally or globally via modern communications infrastructures including communications satellites

The sophistication and quality of European space technology is very high and growing fast driven primarily by civil and commercial needs Ultimately the development of space systems to support network-based operations will depend on how much funding the European countries are willing to direct toward space systems On the European level it will also depend on the extent to which the individual countries are willing to cooperate and share resources As noted below the initial signs are encouraging particularly in satellite communications and earth observation underscored by the robust attempt to create a resilient space policy between the European Union and the European Space Agency along with the Member States Nevertheless funding constraints and the burden of legacy systems may limit investment in space systems

Changing attitudes toward European military space systems

Until recently Europe was not expected to build or deploy systems that allowed them to use space for defense purposes and most European militaries have been reluctant to include dedicated space systems in their budgets Europeans have focused more on civilian uses of space benefi ting from the defense applications

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

124

of civilian systems For example only the United Kingdom Italy and France have launched dedicated military communications satellite systems and Francersquos Helios electro-optical earth observation system is still the only dedicated military reconnaissance satellite deployed by a European country Most of Europersquos 5 billion euro annual expenditure on space goes to civilian programs compared to about 50 per cent of the $40 billion annual US investment The European space industry though employing some 40000 people and generating a turnover of roughly 55 billion euros is much more dependent on the commercial market than its US counterparts (Keohane 2004 3)

Europersquos existing and planned security space programs are generally being initiated as dual-use programs The dual-use approach especially if initiated as a commercial investment has the advantage of saving defense euros for other air- ground- or sea-based military systems Francersquos Syracuse-3 communications satellites ndash its fi rst dedicated military communications satellite ndash and Helios satellites were both preceded by civilian programs The same is true for the United Kingdomrsquos Skynet communication satellite systems as well as the Spanish Hispasat and the Italian SICRAL systems Germany Italy and Spain are also developing dedicated military communications satellites after earlier investments in dual-use systems Francersquos Helios system is based on technology originally developed for the civilian SPOT series of satellites The French Pleiades electro-optical system and the Italian COSMO Skymed synthetic aperture radar system both currently under development are intentionally dual-purpose in nature Both are elements of a cooperative program between France and Italy Germanyrsquos SAR-Lupe dedicated military radar satellite is possible in large part because of the substantial investment the European Space Agency and the German Aerospace Center have made in basic synthetic aperture radar technology Nevertheless some systems such as early warning and electronic surveillance have no clear-cut civilian counterparts and need to be pursued for their own sake though they use subsystems and technologies developed under civil budgets

More recently European interest in the security uses of space has grown signifi cantly and leadership in this area has begun to shift from France toward the European Union Events both internal and external to Europe have contributed to this changing perspective on the uses of space for military purposes

The recent confl icts that the US military was involved in have signifi cantly contributed to changing Europersquos approach to military space Policymakers and military commanders witnessed on a daily basis the considerable advantage the United States drew from space systems combined with new UAVs and the ability to fuse geospatial data (satellite remote sensing signals from GPS satellites and digital maps) with real-time video The US militaryrsquos ability to integrate space capabilities into its network of systems was a critical catalyst of change in European military space policy Infl uential military theorists primarily in France began to press for greater European attention to the development of pan-European security space systems (Hancart 2003 Gavoty 2003a 2003b) These include satellite communications remote sensing and military enhancements to Galileo Europersquos

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

125

major aerospace companies including EADS Alcatel Snecma and Thales have been supportive of these calls to increased investments in security space

The fi rst example of a major European space program with considerable security implications is the Galileo Positioning Navigation and Timing (PNT) system Driven in its inception almost entirely by a political desire for greater commercial autonomy and reliability Europe has pressed forward with this independent system which will duplicate the capability of the US Global Positioning System (GPS) Galileo will be very much a dual-use and trans-European capability Its development is led jointly by the European Commissionrsquos Directorate General for Transportation and the European Space Agency which is by charter civilian in character

The military utility of Galileo has not gone unnoticed by Europersquos defense departments which now depend heavily on the US GPS system for positioning and navigation services The French military especially has funded research on the potential military capabilities of Galileo and plans to use both Galileo and GPS in future operations Other European countries are also considering similar policies and are likely to follow suit The European Union is also planning to use Galileo in support of the European Security and Defense Policy

The Galileo system is currently designed to include 30 satellites and begin offering its services in 2008 The European Commission and the European Space Agency have invested a total of 11 billion euros in the development of initial technologies and in the building of experimental satellites Another 23 billion euros will be spent on building and launching the full constellation of satellites and to prepare for commercial operations To date the building and launching of the fi rst four satellites has been awarded to Galileo Industries a company co-owned by Alcatel Space of France Alenia Spazio of Italy EADS Astrium of Germany Thales and a Spanish consortium of seven companies These four satellites are expected to be launched by the end of 2008 at which point the European Commission and the European Space Agency will award the contract for building the additional 26 satellites and for operating the complete system Europe has also opened participation in the Galileo program to non-European countries China Israel India and Ukraine have joined the program since its inception and negotiations are underway with several other countries

The Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) program which is essentially a strategy for organizing and utilizing Europersquos many already existing and planned earth observation systems represents a second important Europe-wide space initiative with defense implications The GMES program focuses primarily on sustainable development and environmental management and is part of Europersquos efforts to obtain the ability to track regional as well as global environmental trends Like Galileo GMES was initially conceived as a civil program with security considerations added later Like Galileo GMES is managed jointly by the European Commission and the European Space Agency with participation from various other European organizations and fi rms If successful GMES will provide sharply improved better-coordinated European

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

126

capabilities to observe and analyze the environment and human activities on Earth using both new and existing earth observation systems

The GMES program is being undertaken in two phases The fi rst period completed in 2002ndash3 examined the current strengths and weaknesses of the European capacity for space-based environmental and security monitoring and identifi ed the areas that required further investment and research The second or implementation period runs from 2004ndash8 and involves the initial development of infrastructures and capabilities that were identifi ed in the initial period Thus in the near term GMES will develop new information systems and techniques to exploit Europersquos existing space-based earth observation capabilities more effi ciently In the longer term it will serve as a guiding program for planning new earth observation systems

Although focused primarily on European environmental and security concerns the satellite contributions to GMES will be global in scope Most remote sensing satellites orbit in polar orbits taking them over the entire earth as it turns beneath them Europe is still working out the detailed focus and scope of the security aspects of GMES but discussions are tending toward a more activist interpretation of the Petersberg tasks humanitarian relief rescue peacekeeping and crisis management Some of the capabilities developed in the global GMES program could be used for example to enhance Europersquos warfi ghting efforts far from its borders In particular the broader earth observation and analysis capabilities provided by GMES will prove extremely useful for the European military and intelligence community especially when combined with reconnaissance information provided by both the dedicated security and the explicitly dual-use earth observation space systems currently underway

Parallel to Galileo and GMES a European Space Policy has begun to emerge under the auspices of the European Union Starting in the late 1990s the European Union particularly the European Commission began to have increased infl uence in European civil space affairs The EC supplements national space investments by funding research and operation of space systems in support of EU programs and policies and while the European Union continues to depend on the indigenous space programs of individual Member States and on the European Space Agency to provide the technological capabilities for EU programs it is increasingly using its political and economic authority to set the overall direction of Europersquos space efforts

In January 2003 the European Commission published a draft policy paper on space for discussion revision and adoption by the Member States and the European Space Agency After a series of formal consultations the paper was fi nalized in November 2003 as a White Paper laying out a proposed European space policy including defense uses of space

Europe needs an extended space policy driven by demand able to exploit the special benefi ts space technologies can deliver in support of the Unionrsquos policies and objectives faster economic growth job creation and industrial

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

127

competitiveness enlargement and cohesion sustainable development and security and defence

(European Commission 2003b 5 [Emphasis in original])

The White Paper refers explicitly to the uses of space systems to support the European Unionrsquos Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defense Policy Further the very existence of a successful project such as Galileo usable by the entire world is seen as a visible symbol both of growing strategic independence from US policies and also of a more unifi ed Europe offering the prospect of future European success in space (Bescond 2003 40ndash3) A successful GMES program will also strengthen the visibility and acceptability of the European commitment to space systems

In November 2003 the European Commission and the European Space Agency also signed a formal Framework Agreement on Space intended to support ldquothe coherent and progressive development of an overall European Space Policyrdquo (Council of the European Union 2003 5) This agreement further underscored the growing infl uence of the European Union in European space affairs and provides the framework for potential expansion of Europersquos investment in space It focuses cooperation between the two organizations on securing Europersquos independent and cost-effective access to space so that it can continue to be self-reliant in the application and use of space technologies and on ensuring that space activities are undertaken in line with EU policies in particular those supporting sustainable development economic growth and employment The Framework Agreement on Space is intended to consolidate European knowledge of space in a network of centers of excellence thereby achieving greater Europe-wide coherence and synergy between national efforts Specifi c technology areas singled out for initial collaboration include launchers communications satellites earth observation and navigation

Space and space technologies were also included in the EU Constitutional Treaty Article III-254 reads

1 To promote scientifi c and technical progress industrial competitiveness and the implementation of its policies the Union shall draw up a European space policy To this end it may promote joint initiatives support research and technological development and coordinate the efforts needed for the exploration and exploitation of space2 To contribute to attaining the objectives referred to in paragraph 1 European laws or framework laws shall establish the necessary measures which may take the form of a European space program

(European Union 2004 117ndash18)

Elsewhere in the Treaty in Article I-14 covering areas of shared competence space is called out as a shared competence between the European Union and other European entities

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

128

In the areas of research technological development and space the Union shall have competence to carry out actions in particular to defi ne and implement programs however the exercise of that competence may not result in Member States being prevented from exercising theirs

(European Union 2004 22)

Although the Treaty does not include any reference to security space it generally boosts the profi le of space technologies in Europe and European promotion of investment in space systems This will assist proponents of increased emphasis on the use of space in military and security operations and especially in network-based ones

The road to integrated European space systems

These promising European moves toward advanced space-based assets face numerous challenges before they become integral parts of a trans-European network or fully interoperable with the United States One challenge will be integrating space systems into existing European air ground and sea-based command control communications and intelligence capabilities US experience suggests this will be a diffi cult task However the less developed European capability to conduct network-based operations may prove a blessing in disguise allowing the Europeans to learn from the mistakes the United States has made European learning through interaction with the United States in NATO and in coalition operations could reduce the time and expenditure for the European integration effort

A second challenge will be the competition for EU resources especially following enlargement of the Union in May 2004 to include Cyprus the Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Malta Poland Slovakia and Slovenia The expansion will likely add complexity to advancing and coordinating European security space capabilities The new countries will most likely wish to join the space efforts underway in the more technologically advanced partner countries since these provide them with the opportunity to participate in space systems development without starting from scratch The new partners may also bring additional resources to this effort but their relatively weaker economies could slow progress More fundamentally EU enlargement is a costly process Space investments at the trans-European level are likely to compete with other priorities such as regional development and agriculture making it diffi cult to fulfi ll the White Paperrsquos call for increased funding for space systems

A third challenge will be legitimizing the use of space assets for defense purposes given the politics of space in the European context The European Space Agencyrsquos Convention expressly limits its participation to peaceful space efforts though the space programs of the individual countries generally have no such prohibition This could complicate the integration of Galileo into defense planning Furthermore security uses of GMES are currently still limited to supporting the Petersberg Tasks Because of these limitations pressure grew in 2003 and 2004 to

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

129

redefi ne the term ldquopeacefulrdquo As a result technologies that contribute to defensive strategies and that can have supportive roles in warfi ghting may in the future fall under the ldquopeacefulrdquo category Reshaping the defi nition would explicitly allow the European Space Agency to take on security-related tasks and to expand the scope of GMES into the gray areas between peacekeeping and peacemaking allowing closer integration with national and European network-based strategies

Under the leadership of its director Jacques Dordin the European Space Agency recently re-evaluated its Convention concluding that it does not restrict the agencyrsquos ability to engage in programs aimed at defense and security for national or international security and defense institutions The Agency also established a security clearance system that enables it to handle classifi ed information In addition the neutral members of the European Space Agency have signaled that they are willing to have the Agency take on a more active space security role for Europe as a whole Lastly a recent study led by the Instituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) has recommended that the European Space Agency engage in dual-use RampD for space technologies and suggested that the European Union might benefi t by setting up a European Security and Defense Advanced Projects Agency with a small non-permanent staff and fl exible mission-based activity Like the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) this agency would provide a framework for pursuing a strategic approach to developing the applied technologies of the future combining a well-defi ned vision with highly responsive structures and methods (Silvestri 2003 6ndash7)

Just how far Europe will go to emphasize development of dual-use space systems or to create an agency such as this remains to be seen The European Commissionrsquos Preparatory Action on Security Research (PASR) has already funded collaborative projects on using geospatial data for increased situational awareness and on uses of advanced space technologies for expeditionary and crisis management operations It remains to be seen however whether this initial effort can be expanded as part of the Thematic Priority on Security and Space under the European Commissionrsquos seventh research and technology Framework Program

A fi nal challenge will be to coordinate the defense-related space assets currently deployed by EU Member States In earth observation satellites as with civilian space activities France has taken a lead shifting its national strategy from autonomous national systems to promoting multilateral cooperation at the European level French leadership has brought together Germany Italy Spain Belgium and Greece in a joint program ndash the Common Operational Requirements (know by its French name Besoins Opeacuterationnels Communs or BOC) ndash to develop common requirements for security-related earth observation Through the BOC participants are developing a federation of data providers and users that will collect and distribute earth observations data among its members Each member brings different but largely complementary capabilities to the table The BOC is an expansion of cooperative arrangements already underway between France and Italy on Pleiades and COSMO-Skymed and between France and Germany on Pleiades and SAR-Lupe Linking electro-optical and synthetic aperture radar observation satellites will create a very powerful reconnaissance tool

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

130

The EU Satellite Center (EUSC) in Torrejoacuten Spain has also contributed to coordinating European activities related to earth observation It was established in 1991 as the WEU Satellite Center and transferred to the European Union in 2002 It provides the European Union with an analysis of earth observation space imagery to support decision-making in foreign and security policy issues It currently handles space imagery received from the French SPOT the US Landsat 4 and 5 and Indian IRS-1C and D satellites as well as from Russian commercial satellites Within the next few years it will also begin collecting and analyzing data from additional space-based systems including Helios 2 and SAR-Lupe Some imagery from these systems will be delivered free of charge others will have to be paid for In any case the Satellite Center EU offi cials will not be allowed to task the satellites directly

The picture of European collaboration on communications satellites is slightly less clear Though France and the United Kingdom have previously cooperated on satellite communications programs it remains to be seen whether or not the other main players in European space development ndash Germany Italy and Spain ndash will participate In the 1990s France sought to interest Germany and Italy in contributing to the development of Helios 2 but those arrangements fell through in large part as a result of German reluctance to tie itself too tightly to a French initiative In the 1990s French planners also sought to broaden cooperation in military satellite communications through Trimilsatcom a system that was to be co-developed with the United Kingdom and Germany This communications satellite program was intended to meet the common military needs of the proposed partners However the Trimilsatcom effort failed because the partners were unable to integrate their requirements into a common program and agree on a schedule for meeting them (Nardon 2001)

European cooperation on communications satellites has however extended to the NATO framework As noted earlier the Alliance selected a European solution for its next generation satellite communications capability In May 2004 NATO announced that a Joint Consortium of France Italy and the United Kingdom would provide the new constellation of communications satellites which will replace the two existing NATO-owned communications satellites and provide NATO with an improved capability This expanded coverage will include ships at sea and NATOrsquos AWACS early warning aircraft

Beyond intra-European collaboration looms the challenge of transatlantic collaboration While the emerging European security space policies hold some promise for enhanced transatlantic interoperability strong US resistance to more fl exible rules for transatlantic technology transfer is likely to make this diffi cult In response to this problem European companies have begun to use fewer US components in space systems A recent agreement between the European Commission and the European Space Agency calls for a technology development program to assist in insulating European fi rms from US technology export rules and for greater cooperation in this area with such countries as China and India However it also calls for closer cooperation with the US Air Force Furthermore it is to be hoped that the United States and Europe can forge a workable agreement

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

131

on the relationship between Galileo and GPS which could spill over into other forms of space cooperation

There has been considerable progress on European space in the past decade and a growing realization that space will play a role in European defense planning The results remain mixed however While space may play a greater role in the future there are a number of countervailing pressures and challenges budgetary and political which will slow the rate at which this trend emerges

132

7

THE EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

FOR NETWORK-BASED CAPABILITIES

Though the pace of transformation is uneven the major European defense powers have been developing and fi elding state-of-the-art capabilities for conducting network-based operations One important source they have been drawing on for this effort is the European defense industrial and technology base In 2001 the total revenues for the European C4ISR market were estimated at close to $7 billion with a compound annual growth rate of 47 per cent (Frost and Sullivan 2002 1ndash1) Advances in technology and changes in military doctrines have contributed to the marketrsquos growth and are expected to continue to do so in the coming years While this chapter does not provide a comprehensive survey of this market it discusses in some detail the industrial organizations and capabilities that have been most important to the emerging European C4ISR technologies A broad review suggests the European industrial and technology base contains signifi cant capacity for C4ISR work including a number of leading companies engaged in critical development and production work in the areas of C2 communications and ISR In addition much of this work is collaborative both across European countries and across the Atlantic

Overview

The term ldquodefense industrial baserdquo is in reality a misnomer in the area of European C4ISR Several of the countries under discussion in this study are using networking technologies in areas that go beyond defense ndash to commercial communication homeland security and civilian space operations Moreover the technology base on which C4ISR programs draw is increasingly dual-use or entirely commercial as is especially the case for information and communications technologies A review of the industrial and technology base then requires examining not only defense suppliers but commercial fi rms providing these technologies for commercial civilian and defense applications

Communications command and control sensors and advanced materials are only a few of the technologies commercial fi rms can provide for military applications Military sensors for example will integrate technologies in electro-optics and biotechnology that are commercial in origin It remains true however that with the ministries of defense as the principal market for these technologies

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

133

more traditional defense suppliers may enjoy advantageous access having experience of doing business with the defense customer and a track record of military-specifi c products

The fi rms most relevant to C4ISR technologies are as might be expected concentrated in the more militarily advanced members of the EU ndash France Germany Italy Spain and the United Kingdom ndash as well as in Sweden which developed a relatively autonomous base to support its strategy of neutrality However given the role of commercial technology in C4ISR there are also signifi cant capabilities in other smaller countries that make a contribution Firms with strong research development and manufacturing capacity in biotechnology robotics nanotechnology information and telecommunications technologies can be found throughout Europe Finland is home to Nokia and a host of other mobile telecommunications companies with cutting-edge technologies at the core of the nationrsquos networking efforts Barco a global leader in display visualization and simulation technologies is Belgian Moreover these highly innovative commercial companies have been supported for decades by European government investment in civilian RampD so are not newcomers when it comes to doing business with national governments and with the European Union

There are both advantages and disadvantages to having such a widespread industrial and technology base for C4ISR The advantage is that public funds can be spent in ways that strengthen an existing national industrial base and national technologies The disadvantage is that developing and networking advanced C4ISR systems requires a broad range of expertise in designing developing integrating and operating complex systems and expertise that is rarely available solely from the industry within one country European governments typically spend defense resources with the goal of supporting local industry but such a policy approach does not always provide forces with the most advanced or capable technology In the C4ISR area greater effi ciency and deeper transformation may depend on a strategy that uses the most global industrial base pooling technological capabilities sharing costs and reducing risks

The evolution of the European industrial technology base which is becoming more networked and global is likely to encourage such a trend making the domestic political tradeoffs more diffi cult Over the past decade there has been a pronounced move toward consolidation of the European industrial base and extensive mergers and acquisitions involving several major defense companies Moreover large defense-related fi rms have begun to merge with acquire or form partnerships with companies that have expertise in such areas as electro-optics and communications often in the commercial market arena Combining capabilities across borders can sometimes help overcome the ldquolocal buyingrdquo preference of governments as a trans-national fi rm or partnership can move workshares around to accommodate local needs Much of the expertise required for C4ISR and network-based capabilities is to be found in such trans-national companies and partnerships

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

134

The big three Thales EADS and BAE Systems

Thales

Thales is one of the worldrsquos largest defense and consumer electronics corporations and a European leader in the C4ISR market In addition to being a lead contractor for many French C4ISR programs it has as a company with many nationalities signifi cant operations in a number of other countries It has built and deployed a complete C4ISR system integrating US- and French-made legacy systems in the United Arab Emirates It has provided elements of C4ISR systems in a number of other countries Through acquisitions outside of France ndash Tacal Quintec Pilkington Signaal ndash Thales has positioned itself to participate in key programs in other countries including the UK

Thales has created a new division Land and Joint Systems which fuses its optronics and communications businesses as part of a strategic push into the C4ISR market This division offers a wide variety of communications products including the family of PR4G radios which are sold in 25 countries around the world including Spain the Netherlands Denmark Greece Switzerland Poland and Egypt and the RITA 2000 system based on ATMIP architecture and deployed by the French and Belgian armed forces The most recent PR4G version ndash VS4-IP ndash has IP frequency-hopping encryption a built-in GPS and advanced multiplexing features The next generation of PR4G radios will include software radio products The Land and Joint Systems division also has an operational analysis and architecture group that is focused on developing interoperable technologies

Thales has a strong presence in the command and control market with the Cooperative Fighting System (a tactical C2 system) the LCC mobile C2 network and the e-CIS army-level C2 system designed according to NATO STANAGs As prime contractor for the Atlas Martha and SICF programs the company is a key supplier of C2 systems to the French armed forces Future developments include the RITA Local Area System for strategic C2 In naval systems the company has made signifi cant investments in naval C2 systems as well

In surveillance and reconnaissance technologies Thales produces several ground-based systems for surveillance target acquisition and ground-based air defense Squire developed most recently is a man-portable surveillance radar system for ground surveillance and bomb damage assessment and has been deployed by the Dutch army and marines Through its Netherlands branch the company is a global supplier of naval surveillance weapon control and combat management systems Key products include the TAVITAC naval combat management system on the French Lafayette frigates and in Belgium Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and the APAR weapons control system co-developed with EADS and Raytheon and deployed on Canadian Dutch and German frigates More recently Thales has moved into the UAV market leading the international consortium developing the British Watchkeeper UAV system Thales also offers a number of products in the intelligence technologies market and plays an important role in several programs

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

135

including the US Prophet program for vehicle-mounted SIGINT systems and the future British terrestrial SIGINT system Soothsayer In France Thales is the supplier of the SGEA SARIGUE MINREM and SAIM systems as well as of airborne ISR pods to various services of the armed forces

EADS

The European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company ndash EADS ndash was created in 2000 as a merger of the German DaimlerChrysler Aerospace Francersquos Aerospatiale Matra and Spainrsquos CASA Since then EADS has gained a strong market presence in C4ISR technologies and become a lead contractor in many European countries notably France and Germany EADS is becoming a signifi cant presence in the UAV market through a number of collaborative RampD programs These include the sensor package for the EuroHawk HALE UAV co-developed with Northrop Grumman tactical- and operations-level UAVs (the Hunter Eagle-1 and Eagle-2) with Israeli Aircraft Industries several tactical UAVs (the CL-289 with France and Canada the Brevel and the LUNA) the Pointer hand-launched tactical UAV in collaboration with Aerovironment and a maritime rotor wing reconnaissance UAV (SEAMOS terminated in early 2002 when the German navy canceled funding) EADS is also developing a UCAV demonstrator ndash Barracuda ndash with Germany as the fi rst potential customer Since 2004 the company has been at the center of the two largest collaborative European UAV programs It is the prime contractor for the EuroMALE program and a partner in the Neuron UCAV program both funded by the French Ministry of Defense The companyrsquos goal is to ultimately control some 10-15 per cent of the global UAV and UCAV market (Hegmann 2005)

EADS also has strong capabilities in the C2 and in the sensor technologies fi elds In C2 the company is working on the HEROS FAUST and FuumlInfoSys H systems for the German army the SIR and SICA systems for the French army and on systems for the Belgian army and several Persian Gulf states In sensor technologies EADS with Rheinmetall Defense Electronics has developed the ISR platform for the Fennek reconnaissance vehicle deployed by the German and Dutch armed forces It has also developed the APAR weapons control system jointly with Thales and Raytheon deployed on Canadian Dutch and German frigates It is also supplying the maritime sensor platform Fully Integrated Tactical System (FITS) to Mexico Brazil the United Arab Emirates Spain and the US Coast Guard In addition the company offers a combined system of SAR and MTIs that can be placed on UAVs marine reconnaissance and NH-90 helicopters

EADS also offers imagery analysis products to be linked to a number of platforms including satellites OCAPI (Optimizing Controlling and Automating the Processing of Images) and TIPI3D products An EADS mobile satellite ground station ndash Eagle Vision ndash collects imagery from SPOT Landsat IRS RADARSAT and QUICKBIRD satellites Four such stations are operational with US forces and at least one with the French army EADS is also a lead partner in the German

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

136

GAST project to develop a common system for the dissemination of technical intelligence

Several recent acquisitions have made EADS a major player in the European defense communications market In July 2001 the company acquired Cogent Defense and Security Networks from Nortel Networks and with it the contract for supplying the United Kingdom with a deployable communications system for expeditionary forces In May 2003 EADS purchased BAE Systemsrsquo share in the Astrium space joint venture gaining full control of Paradigm Secure Communications and its Skynet 5 program for Britainrsquos military satellite communications In the summer of 2005 EADS acquired the Personal Mobile Radio business of Nokia which allows it to provide a range of mobile radio solutions for defense and homeland security

BAE Systems

BAE Systems was created in 1999 through the merger of British Aerospace with Marconi Electronic Systems BAE Systems is one of the worldrsquos largest suppliers for the aerospace and defense markets with prime contractor capabilities for naval platforms aircraft and electronics It is also a presence in several sectors of the C4ISR market and has acquired important system engineering and integration experience BAE Systems has a signifi cant presence in the US defense market and has a central position as a supplier to the British and Australian armed forces The fi rm was chosen by the British Ministry of Defense to lead the NITEworks partnership aimed at assessing and demonstrating the benefi ts of NEC and the options for its effective and timely delivery In December 2003 BAE Systems announced it would provide the Kuwaiti military with a complete C4I suite These two programs confi rm BAE Systemsrsquo commitment to the C4ISR market

BAE Systems has been particularly present in the market for tactical communications systems with signifi cant involvement in such British programs as Ptarmigan and Falcon and a full line of Multi-Role Switch (MRS) 2000 equipment It has also been a participant in US military communications programs notably JTRS and the Future Combat Systems vehiclesrsquo communications package BAE Systems also provides the British armed forces with satellite terminals the Talon (man-portable) and Dagger (vehicle-mounted) terminals linked to Skynet 4 satellites

BAE Systems possesses only limited capabilities in the UAV market having produced the Phoenix and SkyEye tactical UAVs Both proved unreliable in the operational environments and are not competitive It is investing in the UCAV market however marketing its Nightjar program Together with the British fi rm QinetiQ BAE Systems is one of the few European defense companies with expertise in Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV) through the British Marlin project Other BAE capabilities in ISR are found mainly through the companyrsquos involvement in the now disbanded Alenia Marconi Systems venture and in Atlas Elektronik the naval systems portion of STN-Atlas Elektronik retained by BAE when it split the company with Rheinmetall These have given BAE Systems

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137

a dominant position in radar and sensor technology BAErsquos involvement in the ASTOR program and Nimrod upgrades have also been valuable

The company has not been deeply involved in either the intelligence or the space markets having sold its SIGINT business in 2002

In July 2003 BAE Systems and Finmeccanica signed an agreement to collaborate on C4ISR technologies through a joint venture BAErsquos Avionics Ltdwas merged with Finmeccanicarsquos Galileo Avionica to form Eurosystems an avionics company of which Finmeccanica owns 75 per cent and BAE Systems 25 per cent Under an option Finmeccanica can require BAE Systems to sell its 25 per cent interest in the new Avionics business to Finmeccanica at any time and BAE Systems may require Finmeccanica to purchase its 25 per cent interest after 25 months Eurosystems has capabilities in sensor systems airborne radars mission systems electro-optics and electronic warfare systems At the same time Alenia Marconi Systems a 50-50 joint venture of BAE Systems with Finmeccanica was dissolved with BAE Systems acquiring AMSrsquos UK operations and Finmeccanica acquiring all of the Italian operations of AMS BAE Systems will merge the UK operations of AMS and BAE Systemsrsquo C4ISR Networked Systems and Solutions business to form a wholly owned systems integration business The Eurosystems transaction also created Selenia Communications Limited a wholly owned subsidiary of Finmeccanica whose Marconi Selenia Communications acquired BAE Systemsrsquo UK Communications business The Eurosystems transaction was fi nalized in May 2005

Second tier defense companies

There are a number of smaller second tier defense companies in Europe that are also active in the C4ISR market Some such as the German fi rm Rhode and Schwarz have C4ISR at the core of their business strategy Others such as Saab have been platform and weapons suppliers and have only recently moved into developing and producing C4ISR systems In most cases the smaller participants in the C4ISR market retain a largely national focus and rely on contracts from their home governments

Rheinmetall Defence Electronics is one such company In the summer of 2003 BAE Systems and the German fi rm Rheinmetall Detec joint owners of STN-Atlas Elektronik divided the fi rm into two separate companies The new companies are Rheinmetall Defense Electronics wholly owned by Rheinmetall Detec and specializing in technologies for air and land forces and Atlas Elektronik wholly owned by BAE Systems and specializing in maritime technologies Rheinmetall Defense Electronics is one of Europersquos leading developers of ISR solutions It collaborates with EADS on the development of the ISR suite for the Fennek reconnaissance vehicle to be deployed by the German and Dutch armies This suite includes a sensor platform with a camera a thermal imager and a laser rangefi nder for each vehicle

Rheinmetall Defense Electronics may have signifi cant potential in unmanned aerial systems provided it can expand beyond the German market The company

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138

offers a wide range of reconnaissance target acquisition electronic warfare and combat UAVs including the KZOBrevel target acquisition UAV (also confi gurable for electronic warfare missions) co-developed with EADS It is also working on the Tactical Advanced ReconnaissanceStrike System (TADRES) UCAV previously known as the Taifun for the German Ministry of Defense The vehicle is now being designed to carry an electro-optic sensor for target identifi cation and a synthetic aperture radar for target acquisition A procurement for TADRES is expected before 2009 In 2003 the company signed an MoU (a Memorandum of Understanding) with Francersquos Safran Group to develop the technologies to make the KZO and TADRES vehicles interoperable with the French Sperwer UAV

The company also has capabilities in tactical command and control systems for land forces It has participated in the Battlefi eld Command System (Gefechstfeldfuumlhrungssystem or GeFuumlSys) C2 program for the German army (currently upgraded to FAUST) and provided the Swedish army with the C2 system deployed on its tanks and combat vehicles In 2003 it was awarded a contract to upgrade the C2 systems on Spainrsquos Leopard-2 tanks

Rhode and Schwarz is another company with a key position in the German national market for C4ISR which has yet to become a trans-national player Rhode and Schwarz has cutting-edge technology in the military communications fi eld specifi cally in digitally reprogrammable software radios Its family of multimode multirole multiband (M3) radios offers solutions for aerial naval and land platforms all meeting NATO encryption STANAGs Early in 2003 the company received a contract to supply the Brazilian army with the tactical radio version of the M3 and in 2004 the Swiss Army signed a contract to purchase the VHFUHF version of the M3 In 2005 it received a contract to outfi t the A400M aircraft with M3ARs (Airborne Radios) through 2022 The radios will feature the Second Generation of Anti-Jam Tactical UHF Radio for NATO (SATURN) frequency hopping function The company was also awarded a sole-source contract to develop a fully JTRS- and SCA-compliant version of a Software Defi ned Radio (SDR) for the German military The company is also a supplier of SIGINT technologies specifi cally those for direction fi nding and signals monitoring and analysis The German and Danish militaries have been customers for these products

In 2001 the British Ministry of Defensersquos Defense Evaluation and Research Agency privatized part of its work into a new fi rm ndash QinetiQ ndash as a public-private partnership Today QinetiQ uses the experience gained as a government RampD agency to provide advanced defense solutions including several in the C4ISR domain In the command and control fi eld QinetiQ specializes in maritime C2 offering two major systems the Intelligent Advisor Capability Demonstrator (IACD) and the All Environment Real-Time Interoperability Simulator (AERIS) The IACD has been demonstrated on the Royal Navy aircraft carrier Illustrious

In the ISR area QinetiQ does work on battlespace digitization multi-source information fusion and innovative ISR architectures Through its participation in the British TOPSAT program and other international efforts QinetiQ also has expertise in space-based reconnaissance In the UAV arena QinetiQ focuses on man-portable UAVs for infantry sections It is also one of the few large European

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

139

defense companies to have expertise on Unmanned Underwater Vehicles having worked for the British Ministry of Defense on the development of the Marlin UUV intended for launch and recovery from submarines Additionally company projects are underway to develop new sensor suites for UAVs particularly for thermal imaging

Francersquos Sagem ndash now part of Safran Group ndash has increased its involvement in the C4ISR domain Its defense technology group Sagem Deacutefense Securiteacute has been particularly successful in the UAV market its line of tactical UAVs is deployed by several European militaries The Crecerelle is used by the French army and variants are deployed by the Dutch (Sperwer) Danish (Taarnfalk) Swedish (Ugglan) and most recently the Greek armies Two new versions of the Sperwer are under development to fl y at higher altitudes and faster speeds for longer periods of time The fi rst the Sperwer HV (High Velocity) is a MALE UAV featuring a real-time data link synthetic aperture radar day-night imager or laser target designator and possibly at a later stage radar-jamming payload The second is the Sperwer LE (Long Endurance) also a MALE vehicle whose payload may include a day-night imaging system a Samir missile warning system and a high-speed radio frequency (RF )data link for communications with other UAVs as well as with its ground control station The French government has not yet given full support to these programs though the company anticipates prototypes by the end of 2006 The next generation of Crecerelle ndash SDTI ndash is also in the fi nal stages of development and testing for the French army based on the Sperwer UAV Sagem has also had some success in the tactical command and control sector and is the prime contractor for the French armyrsquos SIT system for linking small units and armored vehicles

Sagem has also engaged in international collaboration on RampD projects In July 2003 Sagem and STN Atlas (now Rheinmetall Defence Electronics) signed a memorandum of understanding to begin an RampD program that will make Sagemrsquos Sperwer UAV interoperable with STN Atlasrsquos KZO and TADRES UAVs This program will develop a common C2 infrastructure to enable the exchange of data and intelligence gathered by these unmanned platforms Sagem also collaborates with General Atomics (US) on the Horus-SD UAV a European version of the Predator and with Dassault on UAV RampD programs Most recently the company announced it has fi tted the Sperwer B UAV with the Israeli Spike long-range precision strike missile weaponizing an existing UAV platform with an off-the-shelf missile similar to the US arming of a Predator UAV with Hellfi re missiles

Though by no means a small fi rm Finmeccanica in Italy is a relatively minor largely national participant in the European C4ISR market Recent decisions such as the Eurosystems transaction described earlier in this chapter may change this reality over time For now the companyrsquos main business is still the construction of platforms but some subsidiaries are beginning to gain a strong foothold in the Italian C4ISR market especially in C2 and ISR Restrictive bid practices of the Italian government facilitate this process and they have provided Finmeccanica with growing expertise in most C4ISR-related technologies The company is increasingly profi cient in developing and producing low- and medium-altitude

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140

UAVs initially through the tactical Mirach-26 and the Mirach-150 programs for the Italian armed forces The Falco tactical UAV is a more recent addition designed to replace the Mirach-26 A faster version of the Mirach-150 Nibbio is also under development In 2003 Finmeccanica signed a contract with Alenia Aeronautica to co-develop a UAV demonstrator that could become a marketable UAV or UCAV product The Sky-X ndash formerly called the Integrated Technology Vehicle (ITV) ndash will carry different payloads including weapons SAR electro-optical and infrared sensors and electronic sensors It will also be equipped with a broadband satellite data link 5 Trials began in 2004 (Kington 2004 9) The newly created Eurosystems avionics company the acquisition of BAE Systemsrsquo military and secure communications assets and the dissolving of Alenia Marconi Systems could give Finmeccanica a stronger position as a participant in the global C4ISR market

Saab long a manufacturer of cars and fi ghter aircraft is another platform producer that is moving into the C4ISR market It created a new division SaabTech which specializes solely in C4ISR and in July 2005 merged it with Avitronicsformerly part of the South African fi rm Gintek to create Saab Avitronics The companyrsquos C4ISR expertise is focused largely on command and control systems for land air and sea Its 9LV Mark 3E naval C3 combat system fuses data from sonar radar and electro-optic systems to create a complete picture of the seascape and is in service with the Royal Swedish Navy as well as with the Australian New Zealand and Singapore navies Another command and control product under development is the Wide Area Situation Picture (WASP) consisting of an air force C2 system adaptable for other services as well Saab also produces terrestrial C2 systems including the Vehicle Command and Control System (VCCS) which provides a single display unit for tactical information and sensor images as overlays on a background digital map and the Battlefi eld Command Support System (BCSS) a land forces C2 system for brigade and lower level units BCSS is deployed by the Australian armed forces Saab has also moved into the UAV market having the experience of the SHARC UCAV project and has signed an MoU with Francersquos Dassault Aviation to co-develop the Neuron UCAV

Saab and Ericsson have created a joint venture Saab Ericsson Network Based Defense Innovation splitting ownership 60-40 respectively In October 2003 this company was awarded a contract from the Swedish Defense Materiel Administration (FMV) to develop the technological foundations for the future Swedish Network-Based Defense Initially this will involve work on design rules and technical specifi cations for the future system The fi rm is partnering with IBM and Boeing on this project

Non-defense companies in the European C4ISR market

As already noted technologies for C4ISR requirements are frequently found in the commercial sector making commercial companies an important element in building European C4ISR capabilities Several of the more signifi cant fi rms are in Scandinavia with technologies that are useful in C4ISR systems with little

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141

modifi cation Ericsson has been very successful in the global ISR market with products such as air defense surveillance radars (Giraffe for both land and sea units sold to the French air force) artillery hunting radars (ARTHUR sold to the Danish army and the British Royal Marines) and airborne early warning systems (Erieye radar deployed by Sweden Brazil and Greece) It is also the only major company in the Swedish C4ISR market that is still wholly Swedish-owned

With a strong civilian technology base especially in mobile communications Ericsson has been able to penetrate the military communications market on a global basis In collaboration with Kongsberg-Ericsson of Norway and Crypto of Switzerland it produces state-of-the-art tactical military communications products ndash EriTac ndash including switches radio relays and bulk encryption units that can be fi tted together according to user requirements to build tactical area networks air defense networks and command post communication networks The system has been sold to fi ve NATO countries as well as to other military customers worldwide including Kuwait and Oman

Nokia has also applied its core competency to the military market for C4ISR technology In 2002 Finnish forces taking part in peacekeeping operations in Kosovo were the fi rst to be outfi tted with the companyrsquos TETRA communications equipment A year later the fi rst Finnish-led KFOR brigade was outfi tted with a similar system less than two months after the decision to procure it The European Unionrsquos forces in Kosovo (EUFOR) use a Nokia system based on the one used by Finnish forces In Finland a complete communications system for the countryrsquos defense and fi rst responder forces was built using TETRA technology The deployable communications networks of the Danish and Swedish armies were based on a similar technology as were the Belgian and Kuwaiti public safety networks and the communications network used by the Irish police

Industry collaboration on C4ISR interoperability

Several collaborative industry frameworks have been created to address interoperability between C4ISR systems Companies involved in these agreements have realized that governments are demanding increasingly complex and advanced systems and systems-of-systems that require industry collaboration

The Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium (NCOIC) is a forum for fi rms involved in the development of C4ISR systems Companies in NCOIC share knowledge about customer requirements for network-centric and network-based operations and discuss strategies and approaches to enhancing system delivery to customers In addition the organization seeks to develop open interoperable C4ISR systems using common best practices and systems engineering techniques On the technology side this is done by analyzing the relevant C4ISR architectures defi ned by governments developing a secure information management model to discuss open standards and identifying open standards-based product types The NCOIC is also developing educational programs on network-centric operations and developing strategies for creating collaborative engineering environments (Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium 2005 14) The consortium

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142

is made up of international aerospace defense information technology and professional services companies in the United States and Europe all with experience in network-based technologies As of 2005 there were 66 members in the NCOIC with another 68 inquiries by potential members The Consortiumrsquos Advisory Council includes prominent US Department of Defense offi cials as well as representatives from NATOrsquos C3 Agency the NATO Headquarters C3 Staff and the Swedish Defense Materiel Agency

Firms in some European countries are seeking to create similar networks In Germany for example an interest group known as the Open Community has been created to coordinate the development of standards and open architectures The member companies of the community have agreed to implement a policy of interoperability based on recognized open commercial and military standards adopting a full spectrum approach Members of Open Community include Atos Origin Diehl BGT Defense CONET CSC Ploumlnzke ESG IBM Deutschland Rheinmetall Defense Electronics Thales Defense Deutschland and Unilog Systems (Rheinmetall Defense Electronics 2005) While valuable national collaborative initiatives such as Open Community will not necessarily address the challenges of international interoperability and cross-national acquisitions

Conclusion

The European industrial base is clearly capable of undertaking signifi cant work on C4ISR programs and technologies not only at the national level but also at the transnational level There are several transatlantic projects in the fi eld These include the Active Phased Array Radar (APAR) project co-developed by Thales EADS and Raytheon and deployed by the German Dutch and Canadian navies (the system enables the tracking and controlling of missiles fi red from various sources by a single ship) MIDS (which enables interoperability between United States British German Italian French and Spanish ships aircraft and missiles) and the Raytheon-Thales jointly-owned fi rm Thales-Raytheon Systems (TRS) working on C2 systems for air defense and tactical communications for Special Forces

Increasingly European companies are initiating intra-European collaborations as opposed to transatlantic programs In the post-Cold War era European defense fi rms have been almost twice as likely to pursue co-production and co-development projects with each other as with US fi rms and over three times more likely than with defense fi rms from other regions (Jones 2005 3) One motivation could be the sense that Americarsquos globally dominant defense industry forces the Europeans to combine efforts in order to compete internationally as well as to avoid excessive dependence on the United States There is a risk in this approach as it will add competitors in the international market and increase the challenge to ensure adequate transatlantic interoperability

For the Europeans regional cooperation does hold many benefi ts Regional collaboration in research and development production and procurement of C4ISR technologies and systems is clearly an important route toward developing

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143

the capabilities needed to conduct network-based operations The European companies are likely to provide pressure from bottom-up for greater collaboration distributing technologies and demonstrators to several European countries They can also promote collaborative approaches to technology development Smaller more local companies can complement the larger ones with niche expertise and experience from national programs Such discussions could enhance interoperability across European military capabilities

Firms in the European industrial and technology base have recognized that developing the C4ISR technologies and systems required to conduct network-based operations will be important to their competitive position both in defense and commercial markets Unmanned vehicles sensor payloads deployable and mobile communications network infrastructures and data analysis technologies are all growth markets in both arenas European fi rms have been quick to grasp this reality and are investing in applications for defense and security customers with cutting-edge technologies While European C4ISR and network strategies are still being developed the industrial and technology base on which Europe will rely to implement strategies is amply capable of supplying them

144

8

EUROPEAN NETWORK-BASED

CAPABILITIES

Policy recommendations

The major European defense powers clearly possess the technology capabilities to research build and deploy modern C4ISR capabilities and move down the road toward military capabilities that are more network-based Many of these countries this survey reveals have made explicit decisions to move in that direction The Europeans face two signifi cant challenges in reaching this goal creating cross-national capabilities that take advantage of C4ISR to increase their ability to operate with each other in autonomous ways and enhancing transatlantic interoperability with the United States There are a number of policy steps the Europeans can take and steps the United States needs to take to realize this twofold objective

While the European allies have in many cases made a national commitment to enhanced networking the commitment to the trans-European and transatlantic goals is less clear At the trans-European level the European countries need to do much more than they do today to develop common standards and equipment Greater European interaction especially in the framework of the EU is needed for progress to be made in achieving trans-European interoperability The new Battlegroups are an important step in the right direction but more needs to be done

With respect to transatlantic interoperability it is clear that the Europeans are not likely to create the extensive network of C4ISR capabilities the United States plans nor need they do so A ldquoplug and playrdquo approach makes more sense for Europe using a US or NATO network backbone and selecting the points in that backbone where connectivity will ensure interoperability Such interoperability is most critical with respect to the timely transmission of voice data and images which will enable networked operations A plug and play strategy depends on common standards and capabilities and on ensuring that these are shared commonly deployed and secure Parallel to European actions the US needs to develop a stronger grasp of European strategic perspectives take European C4ISR technology and interoperability capabilities and intentions seriously work through NATO to enhance the opportunities for greater connectivity and in particular transform the US regime for defense trade to incentivize interoperability decisions transatlantic technology collaboration and industry effi ciency

Network thinking and interoperability are clearly important objectives in todayrsquos security environment The era of large static armored forces that

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145

confront deter and defeat the adversaryrsquos massed formations has ended So too have the days when NATO forces trained and exercised together but were rarely used Today smaller more agile forces are being used regularly in a wide range of coalition operations both within and outside NATO as an organization and primarily outside Europe as a theater of operations

The question of out-of-area operations for NATO has been answered Europeans have clearly made the decision to use their forces in regions they have stayed away from for decades Coalition operations too seem more likely Iraq may be answering the question of whether the US will deploy forces on a largely unilateral basis for contingencies in other regions Coalition operations are now a ldquofact of liferdquo in Bosnia Kosovo Afghanistan and even in Iraq Connectivity between coalition forces will be necessary lack thereof is an obstacle to effective operations

This connectivity cannot be easily created at the point of deployment its absence is likely to lead to decisions to carve out separate zones of operation as seen in Iraq Sustained interoperability will require sustained planning cooperation and investment within Europe and across the Atlantic using military-to-military cooperation and the full panoply of institutions that connect the relevant nations

There are other reasons to push forward on greater cooperation with respect to C4ISR and network-based capabilities within Europe and across the Atlantic Technological effi ciency is one Unconstrained the technologies relevant to network-based operations would fl ow freely between countries many of them are drawn from a global commercial market for information and communications technology There are technological capabilities the Europeans bring to C4ISR from which the US military could benefi t and clear benefi ts to Europe from a less-constrained fl ow of C4ISR technology in the other direction

These same technologies are subject however to dual-use and military technology transfer rules making ineffi ciencies and redundancies inevitable Companies in the United States and Europe complain that even the European and American business units of the same fi rm cannot maximize technological synergies because the regulatory regimes get in the way As a result the same or similar technologies are sometimes being developed separately on both sides of the Atlantic and technological synergies cannot be exploited Similarly the absence of a coordinated strategy in Europe is leading to separate investments on expensive and duplicative programs

There is an economic cost to this ineffi ciency As each nation buys what it needs from its own suppliers each is paying a higher than necessary price and budget resources are being wasted in duplication This is especially a problem in Europe one slowly being responded to in such areas as UAVs and space where cross-national investments are becoming more common It is also a problem for the US which fails to reap the economies that might fl ow from tapping into the European technology base A more fl exible transatlantic technology market has potential benefi ts both for US and European defense investments and defense budgets A more open transatlantic regime for these technologies could also bring greater competition with advantageous results both in terms of price and technological innovation

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

146

European policies and actions

There has been increasingly rapid change in the European approach to C4ISR and network-based capabilities The number of militaries and defense ministries working on formulating and implementing C4ISR doctrines has grown as has the intensity of these efforts There remains much to be done however before all major European forces are adequately transformed for coalition operations outside the NATO area A number of actions can be suggested some at the national level and some within the framework of multilateral institutions

The trans-European commitment to multinational network-based operations is still not entirely clear This goal is not yet centrally embedded in European defense planning for all the progress that has been made over the past decade There remains an inadequate European commitment to joint force planning common requirements and coordinated RampT investment And the European defense market is still not fully open to the benefi ts and effi ciencies that could be realized by more fl exible movement of technology and greater competition among suppliers

European defense planning

At the level of defense and force planning the European allies need to make a clear commitment to the goal of intra-European and transatlantic C4ISR connectivity both in NATO and in the EU European national governments have recognized the importance of connectivity in some areas In the air (fi ghter communications) and at sea (naval communications and fi re control and targeting) the interoperability challenge is being met and collaborative efforts have resulted in a fair degree of connectivity The same cannot be said for land forces even within national militaries let alone at the trans-European or NATO levels All nations are working on this problem as the British Bowman the Dutch TITAAN and the Swedish HF-2000 programs indicate

Most countries are developing C4 systems to conform to NATO STANAGs yet few are moving beyond this level testing interoperability or moving toward the higher standards that prevail today Conforming to NATO STANAGs will not solve the inter-European or transatlantic interoperability problem The pace of some countriesrsquo C4ISR innovation goes well beyond NATO STANAGs However NATO remains an important context for addressing this issue systematically European governments need to work to accelerate the NATO STANAG process and broaden its coverage to also include surveillance and reconnaissance system standards The new Allied Command Transformation provides another important context for this effort one in which the Europeans need to engage fully

An equally strong commitment needs to be made in the European Union in the framework of the Headline Goal and ECAP processes and the European Defense Agency While C4ISR interoperability issues are on the table in the EU both in ECAP and the EDArsquos Capabilities Directorate they do not appear to have received priority attention and they should have it Interoperability requirements will be

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

147

driven by the missions the Europeans plan to undertake and the capabilities needed to network the command and control communications and intelligence need for those missions

Both NATO and the EU have formulated broad defense strategies that dictate when and how the military forces made available to them can be deployed Both have designated specifi c branches to integrate doctrines for network-based operations into their respective strategies NATO through its Command Control and Consultation Agency the European Union through the European Defense Agencyrsquos Capabilities Directorate These offi ces can be an important focus of assistance for nations formulating national doctrines and planning the acquisition of systems If undertaken in a coordinated manner by both NATO and the European Union national migration towards network-based doctrines and capabilities can be achieved more swiftly and effi ciently sharing workload avoiding redundancies and pooling resources NATO and European Union oversight of this transition can help ensure that the goal of intra-European and transatlantic interoperability remains the focus of national planners

The Europeans do not need to adopt US global missions and goals to achieve this interoperability for networked operations Too often the US critique of the Europeans is that their roles missions and forces need to look like those of the US to be interoperable or useful in coalition operations However the Europeans are unlikely to undertake large high intensity combat operations at a global level and unlikely to invest in building the resources required for these With a different strategic ambition but a comparable view of the important threats the Europeans will not need forces that are carbon copies of the US The United Kingdom has taken a different approach developing network-enabled capabilities by testing and modifying existing equipment and evaluating new systems against this network requirement rather than building an entire global network-centric architecture from the ground up ndash evolution as opposed to revolution

The policy challenge is how to ensure connectivity where the European and US force capabilities must meet in coalition deployments inside or outside the NATO framework or for the missions of the NATO Response Force outside the NATO area Given the strategic and resource gap it is critical for the Europeans in cooperation with the United States and in the NATO context to defi ne the critical nodes in the US C4ISR system into which European capabilities need to plug in order to play

Given the difference in resources strategic ambitions and roles and missions a plug and play strategy makes sense for Europe The model would be for the United States or NATO or both to provide the backbone for a network and for the Europeans to select the points in the grid that are critical to ensure the needed interoperability Interoperability will need to focus on the timely transmission of voice data and images the information that will enable networked operations The plug and play strategy relies on common software standards and capabilities Ensuring that software standards are shared commonly deployed and secure will facilitate the communication of voice data and imagery among more complex (US) and less intricate (European) networks

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148

The Europeans will not need all the satellites the United States possesses in order to shape operations that use the intelligence those satellites deliver They will not require all the UAVs the US deploys though their systems will need to be able to disseminate data to and from the US If the Europeans wish to operate autonomously from the United States or from NATO assets available through the Berlin Plus arrangements they will have to decide how much autonomous C4ISR they require to do so European ambitions can be tailored to European requirements and European resources and interoperability in the Alliance can be reinforced at the same time

The NATO Response Force could provide a useful test-bed for C4ISR inter-operability issues US policy sees the NRF as a European force to which it will provide important logistical and C4 support in the near term Eventually in the US view this force is to provide such capabilities without US support The goal from the US perspective is to create incentives for the Europeans to develop integral C4ISR that is interoperable with US forces While the issue of continued US participation in the force remains on the table it provides a useful opportunity for the Europeans to test out their own emerging C4ISR capabilities with potential payoff for the more autonomous capabilities that might emerge in the EU context

Working through the NRF might help address the large uncertainty about the European commitment to both transatlantic and intra-European interoperability There is not yet a clear common view in Europe about the goal of interoperability The British tend to focus on the need for interoperability with the US but less on the goal of interoperability with their European partners The French are committed to greater internal interoperability among their national services but do not focus priority attention on C4ISR interoperability with Britain or Germany Where interoperability exists ndash in the air and at sea ndash it is largely the result of NATO requirements and the acquisition of US systems not from addressing interoperability at the European level

The lack of clear priority attention to this issue stems in part from the absence of cross-European interaction on strategic force and requirement planning among the European defense ministries The Headline Goal and ECAP processes both of which are important do not constitute joint strategic force and requirements planning These processes focus on a particular set of forces and capabilities not on overall defense goals There is a gap between the discussions in Brussels and the day-to-day planning and priority setting in national capitals These latter processes are not coordinated at the European level leaving each nation focused largely on its own national military capabilities A purely national process forces C4ISR and interoperability requirements to compete for funding with commitments to legacy and modernization programs Engaging this dialogue at the level of the European Defense Agencyrsquos Capabilities Directorate and the EU Military Staff could provide important leverage to change these priorities

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

149

Investment in research and technology

The absence of trans-European coordination is particularly telling at the level of research and technology investments Overall the level of European defense-related RampT investment is low and RampT priorities and programs are poorly coordinated across the EU The result is weak spending in the C4ISR arena and redundancies between the major defense countries Low funding moreover combined with major commitment of limited procurement resources to legacy and modernization programs means that RampT projects that reach the prototype or demonstrator stage often do not enter into production

RampT coordination across EU countries is uncommon While the French and British devote signifi cant sums to defense RampT especially in the C4ISR arena they engage in little bilateral coordination on these programs Others such as Italy and Germany which have set a goal of creating more networked forces engage in little trans-European collaboration in these plans or investments Given the overall limitation on defense resources greater coordination and the elimination of duplication in effort would be an important way to obtain the resources needed for interoperability

An important contribution to the trans-European RampT effort may emerge from the European Commissionrsquos 7th Framework Program (FP7) and the EDArsquos RampT programs The Commissionrsquos FP7 that begins in 2007 will include security space and homeland security research and development for the fi rst time with proposed funding of 4ndash7 billion euros for such fi elds as earth observation and detection of chemical and biological agents It will be critical for the Commission to maintain a wide scope for this funding resist efforts to reduce the overall amount and ensure that at least some of it is directed toward dual-use network-based capabilities including UAVs large communications networks and advanced sensors

The EDA RampT programs will have an even more specifi c focus on defense needs The fi rst cluster of investments initiated in the summer of 2005 focuses on technologies for long-endurance UAVs However EDArsquos current RampT budget of some 3 million euros is small As the EDA experience with this program grows so should its budget and its involvement in more complex development and demonstration programs

A truly trans-European system for strategic force and requirements planning is still some way ahead in the future Ultimately for the European Union to meet interoperability and C4ISR requirements such a system will be needed It is the only way to end redundancies and make the force structure changes needed to release budgetary resources for interoperability investments

A cross-European market for dual-use and defense technologies

The focus on interoperability in C4ISR and greater integration of planning and investment activities will only pay off if a cross-European market for dual-use and defense technology comes into being Policies and institutions at the European level are still not adequate to take full advantage of the widespread privatization

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

150

and trans-European consolidation of defense industry and technology capabilities that has occurred over the past decade

Because requirements are defi ned nationally national defense industry policies vary widely and the rules and regulations for acquisition differ also the incentives for industry to collaborate or compete across borders are weak The rules are not standardized budgets are not coordinated the politics of local procurement tend to weigh heavily in investment decisions and defense technology transfer across European borders remains constrained an increasingly global industry is not matched by a regional defense market

The Letter of Intent OCCAR EDA and Commission collaborative research programs all point in the right direction in terms of creating such a market but progress is slow The Commissionrsquos communiqueacutes ndash the latest of which was adopted in 2003 ndash to encourage industrial restructuring and greater effi ciency in the European Defense Equipment Market while praiseworthy have had modest effect Nor have collaborative procurements broken through this logjam Collaborative European defense programs still focus funding on platforms such as the A400 airlifter Tiger helicopter and Eurofi ghter When it comes to network-based capabilities national technology assets and producers tend to be favored and international competition or collaboration resisted

The UK is changing its approach creating a potentially useful precedent Overall British defense procurement policy has moved sharply away from protecting national monopolies and toward transnational competition and teaming Despite what has been a dominant position for BAE Systems in the UK defense market the Ministry of Defense has sent an unambiguous signal that procurements are open to European and transatlantic competitors This has led to a growing position in the British defense market especially that for C4ISR technologies for such fi rms as Thales Raytheon EADS General Dynamics and EDS The explicit goal of this policy change was to reap the advantages of competition and international teaming and ensure that the broadest array of technology was available In return non-British fi rms are expected to bring a substantial portion of work share into the United Kingdom strengthening and broadening the domestic defense technology industry at the same time

Overcoming the weight of the European defense industrial legacy will not be easy but the British model may provide useful lessons for European-level market policy A more open market could provide substantial effi ciency savings through competition with important payoff for European and transatlantic interoperability For these advantages to be reached the Letter of Intent OCCAR EDA and EC research processes would need to be coordinated with the development of an open-market policy resisting efforts to protect that market from competition

American actions

The future of transatlantic interoperability for networked operations will depend on American policy changes as well as on European actions The US has a clear interest in advancing such interoperability based on a history of security

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

151

cooperation and the demands of coalition operations in the twenty-fi rst century (Serfaty 2005 87ndash8) Neither Europe nor the United States can meet the new security challenges alone Addressed through the Alliance the defense capabilities for meeting these challenges would be greatly enhanced by a more effective networked European force If the US wishes not to become involved in a particular situation an effective European capability will provide a valuable policy option for the US

A US policy that encourages and incentivizes the existing trends toward more sophisticated C4ISR investments in Europe needs to focus on three dimensions greater common understanding with respect to strategic perspectives a serious engagement with European efforts currently underway and reforming the US regime for transatlantic defense trade to allow a discussion of technology requirements transatlantic technology collaboration and greater industry effi ciency

Understanding European strategic perspectives

The changes in the world of global security since the end of the Cold War have forced a discussion of how institutions and national strategies need to change to refl ect new international security realities To some degree this dialogue has already led to signifi cant changes including the enlargement of NATO to include the former Warsaw Pact reassuring them about the dramatic change that had taken place The extension of NATOrsquos mission to restore order to the Balkans was also a major change for the Alliance and its fi rst involvement in actual combat in the wider European theater These operations also created stresses in the Alliance and played a role in the US decision to choose coalitions of the willing for the initial military operations in Afghanistan and for the war in Iraq Growing dangers of terrorist strikes and nuclear proliferation have further altered the security agenda for the transatlantic partners

When it comes to the use of military forces the two most recent confl icts may well represent the future trend smaller expeditionary forces deployed at some distance from the homeland operating in relatively spare environments moving with agility and focus to strike adversary targets effectively and terminate combat operations quickly Clearly these twenty-fi rst century wars will rely more than ever on networked operations integrating sensors data communications and the measurement of effects

These military deployments may not always operate in coalition and may not always involve NATO or all the major European powers Disagreements over Iraq and the diffi culties in the execution of Balkan operations both had the effect of giving the Europeans an incentive to accelerate the development of more autonomous capabilities in part to refl ect a different European view of strategic requirements Similarly these disagreements and problems convinced some in the US that the Europeans might be an unreliable partner for such operations both because of differing strategic views and a less advanced military capability

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

152

Given these tensions NATO continues to provide an important context for dialogue at the military and technical level European and American forces will continue to operate together both inside and outside the Alliance and interoperability will be an important tool in conducting such operations successfully The NATO Prague summit of November 2002 made signifi cant progress with respect the transformation of Alliance forces for the new missions and technologies of the twenty-fi rst century by reshaping the NATO command structure with a new transformation command setting new capabilities objectives and endorsing the NRF

NATO has provided one context for a higher level of strategic dialogue as well Critical changes have included the willingness of the European allies to commit the Alliance to out-of-area operations and to stand up the NRF It has not been the only context however The EU has also begun to emerge as a growing player in the security dialogue defi ning a broad strategy document creating a pillar in the Council on this subject pushing through the Headline Goal and ECAP processes and most recently moving forward with the European Defense Agency and the Battlegroups

None of these developments however constitutes a sustained strategic dialogue between the United States and its European allies The US government should take the initiative to begin such a dialogue either in the NATO context or as a higher level discussion among the allied countries This engagement should also involve bringing the European allies into an ongoing discussion in the framework of the quadrennial defense reviews in the United States a process that has largely excluded sustained interaction with the allies

Engaging European programs and capabilities

For the strategic dialogue to have meaning with respect to force and acquisition decisions the US will need to take a serious look at the capabilities the Europeans are putting in place today There is a tendency in the US to discount European investments in C4ISR and network solutions as inadequate The lesson some US policymakers have drawn over the past fi ve decades and especially over the past ten years is that European forces are heavy on manpower and equipment light on new network-centric planning and technology and overall inadequately transformed to refl ect post-Cold War realities In this view the fi rst Gulf War and the Kosovo air war indicated that European land forces lacked the real-time information and C4ISR capabilities necessary for agile expeditionary operations and European air forces could not ensure secure real-time interoperability for air interdiction missions

This study suggests that the European commitment to C4ISR and greater networking is stronger than this view suggests In part in reaction to the lessons of the Gulf War and the Balkans a number of European countries are stepping up to the investments and planning required to acquire advanced C4ISR and achieve greater interoperability In addition there is little doubt that the industrial and technology base available in Europe is both competitive to that of the United

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

153

States and adequate to deliver the capabilities a modern more networked force requires

US policymakers and even NATO leaders have suggested that the way to close the ldquogaprdquo is for the Europeans to increase defense spending Clearly greater spending focused on networking as a priority would help solve the interoperability dilemma However the reality is that overall defense budgets in Europe are unlikely to rise at the rate necessary to provide that capability

A more fruitful US approach would be to make a virtue of this reality by urging a restructuring of European defense investments with a priority on the forces and technologies needed for twenty-fi rst century operations This emphasis could bear fruit While Germany for example may not be able to increase its defense budget overall given domestic German commitments and problems the focus of the German defense program is already shifting toward expeditionary capabilities incorporating modern C4ISR A US message consistent with this internal trend could prove more productive than repeated demands that the Germans spend more overall on defense

US policymakers have argued the priorities case with respect to specifi c acquisitions notably the A400M and Galileo which are sometimes criticized as the ldquowrongrdquo priorities for European defense investment US criticism however has provided an incentive for both projects to move forward Again this policy approach may be counterproductive Both programs are clearly intended by the Europeans to meet European defense (and civil) needs Both provide capabilities the Americans have long sought ndash a more modern European air transport capability and the ability to provide location data for precision-guided munitions The solutions are European and responsive to the needs of a European industrial and technology base as well as the desire to possess some autonomous European capabilities in these areas

ldquoBuy Americanrdquo is not an answer however much US policymakers may think it the most effi cient solution The Europeans are no more likely to satisfy their equipment and technology needs by buying exclusively in the US market than the US Department of Defense is likely to satisfy its needs entirely from European providers Again to make a virtue of this political-economic reality it may make more sense for the US to explore the opportunities to combine technologies and industrial capabilities through collaboration

US concerns about the gap and about European capabilities have led to minimal US effort to involve the Europeans in US planning for network-centric capabilities or to include European technologies in the process of developing these capabilities for the US military

A general skepticism about European capabilities has been combined with a preference in the US defense establishment to work with known US processes and suppliers Extending the research and acquisition process to include European suppliers is a step into the less-known US suppliers moreover are under-standably uneasy about bringing European fi rms into the US market as potential competitors

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

154

Overcoming the transatlantic C4ISR interoperability challenge and implementing a plug and play approach will require overcoming these prevailing attitudes and engaging the Europeans directly with respect to plans and technologies Here too NATO could provide an important context for a multilateral dialogue through collaboration on transatlantic RampD programs for example The NATO-led CAESAR advanced concept technology demonstratr (ACTD) discussed earlier has already proven that sharing data between various national airborne ground surveillance capabilities is possible Other technology areas are ripe for collaborative initiatives

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for both surveillance and combat and their sensor payloads are one such area As already noted many European countries possess substantial technological knowledge and experience in this area including engines airframe design and stealth technology and have expertise in active electronically scanned array radar hyperspectral imaging lightweight synthetic aperture radar and ground moving target indicators relevant for sensor payloads Multinational European programs such as the EuroMALE UAV and the Neuron combat UAV are already under way Cooperation in this area would have not only military and budgetary advantages for participants but could open opportunities for industrial cooperation

Another potentially fruitful arena for transatlantic collaboration is data-sharing of space imagery Europe has underway several multinational efforts to link data gathered by Earth observation systems The Optical and Radar Federated Earth Observation program will link the existing Francersquos SPOT 5 and Helios 2 satellites with systems currently under development the two French Pleiades high-resolution optical satellites the four Italian COSMO-Skymed X-band radar satellites (with a resolution of less than 1 meter for military images) and possibly the fi ve German SAR-Lupe synthetic aperture radar satellites The fi rst satellites in these programs will be operational between 2005 and 2007 and Sweden Spain Austria and Belgium have already secured their industrial cooperation on Pleiades and the sharing of data acquired by the system (Adams and Ben-Ari 2005 21) A transatlantic discussion of how to integrate these platforms and share data including the sensitive issue of intelligence-sharing might be fruitful

Transforming the US defense trade regime

The US regime for export controls and technology transfer may be the ldquolong pole in the tentrdquo for transatlantic collaboration and interoperability (Center for Strategic and International Studies 2001) Policy and industry analysts have noted for some years that the US National Disclosure Process (NDP) International Traffi c in Arms Regulations (ITAR) Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) and Special Security Arrangements (SSA) all of which regulate the transfer and export of US defense technologies and the process of direct foreign investment in the US market pose major obstacles to the technology transfers that will be needed to close the interoperability gap between the United States and its European allies (Adams 2001c)

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

155

Transfers of defense technologies from the US to the European allies go through intensive scrutiny in the Department of Defense and an interagency discussion before a decision is made to approve the deal This has often led to a decision to share parts of hardware with allied collaborators but not software codes that govern the operation of the system leaving allies in possession of only part of the information they would need to operate repair overhaul or adapt systems purchased from or built in collaboration with the United States The US-German-Italian Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) for example has faced this black box problem for some time

US export control rules compound the problem All military technology exports and transfers including the exchange of oral or written expertise on such technology require a license from the Offi ce of Defense Trade Controls in the Department of State after interagency coordination (including the Department of Defense and the armed services) The slowness and complexity of the US export control process and the large number of items on the Munitions List have been a constant irritant in the transatlantic defense relationship US fi rms wishing to collaborate with European counterparts encounter delays European fi rms seeking to acquire US components for European systems fi nd the system unpredictable The US operations of European defense fi rms cannot cross-fertilize with their European branches as such communications require an export license to take place This system has created incentives for the Europeans to build technologies in Europe which are no longer subject to US controls rather than buy technology from the United States

US regulations with respect to the scrutiny and structure of foreign direct investment in the US defense market have further complicated the dialogue about interoperability Direct investments and joint ventures by Europeans (and others) in the US defense market are subject to intensive scrutiny through the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) interagency process While very few such investments have been rejected many are withdrawn or not attempted given the complexities and uncertainties in the US process Successful investments and collaborations such as the BAE Systems acquisition of Lockheed Martinrsquos electronic warfare assets in 2000 and the creation of Thales Raytheon Systems (an air defense joint venture) take years to execute and are diffi cult to operate effi ciently

These diffi culties are compounded by the complexities of the SSA requirements which effectively separate the work and workforce of American business units from those of the European parent company The requirements are designed and enforced to prevent the fl ow of sensitive technologies across the Atlantic They also make effi cient cross-corporate collaboration and economic effi ciencies diffi cult

C4ISR interoperability is at the very heart of coalition operations and the US rules of the road are a disincentive to achieving that goal Major reforms of the US technology transfer export control and investment rules would be needed for transatlantic interoperability and network issues to be solved It will be important for Washington to realize that these rules which seem technical and receive

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

156

lower priority attention are strategic issues for the European allies Technical discussions that leave the current rules and processes in place will not solve the problem they need to be addressed at the higher policy level

Conclusion

Solving the interoperability problems particularly with respect to networked operations and C4ISR is clearly critical to the long-term future of the transatlantic relationship Both the Europeans and the United States will need to take major policy decisions to move this agenda forward The issue is not a technological one the obstacles to a solution are at the level of policy and budgets The Europeans need to focus their priorities clarify strategy work to eliminate redundancies and build institutions and policies at the European level that address C4ISR as a priority The United States needs to engage in a more systematic strategic dialogue with Europe engage the Europeans at the military and technical levels and reform the regulatory regimes and processes that inhibit technology fl ows Neither set of tasks is easy completing them could make a substantial difference in strengthening transatlantic interoperability for coalition operations

157

9

CONCLUSIONS

Recognizing that the changed threats of the twenty-fi rst century demanded a different strategic response and military capability the United States moved relatively swiftly during the 1990s to transform its military Over the past 15 years this has made the US military increasingly more effi cient and effective at carrying out expeditionary combat missions involving air sea and ground forces operating jointly From a force largely trained and equipped for platform-intensive land battles in Western Europe versus a Soviet threat Americarsquos armed forces have become adept at conducting small expeditionary operations anywhere in the world The increased fl exibility maneuverability and lethality of the US military has included substantial investment in emerging technologies for gathering intelligence distributing it rapidly to all relevant decision makers and users and acting upon it Linked together into a network that ties command to warfi ghting these technologies are a critical tool for modern military operations

The conventional wisdom about the Atlantic Alliance is that the Europeans have not gone through a similar adjustment spend far too little on defense and are left with forces that cannot engage in similar operations alone or in coalition with the United States This study demonstrates that this wisdom is a vast oversimplifi cation As a perception of European military capabilities especially in the arena of networked operations this view condemns both sides of the Atlantic to an unnecessary crisis of confi dence There is indeed some truth to the view that a ldquogaprdquo separates the US and its NATO allies in Europe especially in the arena of networked capabilities But there are important nuances to that gap that need to be understood for interoperability to be achieved

This study shows that a number of European allies already possess or are seriously developing important elements even a full spectrum of modern C4ISR doctrines and capabilities The major European defense powers ndash especially the United Kingdom and France ndash experienced the Gulf War and the Kosovo air war as a serious wakeup call with respect to C4ISR and interoperability with the United States Within available means these countries along with the Netherlands Finland and Sweden are investing in cross-service C2 upgraded communications gear with new radio programs and IP-based capabilities are researching testing or deploying UAV platforms with modern sensors and are tackling issues of cross-service interoperability

CONCLUSIONS

158

The United Kingdom is probably the most advanced in developing network doctrine investing in the range of capabilities required and coordinating its activities with the United States France invests across an even more broad range of capabilities than the United Kingdom (including space systems for example) but has a more diffi cult time coordinating with the United States and is still at the early stages of developing a network doctrine Sweden Finland and the Netherlands have laid out plans for achieving a networked C4ISR capability and are moving slowly forward though interoperability is constrained by national policy Germany Italy and Spain have all made policy statements that commit them to a greater focus on C4ISR networked capabilities and interoperability but actual doctrines and deployed capabilities are still thin

Although progress on C4ISR and networking is uneven in Europe there does not appear to be a signifi cant technology gap between the US and its major European allies At the level of basic technological inputs ndash information communications equipment and sensor systems ndash Europe possesses ample and competitive technology both in the defense and the civilian sector and the know-how to cooperate with the producers of US technology to develop systems and capabilities that can interoperate with US defense systems

It is also an oversimplifi cation to argue that there is a capabilities gap between the US and European militaries There clearly are mismatches in capabilities but they are not at the extreme of saying that the US is moving toward a full network-centric capability while the Europeans are irretrievably mired in the last generation of military technology The leading European nations are developing network-based doctrines and integrating them into their broader defense strategies Many nations are developing and deploying systems in such areas as cross-service C2 upgraded communications systems UAV platforms with modern sensors and cross-service interoperability

NATO has underway a number of programs to create greater interoperability between European and American forces with promise of signifi cant progress in the next decade The EU is also beginning to focus on such capabilities under the framework of the ECAP the Battlegroups and the emerging European Defense Agency There are clear persuasive reasons for making investments in network-based capabilities and transatlantic interoperability a high priority on both sides of the Atlantic NATO the EU and various international forums and industrial collaborations are effective mechanisms for making this happen

There clearly are differences in doctrine and deployment across the Atlantic No NATO ally intends to build or deploy the full global set of networked capabilities projected by the United States Only France has invested in virtually all of the elements of such a capability but no nation has the individual resources to build a capability comparable to that of the United States nor does there appear to be a strategic necessity to do so Only a handful of European allies have formulated doctrines for networked operations however based on their understanding of the uses of C4ISR technology in warfare and of the campaigns they foresee themselves conducting in the near future Networking is not yet at the core of

CONCLUSIONS

159

European military planning nor is the role of multilateral institutions such as the EU entirely clear

This transatlantic ldquodoctrine gaprdquo will need to be bridged if future coalition operations are to succeed This is less a technological issue than it is a policy problem C4ISR technologies and expertise of comparable quality exist within companies and national forces on both sides of the Atlantic Several joint US-European programs have proven that these technologies can be linked The NATO-led advanced concept technology demonstrator CAESAR has proven that sharing data between various national airborne ground surveillance capabilities is possible The six-nation Multinational Interoperability Council program has enabled the sharing of classifi ed information using a combined wide area network The co-development of the Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) has resulted in an encrypted jam-resistant interoperable tactical data communications network In 2005 two other advanced concept technology demonstrators were linked to demonstrate how data from various national collection systems can be posted on a common military website and made available for coalition operations in near real time down to the brigade and platoon levels That same year 43 nations conducted over 15000 interoperability tests in the eleventh consecutive Combined Endeavor exercise These programs demonstrate that interoperability ndash with all of its operational advantages ndash can be achieved without requiring individual countries to relinquish certain military capabilities or parts of their industrial base

For the Europeans one priority for European defense planners will be to develop doctrine that can guide the restructuring of their militaries toward a more expeditionary capability using networked systems France for example develops and procures a wide range of state-of-the-art C4ISR assets but does so without a clearly formulated doctrine for expeditionary network-based operations Such doctrine will make it easier to shift spending from older systems such as main battle tanks and armored personnel carriers into network-based systems such as airborne ground surveillance and space assets Other European defense ministries need to follow suit taking maximum advantage of the contribution that networked capabilities can bring to the level of expeditionary and coalition operations to which they choose to commit

The pace of such a change will have important implications for defense investments A substantial share of European national-level investment in C4ISR and networked capabilities is still at the research technology exploration and development stage The investments of the past decade are now beginning to pay off with deployments taking place over the next ten years from now There is a mismatch in timing with the US pace that needs to be tended to

Policy is again on a critical part of the answer As a common European commitment to out-of-area operations and agile and mobile forces emerges it will create a strong incentive for a redirection of national and trans-European defense investments A Europe uncertain about its military roles and missions will enhance the ldquodrag effectrdquo of legacy forces and investments at the national defense planning level This drag is visible in some of the countries under study notably

CONCLUSIONS

160

Germany and Italy which have substantial investments in legacy forces and the industry that provides their platforms

Resources are the other part of the equation Given the major non-defense commitments of many of the European countries and the unclear defi nition of defense priorities it is enormously diffi cult to redirect public resources to defense Defense resources are unlikely to rise in the near term but this does not mean that resources dedicated to C4ISR cannot grow The diffi cult but necessary decision which some have made and others are coming to involves the tradeoff between legacy forces and equipment and the expeditionary networked forces of the future A doctrine that makes network-based forces more central to overall capability will help reshape budget priorities providing resources for C4ISR investment

The doctrine and deployment gaps are at the heart of current interoperability shortfalls within Europe and across the Atlantic While many European militaries are developing or will soon deploy C2 systems that cross service lines and common communications are the focus of some (the United Kingdomrsquos Bowman system is probably the most ambitious and comprehensive) the results are still uneven across countries The question of cross-European interoperability also needs to be addressed as these changes are made The cross-European gap needs to be closed at the same time the transatlantic gap is being bridged

US policymakers who tend to view transformation network-centric operations and interoperability either solely within the US context or at the fringe as a NATO issue need to keep in mind the cross-European level of activity Recent EU developments suggest that the Europeans do not intend to remain behind will see autonomous networked capabilities and will want to apply their own technology to their needs Europe possesses a technological base adequate to meet this requirement and the European intention of developing such capabilities is becoming more clear The emerging strategic vision in Europe while different from that of the United States clearly includes the desire for increased network-based security capabilities and the ability to operate both autonomously and in coalition with the US Policymakers in the United States need to be aware of these cross-European developments as they are starting to shape European attitudes toward strategic missions the development of rapid reaction capabilities technological investments and cooperation across the Atlantic Over time the rise of a defense-capable European Union will change the context within which these issues are discussed

161

GLOSSARY

Airborne Ground Surveillance (AGS) a radar system ndash mounted on an aircraft or helicopter ndash used for mapping friendly and enemy elements on the ground on a continuous basis and for passing information of their location to commanders for command and control intelligence and strike purposes The use of such a system provides strategic and tactical theater surveillance and target acquisition capabilities and thus reduces both the time and mass required to execute operations AGS systems consist of a radar that can operate in synthetic aperture radar (SAR) mode providing broad area imaging at high resolutions ground moving target indicator (GMTI) mode for tracking moving objects or both

Command Control Communications Computers Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) a range of systems grouped for their relevance to network-centric warfare and network-based operations (see below) When these systems are interconnected they can form a network (or a series of networks) on which operators can exchange information and coordinate activities

Galileo Joint European Commission and European Space Agency program for a space-based positioning navigation and timing system similar to the US Global Positioning System Galileo will include 30 satellites and begin offering services in 2008

Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) Joint European Commission and European Space Agency program for the development of new information systems and techniques to exploit Europersquos existing space-based earth observation capabilities more effi ciently and to plan Europersquos next-generation earth observation systems

Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) a joint project of the US air force and army providing an airborne stand-off range surveillance and target acquisition radar and C2 center Sixteen such aircraft are operational providing ground situation information through communication via secure data links with air force command posts army mobile ground stations and other command centers

Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) a high-capacity electronic counter measure resistant communications link designed for all

GLOSSARY

162

services (air surface and land) and all platform types Operates on the UHF band and supports three message standards Link-16 the Interim JTIDS Message Standard (IJMS) and Variable Message Format (VMF)

Link-11 tactical data link used by the US navy and several other allied navies Its ability to operate on high frequency waves enables the system to communicate beyond line of sight making it ideal for maritime communications Link-11 can also operate in the UHF band but is then limited to line-of-sight ranges

Link-16 tactical data link supporting the exchange of surveillance data EW data mission tasking weapons assignments and control data over MIDS and JTIDS equipment

Link-22 next-generation NATO tactical data link also referred to as NATO Improved Link Eleven (NILE)

Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) A fi ve-nation (United States France Italy Germany and Spain) cooperative program created to develop a third-generation Link-16 system

Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) multinational body providing oversight of coalition interoperability and assisting in implementing actions for its improvement The six member countries (Australia Canada France Germany the United Kingdom and the United States) were chosen as most likely and most capable of leading future coalitions

NATO Air Alliance Ground Surveillance (NATO AGS) NATO research development and procurement program currently in the design phase which will provide the Alliance with an aerial battlefi eld surveillance capability through radar and the fusing of information gathered by other sensors Initially the system was to be deployed on manned aircraft only but it has been redesigned for deployment on both manned and unmanned aircraft

Network-Based Operations (NBO) operations (military and non-military) where elements of command control and communications systems are linked to intelligence-gathering and situation awareness systems Unlike network-centric warfare (see below) the term network-based operations does not imply a single unifi ed network into which all forces are linked Rather several disparate networks ndash possibly deployed by forces from different countries ndash are linked This enables better sharing of information and utilization of forces which in turn means that smaller forces can effectively undertake more complex missions in larger areas of operations

Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) the use of interconnected communications and information systems to create a single network that forms the core of information sharing and strategic operational and tactical decision-making The network gives warfi ghters a shared awareness of the battlespace which in turn enables more effi cient command and control of deployed assets better decision-making for commanders and shorter sensor-to-shooter loops

Precision Guided Munitions (PGM) also known as ldquosmart weaponsrdquo PGMs are a key capability in modern warfi ghting They can be specifi cally designed or regular munitions with an added-on guidance system but in either form maximize destruction of the target while reducing the overall amount of

GLOSSARY

163

munitions required to hit it and minimizing collateral damage While the older less accurate visually-guided munitions are still in use more modern versions are laser- or satellite-guided These include the US Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) and the European Storm Shadow and Scalp missiles

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) remotely piloted aircraft used for a variety of military and civilian tasks Usually categorized into tactical UAV (TUAV) which are used for short-range low-altitude missions medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) used for longer more elaborate missions and high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) used for long-term missions at operational and strategic levels In recent years smaller man-portable and hand-launched mini- and micro-UAVs have been developed and deployed for short-term missions as well as combat UAVs (UCAVs) for strike purposes

164

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adams G (2001a) ldquoStrength in Numbers the European allies and American defense planningrdquo in Williams C (ed) Holding the Line US Defense Alternatives for the Early 21st Century Cambridge MA MIT Press

mdashmdash (2001b) ldquoTaking Europe Seriouslyrdquo in Center for International and Strategic Studies European Defense Industrial Consolidation Implications for US Industry and PolicyWashington DC Center for International and Strategic Studies

mdashmdash (2001c) ldquoFortress America in a Changing Transatlantic Defense Marketrdquo in Schmitt B (ed) Between Cooperation and Competition The Transatlantic Defense MarketParis Institute for Security Studies of the European Union

Adams G and Ben-Ari G (2005) ldquoTransatlantic Revival technology cooperation could offer new startrdquo Defense News 208 21

Adams G Ben-Ari G Logsdon J and Williamson R (2004) European C4ISR Capabilities and Transatlantic Interoperability Washington DC Center for Technology and National Security Policy

Aguumlera M (2003) ldquoDecline in German Research Continuesrdquo Defense News 1837 32Assembly of WEU (2002) Arms Cooperation in Europe WEAG and EU Activities

Brussels Assembly of WEUBaker JC Williamson RA and Johnson B (2001) ldquoUS Security Interests and Dual-

Purpose Satellite Technologiesrdquo in Williamson RA (ed) Dual-Purpose Space Technologies Opportunities and Challenges for US Policymaking Washington DC Space Policy Institute

Barry CL (2002) ldquoCoordinating with NATOrdquo in Binnendijk H (ed) Transforming Americarsquos Military Washington DC Center for Technology and National Security Policy

mdashmdash (2003) ldquoTransforming NATO Command and Control for Future Missionsrdquo DefenseHorizons No 28 Washington DC Center for Technology and National Security Policy

Becher K (2003) ldquoTowards Strategic Dialogue in NATO Europersquos conditionrdquo in Nelson CR and Purcell J (eds) Transforming NATO Forces European PerspectivesWashington DC Atlantic Council of the United States

Bescond B (2003) ldquoGalileo un produit Europeacuteen de souveraineteacuterdquo Defense 105 40ndash3Binnendijk H (2004) ldquoNeeded A NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Forcerdquo Defense

Horizons No 45 Washington DC National Defense UniversityBinnendijk H and Kugler R (2002) ldquoTransforming European Forcesrdquo Survival 44

117ndash32

BIBLIOGRAPHY

165

Boulesteix C (2004) Overview of the French Defense Market 2004 online Available at httpstrategisicgccaepicinternetinimr-rinsfengr125657ehtml (accessed 17 September 2005)

Boyer Y (2004) ldquoThe Consequences of US and NATO Transformation for the European Union a European viewrdquo in Hamilton D (ed) Transatlantic Transformations Equipping NATO for the 21st Century Washington DC Center for Transatlantic Relations

Center for Strategic and International Studies (2001) Technology and Security in the Twenty-fi rst Century US Military Export Control Reform Washington DC Center for Strategic and International Studies

Chuter A (2003a) ldquoUK Strike Chief Notes UAVsrsquo Shortcomingsrdquo Defense News 1830 8

mdashmdash (2003b) ldquoFrench-Dutch UAV Draws Interest In Europerdquo Defense News 1838 4mdashmdash (2005a) ldquoUK May Look to Europe for UCAVsrdquo Defense News 2025 1 8mdashmdash (2005b) ldquoUK Seeks to Expand its UAV Capabilitiesrdquo Defense News 2028 4Council of the European Union (2003) Framework Agreement Between the European

Commission and the European Space Agency Brussels Council of the European Union

mdashmdash (2005) Report by the Head of the European Defense Agency to the Council Brussels Council of the European Union

CPM Forum (2005) ldquoThe Bundeswehr today and tomorrowrdquo in CPM Forum (eds) Defenseand Transformation in Germany St Augustin CPM

DalBello R (2003) ldquoCommercial Communication Satellites assessing vulnerability in a changing worldrdquo in Logsdon J and Adams G (eds) Space Weapons Are They Needed Washington DC The George Washington University

Deacuteleacutegation Geacuteneacuterale pour lrsquoArmement (2003) ldquoLes Deacutemonstrateurs Aeacuteronautiques et Spatiauxrdquo DGA Dossier Paris Deacuteleacutegation Geacuteneacuterale pour lrsquoArmement

De Selding P (2003a) ldquoFrench Defense Ministry Considers Commercial Model for Syracuse 3rdquo Space News 1447 6

mdashmdash (2003b) ldquoSkynet 5 Contract Has Built-in Safeguardsrdquo Space News 1447 10Deutch J Kanter A and Scowcroft B (1999) ldquoSaving NATOrsquos foundationrdquo Foreign

Affairs 786 54ndash67De Wijk R (2004) ldquoThe Implications of Force Transformation the small country

perspectiverdquo in Hamilton DS (ed) Transatlantic Transformation Equipping NATO for the 21st Century Washington DC Center for Transatlantic Relations

European Commission (1996) The Challenges Facing the European Defense-Related Industry A Contribution for Action at European Level Brussels European Commission

mdashmdash (1997) Communication from the Commission Implementing European Union Strategy on Defense-Related Industries Brussels European Commission

mdashmdash (2002) STAR 21 Strategic Aerospace Review for the 21st Century Creating a Coherent Market and Policy Framework for a Vital European Industry Brussels European Commission

mdashmdash (2003a) Communication from the Commission European Defense ndash Industrial and Market Issues ndash Towards an EU Defense Equipment Policy Brussels European Commission

mdashmdash (2003b) Space A New European Frontier for an Expanding Union Brussels European Commission

BIBLIOGRAPHY

166

mdashmdash (2003c) Third European Report on Science and Technology Indicators Brussels European Commission

mdashmdash (2004) Green Paper on Defense Procurement Brussels European CommissionEuropean Convention Working Group ndash Defense (2002) Final Report of Working Group

VIII ndash Defense Brussels European Convention Working Group ndash DefenseEuropean Union (2002) Consolidated Version Of The Treaty On European Union Brussels

European Unionmdashmdash (2003) A Secure Europe in a Better World European Security Strategy Brussels

European Unionmdashmdash (2004) Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe Brussels European UnionFinnish Prime Ministerrsquos Offi ce (2004) Finnish Security and Defense Policy 2004 Helsinki

Prime Ministerrsquos Offi ceFiorenza N (2003a) ldquoNATO Battlefi eld Watchdogrdquo Intelligence Surveillance and

Reconnaissance Journal 26 20ndash2mdashmdash (2003b) ldquoUKrsquos Leap Into UAVsrdquo Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance

Journal 23 37ndash9mdashmdash (2004) ldquoInterview with Franccedilois Naville General Manager of the NATO Air Command

and Control System Management Agencyrdquo Defense News 1948 38mdashmdash (2005a) ldquoHelios 2 Boosts French Satellite Intelligencerdquo C4ISR The Journal of Net-

Centric Warfare 42 34mdashmdash (2005b) ldquoNATOrsquos SATCOM Vrdquo C4ISR The Journal of Net-Centric Warfare 42

32ndash4Forbes I (2003) ldquoTransforming NATO Forcesrdquo in Nelson CR and Purcell J (eds)

Transforming NATO Forces European Perspectives Washington DC Atlantic Council of the United States

Frost and Sullivan (2002) European Command Control Communications Computers and Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Market London Frost and Sullivan

Gavoty D (2003a) ldquoLe PPSM une politique spatiale ambitieuserdquo Deacutefense 105 25ndash8mdashmdash ldquoEuropean Global Space Metasystem for Security and Defenserdquo paper presented at

the Athens Green Paper Consultation on Security and Defense Aspects of Space the challenges for the EU to the Green Paper consultation process Athens May 2003

Gompert DC and Nerlich U (2002) Shoulder to Shoulder The Road to US-European Military Cooperability A German-American Analysis Santa Monica CA RAND

Gompert DC Kugler RL and Libicki MC (1999) Mind the Gap Promoting a Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs Washington DC National Defense University Press

Grapin J (2002) Transatlantic Interoperability in Defense Industries How the US and Europe Could Better Cooperate in Coalition Military Operations Washington DC The European Institute

Hancart B (2003) ldquoLe Domaine Spatial dans la Prospective de Deacutefenserdquo Deacutefense 105 21ndash4

Hegmann G (2005) ldquoEADS baut unbemannten Kampffl iegerrdquo Financial Times Deutschland 22 June 2005

House of Lords ndash European Union Committee (2005) European Defense Agency Report With Evidence London The Stationary Offi ce

Hura M McLeod G Larson E Schneider J Gonzales D Norton D Jacobs J OrsquoConnell K Little W Mesic R and Jamison L (2000) Interoperability a Continuous Challenge in Coalition Air Operations Washington DC RAND

BIBLIOGRAPHY

167

International Institute for Strategic Studies (1998) The Military Balance 1998ndash99 London International Institute for Strategic Studies

James AD (2004) ldquoDefense Industry and Transformation a European perspectiverdquo in Hamilton D (ed) Transatlantic Transformations Equipping NATO for the 21st Century Washington DC Center for Transatlantic Relations

James AD and Gummett P (1998) European Defense RTD in Context ManchesterUniversity of Manchester

Joint Chiefs of Staff (2000) Joint Vision 2020 Washington DC Department of DefenseJoint Chiefs of Staff

Jones SG (2005) The Rise of Europersquos Defense Industry Washington DC The Brookings Institution US-Europe Analysis Series

Keohane D (2004) ldquoIntroductionrdquo in Bildt C Dillon M Keohane D and Valasek T (eds) Europe in Space London Center for European Reform

Kington T (2004) ldquoItalyrsquos Sky-X Demonstrator Explores Artifi cial Intelligencerdquo C4ISR The Journal of Net-Centric Warfare 33 9

Krepon M (2003) Space Assurance or Space Dominance The Case Against Weaponizing Space Washington DC The Henry L Stimson Center

Laurent C (2001) ldquoSyracuse 3 a new generation of military satellitesrdquo CNES Magazine12 30

Multinational Interoperability Council (2005) MIC Coalition Building Guide Washington DC Multinational Interoperability Council

Nardon L (2001) France Cedes Leading Role in Space to Europe Washington DC Brookings Institution Center on the United States and France

Naumlsstroumlm S (2004) ldquoSwedenrsquos Approach to Defense Research and Transformationrdquo in Bialos JP and Koehl SL (eds) European Defense Research and Development New Visions and Prospects for Cooperative Engagement Washington DC Center for Transatlantic Relations

Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium An Introduction to the Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium Washington DC Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium

Nicoll A (2005) ldquoConsolidating Europersquos Defense Industries big rewards big obstaclesrdquo IISS Strategic Comments 114

Nilsson P (2003) ldquoOpportunities and Risks in a Network Based Defenserdquo Swedish Journal of Military Technology 3 6ndash11

Nilsson J Oumlqvist A and Oumlfjaumlll P (2004) ldquoInformation Fusion at Battalion Levelrdquo Swedish Journal of Military Technology 2 24ndash8

Norwegian Ministry of Defense (2002) Focus on Restructuring of Norwayrsquos Armed Forces 2002 Oslo Norwegian Ministry of Defense

mdashmdash (2004) Proposition to Parliament No 42 (2003ndash2004) The Continued Modernisation of the Norwegian Armed Forces in the Period 2005ndash2008 Oslo Norwegian Ministry of Defense

Picavet F (2003) ldquoConsultation Command and Control Support in NATOrdquo presentation to the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association The Hague February

Quast KH (2003) ldquoFAUST und HEROS Die Saumlulen des Fuumlhrungs- und Informationssystems des Heeresrdquo Wehrtechnik 1 66ndash7

Reder H (2005) ldquoSatellitengestuumltzte Multimediaplatformenrdquo IT Report 2005 2 47ndash50Rehnstroumlm F (2002) ldquoMoving Towards Network Centric Warfarerdquo Swedish Journal of

Military Technology 26 11ndash12

BIBLIOGRAPHY

168

Rheinmetall Defense Electronics (2005) International Companies Network their Competencies ldquoOpen Communityrdquo Promotes Open Interfaces online Available at httpwwwrheinmetall-detecdeindexphplang=3ampfi d=3132 (accessed 25 August 2005)

Schmitt B (2003a) European Armaments Cooperation Core Documents Chaillot Paper No 59 Paris Institute for Security Studies of the European Union

mdashmdash (2003b) The European Union and Armaments Getting a Bigger Bang for the euroChaillot Paper No 63 Paris Institute for Security Studies of the European Union

Schmitt M (2005) ldquoIntegration of the MIP Command and Control Information Exchange Data Model into National Systemsrdquo paper presented at 10th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium McLean VA June

Serfaty S (2005) ldquoTerms of Estrangement French-American relations in perspectiverdquo Survival 473 73ndash92

Silvestri S (2003) Space and Security Policy in Europe Brussels European Union Institute for Security Studies

Stenbit J (2002) lsquoThe New Challenges of Network-Centric Warfarersquo in Grapin J (ed) Transatlantic Interoperability in Defense Industries How the US and Europe Could Better Cooperate in Coalition Military Operations Washington DC The European Institute

Thiele R (2005) ldquoVerbesserte Einsatzfaumlhigkeit zur Transformation der Bundeswehrrdquo in CPM Forum (eds) Defense and Transformation in Germany St Augustin CPM

Thomas JP (2000) The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalitions Adelphi Paper 333 London International Institute for Strategic Studies

Tigner B (2004) ldquoEU Acquisition Central Agency would coordinate arms buysrdquo DefenseNews 195 4

Tran P (2004) ldquoEyes on Smart Procurement French to restructure industry defense ministryrdquo Defense News 193 4

United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (2003) Delivering Security in a Changing World defence white paper Norwich HM Stationery Offi ce

mdashmdash (2005) Network Enabled Capability Handbook London Ministry of DefenseUnited States Department of Defense (2001) Quadrennial Defense Review Report

Washington DC Department of DefenseUnited States Department of Defense Offi ce of Defense Transformation (2003) Military

Transformation A Strategic Report Washington DC Department of DefenseUnited States National Security Council (2002) The National Security Strategy of the

United States of America Washington DC National Security CouncilWestern European Armaments Group (2002) WEAG Rome Declaration online Available

at httpwwwassembly-weuorgendocumentsdiscoursdis2002weag_rome_declarationhtml (accessed 18 August 2005)

169

INDEX

An asterisk following a page number refers to an entry in the Glossary

911 attacks 95

ACCS (Air Command and Control System NATO) 10 27 64 84 87ndash8

ACT (Allied Command Transformation) 7 25 96ndash7 98ndash100 146

ACTDs (Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrators) 91ndash2 154 159

Afghanistan 25 95 96 105 107 145 German forces in 54 UAVs in 56ndash7 US networked global capacity demonstrated in 3 9

AGS (Alliance Ground Surveillance NATO) 64 92ndash3 161

Air Command and Control System (ACCS) 10 27 64 84 87ndash8

airlift see liftAlliance Ground Surveillance (AGS

NATO) 64 92ndash3 161Allied Command Transformation 7 25

96ndash7 98ndash100 146Amsterdam Treaty of 108ARISTOTE broadband communications

system 20 28armamentsdefense market 114 149ndash50

see also industrial technology baseASTOR (Airborne Stand Off Radar) 40

46 92ATM (asynchronous transfer mode)

technology 20 27 55 134Australia 100 102Austria 30 117AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control

System) 31 43 46 91 123 130

BAE Systems 8 83 136ndash7 155Balkans 3 9 31 94 95 105 NATO

implementation and stabilization forces in 86 see also Bosnia Herzegovina Serbia

Baltic States 54Battlegroups 25 53 64 74 109ndash10 120Belgium 30 114BIGSTAF (German communications

infrastructure) program 20 55BOC (Besoins Opeacuterationnels Communs)

129Bosnia-Herzegovina 3 53 89 94 107

145Bowman network 11 20 40 42ndash3 146

160broadband communications 14 20 28 55

122 140

C4ISR (command control communications computers intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance) needed in changing security environment 1ndash2 defi nition 161 European reluctance to elevate technologies of 10 industrial technology base see industrial technology base NATO Prague summit commitments 94ndash8 perceived gap between United States and Europe in 4ndash6 9 96 157ndash8 see also individualcountries

CAESAR (Coalition Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance) 91 154 159

Canada 92 100 102CATRIN (Italian C2 program) 20 64CBRN (chemical biological radiological

and nuclear) defense 96

INDEX

170

CCEB (Combined Communications Electronics Board) 102ndash3

Central Asia 105Centre National drsquoEtudes Spatiales

(CNES) 24ndash5CJTF (Combined Joint Task Forces

NATO) 86 97CNES (Centre National drsquoEtudes

Spatiales) 24ndash5Coalition Aerial Surveillance and

Reconnaissance (CAESAR) 91 154Combined Communications Electronics

Board (CCEB) 102ndash3Combined Endeavor 104ndash5 159Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF

NATO) 86 97command and control (C2) systems

center of excellence for 88 99 in France 26ndash7 in Germany 53ndash4 interoperability 20 27 103ndash5 seealso interoperability in Italy 64 in NATO 87ndash8 see also Air Command and Control System in Netherlands 69ndash70 see also Netherlands NATO C2 center of excellence in Spain 73 74 in Sweden 78 in United Kingdom 41ndash2 see also C4ISR

communications and computers broadband communications 14 20 28 55 122 140 in France 20 27ndash9 in Germany 20 54ndash6 interoperability 30 42 104ndash5 see also interoperability in Italy 20 65 NATO communications and information programs 89ndash90 NEC systems 11ndash12 in Netherlands 20 70 overview of European digital communications systems 20 in Spain 74 in Sweden 20 79 in United Kingdom 11ndash12 20 42ndash3 see alsoC4ISR satellites

computers see communications and computers

COMSATs (communications satellites) 20 28 122 see also satellites

Cormorant network 11 20 42ndash3COSMO-Skymed (Italian imagery satellite

program) satellite system 30 66 124COTS (Commercial Off The Shelf)

equipment 47 54 55ndash6 78 87 Deployable COTS Network (DCN) 14

CRONOS (Crisis Response Operations in NATO Open Sytems) 89 95

Czech Republic 117

DABINETT program 43ndash4DCI (Defense Capabilities Initiative) 10

96defense budgets Dutch 69 European

4 6 9ndash10 25 95 106 French 24 German defense investment 153 159ndash60 Italian defense investment 159ndash60 RampD investment see research and development (RampD) investment Spanish 73 United States 3 US policy recommendations regarding Europersquos investments 153

Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) 10 96defense market see armamentsdefense

marketdefense strategy European defense

planning recommendations 146ndash8 European focus at nation level 9 10ndash11 Europersquos lack of long-term doctrinal vision on 10 EU strategic defense planning 107ndash11 119ndash20 seealso European Capabilities Action Plan French organizational changes for 21ndash5

Deployable COTS Network (DCN) 14Desert Shield 3Desert Storm 3DGA (Deacuteleacutegation Geacuteneacuterale pour

lrsquoArmement) 21ndash5 33disaster management 122 see also relief

operationsdual-use technologies 8 132 145 149ndash50

space programs 123ndash4 125

EADS (European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company) 8 29 113 125 135ndash6 EADS Astrium 30 43 58 125 EADS CASA 32 Framework Program participation 119 HRM-7000 tactical radio 57 73 Paradigm Secure Communications 43

early warning systems 33ndash40 79ndash83 seealso AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System)

earth observation satellites 3 29ndash30 33 66 123ndash4 see also satellites

ECAP (European Capabilities Action Plan) 108 112 114

INDEX

171

EDA (European Defense Agency) 110ndash11 115ndash16 118 120 149 Industry and Market Directorate 113 RampT Directorate 118

Ericsson 79ndash83 Saab Ericsson Network Based Defense Innovation 140

ERRF (European Rapid Reaction Force) 97ndash8 108ndash9 120

EUCLID (European Cooperation for the Long Term in Defense) 117

Euro Hawk (German (UAV program) 36EUROFINDER 117EuroMALE unmanned aerial vehicles 32

73 83European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP)

108 112ndash13 146European Commission 115 120 125

126ndash7 129 130 encouragement of regional defense market 150 involvement in European RampD 118

European Defense Agency (EDA) 110ndash11 115ndash16 118 120 149

European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) 97ndash8 108ndash9 120

European Space Agency 123 126 127 129 130

European Union armaments policy 107 110 113ndash16 Battlegroups 25 53 64 74 109ndash10 120 defense cooperation with France 25 defense research and technology programs 116ndash19 Headline Goal 5 107 108ndash9 112 146 industrial base planning 113ndash16 space policy in Constitutional Treaty 127ndash8 strategic defense planning 107ndash11 119ndash20 seealso European Capabilities Action Plan

European Union Force (EUFOR) 14

Falcon network 11 43 163FAUST (German C2 system) (Tactical

Command Provision) system 53 54Finland industrial technology base 133

network-based defense (NBD) 13ndash14Finmeccanica 137 139ndash40Framework Programs (FPs) 118ndash19 149France command and control systems

26ndash7 communications and computers 20 27ndash9 defense cooperation with EU and NATO 25 defense doctrine 16 Deacuteleacutegation Geacuteneacuterale pour lrsquoArmement(DGA) 21ndash5 33 as European leader

in space 26 29 123 124 129 French air force 31 32 33 French army 26 30ndash1 33 French navy 25 26ndash7 33 increasing importance of C4ISR capabilities 21ndash6 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 29ndash33 92 interoperability in French forces 25ndash7 NBO capability table 34ndash9 organizational changes for defense strategy 21ndash5 satellites 29 33 122 123 124 Systegraveme drsquoInformation et de Commandement des Armeacutees(SICA) 20

Galileo satellites 4ndash5 124 125 128 131Germany adoption of transformation

policies 16ndash17 command and control (C2) 53ndash4 communications and computers 20 54ndash6 defense investments 153 159ndash60 development of C4ISR capabilities 47 53 German air force 54 55 German army 53ndash4 56ndash7 58 German navy 54 55 57 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 56ndash8 92 limited cycling of forces for NRF 97 NBO capability table 59ndash63 satellites 122 123 124

Global Hawk (US UAV program) 44 52 57 63 91 93

Global Positioning System (GPS) 125 131GMES (Global Monitoring for

Environment and Security) 125ndash7 128ndash9 161

Greece 30 32Griffi n wide area network 47 101 103ground surveillance airborne 21 30

91 154 159 Alliance Ground Surveillance NATO 64 92ndash3 161 earth observation satellites see earth observation satellites seealso intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance radar

Gulf War fi rst 1 6 military lessons of 2 107 152 US networked global capacity demonstrated in 9

Headline Goal 5 107 108ndash9 112 146Helios (French-led imagery satellite

program) earth observation system 29ndash30 33 77 123 124

INDEX

172

HEROS C2 system 53 54Hispasat (Spanish communications

satellite program) satellite system 124humanitarian relief 1 13 105 108ndash10Hungary 117

imagery intelligence (IMINT) 32ndash3 57Indonesia 105industrial technology base European

overview 8 132ndash4 142ndash3 European second tier defense companies 137ndash40 Europersquos largest corporation systems see BAE Systems EADS Thales (corporation) industrial base planning 8 113ndash16 Letter of Intent to facilitate trans-European defense market 114 150 non-defense European C4ISR market 140ndash1 recommendations for a cross-European market 149ndash50 US export control 93 106 154ndash6

intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrators for 91ndash2 154 159 in France 29ndash33 92 in Germany 56ndash8 92 imagery intelligence 32ndash3 57 in Italy 65ndash6 92 in NATO 91ndash3 see also Alliance Ground Surveillance in Netherlands 73 92 satellites 122ndash3 see alsosatellites in Spain 29 77 92 in Sweden 79ndash83 in United Kingdom 43ndash7 see also C4ISR sensors

internet 14 28 42 86 87 see alsobroadband communications

Internet Protocol (IP) Europersquos communication programs increasingly based on 20 IP-network-based infrastructure 53 54 IP-networked radios 27ndash8 55 134 see also tactical radio systems STANAGS for IP-based communications 79

interoperability between British and American forces 12 40 43 Combined Endeavor exercises 104ndash5 of communications and computer networks 42 effects of transatlantic doctrine and deployment differences 158ndash60 between European C2 systems 20 27 European RampT investment as a key to enhancing 116 see alsoresearch and technology (RampT)

programs of French forces 25ndash7 of ground surveillance systems 91ndash3 of imagery intelligence analysis systems 32ndash3 123 Multilateral Interoperability Program 103ndash4 106 Multinational Interoperability Council see MIC multinational network programs (outside NATO context) 100 Multi-sensor Aerospace-ground Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition 92 between NATO and United States 84 94ndash9 105ndash6 154 NATO Prague summit commitments 7 10 94ndash8 through NATO STANAGS 32 79 84 91 93ndash4 146 platform strategy effect on 25 lsquoplug and playrsquo approach 144 147 154 road to integrated European space systems 128ndash31 between satellite systems 30 US concerns about European capabilities of 4ndash5 US export control as disincentive for 93 106 154ndash6

Iraq 3 9 96 105 107 145 UAV performance in 44

Iridium satellite communications system 122Italy collaboration with Spain 64 73

command and control systems 64 communications and computers 20 65 defense investments 159ndash60 gradual deployment of network-based capabilities 58 64 industrial collaboration with United States 58 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 65ndash6 92 NBO capability table 67ndash8 satellites 29 30 66 122 124 see also Helios earth observation system Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force 64 73

JOCS (UK C2 system) (Joint Operational Command System) 27 40 41

Joint Command System (JCS) (UK C2 system) 20 41

JSTARS (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System) 3 33 92 161

JTIDS (Joint Tactical Information Distribution System) 43 46 89 161ndash2 see also MIDS

Kosovo 3 94 95 105 107 145 German forces in 53 54 57 shortfalls revealed

INDEX

173

in European capability 88 152 UAVs in 44 56

Liberia 105lift 1 5 96Link-11 tactical data link 27 28 43 55

65 70 162Link-16 tactical data link 28 29 65

70 79 162 with JTIDS 43 MIDS upgrade of 84 see also MIDS transatlantic interoperability through 25 27

Link-22 tactical data link 28 55 65 74 162

logistics 1 5 96

Maastricht Treaty 108MAJIIC (Multi-sensor Aerospace-ground

Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition) 92

MIC (Multinational Interoperability Council) 42 53 100ndash2 103 106 159 defi nition 162

MIDS (Multifunctional Information Distribution System) 28 74 84 89ndash90 142 159 defi nition 162

MIP (Multilateral Interoperability Program) 103ndash4 106

missiles Surface-Air-Missile Operations Centre (SAMOC) 54 surveillance 123 theatre missile defense 88 95

Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) 28 74 84 89ndash90 142 159

Multilateral Interoperability Program (MIP) 103ndash4 106

Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) 42 53 100ndash2 103 106 159

Multi-sensor Aerospace-ground Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition (MAJIIC) 92

NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) 122

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Air Command and Control System 10 27 64 84 87ndash8 Allied Command Transformation 7 25 88 96ndash7 98ndash100 C2 center of excellence 88 99 Combined Joint Task Forces 86 command

and control programs 87ndash8 seealso Air Command and Control System (ACCS) communications and information programs 89ndash90 General Purpose Communications System 89 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 91ndash3 see alsoAGS interoperability 84 94ndash9 105ndash6 154 see also PCC Istanbul summit 100 NATO Air Alliance Ground Surveillance (NATO AGS) 64 92ndash3 162 NATO Network-Enabled Capabilities (NNEC) project 99 NATO Response Force (NRF) 7 25 88 96 97ndash8 148 Prague summit commitments 7 10 94ndash8 152 as principle transatlantic context for C4ISR issues 84ndash5 105ndash6 progress towards networked C4ISR 9ndash10 roles and capabilities 85ndash7 Satcom V project 90 standardization agreements (STANAGs) 32 79 84 91 93ndash4 146 Washington summit 96

NCOIC (Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium) 141ndash2

NCW (network-centric warfare) 3 9 162NEC (network-enabled capabilities)

11ndash12 40 NATO Network-Enabled Capabilities (NNEC) project 99

Netherlands C4ISR interoperability 66 69 command and control systems 69ndash70 communications and computers 20 70 defense budget 69 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 73 92 NATO C2 center of excellence 88 99 NBO capability table 71ndash2 NBO strategy 14ndash15 support centres 15

network-based defense (NBD) 12ndash14 17network-based operations (NBO) in

a changing security environment 1ndash4 144ndash5 151 defi nition 162 European national capability overview 20ndash3 see also individual countriesEuropean strategies 9ndash18 policy recommendations for Europe regarding European network-based capabilities 144ndash50 policy recommendations for United States regarding European network-based capabilities 150ndash6

Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium (NCOIC) 141ndash2

INDEX

174

network-centric warfare (NCW) 3 9 162network-enabled capabilities (NEC)

11ndash12 40 NATO Network-Enabled Capabilities (NNEC) project 99

Neuron (European UCAV program) 32 39 45 66 67 76 82ndash3 135 140 154

New Zealand 100 102NGCS (NATO General Purpose

Communications System) 89Nokia 136 141Northrop Grumman ISS International Inc

44 57 77 92 113 135Norway network-based defense (NBD)

11 17 participation in MAJIIC 92NRF (NATO Response Force) 7 25 88

96 97ndash8 148nuclear proliferation 151 see also CBRN

(chemical biological radiological and nuclear) defense

OCCAR (Organization Conjoint pour la Cooperation en Matiere drsquoArmament)111 114 116 150

ORFEO (Optical and Radar Federated Earth Observation) 30 66 154

Paradigm Secure Communications (subsidiary of EADS) 43

PASR (Preparatory Action on Security Research) 119

PCC (Prague Capabilities Commitments) 7 10 96

peacemakingpeacekeeping 94 95 105 107 108ndash10 129

Petersberg tasks 108ndash10Phoenix (UK UAV program) 40 44 136Pleiades (French-led imagery satellite

program) earth observation system 30 66 124

Poland 117Prague summit 2002 94ndash8 Prague

Capabilities Commitments (PCC) 7 10 96

Predator (US UAV program) 3 32 45 58 65

Preparatory Action on Security Research (PASR) 119

QinetiQ 138ndash9

radar 30ndash1 79 92ndash3 134 Active Phased Array Radar (APAR) project 142 see

also ASTOR JSTARS ORFEO SAR-Lupe radar satellite

radios see tactical radio systemsRAKEL (Swedish C4 infrastructure) 79

81reconnaissance see intelligence

surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)relief operations 1 13 105 108ndash10research and development (RampD)

investment 6 8 10 26 116 118 German cuts in 53

research and technology (RampT) programs 24 47 105 111 116ndash19 recommendations for investment 149

Rheinmetall Defence Electronics 137ndash8Rhode and Schwarz 138RITA 2000 (French communications

infrastructure) (Reacuteseau Inteacutegreacute de Transmissions Automatiques 2000) 20 27 134

Saab 32 83 140 Saab Ericsson Network Based Defense Innovation 140

Sagem 139SAR-Lupe (German imagery satellite

program) radar satellite 58 124SATCOM-BW satellite communications

program 56Satcom V (NATO communications satellite

program) project 90satellites Common Operational

Requirements (BOC) 129 for communications (COMSATs) 20 28 122 COSMO-Skymed 30 66 124 EU Satellite Center (EUSC) 130 Galileo 4ndash5 124 125 128 131 in geosynchronous orbit 122 Helios 29ndash30 33 77 123 124 Hispasat 124 interoperability 30 Iridium 122 micro-satellites 33 40 in NEC doctrine 11 overview of European developments regarding 20 Pleiades 30 66 124 for reconnaissance and surveillance 122ndash3 SAR-Lupe radar satellite 58 124 SATCOM-BW 56 Satcom V project 90 SICRAL 124 Skynet 11 20 43 124 Spainsat program 74 122 124 Syracuse 20 28 124 see also space programs

sealift see liftsecurity environment international 1ndash4

144ndash5 151

INDEX

175

sensors 1 2 3 5 11 33 British investment 40 dual-use technology 132 see also dual-use technologies interoperability 91ndash3 Multi-sensor Aerospace-ground Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition 92

Serbia 4 94 see also Balkans KosovoSIAF (Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force)

64 73SICA (French C2 system) (Systegraveme

drsquoInformation et de Commandement des Armeacutees) 20

SICRAL (Italian communications satellite program) satellite system 124

signals intelligence (SIGINT) 33 57Skynet satellites 11 20 43 124SOCRATE (French communications

infrastructure) (Systegraveme Opeacuterationnel Constitueacute des Reacuteseaux des Armeacutees pour les Teacuteleacutecommunications) 20 27 116ndash17

South Africa 105space programs CNES 24ndash5 European

collaboration on 121ndash31 France as European leader in space 26 29 123 124 129 role of space programs NBO 121ndash3 see also satellites

Spain command and control systems 73 74 communications and computers 74 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 29 77 92 modernization program 73 NBO capability table 75ndash6 satellites 74 77 122 124 Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force 64 73

SPIRALE (French early warning satellite program) early warning system 33ndash40

STANAGs (NATO standardization agreements) 32 79 84 91 93ndash4 146

support centres 15surveillance see ground surveillance

intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)

Sweden command and control systems 78 communications and computers 20 79 industrial technology base 133 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 79ndash83 NBO capability table 80ndash2 network-based defense (NBD) 12ndash13 77 rapid reaction units 77ndash8

Switzerland 30 32Syracuse (French satellite communications

program) programs 20 28 124

tactical radio systems 17 27ndash8 42ndash3 55 56ndash7 Bowman network 11 20 40 42ndash3 146 160 of Dutch army 70 Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) 28 42 43 45 90 of Swedish services 78 79 by Thalesrsquo Land and Joint Systems 134

terrorism 1 2 95 121 151Thales (corporation) 8 79 134ndash5

Framework Program participation 119 French communications and computer systems 27ndash8 support for increased investments in security space 125 Thales Netherlands 70 Thales Raytheon Systems 88 113 135 142 155 Think Tank 24

THALES (Technology Arrangements for Laboratories for Defense European Science) framework 117

theatre missile defense (TMD) 88 95TIPS (Transatlantic Industry Proposed

Solution) 92ndash3TITAAN (Dutch communications

infrastructure) 23 53 66 69 70 71 146

TOPSAT (UK imagery satellite program) 47 52 138

Turkey 30

UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) 3 31ndash2 44ndash5 56ndash7 73 163

United Kingdom British Army 12 41 42 command and control systems 41ndash2 communications and computers 11ndash12 20 42ndash3 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 43ndash7 92 interoperability with United States 12 40 43 investment in C4ISR systems 40 Joint Command System (JCS) 20 41 Joint Operational Command System (JOCS) 27 40 41 Ministry of Defense restructuring 12 40 NBO capability table 48ndash52 network-enabled capabilities (NEC) 11ndash12 40 Royal Air Force 12 41 43 46 Royal Navy 12 41 43 satellites 122 124

United States export control regulations 93 106 154ndash6 global satellite coverage 122 123 125 interoperability

INDEX

176

with NATO 84 94ndash9 105ndash6 154 seealso interoperability interoperability with United Kingdom 12 40 43 non-compliance with NATO STANAGs 94 perceived gap between United States and European militaries 4ndash6 9 96 153 157ndash8 policy recommendations for United States regarding European network-based capabilities 150ndash6 role in NRF 98 transformation process 2ndash3 9 157 US Navy 25

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) 3 31ndash2 44ndash5 56ndash7 73 163 Advanced Joint Communications Node (AJCN) 44ndash5 digital technology and 123 French linking with manned platforms and space-based assets 26 29 interoperability 44ndash5 56 154 micro-UAVs 45 58 mini-UAVs 31 45 56ndash7

UCAV (combat) technology 32 57ndash8 83 versatility of 20ndash1 99

unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) 45 139

VIRVE (Finnish national C4 infrastructure) 14

Watchkeeper program 40 44ndash5 134WEAG (Western European Armaments

Group) 116ndash18WEAO (Western European Armaments

Organization) 118 120weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

operations 1 2 95 121ndash2wide area networks (WANs) 41 47 86

101 103

ZODIAC (Dutch tactical communications system) 70 71

1313

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wwweBookstoretandfcouk

• BOOK COVER
• HALF-TITLE
• SERIES-TITLE
• TITLE
• COPYRIGHT
• CONTENTS
• LIST OF TABLES
• ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
• ABBREVIATIONS
• 1 INTRODUCTION Networked operations and European capabilities
• 2 EUROPEAN STRATEGIES FOR NETWORK-BASED OPERATIONS
• 3 EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES FOR NETWORK-BASED OPERATIONS
• 4 NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NETWORK-BASED CAPABILITIES
• 5 THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NETWORK-BASED CAPABILITIES
• 6 EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS FOR NETWORK-BASED OPERATIONS
• 7 THE EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE FOR NETWORK-BASED CAPABILITIES
• 8 EUROPEAN NETWORK-BASED CAPABILITIES Policy recommendations
• 9 CONCLUSIONS
• GLOSSARY
• BIBLIOGRAPHY
• INDEX

STRATEGIC CONTESTWeapons proliferation and war in the greater Middle East

Richard L Russell

PROPAGANDA THE PRESS AND CONFLICTThe Gulf War and Kosovo

David R Willcox

MISSILE DEFENCEInternational regional and national implications

Edited by Bertel Heurlin and Sten Rynning

GLOBALISING JUSTICE FOR MASS ATROCITIESA revolution in accountability

Chandra Lekha Sriram

ETHNIC CONFLICT AND TERRORISMThe origins and dynamics of civil wars

Joseph L Soeters

GLOBALISATION AND THE FUTURE OF TERRORISM Patterns and predictions

Brynjar Lia

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND STRATEGYThe evolution of American nuclear policy

Stephen J Cimbala

NASSER AND THE MISSILE AGE IN THE MIDDLE EASTOwen L Sirrs

WAR AS RISK MANAGEMENTStrategy and confl ict in an age of globalised risks

Yee-Kuang Heng

MILITARY NANOTECHNOLOGYPotential applications and preventive arms control

Jurgen Altmann

NATO AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTIONRegional alliance global threats

Eric R Terzuolo

EUROPEANISATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY IDENTITYThe EU and the changing security identities of the Nordic states

Pernille Rieker

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACE-BUILDING

Sustaining the peace in post confl ict societiesEdited by T David Mason and James D Meernik

CONTROLLING THE WEAPONS OF WARPolitics persuasion and the prohibition of inhumanity

Brian Rappert

CHANGING TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY RELATIONSDo the US the EU and Russia form a new strategic triangle

Edited by Jan Hallenberg and Haringkan Karlsson

THEORETICAL ROOTS OF US FOREIGN POLICYMachiavelli and American unilateralism

Thomas M Kane

CORPORATE SOLDIERS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITYThe rise of private military companies

Christopher Kinsey

TRANSFORMING EUROPEAN MILITARIESCoalition operations and the technology gap

Gordon Adams and Guy Ben-Ari

GLOBALIZATION AND CONFLICTNational security in a lsquonewrsquo strategic era

Edited by Robert G Patman

TRANSFORMING EUROPEAN MILITARIES

Coalition operations and the technology gap

Gordon Adams and Guy Ben-Ari

First published 2006 by Routledge

2 Park Square Milton Park Abingdon Oxon OX14 4RN

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canadaby Routledge

270 Madison Ave New York NY 10016

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor amp Francis Group an informa business

copy 2006 Gordon Adams and Guy Ben-Ari

All rights reserved No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic mechanical or other means now known or hereafter invented including photocopying and recording or in any information storage or retrieval system without permission in writing

from the publishers

British Library Cataloguing in Publication DataA catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataA catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN10 0ndash415ndash39264ndash0 (hbk)ISBN10 0ndash203ndash96910ndash3 (ebook)

ISBN13978ndash0ndash415ndash39264ndash8 (hbk)ISBN13 978ndash0ndash203ndash96910ndash6 (ebk)

This edition published in the Taylor amp Francis e-Library 2006

ldquoTo purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor amp Francis or Routledgersquos

collection of thousands of eBooks please go to wwweBookstoretandfcoukrdquo

vii

CONTENTS

List of tables viiiAcknowledgements ixList of abbreviations x

1 Introduction networked operations and European capabilities 1

2 European strategies for network-based operations 9

3 European national capabilities for network-based operations 19

4 NATO and other multilateral network-based capabilities 84

5 The European Union and network-based capabilities 107

6 European collaboration on space assets for network-based operations 121

7 The European industrial and technology base for network-based capabilities 132

8 European network-based capabilities policy recommendations 144

9 Conclusions 157

Glossary 161Bibliography 164Index 169

vii i

TABLES

31 Principal European national capabilities for network-based operations 2232 French capabilities for network-based operations 3433 United Kingdom capabilities for network-based operations 4834 German capabilities for network-based operations 5935 Italian capabilities for network-based operations 6736 Dutch capabilities for network-based operations 7137 Spanish capabilities for network-based operations 7538 Swedish capabilities for network-based operations 80

ix

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors would like to acknowledge the support and assistance of many offi cial and private sector sources in the United States Britain France and at NATO and the European Union whom we interviewed for this study Most of them remain necessarily anonymous but their assistance was clearly essential to the study Several specifi c individuals deserve special mention and thanks Christine Bernot Adm (ret) Jean Betermier Henri Conze Christophe Cornu Emmanuel Germond Michel Iagolnitzer Erol Levy Xavier Pasco Diego Ruiz Palmer and Burkard Schmitt

Special thanks go to Professor John Logsdon and to Professor Ray Williamson of the Space Policy Institute at the George Washington University in Washington DC who were participants in the research and writing process for the original monograph which was the starting point for this book Their knowledge of European space policies and of the national and multinational space programs in Europe were a signifi cant contribution to the space chapter in the book and their comments overall were very helpful

Finally this book is based on a monograph ldquoBridging the Gap European C4ISR Capabilities and Transatlantic Interoperabilityrdquo published by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy of the National Defense University in Washington DC The Center sponsored and funded the research on which the monograph and much of this book is based and we are grateful for their support We particularly want to thank the Centerrsquos Director Hans Binnendijk and staff members Stuart Johnson Elihu Zimet Charles Barry and Richard Kugler for their assistance and excellent comments

x

ABBREVIATIONS

ABCA American British Canadian Australian Armiesrsquo Standardization Program

ACCIS Automated Command and Control Information SystemACCS Air Command and Control SystemACE Allied Command EuropeACLANT Allied Command AtlanticACO Allied Command OperationsACT Allied Command TransformationACTD Advanced Concept Technology DemonstratorADGE Air Defense Ground EnvironmentAEHF Advanced Extremely High FrequencyAERIS All Environment Real-Time Interoperability SimulatorAEW Airborne Early WarningAEWampC Airborne Early Warning and ControlAGS Alliance Ground SurveillanceAirborne Ground

SurveillanceAJCN Advanced Joint Communications NodeAMS Alenia Marconi SystemsAPAR Active Phased Array RadarASCC Air Standardization Coordinating CommitteeASTOR Airborne Stand Off RadarATM Asynchronous Transfer ModeAUSCANNZUKUS Australian Canadian New Zealand United Kingdom

and United States Naval C4 OrganizationAWACS Airborne Warning and Control SystemBACCS Backbone Air Command and Control SystemBCSS Battlefi eld Command Support SystemBi-SCAIS Bi-Strategic Command Automated Information SystemBLD Battlefi eld Land DigitizationBMS Battlefi eld Management SystemCS Collaboration at SeaC2 Command and ControlC3 Command Control and Communications

ABBREVIATIONS

xi

C3I Command Control Communications and IntelligenceC4ISR Command Control Communications Computers

Intelligence Surveillance and ReconnaissanceCAESAR Coalition Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance CCEB Combined Communications Electronics BoardCCIS Command Control and Information SystemCEC Cooperative Engagement CapabilityCEPA Common European Priority AreaCFIUS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United StatesCFSP Common Foreign and Security PolicyCIS Communications and Information SystemsCJTF Combined Joint Task ForcesCOMINT Communications IntelligenceCOMSAT Communications SatelliteCOTS Commercial Off The ShelfCRONOS Crisis Response Operations in NATO Open SystemsCSABM Collaborative System for Air Battlespace ManagementCSS Command Support SystemCTAS Cooperative Transatlantic AGS SystemDARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects AgencyDCI Defense Capabilities InitiativesDCN Deployable COTS NetworkDERA Defense Evaluation and Research AgencyDGA Deacuteleacutegation Geacuteneacuterale pour lrsquoArmement (French armament

agency)DII Defense Information InfrastructureDSCS Defense Satellite Communications SystemEADS European Aeronautic Defense and Space CompanyEC European CommissionECAP European Capabilities Action PlanEDA European Defense AgencyEHF Extremely High FrequencyERG European Research GroupingERRF European Rapid Reaction ForceESA European Space AgencyESDP European Security and Defense PolicyESM Electronic Support MeasuresEUCLID European Cooperation for the Long Term in DefenseEUFOR European Union Force [in Bosnia and Herzegovina]EUROPA European Understandings for Research Organization

Programs and ActivitiesEUSC EU Satellite CentreEW Electronic WarfareEXECOM Executive Support CommitteeFADR Fixed Air Defense Radar

ABBREVIATIONS

xi i

FLIR Forward-Looking Infrared FOCSLE Fleet Operational Command SystemFP Framework ProgramGMES Global Monitoring for Environment and Security GPS Global Positioning SystemHALE High-Altitude Long-EnduranceHF High FrequencyIACD Intelligent Advisor Capability DemonstratorIBS Integrated Broadcast ServiceIEPG Independent European Program GroupIFF Identifi cation Friend or FoeIFOR [NATO] Implementation Force [in Bosnia and

Herzegovina]IJMS Interim JTIDS Message StandardIMINT Imagery IntelligenceINMARSAT International Maritime SatelliteINTA Instituto Nacional de Teacutecnica AeroespacialIP Internet ProtocolISAF International Security Assistance ForceISR Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance ISTAR Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and

ReconnaissanceITAR International Traffi c in Arms RegulationsITV Integrated Technology VehicleJCS Joint Command SystemJFHQ Joint Forces HeadquartersJOCS Joint Operational Command SystemJRRF Joint Rapid Reaction ForceJRRP Jaguar Replacement Reconnaissance PodJSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar SystemJTIDS Joint Tactical Information Distribution SystemJTRS Joint Tactical Radio SystemJUEP Joint Service UAV Experimentation ProgramKFOR [NATO] Kosovo ForceLCS Littoral Combat ShipLEO Low Earth OrbitLOI Letter of IntentM3 Multimode Multi-role Multi-bandMAJIIC Multi-sensor Aerospace-ground Joint ISR Interoperability

CoalitionMALE Medium-Altitude Long-EnduranceMASC Maritime Airborne Surveilllance and ControlMCCIS Maritime Command and Control Information SystemMCCS Mobile Command and Control SystemMIC Multinational Interoperability Council

ABBREVIATIONS

xi i i

MIDS Multifunctional Information Distribution SystemMILSATCOM Military Satellite CommunicationsMIP Multilateral Interoperability ProgramMIWG Multinational Interoperability Working GroupMMA Multi-mission Maritime AircraftMNE Multinational ExperimentMP-RTIP Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion ProgramMRS Multi-Role SwitchMTI Moving Target IndicatorNAC North Atlantic CouncilNACMO NATO ACCS Management OrganizationNACOSA NATO Communications and Information Systems

Operating and Support AgencyNBC Nuclear Biological ChemicalNBD Network-Based DefenseNBO Network-Based OperationsNC3A NATO Command Control and Consultation AgencyNC3B NATO C3 BoardNC3O NATO Consultation Command and Control OrganizationNC3TA NATO C3 Technical ArchitectureNCOIC Network-Centric Operations Industry ConsortiumNCW Network-Centric WarfareNDP National Disclosure ProcessNEC Network-Enabled CapabilitiesNGCS NATO General Purpose Communication SystemNILE NATO Improved Link ElevenNMS NATO Messaging SystemNNEC NATO Network-Enabled CapabilitiesNRF NATO Response ForceOCCAR Organization Conjoint pour la Cooperation en Matiere

drsquoArmamentORFEO Optical and Radar Federated Earth ObservationPASR Preparatory Action on Security ResearchPCC Prague Capabilities CommitmentsPFI Private Finance InitiativePJHQ Permanent Joint HeadquartersPNT Position Navigation and TimingPRT Provisional Reconstruction TeamRampD Research and DevelopmentRampT Research and TechnologyRAPTOR Reconnaissance Airborne Pod for TornadoSACEUR Supreme Allied Commander EuropeSAMOC Surface-Air-Missile Operations CenterSAR Synthetic Aperture RadarSATCOM Satellite Communications

ABBREVIATIONS

xiv

SCA Software Communications ArchitectureSDR Software Defi ned RadioSFOR [NATO] Stabilization Force [in Bosnia and Herzegovina]SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers EuropeSHARC Swedish Highly Advanced Research Confi gurationSHF Super High FrequencySIGINT Signals IntelligenceSLAR Side Looking Airborne RadarSOC Statement of CooperationSOSTAR Standoff Surveillance Target Acquisition RadarSPOT Systegraveme Pour lrsquoObeservation de la TerreSSA Special Security ArrangementSTANAG Standardization AgreementTCAR Transatlantic Cooperative AGS RadarTCDL Tactical Common Data LinkTCPIP Transmission Control ProtocolInternet ProtocolTETRA Terrestrial Trunked RadioTHALES Technology Arrangements for Laboratories for Defense

European ScienceTIPS Transatlantic Industry Proposed SolutionTMD Theater Missile Defense TOPSAT Tactical Optical SatelliteTR TransmitReceiveTTCP The Technical Cooperation ProgramTUAV Tactical Unmanned Aerial VehicleUAV Unmanned Aerial VehicleUCAV Unmanned Combat Aerial VehicleUHF Ultra High FrequencyUUV Unmanned Underwater VehicleVCCS Vehicle Command and Control SystemVHF Very High FrequencyVMF Variable Message FormatVOIP Voice Over Internet ProtocolWAN Wide Area NetworkWASP Wide Area Situation PictureWEAG Western European Armaments GroupWEAO Western European Armaments OrganizationWEU Western European UnionZODIAC Zone Digital Automated and Encrypted Communication

1

1

INTRODUCTION

Networked operations and European capabilities

Network-based operations and the twenty-fi rst century security environment

The international security environment has changed dramatically over the past decade for both the United States and Europe This has meant profound changes for national security strategy and for military capabilities Before 1990 strategy was based on the assumption that the principal tension was between an alliance of democracies led by the United States and the Soviet Union and its allies For the military this meant that both deterrence and victory on the battlefi eld would go to the side with the more capable land air and sea forces massed in formation fi elding heavy weapons produced in substantial numbers by a strong defense industrial base Though this confrontation never occurred in Europe wars elsewhere such as Vietnam tended to be fought using that model

Today both the nature of the strategic threat and the required military capability to meet it have changed Although the fi rst Gulf War involved a more traditional type of threat and massed formations were critical to the response subsequent crises and confl icts have involved more shadowy and asymmetrical opponents and a different range of security challenges The need to fi ght large-scale wars has been replaced by the need to address a wide range of challenges from international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to failed or failing states escalating regional confl icts and humanitarian crises

Military operations to deal with these threats demand different capabilities strategic airlift and sealift deployable logistics precision-guided munitions and force protection elements Most important they require deployable command control communications computers intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities ndash collectively known as C4ISR ndash that are both networked and interoperable National governments and coalitions need the capability to survey large areas of the globe and share and jointly analyze the intelligence they gather in order to make informed decisions on when and where to deploy their forces Once forces have been committed intelligence-gathering assets and sensors are needed to provide the information for operations They also require command and control systems capable of processing the information and providing networked forces with a real-time digitized picture of the situation Reliable and interoperable

INTRODUCTION

2

communication systems need to carry this information across forces and back to command centers in the fi eld and the nationrsquos capital A network of all these capabilities enables more effective and effi cient operations

Even for more traditional operations the evolution of military and dual-use technology has changed the face of combat The fi rst Gulf War suggested that large armies and heavy weaponry were no longer a guarantee of success information dominance proved critical Destroying the adversary had become less important than disrupting his lines of communication and supply Today it is widely accepted in the US military that advanced sensors communications and information technologies networked together to distribute the results are a key ingredient of military success especially for the high intensity operations for which they are planning These technologies and the doctrine that accompanies them allow warfi ghters to see better and further orient themselves on the battlefi eld decide faster strike more accurately and assess the results of their actions more quickly

Changes in US forces and doctrine lead the way

US military planning has been the most responsive to the changing security conditions and the revolution in C4ISR technologies At the strategic level with the end of the Soviet threat US security concerns have focused away from Europe toward the Middle East and Persian Gulf North Asia and the Pacifi c and toward such global security problems as failed states terrorism ethnic and religious confl ict and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction NATO Europe became a secondary concern As a result the US military evolved toward a capability that could operate globally through near-continuous presence or expeditionary operations The focus was no longer on a specifi c theater but looked to reassure all friends and allies dissuade potential military competitors anywhere on the globe deter adversaries and defeat any of them decisively (United States Department of Defense 2003 4ndash5)

US military doctrine began to move away from giving priority to major land battles of massed armies and toward a doctrine that would ensure US ability to be ldquodominant across the full spectrum of military operationsrdquo through a combination of ldquodominant maneuver precision engagement focused logistics and full dimensional protectionrdquo (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2000 2ndash3) This change in doctrine has begun to transform operational concepts training and technology Global forces need to be able to move rapidly and their communications command and control and sensors need to be networked together This requirement has come to be know as ldquotransformationrdquo defi ned by the Defense Department as

A process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts capabilities people and organizations that exploit our nationrsquos advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position which helps underpin peace and stability in the world

(United States Department of Defense 2003 8)

INTRODUCTION

3

To put such forces in place the US relies on a technological revolution that has been taking place for at least 25 years Rapid changes in information and communications technologies made it possible to imagine develop and deploy equipment that supported the process of ldquotransformationrdquo Despite shrinking defense budgets in the 1990s the US military began to move in the direction of what it called network-centric warfare (NCW) As defi ned by the Department of Defense network-centric warfare refers to ldquothe combination of emerging tactics techniques and technologies that a networked force employs to create a decisive warfi ghting advantagerdquo Network-centric warfare ldquoaccelerates our ability to know decide and act linking sensors communications systems and weapons systems in an interconnected gridrdquo (United States Department of Defense 2003 13) Analysts have described NCW this way

The United States hellip is poised to harness key information technologies ndash microelectronics data networking and software programming ndash to create a networked force using weapons capable of pinpoint accuracy launched from platforms beyond range of enemy weapons utilizing the integrated data from all-seeing sensors managed by intelligent command nodes By distributing its forces while still being able to concentrate fi res the US military is improving its mobility speed potency and invulnerability to enemy attack

(Gompert et al 1999 8)

This increasingly networked global capability has been displayed since the fi rst Gulf War in the Balkans and most recently in combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq Desert Shield and Desert Storm revealed the military advantages of networking such capabilities as the Pioneer UAV earth observation satellites and the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) Advanced sensors on manned and unmanned platforms provided real-time intelligence to commanders on the ground via a state-of-the-art command control and communications network In Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo the US used a more advanced UAV ndash the Predator ndash that provided its operators with gigabytes of high-resolution imagery in support of missions The ldquosensor-to-shooterrdquo loop ndash the time between identifi cation of a target and its destruction ndash was reduced from hours to minutes

This rapid change in military capabilities has far-reaching implications for the transatlantic security community Although European militaries have participated in expeditionary operations in the last 15 years their forces ndash structured to defend the European heartland ndash did not adjust as quickly to the expeditionary requirements and asymmetries of the post-Cold War international security environment Throughout the 1990s Europersquos armed forces suffered from a kind of ldquoidentity crisisrdquo While the task of defending the homeland remained a central focus for some of them the new challenges were emerging in every dimension demanding new or transformed capabilities European governments had not yet shaped a strategy and doctrine to deal with this emerging reality nor was the message yet entirely clear as to how military forces were to be used or how the

INTRODUCTION

4

capabilities they need were to be created Equally important uneven attention was paid in the 1990s to how European forces could or should link up with the rapidly changing American military capability For many European countries forces shrank in the 1990s along with defense budgets and the transformation underway in the US was not matched by a similar investment in Europe As a result it became increasingly diffi cult for US and European forces to operate in coalition as the fi rst Gulf War and especially combat operations in the Kosovo and Serbia air war demonstrated (Adams 2001a)

Is there a gap

The emerging sense in the 1990s that European forces were lagging behind the Americans even declining led to an atmosphere of judgment and criticism in the late 1990s From the American perspective this gap was technological and budgetary and had a direct and negative consequence for the ability of the US to operate in coalition with the Europeans either in NATO or coalition operations facing the new security threats of the twenty-fi rst century A common view in the US was that the US military had become so far advanced compared to its European counterparts that military interoperability was increasingly impossible the Europeans would simply never ldquocatch uprdquo

Some of this perception was not new the history of the NATO alliance is riddled with debates about the ldquogaprdquo between the United States and European militaries American policymakers have rarely felt that the European allies produced an adequate capability even to meet the requirements of traditional Central Front war plans If this was true to some degree it did not matter NATO forces were in static positions as a defending force not engaged in active combat testing the reality of the proposition

The new international security environment is different The military forces of the allies have been repeatedly tested in combat and military operations from the Gulf War to the Balkans to the Middle East Combining the more active use of the forces with the presumed ldquogaprdquo in technologies and capability has made the transatlantic interoperability issue a central problem for NATO particularly with respect to C4ISR capabilities and the problem of ldquonetworkingrdquo US defense planners have regularly expressed concern about the extent to which European forces were ldquointeroperablerdquo with the networked capabilities of the US While their contribution in the Balkans and the Middle East were welcome the inability to ldquoconnectrdquo the forces led to operational problems The disparity between the military capabilities of the United States and the European members of NATO came to be known as ldquothe gaprdquo This ldquogaprdquo became so large in the view of some analysts that it threatened the very ability of the Alliance to function as a military partnership (Gompert et al 1999)

Rising concern about this gap led American defense planners to become increasingly critical of European defense efforts Aside from the differences in strategic outlook and expeditionary doctrine the criticism focused on the lag in overall defense investment and especially a low European commitment to the

INTRODUCTION

5

C4ISR technologies that make network-centric operations possible According to this view European defense technologies have fallen signifi cantly behind Gompert et al captured the essence of this critique

The use of transformation technology is far more extensive in US forces than in European forces The quality of US precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and C4ISR (command control communications computers intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance) has improved greatly since the Gulf War whereas European forces still remain incapable even of the type of operations that the US force conducted in 1991

(Gompert et al 1999 4)

According to the critique this gap is most obvious in information and communications technologies the core of C4ISR The United States can gather and fuse data from a wide variety of sensors and integrate them into military operations in ways Europeans cannot Europeans lack the C4ISR capabilities that link target intelligence to shooters in a secure real-time manner What technologies the Europeans do possess it is argued cannot connect smoothly to US technologies making coalition operations diffi cult or even dangerous Some US critics have suggested that European information technologies lag behind the United States making their application to defense needs and interoperability even more problematic (Gompert et al 1999 74ndash7 Deutch et al 1999 54ndash67)

European efforts to improve on current capabilities are greeted with skepticism The European Union ldquoHeadline Goalrdquo process it is argued will not bring into being forces capable of conducting twenty-fi rst century combat missions or being interoperable with US forces European decisions to acquire new equipment such as the A400M transport and Galileo satellites are viewed as redundant even wasteful of scarce defense resources As a result in this view European forces even in a multinational mode will continue to rely on the United States (via NATO) for lift logistics and communications and will continue to pose communications and information distribution problems

This study set out to examine the reality behind this critique The result of a three-year research process it examines European C4ISR capabilities both in national settings and as they are refl ected in the work of NATO and the EU (Adams et al 2004) As such it is the fi rst in-depth view of the extent to which major European defense powers have begun to adapt their forces by integrating advanced C4ISR technology into their force planning and acquisition strategies It focuses on the technologies at the heart of network-based operations information and communications capabilities that are integrated into military systems allowing national and coalition forces to be networked from sensor to shooter and back In effect the study takes a close look at the claim that European forces have fallen hopelessly behind those of the United States and cannot close the technology gap with the United States

The results are inevitably complex It is clear that important European military partners of the United States are actually making signifi cant investments

INTRODUCTION

6

in C4ISR technologies and working to integrate them into military systems While European defense budgets and especially European investment in military research and development (RampD) have declined over the past 15 years many European countries are researching developing and deploying advanced C4ISR capabilities While efforts to develop these systems vary from country to country there is no denying the overall trend in Europe including activity in NATO and the European Union towards obtaining improved capabilities for conducting network-based operations

The conventional wisdom about the ldquogaprdquo is not entirely wrong but it is not entirely right either as this study shows As such this study provides a corrective to the standard view based on hard data well beyond general impressions of the ldquogaprdquo If the practical realities of interoperability in networked operations is to be achieved it will be important to move beyond the rhetoric of the gap and work with actual developments and real technology

Overview

This study has a specifi c focus It is not a general examination of defense transformation in Europe thus does not examine force reductions or restructurings power projection and expeditionary capabilities or precision strike weaponry All of these are worthy of study and a comprehensive understanding of European military capabilities requires such an investigation Networking and C4ISR are however at the heart of effective force transformation Hence this study focuses specifi cally on the investment and deployment of C4ISR within European militaries

The study provides an overview of the strategies and doctrines of major European countries with respect to network-based operations No European country plans to create a fully networked force built around a unifi ed command control and communications architecture and few are planning for the kind of ldquonetwork-centric warfarerdquo capabilities the US seeks to create Europersquos militaries are quite aware of the utility of C4ISR and networking however and see it as a way of linking their forces and equipment through more effective digital communications European militaries and defense planners avoid such terms as ldquonetwork-centricrdquo and ldquowarfarerdquo refl ecting both a different view of the role of C4ISR technologies and of the purposes for which they are prepared to commit military force For many Europeans networking is a utility that enhances their capability not a goal in itself Moreover the purposes of their forces extend well beyond the range of warfare to encompass a wide array of military missions including post-war stability and reconstruction

The most advanced European militaries with respect to C4ISR and network thinking are the UK Sweden Finland and the Netherlands whose doctrines are discussed in some depth France Germany and Norway have yet to formulate a complete in-depth network-based doctrine but are clearly rethinking the ways in which they foresee their militaries operating in the future The doctrines of two European defense powers ndash Italy and Spain ndash are not discussed as they were

INTRODUCTION

7

found to deal little with C4ISR or network-based operations though both possess relevant deployed technologies

There is of course a difference between doctrine and deployment The study examines systematically the actual deployed and developing capabilities for networked operations of seven European countries six of them NATO allies ndash France the United Kingdom Germany Italy Spain and the Netherlands ndash and one non-NATO Sweden These seven were chosen as they are the NATO allies with the largest overall defense investments the largest and most modern forces and in varying degrees have the strongest commitment to deploying advanced C4ISR and being interoperable with the United States

The study explores in some depth the actual C4ISR capabilities of each country including current deployments and programs that are being researched and developed The focus is both on the advanced character of the technology and on the attention being paid to building in interoperability The examination is somewhat arbitrarily divided into discussions of C2 communications and computers and ISR In reality these technologies are and should be integrated as part of a networked capability The capabilities discussion also examines the extent to which national capabilities are being contributed to coalition operations with other countries as well as the countryrsquos involvement in current or planned bi- and multinational expeditionary military frameworks such as the NATO Response Force or the EU Battlegroups To the extent possible the discussion explores interoperability in three dimensions interoperability across a nationrsquos military services with other Europeans (NATO and EU) and with the United States

Because so much of the C4ISR and networking efforts are taking place at a level above single nations the study examines network-based doctrine capabilities and interoperability in multinational frameworks NATO is the key multilateral setting in which networking issues are formally addressed and joint programs most fully developed NATOrsquos networking and C4ISR efforts are signifi cantly more advanced than those of the EU for example Moreover recent initiatives in NATO ndash the Prague Capabilities Commitments the NATO Response Force and Allied Command Transformation ndash all give specifi c priority to developing interoperable network-based capabilities NATO is probably the most important context for focusing on what needs to be done to close the gap with respect to C4ISR The efforts of other multinational entities ndash the Multinational Interoperability Council the Combined Communications-Electronics Board the Multilateral Interoperability Program and the Combined Endeavor exercises ndash arealso important and examined here

While European Union defense planning is at an initial stage it is also becoming an increasingly important context for C4ISR investment and networking discussions and commitments Because the EU effort is both serious and long-term it deserves discussion The trend toward a more common defense capability in Europe autonomous to some extent from the NATO alliance will have important implications for future joint military operations European defense planners are already well aware that such a capability will require autonomous dedicated C4ISR capabilities

INTRODUCTION

8

European programs and activities in the defense fi eld are worthy of separate discussion Space systems are increasingly important to C2 communications and ISR While national space capabilities are reviewed within the discussion of each country there is also a growing network of European-level programs Some of these capabilities are being developed outside the defense context but have important and recognized implications for defense planning In addition the attention paid to cross-European interoperability in space is even more advanced than for other C4ISR activities and hence deserves a more in-depth analysis

The European industrial and technology base is an important part of the emerging capability in C4ISR Europeans have chosen to rely extensively on domestic industrial and technology suppliers for their C4ISR needs and the European capability to respond to such demands is quite extensive Many C4ISR systems are based on civilian or dual-use technologies leading European militaries like their American counterparts to make use of a broad and innovative commercial sector In the European case this sector has been encouraged for decades through public investments in RampD activities The recent emergence of several multinational fi rms ndash EADS Thales and BAE Systems ndash has further strengthened European technological capabilities Europeans argue that their dual-use technology sectors in information sensoring guidance and communications for example are fully competitive with the United States and like American fi rms draw on and participate in a truly global marketplace At the sub-system level it is clear that a substantial two-way street for such technologies applied to defense needs already exists (International Institute for Strategic Studies 1998 273)

Based on this detailed analysis the study makes a number of recommendations for policy changes both in Europe and the United States that would accelerate the pace at which the Europeans invest in and deploy C4ISR and networked capabilities and would substantially enhance transatlantic interoperability While there clearly is some truth to the ldquogaprdquo argument it is also based on a misperception Only the United States has set for itself the twin goals of global operations and a fully network-centric military force to conduct those operations European agendas are more modest with respect to geographic reach and the creation of a fully networked force This does not mean however that American and European military forces cannot be interoperable as they function in NATO or coalition operations There are increasingly clear ways in which they can be connected but a good deal of work remains to be done on both sides of the Atlantic to achieve this goal This study suggests what the elements of a work agenda could be

9

2

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES FOR NETWORK-BASED OPERATIONS

To date thinking and planning for network-based operations has been most advanced in the United States Technological advances over the past 25 years have enabled the US to begin creating the network that is at the heart of this twenty-fi rst century requirement Despite shrinking defense budgets in the 1990s the US Department of Defense began to focus on the ldquotransformationrdquo of its forces pushing towards network-centric warfare (NCW) NCW combined innovative tactics and technologies to give the military a decisive warfi ghting advantage and included linking command and control communications and intelligence gathering systems with weapons systems in an interconnected grid Americarsquos military has demonstrated this increasingly networked global capability in the fi rst Gulf War the Balkans and more recently in combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq

The European militaries have not moved as swiftly to create comparable capabilities With the end of the Soviet threat European defense strategies remained focused on regional security which did not seem to demand advanced networked capabilities European defense budgets declined through the 1990s and were largely focused on hardware inherited from the Cold War era ndash fi ghter aircraft main battle tanks and large ships ndash and on maintaining the existing military force structure European governments were concerned about the potential costs of pursuing a doctrine of network-centric warfare and the impact of such an investment on other defense requirements (James 2004 167)

European thinking began to evolve with the Gulf War of 1991 but especially as a result of the campaigns in the Balkans where Europeans were struck by the disparities between their deployed capabilities and those of the United States This stimulated greater interest in transforming European militaries to acquire similar capabilities that could be interoperable with the US A number of European militaries have made signifi cant progress since then As will be discussed in the next chapter several countries notably France the UK Germany Italy the Netherlands Spain and Sweden are researching developing procuring and deploying signifi cant networked capabilities and the trend is accelerating These include unifi ed digital communications infrastructures cross-service command and control systems and various ISR platforms manned unmanned and space-based Moreover European countries are discovering that these capabilities are

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

10

not as costly as initially perceived and that the European industrial and technology base is capable of providing them The overall trend in a networked direction is clear though progress is uneven across European countries Programs have also been initiated in NATO and the European Union to expedite the use of networked advanced C4ISR in existing and planned forces In NATO the European allies agreed to the Defense Capabilities Initiatives (DCI) in 1999 and to the Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC) in 2002 which include substantial commitments to advanced C4ISR NATO C4ISR programs now include SATCOM V Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) and Air Command and Control System (ACCS) In the EU there is an effort to create expeditionary ldquoBattlegroupsrdquo and to explore C3 jointly between the new European Defense Agency and the EU Military Staff

Only a few European countries however have begun to formulate doctrines for networked operations based on the uses of these technologies in warfare and their views on likely military operations over the coming decades Countries that have begun to explore such doctrine also shy away from the use of such terms as ldquocentricrdquo and ldquowarfarerdquo refl ecting different views both on the importance of C4ISR technologies and on the purposes for which they would commit military force There is no European country planning to create a fully networked force built around a unifi ed command control and communications architecture and few which are willing to place C4ISR technologies at the heart of warfi ghting capabilities in the way the United States has Moreover Europeans foresee a much broader range of military operations than the word ldquowarfarerdquo suggests As a result Europeans tend to use different terms to address planned capabilities such as Network-Enabled Capabilities (NEC) in the UK Networked Operational Command (Vernetzte Operationsfuumlhrung or NetOpFuuml) in Germany and Network-Based Defense in Sweden and Finland NATO has also designated its doctrine differently as NATO Network-Enabled Capabilities (NNEC)

The limitations of European military transformation are not the result of an inadequate technology base Local and multinational suppliers are readily available and largely as technologically advanced as American suppliers Analysts suggest that inadequate investment is the constraint Certainly the signifi cantly lower European defense research and technology investment limits the speed at which such technologies could be acquired and these budgets are unlikely to grow quickly However C4ISR systems are generally more affordable than large defense platforms and as force multipliers can provide a bigger ldquobang for the eurordquo One of the most important constraints on the Europeans is the absence of a long-term strategy and doctrine on the use of force which would integrate networked C4ISR into a strategic design Without clear well-defi ned strategic and doctrinal visions European militaries have hesitated to commit funding to a transformation effort

Such strategies and doctrines as exist moreover remain largely at the national level The United Kingdom Sweden Finland and the Netherlands have all been European pioneers in formulating and implementing network thinking and capabilities into their military doctrines but have done so largely based on specifi c national defense strategies and requirements Others including France

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

11

Germany and Norway are still in the process of formulating national doctrines for network-based operations but have yet to connect this planning to national RampD and acquisition plans Thinking and planning at the European level is still at a very early and tentative stage

This chapter fi rst discusses the C4ISR doctrines of those European countries that have most advanced their thinking about defense transformation and network-based operations the United Kingdom Sweden Finland and the Netherlands It then considers developments in other European countries ndash France Germany and Norway ndash that are at a more initial stage in considering their network-enabled doctrines Two of the larger European defense powers ndash Italy and Spain ndash are not discussed as their defense doctrines deal little with C4ISR or network-based operations though both possess relevant deployed technologies While Italy is undertaking signifi cant change in its military based on a strategy review C4ISR investments do not play a major role in this transformation process There do not appear to be major efforts in Spain to integrate capabilities for network-based operations into national defense planning

United Kingdom

The British Ministry of Defense has moved the most swiftly among the Europeans to embrace the concept of integrating sensors weapons systems support capabilities and decision-makers developing its own doctrine Network-Enabled Capabilities (NEC) It is not the goal of NEC to create a universal network via a single technical solution Nor indeed is the doctrine extremely technically focused Rather than view networks in a centric role it prefers to see them in a more underpinning and supporting role It perceives networks as enabling forces to better exploit the information carried on them to make better and timelier decisions on more agile and appropriate actions that result in effects more closely aligned to strategic aims and objectives

In the NEC doctrine a network of networks is envisioned in which a number of nodes carried by deployed operational assets are interlinked The NEC emphasis is on ldquothe ability to collect fuse and analyze relevant information in near real-time so as to allow rapid decision-making and the rapid delivery of the most appropriate military force to achieve the desired effectrdquo (UK Ministry of Defense 2003 11) NEC will exploit the current and future sensors that gather information ensure that the information is better managed fused and exploited to support decisions and link the network to strike assets that can act upon the information collected As an investment priority NEC compatibility will be built into current and future military platforms

Using this network of networks concept some parts of the battlespace will be linked through a C4ISR backbone using the Skynet satellite constellation and the Bowman Cormorant and Falcon networks In other parts the network will be made up of different communications systems optimized for operating in particular environments (eg air to air communications land communications) While all assets will have to possess some communications capability only a few

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

12

will need to be a permanent and integral part of the network the rest will plug into it via specifi c permanent nodes

Interoperability both technical and non-technical is a critical element of the British NEC concept A key challenge for NEC is to keep abreast of other transformation processes occurring within the armed forces of potential allies most notably the United States Through relatively frequent upgrading of C2 and communications technologies somewhat easier procurement procedures and constant participation in US defense RampD programs the British armed forces today have the highest level in Europe of interoperability with American forces The Royal Navy and Royal Air Force however have a higher level of interoperability with their American and European counterparts than does the British Army

In the near term delivering NEC means identifying options to modify existing systems Delivery in the medium term will require intervening in programmed equipment to ensure that delivered systems are capable of exploiting the information they collect andor receive Over the long term the procurement program is to deliver platforms and systems that are net-ready

In January 2005 the British Ministry of Defense published the NetworkEnabled Capability Handbook designed to introduce the concept of NEC to the larger UK defense community and to outline key programs that will be undertaken to implement the concept The Handbook which will be updated annually describes how NEC will contribute to the strategic operational and tactical levels of command as well as its links with the Command and Battlespace Management program and the Joint High Level Operational Concept (Jt HLOC) being formulated by the Ministry of Defense (UK Ministry of Defense 2005)

Britain restructured the Ministry of Defense to emphasize its commitment to NEC NEC policy and coherence now falls under the Ministry of Defensersquos Directorate of Command and Battlespace Management (CBMJ6) which works closely with the directorate responsible for the equipment in the Directorate for Equipment Capability ndash Command Control and Information Infrastructure (DEC-CCII) headed by a one-star general DEC-CCII is the largest equipment capability area in the Ministry of Defense (the other Core Capability DECs being DEC ISTAR responsible for Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance DEC TA responsible for Air Enablers and DEC CBRN responsible for chemical biological radiological and nuclear warfare) It is responsible for delivering solutions to C2 and information technology gaps in British military capability DEC-CCII is able to balance funding across programs and between other DECs to deliver operational capability

Sweden

Urged by the Swedish parliament the Swedish armed forces moved quickly to rethink defense strategy after the Cold War In addition to their traditional role of territorial defense they are now also required to collaborate with other national security elements such as police and emergency management units as well as

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

13

with the forces of other countries within international coalitions Swedenrsquos long-standing policy of neutrality and non-participation in alliances and its defense strategy of border defense are both evolving rapidly As its new roles and missions emerge the Swedish military is evolving a doctrine of Network-Based Defense (NBD) NBD will facilitate joint operations in defense of the borders as well as in international coalitions at all levels of command using information technology to create a system of systems infrastructure with different platforms linked into it

Once in place NBD will allow the combination of different resources to provide task forces for specifi c operations These task forces will be able to interoperate with other participants The doctrine seeks to obtain the greatest possible effect by combining inputs and outputs from all systems regardless of their organizational affi liation (Nilsson 2003 8) The transition to NBD is expected to take twenty years or so however the fi rst steps are underway including developing and purchasing advanced C2 and communications capabilities for aircraft ships and land vehicles and the initial design of a Network-Based Defense architecture The Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI) and the Swedish Defense Materiel Administration (FMV) play a key role in shaping this vision (Rehnstroumlm 2002 11ndash12)

The Swedes conducted major experimental demonstrations of the key elements of the NBD doctrine between 2002ndash6 The experiments focused on secure information service-oriented architectures and the demonstration of dominant battlespace awareness and C2 elements for rapid reaction forces They also included the demonstration of methods and techniques for effects-based operations The demonstrations brought together units from different services each with its own functional systems and included simulations of a system of systems (Naumlsstroumlm 2004 152ndash3) The demonstrations were undertaken in a special NBD Laboratory in Enkoumlping near Stockholm built and operated by FMV for the Swedish armed forces The implementation phase of the NBD doctrine is planned to begin in 2010

Finland

Since the end of the Cold War Finlandrsquos national security strategy has changed dramatically The 1000 km border with Russia remains a security issue but the Finns are focused on participation in international security and relief operations as the central national security goal As a result of this two-pronged defense strategy Finland is making international defense interoperability a priority to enhance both its ability to receive outside aid for national emergencies as well as the effectiveness of its contributions to multinational operations overseas

A key part of the new strategy is to formulate and implement a doctrine that networks all elements of the nationrsquos defense and security forces using international standards Finland decided that its various forces could be much more effective if connected via a single command control and communications network that would enable seamless coordination and deployment of all of them The planned network would connect all military security police and other emergency and fi rst-

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

14

responder forces Though the Finnish doctrine is called Network-Based Defense it implements a truly network-centric vision plugging in all relevant users

Finland began installing this network ndash VIRVE (the Finnish acronym for Common Network for Authorities) ndash in 1999 and it became operational that same year It was fi rst used in live operations in 2000 and completed in 2002 Today VIRVE is the worldrsquos only fully operational IP-based nationwide command control and communications network for security and rescue forces It is owned by the Finnish Ministry of the Interior and operated by Suomen Erillisverkot an entity owned by the Finnish government and Sonera Finlandrsquos largest telecommunications service provider It currently serves some 30000 users from 20 different agencies and organizations including the Finnish Defense Forces police border security paramedics and fi refi ghters providing them with secure voice and data communications A related system is the basis for Finlandrsquos contribution of a deployable command control and communications network to the European Unionrsquos forces in the Balkans (EUFOR) Co-developed by Finnish companies and the Finnish Defense Forces and known as the Deployable COTS Network (DCN) it is a data transfer network that uses microwave links fi ber optic cables and broadband information services to transfer speech and data and provide Internet access between headquarters and troops in the fi eld

VIRVE is an example of how a national doctrine for network-based defense is taking the fi rst steps towards creating a common joint interoperable C4I system linking all government agencies The architecture structures and datafl ow of this network will be operated together allowing the sharing of information and resources according to specifi c needs It will include an integrated data transfer processing and management environment that covers all services and branches of the Finnish Defense Forces Initial focus will be on the strategic and operational levels but foundations will also be built for tactical level cross-service interoperability (Finnish Prime Ministerrsquos Offi ce 2004 107) By 2012 the army air force and navy are expected to be integrated into the national C4I network developed and able to conduct network-based operations both in Finland and overseas

While the Finnish military strongly supports this capability (the Finnish Chief of Defense Admiral Juhani Kaskeala has clearly prioritized integrated C4I systems as one of the militaryrsquos top development programs) other parts of the Finnish government face a challenge in developing their parts of the network Organizational cultures and operational procedures differ signifi cantly and most agencies lack the capacity for long-term planning and capabilities development However interagency cooperation is strong and there is signifi cant public support for improving both homeland defense and expeditionary capabilities

Netherlands

During the Cold War the Dutch armed forces saw one of their major roles as being able to provide C2 and communications capabilities to the theater of operations Over several decades they built up a C2 and communications capability through

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

15

investment in signals brigades With the end of the Soviet threat sustaining of a massive C3 capability became unnecessary At the same time the revolution in commercial information and communications technologies led to a ldquobrain drainrdquo away from the armed forces into the private sector Dutch defense planners wished to maintain some C2 capacity within the armed forces and to develop the C2 requirements of the future To this end they created three Support Centers in 2001 one for each service to bring together engineers and operational commanders for research development testing and evaluation on C2 systems that could serve the Netherlands armed forces in their new mission Unable to match the salary levels of the private sector the Dutch military compensated by offering the Support Center personnel a free hand in the use of their budget included total fl exibility for acquisition and program management

As the Dutch Ministry of Defense began to move toward a doctrine of expedi-tionary warfare the ability of the C2 Support Centers to provide the customer with deployable and fl exible systems became more important The armyrsquos C2 Support Center was tasked with developing C2 systems for all ground-based operations and is now the largest of the three Support Centers employing some 200 people half of whom are civilians The Center also develops technologies used by the marines the navyrsquos landing platform dock ships and helicopters attached to an airmobile brigade It is responsible for building a common open C2 architecture allowing both old and new systems to work together As of 1 January 2005 the Center was integrated into the newly created joint Defense Materiel Organization

This model of support centers while not a doctrine for network-based operations per se is an important contribution to European strategies for C4ISR Such centers bring together expertise from industry and defense ensuring that user needs and requirements are balanced with an understanding of what technology can support Competitive salaries and a free hand to experiment with the latest technologies and participate in groundbreaking research draw the best and brightest employees from the private sector and the military Finally the technology development strategy of ldquoplan a little build a little fi eld a little and learn a lotrdquo (similar to the US ldquospiral developmentrdquo) will be of interest to many European countries Instead of setting down complex requirements packages in advance and then developing and producing a turnkey product systems are designed in manageable parts that are then gradually developed and tested Along each step of the way the product is evaluated in accordance with overall specifi cations Only then is a prototype built and tested with the end-user While many European companies use this development strategy doing so in a setting with industry the military and end-users has the advantage of making it easier to identify and fi x problems swiftly

Other European countries

Encouraged by the success of the United Kingdom Sweden Finland and the Netherlands other European nations are beginning to formulate strategy and doctrine for network-based operations Rather than create distinct network-based doctrines C4ISR or networked capabilities tend to be included in broader defense

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

16

planning documents alongside plans for refocusing the militaryrsquos roles from territorial defense to expeditionary operations downsizing forces improving training for individual soldiers reorganizing the military command structure and reallocating resources from large platforms to more easily deployable capabilities Most of these efforts are still at an early stage however

France is a signifi cant example of this trend As is discussed in the next chapter France is a European leader in researching developing testing and deploying state-of-the-art C4ISR technologies The broad French technology investment does not however emerge from a comprehensive networking or transformational strategy and doctrine This strategy is not yet in place though use of the concept of network-centric operations (opeacuterations reacuteseaux-centreacutees or ORC) is becoming more widespread within the French armed forces Rather the commitment to obtaining advanced C4ISR is part of an overall French desire to remain self-suffi cient in military capabilities across the board For decades France has pursued a defense doctrine and procurement strategy that would provide its armed forces with independent autonomous capabilities The deployment of a broad arsenal and the avoidance of military specialization in the view of French defense planners make the countryrsquos military more fl exible and less dependent upon others More recently French strategy and doctrine have begun to emphasize military cooperation in the European context recognizing that total autonomy is militarily and fi nancially unachievable

Recent military planning in Germany suggests a growing focus on achieving expeditionary and network-centric capabilities Germany is one of the few European countries to have adopted the concept of transformation in the broadest US sense defi ning it as ldquothe forming of an ongoing forward-looking process of adaptation to a changing security environment in order to improve the Bundeswehrrsquos ability to operaterdquo (Thiele 2005 7) The German government announced in 2003 that it would downsize the armed forces to 211000 troops and to 392 bases by 2010 from the current 252000 troops and 621 bases (CPM Forum 2005 29ndash30) Moving away from a massive land warfare capability and toward an expeditionary capability the German military force will be divided into three categories The fi rst category some 35000 troops will become response forces (Eingreifkraumlfte)capable of participating in high-intensity combat operations These forces will fi eld state-of-the art C4ISR technologies for network-centric operations and interoperability with coalitions and allies The second category approximately 70000 troops will be stabilization forces (Stabilisierungskraumlfte) for medium- to low-intensity operations and will be only partially networked The third category will be support forces (Unterstuumltzungskraumlfte) some 145000 troops which will provide support for the fi rst two and be responsible for basic operations of the Bundeswehr While there are no planned procurement cancellations the funds saved by downsizing forces and the change in defense doctrine are promising for Germanyrsquos future C4ISR capabilities and its interoperability with allies Germany has also formulated a network-centric doctrine that is very similar to the US strategy of Network-Centric Warfare Named Networked Operational

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

17

Command (Vernetzte Operationsfuumlhrung or NetOpFuuml in German) the strategy calls for linking new and existing sensors and weapons platforms on a common information network

Norway which is not in the EU but is a NATO member sees network-based defense as crucial for remaining relevant as a NATO partner and as a contributor to multilateral operations and has made this strategy an important part of the broader restructuring of its armed forces In 2001 the Norwegian parliament approved a major military reform between 2002ndash5 As in Sweden and in other countries this reform was initiated by a shift in the roles assigned to the Norwegian armed forces from primarily territorial defense to expeditionary operations

As a result of this shift the command structure of the military was reorganized the Headquarters Defense Command Norway was disbanded and the Chief of Defense together with his strategic functions was integrated with the Ministry of Defense A new Defense Staff consisting of representatives of the three services and an Inspector General was established to support the Chief of Defense in his role as head of the armed forces In addition the size of the military reduced by approximately 5000 The savings generated from this restructuring would be invested in advanced capabilities and systems These investments have included upgrading the national Defense Data Network (known as FDN) and procuring locally developed advanced multi-role tactical radios (Norwegian Ministry of Defense 2002) In the next cycle 2005ndash8 the Norwegians plan to create a joint Information and Communications Infrastructure unit to support Norwegian forces deployed overseas and an ISTAR unit focused primarily on reconnaissance missions using special forces and UAVs that can operate within multinational coalitions (Norwegian Ministry of Defense 2004)

Conclusion

There is not yet a consistent approach in Europe to Network-Based Operations Some countries still view territorial defense as the principal mission for their armed forces and see stovepiped C4ISR systems as suffi cient for fulfi lling their current and future defense requirements Still a growing number of European nations have learned important lessons from studying US Network-Centric Warfare doctrine and observing such capabilities in action on the battlefi eld in coalition operations Some including Germany France and Norway are beginning to include language about C4ISR networks in their defense modernization plans but have yet to create specifi c detailed doctrines discussing how these networks will be linked with existing military doctrine tactics and technologies Other European countries particularly the United Kingdom Sweden Finland and the Netherlands have developed detailed doctrines and strategies for creating advanced capabilities based on linking communications intelligence gathering and weapons systems into a network capable of distributing information

It is not always true that countries that have worked through doctrine in detail have also deployed the most advanced technology consistent with that doctrine As

EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

18

the French case suggests doctrinal leaders are not always the same as technology leaders Over time the two will need to develop together if the Europeans are to obtain a network-based capability that is interoperable within Europe as well as across the Atlantic

19

3

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES FOR NETWORK-

BASED OPERATIONS

Efforts are well underway in many European countries to develop and acquire national and in some cases multinational capabilities for network-based operations As already noted no country has fully embraced the concept of network-centric operations to the extent the American military has None are seeking to create a full single infrastructure fusing all existing and future assets Most have opted at least for some integration and upgrading of existing capabilities toward greater networking Major procurement programs focus particular attention on cross-service C2 systems digital communications and ISR platforms (tactical operational and strategic) In all of these countries rapid advances in commercial communication and information technology have created a wealth of products applicable to military C4ISR at a relatively low unit cost As a result for many of these countries expensive weapons platforms can be improved through C4ISR-related upgrades thereby increasing capability at an affordable cost

This chapter focuses on actual deployed and planned C4ISR capabilities in seven European countries France the United Kingdom Germany Italy the Netherlands Spain and Sweden As noted doctrines for network-based capabilities are unevenly developed among these countries However these seven countries are clearly the most advanced in Europe both in terms of overall military capability and in the deployment of C4ISR technologies Not surprisingly with the exception of the Netherlands they are also the countries with the highest defense budgets in Europe They are also the most likely partners of the US in coalition operations either individually or as members of NATO and the EU

An overview of the trends in C4ISR-related acquisition and RampT programs in Europe identifi es developments that have been observed in several ndash if not the majority ndash of EU and NATO countries This chapter then reviews developments relevant to network-based operations in each of the seven key countries summarizing major national capabilities both deployed and projected and examining in some detail each countryrsquos network-based systems in terms of C2 communications (including computers) and ISR

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

20

Overview

Signifi cant efforts are already underway in most European countries to connect existing C2 systems across services Several countries are creating a new cross-service C2 infrastructure including the United Kingdom (the Joint Command System) France (SICA) and Italy (CATRIN) Interoperability among these C2 systems is signifi cantly less advanced especially for ground forces The French army for example has three command levels while most other European armies ndash including the United Kingdom Germany and Italy ndash have two which makes the creation of a common C2 architecture among them a challenge

All of the countries reviewed believe that a common digital communications backbone for their services is crucial Several countries fi eld tactical systems based on asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) switches many others have integrated digital switches capable of interfacing with high-speed data networks and complying with European and NATO standards Many of them are at advanced stages in upgrading their communications infrastructure whether through terrestrial networks satellite systems or a combination of both including the British Bowman and Skynet programs the German AUTOKO-90 and BIGSTAF programs and the French SOCRATE RITA 2000 and Syracuse programs Sweden the Netherlands and Italy are also making signifi cant progress in the military communications fi eld

For communications in general the civilian industry is the main driver of innovation and therefore the main standard setter It is not surprising that while different companies are working on communications programs for Europersquos militaries the systems being put in place share attributes they are digital increasingly based on the Internet Protocol (IP) capable of handling voice as well as data and use ATM switching equipment and widespread transmission technologies (satellite radio and fi ber optics)

In addition to space-based military communications many European countries are turning to space for future surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities While military communications satellites (COMSAT) usually are built and operated by individual countries earth observation programs have become increasingly multinational Furthermore intra-European agreements are being put in place to link national space assets In the not-so-distant future data collected by satellites owned by different countries will be disseminated between partners through sharing agreements and communications satellites will carry military transmissions from countries that lease their bandwidth from others A growing number of militaries are acquiring the capability to link their headquarters with their expeditionary forces using broadband mobile communications The French ARISTOTE the German KINTOP the British Cormorant and the Swedish KV90 are examples of such systems already in place

Finally the Europeans are making increased use of unmanned platforms especially aerial ones to fulfi ll the tactical and in some cases operational and strategic intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance requirements While most European countries possess manned platforms for this purpose particularly for

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

21

aerial reconnaissance these are either in need of upgrading or are nearing the end of their service lives All the militaries discussed in this chapter as well as those of several other European countries have begun to experiment with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) ndash often developed by their indigenous technology and industrial base ndash and most have used them in military operations They are viewed as affordable versatile and dependable options for future surveillance and reconnaissance missions Several countries notably the United Kingdom France and Germany are looking to UAVs for other operational needs including signals intelligence (SIGINT) electronic warfare airborne ground surveillance and strike missions However unlike what is often the case in communications and C2 different ISR standards are set by each country which makes interoperability a diffi cult challenge

France

France invests in almost all areas of defense technology relevant to network-based operations However as was explained in the previous chapter the broad French investment in C4ISR capabilities does not yet grow out of a comprehensive network-centric strategy Although the concept of network-centric operations (opeacuterations reacuteseaux-centreacutees or ORC) is widespread within the French armed forces only a handful of offi cers within the French Joint Staff are currently working on network-centric doctrines Nevertheless between 1991 and 1993 several new organizational frameworks were created to review and modernize French doctrine and strategy in this direction The single joint Directorate of Military Intelligence (Direction du Renseignement Militaire or DRM) replaced a variety of existing services and reports to the chief of the defense staff A joint planning staff the Etat-Major Interarmeacutees (EMIA) was created to plan operations in and out of Europe and the Centre Opeacuterationnel Interarmeacutees (COIA) became the joint operations center France also put in place a joint theater C2 structure (Poste de Commandement Interarmeacutee de Theacuteacirctre or PCIAT) and the space bureau in the French Joint Chiefs of Staff was folded into the Command Control Communications and Intelligence (C3I) staff (Thomas 2000 20) The initial purpose of these organizational changes was to facilitate force projection and expeditionary warfare operations However these new organizational structures could provide a setting for developing a military doctrine increasingly focused on transformation and coordination across services

Because force projection expeditionary forces and out-of-theater operations require among other things advanced C2 systems communications networks and real-time intelligence the C4ISR systems that provide this are playing an increasingly important role in French military plans The French defense procurement agency (Deacuteleacutegation Geacuteneacuterale pour lrsquoArmement or DGA) has set up a task force of capability managers (architectes des systegravemes de force) in charge of future issues for defense RampD and procurement and their cross-service applications The areas covered are deterrence C3I force projection deep strike and maintaining operational capability The task force meets regularly

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111

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bull P

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)bull

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e 3

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tegy

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ions

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s s

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)bull

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ir f

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y C

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ork)

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ty

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ry f

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e C

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rine

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ited

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us a

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AV

and

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AV

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gram

s

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

24

with representatives of the French defense industry to coordinate government requirements with private-sector projects and planning In fact several of the larger defense contractors in Europe have set up new groups to act as permanent liaison with members of the task force for this purpose such as the Thales Think Tank (T3)

In 2004 there were still more changes in Francersquos defense organizations The DGA was restructured to include expanded and improved in-house technical capabilities for research technology and testing The French Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Offi ce of the Secretary-General of the Defense Ministry are beginning to assume responsibility for monitoring the development and demonstration of defense programs a responsibility currently held by the DGA These changes are seen as a way to bring industry closer to its client the French military (Tran 2004 4)

The importance of C4ISR for current and future military capabilities has also been refl ected in Francersquos defense budget planning C2 systems space technologies and interoperability enablers have received priority for RampD investment in the 2003ndash8 fi ve year defense plan (the Loi de Programmation Militaire) During the fi rst two years DGA planners focused on space-based SIGINT assets a space-based early warning system demonstrator integrated C2 systems for the army and navy and advanced navigation technologies For 2005ndash6 UAVs and the interlinking of European space assets are the priority By the end of the fi ve year plan France hopes to raise its defense RampT budget to some 12 billion euros (out of a total 15 billion euros) up from 800 million euros in 2004 (Boulesteix 2004) For all C4ISR requirements DGArsquos Directorate of Force Systems and Prospective Systems Analysis (Direction des Systegravemes de force et de la Prospective or DSP) has been replaced by the Directorate of Force Systems and Industrial Technological and Cooperation Strategies or Direction des Sytegravemes de Force et des Strateacutegies Industrielles Technologique et de Coopeacuteration (D4S) which decides on the best and most affordable solutions without prejudice toward any specifi c technology

The DGA is also working on two plans to assess the future C4ISR needs of the French armed forces The fi rst is a technological capabilities plan of systems including C4ISR systems to be acquired by the year 2015 The second is the Prospective Plan for 30 Years (Plan Prospectif agrave Trente Ans or PP30) which looks specifi cally at longer-term needs and solutions for meeting them mainly in the fi elds of telecommunications intelligence networking C2 sensors and UAV technologies The latter fi rst unveiled at the 2005 Paris Air Show (although circulated within the French Ministry of Defense for several years prior to that) is groundbreaking in that it provides a 30 year draft acquisition plan for the French military based on an analysis of expected threats uses of force and technology developments Both plans are updated periodically to guide RampT investments and procurement plans in collaboration with the European Defense Agency other allies ndash most notably the UK ndash and with industry

Working closely with the Joint Planning Staff (EMIA) and with DGA on network-based capabilities is the French space agency known as the Center for

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

25

National Space Studies (Centre National drsquoEtudes Spatiales) or CNES This collaboration refl ects the French governmentrsquos recognition that space has major strategic operational and tactical advantages for networking and intelligence collection purposes As a result CNES has begun overseeing some military space programs on behalf of the Ministry of Defense The French Chief of Staff chairs the space coordination group (Groupe de Coordination Espacendash GCE) which includes representatives from EMIA DGA and other military institutions CNES has also created a team dedicated to military space projects Its members who can either be CNES employees or Ministry of Defense staff seconded to CNES report to the president of CNES as well as to the relevant program managers at the Ministry of Defense The team works on four major areas future planning ongoing projects implementation of dual-use space programs and RampT

More broadly recognizing the costs of an autonomous French defense strategy France is continuing its defense cooperation with the EU and NATO In addition to its Eurocorps commitments France will commit a whole Battlegroup to the EU Battlegroup effort and participate in two others one with Germany Belgium and Luxembourg the other with Belgium France is also committed to participating in the NATO Response Force despite viewing it as duplicative of the EU Rapid Reaction Force It is unlikely however that France will periodically rotate the same forces through the NRF it would be more interested in NRF experience for different kinds of troops drawn from various services While the French understand that smaller countries will participate in the NRF in a specialized manner they prefer to rotate different types of forces through and maintain autonomy

France also views the Allied Command Transformation as an important development and a target for closer cooperation which might provide a window for the EU into US transformation However within the EU the French strongly believe that there needs to be a European fl ag on European military capabilities At this point it is unclear whether the French expect EU capabilities to be able to complement US capabilities to be oriented principally toward autonomous operations or both This issue has major implications for interoperability require-ments and capabilities Currently France is very supportive of the plan to give the European Defense Agency increasingly greater RampT and procurement responsibilities However France also believes that the European national investments in major platforms stand in the way of greater interoperability between European C4ISR systems In the French view European defense budgets include a major commitment to a platform strategy which leaves little funding for C4ISR and interoperability

At the transatlantic level major French platforms such as the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier have good tactical interoperability with the US Navy using Link-16 technology In Afghanistan for example French E-2C aircraft from the Charles de Gaulle guided American fi ghters toward their targets when US E-2C aircraft were overtaxed or unavailable French Special Operations Forces also have good interoperability with their US counterparts At the European level French naval and air forces are fairly interoperable with most European forces but French

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

26

ground forces are not The French Army still fi elds communications systems for example that are not fully interoperable with its allies The coordination of French RampD efforts is focused for now totally on achieving jointness at the national level

As a European leader in space France also seeks greater cooperation with the United States especially for earth observation communications and navigation programs France also views itself as a potential intermediary between the United States and the space-related activities of other European nations and organizations including the European Space Agency and the European Commission (Hura et al2000 64ndash5)

France has arguably the most advanced operational battlespace digitization program in Europe both deployed and planned While there is not yet full interoperability between all French military services the initial investment in cross-service systems has been made and deployment is well underway The major building blocks are a cross-service C2 system a digital communications infrastructure and a network linking national HQs and expeditionary forces In 2004ndash5 two laboratories for demonstrating network-based concepts were created Bulle Opeacuterationelle Aeacuteroterrestre (BOA) demonstrates the ability to fuse information from UAVs and land-based sensors in real time to create a common battlespace picture for land forces and enable a coordinated engagement of targets The second laboratory will focus on linking data collected by ISR assets from all services Since France has also invested heavily across the board in ISR capabilities it is important to demonstrate the ability to link UAVs manned air- and ship-borne platforms and space-based assets

Command and control

France has operational C2 systems in every service The army has four fully operational digital C2 programs the Force Command and Information System (Systegraveme drsquoInformation et de Commandement des Forces or SICF) for division-level C2 (including C2 for overseas task forces) the Regimental Information System (Systegraveme drsquoInformation Reacutegimentaire or SIR) originally for regimental-level C2 but redirected to company level in 2001 the Final Information System (Systegraveme drsquoInformation Terminal or SIT) for tactical-level C2 and armored vehicles and the Automated Surface-to-Surface Artillery Fire and Liaison System (Automatisation des Tirs et des Liaisons de lrsquoArtillerie Sol-sol or ATLAS) Some 750 SIR vehicles 650 SIT systems and nine ATLAS systems are deployed

Other operational digital C2 systems are the armyrsquos Martha air defense system the air forcersquos Aerial Operations Command and Control System (Systegravemede Commandement et de Controcircle des Opeacuterations Aeacuteriennes or SCCOA) and the navyrsquos SIC21 system The French navy also deploys several Naval Tactical Information Exploitation Systems (Systegraveme drsquoExploitation Navale des Informations Tactiques or SENIT) Ships equipped with SENIT can operate as single distributed anti-aircraft systems In addition the French navy in 2004 initiated the Multi-Platform Engagement Capability (Capaciteacute drsquoEngagement

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

27

Multi Plate-formes or CEMP) demonstrator as a possible locally developed counterpart to the US Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) to provide air and naval assets with additional cooperative engagement capability France initially sought to develop CEMP as a collaborative program offering Italy Germany and the Netherlands participation but the offer was not accepted Initial operational capability is expected in 2006

These C2 systems are only partially interoperable with each other or with allied capabilities though SICF and SIR are both compliant with NATO STANAGs The SIR and SIT systems can both be linked to French combat and C2 helicopters and ATLAS and SIR both interface with the French Rapsodie surveillance system ATLAS is currently interoperable with United States United Kingdom Italian and German surface-to-surface fi ring systems as well as with SIR and SCCOA is planned to be interoperable with the NATO Air Command and Control System (ACCS) The French SENIT system is also interoperable with the C2 of the United States Navy and the British Royal Navy through Link-16 and Link-11 which allows interoperability in naval air defense

France is now in the fi nal stages of deploying the next generation C2 system in the form of a strategic-level system called the Joint Information and Command System (Systegraveme drsquoInformation et de Commandement des Armeacutees or SICA) This system which will link the armyrsquos SICF the navyrsquos SIC21 and the air forcersquos SCCOA systems is already installed on various weapons platforms and headquarters It is linked to the SOCRATE and the Syracuse 3 communications systems (see below) and interoperable with the British JOCS and the German Rubin systems

Communications and computers

The Operational System of Joint Telecommunications Networks (SystegravemeOpeacuterationnel Constitueacute des Reacuteseaux des Armeacutees pour les Teacuteleacutecommunicationsor SOCRATE) is the current communications infrastructure linking all of Francersquos services Its 120 ATM switching sites in France cover all military communications including radio fi ber optic and satellite and connect the system to civilian and allied communications networks In addition a more advanced tactical communications system for the French army will enter into service around 2004ndash5 It will be based on IP-networked PR4G (Programme Radio 4egraveme Geacuteneacuteration or 4th Generation Radio Program VHF tactical radios used in man-portable vehicle-mounted or aircraft-mounted confi gurations) and the Automatic Transmission Integrated Network (Reacuteseau Inteacutegreacute de Transmissions Automatiques 2000 or RITA 2000) switching platform both supplied by Thales The RITA 2000 project was initiated in 1993 and has progressively upgraded the French tactical communications infrastructure to facilitate interoperability with allied networks and expeditionary forces and increase bandwidth Its link into the armed forcesrsquo C2 network management is known as the Command Network Center (Centre de Commandement du Reacuteseau or CECOR) In August 2003 the French defense procurement agency announced a 100 million euro plan to upgrade

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

28

the RITA 2000 system with new hardware and software to provide state-of-the-art tactical Internet and mobile communications services

For tactical communications France currently uses older versions of the PR4G radios which nevertheless include features such as frequency hopping encryption Since 2005 however several units have begun using newer versions that include a built-in Global Positioning System (GPS) and tactical Internet capabilities A total of 7050 PR4G-IP radios will be delivered to the French military by 2009 at a cost of 235 million euros In addition the tactical Local Area System (LAS) developed by Thales provides a tactical command post in the fi eld with digital communications capabilities through a vehicle-mounted IP-based system In the French navy several platforms including some E-2C aircraft the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle and several anti-air frigates possess Tactical Digital Information Link technology of the Link-11 and Link-16 types This technology is now installed in aircraft of the French air force as well The Link-11 systems will be replaced by Link-22 (also known as NATO Inproved Link Eleven or NILE) systems in the near future France also procures MIDS terminals and is a partner in the US navy-led MIDS JTRS program to make MIDS terminals compliant with the US JTRS software defi ned tactical radios

French military satellite communications capabilities are also at quite an advanced stage with the Syracuse satellite constellation The previous operational system Syracuse 2 used the military payloads of four Teacuteleacutecom 2 commercial satellites launched between December 1991 and August 1996 and was operated jointly by France Teacuteleacutecom and the French armed forces The system did not provide global coverage but did cover all of Europe and reached the United States to the west and India to the east Its satellites began to reach the end of their lives in 2004 and while most are still available as backup a new system Syracuse 3 was put in orbit to replace them Syracuse 3A was launched in October 2005 and the second satellite is scheduled for launch in 2006 total costs for both are estimated at around 3 billion euros including roughly 600 airborne terrestrial and ship-borne terminals A third satellite to be launched around 2010 is under study The satellites have both SHF and EHF channels Syracuse 3A has nine SHF channels and six EHF channels The Syracuse constellation belongs to the French government though the French Ministry of Defense is considering the possibility of turning management of the third satellite over to a private consortium using the model of Britainrsquos Skynet 5 (De Selding 2003a 6) The Syracuse 3 satellites will form part of the British-French-Italian solution for NATOrsquos future satellite communication needs and France has additional agreements with Germany Belgium and Spain to share Syracuse 3 capacity (Laurent 2001 30)

Since 2002 France also has a deployed system (ARISTOTE) to provide end-to-end communications between operational units in external theaters of operation and their commanders in France ARISTOTE uses the Syracuse constellation and other available allied and commercial COMSATs to provide a broadband architecture based on the latest commercial standards The system supports voice video teleconferencing telegraph fax and data (including tactical Internet)

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

29

Future communications projects include a naval intranet system (RIFAN) a secure e-mail system for the French Ministry of Defense (Universal Secure Messaging or Messagerie Universelle Seacutecuriseacutee or MUSE) and the Airborne Laser Optical Link (Liaison Optique Laser Aeacuteroporteacutee or LOLA) a 2006 test of a 50 million euro demonstrator to explore the feasibility of high-rate laser optical links between an ARTEMIS civilian communications satellite and a UAV in fl ight The Airborne Communication Node (Noeud de Communication Aeacuteroporteacuteor NCA) a UAV-borne high-bandwidth hub capable of linking up to 50 mobile ground or maritime gateways is also under advanced stages of development with a fi rst demonstration expected in 2006 France also plans to procure additional Link-16 equipment for its Rafale aircraft and for some naval platforms

Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance

France is the European leader in deployed space-based ISR capabilities and the operator of Helios the only European military earth observation system currently in orbit Despite the cancellation of the Horus radar satellite program in 1998 France continued its earth observation efforts with the development of two Helios 1 satellites The fi rst was launched in July 1995 and remains operational the second was launched in December 1999 but failed in October 2004 A joint French Italian and Spanish project Helios 1 satellites carry optical imagers with approximately one-meter resolution and are capable of imaging any point on earth within 24 hours providing a dozen images a day They do not have infrared capability Each participating nation can control the onboard imaging system on a pro rata basis based on its fi nancial contribution to the program (France 789 per cent Italy 141 per cent and Spain 7 per cent) The Helios 1 system allows each of the co-owners to maintain strict secrecy from each other regarding the use they make of it However to make optimum use of the imaging capacity the three partner nations have agreed on certain common needs and program the satellite accordingly More than 30 per cent of the imagery taken by Helios 1 is shared between the partners In addition to fi xed ground stations to receive Helios 1 imagery France possesses at least one mobile ground station built by EADS

Helios 2A the fi rst in the next generation of French earth observation satellites was launched in December 2004 and began operating in April 2005 The second satellite will probably be launched in late 2008 Helios 2A carries two sensors operating in the visible and infrared spectrums One is a medium-resolution sensor with a wide fi eld of view and is capable of producing images with a resolution of approximately 1 meter the other has a narrower fi eld of view but is capable of producing images with a 50 cm resolution The satellite has a contractual service life of fi ve years during which it will produce roughly 100 images per day (Fiorenza 2005a)

The ground segment of the Helios 2 system has an open architecture allowing for interoperability with other imagery sources including other satellites reconnaissance aircraft and drones Users whether in Europe or in an overseas theater of operations will have access to a workstation connected to the main

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

30

ground segments from which they will be able to request specifi c tasking perform analysis or access an imagery archive Overall costs for the Helios 2 program are approximately 2 billion euros Belgium and Spain each have a 25 per cent stake in the program and Greece will join it in the future with a small ownership share Helios 2 imagery will also be shared with other EU Member States through the EU satellite center in Torrejoacuten

France is also working on a dual-use satellite system ndash Pleiades ndash a constellation of earth observation satellites able to cover both military and civilian requirements The constellation to be built by EADS Astrium of France will include two new French high-resolution optical satellites capable of resolutions of about 60 cm Other satellites linked to the constellation will be the four Italian COSMO-Skymed X-band radar satellites designed for a resolution of less than one meter for military images and one meter for commercial ones The Pleiades-HR satellite is expected to be launched in 2008 with the other French contribution to the constellation being launched approximately one year later The Italian satellites are expected to be operational by 2007

Pursuant to an agreement signed between France and Italy in January 2001 the Italian system will be linked to the French via Optical and Radar Federated Earth Observation (ORFEO) which will ensure interoperability and information sharing between the two systems France will also give Italy access to SPOT (Systegraveme Pour lrsquoObservation de la Terre) 5 and to Helios 2 imagery The Swedish National Space Board signed an agreement with the French Space Agency in April 2001 guaranteeing its participation in the civilian aspects of the program as well as providing access to some of the data The most recent additions to the Pleiades program in 2002 and 2003 are Spainrsquos defense RampD agency INTA and the civilian space agencies of Austria and Belgium all of which secured their industrial cooperation on Pleiades and the sharing of data acquired by the system The total non-French role on the Pleiades program however is not likely to exceed 15 per cent An information-sharing agreement between France and Germany is also expected

France also has its own limited airborne ground surveillance capabilities The On-Site Radar and Investigation Observation Helicopter (Helicoptre drsquoObservation Radar et drsquoInvestigation sur Zone or HORIZON) is a heliborne ground surveillance radar that operates in moving target indicator mode but not in a synthetic aperture radar mode Operational in the French army since 2002 the system consists of four radars mounted on AS-532 Cougar helicopters and two ground stations It provides ISR capabilities for the tactical and operational levels A similar system was sold to the Swiss army and Turkey has shown an interest Maritime ISR capabilities take the form of the Breguet Atlantic manned aircraft Additional manned aerial ISR is provided by Mirage F1-CR aircraft outfi tted with the Raphael Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) pod an infrared pod and the Stand-Off Reconnaissance Pod (Pod de REconnaissance STand Off or PRESTO) digital camera pod and by the navyrsquos Super Etendard 4 aircraft carrying a camera and infrared and radar pods In land ISR systems the Rapsodie ground radar system is under development with full operational capability expected in 2008ndash9

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

31

It will be interoperable with the SIR command and control system and with the ATLAS fi re control system

In addition France deploys four Boeing Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) E-3 aircraft delivered to the French air force between 1991 and 1992 In 1998 France began upgrading these aircraft to outfi t them with Boeingrsquos Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system and the new Radar System Improvement Program (RSIP) kit Upgrade of the fi rst aircraft was completed in 2005 and the other three will be completed by the end of 2006 The ESM system provides the E-3 with passive listening and detection capabilities which enable it to detect identify and track electronic transmissions from ground airborne and maritime sources The RSIP kit will improve the aircraftrsquos ability to detect and track smaller targets

France has also taken the European lead with respect to surveillance and reconnaissance UAVs Some like the 12 Crecerelle (Kestrel) TUAVs operational with the artillery corps and the four Hunter MALE UAVs tested by the air force have been operational for many years and are approaching the end of their lifetimes The Hunter UAV is a version co-developed by Israeli Aircraft Industries and EADS The Crecerelle has been deployed by the army since 1995 and has been successfully used as part of French NATO operations in the Balkans A communications-jamming version is also in service Each Crecerelle is outfi tted with a TV camera and optical and infrared sensors and the systems were fully operational until 2004

Other TUAVs continue to be operational The army has 54 CL-289 UAVs for tactical reconnaissance missions at the corps and division levels Co-developed with Germany and Canada and successfully deployed in the Balkans it has been operational since 1993 Its payload was initially limited to black and white cameras and infrared sensors but it has been upgraded to include a synthetic aperture radar and its fl ight software and navigation system have also been improved A separate program known as Reconnaissance Vehicle Programming Interpreting and Displaying (Programmation Interpreacutetation Visualisation drsquoEngins de Reconnaissance or PIVER) was undertaken to develop ground stations for this program In addition the French army is purchasing man-portable mini-UAVs for very close range reconnaissance and surveillance These include several Pointer hand-launched UAV systems similar to those in use with the US army marines and special forces which received an export license by the United States in 2001 and the DRAC (Drone de Reconnaissance Au Contact or Drone for Reconnaissance Upon Contact) of which 160 systems (consisting of two UAVs each) are being procured

For its future MALE missions the air force is fi eld-testing the Eagle-1 system as part of the Intermediary MALE Drone System (Systegraveme Inteacuterimaire de Drone MALE or SIDM) This UAV system is based on the Heron UAV produced by Israeli Aircraft Industries modifi ed by EADS Several of these systems are currently being tested with air vehicles carrying synthetic aperture radar moving target indicator radar TV cameras Forward-Looking Infrared (FLIR) and a satellite data link

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

32

The French air force has also begun work on the next generation of MALE UAVs under project EuroMALE planned for deployment between 2008 and 2010 In May 2002 the Netherlands air force announced that it would collaborate on EuroMALE and by 2004 Sweden Italy Switzerland the United Kingdom and Spain had also expressed their interest in joining Out of an estimated cost of 300 million euros the French Ministry of Defense will invest 75 million the rest will be contributed by other governments and industry

The French army is planning the next generation of tactical UAVs The armyrsquos Intermediary Tactical Drone System project (Systegraveme de Drone Tactique Intermediaire or SDTI) for the replacement of the Crecerelle UAVs began in February 2003 with the development of a UAV derived from the Safran Grouprsquos Sperwer The fi rst trial fl ights were undertaken in December 2003 Eighteen vehicles outfi tted with a black-and-white camera and an infrared sensor and four ground stations are expected and will be able to interoperate with the French ATLAS Martha and SICF C2 systems The system became fully operational in 2005

For longer-term needs the Multi-Collector Multi-Mission program (MultiCapteurs Multi Missions or MCMM) has been underway since September 2002 MCMM will provide for the armyrsquos TUAV needs beyond the year 2008 when the CL-289 and SDTI systems will go out of service In addition a tactical rotor-wing UAV built by ECT Industries of France is currently under development for the French navy The fi rst prototype of this project Helicopter Operated from Afar (Heacutelicoptegravere Teacuteleacuteopeacutereacute or HETEL) was fl own in December 2002 and trials began in 2005 Plans are also in place for the development of a long-endurance maritime UAV known as the Long Endurance On-Board Drone (Drone Embarqueacute Longue Endurance or DELE)

France has also begun to develop unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) with two major projects The fi rst outfi ts Sperwer B TUAVs with Israeli-made Spike ER (extended range) precision strike missiles First unveiled in the summer of 2005 this project is similar to the US success with armed Predator UAVs using Hellfi re missiles The second is RampD on a new UCAV Neuron to be operational by 2009 Led by Dassault Aviation which holds a 50 per cent share the program has drawn interest from several European governments and fi rms Alenia Aeronautica of Italy is the second largest industrial partner with a 22 per cent stake In addition EADS CASA of Spain Saab of Sweden Greecersquos Hellenic Aerospace Industry and Switzerlandrsquos RUAG have all signed on as partners and further government-to-government agreements are likely The French Ministry of Defense has set aside some 400 million euros for this program The use of NATO STANAGs in choosing the datalink will ensure its interoperability with other alliance ISR systems using the same standard

To manage mission and support data from geographical and intelligence sources and databases France has deployed the Multi-Source Interpretation Assistance System (Systegraveme drsquoAide agrave Interpreacutetation Multicapteur ndash SAIM) This imagery intelligence analysis system uses data fusion techniques to create an all-digital

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

33

image chain for imagery from sensors (satellites air sea and ground radars) and has some interoperability with national and allied intelligence systems It is in service with the French air force army and navy and was used during recent confl icts and multinational exercises where it proved its interoperability with the Canadian observation satellite Radarsat-1 the US JSTARS system and the French HORIZON system A separate system TIPI3D exists for the exploitation of available imagery for special operations and missile targeting TIPI3D two of which are deployed translates imagery into 3D graphic models

In addition France possesses a number of collection and analysis capabilities for other types of intelligence Airborne SIGINT gathering and analysis capabilities (for both communications and electronic intelligence) have existed since the 1980s Two Gabriel systems mounted on C-160 transport aircraft are currently deployed More recently airborne SIGINT capabilities have been upgraded with the introduction of the Airborne Electronic Warfare Information Collection System (Systegraveme Aeacuteroporteacute de Recueil drsquoInformations de Guerre Electronique or SARIGUE) in 2001 Currently one such system carried by a DC-8 airplane is known to be operational

The French armed forces also deploy terrestrial and naval SIGINT and electronic warfare capabilities The French army deploys the Forward Electronic Warfare System (Systegraveme de Guerre Electronique de lrsquoAvant or SGEA) as well as other mobile electronic warfare and SIGINT collection systems The French navy possesses several vessels carrying SIGINT equipment and deployed its newest one the Dupuy de Locircme under the Joint Forces Electromagnetic Research program (Moyen Interarmeacutees de Recherches Electromagneacutetiques or MINREM) in 2005

France has also deployed military space SIGINT systems since the 1990s Initially two micro-satellites Cerise (Cherry) and Clementine were piggybacked on each of the two Helios 1 satellites launched in 1995 and 1999 An additional signals interception system Euracom was also piggybacked on the fi rst Helios 1 satellite These systems which were intended mainly as pilot projects were complemented in late 2004 by a cluster of four Essaim (Swarm) micro-satellites specializing in COMINT These were piggybacked on the fi rst Helios 2 satellite and began their planned three years of operations in May 2005 Design of two satellites for the monitoring of radar communications from low orbit was initiated in early 2005 under the ELINT program A joint DGA-CNES demonstrator with some 170 million euros in funding the satellites will be in orbit around 2008ndash9 by which time France hopes to persuade other European governments to join in developing a fully operational intelligence collection capability in space

The DGA has initiated the design and production of a space based optical early warning system demonstrator the Preparatory Infrared Alert System (Systegraveme Preacuteparatoire Infra-Rouge pour lrsquoAlerte or SPIRALE) This 124 million euro demonstrator will be a complete system capable of collecting and analyzing infrared imagery against a land background in order to detect ballistic missiles as they are launched It could also be used for other operational missions such as monitoring of weapons proliferation SPIRALE will consist of two micro-

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e 3

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loye

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6ndash7

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ter

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rces

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)

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l be

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ter

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riel

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n op

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tica

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r (S

AIM

)

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T s

yste

m a

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to

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te a

n al

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n fo

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tes

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tion

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n ea

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rvat

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nd o

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llit

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ched

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ery

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ing

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emen

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ith

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gium

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to

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ery

from

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man

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e sy

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chan

ge f

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s 2

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ery

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e de

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ne

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ique

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erm

edia

re

(SD

TI)

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t gen

erat

ion

of ta

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al

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Wil

l be

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rope

rabl

e w

ith

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as M

arth

a an

d S

ICF

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2 sy

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s

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e 3

2 co

ntin

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loye

d to

day

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loye

d by

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d af

ter

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rope

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lity

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aim

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lati

on o

f 4

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T s

atel

lite

s

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en I

nter

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eacutees

de R

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s E

lect

rom

agneacute

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es(M

INR

EM

)

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p-ba

sed

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T a

nd

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INT

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tem

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oMA

LE

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ure

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LE

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o-de

velo

ped

wit

h th

e N

ethe

rlan

ds o

ther

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untr

ies

have

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ress

ed

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rest

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EIA

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o ea

rth

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rvat

ion

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llit

es w

ith

a re

solu

tion

of

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roxi

mat

ely

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m

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ery

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ing

wit

h B

elgi

um S

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ly

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tria

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eden

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erm

any

Mul

ti C

apte

urs

Mul

ti

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sion

s (M

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M)

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ure

arm

y U

AV

Neu

ron

UC

AV

pro

gram

Co-

deve

lope

d w

ith

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y

Spa

in S

wed

en G

reec

e an

d S

wit

zerl

and

Heacutel

icop

tegravere

Teacutel

eacuteopeacute

reacute

(HE

TE

L)

Tact

ical

rot

or-w

ing

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V

for

the

Fre

nch

Nav

y

EL

INT

2 ra

dar

mon

itor

ing

mic

ro-

sate

llit

es

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

40

satellites to be launched in 2008 and a ground segment This project will be the fi rst space early warning system in Europe and may pave the way for a future European early warning space program

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom also has an extensive investment in C4ISR systems and the creation of sensor networks The UK has developed a program to integrate the British C2 and communications infrastructures into a single Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) DII will incorporate the Joint Operational Command System (JOCS) C2 system the Bowman communications system and other individual information systems into a single infrastructure Following a prequalifi cation stage during which four industry teams were invited by the Ministry of Defense to submit outline proposals in March 2005 a team led by EDS and including Fujitsu EADS General Dynamics and LogicaCMG was chosen The contract will be worth some pound3 billion over 10 years Initially DII will provide a fully networked and managed service to around 70000 desktops in Whitehall and in forward deployed headquarters around the world Delivery of the DII system is expected to begin around 2007

As part of the effort to implement the NEC doctrine the British Ministry of Defense is also making considerable investment in new sensors systems The largest and most recent ISR RampD and acquisition programs include the Watchkeeper UAV the Airborne Stand Off Radar (ASTOR) airborne battlefi eld surveillance system and the Soothsayer electronic warfare system In addition several sensor platforms already operational such as the Phoenix UAVs and the Jaguar and Tornado reconnaissance aircraft are being upgraded to include more advanced and integrated ISR suites

In addition the Ministry of Defense created the Network Integration Test and Experimentation organization (NITEworks) in partnership with industry in 2003 to provide an environment to assess and demonstrate the potential applications of the NEC concepts In industry the NITEworks partnership includes BAE Systems QinetiQ Alenia Marconi Systems (AMS) EDS UK Thales UK General Dynamics UK and Raytheon UK Key system integration and interoperability issues will be resolved through testing experimentation and evaluation of various NEC options Eventually NITEworks will identify opportunities for changes in defense RampD and procurement programs

In general the British have paid close attention to interoperability and networking with the United States and somewhat less with its EU partners On the other hand the recent British decision to participate in the EU Battlegroups with one British and a second British-Dutch group opens new possibilities for exploring interoperability in the EU context

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

41

Command and Control

The Royal Navy Royal Air Force and Army deploy separate C2 systems that are not for the most part interoperable Since 1995 the Army has deployed the Joint Operations Command Systems (JOCS) designed to pass information between the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) the Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ) the Joint Rapid Reaction Force (JRRF) headquarters and other headquarters of joint and potentially joint operations It thereby allows the PJHQ to maintain a joint operations picture of deployed forces comprising maritime land and air activities within certain areas The system is deployable and can operate over wide area network connections provided by the Ministry of Defense as well as a range of civilian infrastructures employing the appropriate cryptography JOCS is also synchronized with the US Global Command and Control System

Today JOCS has become the basis for defi ning and developing a more capable system the Joint Command System (JCS) Under JCS plans are in place to integrate the Armyrsquos C2 system with those of the other services ndash most importantly the Royal Navyrsquos Command Support System (CSS) and the Royal Air Forcersquos Command Control and Information System (CCIS) (described below) ndash using state-of-the-art commercial technologies under the Defense Information Infrastructure project

The Royal Air Force deploys the CCIS for aerial C2 and the Air Defense Ground Environment (ADGE) system for tactical control of air defense operations A deployable system for the support of RAF missions both in the United Kingdom and overseas the Collaborative System for Air Battlespace Management (CSABM) is currently under development it is expected to be fi elded by the year 2008 In addition the Backbone Air Command and Control System (BACCS) is currently under development as the British air defense system of the future although the design concept requires it to be fully interoperable with NATO air defense capabilities (the NATO Air Command and Control System will provide the core BACCS software and infrastructure on which the system capability will be based) BACCS is due to enter operational service with the RAF from 2009

The Royal Navy possesses the CSS which replaced the more outdated Fleet Operational Command System (FOCSLE) and provides C2 information to the Command Teams of ships submarines and the Royal Marines 3rd Commando Brigade The system supports situation awareness data message handling and several decision and planning aids for amphibious operations In addition the navy is currently working to install CEC systems on Type 45 destroyers and the Type 23 frigates This system will allow units to exchange radar information delivering a single composite and coherent air picture and allowing units to engage targets on the basis of information from other units In the future CEC may be extended to other air and land platforms but this is not envisioned before 2010 The Royal Navy has also installed the American Collaboration at Sea (CS) tactical maritime C2 system on several vessels This system uses leased bandwidth on commercial satellites (mainly INMARSAT) to transmit a common battlespace picture to all vessels and the naval headquarters to which it is linked

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

42

On the international level the United Kingdom is working with the United States Canada Australia and New Zealand to link their respective C2 systems via a coalition WAN and web server This collaborative program is being carried out in the Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) framework and will most likely be broadened to include France and Germany (discussed in the NATO chapter)

Communications and computers

The British Army currently fi elds Ptarmigan a tactical trunk network linking all headquarters in the fi eld The system was upgraded in early 2003 with the introduction of 30 vehicle-mounted units providing improved data access to mobile subscribers and enabling deployment independent of main Ptarmigan trunk networks Ptarmigan is interoperable with US and NATO forces through interfaces with specifi c systems Beginning in 2008 it will be replaced by Falcon a fully digital air-portable Falcon battlefi eld communications infrastructure Falcon will permit the transmission of data between army headquarters including real-time video and is planned to be interoperable with various NATO communications systems

The British began to deploy Bowman the next-generation tactical combat HFVHFUHF radio network for all British services in July 2003 This capability is being delivered incrementally and the initial capability (secure HFVHF voice and data) was accepted into service by the Ministry of Defense in March 2004 This new infrastructure replaces the 20-year-old Clansman system and the Headquarters infrastructure element of the Ptarmigan trunk communications system It provides Britain with an integrated network supporting digital voice and data for radio telephone intercom and tactical Internet information in a single system As part of the Command and Battlespace Management (Land) (CBM(L)) program ndash battlefi eld information systems being developed for armored fi ghting vehicles artillery fi re control air and nuclear biological and chemical defense ndash Bowman will be used as a communications and C2 infrastructure from fi ghting platform up to divisional level Full deployment is expected by 2006ndash7 when some 20000 military vehicles 156 ships and 276 aircraft will be outfi tted with more than 47000 radios and 26000 computer terminals In December 2004 some 300 Bowman radios were deployed with British forces in Iraq However Bowman will face bandwidth limitations as well as the problem of being digital but lacking a software communications architecture (SCA) Since this would make it hard to interoperate with the US Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) the US program is being adapted to enable it to handle the Bowman waveform

A fully transportable United Kingdom operational-level communications network ndash Cormorant ndash exists for expeditionary forces linking them back to head-quarters in Britain The Cormorant system is provided by EADS and is intended to meet the communications requirements of the United Kingdomrsquos JRRF headquarters in any theater of operations Cormorant can interface with Ptarmigan

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

43

and will be able to interface with its successor Falcon It will also be able to pass data to and from the Bowman network once Bowman is fully fi elded

Military satellite communications capabilities are currently based on the Skynet 4 constellation Two of the fi rst three satellites launched between 1988 and 1990 remain in service These support three newer spacecraft launched between 1998 and 2001 In October 2003 the British Ministry of Defense concluded arrangements to transfer operation of the Skynet 4 system to Paradigm Secure Communications a subsidiary of EADS Under this Private Finance Initiative (PFI) Paradigm was also to upgrade by 2005 the two main Skynet 4 ground stations and to supply new ground stations and a network control center in order to increase bandwidth and refresh technology Paradigm will also manage the leasing of commercial SATCOM bandwidth for the Ministry of Defense The arrangement which is to run until 2019 assures delivery for Ministry of Defense needs while permitting Paradigm to resell unused bandwidth to the governments and militaries of other nations under commercial terms To maintain services to the Ministry of Defense and to its other customers Paradigm will develop launch and operate two to three new satellites built by Astrium also an EADS subsidiary (De Selding 2003b 10) The fi rst of the new Skynet 5 satellites is expected to enter service in 2007 Both the existing and new Skynet satellites remain accessible via the Ministry of Defensersquos existing fl eet of terminals Higher bandwidths are possible with the new Talon (man-portable) and Dagger (vehicle-mounted) mobile terminals Some 50 new Reacher mobile land terminals will also be delivered under the Skynet 5 contract arrangements

The Royal Air Force and Navy have installed the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) Link-16 communications system on most aircraft and helicopters (including Tornado F3s Nimrods Sea Kings and E-3D AWACS) and on several vessels (including carriers frigates and destroyers) providing these and their US counterparts with a common air picture The Royal Navyrsquos Sea Harriers were outfi tted with Link-16 equipment in 2004 Many Royal Navy ships and RAF E-3D AWACS and Nimrods are also equipped with the Link-11 tactical data link system

Finally since interoperability with US forces is still a major concern for British warfi ghters the United Kingdom will most likely buy American JTRS radios and install them on various other aerial maritime and terrestrial platforms as an interim solution for current and upcoming coalition operations

Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance

Britain has initiated a program to fi ll capability gaps identifi ed in the Strategic Defense Reviewrsquos New Chapter in the area of persistent ISR collection and target acquisition deep within the battlespace The DABINETT program will provide information to be used to gather strategic operational and tactical intelligence answer commandersrsquo requests for information provide targeting information to systems in all environments support Special Forces and manage intelligence data The initial phase of the program will address current Management Tasking

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

44

Processing Exploitation and Dissemination (MTPED) shortfalls in the current UK system Once completed DABINETT will comprise a system of systems that provides access to archive data as well as the ability to collect persistently process and disseminate near real time intelligence This capability will offer rapid deployment long reach standoff deep penetration loiter and interoperability with coalition forces in network-based operations It will form an integral part of the British networked-enabled capability enabling precision geo-location for targeting including time sensitive targeting which will be delivered via a Network Centric Collaborative Targeting (NCCT) system Initial deployment is expected by the end of 2006

British UAV capabilities consist primarily of the Phoenix tactical short-range UAV in service since 1998 with the Royal Artillery for reconnaissance and target acquisition Though Phoenix cannot currently share the information it collects directly with other British systems improved data modems currently being developed could make it interoperable with Skynet 4 RAF Tornados and army Apaches However its performance recently tested in Kosovo and Iraq is somewhat limited even at the tactical level including an inability to operate in high-temperature environments a payload consisting solely of a thermal imaging sensor and a slow data link In both the Kosovo and Iraq campaigns these limitations led to the loss of a high number of Phoenix UAVs Twenty-three were lost in Iraq all due to technical failures ndash a ratio of one in six fl ights undertaken ndash and the program was restricted to nighttime operations However the Phoenix was involved in what was probably the fi rst joint close air support operation coordinated by a UAV mission controller it was able to relay imagery and geographical details on Iraqi tank movements to US fi ghters via its ground station (Chuter 2003a 8)

Watchkeeper the British long-endurance operational-level UAV program was completed with two consortia one led by Thales UK and the other by Northrop Grumman ISS International Inc The initial program requirement called for an A and B vehicle the former for battlefi eld surveillance targeting and bomb damage assessment and the latter for close-in surveillance and target identifi cation Following the selection of the Thales-led consortium in July 2004 it was announced that the Hermes 450 and Hermes 180 ndash manufactured by Elbit Systems of Israel ndash would be the A and B vehicles respectively However during contract negotiations in 2005 the smaller Hermes 180 was removed from the requirement and broader roles were assigned to the larger Hermes 450 Its payloads will include electro-optical sensors infrared sensors laser target designators synthetic aperture radar and moving target indicators The Watchkeeper in-service date was also pushed back to 2010 The system will be operated and deployed by the Royal Artillery Corps

To complement the Watchkeeper program the United Kingdom is collaborating with the United States to develop the Advanced Joint Communications Node (AJCN) Once integrated into Watchkeeper it will provide a communications and electronic warfare system that can be reprogrammed in fl ight Based on software radio technology the AJCN will be linked to the UAV ground stations via a

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

45

Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL) This will create a network comprising the different types of Watchkeeper UAVs and tactical radios ndash such as the American JTRS ndash that are also reprogrammable

In early 2004 pending Watchkeeper development the British Ministry of Defense began discussing an Urgent Operation Requirement (UOR) for another UAV system to be fi elded within a shorter timeframe and to be usable by British troops in Iraq The Ministry of Defense reviewed purchasing or leasing the Thales-IAI Hermes systems as well as several micro-UAV systems To date several Desert Hawk and one Buster micro-UAV system (comprising two vehicles and one ground control station) have been acquired and are deployed with British forces in Iraq for very short-range reconnaissance missions In addition the success of the British cooperation with the Combined Joint Predator Task Force in Iraq has led the Ministry of Defense to examine the possibilities of purchasing Predator B UAVs for operations in Afghanistan (Chuter 2005b 4)

In addition to the Urgent Operation Requirement and Watchkeeper the United Kingdom is exploring other future UAV initiatives The Joint Service UAV Experimentation Program (JUEP) was the fi rst step of this process In 2003ndash5 JUEP assessed the wider operational use of UAVs in the tri-service battle environment mainly for maritime and urban operations JUEP involved developing viable concepts of operations for UAVs and assessing the possibilities for exploiting new types of UAV payloads including those giving the vehicle offensive capabilities (Fiorenza 2003b 37ndash9) The program included a demonstration of the Eagle MALE UAV carrying a high defi nition synthetic aperture radar electro-optic and infrared sensors and laser target marking and designation systems It also demonstrated the capability to control a ScanEagle maritime surveillance UAV from a British warship to integrate a British RAPTOR ISR pod (see below) on an American Predator UAV and the utility of several mini-UAV systems Demonstrations of the Global Hawk HALE UAV system and of the use of UCAVs were also planned under JUEP but were not undertaken

The United Kingdom initially envisioned an unmanned combat aerial vehicle program as part of the Future Offensive Air System (FOAS) program However the FOAS was terminated in 2005 and UCAV research was made part of an international collaborative program the Strategic Unmanned Air Vehicle (Experiment) or SUAV(E) An agreement was signed in December 2004 with the United States to participate in the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) program focusing on Boeingrsquos X-45 UCAV However uncertainties about technology transfer and the location of production in the UK led the Ministry of Defense to look to Europe to fulfi ll some of its needs in this area The French-led Neuron program was considered but no decisions have been made on Britainrsquos participation in it (Chuter 2005a 1 8)

The United Kingdom also possesses unmanned underwater ISR capabilities with the deployment in 2002 of the Marlin Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) an electrically powered vehicle intended to be launched from a submarine torpedo tube It is fi tted with seabed imaging sensors but the design is modular and allowing for alternative future payloads

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

46

Britain also currently deploys several manned aerial ISR platforms including four Canberra PR-9 aircraft for photoreconnaissance missions and eighteen Nimrod MR2 maritime patrol aircraft Most Nimrods are equipped with magnetic and acoustic detection equipment (three are outfi tted for SIGINT collection missions) and are interoperable with US Rivet Joint aircraft An upgrade (Nimrod MRA4) will mean some are capable of both maritime and land surveillance missions The upgraded Nimrod aircraft are due to enter into service around 2006 at which point those that were not upgraded will be taken out of service

The Royal Air Forcersquos Jaguar and Tornado GR4 fi ghters provide additional ISR capabilities Since 2000 the Jaguars have been outfi tted with the Jaguar Replacement Reconnaissance Pod (JRRP) containing both electro-optic and infrared sensors that can record digital images onto videotape Several of the latter have been fi tted with the Reconnaissance Airborne Pod for Tornado (RAPTOR) operational since the fall of 2002 This new technology provides an electro-optical and infrared camera system that can capture high-resolution digital imagery day or night and transmit the data to ground stations in near real time It features on-board recording and near real time data link transmission to ground stations The system consists of eight pods and two cabin-based ground stations and has been in use since fall 2002 It made its operational debut during Operation Iraqi Freedom in early 2003 and performed extremely well

The United Kingdom is developing the Airborne Stand Off Radar (ASTOR) system for air-ground surveillance ASTOR will provide strategic long-range all-weather theater surveillance and target acquisition capabilities Raytheon the prime contractor for ASTOR is producing fi ve systems to be deployed on modifi ed Bombardier Global Express business jets as well as two portable ground sites and six tactical ground stations mounted on trucks The radar is a dual-mode system capable of operating in both synthetic aperture radar and moving target indicator mode The aircraft known as the Sentinel R Mk 1 are also outfi tted with operator workstations where the mission management and imagery can be processed and transmitted to the various brigade divisional or joint level ASTOR ground stations Initial deployment is expected to begin in 2006 with the delivery of the fi rst two fl ight-tested aircraft and their ground stations and full operational capability is expected in 2008 Data will be disseminated to allied forces via United Kingdom headquarters only and few direct links to allied systems are anticipated (though an interim solution for interoperability with the US JSTARS system may be through deploying JTRS on the ASTOR platform) ASTOR was the basis for one of the two proposed NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) solutions presented by British Aerospace and Raytheon an option rejected by NATO

In addition the United Kingdom deploys seven E-3D Sentry AEW-1 AWACS aircraft for air-picture management The Sentry aircraft are all equipped with the US JTIDS and are interoperable with US and NATO AWACS systems with Rivet Joint and E-P3 aircraft and with the British Nimrod aircraft Project Eagle currently in the assessment phase is intended to provide an air battle management and combat ID-enabling capability for the E-3D to coordinate air operations and

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

47

to direct forces during operations The in-service date defi ned as the fi rst platform fi tted with the Eagle capability is scheduled for June 2012

As of 2006 when the Canberra planes leave service the United Kingdom will have no assets that can loiter over the battlefi eld and deliver a constant stream of data for extended timeframes nor does the United Kingdom have a program to obtain such persistent surveillance capabilities The Ministry of Defense is considering various options including high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) UAVs satellites and manned platforms In 2004 the Tactical Optical Satellite (TOPSAT) earth observation micro-satellite led by Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd was initiated as part of a pilot program to demonstrate space-based ISR capabilities and their link to commanders on the ground via stationary as well as mobile ground stations The one-year program involved the launching of one 120 kg satellite capable of producing 25 meter resolution optical imagery The success of TOPSAT may lead to the launching of a constellation of satellites in the future

For future maritime surveillance the Maritime Airborne Surveillance and Control (MASC) program will provide an assured airborne surveillance and control capability The options being considered under MASC include the continuation of the capability currently provided by the Sea King Mk 7 Airborne Surveillance and Control (ASaC) system other ship-optimized rotary wing platforms and possible contributions from UAVs although the latter currently form only a peripheral component of the MASC activities The MASC program has recently moved into the assessment phase

The British intelligence analysis and dissemination systems in place include the RAFrsquos Lychgate system ndash which connects intelligence staffs at HQ RAF Strike Command the Ministry of Defense other services and front-line squadrons ndash and the intelligence communityrsquos web-based UKINTELWEB Neither is interoperable with allied systems However the United Kingdom is part of the Integrated Broadcast Service (IBS) network which uses commercial off the shelf (COTS) hardware to exchange information with the intelligence dissemination systems of the United States Canada and Australia In addition the Griffi n TCPIP-based WAN provides a classifi ed electronic information-sharing environment for collaborative planning activities between the strategic and operational level headquarters of Britain Canada Australia New Zealand and the United States In the future Germany and France may also be linked to Griffi n

Germany

The German military is beginning to move toward an advanced networked architecture and deploys a variety of C4ISR systems The German Ministry of Defense completed the formulation of its network-centric doctrine in 2005 and has begun the implementation of some of that doctrine in its acquisition and RampT programs However over the next decade previously planned hardware programs such as the Eurofi ghter Typhoon A400M transport Tiger and NH-90 helicopters will consume the lionrsquos share of German defense acquisition resources In

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llan

ce p

rogr

am

Tabl

e 3

3 co

ntin

ued

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

53

addition Germanyrsquos defense RampD spending has been declining a trend expected to continue through 2010 (Aguumlera 2003 32) Both of these budgetary realities will affect the pace at which Germany develops networked C4ISR capabilities Nevertheless several large-scale C4ISR expenditures are expected the most signifi cant being new C2 and computer networking programs a HALE UAV and advanced communications systems (CPM Forum 2005 33)

German forces do not have a cross-service C2 architecture nor have broadband communications systems been widely deployed Germany has begun embracing the use of UAVs especially since the Balkan and Afghanistan campaigns The German military is currently equipped with several UAVs for tactical and operational missions and funding for a major UAV program the HALE EuroHawk has been approved Once the fi rst UAV comes into service in 2009 outdated manned platforms for ISR will gradually be scrapped and Germany will become increasingly reliant on unmanned ISR capabilities

Germany has been a member of the bi-national German-Netherlands Corps since 1995 Between 2000 and 2002 the Corps became a NATO High Response Force under operational command of SACEUR This Corps has more advanced C4ISR capabilities including the German HEROS C2 system the Dutch TITAAN communications infrastructure (VoIP WAN with SATCOM and HF radio) and French-made tactical Sperwer UAVs Germany is also a member of the Multinational Interoperability Council and will contribute to four of the European Unionrsquos Battlegroups one with France Belgium and Luxembourg one with the Netherlands and Finland one with Austria and the Czech Republic and one with Poland Slovakia Latvia and Lithuania

Command and control

The Bundeswehr C2 systems serve the individual services but lack a common infrastructure The German army is beginning to deploy the HEROS (Heeres-Fuumlhrungsinformationssystem fuumlr die rechnerunterstuumltzte Operationsfuumlhrung in Staumlben or Army Command and Control System for Digitally-supported Command of Operations in Staffs) system that provides C2 for corps division and brigade levels HEROS is an IP-network-based infrastructure for data transmission and can be fi xed or mobile It has been fi elded in one army division with a second still to be fi elded HEROS is also deployed with EUROKORPS and with the German-Netherlands Corps

For battalion-level C2 and below the German army operates the FAUST (Fuumlhrungsausstattung taktisch or Tactical Command Provision) system which includes mobile modules mounted on armored personnel carriers Initially fi elded only in small numbers with German forces in Bosnia Kosovo and Afghanistan FAUST is now being deployed across the German army (Quast 2003 66ndash7) The system is mounted on various command reconnaissance and support vehicles at the platoon squad and section level In addition the armyrsquos tanks and armored vehicles designated for overseas deployment are outfi tted with the Mobile Command and Control System (MCCS) MCCS hardware is based on a

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

54

COTS notebook with integrated communication interfaces GPS and compass unit as well as C2 software developed by STN Atlas (now Rheinmetall Defence Electronics) Several such systems are operational with the German forces in Kosovo and Afghanistan

The German navy uses a C2 system called MHQ (marine headquarters) This IBM mainframe-based infrastructure links all headquarters into a single network In addition all ships in the German navy use the Maritime Command and Control Information System (MCCIS) and the CS tactical C2 system purchased from the United States This enables all German navy vessels to be fully linked between each other and with their various headquarters as well as interoperable with many ships in the US navy

The German air force uses the Eifel C2 system an IP-based infrastructure that has been upgraded to incorporate the whole service (the system is also known as the GAFCCIS ndash German Air Force Command and Control Information System) Other C2 networks that are unique to specifi c units of the German armed forces include the artillery corpsrsquo ADLER (Artillerie- Daten- Lage- und Einsatz-Rechnungsverbund or Integrated Artillery Computer System) and the air defense systemsrsquo Hfl aAFuumlSys (Heeres-Flugabwehr- Aufklaumlrungs- und Fuumlhrungssystemor Army Air Defense Surveillance andd Command System) Finally the armed forces command is linked to the German Ministry of Defense via Rubin an IP-based stationary system for high-level C2

The German army is planning to deploy a more network-oriented C2 infrastructure Known as FuumlInfoSys H (Fuumlhrungsinformationssystem des Heeresor Army Command System or Army Command System) this system will integrate the FAUST and HEROS systems which are not interoperable today Initial testing is scheduled for 2008 Other efforts to upgrade German C2 capabilities include development of the next generation of air defense system through the Surface-Air-Missile Operations Center (SAMOC) project expected to be operational by the end of 2004 A C2 system integrating all services is planned through the project known as FuumlInfoSys der Streitkraumlfte or C2 System of the Armed Forces This project still in its initial stages will eventually integrate the Rubin HEROS FuumlInfoSys H GAFCCIS MHQ and MCCIS systems and connect all military staffs

In 2001 the German Ministry of Defense began to create a common C2 system for the armed forces of the Baltic States (Latvia Lithuania and Estonia) that would be interoperable with Germanyrsquos C2 systems and comply with NATO STANAGs Known as BALTCCIS the project is managed by the German air force in collaboration with BAE Systems and is still in the development stage

Communications and computers

The main tactical communications infrastructure of the German army is the digital Automated Corps Network (Automatisiertes Korpsstammnetz 90 or AUTOKO-90) built by Siemens and deployed since 2000 This network can deliver only limited bandwidth cannot handle IP traffi c and uses EUROCOM a

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

55

communications standard developed in Western Europe in the 1970s as an effort to make all tactical military communications systems interoperable but not widely deployed outside Germany As a complement to AUTOKO-90 the army has added the BIGSTAF (Breitbandiges integriertes Gefechtsstand-Fernmeldesystem or Integrated Broadband System for Command Posts Communications) system to its communications infrastructure Built using Thales and EADS IP and ATM technologies BIGSTAF provides broadband communications (voice and data) for command posts at brigade division and corps levels However BIGSTAF also uses EUROCOM and is therefore not interoperable with most other systems In an effort to move away from EUROCOM Germany has initiated the 420 million euro MobKommSysBw (Mobiles Kommunikationssystem der Bundeswehr or Armed Forces Mobile Communications System) project to develop the Bundeswehrrsquos future mobile communications network Together with the SATCOM-BW network (see below) it will link all fi eld radio communications systems in theaters of operations with communications bases in Germany Service introduction will start in 2007

The German navy has deployed its own communications network the IP-based Tactical Mobile Radio Network on all vessels In addition many navy ships are outfi tted with Link-11 ndash soon to be replaced by Link-22 systems ndash and other communications equipment that were a quick method to achieve interoperability with the US navy The German air force has deployed AutoFuuml (Automatisches Fuumlhrungsfernmeldenetz der Luftwaffe or Air Force Automatic Command Communications Network) a communications infrastructure on all its bases This system is also IP-based with medium bandwidth capabilities For tactical communications some of the Luftwaffersquos Tornados and NH-90 helicopters carry or are being outfi tted with the Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) which will be carried on all 180 new Eurofi ghters The German navy has also equipped two Class 123 frigates with MIDS systems As a partner in the MIDS JTRS program Germany is helping migrate MIDS to a JTRS software communications compliant architecture In addition the German Ministry of Defense has awarded Rohde amp Schwarz a 170 million euro contract for a joint networked family of Software Defi ned Radio (SDR) systems These radios will be fully JTRS and SCA compliant and will be introduced into service in 2009

A cross-service digital communications network the ISDN-BW has been deployed since the mid-1990s carrying voice and data to all central commands The navy and air force have both successfully integrated their own communications infrastructures with ISDN-BW but the army integration is incomplete

To link expeditionary forces with allied forces the local telecommunications infra-structure and headquarters Germany initiated a program known as Interoperability for Crisis Reaction Forces (Krisenreaktionskraumlfte-Interoperabilitaumlt or KINTOP) It involved the development and acquisition of mobile communications gateways based on the TETRAPOL (TErrestrial Trunked RAdio POLice) standard The program was discontinued and the current communications solution for linking expeditionary forces with headquarters is the KommServer-BW a low-tech COTS

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

56

technology linking mobile communications systems such as tactical radios to fi xed communications networks

Germany is also undertaking a satellite communications program known as SATCOM-BW The fi rst phase of the project includes leasing C- and Ku-band capacity from commercial satellites and procuring 40 single- and multi-channel ground stations Expeditionary forces can deploy several relatively large mobile ground stations and communicate with one or both fi xed ground stations in Germany The second phase which is still in the planning stage will build and orbit one X-band and one UHF-band satellite both operated by the private sector Phase 2 is expected to begin in 2005 with at least one satellite in orbit by 2008 and progressive introduction continuing until 2013 Once completed Germanyrsquos expeditionary forces will be able to deploy a larger number of small mobile ground stations giving them more fl exibility and agility in the fi eld (Reder 2005 48ndash9)

Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance

Germany is reassessing its ISR capabilities and planning future research and procurement The major issues are the replacement of the Breguet Atlantic fl eet for maritime patrol the acquisition of land-based ISR assets and the development of an unmanned aerial battlefi eld surveillance capability

Germany is making signifi cant use of UAVs given the expertise in this technology to be found in German industry For tactical reconnaissance and target acquisition missions at the corps and division level the German army uses CL-289 UAVs a tri-national project between France Germany and Canada equipped with a camera and infrared sensor The system has been used successfully in the Balkans since 1993 and has been upgraded recently to improve the on-board navigation system and fl ight software and to enable the outfi tting of the UAV with a SAR payload The Germans use the KZO (Kleinfl uggeraumlt fuumlr Zielortungor Small Device for Target Acquisition) for shorter-range reconnaissance which carries infrared and SAR or laser range fi nder and target designator payloads Six such systems each consisting of ten aircraft are in service Rheinmetall DeTec the manufacturers of the KZO system are making it interoperable with the Safran Grouprsquos Crecerelle and Sperwer UAVs currently in use by France the Netherlands Denmark Sweden and Greece The armed forces of these six countries will in the future be able to exchange tactical and battlefi eld intelligence and target data collected by all of their systems and will have access to a common command and control infrastructure

The German armyrsquos LUNA (Luftgestuumltzte Nahaufklaumlrungsausstattung or Airborne Close-range Reconnaissance System) tactical UAV initially designed for the artillery corps has been fl own over Kosovo ndash carrying video cameras only ndash and in Afghanistan ndash carrying infrared and video cameras as well as SAR Eight systems have been procured It can also be outfi tted with a miniature SAR system and used for NBC detection and electronic warfare missions The hand-launched ALADIN (Abbildende Luftgestuumltzte Aufklaumlrungsdrohne im Naumlchstbereich or Imaging Airborne Close-Range Reconnaissance Drone) mini-UAV which carries

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

57

television and infrared was successfully deployed in Afghanistan and some 155 systems each consisting of two aircraft have been ordered

Germanyrsquos army and navy also deploy manned airborne ISR capabilities including reconnaissance pods fi tted onto Germanyrsquos Tornado aircraft outfi tted with a camera and infrared system The Breguet Atlantic 1150 fl eet performs maritime ISR missions using 11 aircraft carrying MTIs sonars and magnetic detectors and 4 aircraft carrying SIGINT and electronic warfare suites The fl eet has been operational since 1965 Although the aircraft have experienced several upgrades they are scheduled for replacement in 2010 A project to develop the next generation of maritime patrol aircraft initially to be conducted with the Italian armed forces was cancelled Instead Germany is moving toward long endurance unmanned platforms For maritime missions these may consist of UAVs deployed by the German navy on their new corvettes with Northrop Grummanrsquos Fire Scout and Bell Helicopter Textronrsquos Eagle Eye as possible alternatives In the interim Germany bought eight upgraded PC-3 aircraft from the Netherlands in late 2004

For ground-based ISR the German army began deploying the Fennek vehicle in 2004 produced by Krauss-Maffei Wegmann of Germany and SP Aerospace and Vehicle Systems BV of the Netherlands The Fennek is equipped with a sensor platform that includes a camera a thermal imager and a laser rangefi nder co-developed by EADS and Rheinmetall Defence Electronics and the HRM-7000 tactical radio produced by EADS Maritime ISR capabilities include three OsteClass 423 ships that have been deployed since the late 1980s for SIGINT and electronic warfare missions

Germany has several future ISR programs underway The lesson of the Kosovo air campaign was that Germany could not rely on timely sharing of imagery intelligence data from the United States and hence needed to acquire its own intelligence-gathering capability The most important result of this decision is the plan to buy fi ve Global Hawk HALE UAVs from Northrop Grumman and working with EADS install German synthetic aperture radar and signals intelligence collection and analysis suites This 600 million euro project was initiated in 2000 and received the approval of the US air force and the German Ministry of Defense in 2001 A number of successful trial fl ights were conducted in California and Germany during 2003ndash4 and the fi rst prototype delivery is scheduled for 2009 All fi ve systems are expected to be delivered and operational by 2013 The C2 and the crypto technologies will be the same as those mounted on the Global Hawk making the EuroHawk interoperable with its US counterpart EuroHawk is also planned to be interoperable with other ISR capabilities of the German armed forces as well as with NATO EuroHawk UAVs will be the German contribution to the NATO AGS program

Germany is also investing in UCAV technology though the program is still at an early phase Initially known as Taifun (Typhoon) and recently re-named the Tactical Advanced ReconnaissanceStrike System (TADRES) it is being designed to carry an electro-optic sensor for target identifi cation and a synthetic aperture radar for target acquisition Development will continue until 2009 when

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

58

a procurement decision will be made In addition the German army is formulating requirements for micro-UAVs

German security space observation capabilities are also an important development also infl uenced by the Kosovo data-sharing issue The leading program is SAR-Lupe a satellite-based synthetic aperture radar to be deployed by 2007 SAR-Lupe will consist of fi ve Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites the fi rst to be launched in 2006 and a ground segment Total cost of the project is approximately 300 million euros A European consortium led by OHB Systems of Germany is undertaking the project Once SAR-Lupe is operational Germany plans to exchange the data it provides with data collected from the French Helios 2 and Pleiades and the Italian COSMO-Skymed satellites The German Space Agency and EADS Astrium are also working on a commercial synthetic aperture radar satellite named TerraSAR-X which will begin providing image products with a resolution of up to one meter in mid-2006

Intelligence collected from Germanyrsquos surveillance and reconnaissance assets is disseminated to warfi ghters in several ways The German army uses is the LBAA-BW (Luftbild-Auswerteanlage der Bundeswehr or Aerial Picture Analysis Station for the Armed Forces) system designed for the exploitation of intelligence (still images and fi lm) collected by manned or unmanned aerial reconnaissance systems It can be deployed in both stationary and mobile (vehicle-mounted) stations Originally designed for the CL-289 tactical UAV it has been in operation since 1991 An extension program was launched in 1999 to upgrade the system to a common aerial image exploitation station The LBAA-BW can work with imagery collected by CL-289 UAVs as well as by Tornado and Breguet Atlantic aircraft More than 50 units have been deployed In 2007 the GAST (GemeinsamesAuswerte-System or Common Analysis System) project begun in 2003 will create a common system for the dissemination of all intelligence collected via technical means through a single database

Italy

Italy is moving at a slower pace toward a network-oriented defense strategy deployment of advanced C4ISR systems and inter-service interoperability Much of the countryrsquos defense budget over the next few years will be spent on weapons platforms most notably 121 Eurofi ghter aircraft Much-needed C4ISR assets such as early warning aircraft and MIDS data links for aircraft may not be purchased in the near term

ItalianndashUS industrial collaboration is seen as one way of advancing the deployment of network-based capabilities and achieving interoperability with the United States Italy is prepared to buy US technologies as interim solutions to operational problems as seen in the recent procurement of four Predator UAV systems and several Link-16 terminals and in the interest shown in the US Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) project Some Italian defense policymakers have argued that American C4ISR standards will lead the way and that Italy should work toward those standards For now Italy intends to ensure that all

Tabl

e 3

4 G

erm

an c

apab

ilit

ies

for

netw

ork-

base

d op

erat

ions

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

C2

Hee

res-

Fuumlh

rung

sinf

orm

atio

ns-

syst

em f

uumlr d

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rech

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nter

stuumlt

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ng in

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taumlbe

n (H

ER

OS

)

Cor

ps-

div

isio

n- a

nd

brig

ade-

leve

l C2

syst

em

incl

udes

mob

ile

elem

ents

Als

o de

ploy

ed w

ith

EU

RO

KO

RP

S a

nd th

e G

erm

an-D

utch

Cor

ps

Fuumlh

rung

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stat

tung

takt

isch

(FA

US

T)

Reg

imen

t-le

vel a

nd b

elow

C

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stem

inc

lude

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e A

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veh

icle

-ba

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elem

ents

Mob

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Com

man

d an

d C

ontr

ol S

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m (

MC

CS

)C

2 sy

stem

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yrsquos

tank

s an

d ar

mor

ed

vehi

cles

des

igna

ted

for

over

seas

dep

loym

ent

Mar

ine

Hea

dqua

rter

s (M

HQ

)M

arit

ime

Com

man

d an

d C

ontr

ol

Info

rmat

ion

Sys

tem

(M

CC

IS)

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labo

rati

on a

t S

ea (

C

S)

Tact

ical

nav

al C

2 sy

stem

s (i

ncl

link

s to

HQ

s)C

S

ena

bles

in

tero

pera

bili

ty w

ith

som

e U

S s

hips

Ger

man

Air

For

ce

Com

man

d an

d C

ontr

ol

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rmat

ion

Sys

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AF

CC

IS)

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ce C

2 sy

stem

AD

LE

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rtil

lery

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ps C

2 sy

stem

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Air

def

ense

C2

syst

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ntin

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Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

Rub

inH

igh-

leve

l C2

syst

em

link

ing

arm

ed f

orce

s co

mm

and

wit

h M

OD

Sur

face

-Air

-Mis

sile

O

pera

tion

s C

ente

r (S

AM

OC

)

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t gen

erat

ion

mob

ile

air

defe

nse

C2

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emIn

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pera

ble

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h N

AT

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nati

onsrsquo

air

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C

2 sy

stem

s f

or u

se in

m

ulti

nati

onal

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loym

ents

FuumlI

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ys H

Inte

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ER

OS

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US

T in

to s

ingl

e ar

my

C2

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ymen

t ex

pect

ed in

200

6

FuumlI

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ys S

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tegr

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n of

all

C2

(nav

y

air

forc

e a

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s

Com

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and

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mpu

ters

Aut

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netz

(A

UT

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0)

Arm

y ta

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mun

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ions

dig

ital

in

fras

truc

ture

in

plac

e si

nce

2000

its

lim

ited

ba

ndw

idth

wil

l req

uire

a

seri

es o

f up

grad

es in

the

near

fut

ure

Can

not h

andl

e IP

traf

fi c

li

mit

ed in

tero

pera

bili

ty

due

to u

se o

f E

UR

OC

OM

st

anda

rd

Bre

itba

ndig

es i

nteg

rier

tes

Gef

echt

ssta

nd-

Fer

nmel

desy

stem

(BIG

STA

F)

Bro

adba

nd c

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post

co

mm

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atio

ns n

etw

ork

for

brig

ade

div

isio

nal a

nd

corp

s co

mm

and

post

s

inte

grat

ed in

to A

UT

OK

O-

90

Lim

ited

inte

rope

rabi

lity

du

e to

use

of

EU

RO

CO

M

stan

dard

Tabl

e 3

4 co

ntin

ued

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

Tact

ical

Mob

ile

Rad

io

Net

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kN

avy

com

mun

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sy

stem

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ing

all v

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Aut

oFuuml

Com

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sys

tem

li

nkin

g al

l air

for

ce b

ases

Lin

k-11

MID

SE

quip

ped

on s

ome

navy

ve

ssel

s an

d L

uftw

affe

To

rnad

os a

nd N

H-9

0 he

lico

pter

s

Ena

bles

inte

rope

rabi

lity

w

ith

othe

r ve

ssel

s an

d ai

rcra

ft e

quip

ped

wit

h L

ink-

11

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S

ISD

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WC

ross

-ser

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dig

ital

co

mm

unic

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ns n

etw

ork

link

ing

all c

entr

al

com

man

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mS

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r-B

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ased

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ns li

nk f

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expe

diti

onar

y fo

rces

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TC

OM

-BW

Pha

se 1

Lea

sing

of

com

mer

cial

sa

tell

ite

capa

city

for

li

nkin

g ex

pedi

tion

ary

forc

es b

ack

to H

Qs

SA

TC

OM

-BW

Pha

se 2

2 ne

w s

atel

lite

s fi

rst o

ne

in o

rbit

by

2008

Mob

Kom

mS

ysB

wB

unde

sweh

rrsquos

futu

re

mob

ile

com

mun

icat

ions

ne

twor

k li

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g al

l fi e

ld

radi

o co

mm

unic

atio

ns

syst

ems

in th

e va

riou

s th

eate

rs o

f op

erat

ions

wit

h co

mm

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ns b

ases

in

Ger

man

yco

ntin

uedhellip

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

ISR

CL

-289

Ta

ctic

al c

orps

- an

d di

visi

on-l

evel

rec

on a

nd

targ

et a

cqui

siti

on U

AV

pa

yloa

ds in

clud

e co

lor

and

IR c

amer

as a

nd S

AR

KZ

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hort

-ran

ge U

AV

wit

h IR

and

SA

R o

r la

ser

rang

e fi

nder

and

targ

et

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gnat

or p

aylo

ads

Pro

gram

is u

nder

way

to

mak

e K

ZO

TA

DR

ES

and

F

renc

h C

rece

rell

e (a

lso

used

by

Net

herl

ands

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ark

Sw

eden

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reec

e) in

tero

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ble

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ery

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e co

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NB

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tors

and

EW

su

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Dep

loye

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kans

and

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fgha

nist

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guet

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anti

c 11

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anne

d ai

rcra

ft f

or

mar

itim

e S

ampR

and

S

IGIN

TE

W m

issi

ons

Fen

nek

ISR

veh

icle

Sim

ilar

veh

icle

s de

ploy

ed

by R

oyal

Net

herl

ands

A

rmy

Tabl

e 3

4 co

ntin

ued

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

Ost

e S

IGIN

T a

nd E

W s

hips

Luf

tbil

d-A

usw

erte

anla

gede

r B

unde

sweh

r (L

BA

A-

BW

)

Com

mon

aer

ial i

mag

e ex

ploi

tati

on s

tati

on f

or a

ll

Ger

man

def

ense

for

ces

Exp

loit

s im

ages

fro

m C

L-

289

nav

y To

rnad

os a

nd

Bre

guet

Atl

anti

c ai

rcra

ft

Tact

ical

Adv

ance

d R

econ

nais

sanc

eS

trik

e S

yste

m (

TAD

RE

S)

UC

AV

pro

gram

(fo

rmer

ly

know

n as

Tai

fun)

wit

h ta

rget

iden

tifi

cati

on a

nd

enga

gem

ent c

apab

ilit

ies

in

itia

l dep

loym

ent

expe

cted

in 2

009

Pro

gram

is u

nder

way

to

mak

e K

ZO

TA

DR

ES

and

F

renc

h C

rece

rell

e (a

lso

used

by

Net

herl

ands

D

enm

ark

Sw

eden

G

reec

e) in

tero

pera

ble

Eur

oHaw

kH

AL

E U

AV

sys

tem

w

ill i

nclu

de in

tell

igen

ce

coll

ecti

ng a

nd p

roce

ssin

g ca

pabi

liti

es i

niti

al

depl

oym

ent i

n 20

09

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

wit

h di

ffer

ent I

SR

sys

tem

s of

th

e G

erm

an a

rmed

for

ces

N

AT

O a

nd E

U is

pla

nned

as

wel

l as

wit

h U

S G

loba

l H

awk

SA

R-L

upe

5 L

EO

sat

elli

tes

and

a gr

ound

seg

men

t in

itia

l op

erat

iona

l cap

abil

ity

in

2007

Ger

man

y w

ill h

ave

acce

ss

to I

taly

rsquos C

OS

MO

and

F

ranc

ersquos

Hel

ios

2 im

ager

y in

exc

hang

e fo

r S

AR

-Lup

e im

ager

y

Gem

eins

ames

Aus

wer

te-

Sys

tem

(G

AS

T)

Com

mon

sys

tem

for

di

ssem

inat

ion

of a

ll

inte

llig

ence

col

lect

ed v

ia

tech

nica

l mea

ns

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

64

communications systems and information databases are compliant with NATO STANAGs while purchasing additional modules from the United States when these can solve specifi c interoperability needs especially for the navy and air force

Italy also seeks active participation in European RampD programs as a way to defi ne common European requirements and standards at an early stage as well as participation in such NATO programs as AGS and ACCS Italy has also begun deployment of UAV-based ISR capabilities Having developed independent capabilities in satellite communications Italy is also committed to greater intra-European cooperation in the development of future space assets

Italian troops participate in the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force (SIAF) and have good interoperability with their Spanish counterparts In addition Italy will create one of the European Unionrsquos Battlegroups and participate in two others one with Hungary and Slovenia the other with Spain Greece and Portugal It remains to be seen how interoperability issues will be addressed in the latter two Battlegroups

Command and control

Each of Italyrsquos services has its own C2 The air force system is SICCAM (Sistema di Comando e Controllo dellrsquoAeronautica Militare or C2 System for Military Aviation) and the navyrsquos is Leonardo The army has the SIACCON (Systema Automatizzato di Commando e Controllo or Automated Command and Control System) which provides automated support for military units at corps division brigade and battalion level and is compliant with NATO STANAGs The SIACCON land system is fused with the air defense C2 system into a single network under the CATRIN (sistema CAmpale di TRasmissioni ed INformazionior Battlefi eld Information System) program as of July 2000 CATRIN is made up of three different functional subsystems The SORAO (sottosistema di SORveglianza e Acquisizione Obiettivi or Target Surveillance and Acquisition subsystem) subsystem controls ground surveillance and provides battlefi eld awareness target acquisition and information from meteorological and NBC sensors The SOATCC (SOttosistema di Trasmissione Integrate or Integrated Transmission Subsystem) subsystem is responsible for air surveillance and provides C2 over army air defense units and army aviation units The third subsystem SOTRIN (SOttosistema di Trasmissione Integrate or Integrated Transmission Subsystem) ensures the communication fl ow between the various command centers

The most important future C2 system will be the Command Control and Navigation System (Sistemi di Comando Controllo e Navigazione ndash SICCONA) a C2 system that will link all the armyrsquos armored vehicles and provide them with access to the existing SIACCON system Fifty units of the SICCONA system are expected to be deployed sometime in 2006ndash7

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

65

Communications and computers

Most of the communications systems deployed by the Italian armed forces were designed to meet NATO STANAGs Some Link-16 systems purchased from the United States have been installed on Tornado F3 aircraft and Italy is a partner in the MIDS consortium and the MIDS JTRS program In addition the Italian navy has installed Link-11 systems on several of its ships which will be replaced with Link-22 However the tactical digital communications infrastructure of the Italian armed forces is still in its early stages An intranet backbone for the Ministry of Defense called DIFENET based on fi ber optic links is currently under development A military digital information network (Rete Numerica Interforzendash RNI) is also under discussion

Italyrsquos terrestrial communications system is reinforced by the SICRAL (SistemaItaliano per Comunicazioni Riservate ed Allarmi or Italian System for Reserved Communications and Warning) military satellite communications system The fi rst satellite SICRAL 1A was launched in 2001 carrying the fi rst operational EHF communications capacity produced in Europe as well as SHF and UHF However SICRAL does not include onboard processing and therefore cannot be fully interoperable with US systems or compatible with recently approved NATO EHF STANAGs However SICRAL is interoperable with the British Skynet 4 and with most of the channels of the French Syracuse and the Spanish Hispasat systems The system includes over 100 fi xed and mobile terminals including several to be deployed on Italian fi ghter aircraft SICRAL 1B is scheduled to begin service in 2006 and once operational will contribute all of Italyrsquos NATO SATCOM commitments as well as serving as backup for SICRAL 1A It too has UHF SHF and EHF capability The constellation will have coverage from the United States to the Middle East for NATO use The next generation of satellites in this series SICRAL 2 is still being planned but is scheduled for launch around 2010 It will replace SICRAL 1A and is expected to include onboard SHF processing and frequency-hopping capabilities

Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance

Italyrsquos unmanned ISR capabilities are based largely on non-Italian technologies although eight domestically developed Mirach-26 and Mirach-150 tactical UAVs were introduced to the Italian army in 2002 Italy acquired four Predator MALE UAVs intended mainly for reconnaissance missions which became fully operational in 2005 In addition twenty CL-289 tactical UAVs were purchased from EADS in 2002 Italy also possesses manned ISR assets including eighteen Breguet Atlantic aircraft for maritime reconnaissance and one Alenia G-222VS aircraft for airborne SIGINT operations (the latter was used successfully in Kosovo but is scheduled to be replaced by two new C-130J aircraft in 2005 or 2006)

A battlefi eld surveillance system called CRESO (Complesso Radar Eliportato per la Sorveglianga or Combined Heliborne Surveillance Radar) is deployed

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

66

for operational and tactical missions The system carried onboard Agusta-Bell 412 helicopters includes a moving target indicator and forward-looking infrared sensor Four such systems are currently operational all designed to meet NATO STANAGs and to link with other systems via MIDS and the Italian SICRAL system In addition the Italian air force fl ies several Tornado fi ghter-bombers (ECR Electronic Combat Reconnaissance version) equipped with forward-looking infrared sensors and an infrared line scanner for reconnaissance missions

Italyrsquos space-based observation capabilities are in the advanced development stage Having participated in the French Helios 1 and Franco-German Horus satellite programs (the latter was discontinued in 1998) Italy is seeking independent earth observation capabilities Under the COSMO-Skymed project (COnstellation of Satellites for Mediterranean basin Observation) Italy will deploy a constellation of four radar-imaging satellites The X-band radar satellites would feature a SAR payload capable of less than one-meter resolution for the military and of approximately one-meter resolution for images sold commercially The COSMO-Skymed system is managed by the Italian Space Agency and Alenia Spazio is the prime contractor The Italian Ministry of Defense has committed funds to the project in exchange for 20 per cent of the satellitesrsquo viewing time COSMO-Skymed is expected to be fully deployed and operational by 2007 Once all satellites are in place the constellation will be able to take images of any location on the earthrsquos surface with a revisit time of 6ndash12 hours

As a result of an agreement signed between France and Italy in January 2001 COSMO-Skymed will be linked to the French Pleiades constellation via ORFEO a program designed to ensure interoperability and information sharing As part of this agreement Italy will receive access to SPOT 5 and to Helios 2 imagery from France Italy is also negotiating with Argentina regarding the possibility of integrating two Argentinian radar satellites into the COSMO-Skymed system

Future ISR capabilities were also expected through the Italo-German maritime patrol aircraft program This program now canceled would have provided Italy with 14 aircraft by the year 2010 It is currently unclear if Italy will continue with an independent program for the deployment of next-generation manned maritime ISR capabilities There has been talk of Italy joining the US MMA project or acquiring patrol aircraft made by ATR as well as leasing American P-3 Orion aircraft to replace the ageing fl eet of Atlantics jointly operated by the Italian navy and air force In addition Italy is a partner in the French-led Neuron UCAV program

The Netherlands

The Dutch armed forces place a high priority on C4ISR interoperability with NATO and all new Dutch equipment is required to be compatible with NATO STANAGs The armyrsquos C2 Support Center is also the core of a new NATO C2 Center of Excellence (see the NATO chapter) The Royal Netherlands Army Navy and Air Force are increasingly interoperable with each other and with other European services With recent upgrades to the ISIS and TITAAN projects the air

Tabl

e 3

5 It

alia

n ca

pabi

liti

es f

or n

etw

ork-

base

d op

erat

ions

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

C2

Sys

tem

a A

utom

atiz

zato

di

Com

man

do e

Con

trol

lo

(SIA

CC

ON

)

Arm

y C

2 sy

stem

Mee

ts N

AT

O S

TAN

AG

s

SIC

CA

MA

ir F

orce

C2

syst

em

LE

ON

AR

DO

Nav

y C

2 sy

stem

CA

TR

INA

rmy

and

air

defe

nse

C2

com

mun

icat

ion

and

inte

llig

ence

sys

tem

SIC

CO

NA

Inte

grat

ion

of a

ll C

2 sy

stem

s to

be

depl

oyed

by

2006

ndash7

Com

mun

icat

ions

and

co

mpu

ters

Lin

k-11

16

MID

SD

eplo

yed

on s

ever

al

airc

raft

and

shi

psL

inks

to a

llie

d L

ink-

111

6 sy

stem

s

DIF

EN

ET

MO

D in

tran

et b

ased

on

fi be

r op

tic

link

s

Sat

elli

te I

tali

ano

per

Com

unic

azio

ne R

iser

vate

(S

ICR

AL

1)

MIL

SA

TC

OM

sys

tem

Part

ly (

only

SH

F a

nd U

HF

ca

pabi

liti

es)

mee

ts N

AT

O

STA

NA

Gs

inte

rope

rabl

e w

ith

Sky

net 4

and

wit

h m

ost o

f th

e ch

anne

ls o

f th

e S

yrac

use

and

His

pasa

t sy

stem

s

cont

inue

dhellip

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

SIC

RA

L 2

Onb

oard

SH

F p

roce

ssin

g ca

pabi

lity

and

fre

quen

cy-

hopp

ing

prot

ocol

s

Com

pati

ble

wit

h N

AT

O

and

Sky

net 4

but

not

wit

h U

S

Ret

e N

umer

ica

Inte

rfor

ze

(RN

I)M

ilit

ary

digi

tal

info

rmat

ion

netw

ork

ISR

Mir

ach-

261

50Ta

ctic

al U

AV

s us

ed b

y ar

my

Pre

dato

rM

AL

E U

AV

s P

urch

ased

fro

m U

S

CL

-289

Tact

ical

UA

Vs

CR

ES

OH

elib

orne

SA

R s

yste

m f

or

oper

atio

nal a

nd ta

ctic

al

ISR

Mee

ts N

AT

O S

TAN

AG

s

link

s to

all

ied

syst

ems

via

MID

S a

nd S

ICR

AL

Torn

ado

EC

RF

LIR

sen

sor

and

IR

scan

ner

for

reco

n m

issi

ons

Hel

ios

1Ju

nior

par

tner

in F

renc

h op

tica

l sat

elli

te p

rogr

am

Bre

guet

Atl

anti

cM

arit

ime

ISR

Ale

nia

G-2

221

SIG

INT

air

craf

tU

sed

duri

ng th

e K

osov

o cr

isis

C-1

30J

SIG

INT

air

craf

t

CO

SM

O-S

kym

edC

onst

ella

tion

of

four

SA

R

sate

llit

esA

cces

s to

Fre

nch

Hel

ios

2 an

d G

erm

an S

AR

-Lup

e im

ager

y in

exc

hang

e fo

r C

OS

MO

imag

ery

Neu

ron

Part

ner

in F

renc

h-le

d U

CA

V p

rogr

am

Tabl

e 3

5 co

ntin

ued

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

69

force and army will share the same C2 system and communications infrastructure and the navy will link into it in the future

The Netherlands military cannot afford to acquire C4ISR across the full spec-trum of capabilities They have focused instead on several major high-technology programs such as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and Patriot anti-aircraft batteries and on ensuring that deployed C4ISR assets are built to NATO STANAGs Defense budget cuts for 2003 and 2004 put further in doubt the ability of the Netherlands military to carry out a full transformation of the armed forces In these two budget years the reduction in force element size targeted traditional platforms including the navyrsquos frigates which were reduced from 14 to 10 as well as in C4ISR assets such as maritime patrol aircraft all of which are being sold (De Wijk 2004 124ndash5)

The bi-national German-Netherlands Corps created in 1995 became a NATO High Readiness Force between 2000 and 2002 It is under operational command of SACEUR but can also carry out EU-led operations Its C4ISR assets include the German HEROS C2 system the Dutch ISIS battlefi eld awareness and TITAAN communications systems and French Sperwer tactical UAVs In addition the Netherlands will participate in two European Union Battlegroups one with Germany and the other with the United Kingdom

Following the NATO Prague summit the Netherlands army announced that it would build an Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) battalion that will be able to operate with other NATO allies In addition the TITAAN and ISIS systems were successfully deployed as part of the Dutch-led fourth NATO Response Force exercise (NRF-4) including battalion headquarters from Germany France Denmark and Norway

Command and control

The Netherlands has invested signifi cantly in state-of-the-art C2 systems For the Royal Netherlands Army and Air Force the most important of these is the ISIS (Integrated Staff Information System) for mobile headquarters from the brigade level up The program was initiated in 1996 and the latest version ISIS-3 became operational in early 2004 It provides commanders with an advanced PC-based situation awareness tool at the tactical level The Royal Netherlands Air Force the Belgian army and the GermanNetherlands High Readiness Forces Headquarters also have the ISIS system and it has been successfully deployed in Iraq Afghanistan and Liberia as well as with the Dutch contingent of the NRF

Other Dutch C2 programs include the armyrsquos OSIRIS Battlefi eld Management System (BMS) for lower command levels (battalion-level and below) the navy LCF frigates C2 systems the artillery corpsrsquo VUIST system the armyrsquos Advanced Fire Support Information System (AFSIS) for mortar teams at the battalion and brigade level and the armor corpsrsquo Target Information Command and Control System(TICCS) All are compliant with NATO STANAGs and in a short time all of the operational stand-alone C2 applications in use by the artillery will be brought under the AFSIS program However it is not yet clear that a full integration

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

70

of all C2 systems (navy air force and army) is planned Future programs currently being evaluated include C2 systems for logistics engineering and intelligence processes and for individual soldiers and vehicles as well as the interoperability of Dutch C2 systems with those of other nations

Communications and computers

The Dutch militaryrsquos digital communications infrastructure is the Netherlands Armed Forces Integrated Network (NAFIN) supplied by Nortel Networks Fully operational NAFIN supersedes the previous leased public line systems with a secure high-speed network linking more than 250 military installations in the land sea and air services

The Dutch army deploys a mobile tactical digital communications system Its backbone the ZODIAC (ZOne DIgital Automated and enCrypted Communication) system supplied by Thales Netherlands is based on the EUROCOM standard making it interoperable with a few NATO allies principally Germany The radios deployed are Single Channel Radio Access units by Thales Netherlands as well as HF EZB systems In addition the Royal Netherlands Air Force is currently in the process of procuring some 120 MIDS terminals for its F-16s and a few aircraft are already equipped with this technology

The new generation of military communications for the Royal Netherlands armed forces is the TITAAN (Theater Independent Tactical Army and Air Force Network) that brings together legacy and new systems into a converged network It provides the Netherlands army and air force with voice (via IP telephony) and video as well as network management and security In 2002 the army began replacing the ZODIAC system with the fi rst TITAAN modules In 2004 the air force began deploying the TITAAN system for mobile communications TITAAN will eventually also link to the navyrsquos communication network It has been used successfully in operations in Iraq Afghanistan and Liberia and deployed at the Land Component Command level and at the brigade and below levels as part of the Dutch-led fourth NATO Response Force exercise (NRF-4) There are plans to upgrade the TITAAN system to support tactical data links such as Link-11 and Link-16

In 2002 the Dutch Ministry of Defense launched the fi rst phase of its MILSATCOM program The German company ND Satcom was awarded a contract to deliver a turnkey SATCOM network to the Dutch armed forces consisting of one ground station with two C-band one Ku-band and one X-band terminal (plans for a second X-band terminal are being drafted) To date the project has allowed the Satellite Ground Segment at Lauwersmeer to interconnect with NAFIN the communications backbone of the Netherlands armed forces Two new Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) terminals should be operational by 2009 The Dutch have also offered to fi ll part of NATOrsquos future MILSATCOM needs through their system

Tabl

e 3

6 D

utch

cap

abil

itie

s fo

r ne

twor

k-ba

sed

oper

atio

ns

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

C2

Inte

grat

ed S

taff

In

form

atio

n S

yste

m (

ISIS

)A

rmy

and

air

forc

e m

obil

e he

adqu

arte

rs C

2 sy

stem

Mee

ts N

AT

O S

TAN

AG

s

OS

IRIS

Bat

tlefi

eld

M

anag

emen

t Sys

tem

(B

MS

)

Low

er a

rmy

com

man

d le

vels

(ba

ttal

ion

and

belo

w)

Mee

ts N

AT

O S

TAN

AG

s

LC

F f

riga

tes

C2

syst

ems

Nav

y C

2 sy

stem

Mee

ts N

AT

O S

TAN

AG

s

VU

IST

Art

ille

ry C

2 sy

stem

Mee

ts N

AT

O S

TAN

AG

s

Targ

et I

nfor

mat

ion

Com

man

d an

d C

ontr

ol

Sys

tem

(TIC

CS

)

Arm

or C

2 sy

stem

Mee

ts N

AT

O S

TAN

AG

s

Com

mun

icat

ions

and

C

ompu

ters

Net

herl

ands

Arm

ed

Forc

es I

nteg

rate

d N

etw

ork

(NA

FIN

)

Dig

ital

com

mun

icat

ions

in

fras

truc

ture

link

ing

all

thre

e se

rvic

es

ZO

DIA

CA

rmy

mob

ile

tact

ical

di

gita

l com

mun

icat

ions

in

fras

truc

ture

Inte

rope

rabl

e w

ith

thos

e N

AT

O f

orce

s us

ing

the

EU

RO

CO

M s

tand

ard

TIT

AA

N (

The

ater

In

depe

nden

t Tac

tica

l A

rmy

and

Air

For

ce

Net

wor

k)

Nex

t gen

erat

ion

VoI

P-

base

d ar

my

and

air

forc

e m

obil

e di

gita

l net

wor

k

wil

l eve

ntua

lly

repl

ace

ZO

DIA

C a

nd a

lso

be

depl

oyed

by

navy

CO

TS

-bas

ed

cont

inue

dhellip

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

MIL

SA

TC

OM

pro

gram

1 gr

ound

sta

tion

and

4

term

inal

s 2

AE

HF

te

rmin

als

to b

e ad

ded

by

2009

Con

nect

ed to

NA

FIN

ne

twor

k

ISR

Spe

rwer

Tact

ical

UA

Vs

used

fo

r S

ampR

and

targ

et

acqu

isit

ion

mis

sion

s

Sim

ilar

sys

tem

s ar

e de

ploy

ed b

y F

ranc

e

Den

mar

k S

wed

en G

reec

e

Fen

nek

Rec

onna

issa

nce

vehi

cle

wit

h ca

mer

a a

ther

mal

im

ager

and

a la

ser

rang

efi n

der

Co-

deve

lope

d w

ith

Ger

man

y

Squ

ire

Man

-por

tabl

e su

rvei

llan

ce

rada

rs fi

elde

d by

Roy

al

Net

herl

ands

Arm

y an

d M

arin

e C

orps

Eur

oMA

LE

Co-

deve

lope

d w

ith

Fra

nce

Tabl

e 3

6 co

ntin

ued

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

73

Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance

Dutch unmanned ISR capabilities expanded considerably with the procurement of 38 Sperwer UAVs from France Deployed since mid-2000 they are chiefl y used for tactical ISR and target acquisition missions The Dutch are also interested in UAV systems that can perform more elaborate missions and are collaborating with France in the development of EuroMALE (Chuter 2003b 4)

For ground-based ISR the Royal Netherlands Army began deploying the Fennek vehicle in 2004 Produced by Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW) of Germany and Dutch Defense Vehicle Systems of the Netherlands the Fennek is equipped with a sensor platform that includes a camera a thermal imager a laser rangefi nder and HRM-7000 tactical radios

For maritime reconnaissance the Netherlands navy has relied on its fl eet of thirteen Orion P-3C aircraft ten of whose ground surveillance capabilities have recently been upgraded The upgraded planes delivered in November 2003 possess new electronic support measures more advanced radar and acoustic sensors and improved mission systems The upgrades also make the P-3C aircraft more interoperable with those of the US navy However eight of these aircraft will be sold to Germany and the remainder to Portugal thereby eliminating a critical C4ISR element of the Dutch navy

Ground ISR capabilities include 62 recently acquired and deployed Squire man-portable surveillance radars for the Royal Netherlands Army and Marine Corps The radars provide MTI as well as bomb damage assessment capabilities

Spain

Spain has been slower to integrate cross-service C2 and communications infra-structures in its armed forces Army and air force C2 systems were fully deployed only recently SATCOM fi lls much of the militaryrsquos communications needs There is a limited budget for ISR systems for which Spain relies heavily on locally developed products (principally UAVs and SIGINT systems) Few of the Spanish systems are interoperable across services or internationally

Spain is however one of the few Western European countries to have signifi cantly increased its defense budget in recent years The 2004 increase of 45 per cent was focused on a 15-year modernization program which principally involves acquisition of major platforms such as the Eurofi ghter Typhoon A400M airlifter Leopard tank and Pizzaro infantry fi ghting vehicle Few large C4ISR procurement or RampD programs are expected in the near future

Spain has participated in coalition expeditionary operations through its membership in the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force (SIAF) created in 1997 SIAF is a bi-national amphibious force with Italy its fi rst exercise was in 1998 It is activated on call by common agreement and can be called on for Multinational Amphibious Task Force operations under NATO the EUrsquos European Marine Force (EUROMARFOR) or for national missions SIAF command rotates every 12 or 24 months between the two member nations Spain is also creating one

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

74

of the European Unionrsquos Battlegroups and will participate in another with Italy Greece and Portugal

Command and control

The main C2 system for the Spanish army is the Army Command and Control Information System (Sistema de Informacioacuten para Mando y Control del Ejeacutercito de Tierra ndash SIMACET) which provides a common battlefi eld picture for all command centers It covers all operational echelons from army corps division brigade and battalion and independent units (eg expeditionary forces groups of armored vehicles) The Aerial Command and Control System (Sistema de Mando y Control Aeacutereo ndash SIMCA) has been deployed by the Spanish air force since 2001 and is compliant with NATO standards There is no plan for the integration of the Spanish C2 system across services

Communications and computers

The Spanish tactical communications infrastructure consists of PR4G digital radios deployed through the ARGOS project There is little funding for further network integration of communications systems except for the procurement of several MIDS systems for aircraft and the upgrading of Link-11 systems to Link-22 on some ships Spain is also a partner in the MIDS JTRS program that will make its MIDS systems compliant with the JTRS waveforms

Military communications are carried through Hispasat civilian telecom-munications satellites and the XTAR-EUR X-band satellite Four Hispasat satellites are currently in orbit the most recent launched in 2002 However only the two oldest satellites launched in 1992 and 1993 carry military communications payloads The Hispasat system is compatible with Francersquos Syracuse 2 Britainrsquos Skynet 4 and the NATO 4 system The XTAR-EUR satellite operated since April 2005 by Space Systems Loral and Hisdesat is the worldrsquos fi rst satellite developed for commercial X-band services The Spanish Ministry of Defense is its fi rst customer It provides Spain with coverage from Eastern Brazil and the Atlantic Ocean across all of Europe Africa and the Middle East to South East Asia The satellite features on-board switching and multiple steerable beams allowing users access to X-band capacity The XTAR-EUR satellite will be accessible to all existing and future X-band terminals used by the United States and NATO

Future military satellite capabilities are under development through the Spainsat program (XTAR-LANT) undertaken by Hisdesat and Space Systems Loral This satellite will operate in the X-band and possess an anti-jamming system The Spanish Defense Ministry will lease fi ve of Spainsatrsquos thirteen transponders the rest are expected to be leased by the United States and other NATO allies The satellite will cover the region between the Middle East and the Midwestern United States and be fully operational in 2006 It will also be fully interoperable with all existing and future US and NATO X-band terminals

Tabl

e 3

7 S

pani

sh c

apab

ilit

ies

for

netw

ork-

base

d op

erat

ions

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

C2

Sis

tem

a de

Inf

orm

acioacute

n pa

ra M

ando

y C

ontr

ol

del E

jeacuterc

ito

de T

ierr

a (S

IMA

CE

T)

Com

mon

bat

tlefi

eld

pi

ctur

e fo

r al

l arm

y co

mm

and

cent

ers

in

clud

ing

mob

ile

ones

Sis

tem

a de

Man

do y

C

ontr

ol A

eacutereo

(S

IMC

A)

Air

for

ce C

2 sy

stem

Com

plie

s w

ith

NA

TO

S

TAN

AG

s

Com

mun

icat

ions

and

co

mpu

ters

AR

GO

SP

R4G

rad

io-b

ased

tact

ical

di

gita

l com

mun

icat

ions

in

fras

truc

ture

MID

SIn

stal

led

on s

ever

al

airc

raft

and

nav

y sh

ips

Lin

ks to

oth

er M

IDS

sy

stem

s in

all

ied

nati

ons

His

pasa

t C

omm

erci

al S

AT

CO

Ms

from

ear

ly 1

990s

wit

h so

me

tran

spon

ders

leas

ed

to S

pani

sh m

ilit

ary

Part

ly in

tero

pera

ble

wit

h th

e S

yrac

use

(Fra

nce)

S

kyne

t (U

K)

and

NA

TO

4

syst

ems

Spa

insa

tM

ILS

AT

CO

M ndash

UH

F a

nd

SH

F c

apab

ilit

y al

ong

wit

h so

me

EH

F c

apac

ity

and

an

anti

-jam

min

g sy

stem

ISR

Sis

tem

a In

tegr

ado

de

Vig

ilan

cia

Aeacuter

ea (

SIV

A)

Tact

ical

UA

V f

or s

hort

-ra

nge

reco

nnai

ssan

ce

surv

eill

ance

and

targ

et

acqu

isit

ion

cont

inue

dhellip

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

Ori

on P

-3B

Upg

rade

d in

200

3 to

in

clud

e F

ITS

mis

sion

sy

stem

an

elec

tron

ic

war

fare

sys

tem

new

rad

ar

acou

stic

sys

tem

IF

F

VU

HF

and

HF

rad

ios

da

ta li

nk a

nd s

atel

lite

and

in

erti

al n

avig

atio

n sy

stem

s

San

tiag

oB

oein

g 70

7-35

1C

confi

gur

ed f

or C

OM

INT

E

LIN

T o

pera

tion

s

Falc

on-2

02

airc

raft

for

CO

MIN

T

mis

sion

s

Hel

ios

1 +

2Ju

nior

par

tner

in F

renc

h ea

rth

obse

rvat

ion

sate

llit

es I

R a

nd o

ptic

al

IMIN

T c

apab

ilit

ies

Neu

ron

Part

ner

in F

renc

h-le

d U

CA

V p

rogr

am

Tabl

e 3

7 co

ntin

ued

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

77

Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance

For unmanned ISR Spain relies on the locally manufactured SIVA (SistemaIntegrado de Vigilancia Aeacuterea or Integrated System for Aerial Surveillance) a tactical UAV for reconnaissance surveillance and target acquisition Spain has also expressed an interest in Northrop Grummanrsquos Fire Scout vertical take-off and landing tactical UAV for maritime SampR capabilities Manned ISR assets include fi ve Orion P-3B aircraft upgraded in 2003 by EADS to include the Fully Integrated Tactical Mission System (FITS) data fusion system an electronic warfare system new radar acoustic system ID friend-or-foe interrogator VUHF and HF radios a data link and satellite and inertial navigation systems

Spainrsquos space observation capabilities originally depended on the Ishtar optical earth observation satellite but the project did not go forward Instead Spain became a junior partner in the French Helios 1 and Helios 2 satellite programs of which it owns 7 and 25 per cent respectively The Spanish Ministry of Defense has recently revived its plans for an independent earth observation capability discussing a high-resolution synthetic aperture radar satellite possibly with civil security applications

Since March 1998 Spain has operated a single Boeing 707 (the Santiago) confi gured for SIGINT and ISR missions Two Falcon-20 aircraft are also in operation for COMINT missions

Sweden

Although there has been signifi cant progress in formulating a Swedish doctrine for Network-Based Defense (NBD) the Swedish armed forces today are still only partially interoperable across services Infrastructure is currently being put in place for a mobile joint C2 function since all the services are now under a single national command This command is part of the process of transforming the Swedish military into a contingency organization with a mobile high-quality force able to operate in expeditionary mode Many of the new systems procured by the Swedish military are compliant with NATO STANAGs and US military specifi cations (MILSPECS) giving them a good basis for interoperability However most of the older Swedish systems were not designed with international interoperability in mind

Each of the services has its own rapid reaction unit created in 1998ndash9 The army has SWERAP (Swedish Rapid Reaction Unit) the air force has SWAFRAP (Swedish Air Force Rapid Reaction Unit) and the navy has SWENRAP (Swedish Navy Rapid Reaction Unit) Four air force C-130s provide air insertion capability for ground units SWAFRAP is comprised of JAS-39 Gripen aircraft which carry out airborne surveillance and combat search and rescue missions SWENRAP missions are principally mine clearing and peacekeeping operations Swedish rapid reaction forces have been deployed to Liberia as part of the UN force and Swedish Special Forces have operated in the Congo and Afghanistan By January 2008 Sweden intends for its rapid reaction units to be part of the European Unionrsquos Nordic Battlegroup together with Finland Norway and Estonia

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

78

The SWERAP units use a commercial satellite system to link with national headquarters and the KV90 high frequency radio system ndash with two stations in the mission area and two redundant stations in Sweden ndash as a backup Tactical communications in-theater rely on the armyrsquos TS-9000 system Based on the EUROCOM standard this system uses a Thales tactical switchboard an Ericsson tactical radio link system and Cisco routers that form the backbone of a tactical Intranet The TS-9000 also includes radio access points for VHF Ericsson Starcom radios as well as HF-radios

The C4ISR capabilities of the Swedish rapid reaction units do not use groundbreaking or unique technology solutions instead they rely on COTS equipment adapted for their specifi c requirements The Swedish deployment to Kosovo in 1999 needed to be equipped rapidly and within a relatively short period SWERAP became the fi rst battalion in the Swedish armed forces to fi eld advanced C2 and communications systems relying on this COTS approach

Command and control

Current C2 systems in the Swedish armed forces include the 9LV system in service with the navy and the StriC-90 system deployed since 1998 for command and control of attack aircraft and air defense systems StriC-90 is connected to the Giraffe 3D and the Erieye radars and includes data links with Gripen attack aircraft Swedish air force systems are tied into a single network named Airforce 2000 which enables a tactical C2 loop for all the servicersquos units The Swedish army uses the demonstrator IS-Mark information system for mobile and non-mobile ground based headquarters and the SLB (Stridsledningssystem Bataljon or Battalion C2 System) system at the battalion level The two are not interoperable however and data must be manually transferred between them (Nilsson et al2004 24ndash5) Sweden began to integrate all the servicesrsquo C2 systems at all levels in 2005 under the name of SWECCIS (SWEdish C2 Information System)

In October 1995 the Swedish Armed Forces Headquartersrsquo Department of Operations tasked the Defense Research Establishment (Foumlrsvarets Forskningsanstalt or FOA) the Defense Materiel Administration (Foumlrsvarets Materielverk or FMV) and the National Defense College (Foumlrsvarshoumlgskolanor FHS) to propose a vision for a mobile military joint C2 system for the year 2010 This project ndash Mobile Joint Command and Control Function for 2010 (Roumlrlig Operativ Lednings Funktion or ROLF 2010) ndash has been expanded to include civilian C2 elements relevant to national security The goal is a single C2 environment for Swedenrsquos national defense and fi rst responder services in 10ndash15 years The vision calls for the creation of an ldquoaquariumrdquo (Visionarium) a device to present crisis situations in a three-dimensional environment fusing information from many sources Once deployed Visionarium will enable informed and timely decision-making and the dissemination of decisions to security forces

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

79

Communications and computers

For the past ten years the tactical communications infrastructure of the Swedish armed forces has been based on a digital network the TS-9000 The system uses Thales switches and Ericsson radios and relay equipment and has recently been upgraded to include tactical Intranet However it will encounter problems of data capacity once the new information system SWECCIS is introduced The requirement for more bandwidth will be fi lled through satellite communications and the procurement of the HF-2000 radio communications network to be fully deployed by 2008 This system will provide all services with a fully automated data text and voice communications network that can be used from fi xed and mobile stations

Only a few of Swedenrsquos tactical communications systems are interoperable outside Sweden All were designed and deployed under a strategy of Swedish neutrality which ruled out coalition operations Sweden has now participated in several of the Combined Endeavor annual exercises which have tested and proven the interoperability of its tactical communications systems with those of other countries at the non-secure level In the near future Sweden is expected to join the successor of the Tactical Communications (TACOMS) Post 2000 project a NATO initiative to develop STANAGs for IP-based communications between different tactical communications systems

With the change in Swedish strategy the need for interoperable commu nica-tions systems has grown As a result Sweden expects to procure Link-16 terminals and IFF systems Link-16 will fi rst be introduced in the air force and navy with an army deployment to follow Initially it will be installed as stand-alone terminals with limited capacity Sweden has also recently launched a program known as GTRS to acquire a Software Defi ned Radio system built on SCA standards The goal is to introduce the new system to the armed forces after 2008

In 2005 Sweden also began to deploy its national radio communications infrastructure for public safety authorities including the armed forces police coast guard customs service local crisis management and rescue services and emergency healthcare and ambulance services RAKEL (Radio Kommunikation foumlr Effektiv Ledning or Radio Communication for Effi cient Command) based on the TETRA (TErrestrial Trunked RAdio) standard will be supplied by a consortium of Saab Nokia and Eltel Networks and will be owned by the Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) Deployment will start in the south of Sweden and fi nish in the north of the country by 2010 RAKEL is part of the Network-Based Defense doctrine aimed at connecting the Swedish military and the fi rst responders in one network

Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance

The Argus system has been Swedenrsquos principal manned airborne ISR capability since 1997 Argus is based on six Saab 340 aircraft outfi tted with Ericssonrsquos Erieye PS-890 radar along with four ground stations It performs mostly airborne early

Tabl

e 3

8 S

wed

ish

capa

bili

ties

for

net

wor

k-ba

sed

oper

atio

ns

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

C2

Str

iCA

ir d

efen

se C

2 sy

stem

Inte

rope

rabl

e w

ith

the

Sw

edis

h A

rgus

air

born

e ra

dar

syst

em

9LV

Mar

k 3E

Nav

al C

2 sy

stem

IS-M

ark

Arm

y C

2 sy

stem

de

mon

stra

tor

for

mob

ile

and

non-

mob

ile

head

quar

ters

SL

BA

rmy

C2

syst

em f

or

batt

alio

n le

vel

9LV

CE

TR

ISN

aval

C2

syst

em f

or n

ext-

gene

rati

on V

isby

-cla

ss

corv

ette

s

SW

EC

CIS

Inte

grat

ion

of a

ll C

2 (n

avy

air

for

ce a

nd a

rmy)

sy

stem

s a

t all

leve

ls

RO

LF

201

0M

obil

e Jo

int C

omm

and

and

Con

trol

Fun

ctio

nIn

tero

pera

bili

ty is

sues

m

ay b

e sa

crifi

ced

to

rem

ain

on s

ched

ule

Com

mun

icat

ions

and

co

mpu

ters

TS

-900

0A

rmy

tact

ical

co

mm

unic

atio

nsin

fras

truc

ture

inc

ludi

ng

tact

ical

Int

rane

t

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

KV

90C

omm

unic

atio

ns s

yste

m

for

Sw

edis

h R

apid

R

eact

ion

Forc

e

RA

KE

LN

atio

nal m

obil

e ra

dio

syst

em f

or p

ubli

c sa

fety

in

clud

ing

arm

ed f

orce

s

secu

rity

for

ces

and

fi rs

t re

spon

ders

Bas

ed o

n T

ET

RA

sta

ndar

d

HF

-200

0F

utur

e hi

gh-f

requ

ency

ra

dio

com

mun

icat

ions

ne

twor

k (d

ata

and

voic

e)

for

all s

ervi

ces

(ful

ly

depl

oyed

by

2008

)

Mee

ts N

AT

O S

TAN

AG

s

GT

RS

Sw

edis

h eq

uiva

lent

to

the

US

JT

RS

tact

ical

so

ftw

are-

base

d ra

dio

SC

A c

ompl

iant

ISR

Ugg

lan

Tact

ical

UA

V (

base

d on

S

agem

rsquos S

perw

er)

Sim

ilar

sys

tem

s ar

e de

ploy

ed b

y F

ranc

e

Den

mar

k N

ethe

rlan

ds

Gre

ece

FS

R-8

90 A

rgus

Saa

b-34

0 ai

rcra

ft w

ith

Eri

eye

rada

r fo

r ae

rial

C2

and

mar

itim

e su

rvei

llan

ce

Ful

ly in

tegr

ated

into

S

wed

ish

air

defe

nse

syst

em

AR

TH

UR

Art

ille

ry a

nd m

orta

r lo

cati

on r

adar

Dep

loye

d w

ith

ISA

F

cont

inue

dhellip

Dep

loye

d to

day

Dep

loye

d by

200

6ndash7

Dep

loye

d af

ter

2007

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

Gir

affe

Sea

Gir

affe

Lan

d-ba

sed

and

mar

itim

e S

ampR

rad

ars

S-1

02B

Kor

pen

(Rav

en)

2 G

ulfs

trea

m I

V-S

P

airc

raft

for

SIG

INT

Hav

e be

en d

eplo

yed

in

the

Adr

iati

c in

sup

port

of

NA

TO

pea

ceke

epin

g op

erat

ions

Neu

ron

Part

ner

in F

renc

h-le

d U

CA

V p

rogr

am

Ple

iade

sA

cces

s to

Fre

nch

sate

llit

e im

ager

y

Tabl

e 3

8 co

ntin

ued

EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

83

warning and maritime surveillance and reconnaissance missions Other manned ISR assets include two Gulfstream IV-SP aircraft deployed since 1997 for SIGINT missions The Ericsson Giraffe radar recently deployed provides land-based ISR capabilities though its principal mission is air defense The Swedish navy also deploys a maritime version the Sea Giraffe The Swedish ARTHUR (Artillery Hunting Radar) system is fully operational and has been used in Afghanistan

Sweden has only a limited unmanned aerial ISR capability Three Ugglan (Owl) tactical UAV systems were procured from France in 1999ndash2000 based on the Sperwer UAV modifi ed to be able to take off in severe winter conditions As part of the Swedish armed forces long-term vision a number of advanced UAV concepts are currently being studied Gladen is one candidate a HALE UAV equipped with a SAR electro-optic and infrared sensors and able to carry an early warning suite Also under discussion are two combat UAVs the Swedish Highly Advanced Research Confi guration (SHARC) and Skuadern a stealthy MALE reconnaissance and strike UAV both being developed by Saab the latter in collaboration with BAE Systems Sweden is also a partner in the French-led EuroMALE UAV and Neuron UCAV programs

84

4

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL

NETWORK-BASED CAPABILITIES

NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization provides the most important and broad-reaching setting in which the transatlantic allies can address C4ISR technology and interoperability issues Military planning in the European Union though moving forward rapidly is at too early a stage and insuffi ciently comprehensive to resolve interoperability problems today In any case the United States is not an EU member making NATO the most important institutional setting in which transatlantic C4ISR issues can be discussed and resolved

During the Cold War NATO force planning was the setting for allied discussions on C2 communications air defense air operations and air-to-air surveillance Although this review of national network-based capabilities suggests that national systems are imperfectly interoperable at the national level and not always interoperable within the NATO framework the intent to make them NATO interoperable is clear Moreover a number of capabilities developed in the NATO context remain important tools for coalition interoperability even when the Alliance is not formally involved For the purposes of this discussion we will use the defi nition of interoperability common in NATO as described by Major General Picavet Director of the NATO HQ C3 Staff ldquothe ability of alliance forces and when appropriate forces of partner and other nations to train exercise and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasksrdquo (Picavet 2003 34)

NATO has dedicated common C2 and communications capabilities The MIDS upgrade of the US Link-16 system connecting allied aircraft was developed through NATO and NATOrsquos naval communications are largely interoperable through Link-11 technology The AWACS air-to-air surveillance system is a common NATO capability As an organization NATO defi nes and issues Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) for many weapons systems including C3I which set targets for planning national C2 and communications systems among the member nations NATO continues to provide an important setting for future common programs that are part of the C4ISR universe such as the Air Command and Control System (ACCS) program the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) program theater missile defense (TMD) research and the Coalition Aerial Surveillance and

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

85

Reconnaissance (CAESAR) advanced concept technology demonstration NATO will be a driving force for future transformations of European military forces and their links to the US defense as a result of three key decisions made at the November 2002 Prague Summit the Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC) the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the creation of the new Allied Command Transformation (ACT)

While NATO remains the principal transatlantic context for C4ISR discussions and planning the future evolution of the Alliancersquos role is unclear The European allies are increasingly committed to doing parallel planning in the European Union context whose military missions and commitments are growing In addition the future of the US role in coalition operations under a NATO fl ag is somewhat uncertain The US National Security Strategy (2002) and the Quadrennial Defense Review of 2001 both give preference to ad hoc coalitions over a systematic use of NATO for out-of-area operations

NATO roles and capabilities

Throughout the Cold War the allies used the NATO context for common C2 capability planning NATO strategy and force planning and military exercises set the expectations and goals for NATO membersrsquo military forces Based in part on Alliance needs members set goals for their own national defense investment which in turn infl uenced the requirements for equipment including Command Control Communications and Computers (C4) Past practices in the Alliance however may not be an adequate incentive for defi ning and meeting C4ISR requirements today NATO force planning goals are not obligatory and have often not been met in national defense budgets and plans Moreover because they have been developed through negotiation goals and targets developed in the NATO context tend to be incremental while defense technology and mission need to move ahead more quickly As a result as Gompert and Nerlich note the NATO force planning process since the end of the Cold War has become increasingly disconnected from the US national force transformation process

Adjustments in NATOrsquos military plans are worked out through tedious diplomatic negotiations among professionals trained to avoid abrupt change Consequently the United States and the lead European allies do not presently rely on the NATO planning process to guide their force planning and they cannot count on it to organize and guide their effort to create cooperable transformed forces

(Gompert and Nerlich 2002 64)

Nevertheless NATO has served as an important context for allied C4ISR planning The Alliance breaks down network-based capabilities and C4ISR into three categories Command Control and Consultation (C3) Communications and Information Systems (CIS) and ISR Over time separate NATO organizations

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

86

have been created to deal with the fi rst two areas (C3 and CIS) while ISR has been further broken down into specifi c programs and organizations

The NATO concept of C3 covers planning and architecture design of systems while that of CIS covers the management and operation of systems For C3 the Alliance has developed specifi c packages ndash Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) headquarters ndash that play a central role in planning and implementing specifi c Alliance operations such as IFOR and SFOR in the Balkans Since the mid-1990s CJTF core staffs have been established on a permanent basis within selected parent headquarters in the NATO military command structure When the need arises for a CJTF to be deployed the core staff is assembled and augmented as necessary forming a CJTF headquarters specifi cally structured to meet the requirements of the operation in question These CJTF headquarters receive C2 and communications capabilities both from the Alliance and from national forces They will also provide the new NATO Response Force with the joint headquarters it requires to operate (see below)

The Alliance has developed its own dedicated C2 and communications capability for military operations involving senior levels of military and political decision making (Barry 2003) NATO hardware and software can reach across the entire NATO territory connecting land air and maritime forces and political decision makers in national capitals and Brussels including voice data messaging and video teleconferencing This capability uses wireless networks satellites landlines optical fi ber and digital radio and includes local area and wide area networks A signifi cant volume of the traffi c is carried on the Internet and uses commercial equipment including satellites

These C3 and CIS infrastructures are overseen by the NATO Consultation Command and Control Organization (NC3O) The NC3Orsquos mission is to develop the technical architectures standards protocols and overall design for all systems from the tactical military level to the strategicpolitical one Since its reorganization in 1996 the NC3O is linked to three organizations The NATO C3 Board (NC3B) is the senior CIS planning and policymaking body in the Alliance It is composed of representatives of all member nations the strategic military commands and other relevant NATO organizations It reports directly to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the Defense Planning Committee and acts as the oversight board for all NC3O activities The Board has subcommittees on joint requirements and concepts frequency management information systems identifi cation systems interoperability information security communication networks and navigation systems (Picavet 2003)

The NATO Command Control and Consultation Agency (NC3A) is directly responsible for CIS issues within the Alliance It carries out the policies of the Board procures systems and conducts fi eld trials of prototypes NC3Arsquos goal is to create architecture for a common operating environment into which member states can plug in their own C3 networks Lastly the NATO systems are operated by the NATO Communications and Information Systems Operating and Support Agency (NACOSA) It manages CIS conducts joint training and monitors the quality of service both in static and forward deployed locations Over time the Board and

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

87

the NC3A are pushing NATO toward a command and information system with greater mobility and interoperability increasingly based on commercial products and systems The Alliance goal is to create a ready-made architecture that member nations can plug into and to provide a test bed for communications and Internet technologies (Barry 2002 253)

NATO C2 programs

The current NATO C2 systems and related communications capabilities have their limitations The systems have not been mobile though deployability is going to be critical for future out-of-area operations Moreover the current capability is stove-piped Horizontal communications between forces and between governments are not systematically possible Thus the current NATO systems are not yet a network-based capability that would allow all sources of data voice and video (including sensor data) to be brought together vertically and horizontally in real time to provide coherent real-time awareness of the battlefi eld across forces

NATO has however been upgrading this C2 capability with a number of major programs underway or recently completed which will allow Alliance operations to be more network-based The Allied Command Europe (ACE) Automated Command and Control Information System (ACCIS) is intended to be a strategic-level system providing decision support software and a combined operational picture It is currently being given a common hardware and software baseline that will form the core of a future bi-Strategic Command (ACE and ACLANT) automated information system (Bi-SCAIS) the Alliancersquos future C2 system The core services of the Maritime Command and Control Information System (MCCIS) an Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) strategic-level COTS-based information system will be implemented in the ACE ACCIS architecture The NATO C3 Technical Architecture (NC3TA) a new open systems approach for the Alliancersquos C2 infrastructure was initiated in December 2000 and addresses the near-term interoperability requirements of NATO C2 systems setting down technical requirements and guidelines for their implementation

There are additional NATO programs addressing future Alliance C2 require-ments More than a decade ago the Alliance initiated a program to upgrade and expand NATOrsquos air defense net the Air Command and Control System (ACCS) a commonly funded development and procurement program ACCS is intended to be an open architecture program using off-the-shelf components Given the decline in the European theater air threat the ACCS program could have been terminated However ACCS has been designed not only to detect and defend against air attack but also for air tasking and carrying out the tactical planning tasking and execution of all air defense offensive air and air support operations It is intended as a multi-mission simultaneous planning capability coordinating fl ight paths of various aircraft integrating the AWACS air picture preparing offensive operations and coordinating a combined air operations center along with reconnaissance squadrons and fi ghter wings It will include both fi xed sites and deployable components

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

88

Air operations over Kosovo revealed shortfalls in the Alliancersquos capability to coordinate combined air attack and support giving new impetus to the need for the ACCS capability Moreover it became clear that ACCS could provide a vehicle for communications and C2 involving air operations as part of a broader network-based system linked to air-ground surveillance and conceivably even to theater missile defense systems (TMD) As a result the Alliance decided to continue the ACCS effort In 1999 NATO signed a $500 million contract for the initial development effort with Air Command Systems International part of the Thales Raytheon Systems joint venture

Over fi ve years the ACCS system core software was developed and tested concluding the fi rst phase of the program The next phase of the ACCS from 2004 to roughly 2008 includes software integration incremental testing and the introduction of ACCS into national forces The goal is to create ACCS sites in 18 NATO member nations NATO members without an ACCS site will interface with the system via their national airdefense and operations centers (Fiorenza 2004 38)

Theater missile defense is not generally seen as an element of C2 However the NATO TMD effort is relevant to overall C2 capabilities as missile defense can be closely linked to the air defense and air operations capability provided by the ACCS program Moreover a TMD architecture could include mobile tactical missile and air defense capabilities which Alliance forces may require in out-of-area deployments including the NATO Respose Force (NRF) The Alliance has issued two contracts for studies of an Alliance TMD architecture and there is growing consensus that it may be appropriate to develop such a system

NATO introduced still another C2-related program in the summer of 2005 creating a new C2 Center of Excellence based on the model of the Dutch C2 Support Center (described in the previous chapter) Under the auspices of Allied Command Transformation this joint Center is to provide the Alliance with a framework for the exchange of C2 knowledge and lessons learned in order to improve interoperability The initial staff is composed of 15 Dutch Belgian Norwegian and US exchange or liaison offi cers but will expand to include other nationalities The Center will undertake training and education activities related to C2 interoperability including the analysis of case studies and the production of ldquolessons learnedrdquo reports As part of its work the Center will assess the value of the NRF as a stimulus for NATO network-enabled capabilities assist member states in synchronizing their national C2 programs to make them more interoperable and validate network-centric and C4ISR concepts and doctrines developed in other NATO organizations such as the NC3A

The Center was also offered to the European Union as part of the Dutch contribution to the European Strategic Defense Initiative (ESDI) It will collaborate with the European Defense Agency and make its expertise and facilities available to the European Battlegroups (see Chapter 5 on EU capabilities) Though a relatively new addition to the Alliancersquos C4ISR effort the Center of Excellence could become an important arena for NATOrsquos efforts

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

89

NATO communications and information programs

NATOrsquos communications and information networks have also been evolving toward more networked capabilities The NATO General Purpose Communications System (NGCS) is a communications backbone tying all military C2 (data and voice) together with semi-permanent bandwidth on demand using secure and non-secure telephone message wireless and satellite links NGCS is being deployed to replace the obsolete NATO Integrated Communications System The NATO Messaging System (NMS) will provide Alliance commands with e-mail and secure military message handing capability Crisis Response Operations in NATO Open Systems (CRONOS) a Windows NT-based information system initially developed for Bosnia provides secure connectivity (up to NATO Secret) between NATO and several national and coalition systems

Increasingly NATO platforms are also being equipped with the Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) a modernized version of the US Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) The development of MIDS illustrates the increase in Alliance telecommunications interoperability It was designed as a tactical data communications network linking NATO alliesrsquo aircraft (fi ghters and bombers) and air-based ground-based and ship-based C2 centers (Hura et al 2000) As it is deployed across alliance platforms MIDS will also enable better aircraft Identifi cation Friend or Foe (IFF) information The United States France Germany Italy and Spain signed the project memorandum of understanding in 1991 MIDS development has been led by the United States with France acting as deputy program leader (refl ecting the cost shares of the two major program partners)

MIDS like the US JTIDS is based on Link-16 a tactical digital network of encrypted jam-resistant data links and terminals Budget pressures and the desire to gain access to US military technology led the Europeans to support an international program but almost all were unwilling to simply buy JTIDS off the shelf For the United States the need for international collaboration was operational a common tactical communications network would increase interoperability with European allies and increase effectiveness in coalition warfare

A modular open terminal architecture was developed for MIDS followed by an affordable terminal that could be tailored to fi t various military platforms MIDS terminals were developed fi rst for integration into a specifi c set of platforms then modifi ed to accommodate others Finally interoperable jam-resistant data links between US and allied platforms were developed The member nations participating in the program were prohibited from developing competing systems to MIDS

A US chartered international joint venture MIDSCO was awarded the RampD phase of the program in 1994 The JV included GEC-Marconi (UK) Hazeltine (United States) Thomson (France) Marconi Italtel Defense (Italy) Siemens (Germany) and ENOSA (Empresa Nacional de Optica SA Spain) The RampD phase was concluded in 2000 followed by an acquisition phase that included two US vendors (Data Link Solutions and ViaSat Inc) and one European vendor for production and sale of the terminals The European vendor is EuroMIDS a

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

90

consortium comprising Thales (France) Marconi Mobile (Italy) Indra (Spain) and EADS (Germany)

In 2004 the US navy initiated a program within the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) program that would enable it to communicate with MIDS terminals The MIDS JTRS program will transition the existing MIDS Link-16 terminal to a Software Communications Architecture (SCA) compliant with JTRS radio The MIDS JTRS radio will provide three additional programmable channels that will be able to run any of the JTRS approved waveforms The United States France Italy Spain and Germany all participate in the program which will enable them to receive copies of the technical data package for MIDS JTRS and produce terminals to meet their national needs Eventually all US French German Italian and Spanish platforms outfi tted with MIDS JTRS radios will be able to communicate and share a common picture of the battlefi eld

NATOrsquos Satcom V project is also underway intended to provide global wideband video voice and data links to the Alliance Satellite communications have been an important element of the Alliancersquos common communications capability since 1970 when the fi rst NATO satellite was launched The NATO IV satellite system consisted of one active satellite one backup satellite 27 satellite ground terminals and two control centers Operational since 1991 it provided communications in both the UHF and SHF bands NATO has retired the last remaining NATO IV satellite Instead of purchasing and operating the next generation of satellites the Satcom V program ndash previously known as NATO Satcom Post-2000 ndash will purchase capacity from existing European satellites and upgrade existing ground stations The NATO C3 Agency leads the Satcom V program

The United Kingdom France and Italy submitted a joint bid to supply SHF and UHF capacity from existing and planned national programs (Skynet in the United Kingdom Syracuse in France and SICRAL in Italy) The US Department of Defense also submitted a bid offering SHF capacity on its Wideband Gapfi ller satellite system and the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) and UHF capacity on the UHF Follow-On system and the Mobile User Objective System The United States also proposed selling NATO EHF capacity on its Advanced Extremely High Frequency system while France proposed EHF capacity on one of its Syracuse 3 satellites

In May 2004 the NATO C3 Agency selected the joint British-French-Italian bid for the SHF and UHF parts of the Satcom Post-2000 program The 15-year contract includes establishing a NATO Mission Access Center that will route all NATO satellite communications via satellites in the Skynet 5 Syracuse 3 and SICRAL systems Beginning in 2007 the NATO system will be based on two Skynet 5 two Syracuse 3 and two SICRAL satellites A selection for the EHF part of the program is expected soon although EHF capacity is not expected to be needed before 2010 (Fiorenza 2005b)

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

91

NATO intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance programs

NATOrsquos current major ISR program is the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and the Alliance is in the process of acquiring additional ISR capabilities through the NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance program (AGS) The NATO AWACS fl eet is composed of 17 aircraft with dedicated common air-to-air surveillance capability and provides an important sensor input to understanding the battlefi eld Purchased during the late 1980s this NATO E-3A fl eet is currently being improved through modernization programs managed by the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEWampC) Program Management Organization In 2004 the upgrading of the missions systems on board the NATO aircraft was begun and the process will be completed in 2008 The upgrades will enable the AWACS aircraft to receive mission orders and updates via satellite allow the integration of data collected by other platforms with that gathered by the aircraftrsquos sensors increase the number of targets it can track and improve its interoperability with other platforms The United Kingdom France and the United States all possess the AWACS systems giving the Alliance good interoperability in air-to-air surveillance

In 2000 NATO began a research and testing program with direct bearing on the integration of sensor data collected by various different platforms operated by member nations The Coalition Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance (CAESAR) program is unprecedented an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrator (ACTD) funded by the US Defense Department but carried out by NATO The premise of CAESAR is that the NATO interoperability challenge is about information what is needed who needs it and where it comes from The objective of CAESAR is to test national and NATO air- and space-based ground surveillance systems and develop ways to integrate them ultimately leading to a new STANAG for the Alliance

To achieve this objective the CAESAR program is testing tactics techniques and procedures for linking together independent national air reconnaissance and surveillance systems currently deployed on a variety of platforms including the British ASTOR the French Horizon JSTARS Global Hawk RADARSAT (Canada) Predator CRESO (Italian helicopter-based) and others In the future it could be extended to other platforms including the British CEC network and ultimately ACCS and AGS

If the data emerging from CAESAR leads to investments and operational planning it could make a valuable contribution to the NATO effort to network sensor data into its C2 and communications systems It could also make it easier for coalition forces to rely on a variety of national air ground surveillance systems in the absence of a common NATO AGS asset

In addition CAESAR may demonstrate the benefi ts of funding technology demonstrators at the international level ACTDs a result of acquisition reform by the US Defense Department and designed to move technology more quickly into the forces have normally been restricted to US participants More multinational ACTDs in the C4ISR arena could stimulate transatlantic efforts to address the

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

92

interoperability dilemmas in network-based operations For example as a complement to the CAESAR program the United States could increase NATO participation in the Multi-sensor Aerospace-ground Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition (MAJIIC) program This is a 5-year technology demonstrator initiated in 2004 by US Joint Forces Command Its objective is to enhance the interoperability of ISR systems fi elded within a coalition framework via a common military website and made available for coalition operations in near real time Canada France Germany Italy the Netherlands Norway Spain and the United Kingdom already participate in MAJIIC

The most signifi cant NATO program for future ISR capabilities is the NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) project which has been an active RampD program for over a decade It will provide NATO with an aerial battlefi eld surveillance capability using a radar suite with both MTI and SAR modes fusing information gathered by other sensors into a combined digital picture The United States currently fi elds such a capability in the JSTARS (a modifi ed Boeing 707 carrying a communications surveillance reconnaissance and intelligence suite) The system is expected to cost some 4 billion euros which will be shared by all participating nations with initial operational capability targeted for 2010 The United Kingdom is the only NATO nation not taking part in the AGS program

The AGS program has evolved over several years as a number of alternatives were considered and rejected The United States proposed that the Alliance simply buy JSTARS which few allied nations were willing to do The United Kingdom decided to proceed independently with ASTOR and pulled out of the NATO planning effort Competing US and European solutions emerged the Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP an upgrade of the system deployed on JSTARS) and the Standoff Surveillance Target Acquisition Radar (SOSTAR)

In 2003 NATO issued a Request for Proposals for a two-year design and development phase This RFP called for the design and development phase to begin in late 2004 leading to a full program of six aircraft plus UAV systems by 2010 Two transatlantic strategic consortia responded to this Request for Proposals both offering the same radar solution the Transatlantic Cooperative AGS Radar (TCAR) which would fuse MP-RTIP and SOSTAR One consortium was the Transatlantic Industry Proposed Solution (TIPS) led by Northrop Grumman Thales EADS Galileo Avionica General Dynamics Canada Indra and some 70 other companies from all 19 NATO member nations The other was the Cooperative Transatlantic AGS System (CTAS) proposed by Raytheon and British Aerospace Systems based on the United Kingdom ASTOR system (Fiorenza 2003b) In the spring of 2004 the NATO AGS Steering Committee and the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors selected the TIPS consortium as the winner

The AGS system was initially to be deployed solely on manned aircraft However in response to German urgings the program was redesigned for both manned and unmanned aircraft It is not yet clear which version will be deployed fi rst The TIPS-based mixed fl eet is based on manned medium-size aircraft ndash the

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

93

Airbus A321 ndash and the German EuroHawk HALE UAVs a version of Northrop Grummanrsquos Global Hawk

Developing the radar posed a problem for both consortia since US export regulators indicated that they would forbid the export of some crucial technologies such as the TransmitReceive (TR) modules Frustrated by this problem the European partners have spent time and resources to duplicate existing US TR modules creating a capability that downstream will compete with the American technology The TCAR solution offered by the TIPS consortium faces other signifi cant technology transfer issues as the radar is to be co-developed by several European countries ndash France Germany Italy the Netherlands and Spain ndash as well as the United States

The ultimate fate of the AGS system is unclear given the signifi cant additional costs required for full deployment and uncertainty that some key NATO members ndash France the United Kingdom and Germany ndash will continue to participate over the long term A commitment to deploy AGS would involve a considerable increase in common NATO investments and an increase in the NATO common budget ceiling AGS spending might compete with other national defense priorities On the other hand a deployed AGS would give the Alliance a signifi cantly enhanced sensoring capability for operational deployments outside the NATO area and relieve the overload on the US JSTARS currently much in demand

As this discussion suggests there is substantial NATO investment in the elements of common C2 communications and ISR capabilities for the Alliance What is lacking is a clear vision of what the Alliance needs to link sensor and other information into the decision-making and command structures and down to the tactical war fi ghter NC3A is working on such a vision trying to defi ne the linkage between the many NATO systems and standards and achieve the incorporation of common programs such as MCCIS ACCIS ACCS and AGS into a joint system and the integration of that system with the national systems of the member states This C2 and communications architecture needs to be accompanied by a NATO-wide vision of the sensor architecture to which it might be linked NATO does not yet have clear standards for the ISR elements of network-centric operations nor an agreed view on the way in which they should be networked with each other

NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAGs)

NATO has worked for decades to set common standards for defense equipment including C4ISR systems Working groups in the NATO Military Agency for Standardization in conjunction with NATOrsquos Committee of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) have negotiated more than 1700 such STANAGs which set out the standards members should seek to reach when acquiring new equipment Roughly 300 of these standards relate to C4 technology (Grapin 2002 37)

The NC3TA proposes such standards for C2 and communications equipment and information architecture Their guidance should make it possible for nationally procured systems to link up with or plug into the C2 and communications architecture being put together by the Alliance (Barry 2003 10) As noted in the

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

94

review of national programs in this study many C4 items in national inventories are said to be compliant with NATO STANAGs which in theory enhances Alliance interoperability

The STANAG process has not however been fully successful in reaching this goal STANAG compliance is not mandatory but voluntary and there is no institutional process in NATO for validating membersrsquo compliance with the STANAGs As a result many NATO member nations including the United States have developed equipment that does not enhance interoperability as was the case with the German land force communications protocol As one analyst has noted ldquoMost European countries including France are willing to use NATO standards but it is not a usual practice in US procurement for military services to refer (and defer) to themrdquo (Grapin 2002 3)

Non-compliance with STANAGs is linked to the desire in some countries notably the United States to move forward quickly toward a network-based capability The STANAG process tends to be long tedious and bureaucratic often taking several years and resulting in a standard that is a lowest common denominator Once a STANAG has been ratifi ed it is often well behind the evolution of modern technology As a result the process does not have high-level attention and tends not to be viewed as a part of the strategic evolution of the Alliance

In the case of C2 and CIS technologies the pace of innovation is particularly fast and heavily reliant on the commercial sector As some countries move down the road toward networked capabilities they are inclined to set STANAGs aside and move to the best available and most up-to-date technology One analyst estimated that US defense technology is 80 per cent compliant with NATO STANAGs but the remaining 20 per cent includes the technologies critical to the development of network-centric capabilities (Grapin 2002 3) Moreover in the critical area of ISR there are few agreed STANAGs and none as yet for UAVs (Grapin 2002 77)

New NATO commitments to network-based operations

The Alliance took a major step forward toward a commitment to network-centric capabilities with the Prague summit of November 2002 First and most important the NATO agenda moved from a focus on Article 5 missions involving the defense of the NATO member countries to a clear focus on Article 6 out-of-area missions This shift in focus had been emerging since the 50th anniversary Washington summit of 1999 Though the European allies initially resisted efforts to focus on out-of-area missions this change emerged for three reasons First NATOrsquos experience in Bosnia Serbia and Kosovo ndash the fi rst war conducted by NATO as an alliance ndash made it clear that the European defense mission had been superseded by responsibilities for peacemaking and peacekeeping at Europersquos Balkan fringe Balkan operations also exposed a number of weaknesses and gaps in Alliance capabilities

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

95

Moreover 911 the war on terrorism and the war in Afghanistan all involved a new adversary whose transnational character made it a potential threat to all but whose global location necessitated action outside the NATO area While NATO invoked Article 5 for the fi rst time in its history the day after the 911 attacks on the United States the Alliance was not initially involved in the war in Afghanistan However NATO has been directly involved in post-war security operations around Kabul and at the request of the UN took complete control of the security operation around Kabul in August 2003 The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been commanded by the SACEUR and conducted by Allied Command Operations (ACO) ever since and is in the process of deploying to locations outside of Kabul in the form of Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT) This was a signifi cant new out-of-area deployment for many European countries and for the Alliance

Third the 911 attacks and what was presumed at the time to be a potential threat of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq both focused NATO attention more squarely on the risk that hostile states or terrorist organizations might acquire such weapons and the means to deliver them on NATO territory As a result new impetus was given to the Alliancersquos planning for WMD operations and TMD programs

These major security developments brought renewed attention to defense spending and force planning in most of the major NATO allies including the new members from the former Warsaw Pact Persistent US and NATO pressure on allied defense budgets led to a small but important reversal of course in the trend toward declining budgets in the United Kingdom France Italy and the Netherlands and considerable soul-searching about defense budgets and plans in Germany

The new security issues have also intensifi ed European concern about acquiring more modern defense technology particularly transportation logistics and especially relevant to this study C4ISR Balkans operations stimulated the Europeans to engage in more European-level planning for peacekeeping and peacemaking operations as they exposed severe European shortcomings in communications equipment sensors for surveillance and reconnaissance and data fusion CRONOS NATOrsquos Windows-based information-sharing network developed for IFOR in Bosnia was infected with viruses While the United States and the United Kingdom could connect to CRONOS digitally the French and Germans had to use an analog interface which meant slower data rates Secure communications especially at the tactical level were also a problem while communications between aircraft had to be transmitted in the clear Interoperability was problematic a number of ISR systems were used including JSTARS Nimrod Breguet Atlantic Horizon and C-160 aircraft but they could not cross-transmit data ndash thus could not provide all allies with a common picture of the battlespace or transmit directly to strike aircraft Finally Europeans depended on intelligence derived from US surveillance and reconnaissance assets The United States met 95 per cent of the allied intelligence requirements in Kosovo but was slow to release data to coalition partners (Thomas 2000 43ndash53)

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

96

Combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have intensifi ed this need for greater European network-centric capability The progress made by the US since the fi rst Gulf War in agility mobility and information networking of its forces is increasingly clear European C4ISR capabilities are signifi cantly less capable Moreover despite having more than 2 million men and women under arms the European allies still have only a small expeditionary capability largely British and French forces The military missions of the future whether national European or transatlantic depend on a high state of readiness advanced logistics networked C4ISR and a high degree of fl exibility and agility Only US forces came close to meeting this test with the British and French trailing and the other allies far behind

The Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) was agreed on at the 1999 NATO Washington Summit with the goal of addressing these capability shortfalls The DCI identifi ed 58 key capability shortfalls needing investment and multi-national cooperation The shortfalls were divided into fi ve core areas mobility and deployability sustainability effective engagement (the ability to engage an adversary in all types of operations from high to low intensity) survivability (ability to protect forces and infrastructure against future threats) and interoperable communications However the DCI lacked a common strategic orientation provided few doctrinal and institutional links to the US force-transformation process set no priorities and failed to stimulate allied investment in force modernization (Gompert and Nerlich 2002 10)

The 2002 Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC) were adopted to address the DCIrsquos failure Initially PCC goals numbered more than 450 including over 100 commitments related to C2 and information systems far higher than the DCI number However NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson identifi ed eight as a priority focus given their link to expeditionary operations including in particular C3I The PCC particularly targeted the lack of deployable C2 facilities reconnaissance and surveillance assets common interoperable intelligence mechanisms and systems architecture and the shortfalls in the communications arena to link them together PCC were intended to provide a more measurable and reachable target for European force planning and acquisition Some progress has been made notably in strategic airlift and sealift Survivability has been improved with the creation of a chemical biological radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defense battalion under the leadership of the Czech Republic However in many areas related to network-based operations results have been more modest Even the highly successful Czech-led CBRN battalion is still struggling with problems related to communications and deployment

The Alliance took two other signifi cant actions in Prague with major implications for the future of the Alliance in the area of network-based capabilities the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the creation of Allied Command Transformation as part of a major restructuring of the NATO command structure NATOrsquos new command structure is built around a single Strategic Command for Operations at SHAPE in Belgium and three subordinate operational-level joint commands in the Netherlands Naples and Lisbon which are intended to be the parent

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

97

headquarters of three deployable CJTFs two land-based and one sea-based Both of these actions could provide signifi cant incentive for the Europeans to move toward enhanced C4ISR capabilities and greater interoperability with the United States military

Although NATO has a number of common force packages and headquarters under the CJTF label until Prague the Alliance lacked the capability to deploy a small agile and light intervention force with the dedicated transport logistics and communications capabilities such a force needs to sustain itself The NRF is intended to fi ll this gap This force would be highly ready available for out-of-area missions on short notice capable of forcible entry and able to establish a foothold as the point of the spear for a larger NATO ground force to follow In addition the force could do non-combatant evacuations support counterterrorism and assist with post-confl ict management

The NRF will consist of roughly 20000 troops plus naval and air capabilities drawn from the High Readiness Forces of the NATO members With lift logistics and network-capable equipment it could deploy within 5 days and be self-sustaining for 30 The NRF-designated forces would remain actively committed to this mission for a six-month period at which time a new set of forces would become the NRF package while the fi rst group stood down and returned to a lower state of readiness The force would train and exercise together during the highly ready period Because of its high state of readiness the Alliance could use the NRF more often than it might deploy its massive heavier slower capabilities (Binnendijk and Kugler 2002 117ndash32)

The NRF capability has a deeper signifi cance While it would be time-consuming and costly to overhaul all of European NATOrsquos current forces for more agile network-based capabilities the NRF rotation scheme provides an opportunity to cycle those forces through a period of training readiness and stand-down one unit at a time After two years it is hoped that the Europeans will provide the NRF with the ldquoenablersrdquo (lift C4ISR and logistics) currently supplied by the United States Training European forces for agile fl exible operations and equipping them with the enablers they need including networked C4ISR could over time convert existing European military capabilities to a more modern networked force For some supporters NRF constitutes an intense European upgrade program by stealth (Becher 2003 25)

It is not clear that all the allies agree with this vision of the NRF Not all are committed to cycle large elements of their land forces through the NRF and may choose instead to assign a smaller proportion of their forces to the NRF missions and cycle them at a higher rate Germany for example has decided to create three categories of forces only the most highly ready of which will cycle through for the NRF For some allies this approach avoids the expense of upgrading all forces to NRF missions and capabilities over time

For some European allies moreover the relationship between the NRF and the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) is unclear For some NRF is seen as a ldquolast chancerdquo to work with the US military on global military challenges and engage the United States with European defense planning For others investment

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

98

in the NRF is seen as competing with their commitment to the ERRF Though the Alliance view is that the two are compatible not all the allies agree This tension over rapid reaction force planning refl ects a broader uncertainty about the transatlantic defense planning relationship

There is also a difference of view over the role US forces will play in the NRF Europeans have a strong desire for the United States to participate directly in NRF training and exercising and for US forces to be fully integrated into the NRF American sources and initial exercises suggest that the US goal is for the NRF to become a predominantly European capability for rapid deployment which could link up with a separate interoperable American force However this lack of joint US training with the NRF could ultimately impede the ability of the United States and NATO Europe to operate together on the battlefi eld (Binnendijk 2004 3ndash8)

These differing views have implications for the C4ISR elements of the NRF In the all-European case C2 communications and sensoring assets could be entirely European as long as the technology allowed them to plug and play with the United States permitting the download of data interoperable communications and a common sense of the battlespace The US-engaged model could provide greater incentive for both forces to develop common equipment and software to ensure that the force could operate seamlessly

The NRF clearly constitutes a major new NATO commitment The fi rst test bed elements of the force were stood up only a year after Prague and have held several exercises Full NRF operating capability is expected by the summer of 2006 The early training and exercises will test C4ISR requirements and reveal shortfalls that could provide incentive for European investment in the C4ISR arena since the bulk of the C4ISR capability continues to be supplied by the US

The third Prague decision with important long-term implications for the transatlantic relationship in C4ISR is the restructuring of Alliance commands The NATO command structure has now been substantially revised with an Allied Command Operations in Europe and a new Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk VA with operations in Europe The creation of ACT combined with the change in NATO missions puts a premium on upgrades to NATOrsquos C2 and communications infrastructure (Barry 2003 4)

ACT is directly responsible for transformation activities in NATO It supports transformation planning provides lessons learned to national planners lobbies for NATO investment in network-centric programs writes doctrine for network-centric operations and develops educational materials for NATO training activities such as those conducted by the Joint Warfare Center in Norway It could play a central role in supporting and reviewing national investments in network-based capabilities and supporting the active C4I program of NC3A The commander of ACT is dual-hatted as the Joint Forces Commander of the United States positioning ACT as a bridge between US transformation and network-centric thinking and experimentation and European efforts (Forbes 2003 4) European military sources have shown a high degree of interest in ACT programs and activities seeking a high degree of participation ACT is positioned to be an important player in NATOrsquos planning processes It leads the Defense Planning Process

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

99

including the development of the Defense Requirements Review a classifi ed analytic assessment of the minimum military capabilities needed to meet the Alliancersquos goal of carrying out up to three major joint operations simultaneously ACT has also developed some 30 generic scenarios used to inventory capabilities ACTrsquos focus on qualitative force goals could help member nations develop crucial capabilities or force attributes rather than merely reaching quantitative goals

ACT also assesses national contributions to NATO in coordination with national military authorities In addition it has developed a Strategic Vision for transformation and is developing concepts for Allied Future Joint Operations As a part of its goal of driving transformation in the Alliance ACT has worked to establish relationships with other NATO agencies including the NC3A the NATO Undersea Research Center the Research and Technology Organization and the NATO Standardization Agency as well as NATOrsquos educational centers

ACT holds great promise provided its activities are given priority in Washington DC The priority the US plans to give to ACT remains to be tested In addition ACTrsquos role in the allied and US defense planning along with its ability to review national-level C4ISR programs is not yet clear It remains to be seen whether this institutional reform creates incentives both for European force transformation and for more intense transatlantic commitments to interoperability especially in C4ISR

NATO has taken steps since ACT to reinforce the commitment to network-based operations especially the creation of the NATO Network-Enabled Capabilities project In November 2002 the NC3B announced the intention of developing a NATO equivalent of the American NCW concept and the British NEC The fi rst step in this process will be a feasibility study examining the technical and organizational issues such a concept would involve in the NATO context Led by the NC3A with the support of ACT this feasibility study takes a European view of transformation using the terms ldquonetwork enabledrdquo and ldquocapabilitiesrdquo instead of the American ldquonetwork-centricrdquo and ldquowarfarerdquo

Rather than wait for a joint NATO agreement about the investment and organization of the NATO Network-Enabled Capabilities (NNEC) study nine NATO nations (Canada France Germany Italy the Netherlands Norway Spain the United Kingdom and the United States) agreed in November 2003 to jointly fund the study Each nation has agreed to contribute 150000 euros for a total of 1350000 euros The study has delivered a roadmap for NATO to guide the creation of a network-enabled capability for its 26 member nations This roadmap takes into account interoperability issues commercial and technology trends and relevant national assets (both existing and planned) The study covered how network-enabled capabilities can be deployed by the NRF and how national information ownership issues can be overcome With completion of the study in 2005 the NNEC concept was taken over by ACT and made part of the Commandrsquos long-term capability development requirements which in turn form the basis for future NATO procurement In addition ACT conducted two NNEC training courses in June and October of 2005 the second of which took place at the Commandrsquos new C2 Center of Excellence in the Netherlands

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

100

The 2004 Istanbul NATO Summit further stressed the Alliancersquos need to increase the deployability and usability of its forces and for continuing the transformation process already underway The fi nal communiqueacute mentioned in particular the streamlined command arrangements ndash including the establishment of ACT ndash the NRF and a commonly funded AGS program The summit also committed to a project to provide guidance on improving various NATO capabilities including operational planning and intelligence specifi cally for interoperable and deployable forces able to carry out operations and operate jointly in a complex security environment

Other multinational network programs

Outside of the NATO context several other international interoperability frameworks have been established with the aim of achieving better C4ISR coordination between the United States and its allies These are working toward common military standards for equipment fi elded by allied forces including some NATO countries as well as Australia and New Zealand They include the American British Canadian Australian Armiesrsquo Standardization Program (ABCA) the Air Standardization Coordinating Committee (ASCC) the Australian Canadian New Zealand United Kingdom and United States Naval C4 Organization (AUSCANNZUKUS) the Combined Communications Electronics Board (CCEB) the Multilateral Interoperability Program (MIP) and the Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) Another forum known as The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP) is not a military standardization forum but maintains close relationships with the other above-mentioned programs to coordinate the defense RampD efforts of Australia Canada New Zealand the United Kingdom and the United States Of all the above-mentioned interoperability entities the MIC and the MIP are the only ones to include European countries other than the United Kingdom

The Multinational Interoperability Council

In 1996 Australia Canada France Germany the United Kingdom and the United States create the MIC to provide oversight of coalition interoperability and stimulate improvements among the countries most likely and most capable of leading future coalitions Initially referred to as the Six Nation Council the name was changed to the MIC in 1999 Later the member states granted New Zealand and NATO ACT observer status and in 2005 accepted Italy as the Councilrsquos seventh member

The MIC is administered through the US Joint Staffrsquos Deputy Director for Global Operations (J3 DDGO) to provide a multinational senior level forum for addressing the core issues affecting information interoperability between coalition forces It is concerned with policies doctrines operational planning and networking capabilities relevant to the information sharing capabilities of member states It also serves as the senior coordinating body for the member nations in

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

101

resolving interoperability issues and promotes dialogue between operational planners C4ISR technology experts and defense policy analysts involved in coalition operations

MIC membership includes senior operations doctrine and C4ISR experts from each of the member nations It is divided into Multinational Interoperability Working Groups (MIWG) each of which explores specifi c problems in coalition interoperability and proposes solutions There is no fi xed number of MIWGs they are created when problems have been identifi ed and disbanded after their work is done Each MIWG is comprised of representatives from the member nations from various services and agencies according to the needs of the group An Executive Support Committee (EXECOM) assists the MIWGs in addressing actions in a timely fashion when it is not possible to convene a meeting of the entire MIWG The Committee includes a representative of each member nationrsquos defense attacheacute staff in Washington a member of the Working Group on National Correlation and the MIC Executive Secretary (a member of the US Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I)

Currently the MIC has MIWGs that focus on coalition warfare doctrine collabo-rative planning advanced C2 concepts requirements for information exchange and the sharing of classifi ed intelligence secure video- and tele-conferencing and the creation of a combined Wide Area Network known as GRIFFIN The fi ve existing MIWGs cover operations networking logistics doctrines plans and procedures and concept development and experimentation Additionally there is a Capstone MIWG in charge of formulating the MICrsquos strategic plan for the future

MIWGs generally meet twice a year Once they propose a solution it is passed on to the MIC which meets annually to respond and passes its recommendations on to the member nations The organization cannot do more than advise and report its recommendations may or may not eventually be accepted by the member nations The MIC also produces an annual report on policy doctrine and planning for warfi ghting interoperability NATOrsquos doctrine on coalition operations is an important guide for the MIC on this matter

MIC reports to date have concentrated on lessons learned from coalition warfare exercises specifi cally East Timor and Afghanistan on the need for better information sharing applications between the member countries including secure tele-conferencing video-conferencing and e-mail and on a Coalition-Building Guide The latter signed by the members in 2005 identifi es the notion of a coalition Lead Nation defi ned as ldquothat nation with the will and capability competence and infl uence to provide the essential elements of political consultation and military leadership to coordinate the planning mounting and execution of a coalition military operationrdquo (Multinational Interoperability Council 2005 v) France has expressed concern about this defi nition suggesting that circumstances may dictate the need for several Lead Nations in an operation It also requested with German support that the Guide state that only the United Nations can act to sanction coalition actions a request that is not yet refl ected in the fi nal version presented in 2002

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

102

The MIC has also coordinated four Multinational Experiments (MNE) intended to contribute to the interoperability between member nations The fi rst such exercise undertaken in 2001 examined how a combined joint force headquarters would conduct rapid decisive operations within a distributed collaborative information environment with coalition partners MNE2 examined the development of a multinational operational net assessment as well as coalition multinational information sharing MNE3 in February 2004 explored concepts and supporting tools for effects-based operations and to assist the development of future processes organizations and technologies at the operational and joint task force levels of command It also included NATO participation and evaluated the ability of the NRF to support the planning of a coalition effects-based campaign The fourth and fi nal MNE addresses effects-based operations and C2 issues While some view the MIC and its exercises as key tools for France Germany Italy and the United Kingdom to improve interoperability with the US it is not clear how other countries not involved in this forum will benefi t from its lessons (Boyer 2004)

The Combined Communications Electronics Board

The CCEB includes Australia Canada New Zealand the United Kingdom and the United States It coordinates issues related to military communications raised by a member nation Its origins date back to the Combined Communications Board created during the Second World War which defi ned combined UK-US communications policies with Canada Australia and New Zealand as observers Canada became a full member in 1951 Australia in 1969 and New Zealand in 1972 when it was renamed CCEB Germany and France recently sought membership in this organization but both were denied

The CCEBrsquos mission is to maximize the effectiveness of combined operations by defi ning a common environment in which users can share and apply collective information and know-how Although covering all C4 systems of the member nations the CCEB does not own any of them Rather it seeks to defi ne architectures standards and operational procedures that its members will adopt when designing and modifying their national systems As much as possible these will be based on commercial standards and products Over time implementing the CCEBrsquos recommendations should improve interoperability and eventually create a virtual single system used by all members Adopting these standards is voluntary however which means that interoperability will be advanced only if the nations make the decision to implement the CCEB-developed standards

The CCEBrsquos one permanent full-time member of staff the Permanent Secretary coordinates the organizationrsquos daily activities All other personnel are drawn from national organizations on a part-time temporary basis Member nations contribute resources individually to specifi c tasks The senior C4 offi cials or Principals appointed to the CCEB by the member nations are in charge of formulating the organizationrsquos broader goals and of bringing them into national decision-making bodies An Executive Group coordinates the development of policies and plans

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

103

formulated by the Principals and prioritizes tasks In addition the member nationrsquos representatives in Washington DC may be tasked individually to work on CCEB assignments as may staff members at national headquarters

The majority of the CCEBrsquos work is undertaken under the auspices of Working Groups which consider specifi c issues raised by member nations Currently Working Groups are in place to discuss information security frequency planning directory services wide area networks (specifi cally the GRIFFIN WAN) and communications publications In addition Task Forces may be established to address specifi c short-term issues one currently deals with secure military messaging

In September 2001 the CCEB and the MIC signed a Statement of Cooperation (SOC) under which the CCEB is recognized as the expert technical body on C4 systems while the MIC is recognized as responsible for providing leadership in joint and coalition warfare doctrine and requirements Since the CCEBrsquos aim is to defi ne a joint and combined C4 interoperability environment and to enhance interoperability among C4 systems the SOC ensures that this goal is coordinated with efforts for developing doctrines and solutions brought forward by the MIC for information sharing between countries Equally important the SOC enables non-CCEB members of the MIC ndash Germany Italy and France ndash to participate in those CCEB groups directly involved in MIC-directed activities and to receive status updates on CCEB activities at MIC meetings In addition the SOC has also led to some technical MIC work being subcontracted to the CCEB

The Multilateral Interoperability Program

In April 1998 Canada France Germany Italy the United Kingdom and the United States created the MIP merging two existing programs the BIP (Battlefi eld Interoperability Program) and the QIP (Quadrilateral Interoperability Program) both of which were aimed at improving interoperability between land C2 systems In 2002 the MIP merged with the Army Tactical Command and Control Information System (ATCCIS) program which had been working since 1980 on technical standards and specifi cations for NATO membersrsquo C2 systems to make them interoperable

In November 2003 24 nations (Canada Denmark France Germany Italy the Netherlands Norway Spain Turkey the United Kingdom and the United States as full members and Australia Austria Belgium Bulgaria the Czech Republic Finland Greece Hungary Lithuania Poland Romania Slovenia and Sweden as associate members) and two NATO commands (ACT and AFNORTH which today is Joint Force Command Brunssum) signed a Statement of Intent to advance international interoperability of land C2 systems at all levels from corps to battalion to support multinational combined and joint operations This goal is to be achieved through a technical interoperability solution or baseline that could be integrated into membersrsquo existing C2 infrastructures However the program would not actually develop a common C2 system leaving it to the membersrsquo discretion to accept the technical solution

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

104

The MIP solution has two technical aspects a common data model known as the Command and Control Information Exchange Data Model (C2IEDM) and a set of procedures and protocols that allow the replication of data among different C2 systems known as the MIP Data Exchange Mechanism (MIPDEM) Countries that incorporate this solution into their C2 systems can share any information they choose with other nationsrsquo C2 systems over any means of communication available The British Canadian Danish French German Italian Dutch Norwegian Portuguese Spanish and US armiesrsquo C2 systems have to date been certifi ed as MIP conformant and more are expected to follow

In 2004 NATO adopted the MIPrsquos C2IEDM data model which signifi ed the increasing importance and acceptation of the MIP as a standard-setting entity It seems increasingly likely that the MIP solution will have a signifi cant infl uence on the development and design of future national systems These solutions however are not ldquoplug-and-playrdquo solutions In order to ensure true semantic interoperability far-reaching modifi cations to the core of national C2 information systems are necessary rather than just the addition of mapping adapters as new interfaces to the existing systems (Schmitt 2005 2)

The Combined Endeavor exercises

As another multilateral effort the Headquarters of the US European Command (EUCOM) sponsors and coordinates a multinational command control communications and computer (C4) exercise known as Combined Endeavor Its aim is to develop C2 and communications interoperability in preparation for crisis response operations by testing and documenting solutions that may then be integrated into national systems The exercise has been held every year since 1995 each builds on the capabilities demonstrated and lessons learned during the previous one The exercises also include demonstrations of emerging C4 technologies developed by a nation or group of nations that may in the future contribute to coalition interoperability solutions

Combined Endeavor has grown from its fi rst exercise in 1995 That exercise included some 3300 interoperability tests conducted by 10 participating nations during a 2-week period in Germany and Austria In 2005 the exercise included 43 partner nations and 2 multinational organizations (NATO and the South East Europe Brigade) all testing advanced systems and networks The 2005 exercise included over 15000 interoperability tests including a 1-gigabyte core communications backbone between several nodes used to transmit voice video and data A Combined Joint Communications Coordination Center was stood up to demonstrate the effectiveness of network management procedures for multinational networks The 2005 exercise also put all participating nations through the US and NATO network security accreditation process prior to connecting to the network demonstrating the capability to build a protected coalition network a signifi cant achievement in the fi eld of information assurance

At the end of each exercise the results are documented in an interoperability guide that codifi es the results from all interoperability tests down to the level

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

105

of wiring diagrams for specifi c systems This information is crucial to planning future multinational network-based operations It enables forces to plug and play based on proven results Interoperability solutions that have emerged from past Combined Endeavor exercises have been used to support military peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations in the Balkans Kosovo Afghanistan Iraq Indonesia and Liberia

The Combined Endeavor exercise is an important tool for highlighting the benefi ts of networks in modern security operations Participants observe fi rst-hand how advanced C4 capabilities can make them more interoperable and thus more effective in a multinational environment By involving not only EU and NATO members but also allies from other regions such as South Africa and Central Asia the importance of networking C4 and coalition interoperability is conveyed to a wide array of potential coalition partners

Conclusion

As an organization NATO has clearly moved strongly to advance the Alliancersquos C4ISR capabilities into the twenty-fi rst century and has taken multiple steps to incentivize its members to move in this direction While the traditional NATO force planning methods do not yet fully support this effort the decision to create the NRF could constitute a major step toward a transformed capability NATO common programs for C2 and communications including space communications are being modernized Several new RampT investment programs hold promise for a move toward a more integrated C2 communications and sensor data architecture including ACCS AGS TMD and CAESAR Finally the Prague decisions (PCC NRF and ACT) all could help redefi ne alliance capabilities and restructure European member state investments

This is however a more fragile trend than it appears Should US force planning and investment continue to be largely unilateral conducted outside the Alliance framework the transatlantic C4ISR gap will be harder to bridge In 2002 for example John Stenbit then Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command Control Communications and Intelligence suggested this might be a preferred US policy noting that interoperability is ldquobest thought of in bilateral and multilateral relations not alliancesrdquo He added that ldquothe dynamics of how these communities of interest are going to form and un-form and around which changing sets of parameters are quicker than the processes that NATO considers when looking forwardrdquo (Stenbit 2002 85ndash92)

For NATO to continue to play a key role in the process of reshaping European C4ISR capabilities the US will need to put interoperability at the center of its C4ISR planning process which is not currently the case NATO interoperability features in US equipment designs tend to be removed when programs are trimmed to meet budget constraints and the key performance parameter now included in most American systems is interoperability within US forces not with NATO (Barry 2003 9) The US will need to give ACT priority as the bridge to European capabilities US funding decisions with respect to ACCS AGS or TMD can either

NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NBCs

106

strengthen or weaken efforts to create a common European C4ISR architecture The US staying at the margin of the NRF could also undermine European willingness to invest seriously in that effort A US decision to delay diminish or cancel the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter which has signifi cant transatlantic participation could have a major impact on the willingness of the European allies to commit to common programs Finally continuing US unwillingness to reform its export control and technology transfer rules will weaken the incentive European allies have to commit to transatlantic collaborative technology programs inside or outside NATO

There could also be trends in European policies that weaken the role of NATO in enhancing transatlantic C4ISR interoperability and the move toward networked capabilities While the European Unionrsquos defense activities (discussed in the next chapter) are not as advanced as the changes in NATO if the EU moves toward a vision and capabilities that are separate from NATO it could undermine the NATO effort There are important positive reasons for the Europeans to create more autonomous European capabilities but it will also be important to manage the evolution of the EU-NATO relationship so progress can continue in both frameworks Furthermore whether through the European Union or NATO a failure to provide adequate European investment in C4ISR or to continue funding for PCC priorities and ACCS AGS and TMD programs could weaken the NATO effort and interoperability in general Finally national investments in Europe need to give continued priority to interoperability within Europe and across the Atlantic for the effort to succeed

In addition to NATO the US and the Europeans need to be sure to rationalize and give appropriate attention to work in the other multinational frameworks that address specifi c areas of C4ISR interoperability All of the frameworks discussed in this chapter involve the United States as a key participant and place great emphasis on transatlantic interoperability issues However with the exception of the MIC and the MIP none involve European partners other than the United Kingdom The MIC analyzes policies doctrines and procedures for coalition interoperability and the MIP with a much broader membership base is limited to specifi c command and control solutions for land forces Neither deals with technical solutions to broad interoperability challenges Furthermore the denial of membership to France and Germany could set back transatlantic collaboration on standards architectures and protocols for interoperability between national C4ISR systems This leaves two of the three European militaries currently capable of executing out-of-area security operations outside the interoperability loop

107

5

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NETWORK-BASED

CAPABILITIES

Defense and security issues have emerged as a major concern for the European Union over the past decade stimulated and accelerated by the lessons Europeans have learned from the interoperability diffi culties experienced by European forces operating in the fi rst Gulf War Bosnia the Kosovo air campaign Afghanistan and Iraq Most of these lessons involve obstacles to achieving successful C4ISR interoperability

Increasingly major European militaries feel the need for a common rapid deployment military capability that can operate autonomously using its own dedicated equipment transport and C4ISR or borrowing NATO assets Slowly steps are being taken to make this intention a reality including internal developments in the European Union and the negotiation of the ldquoBerlin Plusrdquo agreement with NATO which gives the European Union recourse to NATO assets to carry out crisis management operations when NATO is not involved

During 2003ndash4 the European Union took signifi cant strides forward in developing operational capability and conducting strategic defense planning It conducted independent policing operations in Bosnia a military peacekeeping mission in Macedonia and a small peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Operation Artemis in the Congo became a model for the creation of the EU Battlegroups one year later (see below) In December 2004 the European Union Force (EUFOR) replaced the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) as the peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina

In the area of strategic defense planning the European Council decided in 2004 to focus on defense planning outside the framework of its Constitution discussion and accelerated the establishment of a European-level agency responsible for armaments policy and oversight on the capabilities process The European Union also announced the Headline Goal 2010 which builds on the Helsinki Headline Goal expanding and deepening EU commitments to strengthen its military and civilian capabilities with a strong emphasis on interoperability deployability and sustainability In the same year the Council announced a plan to create 13 EU Battlegroups at the Military Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels

The failure to ratify the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands has not impeded progress towards these improved European defense capabilities It seems clear the many of the EU members are seeking ways to participate more

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

108

effectively in overseas military operations including combat peacekeeping and post-confl ict reconstruction both autonomously and in coalition with the United States regardless of the uncertainties of the EU constitutional process Such operations will require new assets for rapid force deployment and especially systems that will enable these forces to collect intelligence share it amongst themselves and with headquarters and act upon it in a coordinated manner

EU strategic defense plans and capabilities

European-level strategic thinking and defense planning have made signifi cant strides since the Maastricht treaty was signed in 1991 (Adams 2001a) Initially European militaries and defense budgets shrank with the end of the Cold War as they did in the United States Several changes marked turning points for Europe The Maastricht Treaty committed the European Unionrsquos Members States to forging a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and created the Second Pillar in the European Union involving political and security issues The European Council ndash representing the Member States ndash would handle this on an intergovernmental basis The Treaty of Amsterdam which came into force in 1999 went a step further defi ning the CFSP as ldquoincluding the progressive framing of a common defense policy hellip which might lead to a common defenserdquo (European Union 2002 Article 1-12-4)

The European Rapid Reaction Force and the Battlegoups

In 1999 the European Council meeting in Cologne set a European Union goal of having the capacity for independent action in the form of capable military forces and the means to use these forces in response to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO That same year in Helsinki the European Council crafted an EU Headline Goal to create a force of 50000ndash60000 troops that could be deployed within 60 days and supported in theater for a year The mission of this force would be what was called the Petersberg tasks humanitarian and rescue missions peacekeeping and operations of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking This range of missions was defi ned at a WEU declaration made in Petersberg Germany in June 1992 and was codifi ed in the Amsterdam Treaty

To oversee this work the European Union created the Political and Security Committee The PSC would consider and act on foreign policy and security issues and manage crisis interventions The Union also created a Military Committee consisting of senior offi cers from the Member States which has responsibility for military planning and a Military Staff of roughly 150 based in Brussels to examine and shape military requirements for the Headline Goal force

The European Union then inventoried European national military capabilities relevant to the Headline Goal and set objectives to meet inventory shortfalls held Capability Improvement Conferences to track commitments and created the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) with nationally-led working groups

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

109

to develop strategies for meeting key shortfalls At the Laeken Belgium meeting in December 2002 the Council declared that the European Union had achieved the capability to conduct some crisis management operations The European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) that emerged from this Headline Goal process is committed to missions that are somewhat different from those defi ned for the NATO Response Force The NRF is intended to be lighter and more rapidly deployable for early arrival in out-of-area missions while the ERRF is largely intended for humanitarian and peacekeeping missions

This distinction between the Petersberg tasks and high-intensity combat has been a gray area in the European defense discussion To some supporters the European Unionrsquos ERRF was distinct from a European high-intensity network-based military capability while to others the higher end of the Petersberg tasks overlapped with high intensity combat and would require a network-based capability

With respect to C4ISR and network-based operations this distinction may not be signifi cant Any EU force that is intended to operate on a coalition basis will require C2 systems that cover the entire force Whether it is heavy and slow or light and mobile the utility of ISR systems for the total force is unarguable The European Unionrsquos review of capabilities and the goals being set clearly point toward more network-centric forces Moreover while the European Union can make use of both national (currently German British and French possibly Greek and Italian in the near future) and NATO operational headquarters (the latter under the Berlin Plus agreement) for controlling its missions these assets are not mobile European military planners are aware that a future ERRF would need dedicated mobile C2 and communications systems to deploy in the fi eld

The European Unionrsquos ability to deploy small and effective response forces has been further enhanced by a separate EU decision to create smaller mobile Battlegroups This decision began with a 2003 Franco-British agreement according to which they would encourage the European Union to develop a capability that could respond more rapidly than the emerging ERRF with particular attention to the readiness deployability interoperability and sustainability of such a force This goal was further elaborated in London in November 2003 the objective being a 1500-person EU force built on the model of Operation Artemis which could deploy in 15 days with appropriate transportation and sustainability

Increasingly offi cials working on the European Constitution realized that the Headline Goal force would only get part of the way toward the objective of rapid reaction and out-of-area operations (European Union 2003) The text of the European Unionrsquos draft constitution pointed toward a more ambitious European security strategy The fi nal report of the Conventionrsquos working group on defense called not only for the Headline Goal force but also for ldquosmaller rapid response elements with very high readinessrdquo including C2 intelligence and reconnaissance (European Convention Working Group ndash Defense 2002 5) The working group also recommended that the Petersberg tasks be updated and broadened to include confl ict prevention joint disarmament operations military advice and assistance post-confl ict stabilization and support for anti-terrorism operations in non-

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

110

European Union countries It urged Members States to implement more intense defense cooperation than that provided for in the Headline Goal force (European Convention Working Group ndash Defense 2002 23ndash4)

The 2004 Constitutional Treaty itself repeated many of these themes It amended the Petersberg tasks to include joint disarmament operations humanitarian and rescue missions provision of military advice and assistance confl ict prevention and peacekeeping crisis management peacemaking and post-confl ict stabilization It also tasked the proposed European Armaments Research and Military Capabilities Agency ndash todayrsquos European Defense Agency ndash with helping to identify the military capability objectives of the Member States and evaluate them (European Union 2004)

At the November 2004 EU Military Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels the members moved even further announcing the intention to create EU Battlegroups each numbering 1500 ground troops These will be smaller in scope than the ERRF but are intended to correct some of its shortcomings especially the need for more rapid deployment The Battlegroups are planned to reach the theater of operations in 15 days and sustain an operation for 30 days (120 days with rotation) France the UK and Italy each pledged to have one operational Battlegroup ready by the end of 2005 Ten other Battlegroups will be developed collaboratively by different combinations of EU Member States and one will include Norway a non-EU member These Battlegroups are intended to be operational by 2007 by which time the European Union should be able to undertake two concurrent Battlegroup-sized rapid response operations

The European Defense Agency

The constitutional discussion focused particular attention on the need for a more focused EU capability to deal with military requirements the evolution of capabilities to meet those requirements and the readiness of the European defense industrial and technology base to cope with those needs The Convention recommended the creation of a European Armaments and Strategic Research Agency to track progress toward the interoperability and force readiness necessary to accomplish the wider missions they were promoting (European Convention Working Group ndash Defense 2002 23ndash4) In 2003 this particular proposal was advanced on a separate track largely supported by French and British government policies The EU Council of Ministers decided to ask the Council staff to plan the implementation of the European Defense Agency well ahead of the schedule for ratifying and implementing the proposals for a new EU constitutional charter The mission of the agency was elaborated in detail in November 2003 including operational requirements strengthening the defense industrial and technological base defi ning a European capabilities and armaments policy and helping the Council evaluate the improvement of military capabilities

The Council decision created an Agency Establishment Team under High Representative Javier Solana to present proposals by April 2004 for decisions in June Those proposals were intended to move the EDA issue onto a fast track

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

111

covering the structure and organization of the agency its internal working methods its working relationship with the Council and the Commission ties with the Organization Conjoint pour la Cooperation en Matiere drsquoArmament (OCCAR) and the Western European Union (WEU) RampD programs (see below) its budget administration and staffi ng It was also to outline a fi rst operational program for the agency in the fi elds of capabilities development armaments cooperation industrial and technology base policy research promotion and potential plans for creating a European defense market

The Establishment Team of 12 led by British civil servant Nick Witney began work in February 2004 Its proposals moved toward creating a relatively small agency directed by a steering committee of ministers of defense and funded by joint contributions to an administrative fund They discussed creating a second funding arrangement in the European Union for defense RampT studies and only the gradual absorption of existing multilateral procurement activities such as OCCAR (Tigner 2004 4)

The Agency came into existence in the summer of 2004 Despite a modest 2005 budget of 25 million euros and a staff of 78 the EDA has made important progress in the fi rst year particularly in areas relevant to network-based operations Two ldquofl agship projectsrdquo have been initiated in the C4ISR realm The fi rst undertaken by the Agencyrsquos RampT Directorate funds projects related to long-endurance UAVs (described later in this chapter) The second headed by the Capabilities Directorate seeks to improve European capabilities and interoperability in command control and communications

Initially a joint EDA-EU Military Staff study identifi ed a wide range of C3I capability gaps Many were characterized as ldquoderiving from the absence of any detailed assessment of overall C3 requirements for ESDP or coherent architectures for satisfying themrdquo (Council of the European Union 2005 4) The study also highlighted the potential of software-defi ned radio for C3 interoperability and submitted a detailed proposal for pursuing additional C3 work to the Capabilities Steering Board While the overall direction of EDArsquos C3I agenda is still evolving it is likely to include specifi c problems in ongoing EU operations (such as Operation Althea in Bosnia) and the needs of the emerging Battlegroups In addition the agenda may explore improvements in EU procurement of satellite bandwidth for future operations (House of Lords 2005 21)

Focusing on capabilities

Despite these recent developments there is not currently a joint multinational force at the European level that can fi eld common C4ISR assets and carry out fully network-based operations It is not yet clear whether the Member States will commit the resources needed to upgrade and integrate the national capabilities already described Despite the budgetary constraints that make such a capability diffi cult there is an active process underway at the European level to give Member States the incentive to modernize and transform forces and equipment to make them more interoperable

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

112

The Headline Goal and the European Capabilities Action Plan have identifi ed capability shortfalls and set priorities for meeting them The initial Headline Goal and evaluation processes through 2001 identifi ed 19 critical shortfalls and a process for meeting shortfalls The ECAP panels each chaired by a Member State include eight capabilities relevant to network-based operations UAVs for surveillance and target acquisition deployable communications modules headquarters theater surveillance and reconnaissance air picture strategic ISR IMINT collection HALEMALE UAVs early warning and distant detection at the strategic level

This fi rst stage of the ECAP process led to reports submitted in March 2003 proposing changes to national contributions or new acquisitions to fi ll the capability gaps The May 2003 Capabilities Conference then identifi ed ten groups to develop strategies for fi lling key shortfalls through acquisition leasing multinational projects or role specialization three of which deal with C4ISR capabilities headquarters (United Kingdom lead) UAVs (French lead) and space-based assets (French lead)

The weakness of the ECAP process is that it is voluntary and not clearly linked to funding decisions or coordinated with the EU Military Staff The ECAP groups could not design long-term procurement plans as national planners and procurement specialists were not members Proposed acquisitions faced major political and fi nancial hurdles Moreover ECAP was designed in the context of the Headline Goal target and was not linked to the rapid deployment Battlegroups discussed above The European Council decided in November 2003 to tighten the process develop a clear roadmap and begin to identify objectives timelines and reporting procedures for each group

Progress has been made since with respect to headquarters medical treatment facilities and nuclear chemical and biological defenses However the ECAP process continues to lack clear leadership and coordination The ECAP approach leaves it up to the Member States to decide when and how additional capabilities should be acquired and makes it diffi cult to achieve results in areas that require signifi cant fi nancial investments such as strategic lift and air-to-air refueling

Pressure on the members was increased by requiring them to set goals and timelines and to publish their results in regular Capability Improvement Charts presented during each rotating EU Presidency Progress remains minimal however particularly in areas relevant for network-based operations There are currently no new or planned projects growing out of the ECAP process and a number of the ECAP Project Groups have indicated that they have reached or are close to reaching the maximum possible results within the current framework

In May 2005 the European Council approved an EDAEU Military Committee evaluation report on the ECAP The report included a detailed review of the ECAP Project Groups and suggested refocusing their work in the framework of the 2010 Headline Goal The Project Group on interoperability for humanitarian and evacuation operations will be discontinued while those on Special Forces and helicopters will continue in their present format All others will be incorporated into a new more integrated process coordinated by the European Defense Agency

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

113

in the framework of broader European Security and Defense Policy goals Under newly established Integrated Development Teams military technological and industrial representatives will generate specifi c projects to fulfi ll capability shortfalls Together with the newly outlined Headline Goal 2010 this revised process may provide incentives for Member States to reaffi rm their ECAP commitments

Industrial base planning

Over the past 15 years the national governments and Commission of the European Union have taken several steps to advance the issue of a Europe-wide armaments policy to match the emerging force requirements and to ensure a healthy industrial and technology base The creation of the EDArsquos Industry and Market Directorate is the latest such step

From the perspective of the defense industrial and technology base the Europeans have three options for arming national or cross-national forces with particular attention to their interoperability They could acquire advanced defense technology from the United States which was common during the Cold War Buying American however is increasingly unattractive to European governments given the lack of reciprocal access for European fi rms to the US defense market the diffi culties encountered with US export control and technology transfer regulations and processes and the negative impact it would have on the smaller European industrial and technology base (Adams 2001b 30ndash4)

The second option is to develop defense systems and technologies on a transatlantic basis US trade and technology transfer rules make this diffi cult though the European industry is pursuing this option as the strategic partnership of EADS and Northrop Grumman and the Thales Raytheon Systems joint venture suggest However European fi rms and governments have been concerned that their smaller fi rms could be swallowed up by larger American partners and about the risk that technology would fl ow only one way from Europe to the United States

The third option is for Europeans to strengthen their own defense industrial and technology base to be able to supply their own defense technology independently of the United States as well as to build partnerships with ndash and create competition for ndash US companies There has been growing support in Europe for this third option To sustain a European defense industrial and technology base however requires removing the intra-European barriers to industry relations technology transfer defense trade and cross-national acquisition The policy developments of the past decade at the European level are slowly defi ning a more trans-European defense market The most important change has been the development of multilateral institutions and processes that facilitate a trans-European defense market and cooperative defense procurement The creation of the European Defense Agency could be a critical breakthrough empowering the European Union to become a player in armaments policy a role previously constrained by the terms of the European Union treaties (Schmitt 2003a 2003b)

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

114

The emergence of a European armaments market and matching policy is likely to be critical to the prospects for success in the ECAP and in the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) The harmonization of military requirements the standardization of equipment to meet those requirements the elimination of acquisition and research redundancies budgetary savings and greater interoperability could all fl ow from this development Efforts to create a defense industrial policy at the EU level to harmonize rules governing requirements and defense trade to create a framework for cross-European defense acquisition programs and to create EU-level structures that can deal with arms market policies will all contribute to reaching these goals

This industrial and technology base process has been underway for nearly a decade but progress has been marked in recent years In 1996 France Germany Italy and the United Kingdom created a Joint Armaments Cooperation Organiza-tion (known by its French acronym OCCAR for Organization Conjoint pour la Cooperation en Matiere drsquoArmament) to manage specifi c cross-European defense programs including the HOT Roland and Milan missiles the Tiger helicopter and recently the A400M transport aircraft OCCAR is based on intergovernmental agreements and has been restricted to joint production programs not research and development Although OCCAR is not an EU entity as interest has grown in an EU-level armaments policy other European Union members have joined (Belgium) or intend to do so (Spain Netherlands Sweden) The organization achieved independent legal status in 2001

In 1998 the six largest arms producing countries (United Kingdom France Germany Sweden Italy and Spain) signed a Letter of Intent (LOI) to address jointly a number of areas of policy that would facilitate a more trans-European defense market for European industry The LOI process which follows a Framework Agreement announced in 2001 covers security of defense supply export control processes security of information military research and technology technical information and harmonization of military requirements This process is also outside the European Union framework and clearly intergovernmental it creates no new European-level structures or organizations The goal is to make national rules and procedures in these areas compatible with each other not to harmonize all standards or policies Though the process is slow and laborious it does put the national bureaucracies of six countries into a working process with each other in an effort to defi ne policies that will integrate the European defense market

Interest in armaments policy has also developed inside the European Union itself Article 296 of the Amsterdam Treaty provides that ldquoany Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or the trade in arms munitions and war materialrdquo (European Commission 2004 6) European Union members referred to this Article for years to protect national industrial and technology base decisions from being part of the EU agenda In 1995 however the EU Council of Ministers took a limited fi rst step toward addressing these concerns creating a working group on Armaments Policy (POLARM) POLARM

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

115

activity remained limited until the early 2000s when a broader interest in this policy area emerged in Europe (Schmitt 2003b 32)

The European Commission the EUrsquos supranational secretariat has also had an interest in armaments policy despite the reluctance of the members to become more active in this area Since 2000 the Commission has had direct authority over dual-use export controls in the European Union though national governments continue to defi ne the contents of the control list through negotiations and retain authority over purely military exports The Commission has also begun trying to shape broader armaments and defense market policies (European Commission 1997 2003a) and has also encouraged private sector activities that would support the emergence of a stronger European Union policy in this area (European Commission 2002) The Commission also plays a more direct role in the area of dual-use space programs such as Galileo as discussed in the next chapter

The Commission has been particularly concerned with the question of how to enhance interoperability The STAR 21 report sponsored by the Commission in 2002 focused on the goal of enhancing European interoperability both in the EU and NATO contexts and ensuring European autonomy from the United States if needed The report pointed out that to be interoperable with the US or act autonomously EU military requirements needed to he harmonized and RampD shared at a European level (European Commission 2002 29ndash30) The Commissionrsquos 2003 communication on armaments policy argued strongly for a ldquogenuine European Defense Equipment Marketrdquo to provide economies of scale greater acquisition bargaining power and especially to meet the needs of interoperability To achieve interoperability in a cost-effective way the Commission argued ldquothe solution would be to equip the national units that make up these forces increasingly with the same equipmentrdquo (European Commission 2003a 6)

Progress toward a coherent EU policy on armaments and greater interoperability and modern C4ISR across European forces will be slow at the European level The European Defense Agency will play a critical role defi ning capabilities goals more broadly than the Headline Goal devoting attention to network-centric C4ISR capabilities supporting research efforts to support those goals encouraging national governments to realign their budgets to acquire key technologies and systems coordinating national acquisitions and providing a central point for the realignment of the European defense market The EDA authority remains limited but over time it could develop the capabilities needed to perform these tasks at the European level as other EU-level policy institutions have done in the past

The EU process is largely an intergovernmental one and has led to relatively slow policy change The Member States will inevitably restrain EDArsquos activity To be fully effective it will need greater autonomy and a larger budget The linkages between its capabilities functions its evaluation functions its research support and its procurement functions will need to be clarifi ed The relationship with the Commission which manages its own armaments research policy process and has explicit responsibilities for industrial research competition and trade policy will need to be carefully defi ned Harmonizing its relationship with the

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

116

non-EU processes and organizations ndash OCCAR and the LOI ndash will be complex But the fi rst steps toward greater European-level responsibilities for defense and armaments policy have clearly been taken

Defense research and technology programs

The European defense research and technology investment and harmonization of national RampT investments will be key to achieving greater interoperability and networked forces without major additional budget expenditures The United States outspends the European NATO allies by a ratio of 51 on total defense RampD a ratio that has grown with the increases in US defense budgets in the early 2000s The United States RampT investment has also explicitly focused on network-centric technologies military transformation and C4ISR By contrast European RampT investments remain largely national duplicative and poorly coordinated across national boundaries making the total less than the sum of its parts

The general view in Europe is that most EU Member States underspend on research and development In 2002 the European Council set a goal of spending three per cent of GDP on RampD in each Member State by 2010 At current growth rates the EU average will reach only 23 per cent by that year Only two European countries Sweden and Finland currently spend above the 3 per cent target and the European Union average is still just under 2 per cent (compared to 27 per cent in the United States) (European Commission 2003c 48 52) In defense RampD the trend is even less promising In 2001 the Member States of the European Union spent slightly over $9 billion on defense-related RampD or 75 per cent of the average defense budget (compared with almost 14 per cent of the US defense budget in the same year) (Adams et al 2004 122)

Article 296 of the Amsterdam Treaty has made it diffi cult for the European Commission to address the RampD problem restricting Commission action to cases where trade policies or dual-use RampD investments distorted the operations of the civilian common market Moreover due to the sensitivity of the issue for some Member States the Commission intervened reluctantly and slowly As a result defense research and technology investments have remained a domain for the Member States with relatively little cooperation in the EU context (James and Gummett 1998)

The Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) program of the WEU has been a major exception at the European-level WEAG was created when the WEU absorbed the Independent European Program Group (IEPG) which between 1976 and 1992 had acted as an armaments procurement cooperation forum for all of the European NATO countries (except Iceland) Since its establishment WEAG which has 19 members has stimulated collaborative defense RampT programs among its member countries and has examined the harmonization of defense requirements and opening national defense markets to European-wide competition Separately an agreement the System Of Cooperation for Research And Technology in Europe (SOCRATE) was created in 1998 to enable Finland and Sweden ndash at that time not WEAG members ndash to participate in WEAG RampD projects Later SOCRATE

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

117

was amended to allow the participation of Austria the Czech Republic Hungary and Poland The annual WEAG budget has averaged about 100 million euros in recent years WEAG defense technology RampT is handled under Panel II of the organization (Panel I being concerned with cooperative equipment procurement and Panel II with policies and procedures to enhance collaboration) Under this panel there exist several instruments for collaborative RampT

WEAG Panel IIrsquos fi rst instrument formed in 1989 was European Cooperation for the Long Term in Defense (EUCLID) EUCLID supports projects proposed by government representatives that are jointly funded by the participating governments and the private sector The work is carried out by an industrial consortium including at least one company from each of the participating nations EUCLID covers 13 Common European Priority Areas (CEPA) of technology These include such network-oriented technologies as UAVs and robotics military space and advanced communications Each CEPA has its own Lead Nation appointed by WEAG Panel II responsible for reporting on its activities and an industrial team of leading companies

The second WEAG instrument is the Technology Arrangements for Laboratories for Defense European Science (THALES) Signed in November 1996 THALES facilitates cooperation between government-owned or sponsored defense research agencies although governments may choose to designate a private-sector entity to undertake work on specifi c projects The collaborative projects in the THALES framework are Joint Programs (JP) established within the EUCLID CEPAs in a manner identical to the way EUCLID collaborations are formed Each of the participants in the JP is responsible for placing contracts or making arrangements at the national level

A third mechanism EUROFINDER allows industry to propose RampD projects and receive co-funding for them Proposals need not be associated with any particular WEAG CEPA but since they address national defense RampT strategies they are often aligned with government technology priorities Once a year the WEAG members receive and evaluate proposals from industry Each EUROFINDER program is co-funded by the governments that wish to participate and by the industrial participants The work is carried out by industrial consortia including at least one company from each of the nations that take part in the program Since the start of the EUROFINDER program in 1996 188 proposals have been received of which about half were funded

The fi nal WEAG mechanism the European Understandings for Research Organization Programs and Activities (EUROPA) was created in May 2001 It enables any two or more signatories to propose the creation of a European Research Grouping (ERG) to carry out one or more individual or collaborative RampT projects with a relatively larger degree of fl exibility than that offered by the EUCLID or THALES The fi rst ERG was created by 14 countries in late 2001 but membership in ERGs varies EUROPA also requires WEAG members to provide regular information on the areas of defense RampT in which they are prepared to cooperate This information is then used by WEAG to identify opportunities for cooperation and to fl ag duplicative work being undertaken

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

118

WEAG has succeeded in providing a discussion forum on European armaments cooperation Since its Member States each have an equal vote countries with strong defense industries cannot impose their goals on the others In terms of actual RampT projects however WEAGrsquos accomplishments are more modest Its membership includes both producer and consumer countries with different requirements and technological capabilities and decisions must be taken by consensus Projects that benefi t only a small number of countries such as those related to power projection or technologies for out-of-theater operations do not have priority (Assembly of WEU 2002)

The Western European Armaments Organization (WEAO) also operates under the WEU framework Created in 1996 WEAO provides administrative support to the WEAO Board of Directors and WEAG Panel II and legal assistance for countries signing RampT collaboration agreements for specifi c WEAG projects WEAO can implement WEAG decisions on defense RampT because it has the authority and the necessary legal power to place contracts By 2001 it had facilitated the creation of 120 projects with a total of 500 million euros in funding (WEAG 2002)

In April 2005 the Steering Board of the European Defense Agency agreed that the EDA will gradually absorb the activities of the WEAG and WEAO in particular those covering RampT The hope is to make defense RampT more cost-effective and tie it more closely to the capabilities needed for the European Security and Defense Policy

At the same time the EDA Steering Board approved a set of principles governing the Agencyrsquos RampT functions including plans to establish networks of government research center industry and international experts bodies to collaborate in specifi c areas In July of 2005 the Agencyrsquos RampT Directorate announced that it had selected two critical technology areas involving long-endurance UAVs for which it intends to contract out initial technology demonstration studies with 2005 budget funds The two areas ndash survivability and digital data links ndash were chosen by national experts as covering critical gaps not addressed by ongoing European UAV programs In addition more than ten other critical technology areas identifi ed by national experts may be addressed separately as ad hoc cooperation projects by Member States by future EDA-funded studies or under industry initiatives

Despite the limitation in Article 296 the European Commission has also begun to be a major player in European-level RampD Since 1983 the Commission has managed its own civilian collaborative RampD program the Framework Program (FP) The FP is now in its sixth round of 4-year funding cycles with 175 billion euros committed to fund projects between 2003 and 2006

Firms universities or government agencies wishing to receive FP funding create RampD consortia (made up of a minimum of three partners at least two from European Member States) and submit joint project ideas in response to Commission calls for proposals The consortia may also include participants from various non-EU states (Associated States) such as Switzerland Norway and Israel which have signed collaboration agreements with the EC The Commission funds 50 per cent of the project costs FP projects can currently only cover civilian technologies though these very often include research with dual-use or military

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

119

applications such as aerospace energy (including nuclear energy) life sciences and information technologies

In the fi rst annual work program for FP6 announced in 2002 proposals were requested in intelligent vehicles and aircraft interoperable information and communications networks end-to-end SATCOM systems and data fusion among others It has been estimated that approximately one-third of the projects funded by FPs could be considered as dual-use projects (European Commission 1996) Thales EADS British Aerospace and many other European defense fi rms are active participants in these FP projects

In 2003 the Commission moved more directly into the defense-related research arena announcing the Preparatory Action on Security Research (PASR) as its contribution to the EU goal of addressing key security challenges Between 2004 and 2006 the PASR focused on bridging the gap between civilian research supported by the Framework Program and national and intergovernmental defense programs Funding for the PASR combined Commission funds national ministerial budgets (defense and non-defense) and industry contributions After two calls for proposals the Commission invested approximately 30 million euros in 24 security research projects covering border and coastal surveillance aviation security detection of biological and chemical agents situational awareness securing critical infrastructures and satellite intelligence

Though relatively modest in scope and size the PASR nevertheless represents an important fi rst step for the Commission as it begins to initiate and oversee multi-national security RampT activities and link them with its overall RampT activities With the seventh Framework Program starting in 2007 the Commission will include security space and homeland security research and development as parts of its portfolio for the fi rst time As in prior programs every Member State will contribute to the overall budget but the Commission will allocate funds for specifi c projects following the FP guidelines

FP7 may differ from its predecessors however in having a proposed duration of seven years and an annual budget of over 10 billion euros Moreover while there have been Commission investments in defense- and security-related research through dual-use and specifi c civilian projects setting aside specifi c funds (proposed at 570 million euros annually) for such fi elds as earth observation and detection of chemical and biological agents could be an important fi rst step in the development of a European-wide security capability

Conclusion

The European Union is starting to emerge as an increasingly important context for European planning with regard to expeditionary operations military capabilities defense procurement industrial policy and research and technology investment all with direct relevance to strengthening European C4ISR capabilities While the European-level agenda does not explicitly focus on C4ISR interoperability as a priority target the planning and investment choices being made point inexorably in that direction

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NBCs

120

The primary weaknesses of the ERRF ndash swift deployability and the capacity to conduct high-intensity operations ndash have been addressed through the creation of the Battlegroups which are coming into existence quickly C4ISR will be a critical element in the ability of these Battlegroups to operate either in coalition with or autonomously from the United States

The creation and rapid institutionalization of the European Defense Agency is a key development It reports directly to the European Council and has taken on critical functions in the emerging European defense identity The EDA promises to give more attention to a capabilities process that had begun to lag and is positioned to combine that process with its focus on the industrial and technology base It has singled out two critical C4ISR shortfalls ndash long-endurance UAVs and C3 systems ndash a decision that holds promise for Europersquos future ability to carry out network-based operations Moreover projects can move ahead in the EDA framework without requiring the agreement of all the Member States avoiding the problem of the ldquolowest common denominatorrdquo common to other European efforts

There has also been signifi cant progress at the European level in the areas of industrial policy and security-related research and technology investment The European Defense Agency and the European Commission have both initiated important collaborative security RampT programs involving key private sector actors The consolidation of WEAG and WEAO programs into the EDA will allow a tighter focus on the needs of the emerging European defense capability

Within this general strengthening of European-level institutions and planning processes related to defense C4ISR cannot help but emerge as a central issue and funding priority It will be critical to allowing the Europeans to mount a capability that can operate both in coalition with the United States and on its own

121

6

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS FOR

NETWORK-BASED OPERATIONS

From command and control through military communications and intelligence gathering to weapons targeting space-based systems have become a key part of a nationrsquos military capabilities Space systems are increasingly important for monitoring potential threats managing military forces and carrying out combat operations They are being closely integrated into the military C4ISR architecture both in Europe and the United States Furthermore military space capabilities are increasingly dependent on the private sector While the Cold War years were characterized by largely military activity in space the 1990s witnessed a surge of private sector pursuits and commercial space launches began to exceed national security missions Today government agencies worldwide are contracting space programs and services out to companies and multinational consortia and relying on multiple commercial contractors and sub-contractors for their space programs In addition many existing space assets and launch vehicles are now owned by private fi rms or international entities rather than by countries (Krepon 2003 8ndash9)

US military forces are highly dependent on space assets for pre-confl ict global awareness and planning for communications and for combat operations Increasingly European countries are also relying on space assets and are researching testing and deploying them as central ingredients of national and trans-European military capabilities In addition European space programs are increasingly based on cross-national cooperation achieving a degree of interoperability through non-NATO agreements and arrangements Space is a signifi cant European security and dual-use investment that could over time enhance European autonomy from US defense operations and increase trans-European interoperability while providing nodes for transatlantic interoperability as well It is not clear however whether the trans-national European capability will be Europe-wide or be restricted to a few dominant players in the European space arena

The role of space systems

Space-based assets are able to provide unimpeded continuous and persistent coverage of large areas of the globe This provides a signifi cant advantage when undertaking expeditionary warfare combating terrorism WMD counter-

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

122

proliferation and disaster management Embedding space assets in a joint and networked manner can link headquarters and units both at home and in the fi eld without geographical limitations

The fi rst key defense role for satellites has been communications In the 1950s Arthur C Clarke was the fi rst to recognize that three satellites in geosynchronous orbit spaced equidistant along the equator could provide worldwide communications coverage between the latitudes of approximately 60ordmN and 60ordmS while remaining relatively secure from attack Since the fi rst geosynchronous satellites were launched in the 1960s communications satellites have proliferated and become a staple of the global communications industry They provide a redundant network that is largely independent from terrestrial communications systems and can deliver broadband communications anywhere within their area of coverage via increasingly smaller and lighter terminals and handheld phones (DalBello 2003 217) In the 1990s Iridium the fi rst fully functional polar-orbiting satellite communication system was launched Polar-orbiting satellites provide communications at high latitudes but compared to geosynchronous systems they are extremely complex and expensive to build launch and operate The Iridium constellation of 66 satellites was a technical success but a commercial failure and its major customer today is the US Department of Defense

As discussed earlier France the United Kingdom Italy and Spain operate dedicated or partially dedicated military geosynchronous satellites for military communications Germany leases time on commercial satellites and is planning for dedicated military satellites in the future However no European country currently operates the necessary trio of dedicated military communications satellites to achieve full global coverage Only the United States has such coverage obtained through the low-earth orbit Iridium series and through its geosynchronous satellites

Many countries including the United States lease commercial satellite capacity for non-sensitive communications relying on dedicated military satellite communications for secure transmissions However commercial systems are not as secure as the ones dedicated to military use and commercial business practices may confl ict with military objectives making their use for military communications uncertain (Baker et al 2001)

Reconnaissance and surveillance is the second area where space offers signifi cant advantages for military and security operations The United States and the Soviet Union fi rst orbited reconnaissance satellites during the height of the Cold War in the 1960s these fi rst ldquospy satellitesrdquo used panchromatic and infrared fi lm dropped to earth in sealed containers from satellites for processing and analysis In the mid-1970s digital electro-optical systems fl ying in polar orbits allowed operators to image any place on Earth and return the images by means of electronic transmission thereby increasing satellite fl exibility and longevity In the civilian world NASA led the way in the development of such satellites with the building and launching of the Landsat series of satellites beginning in July 1972 However clouds and dark of night hamper the highly sophisticated digital cameras placed on these satellites Hence more recently synthetic aperture radar systems

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

123

operating at microwave frequencies have been developed Although synthetic aperture radar satellites provide imagery with reduced sharpness compared to the best electro-optical systems they can pierce through cloud cover and darkness

In Europe only France currently operates dedicated earth observation satellites Helios 1 and 2 However France Germany Italy and the United Kingdom are all developing electro-optical and synthetic aperture radar reconnaissance satellites The United States operates highly sophisticated reconnaissance satellite systems the exact technological capabilities of which remain highly classifi ed The United States and other countries also rely on high-resolution commercial remote sensing satellites to satisfy part of their need for routine reconnaissance data

Early warning and signals intelligence are still other areas where satellites can be used for military and security purposes The United States operates a series of surveillance satellites that monitors the globe for signs of a missile launch as well as signals intelligence satellites for monitoring communications and electronic transmissions around the world The latter have been reportedly put to use to detect communications from would-be terrorists No European countries currently operate such systems though French defense planners are in the early stages of developing their own signals intelligence and missile early warning systems including several pilot projects already in orbit

Digital technologies have revolutionized the handling of data and information from space systems allowing analysts to merge digital imagery maps with data from UAVs AWACS aircraft and other sources to create powerful information products that give fi eld commanders improved awareness of the battlefi eld and enhanced capabilities for defeating the adversary All of this information can now be sent quickly and effi ciently regionally or globally via modern communications infrastructures including communications satellites

The sophistication and quality of European space technology is very high and growing fast driven primarily by civil and commercial needs Ultimately the development of space systems to support network-based operations will depend on how much funding the European countries are willing to direct toward space systems On the European level it will also depend on the extent to which the individual countries are willing to cooperate and share resources As noted below the initial signs are encouraging particularly in satellite communications and earth observation underscored by the robust attempt to create a resilient space policy between the European Union and the European Space Agency along with the Member States Nevertheless funding constraints and the burden of legacy systems may limit investment in space systems

Changing attitudes toward European military space systems

Until recently Europe was not expected to build or deploy systems that allowed them to use space for defense purposes and most European militaries have been reluctant to include dedicated space systems in their budgets Europeans have focused more on civilian uses of space benefi ting from the defense applications

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

124

of civilian systems For example only the United Kingdom Italy and France have launched dedicated military communications satellite systems and Francersquos Helios electro-optical earth observation system is still the only dedicated military reconnaissance satellite deployed by a European country Most of Europersquos 5 billion euro annual expenditure on space goes to civilian programs compared to about 50 per cent of the $40 billion annual US investment The European space industry though employing some 40000 people and generating a turnover of roughly 55 billion euros is much more dependent on the commercial market than its US counterparts (Keohane 2004 3)

Europersquos existing and planned security space programs are generally being initiated as dual-use programs The dual-use approach especially if initiated as a commercial investment has the advantage of saving defense euros for other air- ground- or sea-based military systems Francersquos Syracuse-3 communications satellites ndash its fi rst dedicated military communications satellite ndash and Helios satellites were both preceded by civilian programs The same is true for the United Kingdomrsquos Skynet communication satellite systems as well as the Spanish Hispasat and the Italian SICRAL systems Germany Italy and Spain are also developing dedicated military communications satellites after earlier investments in dual-use systems Francersquos Helios system is based on technology originally developed for the civilian SPOT series of satellites The French Pleiades electro-optical system and the Italian COSMO Skymed synthetic aperture radar system both currently under development are intentionally dual-purpose in nature Both are elements of a cooperative program between France and Italy Germanyrsquos SAR-Lupe dedicated military radar satellite is possible in large part because of the substantial investment the European Space Agency and the German Aerospace Center have made in basic synthetic aperture radar technology Nevertheless some systems such as early warning and electronic surveillance have no clear-cut civilian counterparts and need to be pursued for their own sake though they use subsystems and technologies developed under civil budgets

More recently European interest in the security uses of space has grown signifi cantly and leadership in this area has begun to shift from France toward the European Union Events both internal and external to Europe have contributed to this changing perspective on the uses of space for military purposes

The recent confl icts that the US military was involved in have signifi cantly contributed to changing Europersquos approach to military space Policymakers and military commanders witnessed on a daily basis the considerable advantage the United States drew from space systems combined with new UAVs and the ability to fuse geospatial data (satellite remote sensing signals from GPS satellites and digital maps) with real-time video The US militaryrsquos ability to integrate space capabilities into its network of systems was a critical catalyst of change in European military space policy Infl uential military theorists primarily in France began to press for greater European attention to the development of pan-European security space systems (Hancart 2003 Gavoty 2003a 2003b) These include satellite communications remote sensing and military enhancements to Galileo Europersquos

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

125

major aerospace companies including EADS Alcatel Snecma and Thales have been supportive of these calls to increased investments in security space

The fi rst example of a major European space program with considerable security implications is the Galileo Positioning Navigation and Timing (PNT) system Driven in its inception almost entirely by a political desire for greater commercial autonomy and reliability Europe has pressed forward with this independent system which will duplicate the capability of the US Global Positioning System (GPS) Galileo will be very much a dual-use and trans-European capability Its development is led jointly by the European Commissionrsquos Directorate General for Transportation and the European Space Agency which is by charter civilian in character

The military utility of Galileo has not gone unnoticed by Europersquos defense departments which now depend heavily on the US GPS system for positioning and navigation services The French military especially has funded research on the potential military capabilities of Galileo and plans to use both Galileo and GPS in future operations Other European countries are also considering similar policies and are likely to follow suit The European Union is also planning to use Galileo in support of the European Security and Defense Policy

The Galileo system is currently designed to include 30 satellites and begin offering its services in 2008 The European Commission and the European Space Agency have invested a total of 11 billion euros in the development of initial technologies and in the building of experimental satellites Another 23 billion euros will be spent on building and launching the full constellation of satellites and to prepare for commercial operations To date the building and launching of the fi rst four satellites has been awarded to Galileo Industries a company co-owned by Alcatel Space of France Alenia Spazio of Italy EADS Astrium of Germany Thales and a Spanish consortium of seven companies These four satellites are expected to be launched by the end of 2008 at which point the European Commission and the European Space Agency will award the contract for building the additional 26 satellites and for operating the complete system Europe has also opened participation in the Galileo program to non-European countries China Israel India and Ukraine have joined the program since its inception and negotiations are underway with several other countries

The Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) program which is essentially a strategy for organizing and utilizing Europersquos many already existing and planned earth observation systems represents a second important Europe-wide space initiative with defense implications The GMES program focuses primarily on sustainable development and environmental management and is part of Europersquos efforts to obtain the ability to track regional as well as global environmental trends Like Galileo GMES was initially conceived as a civil program with security considerations added later Like Galileo GMES is managed jointly by the European Commission and the European Space Agency with participation from various other European organizations and fi rms If successful GMES will provide sharply improved better-coordinated European

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

126

capabilities to observe and analyze the environment and human activities on Earth using both new and existing earth observation systems

The GMES program is being undertaken in two phases The fi rst period completed in 2002ndash3 examined the current strengths and weaknesses of the European capacity for space-based environmental and security monitoring and identifi ed the areas that required further investment and research The second or implementation period runs from 2004ndash8 and involves the initial development of infrastructures and capabilities that were identifi ed in the initial period Thus in the near term GMES will develop new information systems and techniques to exploit Europersquos existing space-based earth observation capabilities more effi ciently In the longer term it will serve as a guiding program for planning new earth observation systems

Although focused primarily on European environmental and security concerns the satellite contributions to GMES will be global in scope Most remote sensing satellites orbit in polar orbits taking them over the entire earth as it turns beneath them Europe is still working out the detailed focus and scope of the security aspects of GMES but discussions are tending toward a more activist interpretation of the Petersberg tasks humanitarian relief rescue peacekeeping and crisis management Some of the capabilities developed in the global GMES program could be used for example to enhance Europersquos warfi ghting efforts far from its borders In particular the broader earth observation and analysis capabilities provided by GMES will prove extremely useful for the European military and intelligence community especially when combined with reconnaissance information provided by both the dedicated security and the explicitly dual-use earth observation space systems currently underway

Parallel to Galileo and GMES a European Space Policy has begun to emerge under the auspices of the European Union Starting in the late 1990s the European Union particularly the European Commission began to have increased infl uence in European civil space affairs The EC supplements national space investments by funding research and operation of space systems in support of EU programs and policies and while the European Union continues to depend on the indigenous space programs of individual Member States and on the European Space Agency to provide the technological capabilities for EU programs it is increasingly using its political and economic authority to set the overall direction of Europersquos space efforts

In January 2003 the European Commission published a draft policy paper on space for discussion revision and adoption by the Member States and the European Space Agency After a series of formal consultations the paper was fi nalized in November 2003 as a White Paper laying out a proposed European space policy including defense uses of space

Europe needs an extended space policy driven by demand able to exploit the special benefi ts space technologies can deliver in support of the Unionrsquos policies and objectives faster economic growth job creation and industrial

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

127

competitiveness enlargement and cohesion sustainable development and security and defence

(European Commission 2003b 5 [Emphasis in original])

The White Paper refers explicitly to the uses of space systems to support the European Unionrsquos Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defense Policy Further the very existence of a successful project such as Galileo usable by the entire world is seen as a visible symbol both of growing strategic independence from US policies and also of a more unifi ed Europe offering the prospect of future European success in space (Bescond 2003 40ndash3) A successful GMES program will also strengthen the visibility and acceptability of the European commitment to space systems

In November 2003 the European Commission and the European Space Agency also signed a formal Framework Agreement on Space intended to support ldquothe coherent and progressive development of an overall European Space Policyrdquo (Council of the European Union 2003 5) This agreement further underscored the growing infl uence of the European Union in European space affairs and provides the framework for potential expansion of Europersquos investment in space It focuses cooperation between the two organizations on securing Europersquos independent and cost-effective access to space so that it can continue to be self-reliant in the application and use of space technologies and on ensuring that space activities are undertaken in line with EU policies in particular those supporting sustainable development economic growth and employment The Framework Agreement on Space is intended to consolidate European knowledge of space in a network of centers of excellence thereby achieving greater Europe-wide coherence and synergy between national efforts Specifi c technology areas singled out for initial collaboration include launchers communications satellites earth observation and navigation

Space and space technologies were also included in the EU Constitutional Treaty Article III-254 reads

1 To promote scientifi c and technical progress industrial competitiveness and the implementation of its policies the Union shall draw up a European space policy To this end it may promote joint initiatives support research and technological development and coordinate the efforts needed for the exploration and exploitation of space2 To contribute to attaining the objectives referred to in paragraph 1 European laws or framework laws shall establish the necessary measures which may take the form of a European space program

(European Union 2004 117ndash18)

Elsewhere in the Treaty in Article I-14 covering areas of shared competence space is called out as a shared competence between the European Union and other European entities

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

128

In the areas of research technological development and space the Union shall have competence to carry out actions in particular to defi ne and implement programs however the exercise of that competence may not result in Member States being prevented from exercising theirs

(European Union 2004 22)

Although the Treaty does not include any reference to security space it generally boosts the profi le of space technologies in Europe and European promotion of investment in space systems This will assist proponents of increased emphasis on the use of space in military and security operations and especially in network-based ones

The road to integrated European space systems

These promising European moves toward advanced space-based assets face numerous challenges before they become integral parts of a trans-European network or fully interoperable with the United States One challenge will be integrating space systems into existing European air ground and sea-based command control communications and intelligence capabilities US experience suggests this will be a diffi cult task However the less developed European capability to conduct network-based operations may prove a blessing in disguise allowing the Europeans to learn from the mistakes the United States has made European learning through interaction with the United States in NATO and in coalition operations could reduce the time and expenditure for the European integration effort

A second challenge will be the competition for EU resources especially following enlargement of the Union in May 2004 to include Cyprus the Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Malta Poland Slovakia and Slovenia The expansion will likely add complexity to advancing and coordinating European security space capabilities The new countries will most likely wish to join the space efforts underway in the more technologically advanced partner countries since these provide them with the opportunity to participate in space systems development without starting from scratch The new partners may also bring additional resources to this effort but their relatively weaker economies could slow progress More fundamentally EU enlargement is a costly process Space investments at the trans-European level are likely to compete with other priorities such as regional development and agriculture making it diffi cult to fulfi ll the White Paperrsquos call for increased funding for space systems

A third challenge will be legitimizing the use of space assets for defense purposes given the politics of space in the European context The European Space Agencyrsquos Convention expressly limits its participation to peaceful space efforts though the space programs of the individual countries generally have no such prohibition This could complicate the integration of Galileo into defense planning Furthermore security uses of GMES are currently still limited to supporting the Petersberg Tasks Because of these limitations pressure grew in 2003 and 2004 to

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

129

redefi ne the term ldquopeacefulrdquo As a result technologies that contribute to defensive strategies and that can have supportive roles in warfi ghting may in the future fall under the ldquopeacefulrdquo category Reshaping the defi nition would explicitly allow the European Space Agency to take on security-related tasks and to expand the scope of GMES into the gray areas between peacekeeping and peacemaking allowing closer integration with national and European network-based strategies

Under the leadership of its director Jacques Dordin the European Space Agency recently re-evaluated its Convention concluding that it does not restrict the agencyrsquos ability to engage in programs aimed at defense and security for national or international security and defense institutions The Agency also established a security clearance system that enables it to handle classifi ed information In addition the neutral members of the European Space Agency have signaled that they are willing to have the Agency take on a more active space security role for Europe as a whole Lastly a recent study led by the Instituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) has recommended that the European Space Agency engage in dual-use RampD for space technologies and suggested that the European Union might benefi t by setting up a European Security and Defense Advanced Projects Agency with a small non-permanent staff and fl exible mission-based activity Like the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) this agency would provide a framework for pursuing a strategic approach to developing the applied technologies of the future combining a well-defi ned vision with highly responsive structures and methods (Silvestri 2003 6ndash7)

Just how far Europe will go to emphasize development of dual-use space systems or to create an agency such as this remains to be seen The European Commissionrsquos Preparatory Action on Security Research (PASR) has already funded collaborative projects on using geospatial data for increased situational awareness and on uses of advanced space technologies for expeditionary and crisis management operations It remains to be seen however whether this initial effort can be expanded as part of the Thematic Priority on Security and Space under the European Commissionrsquos seventh research and technology Framework Program

A fi nal challenge will be to coordinate the defense-related space assets currently deployed by EU Member States In earth observation satellites as with civilian space activities France has taken a lead shifting its national strategy from autonomous national systems to promoting multilateral cooperation at the European level French leadership has brought together Germany Italy Spain Belgium and Greece in a joint program ndash the Common Operational Requirements (know by its French name Besoins Opeacuterationnels Communs or BOC) ndash to develop common requirements for security-related earth observation Through the BOC participants are developing a federation of data providers and users that will collect and distribute earth observations data among its members Each member brings different but largely complementary capabilities to the table The BOC is an expansion of cooperative arrangements already underway between France and Italy on Pleiades and COSMO-Skymed and between France and Germany on Pleiades and SAR-Lupe Linking electro-optical and synthetic aperture radar observation satellites will create a very powerful reconnaissance tool

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

130

The EU Satellite Center (EUSC) in Torrejoacuten Spain has also contributed to coordinating European activities related to earth observation It was established in 1991 as the WEU Satellite Center and transferred to the European Union in 2002 It provides the European Union with an analysis of earth observation space imagery to support decision-making in foreign and security policy issues It currently handles space imagery received from the French SPOT the US Landsat 4 and 5 and Indian IRS-1C and D satellites as well as from Russian commercial satellites Within the next few years it will also begin collecting and analyzing data from additional space-based systems including Helios 2 and SAR-Lupe Some imagery from these systems will be delivered free of charge others will have to be paid for In any case the Satellite Center EU offi cials will not be allowed to task the satellites directly

The picture of European collaboration on communications satellites is slightly less clear Though France and the United Kingdom have previously cooperated on satellite communications programs it remains to be seen whether or not the other main players in European space development ndash Germany Italy and Spain ndash will participate In the 1990s France sought to interest Germany and Italy in contributing to the development of Helios 2 but those arrangements fell through in large part as a result of German reluctance to tie itself too tightly to a French initiative In the 1990s French planners also sought to broaden cooperation in military satellite communications through Trimilsatcom a system that was to be co-developed with the United Kingdom and Germany This communications satellite program was intended to meet the common military needs of the proposed partners However the Trimilsatcom effort failed because the partners were unable to integrate their requirements into a common program and agree on a schedule for meeting them (Nardon 2001)

European cooperation on communications satellites has however extended to the NATO framework As noted earlier the Alliance selected a European solution for its next generation satellite communications capability In May 2004 NATO announced that a Joint Consortium of France Italy and the United Kingdom would provide the new constellation of communications satellites which will replace the two existing NATO-owned communications satellites and provide NATO with an improved capability This expanded coverage will include ships at sea and NATOrsquos AWACS early warning aircraft

Beyond intra-European collaboration looms the challenge of transatlantic collaboration While the emerging European security space policies hold some promise for enhanced transatlantic interoperability strong US resistance to more fl exible rules for transatlantic technology transfer is likely to make this diffi cult In response to this problem European companies have begun to use fewer US components in space systems A recent agreement between the European Commission and the European Space Agency calls for a technology development program to assist in insulating European fi rms from US technology export rules and for greater cooperation in this area with such countries as China and India However it also calls for closer cooperation with the US Air Force Furthermore it is to be hoped that the United States and Europe can forge a workable agreement

EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS

131

on the relationship between Galileo and GPS which could spill over into other forms of space cooperation

There has been considerable progress on European space in the past decade and a growing realization that space will play a role in European defense planning The results remain mixed however While space may play a greater role in the future there are a number of countervailing pressures and challenges budgetary and political which will slow the rate at which this trend emerges

132

7

THE EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

FOR NETWORK-BASED CAPABILITIES

Though the pace of transformation is uneven the major European defense powers have been developing and fi elding state-of-the-art capabilities for conducting network-based operations One important source they have been drawing on for this effort is the European defense industrial and technology base In 2001 the total revenues for the European C4ISR market were estimated at close to $7 billion with a compound annual growth rate of 47 per cent (Frost and Sullivan 2002 1ndash1) Advances in technology and changes in military doctrines have contributed to the marketrsquos growth and are expected to continue to do so in the coming years While this chapter does not provide a comprehensive survey of this market it discusses in some detail the industrial organizations and capabilities that have been most important to the emerging European C4ISR technologies A broad review suggests the European industrial and technology base contains signifi cant capacity for C4ISR work including a number of leading companies engaged in critical development and production work in the areas of C2 communications and ISR In addition much of this work is collaborative both across European countries and across the Atlantic

Overview

The term ldquodefense industrial baserdquo is in reality a misnomer in the area of European C4ISR Several of the countries under discussion in this study are using networking technologies in areas that go beyond defense ndash to commercial communication homeland security and civilian space operations Moreover the technology base on which C4ISR programs draw is increasingly dual-use or entirely commercial as is especially the case for information and communications technologies A review of the industrial and technology base then requires examining not only defense suppliers but commercial fi rms providing these technologies for commercial civilian and defense applications

Communications command and control sensors and advanced materials are only a few of the technologies commercial fi rms can provide for military applications Military sensors for example will integrate technologies in electro-optics and biotechnology that are commercial in origin It remains true however that with the ministries of defense as the principal market for these technologies

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

133

more traditional defense suppliers may enjoy advantageous access having experience of doing business with the defense customer and a track record of military-specifi c products

The fi rms most relevant to C4ISR technologies are as might be expected concentrated in the more militarily advanced members of the EU ndash France Germany Italy Spain and the United Kingdom ndash as well as in Sweden which developed a relatively autonomous base to support its strategy of neutrality However given the role of commercial technology in C4ISR there are also signifi cant capabilities in other smaller countries that make a contribution Firms with strong research development and manufacturing capacity in biotechnology robotics nanotechnology information and telecommunications technologies can be found throughout Europe Finland is home to Nokia and a host of other mobile telecommunications companies with cutting-edge technologies at the core of the nationrsquos networking efforts Barco a global leader in display visualization and simulation technologies is Belgian Moreover these highly innovative commercial companies have been supported for decades by European government investment in civilian RampD so are not newcomers when it comes to doing business with national governments and with the European Union

There are both advantages and disadvantages to having such a widespread industrial and technology base for C4ISR The advantage is that public funds can be spent in ways that strengthen an existing national industrial base and national technologies The disadvantage is that developing and networking advanced C4ISR systems requires a broad range of expertise in designing developing integrating and operating complex systems and expertise that is rarely available solely from the industry within one country European governments typically spend defense resources with the goal of supporting local industry but such a policy approach does not always provide forces with the most advanced or capable technology In the C4ISR area greater effi ciency and deeper transformation may depend on a strategy that uses the most global industrial base pooling technological capabilities sharing costs and reducing risks

The evolution of the European industrial technology base which is becoming more networked and global is likely to encourage such a trend making the domestic political tradeoffs more diffi cult Over the past decade there has been a pronounced move toward consolidation of the European industrial base and extensive mergers and acquisitions involving several major defense companies Moreover large defense-related fi rms have begun to merge with acquire or form partnerships with companies that have expertise in such areas as electro-optics and communications often in the commercial market arena Combining capabilities across borders can sometimes help overcome the ldquolocal buyingrdquo preference of governments as a trans-national fi rm or partnership can move workshares around to accommodate local needs Much of the expertise required for C4ISR and network-based capabilities is to be found in such trans-national companies and partnerships

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

134

The big three Thales EADS and BAE Systems

Thales

Thales is one of the worldrsquos largest defense and consumer electronics corporations and a European leader in the C4ISR market In addition to being a lead contractor for many French C4ISR programs it has as a company with many nationalities signifi cant operations in a number of other countries It has built and deployed a complete C4ISR system integrating US- and French-made legacy systems in the United Arab Emirates It has provided elements of C4ISR systems in a number of other countries Through acquisitions outside of France ndash Tacal Quintec Pilkington Signaal ndash Thales has positioned itself to participate in key programs in other countries including the UK

Thales has created a new division Land and Joint Systems which fuses its optronics and communications businesses as part of a strategic push into the C4ISR market This division offers a wide variety of communications products including the family of PR4G radios which are sold in 25 countries around the world including Spain the Netherlands Denmark Greece Switzerland Poland and Egypt and the RITA 2000 system based on ATMIP architecture and deployed by the French and Belgian armed forces The most recent PR4G version ndash VS4-IP ndash has IP frequency-hopping encryption a built-in GPS and advanced multiplexing features The next generation of PR4G radios will include software radio products The Land and Joint Systems division also has an operational analysis and architecture group that is focused on developing interoperable technologies

Thales has a strong presence in the command and control market with the Cooperative Fighting System (a tactical C2 system) the LCC mobile C2 network and the e-CIS army-level C2 system designed according to NATO STANAGs As prime contractor for the Atlas Martha and SICF programs the company is a key supplier of C2 systems to the French armed forces Future developments include the RITA Local Area System for strategic C2 In naval systems the company has made signifi cant investments in naval C2 systems as well

In surveillance and reconnaissance technologies Thales produces several ground-based systems for surveillance target acquisition and ground-based air defense Squire developed most recently is a man-portable surveillance radar system for ground surveillance and bomb damage assessment and has been deployed by the Dutch army and marines Through its Netherlands branch the company is a global supplier of naval surveillance weapon control and combat management systems Key products include the TAVITAC naval combat management system on the French Lafayette frigates and in Belgium Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and the APAR weapons control system co-developed with EADS and Raytheon and deployed on Canadian Dutch and German frigates More recently Thales has moved into the UAV market leading the international consortium developing the British Watchkeeper UAV system Thales also offers a number of products in the intelligence technologies market and plays an important role in several programs

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

135

including the US Prophet program for vehicle-mounted SIGINT systems and the future British terrestrial SIGINT system Soothsayer In France Thales is the supplier of the SGEA SARIGUE MINREM and SAIM systems as well as of airborne ISR pods to various services of the armed forces

EADS

The European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company ndash EADS ndash was created in 2000 as a merger of the German DaimlerChrysler Aerospace Francersquos Aerospatiale Matra and Spainrsquos CASA Since then EADS has gained a strong market presence in C4ISR technologies and become a lead contractor in many European countries notably France and Germany EADS is becoming a signifi cant presence in the UAV market through a number of collaborative RampD programs These include the sensor package for the EuroHawk HALE UAV co-developed with Northrop Grumman tactical- and operations-level UAVs (the Hunter Eagle-1 and Eagle-2) with Israeli Aircraft Industries several tactical UAVs (the CL-289 with France and Canada the Brevel and the LUNA) the Pointer hand-launched tactical UAV in collaboration with Aerovironment and a maritime rotor wing reconnaissance UAV (SEAMOS terminated in early 2002 when the German navy canceled funding) EADS is also developing a UCAV demonstrator ndash Barracuda ndash with Germany as the fi rst potential customer Since 2004 the company has been at the center of the two largest collaborative European UAV programs It is the prime contractor for the EuroMALE program and a partner in the Neuron UCAV program both funded by the French Ministry of Defense The companyrsquos goal is to ultimately control some 10-15 per cent of the global UAV and UCAV market (Hegmann 2005)

EADS also has strong capabilities in the C2 and in the sensor technologies fi elds In C2 the company is working on the HEROS FAUST and FuumlInfoSys H systems for the German army the SIR and SICA systems for the French army and on systems for the Belgian army and several Persian Gulf states In sensor technologies EADS with Rheinmetall Defense Electronics has developed the ISR platform for the Fennek reconnaissance vehicle deployed by the German and Dutch armed forces It has also developed the APAR weapons control system jointly with Thales and Raytheon deployed on Canadian Dutch and German frigates It is also supplying the maritime sensor platform Fully Integrated Tactical System (FITS) to Mexico Brazil the United Arab Emirates Spain and the US Coast Guard In addition the company offers a combined system of SAR and MTIs that can be placed on UAVs marine reconnaissance and NH-90 helicopters

EADS also offers imagery analysis products to be linked to a number of platforms including satellites OCAPI (Optimizing Controlling and Automating the Processing of Images) and TIPI3D products An EADS mobile satellite ground station ndash Eagle Vision ndash collects imagery from SPOT Landsat IRS RADARSAT and QUICKBIRD satellites Four such stations are operational with US forces and at least one with the French army EADS is also a lead partner in the German

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

136

GAST project to develop a common system for the dissemination of technical intelligence

Several recent acquisitions have made EADS a major player in the European defense communications market In July 2001 the company acquired Cogent Defense and Security Networks from Nortel Networks and with it the contract for supplying the United Kingdom with a deployable communications system for expeditionary forces In May 2003 EADS purchased BAE Systemsrsquo share in the Astrium space joint venture gaining full control of Paradigm Secure Communications and its Skynet 5 program for Britainrsquos military satellite communications In the summer of 2005 EADS acquired the Personal Mobile Radio business of Nokia which allows it to provide a range of mobile radio solutions for defense and homeland security

BAE Systems

BAE Systems was created in 1999 through the merger of British Aerospace with Marconi Electronic Systems BAE Systems is one of the worldrsquos largest suppliers for the aerospace and defense markets with prime contractor capabilities for naval platforms aircraft and electronics It is also a presence in several sectors of the C4ISR market and has acquired important system engineering and integration experience BAE Systems has a signifi cant presence in the US defense market and has a central position as a supplier to the British and Australian armed forces The fi rm was chosen by the British Ministry of Defense to lead the NITEworks partnership aimed at assessing and demonstrating the benefi ts of NEC and the options for its effective and timely delivery In December 2003 BAE Systems announced it would provide the Kuwaiti military with a complete C4I suite These two programs confi rm BAE Systemsrsquo commitment to the C4ISR market

BAE Systems has been particularly present in the market for tactical communications systems with signifi cant involvement in such British programs as Ptarmigan and Falcon and a full line of Multi-Role Switch (MRS) 2000 equipment It has also been a participant in US military communications programs notably JTRS and the Future Combat Systems vehiclesrsquo communications package BAE Systems also provides the British armed forces with satellite terminals the Talon (man-portable) and Dagger (vehicle-mounted) terminals linked to Skynet 4 satellites

BAE Systems possesses only limited capabilities in the UAV market having produced the Phoenix and SkyEye tactical UAVs Both proved unreliable in the operational environments and are not competitive It is investing in the UCAV market however marketing its Nightjar program Together with the British fi rm QinetiQ BAE Systems is one of the few European defense companies with expertise in Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV) through the British Marlin project Other BAE capabilities in ISR are found mainly through the companyrsquos involvement in the now disbanded Alenia Marconi Systems venture and in Atlas Elektronik the naval systems portion of STN-Atlas Elektronik retained by BAE when it split the company with Rheinmetall These have given BAE Systems

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

137

a dominant position in radar and sensor technology BAErsquos involvement in the ASTOR program and Nimrod upgrades have also been valuable

The company has not been deeply involved in either the intelligence or the space markets having sold its SIGINT business in 2002

In July 2003 BAE Systems and Finmeccanica signed an agreement to collaborate on C4ISR technologies through a joint venture BAErsquos Avionics Ltdwas merged with Finmeccanicarsquos Galileo Avionica to form Eurosystems an avionics company of which Finmeccanica owns 75 per cent and BAE Systems 25 per cent Under an option Finmeccanica can require BAE Systems to sell its 25 per cent interest in the new Avionics business to Finmeccanica at any time and BAE Systems may require Finmeccanica to purchase its 25 per cent interest after 25 months Eurosystems has capabilities in sensor systems airborne radars mission systems electro-optics and electronic warfare systems At the same time Alenia Marconi Systems a 50-50 joint venture of BAE Systems with Finmeccanica was dissolved with BAE Systems acquiring AMSrsquos UK operations and Finmeccanica acquiring all of the Italian operations of AMS BAE Systems will merge the UK operations of AMS and BAE Systemsrsquo C4ISR Networked Systems and Solutions business to form a wholly owned systems integration business The Eurosystems transaction also created Selenia Communications Limited a wholly owned subsidiary of Finmeccanica whose Marconi Selenia Communications acquired BAE Systemsrsquo UK Communications business The Eurosystems transaction was fi nalized in May 2005

Second tier defense companies

There are a number of smaller second tier defense companies in Europe that are also active in the C4ISR market Some such as the German fi rm Rhode and Schwarz have C4ISR at the core of their business strategy Others such as Saab have been platform and weapons suppliers and have only recently moved into developing and producing C4ISR systems In most cases the smaller participants in the C4ISR market retain a largely national focus and rely on contracts from their home governments

Rheinmetall Defence Electronics is one such company In the summer of 2003 BAE Systems and the German fi rm Rheinmetall Detec joint owners of STN-Atlas Elektronik divided the fi rm into two separate companies The new companies are Rheinmetall Defense Electronics wholly owned by Rheinmetall Detec and specializing in technologies for air and land forces and Atlas Elektronik wholly owned by BAE Systems and specializing in maritime technologies Rheinmetall Defense Electronics is one of Europersquos leading developers of ISR solutions It collaborates with EADS on the development of the ISR suite for the Fennek reconnaissance vehicle to be deployed by the German and Dutch armies This suite includes a sensor platform with a camera a thermal imager and a laser rangefi nder for each vehicle

Rheinmetall Defense Electronics may have signifi cant potential in unmanned aerial systems provided it can expand beyond the German market The company

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

138

offers a wide range of reconnaissance target acquisition electronic warfare and combat UAVs including the KZOBrevel target acquisition UAV (also confi gurable for electronic warfare missions) co-developed with EADS It is also working on the Tactical Advanced ReconnaissanceStrike System (TADRES) UCAV previously known as the Taifun for the German Ministry of Defense The vehicle is now being designed to carry an electro-optic sensor for target identifi cation and a synthetic aperture radar for target acquisition A procurement for TADRES is expected before 2009 In 2003 the company signed an MoU (a Memorandum of Understanding) with Francersquos Safran Group to develop the technologies to make the KZO and TADRES vehicles interoperable with the French Sperwer UAV

The company also has capabilities in tactical command and control systems for land forces It has participated in the Battlefi eld Command System (Gefechstfeldfuumlhrungssystem or GeFuumlSys) C2 program for the German army (currently upgraded to FAUST) and provided the Swedish army with the C2 system deployed on its tanks and combat vehicles In 2003 it was awarded a contract to upgrade the C2 systems on Spainrsquos Leopard-2 tanks

Rhode and Schwarz is another company with a key position in the German national market for C4ISR which has yet to become a trans-national player Rhode and Schwarz has cutting-edge technology in the military communications fi eld specifi cally in digitally reprogrammable software radios Its family of multimode multirole multiband (M3) radios offers solutions for aerial naval and land platforms all meeting NATO encryption STANAGs Early in 2003 the company received a contract to supply the Brazilian army with the tactical radio version of the M3 and in 2004 the Swiss Army signed a contract to purchase the VHFUHF version of the M3 In 2005 it received a contract to outfi t the A400M aircraft with M3ARs (Airborne Radios) through 2022 The radios will feature the Second Generation of Anti-Jam Tactical UHF Radio for NATO (SATURN) frequency hopping function The company was also awarded a sole-source contract to develop a fully JTRS- and SCA-compliant version of a Software Defi ned Radio (SDR) for the German military The company is also a supplier of SIGINT technologies specifi cally those for direction fi nding and signals monitoring and analysis The German and Danish militaries have been customers for these products

In 2001 the British Ministry of Defensersquos Defense Evaluation and Research Agency privatized part of its work into a new fi rm ndash QinetiQ ndash as a public-private partnership Today QinetiQ uses the experience gained as a government RampD agency to provide advanced defense solutions including several in the C4ISR domain In the command and control fi eld QinetiQ specializes in maritime C2 offering two major systems the Intelligent Advisor Capability Demonstrator (IACD) and the All Environment Real-Time Interoperability Simulator (AERIS) The IACD has been demonstrated on the Royal Navy aircraft carrier Illustrious

In the ISR area QinetiQ does work on battlespace digitization multi-source information fusion and innovative ISR architectures Through its participation in the British TOPSAT program and other international efforts QinetiQ also has expertise in space-based reconnaissance In the UAV arena QinetiQ focuses on man-portable UAVs for infantry sections It is also one of the few large European

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

139

defense companies to have expertise on Unmanned Underwater Vehicles having worked for the British Ministry of Defense on the development of the Marlin UUV intended for launch and recovery from submarines Additionally company projects are underway to develop new sensor suites for UAVs particularly for thermal imaging

Francersquos Sagem ndash now part of Safran Group ndash has increased its involvement in the C4ISR domain Its defense technology group Sagem Deacutefense Securiteacute has been particularly successful in the UAV market its line of tactical UAVs is deployed by several European militaries The Crecerelle is used by the French army and variants are deployed by the Dutch (Sperwer) Danish (Taarnfalk) Swedish (Ugglan) and most recently the Greek armies Two new versions of the Sperwer are under development to fl y at higher altitudes and faster speeds for longer periods of time The fi rst the Sperwer HV (High Velocity) is a MALE UAV featuring a real-time data link synthetic aperture radar day-night imager or laser target designator and possibly at a later stage radar-jamming payload The second is the Sperwer LE (Long Endurance) also a MALE vehicle whose payload may include a day-night imaging system a Samir missile warning system and a high-speed radio frequency (RF )data link for communications with other UAVs as well as with its ground control station The French government has not yet given full support to these programs though the company anticipates prototypes by the end of 2006 The next generation of Crecerelle ndash SDTI ndash is also in the fi nal stages of development and testing for the French army based on the Sperwer UAV Sagem has also had some success in the tactical command and control sector and is the prime contractor for the French armyrsquos SIT system for linking small units and armored vehicles

Sagem has also engaged in international collaboration on RampD projects In July 2003 Sagem and STN Atlas (now Rheinmetall Defence Electronics) signed a memorandum of understanding to begin an RampD program that will make Sagemrsquos Sperwer UAV interoperable with STN Atlasrsquos KZO and TADRES UAVs This program will develop a common C2 infrastructure to enable the exchange of data and intelligence gathered by these unmanned platforms Sagem also collaborates with General Atomics (US) on the Horus-SD UAV a European version of the Predator and with Dassault on UAV RampD programs Most recently the company announced it has fi tted the Sperwer B UAV with the Israeli Spike long-range precision strike missile weaponizing an existing UAV platform with an off-the-shelf missile similar to the US arming of a Predator UAV with Hellfi re missiles

Though by no means a small fi rm Finmeccanica in Italy is a relatively minor largely national participant in the European C4ISR market Recent decisions such as the Eurosystems transaction described earlier in this chapter may change this reality over time For now the companyrsquos main business is still the construction of platforms but some subsidiaries are beginning to gain a strong foothold in the Italian C4ISR market especially in C2 and ISR Restrictive bid practices of the Italian government facilitate this process and they have provided Finmeccanica with growing expertise in most C4ISR-related technologies The company is increasingly profi cient in developing and producing low- and medium-altitude

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

140

UAVs initially through the tactical Mirach-26 and the Mirach-150 programs for the Italian armed forces The Falco tactical UAV is a more recent addition designed to replace the Mirach-26 A faster version of the Mirach-150 Nibbio is also under development In 2003 Finmeccanica signed a contract with Alenia Aeronautica to co-develop a UAV demonstrator that could become a marketable UAV or UCAV product The Sky-X ndash formerly called the Integrated Technology Vehicle (ITV) ndash will carry different payloads including weapons SAR electro-optical and infrared sensors and electronic sensors It will also be equipped with a broadband satellite data link 5 Trials began in 2004 (Kington 2004 9) The newly created Eurosystems avionics company the acquisition of BAE Systemsrsquo military and secure communications assets and the dissolving of Alenia Marconi Systems could give Finmeccanica a stronger position as a participant in the global C4ISR market

Saab long a manufacturer of cars and fi ghter aircraft is another platform producer that is moving into the C4ISR market It created a new division SaabTech which specializes solely in C4ISR and in July 2005 merged it with Avitronicsformerly part of the South African fi rm Gintek to create Saab Avitronics The companyrsquos C4ISR expertise is focused largely on command and control systems for land air and sea Its 9LV Mark 3E naval C3 combat system fuses data from sonar radar and electro-optic systems to create a complete picture of the seascape and is in service with the Royal Swedish Navy as well as with the Australian New Zealand and Singapore navies Another command and control product under development is the Wide Area Situation Picture (WASP) consisting of an air force C2 system adaptable for other services as well Saab also produces terrestrial C2 systems including the Vehicle Command and Control System (VCCS) which provides a single display unit for tactical information and sensor images as overlays on a background digital map and the Battlefi eld Command Support System (BCSS) a land forces C2 system for brigade and lower level units BCSS is deployed by the Australian armed forces Saab has also moved into the UAV market having the experience of the SHARC UCAV project and has signed an MoU with Francersquos Dassault Aviation to co-develop the Neuron UCAV

Saab and Ericsson have created a joint venture Saab Ericsson Network Based Defense Innovation splitting ownership 60-40 respectively In October 2003 this company was awarded a contract from the Swedish Defense Materiel Administration (FMV) to develop the technological foundations for the future Swedish Network-Based Defense Initially this will involve work on design rules and technical specifi cations for the future system The fi rm is partnering with IBM and Boeing on this project

Non-defense companies in the European C4ISR market

As already noted technologies for C4ISR requirements are frequently found in the commercial sector making commercial companies an important element in building European C4ISR capabilities Several of the more signifi cant fi rms are in Scandinavia with technologies that are useful in C4ISR systems with little

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

141

modifi cation Ericsson has been very successful in the global ISR market with products such as air defense surveillance radars (Giraffe for both land and sea units sold to the French air force) artillery hunting radars (ARTHUR sold to the Danish army and the British Royal Marines) and airborne early warning systems (Erieye radar deployed by Sweden Brazil and Greece) It is also the only major company in the Swedish C4ISR market that is still wholly Swedish-owned

With a strong civilian technology base especially in mobile communications Ericsson has been able to penetrate the military communications market on a global basis In collaboration with Kongsberg-Ericsson of Norway and Crypto of Switzerland it produces state-of-the-art tactical military communications products ndash EriTac ndash including switches radio relays and bulk encryption units that can be fi tted together according to user requirements to build tactical area networks air defense networks and command post communication networks The system has been sold to fi ve NATO countries as well as to other military customers worldwide including Kuwait and Oman

Nokia has also applied its core competency to the military market for C4ISR technology In 2002 Finnish forces taking part in peacekeeping operations in Kosovo were the fi rst to be outfi tted with the companyrsquos TETRA communications equipment A year later the fi rst Finnish-led KFOR brigade was outfi tted with a similar system less than two months after the decision to procure it The European Unionrsquos forces in Kosovo (EUFOR) use a Nokia system based on the one used by Finnish forces In Finland a complete communications system for the countryrsquos defense and fi rst responder forces was built using TETRA technology The deployable communications networks of the Danish and Swedish armies were based on a similar technology as were the Belgian and Kuwaiti public safety networks and the communications network used by the Irish police

Industry collaboration on C4ISR interoperability

Several collaborative industry frameworks have been created to address interoperability between C4ISR systems Companies involved in these agreements have realized that governments are demanding increasingly complex and advanced systems and systems-of-systems that require industry collaboration

The Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium (NCOIC) is a forum for fi rms involved in the development of C4ISR systems Companies in NCOIC share knowledge about customer requirements for network-centric and network-based operations and discuss strategies and approaches to enhancing system delivery to customers In addition the organization seeks to develop open interoperable C4ISR systems using common best practices and systems engineering techniques On the technology side this is done by analyzing the relevant C4ISR architectures defi ned by governments developing a secure information management model to discuss open standards and identifying open standards-based product types The NCOIC is also developing educational programs on network-centric operations and developing strategies for creating collaborative engineering environments (Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium 2005 14) The consortium

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

142

is made up of international aerospace defense information technology and professional services companies in the United States and Europe all with experience in network-based technologies As of 2005 there were 66 members in the NCOIC with another 68 inquiries by potential members The Consortiumrsquos Advisory Council includes prominent US Department of Defense offi cials as well as representatives from NATOrsquos C3 Agency the NATO Headquarters C3 Staff and the Swedish Defense Materiel Agency

Firms in some European countries are seeking to create similar networks In Germany for example an interest group known as the Open Community has been created to coordinate the development of standards and open architectures The member companies of the community have agreed to implement a policy of interoperability based on recognized open commercial and military standards adopting a full spectrum approach Members of Open Community include Atos Origin Diehl BGT Defense CONET CSC Ploumlnzke ESG IBM Deutschland Rheinmetall Defense Electronics Thales Defense Deutschland and Unilog Systems (Rheinmetall Defense Electronics 2005) While valuable national collaborative initiatives such as Open Community will not necessarily address the challenges of international interoperability and cross-national acquisitions

Conclusion

The European industrial base is clearly capable of undertaking signifi cant work on C4ISR programs and technologies not only at the national level but also at the transnational level There are several transatlantic projects in the fi eld These include the Active Phased Array Radar (APAR) project co-developed by Thales EADS and Raytheon and deployed by the German Dutch and Canadian navies (the system enables the tracking and controlling of missiles fi red from various sources by a single ship) MIDS (which enables interoperability between United States British German Italian French and Spanish ships aircraft and missiles) and the Raytheon-Thales jointly-owned fi rm Thales-Raytheon Systems (TRS) working on C2 systems for air defense and tactical communications for Special Forces

Increasingly European companies are initiating intra-European collaborations as opposed to transatlantic programs In the post-Cold War era European defense fi rms have been almost twice as likely to pursue co-production and co-development projects with each other as with US fi rms and over three times more likely than with defense fi rms from other regions (Jones 2005 3) One motivation could be the sense that Americarsquos globally dominant defense industry forces the Europeans to combine efforts in order to compete internationally as well as to avoid excessive dependence on the United States There is a risk in this approach as it will add competitors in the international market and increase the challenge to ensure adequate transatlantic interoperability

For the Europeans regional cooperation does hold many benefi ts Regional collaboration in research and development production and procurement of C4ISR technologies and systems is clearly an important route toward developing

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

143

the capabilities needed to conduct network-based operations The European companies are likely to provide pressure from bottom-up for greater collaboration distributing technologies and demonstrators to several European countries They can also promote collaborative approaches to technology development Smaller more local companies can complement the larger ones with niche expertise and experience from national programs Such discussions could enhance interoperability across European military capabilities

Firms in the European industrial and technology base have recognized that developing the C4ISR technologies and systems required to conduct network-based operations will be important to their competitive position both in defense and commercial markets Unmanned vehicles sensor payloads deployable and mobile communications network infrastructures and data analysis technologies are all growth markets in both arenas European fi rms have been quick to grasp this reality and are investing in applications for defense and security customers with cutting-edge technologies While European C4ISR and network strategies are still being developed the industrial and technology base on which Europe will rely to implement strategies is amply capable of supplying them

144

8

EUROPEAN NETWORK-BASED

CAPABILITIES

Policy recommendations

The major European defense powers clearly possess the technology capabilities to research build and deploy modern C4ISR capabilities and move down the road toward military capabilities that are more network-based Many of these countries this survey reveals have made explicit decisions to move in that direction The Europeans face two signifi cant challenges in reaching this goal creating cross-national capabilities that take advantage of C4ISR to increase their ability to operate with each other in autonomous ways and enhancing transatlantic interoperability with the United States There are a number of policy steps the Europeans can take and steps the United States needs to take to realize this twofold objective

While the European allies have in many cases made a national commitment to enhanced networking the commitment to the trans-European and transatlantic goals is less clear At the trans-European level the European countries need to do much more than they do today to develop common standards and equipment Greater European interaction especially in the framework of the EU is needed for progress to be made in achieving trans-European interoperability The new Battlegroups are an important step in the right direction but more needs to be done

With respect to transatlantic interoperability it is clear that the Europeans are not likely to create the extensive network of C4ISR capabilities the United States plans nor need they do so A ldquoplug and playrdquo approach makes more sense for Europe using a US or NATO network backbone and selecting the points in that backbone where connectivity will ensure interoperability Such interoperability is most critical with respect to the timely transmission of voice data and images which will enable networked operations A plug and play strategy depends on common standards and capabilities and on ensuring that these are shared commonly deployed and secure Parallel to European actions the US needs to develop a stronger grasp of European strategic perspectives take European C4ISR technology and interoperability capabilities and intentions seriously work through NATO to enhance the opportunities for greater connectivity and in particular transform the US regime for defense trade to incentivize interoperability decisions transatlantic technology collaboration and industry effi ciency

Network thinking and interoperability are clearly important objectives in todayrsquos security environment The era of large static armored forces that

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

145

confront deter and defeat the adversaryrsquos massed formations has ended So too have the days when NATO forces trained and exercised together but were rarely used Today smaller more agile forces are being used regularly in a wide range of coalition operations both within and outside NATO as an organization and primarily outside Europe as a theater of operations

The question of out-of-area operations for NATO has been answered Europeans have clearly made the decision to use their forces in regions they have stayed away from for decades Coalition operations too seem more likely Iraq may be answering the question of whether the US will deploy forces on a largely unilateral basis for contingencies in other regions Coalition operations are now a ldquofact of liferdquo in Bosnia Kosovo Afghanistan and even in Iraq Connectivity between coalition forces will be necessary lack thereof is an obstacle to effective operations

This connectivity cannot be easily created at the point of deployment its absence is likely to lead to decisions to carve out separate zones of operation as seen in Iraq Sustained interoperability will require sustained planning cooperation and investment within Europe and across the Atlantic using military-to-military cooperation and the full panoply of institutions that connect the relevant nations

There are other reasons to push forward on greater cooperation with respect to C4ISR and network-based capabilities within Europe and across the Atlantic Technological effi ciency is one Unconstrained the technologies relevant to network-based operations would fl ow freely between countries many of them are drawn from a global commercial market for information and communications technology There are technological capabilities the Europeans bring to C4ISR from which the US military could benefi t and clear benefi ts to Europe from a less-constrained fl ow of C4ISR technology in the other direction

These same technologies are subject however to dual-use and military technology transfer rules making ineffi ciencies and redundancies inevitable Companies in the United States and Europe complain that even the European and American business units of the same fi rm cannot maximize technological synergies because the regulatory regimes get in the way As a result the same or similar technologies are sometimes being developed separately on both sides of the Atlantic and technological synergies cannot be exploited Similarly the absence of a coordinated strategy in Europe is leading to separate investments on expensive and duplicative programs

There is an economic cost to this ineffi ciency As each nation buys what it needs from its own suppliers each is paying a higher than necessary price and budget resources are being wasted in duplication This is especially a problem in Europe one slowly being responded to in such areas as UAVs and space where cross-national investments are becoming more common It is also a problem for the US which fails to reap the economies that might fl ow from tapping into the European technology base A more fl exible transatlantic technology market has potential benefi ts both for US and European defense investments and defense budgets A more open transatlantic regime for these technologies could also bring greater competition with advantageous results both in terms of price and technological innovation

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

146

European policies and actions

There has been increasingly rapid change in the European approach to C4ISR and network-based capabilities The number of militaries and defense ministries working on formulating and implementing C4ISR doctrines has grown as has the intensity of these efforts There remains much to be done however before all major European forces are adequately transformed for coalition operations outside the NATO area A number of actions can be suggested some at the national level and some within the framework of multilateral institutions

The trans-European commitment to multinational network-based operations is still not entirely clear This goal is not yet centrally embedded in European defense planning for all the progress that has been made over the past decade There remains an inadequate European commitment to joint force planning common requirements and coordinated RampT investment And the European defense market is still not fully open to the benefi ts and effi ciencies that could be realized by more fl exible movement of technology and greater competition among suppliers

European defense planning

At the level of defense and force planning the European allies need to make a clear commitment to the goal of intra-European and transatlantic C4ISR connectivity both in NATO and in the EU European national governments have recognized the importance of connectivity in some areas In the air (fi ghter communications) and at sea (naval communications and fi re control and targeting) the interoperability challenge is being met and collaborative efforts have resulted in a fair degree of connectivity The same cannot be said for land forces even within national militaries let alone at the trans-European or NATO levels All nations are working on this problem as the British Bowman the Dutch TITAAN and the Swedish HF-2000 programs indicate

Most countries are developing C4 systems to conform to NATO STANAGs yet few are moving beyond this level testing interoperability or moving toward the higher standards that prevail today Conforming to NATO STANAGs will not solve the inter-European or transatlantic interoperability problem The pace of some countriesrsquo C4ISR innovation goes well beyond NATO STANAGs However NATO remains an important context for addressing this issue systematically European governments need to work to accelerate the NATO STANAG process and broaden its coverage to also include surveillance and reconnaissance system standards The new Allied Command Transformation provides another important context for this effort one in which the Europeans need to engage fully

An equally strong commitment needs to be made in the European Union in the framework of the Headline Goal and ECAP processes and the European Defense Agency While C4ISR interoperability issues are on the table in the EU both in ECAP and the EDArsquos Capabilities Directorate they do not appear to have received priority attention and they should have it Interoperability requirements will be

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

147

driven by the missions the Europeans plan to undertake and the capabilities needed to network the command and control communications and intelligence need for those missions

Both NATO and the EU have formulated broad defense strategies that dictate when and how the military forces made available to them can be deployed Both have designated specifi c branches to integrate doctrines for network-based operations into their respective strategies NATO through its Command Control and Consultation Agency the European Union through the European Defense Agencyrsquos Capabilities Directorate These offi ces can be an important focus of assistance for nations formulating national doctrines and planning the acquisition of systems If undertaken in a coordinated manner by both NATO and the European Union national migration towards network-based doctrines and capabilities can be achieved more swiftly and effi ciently sharing workload avoiding redundancies and pooling resources NATO and European Union oversight of this transition can help ensure that the goal of intra-European and transatlantic interoperability remains the focus of national planners

The Europeans do not need to adopt US global missions and goals to achieve this interoperability for networked operations Too often the US critique of the Europeans is that their roles missions and forces need to look like those of the US to be interoperable or useful in coalition operations However the Europeans are unlikely to undertake large high intensity combat operations at a global level and unlikely to invest in building the resources required for these With a different strategic ambition but a comparable view of the important threats the Europeans will not need forces that are carbon copies of the US The United Kingdom has taken a different approach developing network-enabled capabilities by testing and modifying existing equipment and evaluating new systems against this network requirement rather than building an entire global network-centric architecture from the ground up ndash evolution as opposed to revolution

The policy challenge is how to ensure connectivity where the European and US force capabilities must meet in coalition deployments inside or outside the NATO framework or for the missions of the NATO Response Force outside the NATO area Given the strategic and resource gap it is critical for the Europeans in cooperation with the United States and in the NATO context to defi ne the critical nodes in the US C4ISR system into which European capabilities need to plug in order to play

Given the difference in resources strategic ambitions and roles and missions a plug and play strategy makes sense for Europe The model would be for the United States or NATO or both to provide the backbone for a network and for the Europeans to select the points in the grid that are critical to ensure the needed interoperability Interoperability will need to focus on the timely transmission of voice data and images the information that will enable networked operations The plug and play strategy relies on common software standards and capabilities Ensuring that software standards are shared commonly deployed and secure will facilitate the communication of voice data and imagery among more complex (US) and less intricate (European) networks

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

148

The Europeans will not need all the satellites the United States possesses in order to shape operations that use the intelligence those satellites deliver They will not require all the UAVs the US deploys though their systems will need to be able to disseminate data to and from the US If the Europeans wish to operate autonomously from the United States or from NATO assets available through the Berlin Plus arrangements they will have to decide how much autonomous C4ISR they require to do so European ambitions can be tailored to European requirements and European resources and interoperability in the Alliance can be reinforced at the same time

The NATO Response Force could provide a useful test-bed for C4ISR inter-operability issues US policy sees the NRF as a European force to which it will provide important logistical and C4 support in the near term Eventually in the US view this force is to provide such capabilities without US support The goal from the US perspective is to create incentives for the Europeans to develop integral C4ISR that is interoperable with US forces While the issue of continued US participation in the force remains on the table it provides a useful opportunity for the Europeans to test out their own emerging C4ISR capabilities with potential payoff for the more autonomous capabilities that might emerge in the EU context

Working through the NRF might help address the large uncertainty about the European commitment to both transatlantic and intra-European interoperability There is not yet a clear common view in Europe about the goal of interoperability The British tend to focus on the need for interoperability with the US but less on the goal of interoperability with their European partners The French are committed to greater internal interoperability among their national services but do not focus priority attention on C4ISR interoperability with Britain or Germany Where interoperability exists ndash in the air and at sea ndash it is largely the result of NATO requirements and the acquisition of US systems not from addressing interoperability at the European level

The lack of clear priority attention to this issue stems in part from the absence of cross-European interaction on strategic force and requirement planning among the European defense ministries The Headline Goal and ECAP processes both of which are important do not constitute joint strategic force and requirements planning These processes focus on a particular set of forces and capabilities not on overall defense goals There is a gap between the discussions in Brussels and the day-to-day planning and priority setting in national capitals These latter processes are not coordinated at the European level leaving each nation focused largely on its own national military capabilities A purely national process forces C4ISR and interoperability requirements to compete for funding with commitments to legacy and modernization programs Engaging this dialogue at the level of the European Defense Agencyrsquos Capabilities Directorate and the EU Military Staff could provide important leverage to change these priorities

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

149

Investment in research and technology

The absence of trans-European coordination is particularly telling at the level of research and technology investments Overall the level of European defense-related RampT investment is low and RampT priorities and programs are poorly coordinated across the EU The result is weak spending in the C4ISR arena and redundancies between the major defense countries Low funding moreover combined with major commitment of limited procurement resources to legacy and modernization programs means that RampT projects that reach the prototype or demonstrator stage often do not enter into production

RampT coordination across EU countries is uncommon While the French and British devote signifi cant sums to defense RampT especially in the C4ISR arena they engage in little bilateral coordination on these programs Others such as Italy and Germany which have set a goal of creating more networked forces engage in little trans-European collaboration in these plans or investments Given the overall limitation on defense resources greater coordination and the elimination of duplication in effort would be an important way to obtain the resources needed for interoperability

An important contribution to the trans-European RampT effort may emerge from the European Commissionrsquos 7th Framework Program (FP7) and the EDArsquos RampT programs The Commissionrsquos FP7 that begins in 2007 will include security space and homeland security research and development for the fi rst time with proposed funding of 4ndash7 billion euros for such fi elds as earth observation and detection of chemical and biological agents It will be critical for the Commission to maintain a wide scope for this funding resist efforts to reduce the overall amount and ensure that at least some of it is directed toward dual-use network-based capabilities including UAVs large communications networks and advanced sensors

The EDA RampT programs will have an even more specifi c focus on defense needs The fi rst cluster of investments initiated in the summer of 2005 focuses on technologies for long-endurance UAVs However EDArsquos current RampT budget of some 3 million euros is small As the EDA experience with this program grows so should its budget and its involvement in more complex development and demonstration programs

A truly trans-European system for strategic force and requirements planning is still some way ahead in the future Ultimately for the European Union to meet interoperability and C4ISR requirements such a system will be needed It is the only way to end redundancies and make the force structure changes needed to release budgetary resources for interoperability investments

A cross-European market for dual-use and defense technologies

The focus on interoperability in C4ISR and greater integration of planning and investment activities will only pay off if a cross-European market for dual-use and defense technology comes into being Policies and institutions at the European level are still not adequate to take full advantage of the widespread privatization

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

150

and trans-European consolidation of defense industry and technology capabilities that has occurred over the past decade

Because requirements are defi ned nationally national defense industry policies vary widely and the rules and regulations for acquisition differ also the incentives for industry to collaborate or compete across borders are weak The rules are not standardized budgets are not coordinated the politics of local procurement tend to weigh heavily in investment decisions and defense technology transfer across European borders remains constrained an increasingly global industry is not matched by a regional defense market

The Letter of Intent OCCAR EDA and Commission collaborative research programs all point in the right direction in terms of creating such a market but progress is slow The Commissionrsquos communiqueacutes ndash the latest of which was adopted in 2003 ndash to encourage industrial restructuring and greater effi ciency in the European Defense Equipment Market while praiseworthy have had modest effect Nor have collaborative procurements broken through this logjam Collaborative European defense programs still focus funding on platforms such as the A400 airlifter Tiger helicopter and Eurofi ghter When it comes to network-based capabilities national technology assets and producers tend to be favored and international competition or collaboration resisted

The UK is changing its approach creating a potentially useful precedent Overall British defense procurement policy has moved sharply away from protecting national monopolies and toward transnational competition and teaming Despite what has been a dominant position for BAE Systems in the UK defense market the Ministry of Defense has sent an unambiguous signal that procurements are open to European and transatlantic competitors This has led to a growing position in the British defense market especially that for C4ISR technologies for such fi rms as Thales Raytheon EADS General Dynamics and EDS The explicit goal of this policy change was to reap the advantages of competition and international teaming and ensure that the broadest array of technology was available In return non-British fi rms are expected to bring a substantial portion of work share into the United Kingdom strengthening and broadening the domestic defense technology industry at the same time

Overcoming the weight of the European defense industrial legacy will not be easy but the British model may provide useful lessons for European-level market policy A more open market could provide substantial effi ciency savings through competition with important payoff for European and transatlantic interoperability For these advantages to be reached the Letter of Intent OCCAR EDA and EC research processes would need to be coordinated with the development of an open-market policy resisting efforts to protect that market from competition

American actions

The future of transatlantic interoperability for networked operations will depend on American policy changes as well as on European actions The US has a clear interest in advancing such interoperability based on a history of security

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

151

cooperation and the demands of coalition operations in the twenty-fi rst century (Serfaty 2005 87ndash8) Neither Europe nor the United States can meet the new security challenges alone Addressed through the Alliance the defense capabilities for meeting these challenges would be greatly enhanced by a more effective networked European force If the US wishes not to become involved in a particular situation an effective European capability will provide a valuable policy option for the US

A US policy that encourages and incentivizes the existing trends toward more sophisticated C4ISR investments in Europe needs to focus on three dimensions greater common understanding with respect to strategic perspectives a serious engagement with European efforts currently underway and reforming the US regime for transatlantic defense trade to allow a discussion of technology requirements transatlantic technology collaboration and greater industry effi ciency

Understanding European strategic perspectives

The changes in the world of global security since the end of the Cold War have forced a discussion of how institutions and national strategies need to change to refl ect new international security realities To some degree this dialogue has already led to signifi cant changes including the enlargement of NATO to include the former Warsaw Pact reassuring them about the dramatic change that had taken place The extension of NATOrsquos mission to restore order to the Balkans was also a major change for the Alliance and its fi rst involvement in actual combat in the wider European theater These operations also created stresses in the Alliance and played a role in the US decision to choose coalitions of the willing for the initial military operations in Afghanistan and for the war in Iraq Growing dangers of terrorist strikes and nuclear proliferation have further altered the security agenda for the transatlantic partners

When it comes to the use of military forces the two most recent confl icts may well represent the future trend smaller expeditionary forces deployed at some distance from the homeland operating in relatively spare environments moving with agility and focus to strike adversary targets effectively and terminate combat operations quickly Clearly these twenty-fi rst century wars will rely more than ever on networked operations integrating sensors data communications and the measurement of effects

These military deployments may not always operate in coalition and may not always involve NATO or all the major European powers Disagreements over Iraq and the diffi culties in the execution of Balkan operations both had the effect of giving the Europeans an incentive to accelerate the development of more autonomous capabilities in part to refl ect a different European view of strategic requirements Similarly these disagreements and problems convinced some in the US that the Europeans might be an unreliable partner for such operations both because of differing strategic views and a less advanced military capability

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

152

Given these tensions NATO continues to provide an important context for dialogue at the military and technical level European and American forces will continue to operate together both inside and outside the Alliance and interoperability will be an important tool in conducting such operations successfully The NATO Prague summit of November 2002 made signifi cant progress with respect the transformation of Alliance forces for the new missions and technologies of the twenty-fi rst century by reshaping the NATO command structure with a new transformation command setting new capabilities objectives and endorsing the NRF

NATO has provided one context for a higher level of strategic dialogue as well Critical changes have included the willingness of the European allies to commit the Alliance to out-of-area operations and to stand up the NRF It has not been the only context however The EU has also begun to emerge as a growing player in the security dialogue defi ning a broad strategy document creating a pillar in the Council on this subject pushing through the Headline Goal and ECAP processes and most recently moving forward with the European Defense Agency and the Battlegroups

None of these developments however constitutes a sustained strategic dialogue between the United States and its European allies The US government should take the initiative to begin such a dialogue either in the NATO context or as a higher level discussion among the allied countries This engagement should also involve bringing the European allies into an ongoing discussion in the framework of the quadrennial defense reviews in the United States a process that has largely excluded sustained interaction with the allies

Engaging European programs and capabilities

For the strategic dialogue to have meaning with respect to force and acquisition decisions the US will need to take a serious look at the capabilities the Europeans are putting in place today There is a tendency in the US to discount European investments in C4ISR and network solutions as inadequate The lesson some US policymakers have drawn over the past fi ve decades and especially over the past ten years is that European forces are heavy on manpower and equipment light on new network-centric planning and technology and overall inadequately transformed to refl ect post-Cold War realities In this view the fi rst Gulf War and the Kosovo air war indicated that European land forces lacked the real-time information and C4ISR capabilities necessary for agile expeditionary operations and European air forces could not ensure secure real-time interoperability for air interdiction missions

This study suggests that the European commitment to C4ISR and greater networking is stronger than this view suggests In part in reaction to the lessons of the Gulf War and the Balkans a number of European countries are stepping up to the investments and planning required to acquire advanced C4ISR and achieve greater interoperability In addition there is little doubt that the industrial and technology base available in Europe is both competitive to that of the United

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

153

States and adequate to deliver the capabilities a modern more networked force requires

US policymakers and even NATO leaders have suggested that the way to close the ldquogaprdquo is for the Europeans to increase defense spending Clearly greater spending focused on networking as a priority would help solve the interoperability dilemma However the reality is that overall defense budgets in Europe are unlikely to rise at the rate necessary to provide that capability

A more fruitful US approach would be to make a virtue of this reality by urging a restructuring of European defense investments with a priority on the forces and technologies needed for twenty-fi rst century operations This emphasis could bear fruit While Germany for example may not be able to increase its defense budget overall given domestic German commitments and problems the focus of the German defense program is already shifting toward expeditionary capabilities incorporating modern C4ISR A US message consistent with this internal trend could prove more productive than repeated demands that the Germans spend more overall on defense

US policymakers have argued the priorities case with respect to specifi c acquisitions notably the A400M and Galileo which are sometimes criticized as the ldquowrongrdquo priorities for European defense investment US criticism however has provided an incentive for both projects to move forward Again this policy approach may be counterproductive Both programs are clearly intended by the Europeans to meet European defense (and civil) needs Both provide capabilities the Americans have long sought ndash a more modern European air transport capability and the ability to provide location data for precision-guided munitions The solutions are European and responsive to the needs of a European industrial and technology base as well as the desire to possess some autonomous European capabilities in these areas

ldquoBuy Americanrdquo is not an answer however much US policymakers may think it the most effi cient solution The Europeans are no more likely to satisfy their equipment and technology needs by buying exclusively in the US market than the US Department of Defense is likely to satisfy its needs entirely from European providers Again to make a virtue of this political-economic reality it may make more sense for the US to explore the opportunities to combine technologies and industrial capabilities through collaboration

US concerns about the gap and about European capabilities have led to minimal US effort to involve the Europeans in US planning for network-centric capabilities or to include European technologies in the process of developing these capabilities for the US military

A general skepticism about European capabilities has been combined with a preference in the US defense establishment to work with known US processes and suppliers Extending the research and acquisition process to include European suppliers is a step into the less-known US suppliers moreover are under-standably uneasy about bringing European fi rms into the US market as potential competitors

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

154

Overcoming the transatlantic C4ISR interoperability challenge and implementing a plug and play approach will require overcoming these prevailing attitudes and engaging the Europeans directly with respect to plans and technologies Here too NATO could provide an important context for a multilateral dialogue through collaboration on transatlantic RampD programs for example The NATO-led CAESAR advanced concept technology demonstratr (ACTD) discussed earlier has already proven that sharing data between various national airborne ground surveillance capabilities is possible Other technology areas are ripe for collaborative initiatives

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for both surveillance and combat and their sensor payloads are one such area As already noted many European countries possess substantial technological knowledge and experience in this area including engines airframe design and stealth technology and have expertise in active electronically scanned array radar hyperspectral imaging lightweight synthetic aperture radar and ground moving target indicators relevant for sensor payloads Multinational European programs such as the EuroMALE UAV and the Neuron combat UAV are already under way Cooperation in this area would have not only military and budgetary advantages for participants but could open opportunities for industrial cooperation

Another potentially fruitful arena for transatlantic collaboration is data-sharing of space imagery Europe has underway several multinational efforts to link data gathered by Earth observation systems The Optical and Radar Federated Earth Observation program will link the existing Francersquos SPOT 5 and Helios 2 satellites with systems currently under development the two French Pleiades high-resolution optical satellites the four Italian COSMO-Skymed X-band radar satellites (with a resolution of less than 1 meter for military images) and possibly the fi ve German SAR-Lupe synthetic aperture radar satellites The fi rst satellites in these programs will be operational between 2005 and 2007 and Sweden Spain Austria and Belgium have already secured their industrial cooperation on Pleiades and the sharing of data acquired by the system (Adams and Ben-Ari 2005 21) A transatlantic discussion of how to integrate these platforms and share data including the sensitive issue of intelligence-sharing might be fruitful

Transforming the US defense trade regime

The US regime for export controls and technology transfer may be the ldquolong pole in the tentrdquo for transatlantic collaboration and interoperability (Center for Strategic and International Studies 2001) Policy and industry analysts have noted for some years that the US National Disclosure Process (NDP) International Traffi c in Arms Regulations (ITAR) Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) and Special Security Arrangements (SSA) all of which regulate the transfer and export of US defense technologies and the process of direct foreign investment in the US market pose major obstacles to the technology transfers that will be needed to close the interoperability gap between the United States and its European allies (Adams 2001c)

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

155

Transfers of defense technologies from the US to the European allies go through intensive scrutiny in the Department of Defense and an interagency discussion before a decision is made to approve the deal This has often led to a decision to share parts of hardware with allied collaborators but not software codes that govern the operation of the system leaving allies in possession of only part of the information they would need to operate repair overhaul or adapt systems purchased from or built in collaboration with the United States The US-German-Italian Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) for example has faced this black box problem for some time

US export control rules compound the problem All military technology exports and transfers including the exchange of oral or written expertise on such technology require a license from the Offi ce of Defense Trade Controls in the Department of State after interagency coordination (including the Department of Defense and the armed services) The slowness and complexity of the US export control process and the large number of items on the Munitions List have been a constant irritant in the transatlantic defense relationship US fi rms wishing to collaborate with European counterparts encounter delays European fi rms seeking to acquire US components for European systems fi nd the system unpredictable The US operations of European defense fi rms cannot cross-fertilize with their European branches as such communications require an export license to take place This system has created incentives for the Europeans to build technologies in Europe which are no longer subject to US controls rather than buy technology from the United States

US regulations with respect to the scrutiny and structure of foreign direct investment in the US defense market have further complicated the dialogue about interoperability Direct investments and joint ventures by Europeans (and others) in the US defense market are subject to intensive scrutiny through the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) interagency process While very few such investments have been rejected many are withdrawn or not attempted given the complexities and uncertainties in the US process Successful investments and collaborations such as the BAE Systems acquisition of Lockheed Martinrsquos electronic warfare assets in 2000 and the creation of Thales Raytheon Systems (an air defense joint venture) take years to execute and are diffi cult to operate effi ciently

These diffi culties are compounded by the complexities of the SSA requirements which effectively separate the work and workforce of American business units from those of the European parent company The requirements are designed and enforced to prevent the fl ow of sensitive technologies across the Atlantic They also make effi cient cross-corporate collaboration and economic effi ciencies diffi cult

C4ISR interoperability is at the very heart of coalition operations and the US rules of the road are a disincentive to achieving that goal Major reforms of the US technology transfer export control and investment rules would be needed for transatlantic interoperability and network issues to be solved It will be important for Washington to realize that these rules which seem technical and receive

EUROPEAN NBCs POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

156

lower priority attention are strategic issues for the European allies Technical discussions that leave the current rules and processes in place will not solve the problem they need to be addressed at the higher policy level

Conclusion

Solving the interoperability problems particularly with respect to networked operations and C4ISR is clearly critical to the long-term future of the transatlantic relationship Both the Europeans and the United States will need to take major policy decisions to move this agenda forward The issue is not a technological one the obstacles to a solution are at the level of policy and budgets The Europeans need to focus their priorities clarify strategy work to eliminate redundancies and build institutions and policies at the European level that address C4ISR as a priority The United States needs to engage in a more systematic strategic dialogue with Europe engage the Europeans at the military and technical levels and reform the regulatory regimes and processes that inhibit technology fl ows Neither set of tasks is easy completing them could make a substantial difference in strengthening transatlantic interoperability for coalition operations

157

9

CONCLUSIONS

Recognizing that the changed threats of the twenty-fi rst century demanded a different strategic response and military capability the United States moved relatively swiftly during the 1990s to transform its military Over the past 15 years this has made the US military increasingly more effi cient and effective at carrying out expeditionary combat missions involving air sea and ground forces operating jointly From a force largely trained and equipped for platform-intensive land battles in Western Europe versus a Soviet threat Americarsquos armed forces have become adept at conducting small expeditionary operations anywhere in the world The increased fl exibility maneuverability and lethality of the US military has included substantial investment in emerging technologies for gathering intelligence distributing it rapidly to all relevant decision makers and users and acting upon it Linked together into a network that ties command to warfi ghting these technologies are a critical tool for modern military operations

The conventional wisdom about the Atlantic Alliance is that the Europeans have not gone through a similar adjustment spend far too little on defense and are left with forces that cannot engage in similar operations alone or in coalition with the United States This study demonstrates that this wisdom is a vast oversimplifi cation As a perception of European military capabilities especially in the arena of networked operations this view condemns both sides of the Atlantic to an unnecessary crisis of confi dence There is indeed some truth to the view that a ldquogaprdquo separates the US and its NATO allies in Europe especially in the arena of networked capabilities But there are important nuances to that gap that need to be understood for interoperability to be achieved

This study shows that a number of European allies already possess or are seriously developing important elements even a full spectrum of modern C4ISR doctrines and capabilities The major European defense powers ndash especially the United Kingdom and France ndash experienced the Gulf War and the Kosovo air war as a serious wakeup call with respect to C4ISR and interoperability with the United States Within available means these countries along with the Netherlands Finland and Sweden are investing in cross-service C2 upgraded communications gear with new radio programs and IP-based capabilities are researching testing or deploying UAV platforms with modern sensors and are tackling issues of cross-service interoperability

CONCLUSIONS

158

The United Kingdom is probably the most advanced in developing network doctrine investing in the range of capabilities required and coordinating its activities with the United States France invests across an even more broad range of capabilities than the United Kingdom (including space systems for example) but has a more diffi cult time coordinating with the United States and is still at the early stages of developing a network doctrine Sweden Finland and the Netherlands have laid out plans for achieving a networked C4ISR capability and are moving slowly forward though interoperability is constrained by national policy Germany Italy and Spain have all made policy statements that commit them to a greater focus on C4ISR networked capabilities and interoperability but actual doctrines and deployed capabilities are still thin

Although progress on C4ISR and networking is uneven in Europe there does not appear to be a signifi cant technology gap between the US and its major European allies At the level of basic technological inputs ndash information communications equipment and sensor systems ndash Europe possesses ample and competitive technology both in the defense and the civilian sector and the know-how to cooperate with the producers of US technology to develop systems and capabilities that can interoperate with US defense systems

It is also an oversimplifi cation to argue that there is a capabilities gap between the US and European militaries There clearly are mismatches in capabilities but they are not at the extreme of saying that the US is moving toward a full network-centric capability while the Europeans are irretrievably mired in the last generation of military technology The leading European nations are developing network-based doctrines and integrating them into their broader defense strategies Many nations are developing and deploying systems in such areas as cross-service C2 upgraded communications systems UAV platforms with modern sensors and cross-service interoperability

NATO has underway a number of programs to create greater interoperability between European and American forces with promise of signifi cant progress in the next decade The EU is also beginning to focus on such capabilities under the framework of the ECAP the Battlegroups and the emerging European Defense Agency There are clear persuasive reasons for making investments in network-based capabilities and transatlantic interoperability a high priority on both sides of the Atlantic NATO the EU and various international forums and industrial collaborations are effective mechanisms for making this happen

There clearly are differences in doctrine and deployment across the Atlantic No NATO ally intends to build or deploy the full global set of networked capabilities projected by the United States Only France has invested in virtually all of the elements of such a capability but no nation has the individual resources to build a capability comparable to that of the United States nor does there appear to be a strategic necessity to do so Only a handful of European allies have formulated doctrines for networked operations however based on their understanding of the uses of C4ISR technology in warfare and of the campaigns they foresee themselves conducting in the near future Networking is not yet at the core of

CONCLUSIONS

159

European military planning nor is the role of multilateral institutions such as the EU entirely clear

This transatlantic ldquodoctrine gaprdquo will need to be bridged if future coalition operations are to succeed This is less a technological issue than it is a policy problem C4ISR technologies and expertise of comparable quality exist within companies and national forces on both sides of the Atlantic Several joint US-European programs have proven that these technologies can be linked The NATO-led advanced concept technology demonstrator CAESAR has proven that sharing data between various national airborne ground surveillance capabilities is possible The six-nation Multinational Interoperability Council program has enabled the sharing of classifi ed information using a combined wide area network The co-development of the Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) has resulted in an encrypted jam-resistant interoperable tactical data communications network In 2005 two other advanced concept technology demonstrators were linked to demonstrate how data from various national collection systems can be posted on a common military website and made available for coalition operations in near real time down to the brigade and platoon levels That same year 43 nations conducted over 15000 interoperability tests in the eleventh consecutive Combined Endeavor exercise These programs demonstrate that interoperability ndash with all of its operational advantages ndash can be achieved without requiring individual countries to relinquish certain military capabilities or parts of their industrial base

For the Europeans one priority for European defense planners will be to develop doctrine that can guide the restructuring of their militaries toward a more expeditionary capability using networked systems France for example develops and procures a wide range of state-of-the-art C4ISR assets but does so without a clearly formulated doctrine for expeditionary network-based operations Such doctrine will make it easier to shift spending from older systems such as main battle tanks and armored personnel carriers into network-based systems such as airborne ground surveillance and space assets Other European defense ministries need to follow suit taking maximum advantage of the contribution that networked capabilities can bring to the level of expeditionary and coalition operations to which they choose to commit

The pace of such a change will have important implications for defense investments A substantial share of European national-level investment in C4ISR and networked capabilities is still at the research technology exploration and development stage The investments of the past decade are now beginning to pay off with deployments taking place over the next ten years from now There is a mismatch in timing with the US pace that needs to be tended to

Policy is again on a critical part of the answer As a common European commitment to out-of-area operations and agile and mobile forces emerges it will create a strong incentive for a redirection of national and trans-European defense investments A Europe uncertain about its military roles and missions will enhance the ldquodrag effectrdquo of legacy forces and investments at the national defense planning level This drag is visible in some of the countries under study notably

CONCLUSIONS

160

Germany and Italy which have substantial investments in legacy forces and the industry that provides their platforms

Resources are the other part of the equation Given the major non-defense commitments of many of the European countries and the unclear defi nition of defense priorities it is enormously diffi cult to redirect public resources to defense Defense resources are unlikely to rise in the near term but this does not mean that resources dedicated to C4ISR cannot grow The diffi cult but necessary decision which some have made and others are coming to involves the tradeoff between legacy forces and equipment and the expeditionary networked forces of the future A doctrine that makes network-based forces more central to overall capability will help reshape budget priorities providing resources for C4ISR investment

The doctrine and deployment gaps are at the heart of current interoperability shortfalls within Europe and across the Atlantic While many European militaries are developing or will soon deploy C2 systems that cross service lines and common communications are the focus of some (the United Kingdomrsquos Bowman system is probably the most ambitious and comprehensive) the results are still uneven across countries The question of cross-European interoperability also needs to be addressed as these changes are made The cross-European gap needs to be closed at the same time the transatlantic gap is being bridged

US policymakers who tend to view transformation network-centric operations and interoperability either solely within the US context or at the fringe as a NATO issue need to keep in mind the cross-European level of activity Recent EU developments suggest that the Europeans do not intend to remain behind will see autonomous networked capabilities and will want to apply their own technology to their needs Europe possesses a technological base adequate to meet this requirement and the European intention of developing such capabilities is becoming more clear The emerging strategic vision in Europe while different from that of the United States clearly includes the desire for increased network-based security capabilities and the ability to operate both autonomously and in coalition with the US Policymakers in the United States need to be aware of these cross-European developments as they are starting to shape European attitudes toward strategic missions the development of rapid reaction capabilities technological investments and cooperation across the Atlantic Over time the rise of a defense-capable European Union will change the context within which these issues are discussed

161

GLOSSARY

Airborne Ground Surveillance (AGS) a radar system ndash mounted on an aircraft or helicopter ndash used for mapping friendly and enemy elements on the ground on a continuous basis and for passing information of their location to commanders for command and control intelligence and strike purposes The use of such a system provides strategic and tactical theater surveillance and target acquisition capabilities and thus reduces both the time and mass required to execute operations AGS systems consist of a radar that can operate in synthetic aperture radar (SAR) mode providing broad area imaging at high resolutions ground moving target indicator (GMTI) mode for tracking moving objects or both

Command Control Communications Computers Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) a range of systems grouped for their relevance to network-centric warfare and network-based operations (see below) When these systems are interconnected they can form a network (or a series of networks) on which operators can exchange information and coordinate activities

Galileo Joint European Commission and European Space Agency program for a space-based positioning navigation and timing system similar to the US Global Positioning System Galileo will include 30 satellites and begin offering services in 2008

Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) Joint European Commission and European Space Agency program for the development of new information systems and techniques to exploit Europersquos existing space-based earth observation capabilities more effi ciently and to plan Europersquos next-generation earth observation systems

Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) a joint project of the US air force and army providing an airborne stand-off range surveillance and target acquisition radar and C2 center Sixteen such aircraft are operational providing ground situation information through communication via secure data links with air force command posts army mobile ground stations and other command centers

Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) a high-capacity electronic counter measure resistant communications link designed for all

GLOSSARY

162

services (air surface and land) and all platform types Operates on the UHF band and supports three message standards Link-16 the Interim JTIDS Message Standard (IJMS) and Variable Message Format (VMF)

Link-11 tactical data link used by the US navy and several other allied navies Its ability to operate on high frequency waves enables the system to communicate beyond line of sight making it ideal for maritime communications Link-11 can also operate in the UHF band but is then limited to line-of-sight ranges

Link-16 tactical data link supporting the exchange of surveillance data EW data mission tasking weapons assignments and control data over MIDS and JTIDS equipment

Link-22 next-generation NATO tactical data link also referred to as NATO Improved Link Eleven (NILE)

Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) A fi ve-nation (United States France Italy Germany and Spain) cooperative program created to develop a third-generation Link-16 system

Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) multinational body providing oversight of coalition interoperability and assisting in implementing actions for its improvement The six member countries (Australia Canada France Germany the United Kingdom and the United States) were chosen as most likely and most capable of leading future coalitions

NATO Air Alliance Ground Surveillance (NATO AGS) NATO research development and procurement program currently in the design phase which will provide the Alliance with an aerial battlefi eld surveillance capability through radar and the fusing of information gathered by other sensors Initially the system was to be deployed on manned aircraft only but it has been redesigned for deployment on both manned and unmanned aircraft

Network-Based Operations (NBO) operations (military and non-military) where elements of command control and communications systems are linked to intelligence-gathering and situation awareness systems Unlike network-centric warfare (see below) the term network-based operations does not imply a single unifi ed network into which all forces are linked Rather several disparate networks ndash possibly deployed by forces from different countries ndash are linked This enables better sharing of information and utilization of forces which in turn means that smaller forces can effectively undertake more complex missions in larger areas of operations

Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) the use of interconnected communications and information systems to create a single network that forms the core of information sharing and strategic operational and tactical decision-making The network gives warfi ghters a shared awareness of the battlespace which in turn enables more effi cient command and control of deployed assets better decision-making for commanders and shorter sensor-to-shooter loops

Precision Guided Munitions (PGM) also known as ldquosmart weaponsrdquo PGMs are a key capability in modern warfi ghting They can be specifi cally designed or regular munitions with an added-on guidance system but in either form maximize destruction of the target while reducing the overall amount of

GLOSSARY

163

munitions required to hit it and minimizing collateral damage While the older less accurate visually-guided munitions are still in use more modern versions are laser- or satellite-guided These include the US Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) and the European Storm Shadow and Scalp missiles

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) remotely piloted aircraft used for a variety of military and civilian tasks Usually categorized into tactical UAV (TUAV) which are used for short-range low-altitude missions medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) used for longer more elaborate missions and high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) used for long-term missions at operational and strategic levels In recent years smaller man-portable and hand-launched mini- and micro-UAVs have been developed and deployed for short-term missions as well as combat UAVs (UCAVs) for strike purposes

164

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adams G (2001a) ldquoStrength in Numbers the European allies and American defense planningrdquo in Williams C (ed) Holding the Line US Defense Alternatives for the Early 21st Century Cambridge MA MIT Press

mdashmdash (2001b) ldquoTaking Europe Seriouslyrdquo in Center for International and Strategic Studies European Defense Industrial Consolidation Implications for US Industry and PolicyWashington DC Center for International and Strategic Studies

mdashmdash (2001c) ldquoFortress America in a Changing Transatlantic Defense Marketrdquo in Schmitt B (ed) Between Cooperation and Competition The Transatlantic Defense MarketParis Institute for Security Studies of the European Union

Adams G and Ben-Ari G (2005) ldquoTransatlantic Revival technology cooperation could offer new startrdquo Defense News 208 21

Adams G Ben-Ari G Logsdon J and Williamson R (2004) European C4ISR Capabilities and Transatlantic Interoperability Washington DC Center for Technology and National Security Policy

Aguumlera M (2003) ldquoDecline in German Research Continuesrdquo Defense News 1837 32Assembly of WEU (2002) Arms Cooperation in Europe WEAG and EU Activities

Brussels Assembly of WEUBaker JC Williamson RA and Johnson B (2001) ldquoUS Security Interests and Dual-

Purpose Satellite Technologiesrdquo in Williamson RA (ed) Dual-Purpose Space Technologies Opportunities and Challenges for US Policymaking Washington DC Space Policy Institute

Barry CL (2002) ldquoCoordinating with NATOrdquo in Binnendijk H (ed) Transforming Americarsquos Military Washington DC Center for Technology and National Security Policy

mdashmdash (2003) ldquoTransforming NATO Command and Control for Future Missionsrdquo DefenseHorizons No 28 Washington DC Center for Technology and National Security Policy

Becher K (2003) ldquoTowards Strategic Dialogue in NATO Europersquos conditionrdquo in Nelson CR and Purcell J (eds) Transforming NATO Forces European PerspectivesWashington DC Atlantic Council of the United States

Bescond B (2003) ldquoGalileo un produit Europeacuteen de souveraineteacuterdquo Defense 105 40ndash3Binnendijk H (2004) ldquoNeeded A NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Forcerdquo Defense

Horizons No 45 Washington DC National Defense UniversityBinnendijk H and Kugler R (2002) ldquoTransforming European Forcesrdquo Survival 44

117ndash32

BIBLIOGRAPHY

165

Boulesteix C (2004) Overview of the French Defense Market 2004 online Available at httpstrategisicgccaepicinternetinimr-rinsfengr125657ehtml (accessed 17 September 2005)

Boyer Y (2004) ldquoThe Consequences of US and NATO Transformation for the European Union a European viewrdquo in Hamilton D (ed) Transatlantic Transformations Equipping NATO for the 21st Century Washington DC Center for Transatlantic Relations

Center for Strategic and International Studies (2001) Technology and Security in the Twenty-fi rst Century US Military Export Control Reform Washington DC Center for Strategic and International Studies

Chuter A (2003a) ldquoUK Strike Chief Notes UAVsrsquo Shortcomingsrdquo Defense News 1830 8

mdashmdash (2003b) ldquoFrench-Dutch UAV Draws Interest In Europerdquo Defense News 1838 4mdashmdash (2005a) ldquoUK May Look to Europe for UCAVsrdquo Defense News 2025 1 8mdashmdash (2005b) ldquoUK Seeks to Expand its UAV Capabilitiesrdquo Defense News 2028 4Council of the European Union (2003) Framework Agreement Between the European

Commission and the European Space Agency Brussels Council of the European Union

mdashmdash (2005) Report by the Head of the European Defense Agency to the Council Brussels Council of the European Union

CPM Forum (2005) ldquoThe Bundeswehr today and tomorrowrdquo in CPM Forum (eds) Defenseand Transformation in Germany St Augustin CPM

DalBello R (2003) ldquoCommercial Communication Satellites assessing vulnerability in a changing worldrdquo in Logsdon J and Adams G (eds) Space Weapons Are They Needed Washington DC The George Washington University

Deacuteleacutegation Geacuteneacuterale pour lrsquoArmement (2003) ldquoLes Deacutemonstrateurs Aeacuteronautiques et Spatiauxrdquo DGA Dossier Paris Deacuteleacutegation Geacuteneacuterale pour lrsquoArmement

De Selding P (2003a) ldquoFrench Defense Ministry Considers Commercial Model for Syracuse 3rdquo Space News 1447 6

mdashmdash (2003b) ldquoSkynet 5 Contract Has Built-in Safeguardsrdquo Space News 1447 10Deutch J Kanter A and Scowcroft B (1999) ldquoSaving NATOrsquos foundationrdquo Foreign

Affairs 786 54ndash67De Wijk R (2004) ldquoThe Implications of Force Transformation the small country

perspectiverdquo in Hamilton DS (ed) Transatlantic Transformation Equipping NATO for the 21st Century Washington DC Center for Transatlantic Relations

European Commission (1996) The Challenges Facing the European Defense-Related Industry A Contribution for Action at European Level Brussels European Commission

mdashmdash (1997) Communication from the Commission Implementing European Union Strategy on Defense-Related Industries Brussels European Commission

mdashmdash (2002) STAR 21 Strategic Aerospace Review for the 21st Century Creating a Coherent Market and Policy Framework for a Vital European Industry Brussels European Commission

mdashmdash (2003a) Communication from the Commission European Defense ndash Industrial and Market Issues ndash Towards an EU Defense Equipment Policy Brussels European Commission

mdashmdash (2003b) Space A New European Frontier for an Expanding Union Brussels European Commission

BIBLIOGRAPHY

166

mdashmdash (2003c) Third European Report on Science and Technology Indicators Brussels European Commission

mdashmdash (2004) Green Paper on Defense Procurement Brussels European CommissionEuropean Convention Working Group ndash Defense (2002) Final Report of Working Group

VIII ndash Defense Brussels European Convention Working Group ndash DefenseEuropean Union (2002) Consolidated Version Of The Treaty On European Union Brussels

European Unionmdashmdash (2003) A Secure Europe in a Better World European Security Strategy Brussels

European Unionmdashmdash (2004) Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe Brussels European UnionFinnish Prime Ministerrsquos Offi ce (2004) Finnish Security and Defense Policy 2004 Helsinki

Prime Ministerrsquos Offi ceFiorenza N (2003a) ldquoNATO Battlefi eld Watchdogrdquo Intelligence Surveillance and

Reconnaissance Journal 26 20ndash2mdashmdash (2003b) ldquoUKrsquos Leap Into UAVsrdquo Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance

Journal 23 37ndash9mdashmdash (2004) ldquoInterview with Franccedilois Naville General Manager of the NATO Air Command

and Control System Management Agencyrdquo Defense News 1948 38mdashmdash (2005a) ldquoHelios 2 Boosts French Satellite Intelligencerdquo C4ISR The Journal of Net-

Centric Warfare 42 34mdashmdash (2005b) ldquoNATOrsquos SATCOM Vrdquo C4ISR The Journal of Net-Centric Warfare 42

32ndash4Forbes I (2003) ldquoTransforming NATO Forcesrdquo in Nelson CR and Purcell J (eds)

Transforming NATO Forces European Perspectives Washington DC Atlantic Council of the United States

Frost and Sullivan (2002) European Command Control Communications Computers and Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Market London Frost and Sullivan

Gavoty D (2003a) ldquoLe PPSM une politique spatiale ambitieuserdquo Deacutefense 105 25ndash8mdashmdash ldquoEuropean Global Space Metasystem for Security and Defenserdquo paper presented at

the Athens Green Paper Consultation on Security and Defense Aspects of Space the challenges for the EU to the Green Paper consultation process Athens May 2003

Gompert DC and Nerlich U (2002) Shoulder to Shoulder The Road to US-European Military Cooperability A German-American Analysis Santa Monica CA RAND

Gompert DC Kugler RL and Libicki MC (1999) Mind the Gap Promoting a Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs Washington DC National Defense University Press

Grapin J (2002) Transatlantic Interoperability in Defense Industries How the US and Europe Could Better Cooperate in Coalition Military Operations Washington DC The European Institute

Hancart B (2003) ldquoLe Domaine Spatial dans la Prospective de Deacutefenserdquo Deacutefense 105 21ndash4

Hegmann G (2005) ldquoEADS baut unbemannten Kampffl iegerrdquo Financial Times Deutschland 22 June 2005

House of Lords ndash European Union Committee (2005) European Defense Agency Report With Evidence London The Stationary Offi ce

Hura M McLeod G Larson E Schneider J Gonzales D Norton D Jacobs J OrsquoConnell K Little W Mesic R and Jamison L (2000) Interoperability a Continuous Challenge in Coalition Air Operations Washington DC RAND

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International Institute for Strategic Studies (1998) The Military Balance 1998ndash99 London International Institute for Strategic Studies

James AD (2004) ldquoDefense Industry and Transformation a European perspectiverdquo in Hamilton D (ed) Transatlantic Transformations Equipping NATO for the 21st Century Washington DC Center for Transatlantic Relations

James AD and Gummett P (1998) European Defense RTD in Context ManchesterUniversity of Manchester

Joint Chiefs of Staff (2000) Joint Vision 2020 Washington DC Department of DefenseJoint Chiefs of Staff

Jones SG (2005) The Rise of Europersquos Defense Industry Washington DC The Brookings Institution US-Europe Analysis Series

Keohane D (2004) ldquoIntroductionrdquo in Bildt C Dillon M Keohane D and Valasek T (eds) Europe in Space London Center for European Reform

Kington T (2004) ldquoItalyrsquos Sky-X Demonstrator Explores Artifi cial Intelligencerdquo C4ISR The Journal of Net-Centric Warfare 33 9

Krepon M (2003) Space Assurance or Space Dominance The Case Against Weaponizing Space Washington DC The Henry L Stimson Center

Laurent C (2001) ldquoSyracuse 3 a new generation of military satellitesrdquo CNES Magazine12 30

Multinational Interoperability Council (2005) MIC Coalition Building Guide Washington DC Multinational Interoperability Council

Nardon L (2001) France Cedes Leading Role in Space to Europe Washington DC Brookings Institution Center on the United States and France

Naumlsstroumlm S (2004) ldquoSwedenrsquos Approach to Defense Research and Transformationrdquo in Bialos JP and Koehl SL (eds) European Defense Research and Development New Visions and Prospects for Cooperative Engagement Washington DC Center for Transatlantic Relations

Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium An Introduction to the Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium Washington DC Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium

Nicoll A (2005) ldquoConsolidating Europersquos Defense Industries big rewards big obstaclesrdquo IISS Strategic Comments 114

Nilsson P (2003) ldquoOpportunities and Risks in a Network Based Defenserdquo Swedish Journal of Military Technology 3 6ndash11

Nilsson J Oumlqvist A and Oumlfjaumlll P (2004) ldquoInformation Fusion at Battalion Levelrdquo Swedish Journal of Military Technology 2 24ndash8

Norwegian Ministry of Defense (2002) Focus on Restructuring of Norwayrsquos Armed Forces 2002 Oslo Norwegian Ministry of Defense

mdashmdash (2004) Proposition to Parliament No 42 (2003ndash2004) The Continued Modernisation of the Norwegian Armed Forces in the Period 2005ndash2008 Oslo Norwegian Ministry of Defense

Picavet F (2003) ldquoConsultation Command and Control Support in NATOrdquo presentation to the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association The Hague February

Quast KH (2003) ldquoFAUST und HEROS Die Saumlulen des Fuumlhrungs- und Informationssystems des Heeresrdquo Wehrtechnik 1 66ndash7

Reder H (2005) ldquoSatellitengestuumltzte Multimediaplatformenrdquo IT Report 2005 2 47ndash50Rehnstroumlm F (2002) ldquoMoving Towards Network Centric Warfarerdquo Swedish Journal of

Military Technology 26 11ndash12

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168

Rheinmetall Defense Electronics (2005) International Companies Network their Competencies ldquoOpen Communityrdquo Promotes Open Interfaces online Available at httpwwwrheinmetall-detecdeindexphplang=3ampfi d=3132 (accessed 25 August 2005)

Schmitt B (2003a) European Armaments Cooperation Core Documents Chaillot Paper No 59 Paris Institute for Security Studies of the European Union

mdashmdash (2003b) The European Union and Armaments Getting a Bigger Bang for the euroChaillot Paper No 63 Paris Institute for Security Studies of the European Union

Schmitt M (2005) ldquoIntegration of the MIP Command and Control Information Exchange Data Model into National Systemsrdquo paper presented at 10th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium McLean VA June

Serfaty S (2005) ldquoTerms of Estrangement French-American relations in perspectiverdquo Survival 473 73ndash92

Silvestri S (2003) Space and Security Policy in Europe Brussels European Union Institute for Security Studies

Stenbit J (2002) lsquoThe New Challenges of Network-Centric Warfarersquo in Grapin J (ed) Transatlantic Interoperability in Defense Industries How the US and Europe Could Better Cooperate in Coalition Military Operations Washington DC The European Institute

Thiele R (2005) ldquoVerbesserte Einsatzfaumlhigkeit zur Transformation der Bundeswehrrdquo in CPM Forum (eds) Defense and Transformation in Germany St Augustin CPM

Thomas JP (2000) The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalitions Adelphi Paper 333 London International Institute for Strategic Studies

Tigner B (2004) ldquoEU Acquisition Central Agency would coordinate arms buysrdquo DefenseNews 195 4

Tran P (2004) ldquoEyes on Smart Procurement French to restructure industry defense ministryrdquo Defense News 193 4

United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (2003) Delivering Security in a Changing World defence white paper Norwich HM Stationery Offi ce

mdashmdash (2005) Network Enabled Capability Handbook London Ministry of DefenseUnited States Department of Defense (2001) Quadrennial Defense Review Report

Washington DC Department of DefenseUnited States Department of Defense Offi ce of Defense Transformation (2003) Military

Transformation A Strategic Report Washington DC Department of DefenseUnited States National Security Council (2002) The National Security Strategy of the

United States of America Washington DC National Security CouncilWestern European Armaments Group (2002) WEAG Rome Declaration online Available

at httpwwwassembly-weuorgendocumentsdiscoursdis2002weag_rome_declarationhtml (accessed 18 August 2005)

169

INDEX

An asterisk following a page number refers to an entry in the Glossary

911 attacks 95

ACCS (Air Command and Control System NATO) 10 27 64 84 87ndash8

ACT (Allied Command Transformation) 7 25 96ndash7 98ndash100 146

ACTDs (Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrators) 91ndash2 154 159

Afghanistan 25 95 96 105 107 145 German forces in 54 UAVs in 56ndash7 US networked global capacity demonstrated in 3 9

AGS (Alliance Ground Surveillance NATO) 64 92ndash3 161

Air Command and Control System (ACCS) 10 27 64 84 87ndash8

airlift see liftAlliance Ground Surveillance (AGS

NATO) 64 92ndash3 161Allied Command Transformation 7 25

96ndash7 98ndash100 146Amsterdam Treaty of 108ARISTOTE broadband communications

system 20 28armamentsdefense market 114 149ndash50

see also industrial technology baseASTOR (Airborne Stand Off Radar) 40

46 92ATM (asynchronous transfer mode)

technology 20 27 55 134Australia 100 102Austria 30 117AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control

System) 31 43 46 91 123 130

BAE Systems 8 83 136ndash7 155Balkans 3 9 31 94 95 105 NATO

implementation and stabilization forces in 86 see also Bosnia Herzegovina Serbia

Baltic States 54Battlegroups 25 53 64 74 109ndash10 120Belgium 30 114BIGSTAF (German communications

infrastructure) program 20 55BOC (Besoins Opeacuterationnels Communs)

129Bosnia-Herzegovina 3 53 89 94 107

145Bowman network 11 20 40 42ndash3 146

160broadband communications 14 20 28 55

122 140

C4ISR (command control communications computers intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance) needed in changing security environment 1ndash2 defi nition 161 European reluctance to elevate technologies of 10 industrial technology base see industrial technology base NATO Prague summit commitments 94ndash8 perceived gap between United States and Europe in 4ndash6 9 96 157ndash8 see also individualcountries

CAESAR (Coalition Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance) 91 154 159

Canada 92 100 102CATRIN (Italian C2 program) 20 64CBRN (chemical biological radiological

and nuclear) defense 96

INDEX

170

CCEB (Combined Communications Electronics Board) 102ndash3

Central Asia 105Centre National drsquoEtudes Spatiales

(CNES) 24ndash5CJTF (Combined Joint Task Forces

NATO) 86 97CNES (Centre National drsquoEtudes

Spatiales) 24ndash5Coalition Aerial Surveillance and

Reconnaissance (CAESAR) 91 154Combined Communications Electronics

Board (CCEB) 102ndash3Combined Endeavor 104ndash5 159Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF

NATO) 86 97command and control (C2) systems

center of excellence for 88 99 in France 26ndash7 in Germany 53ndash4 interoperability 20 27 103ndash5 seealso interoperability in Italy 64 in NATO 87ndash8 see also Air Command and Control System in Netherlands 69ndash70 see also Netherlands NATO C2 center of excellence in Spain 73 74 in Sweden 78 in United Kingdom 41ndash2 see also C4ISR

communications and computers broadband communications 14 20 28 55 122 140 in France 20 27ndash9 in Germany 20 54ndash6 interoperability 30 42 104ndash5 see also interoperability in Italy 20 65 NATO communications and information programs 89ndash90 NEC systems 11ndash12 in Netherlands 20 70 overview of European digital communications systems 20 in Spain 74 in Sweden 20 79 in United Kingdom 11ndash12 20 42ndash3 see alsoC4ISR satellites

computers see communications and computers

COMSATs (communications satellites) 20 28 122 see also satellites

Cormorant network 11 20 42ndash3COSMO-Skymed (Italian imagery satellite

program) satellite system 30 66 124COTS (Commercial Off The Shelf)

equipment 47 54 55ndash6 78 87 Deployable COTS Network (DCN) 14

CRONOS (Crisis Response Operations in NATO Open Sytems) 89 95

Czech Republic 117

DABINETT program 43ndash4DCI (Defense Capabilities Initiative) 10

96defense budgets Dutch 69 European

4 6 9ndash10 25 95 106 French 24 German defense investment 153 159ndash60 Italian defense investment 159ndash60 RampD investment see research and development (RampD) investment Spanish 73 United States 3 US policy recommendations regarding Europersquos investments 153

Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) 10 96defense market see armamentsdefense

marketdefense strategy European defense

planning recommendations 146ndash8 European focus at nation level 9 10ndash11 Europersquos lack of long-term doctrinal vision on 10 EU strategic defense planning 107ndash11 119ndash20 seealso European Capabilities Action Plan French organizational changes for 21ndash5

Deployable COTS Network (DCN) 14Desert Shield 3Desert Storm 3DGA (Deacuteleacutegation Geacuteneacuterale pour

lrsquoArmement) 21ndash5 33disaster management 122 see also relief

operationsdual-use technologies 8 132 145 149ndash50

space programs 123ndash4 125

EADS (European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company) 8 29 113 125 135ndash6 EADS Astrium 30 43 58 125 EADS CASA 32 Framework Program participation 119 HRM-7000 tactical radio 57 73 Paradigm Secure Communications 43

early warning systems 33ndash40 79ndash83 seealso AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System)

earth observation satellites 3 29ndash30 33 66 123ndash4 see also satellites

ECAP (European Capabilities Action Plan) 108 112 114

INDEX

171

EDA (European Defense Agency) 110ndash11 115ndash16 118 120 149 Industry and Market Directorate 113 RampT Directorate 118

Ericsson 79ndash83 Saab Ericsson Network Based Defense Innovation 140

ERRF (European Rapid Reaction Force) 97ndash8 108ndash9 120

EUCLID (European Cooperation for the Long Term in Defense) 117

Euro Hawk (German (UAV program) 36EUROFINDER 117EuroMALE unmanned aerial vehicles 32

73 83European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP)

108 112ndash13 146European Commission 115 120 125

126ndash7 129 130 encouragement of regional defense market 150 involvement in European RampD 118

European Defense Agency (EDA) 110ndash11 115ndash16 118 120 149

European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) 97ndash8 108ndash9 120

European Space Agency 123 126 127 129 130

European Union armaments policy 107 110 113ndash16 Battlegroups 25 53 64 74 109ndash10 120 defense cooperation with France 25 defense research and technology programs 116ndash19 Headline Goal 5 107 108ndash9 112 146 industrial base planning 113ndash16 space policy in Constitutional Treaty 127ndash8 strategic defense planning 107ndash11 119ndash20 seealso European Capabilities Action Plan

European Union Force (EUFOR) 14

Falcon network 11 43 163FAUST (German C2 system) (Tactical

Command Provision) system 53 54Finland industrial technology base 133

network-based defense (NBD) 13ndash14Finmeccanica 137 139ndash40Framework Programs (FPs) 118ndash19 149France command and control systems

26ndash7 communications and computers 20 27ndash9 defense cooperation with EU and NATO 25 defense doctrine 16 Deacuteleacutegation Geacuteneacuterale pour lrsquoArmement(DGA) 21ndash5 33 as European leader

in space 26 29 123 124 129 French air force 31 32 33 French army 26 30ndash1 33 French navy 25 26ndash7 33 increasing importance of C4ISR capabilities 21ndash6 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 29ndash33 92 interoperability in French forces 25ndash7 NBO capability table 34ndash9 organizational changes for defense strategy 21ndash5 satellites 29 33 122 123 124 Systegraveme drsquoInformation et de Commandement des Armeacutees(SICA) 20

Galileo satellites 4ndash5 124 125 128 131Germany adoption of transformation

policies 16ndash17 command and control (C2) 53ndash4 communications and computers 20 54ndash6 defense investments 153 159ndash60 development of C4ISR capabilities 47 53 German air force 54 55 German army 53ndash4 56ndash7 58 German navy 54 55 57 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 56ndash8 92 limited cycling of forces for NRF 97 NBO capability table 59ndash63 satellites 122 123 124

Global Hawk (US UAV program) 44 52 57 63 91 93

Global Positioning System (GPS) 125 131GMES (Global Monitoring for

Environment and Security) 125ndash7 128ndash9 161

Greece 30 32Griffi n wide area network 47 101 103ground surveillance airborne 21 30

91 154 159 Alliance Ground Surveillance NATO 64 92ndash3 161 earth observation satellites see earth observation satellites seealso intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance radar

Gulf War fi rst 1 6 military lessons of 2 107 152 US networked global capacity demonstrated in 9

Headline Goal 5 107 108ndash9 112 146Helios (French-led imagery satellite

program) earth observation system 29ndash30 33 77 123 124

INDEX

172

HEROS C2 system 53 54Hispasat (Spanish communications

satellite program) satellite system 124humanitarian relief 1 13 105 108ndash10Hungary 117

imagery intelligence (IMINT) 32ndash3 57Indonesia 105industrial technology base European

overview 8 132ndash4 142ndash3 European second tier defense companies 137ndash40 Europersquos largest corporation systems see BAE Systems EADS Thales (corporation) industrial base planning 8 113ndash16 Letter of Intent to facilitate trans-European defense market 114 150 non-defense European C4ISR market 140ndash1 recommendations for a cross-European market 149ndash50 US export control 93 106 154ndash6

intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrators for 91ndash2 154 159 in France 29ndash33 92 in Germany 56ndash8 92 imagery intelligence 32ndash3 57 in Italy 65ndash6 92 in NATO 91ndash3 see also Alliance Ground Surveillance in Netherlands 73 92 satellites 122ndash3 see alsosatellites in Spain 29 77 92 in Sweden 79ndash83 in United Kingdom 43ndash7 see also C4ISR sensors

internet 14 28 42 86 87 see alsobroadband communications

Internet Protocol (IP) Europersquos communication programs increasingly based on 20 IP-network-based infrastructure 53 54 IP-networked radios 27ndash8 55 134 see also tactical radio systems STANAGS for IP-based communications 79

interoperability between British and American forces 12 40 43 Combined Endeavor exercises 104ndash5 of communications and computer networks 42 effects of transatlantic doctrine and deployment differences 158ndash60 between European C2 systems 20 27 European RampT investment as a key to enhancing 116 see alsoresearch and technology (RampT)

programs of French forces 25ndash7 of ground surveillance systems 91ndash3 of imagery intelligence analysis systems 32ndash3 123 Multilateral Interoperability Program 103ndash4 106 Multinational Interoperability Council see MIC multinational network programs (outside NATO context) 100 Multi-sensor Aerospace-ground Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition 92 between NATO and United States 84 94ndash9 105ndash6 154 NATO Prague summit commitments 7 10 94ndash8 through NATO STANAGS 32 79 84 91 93ndash4 146 platform strategy effect on 25 lsquoplug and playrsquo approach 144 147 154 road to integrated European space systems 128ndash31 between satellite systems 30 US concerns about European capabilities of 4ndash5 US export control as disincentive for 93 106 154ndash6

Iraq 3 9 96 105 107 145 UAV performance in 44

Iridium satellite communications system 122Italy collaboration with Spain 64 73

command and control systems 64 communications and computers 20 65 defense investments 159ndash60 gradual deployment of network-based capabilities 58 64 industrial collaboration with United States 58 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 65ndash6 92 NBO capability table 67ndash8 satellites 29 30 66 122 124 see also Helios earth observation system Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force 64 73

JOCS (UK C2 system) (Joint Operational Command System) 27 40 41

Joint Command System (JCS) (UK C2 system) 20 41

JSTARS (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System) 3 33 92 161

JTIDS (Joint Tactical Information Distribution System) 43 46 89 161ndash2 see also MIDS

Kosovo 3 94 95 105 107 145 German forces in 53 54 57 shortfalls revealed

INDEX

173

in European capability 88 152 UAVs in 44 56

Liberia 105lift 1 5 96Link-11 tactical data link 27 28 43 55

65 70 162Link-16 tactical data link 28 29 65

70 79 162 with JTIDS 43 MIDS upgrade of 84 see also MIDS transatlantic interoperability through 25 27

Link-22 tactical data link 28 55 65 74 162

logistics 1 5 96

Maastricht Treaty 108MAJIIC (Multi-sensor Aerospace-ground

Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition) 92

MIC (Multinational Interoperability Council) 42 53 100ndash2 103 106 159 defi nition 162

MIDS (Multifunctional Information Distribution System) 28 74 84 89ndash90 142 159 defi nition 162

MIP (Multilateral Interoperability Program) 103ndash4 106

missiles Surface-Air-Missile Operations Centre (SAMOC) 54 surveillance 123 theatre missile defense 88 95

Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) 28 74 84 89ndash90 142 159

Multilateral Interoperability Program (MIP) 103ndash4 106

Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) 42 53 100ndash2 103 106 159

Multi-sensor Aerospace-ground Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition (MAJIIC) 92

NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) 122

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Air Command and Control System 10 27 64 84 87ndash8 Allied Command Transformation 7 25 88 96ndash7 98ndash100 C2 center of excellence 88 99 Combined Joint Task Forces 86 command

and control programs 87ndash8 seealso Air Command and Control System (ACCS) communications and information programs 89ndash90 General Purpose Communications System 89 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 91ndash3 see alsoAGS interoperability 84 94ndash9 105ndash6 154 see also PCC Istanbul summit 100 NATO Air Alliance Ground Surveillance (NATO AGS) 64 92ndash3 162 NATO Network-Enabled Capabilities (NNEC) project 99 NATO Response Force (NRF) 7 25 88 96 97ndash8 148 Prague summit commitments 7 10 94ndash8 152 as principle transatlantic context for C4ISR issues 84ndash5 105ndash6 progress towards networked C4ISR 9ndash10 roles and capabilities 85ndash7 Satcom V project 90 standardization agreements (STANAGs) 32 79 84 91 93ndash4 146 Washington summit 96

NCOIC (Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium) 141ndash2

NCW (network-centric warfare) 3 9 162NEC (network-enabled capabilities)

11ndash12 40 NATO Network-Enabled Capabilities (NNEC) project 99

Netherlands C4ISR interoperability 66 69 command and control systems 69ndash70 communications and computers 20 70 defense budget 69 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 73 92 NATO C2 center of excellence 88 99 NBO capability table 71ndash2 NBO strategy 14ndash15 support centres 15

network-based defense (NBD) 12ndash14 17network-based operations (NBO) in

a changing security environment 1ndash4 144ndash5 151 defi nition 162 European national capability overview 20ndash3 see also individual countriesEuropean strategies 9ndash18 policy recommendations for Europe regarding European network-based capabilities 144ndash50 policy recommendations for United States regarding European network-based capabilities 150ndash6

Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium (NCOIC) 141ndash2

INDEX

174

network-centric warfare (NCW) 3 9 162network-enabled capabilities (NEC)

11ndash12 40 NATO Network-Enabled Capabilities (NNEC) project 99

Neuron (European UCAV program) 32 39 45 66 67 76 82ndash3 135 140 154

New Zealand 100 102NGCS (NATO General Purpose

Communications System) 89Nokia 136 141Northrop Grumman ISS International Inc

44 57 77 92 113 135Norway network-based defense (NBD)

11 17 participation in MAJIIC 92NRF (NATO Response Force) 7 25 88

96 97ndash8 148nuclear proliferation 151 see also CBRN

(chemical biological radiological and nuclear) defense

OCCAR (Organization Conjoint pour la Cooperation en Matiere drsquoArmament)111 114 116 150

ORFEO (Optical and Radar Federated Earth Observation) 30 66 154

Paradigm Secure Communications (subsidiary of EADS) 43

PASR (Preparatory Action on Security Research) 119

PCC (Prague Capabilities Commitments) 7 10 96

peacemakingpeacekeeping 94 95 105 107 108ndash10 129

Petersberg tasks 108ndash10Phoenix (UK UAV program) 40 44 136Pleiades (French-led imagery satellite

program) earth observation system 30 66 124

Poland 117Prague summit 2002 94ndash8 Prague

Capabilities Commitments (PCC) 7 10 96

Predator (US UAV program) 3 32 45 58 65

Preparatory Action on Security Research (PASR) 119

QinetiQ 138ndash9

radar 30ndash1 79 92ndash3 134 Active Phased Array Radar (APAR) project 142 see

also ASTOR JSTARS ORFEO SAR-Lupe radar satellite

radios see tactical radio systemsRAKEL (Swedish C4 infrastructure) 79

81reconnaissance see intelligence

surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)relief operations 1 13 105 108ndash10research and development (RampD)

investment 6 8 10 26 116 118 German cuts in 53

research and technology (RampT) programs 24 47 105 111 116ndash19 recommendations for investment 149

Rheinmetall Defence Electronics 137ndash8Rhode and Schwarz 138RITA 2000 (French communications

infrastructure) (Reacuteseau Inteacutegreacute de Transmissions Automatiques 2000) 20 27 134

Saab 32 83 140 Saab Ericsson Network Based Defense Innovation 140

Sagem 139SAR-Lupe (German imagery satellite

program) radar satellite 58 124SATCOM-BW satellite communications

program 56Satcom V (NATO communications satellite

program) project 90satellites Common Operational

Requirements (BOC) 129 for communications (COMSATs) 20 28 122 COSMO-Skymed 30 66 124 EU Satellite Center (EUSC) 130 Galileo 4ndash5 124 125 128 131 in geosynchronous orbit 122 Helios 29ndash30 33 77 123 124 Hispasat 124 interoperability 30 Iridium 122 micro-satellites 33 40 in NEC doctrine 11 overview of European developments regarding 20 Pleiades 30 66 124 for reconnaissance and surveillance 122ndash3 SAR-Lupe radar satellite 58 124 SATCOM-BW 56 Satcom V project 90 SICRAL 124 Skynet 11 20 43 124 Spainsat program 74 122 124 Syracuse 20 28 124 see also space programs

sealift see liftsecurity environment international 1ndash4

144ndash5 151

INDEX

175

sensors 1 2 3 5 11 33 British investment 40 dual-use technology 132 see also dual-use technologies interoperability 91ndash3 Multi-sensor Aerospace-ground Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition 92

Serbia 4 94 see also Balkans KosovoSIAF (Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force)

64 73SICA (French C2 system) (Systegraveme

drsquoInformation et de Commandement des Armeacutees) 20

SICRAL (Italian communications satellite program) satellite system 124

signals intelligence (SIGINT) 33 57Skynet satellites 11 20 43 124SOCRATE (French communications

infrastructure) (Systegraveme Opeacuterationnel Constitueacute des Reacuteseaux des Armeacutees pour les Teacuteleacutecommunications) 20 27 116ndash17

South Africa 105space programs CNES 24ndash5 European

collaboration on 121ndash31 France as European leader in space 26 29 123 124 129 role of space programs NBO 121ndash3 see also satellites

Spain command and control systems 73 74 communications and computers 74 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 29 77 92 modernization program 73 NBO capability table 75ndash6 satellites 74 77 122 124 Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force 64 73

SPIRALE (French early warning satellite program) early warning system 33ndash40

STANAGs (NATO standardization agreements) 32 79 84 91 93ndash4 146

support centres 15surveillance see ground surveillance

intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)

Sweden command and control systems 78 communications and computers 20 79 industrial technology base 133 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 79ndash83 NBO capability table 80ndash2 network-based defense (NBD) 12ndash13 77 rapid reaction units 77ndash8

Switzerland 30 32Syracuse (French satellite communications

program) programs 20 28 124

tactical radio systems 17 27ndash8 42ndash3 55 56ndash7 Bowman network 11 20 40 42ndash3 146 160 of Dutch army 70 Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) 28 42 43 45 90 of Swedish services 78 79 by Thalesrsquo Land and Joint Systems 134

terrorism 1 2 95 121 151Thales (corporation) 8 79 134ndash5

Framework Program participation 119 French communications and computer systems 27ndash8 support for increased investments in security space 125 Thales Netherlands 70 Thales Raytheon Systems 88 113 135 142 155 Think Tank 24

THALES (Technology Arrangements for Laboratories for Defense European Science) framework 117

theatre missile defense (TMD) 88 95TIPS (Transatlantic Industry Proposed

Solution) 92ndash3TITAAN (Dutch communications

infrastructure) 23 53 66 69 70 71 146

TOPSAT (UK imagery satellite program) 47 52 138

Turkey 30

UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) 3 31ndash2 44ndash5 56ndash7 73 163

United Kingdom British Army 12 41 42 command and control systems 41ndash2 communications and computers 11ndash12 20 42ndash3 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 43ndash7 92 interoperability with United States 12 40 43 investment in C4ISR systems 40 Joint Command System (JCS) 20 41 Joint Operational Command System (JOCS) 27 40 41 Ministry of Defense restructuring 12 40 NBO capability table 48ndash52 network-enabled capabilities (NEC) 11ndash12 40 Royal Air Force 12 41 43 46 Royal Navy 12 41 43 satellites 122 124

United States export control regulations 93 106 154ndash6 global satellite coverage 122 123 125 interoperability

INDEX

176

with NATO 84 94ndash9 105ndash6 154 seealso interoperability interoperability with United Kingdom 12 40 43 non-compliance with NATO STANAGs 94 perceived gap between United States and European militaries 4ndash6 9 96 153 157ndash8 policy recommendations for United States regarding European network-based capabilities 150ndash6 role in NRF 98 transformation process 2ndash3 9 157 US Navy 25

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) 3 31ndash2 44ndash5 56ndash7 73 163 Advanced Joint Communications Node (AJCN) 44ndash5 digital technology and 123 French linking with manned platforms and space-based assets 26 29 interoperability 44ndash5 56 154 micro-UAVs 45 58 mini-UAVs 31 45 56ndash7

UCAV (combat) technology 32 57ndash8 83 versatility of 20ndash1 99

unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) 45 139

VIRVE (Finnish national C4 infrastructure) 14

Watchkeeper program 40 44ndash5 134WEAG (Western European Armaments

Group) 116ndash18WEAO (Western European Armaments

Organization) 118 120weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

operations 1 2 95 121ndash2wide area networks (WANs) 41 47 86

101 103

ZODIAC (Dutch tactical communications system) 70 71

1313

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wwweBookstoretandfcouk

• BOOK COVER
• HALF-TITLE
• SERIES-TITLE
• TITLE
• COPYRIGHT
• CONTENTS
• LIST OF TABLES
• ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
• ABBREVIATIONS
• 1 INTRODUCTION Networked operations and European capabilities
• 2 EUROPEAN STRATEGIES FOR NETWORK-BASED OPERATIONS
• 3 EUROPEAN NATIONAL CAPABILITIES FOR NETWORK-BASED OPERATIONS
• 4 NATO AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NETWORK-BASED CAPABILITIES
• 5 THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NETWORK-BASED CAPABILITIES
• 6 EUROPEAN COLLABORATION ON SPACE ASSETS FOR NETWORK-BASED OPERATIONS
• 7 THE EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASE FOR NETWORK-BASED CAPABILITIES
• 8 EUROPEAN NETWORK-BASED CAPABILITIES Policy recommendations
• 9 CONCLUSIONS
• GLOSSARY
• BIBLIOGRAPHY
• INDEX