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FOREWORD

Studies on ethnicity and the armed forces flourished duringthe Soviet era, but relati vely l i t t le att ent ion has been paid to theissue within the successor states. The republics of Central Asiaare ostensibly ethni cthey are named after the t i tular ethnicgroup that supposedly predominates in each. But , in t rut h, theyare art i fi cial creations, the product of Soviet gerrymander ing andvarious waves of ethnic emigrat ion.

A major facet of nation-bui lding in Cent ral Asia has been t he

development of republican armed forces independent of theRussian Federation and the Commonwealth of IndependentStates. The mission of the Cent ral Asian regimes is to create newnational institutions such as the armed forces that canaccomodate and int egrate the various ethnic composit ions. Eachrepubl ic has had varying success in thi s process, in part becauseof t he relat ive weight of various ethnic mixtures, but also becauseof the her i tage of Soviet ethnic pol i t ics.

The author examines whether ethnic consciousness affectsmilitary service and the specific roles played by ethnic groupswithin the armed forces, or if military institutions affectethnicity. The Soviets used military service as a tool to breakdown ethnicity and create a New Soviet Man. They failed. DoCentral Asian armed forces break down ethnic divisions andserve as a vehicle for social i nt egration or do they reinforce ethnicconsciousness within minorities and therefore sharpen ethnicpolarization? Ethnicity tore the Soviet Union apart. Can theCentral Asian states avoid that fate? Will their military forceshelp or hinder that process? Can the U.S. armed forces, whichhave a well-mer ited reputation for managing diversity, provide arole model to help promote stability in this increasinglyimpor tant, energy r ich, region?

LARRY M. WORTZELColonel, U.S. Ar myDirector , St rategic Studies Inst it ute

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BI OGRAPHI CAL SKETCH OF TH E AUTH OR

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DIANNE L. SMITH is theanalyst on Russia for Allied Forces Central Europe. FromAugust 1997 unt i l Jul y 1998 she was the Di rector of ArmyIntelligence at the Center for Strategic Leadership. Sheserved as a Strategic Research Analyst in the StrategicStudies Inst i tute from August 1995 to August 1997. Pr ior tothat she was Team Chief for Cent ral Asia, National M il i tary

Intelligence Collection Center, Defense IntelligenceAgency. A Mil i tary Intel l igence officer and Russian ForeignArea Officer , her previous assignments include U.S. ArmyExchange Off icer to the United Kingdom DefenseIntelligence and Security School, Ashford, Kent, UnitedKingdom; Chief of Strategic Inte l l igence Branch,Intelligence Division, Allied Forces Central Europe,Brunssum, Netherlands; Counterintelligence Officer,

Combined Field Army (ROK-US), Uijongbu, Korea; andAssistant Professor of Russian History at t he U.S. Mi l i taryAcademy. Her recent works include Muscovite Logistics,1475-1598 and From Chattanooga to Durham Station, theInfluence of Logist ics Upon Shermans St rategy. She holdsa B.A. in history and international relations from theUniversity of Nebraska and an M.A. and Ph.D. in Russianhistory from the University of Cal i fornia at Davis. She is a

graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General StaffCollege and the U.S. Army War Col lege.

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SUMMARY

Race. Ethnicity. Religion. The decade following thecollapse of the Soviet bloc has not wi tnessed t he creation of aNew World Order, but a New World Disorder in whichconflicts involving race, ethnicity, and religion haveresul ted in t he deaths of over one mi l l ion people. Breakingthe constraints of totalitarianism has opened a PandorasBox around the world. Early fears that the Central Asian

states also would fall victim to ethnic hatred have so farlargely proved false. But Central Asia is a region of greatwealth and great instabilitymore so following recentvictories by Afghanistans radical Taliban which shares areligious and ethnic heritage with many of its northernneighbors.

Ethnicity is defined as the basis for groups whose

membership is determined by ties of kinship, language,religion, race, or culture. Supposedly the Central Asianstates are ethnic creations, named after the titularmajority, e.g., Kazakhs in Kazakhstan. But that is a falseillusion. Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan,and Turkmenistan did not exist prior to the drawing ofSoviet republican boundaries. Their independence in 1991was just as art i fi cialthe resul t of t he breakup of t he Soviet

Union and the bir th of sovereign states fr om internal Sovietadminist rative boundaries. As a resul t , each was faced wi ththe immediate tasks of ident i fying it s national ident i ty andnation-building.

This study examines the impact of ethnicity on thearmed forces of the Central Asian states by first sum-marizing the ethnic composition of the five new republics,then examining the legacy of Soviet ethnic policy uponCentral Asia. It then considers ways in which differentnewly-independent states have created their militaryinst i tut ions and handled the issue of ethnici ty wi thin theirarmed forces. Finally, it examines the possible role the

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United States can play in assisting the armed forces ofCentral Asia to learn how to manage diversity and thuspromote stability in this energy rich, but inherently

unstable, r egion.The nation-states of Central Asia suffer from the

dysfunction that occurs when territorial and ethnicboundaries do not coincide. All five republics are theart i ficial creations of Soviet cartographers who deliberatelycut across nat ional i t ies to generate ethnic tensions, to makeeach republ ic a sor t of Matreshka-doll wit h minor it ies insideminorities inside minoritiesall dependent on Moscow.Thus, the new republics created with the breakup of theSoviet Union reflect the tension between nation-buildingand sel f-determinat ionbetween making do wi th the handdealt you and t rying to reshuffl e the deck.

Making do means t rying to create viable armed forcesfrom the remnants of Soviet forces stationed within theboundaries at independence. Making do means trying to

create a professional officer corps to reflect the titularnat ional i ty for which t he state was named (e.g., Uzbeks inUzbek is tan) when the of f icer corps inher i ted a tindependence was not just predominantly Slavic, butuniformly Slavic. Making do means overcoming the Sovietheritage of ethnic stereotype and discrimination and thehat reds fostered dur ing out breaks of violence in the waningdays of empire. Making do means trying to identify a

historical military heritage to build upon. Making domeans t rying to recrui t , t rain, house, feed, and field armedforces with Soviet leftovers. Making do means trying tosuceed at ethnic integrat ion when a r icher, morecent rali zed, and more power ful Soviet Union fail ed.

But the Cent ral Asian states do not necessari ly have tomake do on their own. This region is becoming increasing-

ly more important to the United States, both in terms ofaccess to i ts energy and mineral resources and in secur ingstability in a central core around which regional powerssuch as Russia, China, Iran, and Turkey (and destabil izing

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regimes such as the Tal iban) jockey for posit ion. Al leviatingethni c tensions within the armed forces of the Cent ral Asianstates and helping them manage diversi ty, therefore, is of

great importance to the United States. The U.S. armedforces, by pr oviding a successful model for that process andengaging these forces dur ing their formulative per iod, canpromote regional stabi l i ty.

Ethnic politics may yet tear apart the Central Asianrepublics as i t has many of t heir neighbors (and t he SovietUnion). Whether the Central Asian states can preventethnicity from shaping or distor t ing their armed forces wi l lbe a key indicator of t heir abi l i ty to manage diversi ty wi thinsociety as a whole. Whether the Central Asian states canul t imately use the mi l i tary as a force for social integrationwill reveal their ability to create tools to shape their ownfuture.

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OPENI NG PANDORAS BOX?ETHN I CI TY AND CENTRAL ASI AN

MIL ITARIES

INTRODUCTION

The collapse of the Soviet Union created five newrepublics in Central Asia: Kazakstan, Uzbekistan,Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. They were

ill-prepared for independence. Each possessed executiveand legislati ve inst i tut ions (to include a Minist ry of ForeignAffairs) as ostensibly self-standing republics voluntarilyformed into a larger union, but there was no republican-level military framework, and local economies were allsubordinate to centralized planning and direction fromMoscow. Each state, therefore, was immediately faced wi ththe ser ious business of nat ion-bui lding.

The nations of Central Asia had no tradition ofstatehood pr ior to their creation by Stalin i n t he 1920s and1930s. Each Soviet Socialist Republ ic was named aft er onespecifi c (supposedly predominant ) ethnic group, but in real-i ty, as a resul t of centur ies of t ransmigration, the republicsinstead bore a decidedly multi-ethnic character. Moscowsattempts to create a Soviet identity which transcended

ethnicity, nationality, and religion failed. When BorisYeltsin unleashed and encouraged ethnic nationalism towrest central power from the Communist Party, hesucceeded instead in destroying the Soviet Union andbreaking it along ethni c l ines.1 Thus, as the new states t ry tocome to gr ips wi th t heir own ident ity, each str uggles to buil dinstitutions that integrate and assimilate often antagonis-t ic ethnic groups. The armed forces are part icularly affected

by this process.Studies flour ished dur ing the Soviet era on ethni city and

the armed forces, but relatively little attention has beenpaid to the issue wi thin t he successor states. Ethnicity (here

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defined as the basis for groups whose membership isdetermined by ties of kinship, language, religion, race, orculture) interacts with other sources of identification

gender, class, occupation, locality, and institutionalaffiliationto produce the complex social and politicalfabric of t he new republics.2 Ethni city i s passive, l ike genderor race. When cognizance of ethnic background becomes avital part of self-identity, ethnicity is elevated to ethnicconsciousness. When ethnic consciousness becomes anactive factor in decisionmaking, it then becomes ethnicpol i t ics. Ethnic pol i t ics is reflected wi thin Cent ral Asia in

four main areas: between Moscow (which has appointeditself defender of diasporaRussians living outside Russiasborders) and the new republics; among the five republics;among ethnic groups within each republic; and amongindividuals in their neighborhoods, schools, mil i tary uni ts,and workplaces.

The issue of ethnic pol i t ics and t he armed forces can be

considered from two perspectives. How does ethnicityinfluence the armed forces? Does ethnic consciousnessaffect mi l i tary service or the specifi c roles played by ethnicgroups within the armed forces? On the other hand, howhave mi l i tary inst i tut ions affected ethnicity? Are the armedforces a tool to break down ethnic divisions or a vehicle forsocial integration? Or do they reinforce ethnic conscious-ness within minorities and therefore sharpen ethnic

polarization?

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The mil i tary can play a var iety of negative orpositive roles when the state is playing ethnic politicsasan integrating institution, as a force to suppress ethnicunrest or secession, as a participant in unrest, or as apoli t ical force to intervene in civi l ian pol i t ics (especiall y i fits ethnic composition does not mirror that of the existingregime).4

This study examines the impact of ethnicity on the

armed forces of the Central Asian states by f irstsummarizing the ethnic composition of the five newrepublics, then examining the legacy of Soviet ethnic pol icyupon Cent ral Asia. Next , it considers ways in which di ffer -

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ent newly-independent states have created their militaryinst i tut ions and handled the issue of ethni ci ty as i t relatesto their armed forces and explores the use of armed forces as

a tool of ethnic pol i t ics. Finall y, i t discusses the implicationto the United States of ethnicity within Central Asianarmed forces and suggests ways in which t he U.S. mi l i tarycan engage these forces and help them to learn how tomanage diversity.

TH E ETHN I C COMPOSI TI ON OFTHE CENTRAL ASI AN REPUBLI CS

The nation states of Central Asia suffer from thedysfunct ion t hat occurs when the ter r i tor ial boundaries andethnic boundaries do not coincide.5 Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan,Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan did not existpr ior to the drawing of Soviet republican boundaries. Beforethat the mass of Central Asians distinguished themselvesmostly as urban versus rural, nomadic versus sedentary,

Turkic-speaking versus Persian-speaking, or by the clanthey belonged to:

To a great extent, drawing the boundaries for the five

republics created the peoples for whom they were named,

mandating new ethnic identities that earlier had been onlyone part of t he many ways members of various Cent ral Asian

tr ibes had ident i fied themselves and their kin. Closely related

nomadic fami li es who had differed from one another primari ly

in the manner of their migrat ions suddenly received passportsthat identified them as Kazakhs or Kyrgyz, and found

themselves l iving in neighbor ing republics. Simi larly sedentswho farmed in essentially the same way but spoke Turkic orPersian dialects at home now became Uzbeks and Tajiks,respectively. All these peoples had small national elites for

whom nat ional ident i ty was primary, but t hey were in a clearminor it y. . . .6

Since no nation-states existed in the centuries beforeRussian conquest, substantial transmigration of ethnicgroups characterized the region. As a result, majorconcentrations of ethnic minorities now reside within

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countries other than their titular7 nation, to include: onemi l l ion Uzbeks in t he Khojent province of Tajik istan, half amillion Uzbeks in the Osh area of the Fergana valley in

Kygyzstan, and 280,000 Uzbeks in t he Chimkent region ofKazakstan; one to two million Tajiks in Samarkand andBukhara, Uzbekistan; near ly a mi l l ion Kazaks inUzbekistan; and roughly eight million (a number dailydeclining) Russians, Ukrainians, and Germans in thenorthern part of Kazakstan.8 Thus,

Kazakhstan is a Tur kic state, but also a Russian one; Tajikistan

is a Persian state, but also a Turkic one; Uzbekistan is a Turkicstate, but also a Persian one. In the end, all are in fact

multinational states, formed from a multinational society that

dissolved aft er i ts ideology was discredited.9

Stalins car tographic exercises purposeful ly cut acrossnat ional i t ies, to divide and conquer; borders were drawndel iberately t o generate internal ethni c tensions, to makeeach republ ic a sor t of Matreshka-doll wit h minor it ies inside

minorities inside minoritiesall dependent on Moscow.10Central authorities meant these borders as internaladministrative control mechanisms; no one dreamed thatSoviet Socialist Republ ics would ever become actual states.As a resul t , each state claims terr i tory from i ts neighbors. Asample of ethno-territorial disputes between Russia,Kazakstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, andKyrgyzstan is provided in the Appendix.

Powerful external forces also compl icated the ethnic mixwi thin Cent ral Asia. The region became a war t ime dumpingground for exiled nationalities, such as Volga Germans,Crimean Tatars, Koreans, and Meskhetian Turks. Stalinrelocated war industries (and their work forces) fromEuropean Russia during the early days of World War II.Khrushchevs Virgin Land program of the 1950s and

Moscows systemat ic immigration of ethnic Slavs (to dilutethe titular nationality) after Stalins death contributed aswell.

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A final complication was the strata of well-educated,Soviet ized, urban Cent ral Asians who had scaled the SovietUnions military, business, administrative, and govern-

mental hierarchy. Educated in Moscow, fluent in Russianbut often mute in their mother tongue, the bulk of theiradulthood spent out side their home republic, they were theethnic elite destined to return and build the new nations.But , they were oft en also the Soviet el i te who had the leastfamili ar i ty wit h their own homeland.

Turkmenis tan.

The ethnic composit ion of Turkmenistan (population 4.1million) is approximately 74 percent Turkmen, 7 percentRussian, 9 percent Uzbek, 2 percent Kazak, and 6 percentother.11 The main t r ibal uni t is the Ahal-Tekke (wi th t ies toKhorezm and Bukhara in Uzbekistan), which dominatesthe government. Other groups include the Ersary andYomut which now interact with fellow tribesmen in Iran

and Afghanistan. Russian emigration from Turkmenistanhas been much smaller than in other republics, especiall yamong the well-assimilated, second- or third-generationRusso-Turkmen with good jobs in the energy sector. ADecember 1993 agreement establishing the principle ofdual nationality sought to ease the fears of ethnicRussians.12 But, it is only valid with Russians; it is notaccessible to other Cent ral Asian nat ional i t ies.

Uzbekistan.

The ethnic composition of Uzbekistan (population 23.4million) is approximately 71 percent Uzbek, 8 percentRussian, 4 percent Tajik, 4 percent Kazak, 4 percent Tatar,and 9 percent other (including 2 percent Karakalpak).13

People declaring themselves Uzbek also include

subcommunities of Kipchaks and Kuramas.14

There hasbeen a steady increase in the percent age of Uzbeks wi thinUzbekistan; in 1959 they compr ised only 62 percent and theRussians 13.5 percent.15 Tashkent has declared that

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Karakalpakstan is an autonomous region; constitution-ally it can function apart from the national Uzbek govern-ment as long as i t compl ies wi th Uzbek law.16 Not content ,

the Karakalpaks have declared their own sovereignty andmore nationalistic elements demand full independence.17

Samarkand and Bukhara are predominantly Tajik, butwere given to Uzbekistan in 1924. The Fergana Valley,divi ded between K yrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajik istan, isalso an area where ethnic tensions are high.

Kyrgyzstan.

The ethnic composition of Kyrgyzstan (population 4.7million) is approximately 53 percent Kyrgyz, 22 percentRussian, 13 percent Uzbek, 2.5 percent Ukrainian, 2.5percent German, and 8.5 percent other. The three majorclans are from Naryb (President Akayevs home base),Talas, and Osh.18 Tension exists between the sout hern clanswho resent the nor therner s dominant role in government .

But , there is also tension among resident Uzbeks, especiallyin t he Osh r egion; some have even at tempt ed to establi sh anautonomous territory in Osh Oblast.19 The plummetingeconomy and the collapse of the defense industry whichemployed many Slavs has caused a sharp exodus in recentyears . Net S lav ic ou tmigra t ion f rom Kyrgyzs tanskyrocketed fr om 2.4 thousand in 1989 to 55.9 thousand i n1992.20 By 1996, some 200,000 Russians had left.21 Efforts

to accomodate the Russians such as creating a SlavonicUniversity in Bishkek have been unsuccessful. Kyrgyzstanrefuses to grant dual citizenship arguing that if Bishkekgranted it to one they would have to grant it to all. IfBishkek gave it to Slavs and Germans, then they wouldhave to give it to Uzbeks and Tajiks as well, which wouldlead t o unpredictable consequences.22

Taj ik is tan.

The ethnic composition of Tajikistan (population 6million) is approximately 65 percent Tajik, 25 percent

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Uzbek, 3.5 percent Russian, and 6.5 percent other.23

Tajikistan is the only predominantly non-Turkic CentralAsian state. Its people are ethnically related to Persians

(Iran) and speak a language simi lar t o Farsi. Taji k istan hastwo main clans: the (mainly Uzbek) Leninabad-basedKhojent group, who border on Uzbekistan and the Ferganavalley, and the Kurgan-Tyube-Kulyab clan from along thesouthern border with Afghanistan. There are now moreethnic Tajiks across the border in Afghanistan than inTajikistan itself.24 Russian emigration from Tajikistanbegan before independence; many left after the 1989 law

which declared Tajik the state language, includingprofessional and skilled workers. By April 1993, about300,000 ethnic Russians (or 77 percent of the pre-warRussian population) fled Tajik istan, as the Dushanbe r iots,then the civil war, erupted. By 1996 over 450,000 ofTajik istans pre-war 560,000 Russians had fled.25

Kazakstan.

Kazaks do not form a major ity in t heir republic, and as aresul t , the states attempts to define i ts character are morecomplex.26 The ethnic composi t ion of Kazakstan(population 17 mi l l ion) is approximately 43 percent Kazak,36 percent Russian, 5 percent Ukrainian, 3 percentGerman, 2 percent Uzbek, 2 percent Tatar and 9 percentother.27 Although Kazakhs still retain only a plurality

within Kazakhstan, their proportion is increasing as aresul t of outmigration by other groups; Russians compr ised40 percent of the total population at independence. Theirnumbers are slowly declining as a result of out-migration;more than 500,000 have left since independence.28 This issomewhat offset by intra-regional migration of ethnicRussians from other Central Asian states to Kazakstan.Russians are grouped in the north and in the capit al city of

Almaty. Nearl y half resided in the republics capital city andover 95 percent lived in urban areas.29 The Germanpopulation in Kazakstan has almost halved since 1989when i t numbered 958,000.30 This has been offset to a smal l

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degree by some in-migration of Kazaks from Russia andcountries to which Kazaks fled in the 1930s such asMongolia and Iran; in 1992 alone over 100,000 Kazaks

returned.31

The fallout from the December 1986 riots32 had aprofound impact on Kazakstani society. Whi le the or iginaldemonstration was not anti-Russian, it did mark awatershed in ethnic relations in Kazakstan. Many feltbetrayed that ethnic Russians, including liberal, pro-democracy leaders, did not protest the repression of Kazaks:

This sense of exclusion, reject ion, and betrayal was the start ingpoint for a fundamental reappraisal of t he great fr iendship: theconsequences of this shi ft were not immediately apparent but

eventuall y i t led to a disti nct divergence between t he pol i t ical

interests of the two groups. In the case of the Kazakhs, thismerged with the growing awareness of ethnic identity,

providing the impetus for the emergence of a nationalist trend

in public opini on.33

Attempts to define a national identity have becomeincreasingly polarizing as the state waivers on whether todevelop a supra-nat ional Kazakstani ident i ty or emphasizethe predominance of ethnic Kazaks. The bi l l on sovereignt y,adopted on October 25, 1990, acknowledged the specialposition of the Kazak people. The 1993 constitutionguaranteed all citizens equal rights, but specified that therepubl ic was founded on the pr inciple of Kazakself-determination. The 1995 Constitution unequivocallydesignated the territory of the republic as primordialKazak land, pushing Kazak predominance.34 Thisconstitution guarantees full citizenship rights for Kazaksand non-Kazaks alike, but implies that the latter areforeigners, volunt ari ly set t led on Kazak terr i tory, who mustaccept the norms set by the ti tular group (Kazaks). Almatys

continued use of Russian as the official medium of com-munication is a concession to minorities and not anatt empt to create a polyethnic Kazakstani ident i ty.35

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Russi ans i n t he Near Abr oad: Fr i ght and F l i ght .

The last decade has been marked by the migration of

nationalities (especially Slavs and Germans) withinCent ral Asia and to other republics. Ethnic Russians nevermade up more than 10 percent of the population except inKazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Large-scale emigration ofethnic Russians to, from, and within Central Asia hasoccurred since 1992, al though the process began as ear ly as1988-89 when the massacre of Meskhetian Turks in theFergana Valley of Uzbekistan led to a voluntary Russian

outflow as well.36

The fli ght of European ethnic groups from Cent ral Asia

der ives as much from percept ion and expectat ion as actualpersecution.37 Departing Russians blamed danger fromarmed conflict, discomfort at living in a newly constitutedstate that was int roducing nat ional legislati on that favoredthe titular nationality over the Russian population, andcreeping Islamization as reasons for their departure.38 Fearof spillover from the civil war in Tajikistan also causedmany to flee.

TH E SOVIET L EGACY

As each count ry grapples wi th creating mi l i tary forces, itbui lds upon t he mixed legacy of Tsarist , then Soviet , rule inCentral Asia: military tradition, a post-war manpowerpolicy of stereotype and discrimination, and outbreaks ofviolence in the waning days of empi re.39

Mi l i t ar y T r ad i t i on.

Mili tary inst i tut ions place great value on ceremony andtradit ion. Armies seek cont inuit y with their mi li tary past .Thus, unit colors (flags) bear streamers of past victories.Mil i tary schools study the nat ions bat t les, campaigns, andgreat captains.

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they provided an overwhelmingly local, ethnic character.Thus, when the Central Asian Military District activatedreserve units to invade neighboring Afghanistan in

December 1979, many foreign observers were struck by t helarge Cent ral Asian makeup of t he lead element s.42

Regional military history is revamped for modernpurposes. Emerging Cent ral Asian armies exploit the Sovietexper ience of national heroes. New mil i tary schools includeexhibits of local soldiers awarded the Hero of the SovietUnion wi thin their classrooms. Somet imes judicious edit ingof facts supports the cause. Therefore, Tamarlane, theMongol conquerer, is slowly being transmorgified into theFirst Uzbek t o glor i fy that states mi l i tary past .

Post -w ar M anp ow er Pol i cy.

Soviet manpower policy after World War II is welldocumented.43 Moscow regarded mi l i tary service as a tool tosocialize ethnic minorities, teach Russian, break downnationalist loyalt ies, submit t roops to pol i t ical t raining, andcreate the New Soviet Man.44 Ethnic Russians made upbarely half of the Soviet population, but they predominatedin high technology services (such as the Strategic RocketForces and Ai r Forces) and secur i ty forces (such as the KGBBorder Guards). Slavs, especially Eastern Ukrainians,dominated the career non-commissioned officer ranks.Slavs also made up nearly 95 percent of the officer corps,although isolated examples of non-Slavic officers reachinggeneral officer rank existed. Combat units included all120-plus ethnic groups of the Soviet Union, but CentralAsians increasingly found themselves segregated innon-combat suppor t uni ts such as construct ion bat tali ons orinternal secur i ty forces.45 Cent ral Asian minor it ies sufferedthrough dedovshchina (hazing by senior conscripts) and

barracks-slang ethnic slur s.The consequences of Soviet recruitment practices are

evident today:

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By definition, recruitment governs composition. Becauseindividual careers may span twenty or thirty years, the

composit ion of a government body is diff icul t to change wi thouttaking drastic, irregular, and sometimes provocative steps.

Once heavy recruitment of certain ethnic groups begins, it islikely to continue . . . The pool of applicants from the group

already serving may become larger and better qualified thanthe pool of applicants from other groups, whose more able

members begin to sense better opportunities in other direc-

t ions. What began as ethnic favor it ism is thus sustained. . . .46

Eth ni c Conf l i ct i n t he Wani ng Days of Soviet Rul e.

One of the unexpected (at least to Mikhail Gorbachev)consequences of glasnost and perestroikain t he late 1980swas the outbreak of ethnic violence wi thin the Soviet Union.Inter-ethnic conflict reflects the multitude of individualdecisionsindividual mechanisms for coping with thestresses and frustration of modern societythat merge inshort bursts of frenzy and bloodshed.47 That spontaneous

out breaks based on ethnic l ines should occur was a shock tothose who believed the Party line of internationalismwithin Soviet society; it did not suprise non-Slavs whorealized that the ethnici ty l isted in a Soviet passpor t moldedevery event in t heir l i fe. But the pat tern of ethnic confl ict inSoviet Central Asia soon shifted from spontaneousoutbursts to violence wi th hints of organization.

The fir st major , repor ted incident of r iot ing occur red inAlma Ata (present Almaty), Kazakh Soviet SocialistRepublic (SSR), over the replacement of ethnic-KazakCommunist leader Dinmukhamed Kunyaev by RussianGennady Kolbin in December 1986. Official sourcesreported three dead (unofficial, but unsubstantiated,sources put the number at over 1000).48 Internationalatt ent ion t hen shif ted to the Balt ics and the Caucasus, but a

series of ethnic clashes continued in Central Asia whichwere elevated to pogroms by virtue of their seemingorganization and barbarity. Riots broke out in Dushanbe,Tadzhik SSR in February and March 1989.49 Then camer iots in Ashkhabad and Nebit -Dag, Turkmen SSR, in May

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1989.50 In June 1989 Meskhetian Turks, political exilesfrom Georgia who had settled in the Uzbek side of thevolatile Fergana valley, were set upon and murdered by

Uzbek mobs, leaving over 200 dead and hundreds injured.Soviet authorities were forced to airlift the remaining15,000 Meskhet ian Tur ks out of the republic.51 I n June localKazaks in Novyi Uzen, Kazakh SSR, attacked Caucasiannat ionals who had long l ived in t he region.52 Ethnic tensionbetween Uzbeks and Kyrgyz on the Kyrgyz side of thedivided Fergana val ley sparked a massacre of Uzbek men,women, and children in the ethnic enclave of Uzsen.53 In

1990 disturbances occurred in Dushanbe, Tadzhik SSR(February); in Buk, Parkent, Andizhan, and Namagan,Uzbek SSR (February, March, May and Decemberrespect ively); and Osh, K irgiz SSR (June), leaving over 350dead and 2,000 wounded.54

The causes for the r iot ing are hot ly debated. Yacoov Roiargues that many of t he riotsif spontaneous from below

were manipulated fr om above. He cont ends that they seemto have been largely aggravated, if not actual ly instigatedby the powers-that-be in Moscow and the republicancapitals in an attempt to consolidate their positions andweaken those of their pol i t ical opponent s.55 However, theauthorities were playing with fire, for once unleashed,disturbances were not always cont rol lable and could in t hefinal event misfire.56 If instigated, the local authorities

were playing upon existing tensions and publi c percept ionsof favor it ism i n housing allocation, employment , and landdistribution, in regions faced with land shortages, highunemployment , and problems wi th water r ights.

This bloody heritage has been passed on to the newrepublics. The Soviets divided the Fergana valley amongTajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Tajikistan andKyrgyzstan have long-standing disputes over water r ight s

and grazing along their common border, the cour se of whichTajikistan has refused to rati fy by treaty; they even brieflycame to blows over border demarcation in the summer of1989. The influx of refugees from war-torn Tajikistan (and

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exiled opposition figures) has exacerbated the tension.Tajikistan and Uzbekistan also dispute the status of theUzbek cities of Bukhara and Samarkand, former centers

of Tajik intel lectual and commercial l i fe. Tajiks resent beingleft with the then-backwater town of Dushanbe for theirrepublican capital. In r eturn, many Uzbeks claim Tajiks aresimply Uzbeks who speak Persian;57 indeed the originalboundaries drawn in 1924 included Tajikistan as anAutonomous SSR of the Uzbek SSR. Uzbeks haveper iodicall y staked claim to all of the Fergana val ley, whichincludes Kyrgyzstans Osh oblast and part of the Khojent

oblast in Tajikistan. The Uzbeks also argue that part ofsouthern Kazakstan and eastern Turkmenistan rightlybelong to them as well.58

This history of ethnic confl ict acts as an albat ross aroundthe necks of Cent ral Asians. Bloodlet t ing is easier once thethr eshold has been broken. Vict ims seek revenge; sur vivorsview their neighbors with suspicion. Ethnic, clan, and

subregional tensions lie just below the surfacewitnessTajikistanjust waiting for the spark to set it off. As aresult, ethnic tensions exist between the Central Asianstates at the very time they need to think collectively tosafeguard their national security. Ethnic tensions existbetween Cent ral Asians when t hey must work together toform new state insti tut ions, such as armed forces.

CREATION OF CENTRAL ASI AN MI L I TARIES

Cr eat i ng Nat i onal Ar mi es.

Ethnicity becomes a problem when creating nationalarmies. A central issue confronting each Central Asianstate is how to develop an off icer corpspreferably one thatis indigenouswhich is loyal to the new regime. Several

approaches are possible. First, the new republics canencourage ethnic officers serving abroad to return, t ake upthe new cit izenship, and assume leadership posit ions in thenew armed forces. This has limited prospects for success inCentral Asia because of the disproportionately small

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number of Cent ral Asian mi l i tary offi cers, and their scarcityin important specialt ies and higher ranks.

A second approach is attestation. If there are moreofficers available than needed, the process of eliminatingless proficient officers may be used also to eliminatenon-citizen (and potentially disloyal) officers. The smallnumber of indigenous officers basically cancels out thismethod.

A third approach is to train a completely new officercorps to replace the old one. This is a lengthy process that

requires the new state to develop, man, and finance localofficer training institutions.59 Most of the new states,therefore, remain dependent upon Russian academies toeducate their off icer cadres.

Not all states made an effort to alter the ethniccomposition of the armed forces upon independence,seeking accommodation for existing minorities (e.g.,

Russians) while gradually broadening the indigenousethnic base. These states concede that there is littleprospect of forming an indigenous off icer corps in the shortrun and prefer to retain the exist ing offi cers.

There are negative aspects to this option: the officercorps may come to resemble a mercenary formation withquestionable loyalty and a large gulf may develop betweenofficers and native enlisted personnel. Tension may also

develop between the new government and the foreignofficers over financing and civi l r ights. On t he other hand,such a mercenary force would hopefully be immune fromlocal political intrigues.60 Regardless of which option isadopted, the process of developing true professionals willtake at least two decades, if not more, as officers just nowenter ing the armed forces r ise to senior rank.

Similar problems exist in creating enlisted ranks. Anall -volunt eer force might allow t he republic to man the newarmed forces predominantly with the titular nationality,but such a force is cost prohibit ive for all the successor states

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of the Soviet Union (to include Russia). Therefore,conscr ipt ion, drawing from al l the ethnic groups in t he newrepublic, must continue. This, unfortunately, puts rival

ethnic groups in close quarters where the Soviet t radit ion ofdedovshchina continuesbut this time by the titularnationality.61

Another prominant factor in creating national forces isthat Cent ral Asian forces adopted the Soviet model of whatDr . Jacob Kipp calls mul t iple mi l i tar ies. In Soviet terms,armed forcesrefers not only to troops subordinate to theMinistry of Defense, but also to a variety of other militaryforces subordinate to non-Defense agencies, to includeinternal security forces, borders guards, and president/national guards. They all have a military role, but theCentral Asian regimes prefer smaller interior forces as atool to suppress poli t ical and ethnic dissent . As a resul t , todate the ground forces have avoided this debilitating role.An added advantage is that smaller interior forces can

target their recruiting to groups whose loyalty is not indoubt and avoid the ethnic sweep of nat ional conscr ipt ion.This is a classic composit ional technique.

Comp osi t i onal Techni ques.

Social scientists examining the process of building newmilitary forces among the newly-independent colonies ofAsia and Afr ica dur ing the last half-century have ident ifiedfive main compositional techniques used by new armedforces to integrate opponents, segregate supporters, anddeploy them accordingly:

Homogenization of the army. A l ter the internalcomposit ion of the main regular units, especiall y the officercorps, to achieve ethnic congruence between the officercorps and the regime.

Balance inside the army. Redress unfavorable ethnicratios within the officer corps by placing divergent ethnic

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memberships in close proximity, so that they counter-balance each other.

Balance outside the army. Create wholly new unitsout side the main regular army uni ts, often outside the armyitself, or greatly bolster such units of this kind as alreadyexist (e.g., wi th an internal secur ity mission).

Foreign forces. Employ foreign forces inside or outsidethe regular army. Foreign commanders can be posit ioned atsensit ive point s ranging from chief of staff to commander offield units. Alternatively, foreign troops can provide

personnel for uni ts out side the regular army that serve as acounterpoise to regular forces.

Ki nship control. Place close relat ives in command of keyunits, especially those units already packed with troopsethnicly akin to the rulers of the regime.62

As each of the new Central Asian states struggled tocreate republican forces, various adaptations of these

techniques are apparent. See Table 1.

Size(SquareMiles)

Population(millions)

ArmedForces

BorderTroops

InternalSecurityForces

Kazakstan 2,717,300 16 35,100 12,000 20,000

Kyrgyzstan 198,000 4.5 12,000 5,000

Tajik istan 143,100 6.1 7,000 1,200

Turkmenistan 488,100 4.2 19,000Uzbekistan 447,400 23.5 65,000 15,300

Table 1. Cen t r al Asi an Ar med For ces.63

Uzbekistan.

Uzbekistan was among the first of the Central Asianstates to establish its own armed forces, but within thecontext of the uni f ied command structure of theCommonwealth of I ndependent States (CIS). On August 31,1991, Tashkent declared nat ional sovereignty and the r ightto defend i ts own borders. A week later the new President

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announced creation of a Ministry for Defense Affairs andappointment of the first Defense MinisterLieutenantGeneral Rustam Ahmedov, an Uzbek.64 On January 14,

1992, Uzbekistan assumed jurisdiction over all formerSoviet ground, air, and air defense units, formations andinstall ations deployed on i ts soi l , wi th t he except ion of t hosestrategic forces retained under the Commonwealth ofIndependent States (CIS).

But, within six months, Ukraine opted out of the CISmilitary structure and Russia decided to create its ownnational forces; the process of creating national forcesoutside the CIS st ructure had begun. Other Cent ral Asianstates resisted or drug their feet, but Uzbekistanimmediately began to throw off t he t rappings of Soviet rule.The ex-Soviet Turkestan Mi l i tary Dist r ict was abol ished onJune 30, 1992, and its headquarters appropriated for thenew Uzbek armed forces. A month later Tashkent created aful l-flung Minist ry of Defense and brought all mi li tary uni ts

under it s author it y.

65

A National Border Guard force tookover from the ex-Soviet Central Asian Border TroopsDistrict.66 A National Guard replaced former Soviet Inter ior(internal secur i ty) t roops (Ministerstvo Vnut rennykh Del orMVD).67 Uzbekistan alone guards i ts external border (withAfghanistan) without the aid of Russian border troops.Finally, Uzbekistan oversaw the removal of all Russianforces from its territory; the last unit was deported to

Tajikistan in ear ly 1995.Creating institutions was easier than producing the

cadres to fi l l them. Few Uzbeks were actually serving in theSoviet Armed Forces and not many of them were actuallystationed within Uzbekistan. Even before July 1992,President Karimov had begun the process of r ecall ing ethnicUzbeks not under contract serving abroad in non-CISrepublics (e.g., the Baltic states, Azerbaijan) to return to

Uzbekistan and declaring that the remainder of Uzbekistanrecruits would serve in the Turkestan Military district,republican MVD troops, National Guard units or performalternative service locally.68 Later this homecoming

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process became even more severe; Uzbeks who cont inued toserve abroad, even in CIS forces, for feit ed their cit izenship.Tashkent then l imi ted service to cit izens of Uzbekistan. I t is

the sole Cent ral Asian state which does not all ow RussianFederation citizens to serve in its armed forces.

Uzbekistan has embarked on a pol icy of homogenizat ionof t he armed forces. In t he short term i t is producing a morebalanced ethnic mix in the officer corps. With thenationalization of Soviet forces, the Uzbek Army wascharacter ized by a overwhelmingly-Slavic off icer corps andpredominantly Uzbek enlisted forces. That soon stronglyshi fted, as a resul t of Slavic migration, the Uzbek refusal togrant dual citizenship, and a conscious governmentprogram to put Uzbek officers in charge.69 At independence,Russian-speaking personnel comprised 70 percent of theofficers corps of the Soviet forces in Uzbekistan.70 Theheadquart ers of the Turkestan M il i tary Dist r ict provided a(most ly-Slavic) pool of off icers for senior posit ions; of the 15

generals serving in Uzbekistan in 1992, only 5 were Uzbek.Tashkent acquired senior Uzbek officers by rejuvenatingthe careers of a group of Uzbek officers whose careersseemingly had dead-ended in the 1980s. For example,Rustam Akhmedov, a lieutenant colonel with 24 yearsservice but shunt ed aside to Civi l Defense, was promoted toUzbek major general and appointed Defense Minister.Russians appointed as deput ies (including the Army Chief

of Staff) monopolized off icer posit ions in the shor t term, butwi thin a year, appointments became more balanced. EthnicSlavs who remained accepted Uzbek ci t izenship.

I t wi l l take t ime to create an indigenous officer corps atall ranks, but Tashkent was fortunate that three majorSoviet educational institutions (the Tashkent HigherAll-Arms Command School, the Tashkent Higher TankCommand School, and the Samarkand Higher Military

Automobile Command), four military lyceumprep-schools,and the Tashkent Special M il i tary Gymnasium (Internat)were located in Uzbekistan. In 1993 Uzbekistan began itsown air cadet training program with a group at the

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Tashkent Combined Arms School. Now there is an AirAcademy at Ozizak. In 1994, Uzbekistan established inTashkent the new Armed Forces Academy, a joint

institution to train officers for brigade- and corps-levelcommand and staff assignments. It is the first suchinst i tut ion in Cent ral Asia, and reflects Tashkent s decisionto forego sending i ts officers to Russia for advanced mi l i tarytraining.

Within the Uzbek mi l i tary (and society as a whole), theUzbek national language is slowly gaining ground. Forexample, Uzbek is now a requirement for non-Uzbekspeakers at the Tashkent Combined Arms School. However ,Russian remains the military language of instruction andcommand and cont rol. Part of the diff icul ty is that mil i tarymanuals are in Russian, and it is too diff icul t and expensiveat this stage to translate them. Also, many Central AsianTurkic languages simply lack the vocabulary for militaryoperations.

As Uzbekistan has distanced itself from Russia and junior officers move up in rank, it is expected thatpreference for Uzbek officers will become increasinglycommon. Such officers should support President Karymov.They are not bound to him by kinship ties per se, but bypersonal bounds of loyalty because they owe their posit ionin the new regime to him.

Kyrgyzstan.

Bishkek originally made little effort to establish anational force, giving strong support to the CIS unifiedcommand movement and relying on Russias 40th Army(headquartered in Almaty) to fund ex-Soviet forces inKyrgyzstan.71 During the early months Kyrgyzstancontinued to call up conscripts to serve in the CIS unified

forces; a March 1992 agreement with Russia allowedapproximately 70 percent of K yrgyz recrui ts to serve in t heter r i tory of other republics.72 The law On M il i tary Servicestated that 1992 draftees would serve only in strategic

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forces deployed in Russia; service outside Kyrgyzstanwould be on a cont ractual basis.73

Kyrgyzstan eventual ly created nat ional forces, but not ofits own free will. According to one official, in May 1992Akayev received a telegram from [CIS Defense Minister]Shaposhnikov telling him to take control of the forces onKyrgyz terr i tory because the center would no longer pay forthem.74 On May 29, 1992, President Akayev issued a decreeset t ing up the Kyrgyz Army, using a Soviet motor ized r i fledivision (MRD) stationed in Osh as the core. Only a yearlater, on August 18, 1993, did Bishkek announce thecreation of a Kyrgyz General Staff.75

Bishkeks primary military problem is cadre, bothenlisted and officer. Once the unified command conceptcollapsed, Kyrgyzstan set up regulations to create aconscript force of nearly 20,000a target it has not beenable to meet . Within a year i t was apparent that these planswere over ly ambit ious, especially because Bishkek could not

finance such a force following the collapse of the Kyrgyzeconomy. Todays conscript force consists of 14,000 men.L ife in the ranks is arduous. Impover ished Kyrgyz recrui tslack food and clothing; some even r isk starvation. Bul lyingin the barracks continues. No longer the predominantethnic group, Kyrgyzstan-born Russian conscr ipts face thesame type of harrassment they used to infl ict on K yrgyz. I fdiscipline collapses in the barracks, ethnic tensions,

especially among those who have already come to blowssuch as the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, threaten to destroy unitmorale and cohesion. I s i t any wonder that parent s do notwant their sons to join the armed forces and draft dodgingand desert ion flour ish?76

Serious problems also confront the officer corps. TheKyrgyz are the second smallest titular population; they

make up barely half of Kyrgyzstans population. Like theKazaks, they were a nomadic people and did not seek outmilitary careers. Of 4,000 Soviet officers stationed inKyrgyzstan at the inception, about 90 percent were

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Russian; not one regimental commander and only onebattalion commander were Kyrgyz. Around 1,700 Kyrgyzofficers were serving outside Kyrgyzstan in 1991, many of

whom returned to serve in the new Kyrgyz forces.77

Butnumbers alone do not ensure sufficient experiencedveterans for specifi c ranks and mil i tary specialt ies. Bishkekappointed an ethnic Kyrgyz as its first Defense Minister,but the Chief of the Main Staff was Russian.78 Additionalappoint ments included exper ienced Russian and Ukrainianofficers, with many Kyrgyz officers appointed to deputypositions.

The Kyrgyz forces have become increasingly homog-enized only because effor ts to retain ski l led Russian off icershave not been successful.79 An interstate treaty allowsRussian soldiers to serve in the Kyrgyz armed forces on acontractual basis through the end of 1999. A 1994agreement enables cont ract Russians to t ransfer to Russianor Kyrgyz service without any obstacles.80 But such effor ts

have failed to halt the hemorrhage of skilled officersfoll owing the col lapse of t he Kyrgyz economy.

Yet, even so, internal tensions have also appearedamong those Kyrgyz who make up the officer corps. Pressreports have noted wi thin t he armed forces the nor th-sout hdivi sion visible in national pol i t ics. Northern offi cers havebeen reluctant to serve in t he south.81

To protect its external borders, Kyrgyzstan has beenforced to rely upon foreign forces. At independence theKyrgyz Border Guards Command (subordinate to theMinistry of Defense and commanded by a Kyrgyz generalofficer) administratively replaced the Kirghiz (Kyrgyz)Directorate of the former Central Asian Border Troopsdistr ict of t he USSR KGB. In 1992, when Almaty took overthe ex-Soviet Eastern Border District, Bishkek found the

Border Troops on its territory were without leadership,support, or even medical supplies. Bishkek appealed toMoscow for help and under an October 1992 bil ateral t reaty,Russia assumed responsibility for guarding Kyrgyzstans

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borders. A joint Kyrgyz-Russian Border Troops Commandwas established, commanded by a Russian.82 The Group ofRussian Border Guards in Kyrgyzstan (GRBGK) serves

Kyrgyzstan, but it is subordinate to the Russian FederalBorder Guard Service and Moscow f inances 80 percent of i tsbudget . Just as the Roman legions along the Rhine becameincreasingly Teutonic, so the GRBGK has becomeincreasingly Central Asian. Under recent recruitment,more than 60 percent of the enlisted inductees into theRussian border forces are now ethnic Kyrgyz.83

Severe financial constraints have forced massivereduct ions in the size of K yrgyzstans armed forces, yet i t isunable to man even those positions with ethnic Kyrgyz.Kyrgyzstan re l ies upon fore ign of f icers not as amanagement tool , but because it is incapable of manning i tssmall armed forces domestically. The shift toward a moreequal balance between Slavs and Kyrgyz is not part of asystematic program of officer development, but reflects

migration of ethnic Russians out of the republic.

Taj ik is tan.

It is difficult to discuss ethnicity within Tajikistansmi l i tary, because indigenous forces are almost nonexistent .Tajikistans new armed forces failed to defend t he regime,and as a consequence the country has been wracked withcivil war and cross border incursions. Failure to produceviable armed forces has resul ted in a secur i ty pol icy totall ydependent upon the willingness of other states to acceptresponsibi l i ty for Tajikistan and to expend men, money, andmateriel to prop it up. The continued existence of theRakhmanov regime depends upon mil i tary suppor t from t heRussian Federation and fel low Cent ral Asian CIS members;i f t he pol i t ical decision were made to wi thdraw that support ,

the regime would l ikely cease to exist .The Tajik civi l war (May 1992 to early 1993), labeled by

many as the work of Islamic fundamentalists, moreaccurately reflected the domestic conflict between rival

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ethnic groups, regions, and clans, for access to pol i t ical andeconomic spoils. Over 100,000 perished in the civil war,some 380,000 persons were displaced by the fighting, and

110 ,000 Ta j i ks f l ed ac ross the Amu Darya in toAfghanistan.84 The Dushanbe government survives onlybecause Russia sided with the current regime during thecivil war, signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, andMutual Cooperation with Dushanbe in May 1993, and basessome 22,000 to 25,000 border guards and peacekeepingforces in the republic.

The initial pattern for Tajikistans armed forces wassimilar to that of its neighbors: form a National Guard,85

establ ish a National Defense Affairs Commi t tee (NDAC) tooversee nationalization of Soviet units deployed inTajikistan, and create indigenous units. The mostsignificant decision to shape Tajikistans early forces wasDushanbes declaration that the main Russian forcedeployed in Taji kistan, the 201st Motor ized Rif le Division

(MRD) would not be nationalized to form the basis of thenew Tajik Armed Forces. A subsequent visit by RussianDefense Minister Grachev confirmed that the divisionwould not be disbanded or withdrawn, although localrecrui tment would increase the proport ion of ethnic Taji ksand all Russians serving would be on contract.86 Instead,the 201st MRD would remain in Tajikistan until at least1999 in supportof the Taji k Army.87

Without that trained, well-equipped core, Tajikistanwas forced to rely on leftovers to form its conventionalforces, and leftovers they were. The first sub-units of thenew national army which took the oath of allegiance inDushanbes main square on February 23, 1992, were amixture internal security, local militia (police), and KNB(KGB successor) t roops. The fi rst fi ve battali ons were alsounconventional, formed from paramilitary Popular Front

volunteers.88 In June 1992 Dushanbe announced aconscription system, but proclamations could not resolvethe real issues stonewalling development of operationalforces: a shortage of experienced ethnic Tajik officers and

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non-commissioned officers, reliance on Russian trainingfacilities (of the 201st MRD), the inability to enforceconscription, and a nonexistent military doctrine to pull it

all together. I t also did not solve the most crucial issue: lackof funds to pay for such forces. During the Soviet period,subsidies from the center used to make up at least 50percent [of the budget], and in some years they were as highas 80 percent . 89 Wit hout that support , combined with civi lwar and the exodus of nearly 500,000 ski l led Russians, theTajik economy went into a freefall following independencefrom which i t has yet to recover.

Any real effor ts to create a genuine armed forces awaitedthe appointment of (ethnic Russian) Colonel AlexanderShishlyannikov as Defense Minister in January 1993.90 Ayear after independence, Shishlyannikov was st i l l start ingfrom scratch. The government admit ted that the call -up ofthe previous fall was to all intents and purposes wreckedbecause of the tense sociopolitical situation.91 The army

would form anew from another call-up of conscripts andexist ing Popular Front formations.

Russian assistance helped to create a Tajik DefenseMinistry, special purpose troops, internal troops, and aheli copter squadron by ear ly 1994.92 Shishlyannikov hopedto create a smal l, highly mobile, professional and dedicatedarmy,93 but wi thout a viable conscr ipt system he had to relyupon troops of the so-called Popular Front of Tajikistan

paramil i tary, pro-communist forces raised dur ing the civi lwar. I t was a poor foundat ion upon which to build. By Apr i l1995, Tajik armed forces, totalling 11,500, were organizedint o one incompletely-manned spetnaz(special operations)unit, four infantry battalions, and two motorized riflebrigades.94

Current forces cannot insure Tajikistans security.

Therefore, the Rakhmonov regime has come to rely upontwo foreign armed forces: the Group of Russian BorderTroops in Tajikistan (GRBTT) and the Joint CIS Peace-keeping Force in Tajik istan.

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Tajikistan lacks resources to maintain forces along its2,000-kilometer border. During the CIS Kiev summit inMarch 1992 Tajikistan confirmed that Russian Border

Guards would maint ain Dushanbes borders. In late August1992 a reorganization of former-Soviet border forcesdistr icts occur red and jur isdict ion for the southern borderof t he CIS was t ransferred to the GRBTT. Taji kistan hadno border t roops of i ts own unt i l May 1994, when t he Taji kSupreme Soviet created a smal l indigenous Border Tr oopsof the Republic of Tajikistan to support the GRBTT. Thethree border brigades then formed (and a four th in 1995) are

used independent ly in r ear areas and joint ly wi th Russianforces in the mountain regions. Tajik border guards arecommanded by Russian officers. Given the choice, however,over 80 percent of Taji k off icers and war rant off icers chooseduty in the Russian border troops because of the betterpay.95

The ethnic composit ion of this force has altered since i ts

formation. After 6 years of local recruitment, the termRussian border forces refers more to i ts chain of commandand subordination to Moscow than its ethnic composition.Of the GRBTTs approximately 18,000 men, about 12,000are Tajik and the remainder made up of some 4,000Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians and some 2,000Kazaks, Kyrgyz and Uzbeks.96

The second external force to provide security to

Rakhmonovs regime is the CIS Collective PeacekeepingForce in Tajikistan (CCPFT), created under the collectivesecurity provisions of the Tashkent accord, to separatewarring factions and safeguard the newly appointedcoali t ion government .97 The 201st MRD was not par t of theoriginally-designated force and was tasked to guard keyinstallat ions and mil i tary faci l i t ies, but was drawn into theCCPFT once the magnitude of the mission and the lack of

resources became apparent. It was not until October 1993that an actual CIS Collective Peacekeeping Force wasfinally dispatched to Tajik istan.98 Limi ted cont ingents fromUzbekistan, Kazakstan, and Kyrgyzstan joined Russian

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troops from the 201st MRD; all were commanded by aDeputy Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Joint ArmedForces.

Ethnic tensions within Cent ral Asia affected the wi l l ing-ness of Taj ikistans neighbors to send forces to the CCPFT.

The participation of regional powers in peacekeeping . . . is

ext remely sensit ive in Cent ral Asia, where front iers are oftenart if icial, ethnic groups are divided and deep-rooted r ivalr ies

have recently re-emerged. Peacekeeping operations by

Central Asian states in neighboring states, in which they

might have an ethnic minor it y or ter r it or ial claims, could putfurther strain on the fragile inter-ethnic relations in the

region. Thus, many Tajiks, who, as the only non-Turkicpeoples in Central Asia, have a historical fear of being

subjugated by the Turkic majority, view with suspicion thedeployment of Uzbek or Kyrgyz peacekeeping troops inTajikistan, particularly in the south. Not surprisingly, theleaders of the other Central Asian states are aware of these

nuances and are concerned about the possible boomerang

effects of meddling in Tajik affair s.99

This use of foreign forces to defend Tajikistan wasnecessary because Tajikistan also never succeeded indeveloping an indigenous off icer corps or a conscr ipt force toserve under it. The first Chairman of the DefenseCommit tee was an ethnic Russian. As units were graduallyt rans fe r red to Ta j i k con t ro l , ano the r Russ ian ,

Shishlyannikov was named Defense Minister.

The appointment of a non-Tajik to create and control thedevelopment of the Tajik Armed Forces was a further

indication of the dearth of senior native qualified military

commanders in the Cent ral Asian republics on which to bui ld anational command.100

At h is f i rs t meet ing wi th Ta j ik defense of f ic ia ls ,

Shishlyannikov discussed the future of 513 ethnic Tajiksserving with other armies of the CIS.101 They, too, lackedstaff and command exper ience. I t was not a big pool to bui ldupon and not all chose to return. The situation did not

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improve as civil war engulfed the nation and militaryoperations fell under the sway of the Russian 201st MRDand the CCPFT. Tajikization of Russian ground and

border units also has drawn Tajik candidates into thebet ter-paid Russian forces.

The distinction between Russian border forces, theRussian 201st MRD, and the Taji k Army remains blurred.Some Russian off icers from the 201st MRD havetransferred to the Tajik mil itary; an October 1994agreement provided Russian mi l i tary advisors to the Taji kArmed Forces. New Tajik recruits since 1993 have beenused to boost manpower in CIS (that is, Russian) units onTajik territory, to include the 201st MRD and bordertroops.102 By this means the Tajikization of existingRussian units began. This localization of the 201st MRDmight make eventual withdrawal of Russian forcesdifficult.103

Tajikistan, therefore, also rel ies on foreign t roops for i ts

security not as a management tool but because it isincapable of creating a viable indigenous force. It totallydepends upon t he foreign forces, especially Russian. Taji kforces are trained by the 201st MRD; no domesticeducational infr ast ructure exists. I t has no external out letto bypass Russian author i ty; Tajikistan is the lone Cent ralAsian state not to join Part nership for Peace. I t dif fers fromKyrgyzstan in that Russian forces are stationed in

Tajik istan rather than individual offi cers on a cont ractualbasis. Therefore, ethnicity issues relate less to inter -ethnictensions withinthe Tajik Army, than int er -ethnic tensionsof Tajiks serving with foreign forces on its soil or betweenTajik forces and Cent ral Asian neighbors sending forces todefend i t .

On June 27, 1997, Tajik President Imomali Rakhmonov

and Sayed Abdullo Nuri, the leader of the Islamicopposit ion, signed (in Moscow) a peace accord known as theGeneral Agreement of National Reconciliation and PeaceEstablishment. As refugees return and the disparate

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political factions attempt to rebuild (or really start toconstruct in the first place) a unified Tajik state, theposition of the CCPFT and GRBTT must necessarily

change. Russian forces will still be needed in the shortterm in border regions, but in what r ole and in what numberis yet unknown. However, given the significant number oflocally-recruited personnel, it may not be a matter ofRussian forces returning home, but ethnic Taji ks shi ft ing toTajik author ity. On t he other hand, Dushanbe needs to usei ts f in i te funds for rebu i ld ing and i t can f inancereconstruction by cutting the defense rolls; therefore, an

immediate Russian exodus may not resul t . Regardless, thenext stage in t he creation of Tajik istans armed forces is justbeginning, and it is too early to suggest whether centralauthorities will be successful in weaning themselves fromforeign support and overcoming a decade of tribalism andwar lordism t o form a viable nat ional armed forces capable ofensur ing nat ional secur ity.

Turkmenis tan.

Ashgabat was also or iginall y a fi rm suppor ter of a CISuni fied force unt i l the pace of nationalizati on by Azerbai jan,Ukraine, and Moldova forced it to confront creation of aTurkmen Armed Forces even though it will requiresubstantial financial and material resources.104 But,Turkmenistan, listening to its own different drummer,

fol lowed a unique path within Cent ral Asia.

First, although it set up its own Ministry of DefenseAffairs (January 1992) and created a ceremonial NationalGuard (October 1991), the bilateral Russo-TurkmenAgreement of July 1992 stated that formations and uni ts onTurkmen soil would be under Russo-Turkmen joint

jurisdiction with the Russian Defense Ministry retaining

sole cont rol over cer tain air defense and long-range bomberunits and the two defense ministers coordinating theactivities of joint armed forces deployed on the territory ofTurkmenistan.105 Of approximately 300 Soviet units

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stationed in Turkmenistan in December 1991, about 200units and formations were transferred to Turkmencontrol.106

There was an acute shortage of t rained, senior Turkmenofficers fr om t he ranks of the Soviet Armed Forces, forcingthe new Turkmen Defense Ministry to rely on ethnicRussian, Ukrainian, and Belorussians assigned to theSoviet army corps at the time of transfer to Turkmencont rol . Of t he approximately 80,000 soldiers stationed onTurkmen territory prior to August 31, 1992, about 95percent of t he enl isted t roops were Turkmen and about 90percent of the off icers were Russian.107

The exper iment of joint command was unsuccessful andended on January 1, 1994; only about 45 members of theRussian Ministry of Defense (for coordination andconsultation), a small number of troops at strategicfaci l i t ies, and border guards would remain. Funding wouldno longer be shared, but would fall ful ly on Turkmenistan.

Henceforth, all Russian citizens serving in Turkmenistanwould have to sign a contract; as an incentive, suchcontracts generally guaranteed a higher salary than theycould get in Russia, off icial pr ivi leges, career advancementand a pension.108 To alleviate problems for those whoremained on contract, Turkmenistan created dual citizen-ship in 1993.

The government also attempted to persuade nativeethnic Russians to remain in Turkmenistan. In aSeptember 1996 speech, President Niyazov stated,

All Russians l ivi ng, working and serving in Tur kmenistan must

understand that you are not just temporary residents here. Thisapplies first and foremost, perhaps, to military personnel. You

are protecting your Homeland; after all, it is here that your

children were born and here that your ancestors lived and

contributed. You must feel yourselves to be at home. . . .Turkmenistan is a Homeland to you, and you are free citizens

and may accept dual ci t izenship; no one is going to infr inge youin any respect.109

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The second way in which Ashgabat l istened to i ts owndrummer was Turkmenistans refusal to approve thecollect ive secur i ty agreement at Tashkent and i ts decision

to sign a ser ies of bilateral agreements with Russia instead.Niyazov has also refused to send peacekeeping forces toTajikistan. Ashgabat has refr ained from sending delegatesto CIS meetings except those concerning drugs andinternational crime. With great fanfare Turkmenistanadopted a pol icy of posit ive neut rali ty in 1995, stating forus, permanent neutrality means permanent politicalsovereignty and permanent economic independence.110

Turkmenistan was also the first Central Asian nation tojoin Partnership for Peace (in May 1994).111

Ashgabat has slowly developed a traini ng infrast ructurefor Turkmen officers. At independence no military schoolsor officer academies existed in Turkmenistan. A 1993agreement permits Turkmen officers to be trained inRussian mi l i tary schools. That same year, however , the fi rst

Turkmen M il it ary I nst it ute, a 4-year program for armor, airforce, logistics, and communications specialists, opened inAshgabat. Border forces have been t rained at the Nebit -DagTraining Center since September 1992.

From the beginning, even during the period of jointcommand, Turkmenistan sought a distinctive Turkmenident ity in mi l i tary affairs. President Saparmurad Niyazovhad himself appointed Commander-in-Chief of the (then

nonexistent ) Armed Forces and named Hero of Turkestan.He named units in his honor and by the end of 1992promoted himself to four-star general.112 He appointedTurkmen to key leadership positions including DefenseMinister , First Deputy, and Chief of t he Main Staff. Whenthe former Soviet army corps was transferred to Turkmencontrol in August/September 1992, four senior Russianofficers from the corps were promoted to general rank.

Three further waves of promotions in October featuredRussians, some Ukrainians and Belorussians, and a fewTurkmen.113

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Such preferences did not sit well:

The promotion of Russian and other Slav officers by Decree ofthe President of Turkmenistan was above all a ploy to retaintheir services and loyalt y for the t ime being throughout the fi rstcrucial stage of the build-up of national Armed Forces . . . It is

possible that the preference given t o Slav officers in an Ar my ofwhich 86.6 percent of all servicemen are Tur kmen was causingfriction within the senior Turkmen officer corps. This may be

the explanation for a rather bizarre reshuffle announced inearl y Apr i l 1993 . . .114

The firing of senior ethnic Russian officers was matchedwith reports of the abrupt removal from active service ofsome 180 Russian platoon/company commanders by theTurkmen mi l it ary leadership.

Other sources of friction have emerged. For example,Ashgabat appointed non-Turkmen speaking Russians tocommand non-Russian speaking Turkmen battalions,regiment s, and brigades. Russian and other Slav off icers on

cont ract were not required to take Tur kmen nat ionali ty orthe oath of l oyalty to the President . Complaints were voicedthat Russian officers were subject to constant sur vei l lance,bugging of their offices and quarters, and fr equent physicalharassment, including interrogation by Turkmen securityofficials.115

I t is too ear ly t o assess the success of these programs.

True, the outflow of Slavs has been less severe inTur kmenistan. However, the t rue gauge wi l l be how manyRussian officers renew their cont racts. The exper iment of a

joint command with foreign forces failed. Attempts tobalance forces inside the army also face problems, alt houghdual cit izenship helps retent ion.

Kazakstan.

Kazakstan was the last Central Asian state to give upthe idea of a unified command. On May 8, 1992, one dayafter Boris Yeltsin announced the creation of a Russian

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army, President Nursultan Nazarbayev declaredhimself Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces ofKazakstan. His initial moves were more limited. He

established a National Security Council and the StateCommittee of Defence116 (a de facto Defense Ministry);restructured the Soviet internal security apparatus;created a Republican Guard to protect the President andsenior officials; and transferred control of the InternalTroops (responsible for maintenance of public order andsuppression of public disturbances) to republican cont rol.117

A President ial decree of Apri l 16, 1992, t ransferred the bulk

of the ex-Soviet 40th Army to the jurisdiction of theKazakstani government, which redesignated it theAll-Arms Army. Three weeks later the Armed Forces ofthe Republic of Kazakstan and a Defense Ministry wereproclaimed. In t he end, Kazakstani mi l i tary forces includedGround Forces, Air Forces, Air Defense Forces, Navalunits,118 and the Republican Guard.

Kazakstan did create a wholly new unit outside theregular army to provide balance outside the army. Thenewly-created Nat ional Guard had both Russian and ethnicKazak personnel, but approximately 68 percent of theofficers are Kazak, an unusual (but understandable)proportion.119 However, its size was too small to be a truecounterbalance.

Within the armed forces, the pat tern was more famil iar:

97 percent of the new Kazakstani officer corps was ethnicRussian.120 There was a ser ious shortage of nat ional cadres;the number of former-Soviet, active duty Kazak officersnumbered only about 3,000 from lieutenant to generalofficernot enough to wash ones hands withandinsufficient to man a single division because of rank andspecialty dysfunct ion. There was not a single Kazak generalcommanding a division, army or mi l i tary dist r ict among the

3,000; colonels numbered only about 50, most ly in suppor troles. Until December 1, 1990, there were only 99 Kazakofficers attending Soviet institutes and academies.Kazakstan hosted only three military prep-schools, two

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military secondary schools (as opposed to 34 in Ukraine),and two ex-Soviet Army military schools: the AlmatyHigher Al l -Arms Command School (only six Kazaks among

the faculty and 84 Kazaks out of 1000 students atindependence) and the Border Guards Academy. Socialrestraint also prohibited ethnic Kazaks from joining themilitary. One does not hear the words become acommander , become an off icer from the mout hs of parent sin local areas. On the contrary, what they say is, If youbecome an officer, you will become too Russian and moveaway. 121

Kazakstan was unique in that a distinguished Kazakexisted to become the first Defense Minister; GeneralSagadat Nurmagambetov, Hero of t he Soviet Union dur ingWor ld War I I and former division commander , had att endedthe short course of the General Staff College. His deputydefense ministers were experienced Russian officers, soon

joined by bright young Kazak colonels promoted to general

rank. Elderly General Nurmagambetov was replaced asDefense Minister in October 1995 by 41-year old L ieutenantGeneral Ailibek Kasymov, a graduate of the FrunzeAcademy and former Chief of Staff of the 40th Army, whohad served since November 1992 as Chief of the MainStaff.122

The percentage of ethnic Russians in the newKazakstani armed forces did not exact ly mi r ror condit ions

in other Central Asian states. The question of ethniccomposition in Kazakstan is complicated by the fact thatnearly 40 percent of the population is ethnic Russianmainly the result of drawing Kazakstans borders in the1930s to include areas of Mother Russia dating back to the16th century. No one expected the artificial boundary toactual ly create an independent state which would break offsuch a huge chunk of the historical Russian Empire.

Therefore, one must be careful when discussing ethnicRussian officers in the Kazakstani armed forces, becausethey may include those who have accepted Kazakstanici t izenship based on their residence in nort hern Kazakstan.

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I t was hoped that indigenous Russian officers would remainin the mil it ary. I t is difficul t to determine if that occurred.There was a sharp exodus of ethnic Russian officers

fol lowing the shi ft to Kazakstani service, but whether theyreturned to Russia or merely left mi l i tary service for civi l ianl i fe in Kazakstan has yet to be ident ified.

Moscow did attempt to assist Almaty in stopping thisexodus; in July 1993 Moscow amended its Law on Conscr ip-tion and Military Service to ensure that Russian citizensundergoing their military service on the territory of otherrepublics (e.g., Kazakstan) would continue to receive legalrights envisaged by the Russian laws until December 31,1993. This was later extended to December 31, 1999. Thoseofficers and warrant officers who remained were notobli gated to take Kazak cit izenship or swear an oath.123 Thismove was unsuccessful.

The fai lure of legislat ion t o halve the exodus of Russiansis perhaps explained by attitudes about service in

Kazakstan as portrayed by Russian officers to journalists.A wall of mist rust is gradually being erected between theofficer corps and the top army command. Russian officerscomplained that although the Russians made up themajority of officers, only ethnic Kazaks were promoted tothe rank of general. They resented serving under seniorKazak officers whose rampant incompetence resultedfrom promotions based on the factor of ethnicity and

capabil i ty for pol i t ical maneuver ing rather than expert iseI t is not surpr ising that more and more ethnic Russians areabandoning military service. . . . leading to cases whereonly 30-40 percent of the officer slots are filled. This is inspite of the fact that many ethnic Russians regardKazakstan as their historic native land. Refusal tocontinue service was usually based on alleged creepingdiscrimination against Russians and insufficient pay

compared to what their counterparts in Russia and otherrepubl ics made.124

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Kazakstan also had t o face the quest ion of language. Fewof the 60 percent non-Kazak populace spoke Kazak atindependence. This was especially true for those ethnic

Slavs making up the officer corps (even those born inKazakstan). The desire to push the Kazak language washindered not only by the embarrassing number of RussifiedKazak intellectuals who did not speak Kazak, but theknowledge that unti l domestic mil itary educationalinsti tut ions could be establ ished, personnel would have tocontinue to train in Russiawhere they needed thelanguage.125

The greatest ethnic challenge to creating a new armedforces is in Kazakstan. Kazaks st i l l hold only a plurali ty intheir own count ry. They st ruggle to determine whether theywant to form a Kazak armed forces or a Kazakstani armedforces; unt i l they resolve that issue, ethnic pol icy cannot beconfirmed.

TH E NEW M I L I TARI ES AS A FORCEOF ETH NI C INTEGRATI ON

The opposite perspect ive asks how mil i tary inst i tut ionshave affected ethnic consciousness? Have the armed forcesbeen used to break down ethnic divisions and serve as avehicle for social int egrat ion? I f so, how successful have theybeen? I f not , have they reinforced ethnic consciousness andthereby int ensified ethni c polari zati on?126

Mil i tary duty is dominated by the concept that service tothe state and an oath to defend the regime outweigh allother loyalt ies.

Membership in t he army . . . is supposed to give rise to loyalt y

transcending obligat ions to ethnic col lect ivism at least wi thin

the realm of mi li tary duty. The mi li tary emphasis on duty andthe untrammeled obligation to obey presuppose at least the

soldier s abil it y to compart mentalize his ethnic affi li ati on.127

In polyethnic societies, the regime may attempt to use themilitary as a force for ethnic integration, hoping to break

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down barr iers of individual ident i ty and bui ld in t heir placea higher ident i ty to the nati on.

Many studies on t he Soviet ethnic pol icy focused on t heMoscows use of t he mil i tary as a force of social int egration.Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone talked of a process ofsblizhenie (rapproachment)the on-going process ofmodernization and internationalization (cultural andethnic mixing) of Soviet society to t ransfer ethnic specifi ci tyfrom the traditional sphere of material culture to a newspir i tual and mainl y professional (i .e. modern) cul ture. Bysuch means they would substitute a new Soviet urbanculture (basically Russian) for the traditional cultures ofnon-Russians.128

The Sov ie t m i l i t a r y ac t i ve l y pu rsued e thn i cassimilation. Political training was mandatory, run by acadre of professional political officers who also fereted outsuspect behavior. Party membership (or at leastparticipation in Komsomol, or the Communist Youth

organization) was pushed for recruits; membership wasessential for those seeking senior rank and positions ofauthor ity. The best and the brightest were lured away fromtheir home republic; non-Slavs were rarely allowed to servein their nat ive republi c during their mil it ary career.

The new Central Asian republics have yet to reveal asimilar program. Not all have even revealed whether they

desire (or int end) to do so. For example, does Almaty want tocreate a new K azakstani ident i ty, impose Kazak cul tureupon al l i ts cit izens, or simply wr ite off non-Kazaks? Nor isit yet apparent that any purposeful assignment policyattempts to station men throughout each state based ontheir ethnicity, e.g., for Bishkek to avoid assigning ethnicUzbek off icers to Osh where r iots occur red between Kyrgyzand Uzbeks dur ing the Soviet era.

Social integration involves both att i tudinal andfunctional integration. Attitudinal integration impliescommi tment to the preservation of t he new r epublic and its(e.g., Kazakstani) norms; this is incompatible with greater

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loyalty to an ethnic (e.g., Russian) identity. Functionalintegrat ion assumes outward conformity wi th therequirements imposed by these norms; this does not

preclude ethnic loyalty as long as i t is not projected and doesnot resul t in act ions inimical to the new regime. In mi l i taryterms, attitudinal integration is the ultimate goal ofpolitical-military indoctrination and the guarantee ofloyalty under st ress. Funct ional int egrat ion is acceptable aslong as it guarantees assured responses to command.Management of military manpower attempts to maximizeconditions that promote functional integration. Military

t raining should promote att i tudes (and act ions) in servicepersonnel that reflect shared norms and valuesand thuspromote at t i tudinal integrat ion.129

By such criteria, one can divide Central Asian officersand soldiers into three main groups. Those integrated inattitudinal and functional terms generally comprise thetitular populace and other Central Asian groups without

their own republic who are fluent in (or wi l l ing to learn) thetitular language. Those integrated functionally generallycomprise non-titular groups such as ethnic Russians whohave decided to remain in t he new republics and are makingthe best of i t or other t i tular nat ionali t ies who remain due topersonal reasons, e.g., int ermar r iage or t hey found a homein the Army. Some will make the effort to learn the newlanguage. Non-integrated include those groups such as

ethnic Russians who desire to return to Russia but whocannot due to personal or financial reasons. They willremain clustered in their own ethnic strongholds such asnorthern Kazakstan and make no effort to learn the newnational language.

The problem with such neat dist inct ions is the fact thatRussian remains the military language. If the respectivemil i taries shi fted to the t i tular language, they would have to

ini t iate language programs simi lar to those of the old SovietAr med Forces in reverse. L ikewise, using language as a toolof integration risks alienating those Slavic officers and

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non-commissioned officers upon whose continued serviceeach state (except Uzbekistan) rel ies.

Other factors have limited the new nations using themi l i tary as a tool for social i ntegration. For such a pol icy towork, there must be systematic implementation wi thin anoverall t raini ng program; most of t he Cent ral Asian forcesare hard pressed to conduct t raini ng in basic mi l i tary ski l ls,let alone social engineering. A major target audienceindeed those needing the instruction mostcannot betrained because they are absent from duty due to draftevasion and desert ion. The outmigration of ethnic Slavs andGermans, among other factors, has wreaked havoc on localeconomies as large segments of highly trained and highlyeducated managers, professionals, and bureaucrats departthe new republics; the resultant decline in economicstandards within the republics means less money for thenational budget. Faced with finite funds and competingdemands, the military budgets have suffered. Precious

revenues must be used t o feed and compensate troops, notfor pol it ical t raining.

opening pandora’s box ethnicity and central asian militaries pub114

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