towards a theoretical conceptualisation of superstition

7/28/2019 Towards a theoretical conceptualisation of superstition

1/16

TOWARDS A THEORETICALCONCEPTUALISATION OF SUPERSTITION*

KARL E. SCH HBE and THEODOR E R. SARBIN

" Ma n needs a rule for his will, and will inventone if one be not given him "W illiam James

I . Introduction

THE purpose of this paper is to suggest a general way of thinking aboutsuperstitions. W hile it is com mon to describe some beliefs and be-haviours as ' superstitions ', it is uncommon for philosophers, psycho-logists, and other systematic writers to be explicit about the meaningthey intend to convey by the use of such a descriptive labeL A widerange of phenomena, including magic, ritual, myth, and occultpractices, is traditionally denoted by the term superstition, and by cus-tom die whole lot is summarily assigned to the province of anthropo-logical inquiry. Wh ile a great amoun t of concern widiin psychologyhas centred on such related topics as prejudice and attitudinal bias, notmu ch effort has been directed towards an understanding of superstitionsas such. Few and limited, indeed, have been the attempts to integratea concept of superstition into psychological theory.1

To the theorist, the topic is immediately discouraging. The term' superstition ' is so frequently used that common experience and com-mo n sense seem to provide an adequate basis for understanding. W eknow that superstitions arc to be regarded as erroneous beliefs:irrational, prim itive, and based on inadequate information. Inaddition, we subscribe to the assertion that superstitions, even thoughmanifestly false, provide some want-satisfying, or utilitarian, function.

* Received 10.ii.651 A notable exception is Willoughby (1935). A check of the Psychological Ab-

stracts reveals that fewer than three articles per year have appeared under the ' belief'index li f ti n g Even fewer are listed under superstition. ' There seems to be no

quantitative trend over the last thirty-six years. In a recent historical review o f thetopic, Cohen (i96 0) has shown that only five o f a sample of fifty psychological text-book* have devoted a chapter to beliefs. The resistance of psychologists to investigatebeliefs is worthy of study in its own right.

143


2/16

KARL E. SCHIEBE AND THEODORE R. SARBIN

Then, too, weare aware that the am ount of descriptive material existingon superstitions is vast by any standards. Frazer's (1925) encylopedicGolden Bough and Tylor's (1888) classic work on primitive societies arebut tw o early examples of the bulk of ethnographic wo rk on this topic.Lewinsohn's (1961) book on prophecy and prediction, Willoughby's(1935) lengthy article on magic, and Cohen's (i960) work on gamblingbehaviour are likewise replete with examples of superstitious practices.In short, the concept is too familiar to seem very strange. But upo nexamination this familiarity acquires a fascinating strangeness.

The focus of this fascination is the functional significance of invalidbeliefs. A number of writers have been impressed w idi this idea.Ma linowski's (1926) analysis of m agical practices among the T robriand

Islanders centres about the thesis that every such practice and corres-ponding superstitiousbelief,' fulfills some vital function, has some taskto accomplish, representsan indispensable part with ina working whole'(p . 132). Malinowski established the importance of superstitions byviewing them in theirfunctional contex t. The serious student of cul-ture and behaviour could no longer disdainfully dismiss superstitionsas futile primitive beliefs or esoteric phenomena. Malinowski co n-sidered superstitions to be current vital elements within a culture ratherthan vestigial remnants ofthe past.

This conceptionis both tempered and extended toward psychologyin M erto n's discussion(1957) of the distinction between the manifest andlatent functions of social behav iour. The application of latent function

analysis clarifies apparent irrational, paradoxical, and superstitious socialpatterns. For instance, once the latent function of conspicuous con -sumption is seen to be the acquisition of status through expensivepurchases, this pattern of social behaviour is better understood, andno longer appears paradoxical. Superstitions are established in thissense as continuous with normal or rational modes of believing andbehaving.

A third and more purely psychological point of viewis contained inRot ter's Social Learning The ory . Rotte r's conception o f GeneralisedExpectancies 'is inclusive of a class of beliefs that might well be labelled' superstitions '. An expectancy is defined by Ro tter (1954) as, ' Theprobability held by the individual that a particular reinforcement willoccur as a function of a specific behavior on his part in a specific situ-ation or situations ' (p. 107). Expectancies derived from specific situ-ations tend to generalise to similar situations. Rotter views the failureto cross-validate generalised expectanciesas responsible for superstitions.

144


3/16

THEORETICAL CONCEPTUALISATION OF SUPERSTITION

The remaining root of the present discussion is a general inferencemodel developed by Sarbin, Tart, and Bailey (i960) as a psychologicaldescription of the prediction process. Sarbin,et al. in considering theinformational basis of categorical judgm ent s (which a re called instanti-ations), suggest that, 'Where adequate input is lacking, the cognitiveorganisations function to " fill in the gap " and instantiations are thenlargely a function of the modules (predicates) selected by factors otherthan sensory in pu t' (p. 131). Propositions in the form o f majorpremises stand ready to give mean ing to sensory input s. Propositionsthat are empirically derived or inductively confirmed earn the label' scientific ' or ' rat ion al'. Others, developed throug h analogy orfantasy or acquired through authority, until examined through induc-

tion, must be considered irrational or superstitious. Regardless of howderived, these premises serve as guides to action.

Both Rotter and Sarbin suggest, in effect, that a person's conduct ispredicated on more information than is provided through currentinputs. Malinow ski and Merton argue that cultures and societies dothe same thin g. In all these sources, the thesis is emphasised thatinvalid beliefs have functional significance. W e direct the rest of thisessay to an elaboration ofthis thesis. In the end we hope to providethe basis for a useful set of conventions for the employment of theterm ' superstition'.

2. Some D efinitions and Some Q uestions

Anticipating the model which will later be presented, we define asuperstition as a special kind of expectation (or subjective probability,hypothesis, premise, belief). A superstition may be said to existwhenever an individual persistently or repeatedlybehaves as if his sub-jective estimate of the result of that behaviour is significantly different from anobjective (scientific) estimate of the effect of that behaviou r. Some un-settled problems as to the inclusiveness ofthis definition are containedhere, but it will do for a start. However, it should be clearly unde r-stood that the term superstition is not meant at this time in its usualpejorative sense. The full reasons for this will become clear later.

Questions that deserve examination regarding these special ex-

pectancies include the following. W hat determines whether or not anindividual subscribes to a given superstition? Some people carrycharms and amulets, consult astrologers and palmists, and some do not.Is it the case that some people are superstitious and some are not? O r

K 145


4/16

KARL E. SCHEIBE AND THEOD ORE R. SA RBIN

may it be that everyone is superstitious in nearly like degree, only thespecific co ntent of the superstition varying from individual to individualand from grou p to group ? Tha t college students subscribe to numeroussuperstitions had been demonstrated (Gilliland, 1930; Dockeray andValentine, 1935). Is it not approp riate to describe the postulates ofscientific theoreticians and of theologians as somewhat highly evolvedsuperstitions?1

At the moment, we have no systematic studies to support hypo-theses regarding differential distributions of superstitions amon gdifferent educational classes.

These problems are approachable, but it seems that they may all besubsumed under the m ore general question: W hat are the conditionsunder which superstitions are formed, maintained, and abandoned?It is to this question that we address ourselves, but not until we presenta theoretical conceptualisation of superstition in more detail.

3. A Cognitive Model

W ha t does a man need in order to participate in a culture? In thesimplest terms, he needs a bod y with muscles that work . In addition,he needs some desires, or values. These two propositions may becombined into die following sentence: Man wants a great variety ofthings; for examp le, food, shelter, and cloth ing; children, happiness,satisfaction, security, and a sense of self-esteem, andis capable of action.

But he lacks the sine qua non to participate in a culture, to behaveeffectively. He needs to know how to direct his actions toward desiredends. In Tolman's (1958) terms, he needs to have a cognitive map ofmeans-ends relationships. In the terms of the present analysis, heneeds a set of beliefs, some of which may be denoted by the term' su perstitions'.

The behaviour model here suggested is in part borrowed fromRotter (1954). Thepotential to behave is some function of die expec-tancy regarding a favourable outcom e of that behaviour, and thevalueof the outcom e of that behav iour. Expectancies derive from pastobservations of contiguously occurring events, and may be said torepresent perceived cause and effect relationships between behavioursand the outcomes of behaviours. To complete the skeleton of themodel for superstition, it need only be observed thatreal cause and

1 Since the pejorative sense is not here intended, an affirmative answer to this butproposition need offend no one.

146


5/16


effect relationships are obscure, and often quite different from perceivedcause and effect relationships.

We are now brought up to thepsychological problem of epistomo-logy. How do we come to know what we know? W hat is therelation of the real world to the known w orld? H ow do we knowthat we know ? Hum e argues that cause and effect relationships arenot ultimately compelled upon usin toto, but rather are inferencesbased upon contiguity. He says in hisTreatise of Human Nature,' W efind on ly that the effect does, in fact, follow th e cause. Th e impact ofone billiard ball upon another is followed by the m otion of the second.There is here contiguity in space and time, but nothing to suggestnecessary connection.' Yet, it is often over-looked that thou gh this

inference be logically unnecessary, it is psychologically very powerful.Cause and effect relationshipsare psychologically compelled upon usin toto, as Heider (1944), Mich otte (1963), and Piaget (1955) have am plydemonstrated. In short, it is possible to believe that the kno wn worldis the real world, and to actas if it is, even though it m ight be impossibleto be ultimately correct in thisbelief.

Consider an exam ple: Farmer Brow n wants"to plant his corn. Hewants to do it so as to maximise his autum n harvest. W ha t is to deter-mine when and how he plants and cultivates his corn? He certainlydoes not proceed on a trial and error basis. He uses a num ber o f rules.These will have to do with the calendar date, the state of the weather,the moisture of the soil, the type ofseed, and perhaps the phase of the

mo on or the pain in his bunions. He has probably derived few if anyof these rules by his own empirical observations, but has acquired themfrom his ' cultures '. But o nly some of them wo uld be called super-stitions, and these would be so called because of some demonstrationthat the application of the rule has no effect on the outcom e of th e crop.However, even if Farmer Brown were to be shown compellingstatistics which contrad icted one of his rules (expectancies) he still m igh tapply the rule. Und er these circumstances, w e would feel justifiedin calling Farmer B row n's behaviour superstitious.

To rephrase the conceptual scheme: superstitions come to existbecause of imperfect knowledge of antecedent-consequent relation-ships in the ecology. O n the assumption that an elaborate and fairly

definite set of beliefs isnecessary to support active behaviour, we con-sider superstitions to ' fill the gap ', as it were, between the objectiveprobability estimates available to a person, and the degree of subjectiveprobability required to execute behaviours. The beginning fact is

147


6/16

KARL E. SCHEIBE AND THEODORE R. SARBIN

objective uncertainty. In. the face of this uncertainty, beliefs must beadop ted, so that a man is not transfixed for lack of Tru th. W here helacks truth and needs it, he makes it up, somehow. W e shall nowconsider how this construction occurs.

4. The Development ofSuperstitions

In an experiment with pigeons, Skinner (1948; also Morse andSkinner, 1957) has demonstrated the means of development ofa ' sortof superstition '. Using his operant conditioning technique, he wasable to establish firmly those behaviour patterns whichhappened toprecede the presentation of the reinforcement. Th e bird behaves as if

' there were a causal relation between its behaviour and the p resentationof food, although such a relation is lacking ' (Skinner, 1948, p. 170).The superstitious rituals are due not only ' to the fact that a reinforcingstimulus strengthens any behavior it may happen to follow, eventho ugh a contingency has not b een explicitly arranged, but also to thefact that the change in behavior resulting from one accidental con-tingency makes similar accidents more probable ' (Morse and Skinner,1957. p- 308).

Harry Stack Sullivan quotes as a prime example of primitive' parataxic ' thinking a case portrayed in one of Franz Kafka's shortstories. A dog wh o lived in a kennel surrounded by a high fence wasurinating on e day when a bone was thro wn over the fence. The dog

tho ug ht, ' M y urinating made that bone appear '. Thereafter w hen -ever he wanted something to eat he lifted his leg.1 Sullivan believesthat much of our thinking does not advance beyond the level ofpara taxis; that we see causal connections betw een experiences thathave nothing to do widi one another.

The essential features of these animal illustrations is that accidentalcontingencies are mis-represented as essential contingencies. There is,of course, a wealth of anecdotal human evidence which fits the samedescription. For example (from Diprose's Anecdotes of CuriousSuperstititions and Omens):

In Devonshire, the appearance ofa white-breasted bird has long beenconsidered an om en of death. This beliefhas been traced to a circum -stance said to have happened to the Oxenham family in that county,and related by Howell, in his Familiar Letters; wherein is the followingmon umen tal inscription : Here lies John Oxenham , a goodly yo ung

1 We are indebted to Hall and Lindzey (1957) for this example.

148


7/16


nu n, in whose chambers, as he was struggling with the pangs of death,a bird with a white breast, was seen fluttering about his bed, and tovanished. He died immediately. The same circumstances are relatedof his sister Mary, and two or three others ofthe family.

The p aradigm is the same. First is the condition of uncertaintyregarding a valued ou tcom e: Skinner's pigeons uncertain as to when orwhe ther th ey were going to be fed, and Joh n O xenh am's relativesuncertain as to when or whether John would expire. Then, immedi-ately prior to the revelation of the outcome, something fortuitoushappened. Mo reover, this fortuitous pairing of events was repeated,at least once. Since both the pigeon and the Oxen hams are ignorantof any more powerful causal agent, the fortuitous events are taken as

causes. In the future, the pigeon has the habit of mak ing swipingmotions with its head. The Oxenham s have the habit of avoidingwhite-breasted birds. The same is true of Kafka's dog , which has thehabit of raising its leg at inappropriate times.

This type of explanation does well enough for the individuals con-cerned. But ho w do we explain the fact that the white-bird supersti-tion becomes widely disseminated throughout the culture, while thecolony of pigeons is probably not so taken in? W e would do well atthis point to heed a warning made long ago by jastro w(1900) regardingthe develo pment of superstitions. He warns against the practice ofanalogical reasoning : The inference of a further degree of resemblancefrom an observed degree of resemblance. Jastrow argued that many

superstitions, in particular Voodoo practices, derive from this faultylogical procedu re. Sarbin,et al. (i960), have formalised this processof analogical mediation as follows:

A has characteristic x.x and y arc defining characteristics of species M.Therefore, A has characteristic y andis a member of species M(p. 62).

Th e conclusion, of course, is false. Yet the Vood oo Priest persistsin the belief that mutilation of the representation of a person will doharm to that person, and our more p rimitive com parative psychologistspersist in the belief that what is true of learning in the pigeon is alsotrue of human learning.

We should conclude that the pigeon can carry us no farther in ourunderstanding of superstition. W e are left widi the majority ofhuman superstitions quite unexplained. Skinnerian conditioningmust involve the empirical contiguity of the perceived cause and effect

149


8/16


for each individual who bears the superstition. Fortunately or un -fortunately, there seems to be something else than this involved in theways people acquire superstitions. In fact, for hum an beings, eventhe first-order demonstration of the efficacy of superstition is notnecessary. Tha t is, they need no t ever be witnesses to the originalcontiguity between the fortuitous event and the outcome. Forexample, Leonardo da Vinci, inThe Last Supper, painted Judas Iscariotin the act of knocking over the salt-cellar. Thisis held to be the originof the still extant superstition that it is bad luck to spill the salt. Nowmost people who have this superstition are probably not even awareof its orig in. Likewise, astrological superstitions may have had theirorig in in the fortuitous pairing, of a given stellar orien tation and a

particular notewo rthy earthly event. But such origins are buried inantiq uity . Yet people continu e to be superstitious abou t the placementof stars.

It is to be noted that popular astrology has enjoyed a recent boomand revival. Lewinsohn (1961) offers the following speculation onthis phenomenon:

While the revolution which has been changing the Newtonian worldpicture ever since 1900 has made some people more skeptical, it hassimply made others more credulous. Scientific laws which our text-books have taught us to look uponas eternal truths have collapsed likeninepins, and new ones still lack the authority that their predecessorsenjoyed. Scientists have grow n a little more circumspect and no

longer dare to proclaim general laws with the facility of their 19thcentury predecessors. Because of these developments, laymen havebegun to feel that it is impossible to distinguish truth from hypothesis.Now, laymen have always been sticklers for certainty, and where truthis uncertain, they will accept anything that is presentedas being simpleand sure (pp. 93-94).

In this vein we might also suggest that the current resurgence ofmysticism in psychology, as exemplified by some of the existentialpsychologies, and the popular issue of consciousness-expanding, orpsychodelic drugs, might be traceable to the lack of definitive state-ments within the field of psychology, to the disillusionment withpsychoanalytic absolutes, and to the great difficulty of understandingcurrent psychological orientations.

Returning to the problem of the acquisition of superstitions, weshall no longer avoid the most simple declaration: thatis, people mayacquire their superstitions by direct verbal communication, as well as

150


9/16


by first-hand perception of fortuitous pairings of events. Itis as if eachculture presents its participants with a rule book which states standardbeliefs abou t what leads to what. These standard beliefs may be re-garded as major premises that stand readyunder conditions of un-certaintyto instantiate a potentially threatening or disturbing eventin such a way as to bring it under control.

5. The Maintenance of Superstitions

Any object which remains uncontradicted isipso facto believed andposited as absolute realityWilliam James

It is the thesis of this section that if an individual already has an

explanation regarding a given event, that explanation will tend tostand until replaced by some ' stronger magic ', and that this replace-men t is contingent on several conditions. Itis commonplace in sciencethat a theory is rarely, if ever, negated by its own terms, but rathermust be replaced by a better theory if itis to be replaced atall. Perhapsthis is wh y Freudian theory has endured. Volumes of criticism havebeen directed towards it, but nobody seems to have publicised acompeting theory as general and elaborate and dramatic for the under-standing of psychological cause-effect relationships. Perhaps some ofthe newer psychodynamic theories are just as general, but still theFreudian monument stands, and will continue to stand through itsown inertia, unless it is challenged by a significantly stronger (moredram atic, more need-fulfilling) dieory. Little is gained in substitutingone belief for a pragmatically equivalent one.

One might point to a set of beliefs held by laymen and by manyprofessionals in the mental hea lth fieldas an example of the maintenanceof a superstition. Some disordered persons(i.e. those whose behaviourdoes not follow rules considered appropriate by certain members ofthe society) are ' diagnosed ' as sick persons and are given a labelschizophrenia. This labelling is coterm inous with wha t goes on whena person is sick as the result of microbial invasion, virus infection,fractured bones, etc. Because of superficial similarities in the conductof some disordered personsdisturbed speech, invalid judgments,' hallucin ation', etc.with the conduct of persons w ith kno^vndisease processes (toxins, brain tumours, virus infections, etc), theillicit analogical leap is made that all disorder may be accounted forthrough application o f the disease model. The failure to establishuniform diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia, the failure to find


10/16

KARL E . SCHEIBE AN D TH EO DO RE R . SAR BIN

lang uage and thou ght disorders substantially different from rates inthe normal population (when the effects of commitment and hospital-isation procedures are controlled), and the arbitrariness with which aperson is ch's-dfied as mentally ill, have not eliminated the belief thatdisordered persons are ' sick ' , must be ' diagnosed ', and subjected tolegal and medical procedurespresumably for the' cure ' of the patient(Sarbin, 1962). T he ope ration of such a superstition to ' fill the gap 'is epitomized in Cum m ing and C um mi ng 's (1955) account of the in-effectiveness of a community mental-health educational programme.

In our attempts to produce a more permissive climate for former mentalpatients, we conveyed the idea that they were pretty much like everyoneelse, and that there was no sharp line dividing the sane from the insane,bu t rather a continuou s range of behavior. In stressing this idea w ewere hammering directly at the core of the community's own solutionto the problem of the mentally ill. Ou r problem was not theirs. W ewere concerned widi the cure of the mentally ill, the people of PrairieTown with the stability and solidarity of their own community. . . .Prairie Town's pattern of beliefs and attitudes toward mental illnesswas no t m erely a patchw ork of half-trutlis, fallacies, and inconsistencies.. . . it played an impo rtant part in preserving the well-being of thecommunity and the peace of mind and self-esteem of the averageindividual (pp. 63-64).

The basis for the longevity of superstitions need no longer beshroud ed in my stery. If we accept the general statemen t of the Lawof Effecta response that is followed by reinforcem ents w ill prob ablybe employed again under the same or similar circumstancesthen theevents that support superstitions may be ordered through the inferencemodel (Sarbin, et at. i960). Certain events occur. The y providesensory inputs. If these inputs cannot be readily instantiated (assigned toa class) by the participants in a culture , cognitive strain follows. Thi sis characterised by large increases in cognitive activityan effort to finda major premise diat contains the same middle term as the so -far-unin-stantiated inp ut. Increases in cogn itive activity freq uen tly' spill ove r 'into physiological activity, sometimes identified as dysphoric affects.The solution to the problem is through the employment of r i tual orother procedures dictated by the superst i tion. Fil ling the gap in kno w-ledge through provision of a usable major premise reduces cognitive

strain. This may be reinforcing in either or bo th of tw o ways (1) itmay be arousal reducing (drive reduction in the Hullian sense) and (2)the persons carrying out the ritual are given appr oval (generalised social

152


11/16


reinforcement in the Skinnerian sense). The solutionno m atterhow irrational from our point of viewis thus self-perpetuating.Following are some instances ofthis general theme.

Am ong the Polynesians it is very com mon to resolve the questionsof guilt or innocence of a defendant by spinning a coconut, and observ-ing the direction in which it comes to rest. It is com mon knowledgethat witch trials were often conducted by the similar method of' ordeal' , in which the accused was thrown into water, or otherwiseplaced in a perilous situation. Survival was accepted as proof o finnocence, while death gave certainty of guilt. After the ordeal isover, the accepted conclusionis a source of satisfaction to all concerned.If the accused survives, the accusers are relieved that they have no t takena life in vain. If the accused dies, the actions ofthe accusers are vin-dicated, and again relief, or a reinforcing state of affairs, is the con-sequence.

O r consider the example of prayer to believed-in gods. Since theprayer is believed to be efficacious in altering the course of futureevents, the worshipper feels relieved and comforted immediately afterhaving prayed . He may no w rest because he has placed control in thehands of a greater power. An appeal has been made to the powerswhich control all uncertainty, and human wo rryis no longer necessary.Even if the prayer is not answered the prayer is still, on the whole, asource of relief and com fort. Further, his actions may be approvedby significant others in the community.

Or consider the more homely and current example of filter-tipcigarettes. It is now fairly w ell established that the presence of a filterdoes little to alter the probability of smoking leading to lung cancer(Smoking and Health, 1964). Yet filter cigarettes succeed in reducingsome of the tension in smokers aroused by the cancer research findings.

Additional examples could be cited by the score, but the essentialpoint is that the superstition does indeed have an effect, even thoughthe perceived causal relation is entirely false. On ce installed, andinvested witha high degree of confidence, the superstitionis completelyself-maintaining, and requires no further confirmation in the way offortuitous pairings of events, so long as the superstition is not subjectedto conflict and challenged by an alternative and functionally moreappropriate belief.

The Hutterite communities of the eastern United States provide arevealing example on this point1: the culture remains quite distinct

1 The source of informationhere is a report on' folkobstetrics ' by Eaton (1958).

153


12/16


from that of the surrounding communities, and this distinction ischerished by the Hutterite s. A remarkable people, they have success-fully resisted the intrusion of science into the m ajority o f their customs,and do not seem much the worse for this rigidity. In fact, their child-birth traditions function so well for them, that while the averagemo ther has n children, a severe complication is very rare. TheHutterites have numerous superstitions about the ' evil eye ' and aboutsexual taboos, and these are accepted from generation to generationwith out muc h question. Alcoholism, crime, dope-addiction, andmental disorders are present only to a negligible degree. In fact, thecurrent problems of this culture can be traced directly to the partiallysuccessful attempts of outsiders to have them institute more modern

practices in childbirth and child rearing. The beliefs of this culturehave worked for them in a very efficient and satisfying fashion and arethereby self-sustaining. The tru th of this statement is demonstrableeven though we would not hesitate to label a large number of theirbeliefs as ' superstitions '.

Of course, not all persistent superstitions have such an obviousfunctiona l significance. Saunders (1958) repor ts that beliefs regardingmedical practices came from four widely disparate sources for theSpanish-Americans of the south-w est. These people seem to be able toaccept all of these beliefs, even though many of them seem contra-dicto ry. Characteristically, they try their ow n folk-medicine first,and if these techniques are ineffective, they simply turn to something

else. ' A remedy is tried, and if it work s no surprise is evinced, sincethat is what was expected. If it does n ot wo rk, the failureis rationalizedand som ething else is tr ie d' (Saunders, 1958, p. 191). Clearly thesefolk beliefs exhibit a fair amount of inertia in the face o f challenge.Beliefs which seem inconsistent and dissonant to us are not necessarilyso for the people who hold those beliefs.

Another basis for the m aintenance of a superstition is the process ofinsulation against or distortion of objective information to conform tothe superstitious com mi tment. For example, for some individualsagreement between the conclusion of a syllogism and one's own beliefsfunctions as a criterion for udg ing the soundness of syllogistic reasoning(Thouless, 1959; Morgan and Morton, 1944; Thistlethwaite, 1950).

Highly prejudiced individuals are resistant to change in general(Rokeach, 1943) and individuals with highly conservative beliefs areresistant to contrary information (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949).

It has been experimentally demonstrated that the extent to which

154


13/16

T H E O R E T I C A L C O N C E P T U A L I S AT I O N O F S U P E R S T I T I O N

beliefs about m atters of fact deviate from the trut h is hig hly related tothe level of information the respondents possess about those facts.Moreover, the distortions in beliefs are consistent with the evaluativesignificance assigned by the respo ndents to those beliefs. Th at is,individuals tend to believe what they want to believe where lack ofinformation makes this possible (Scheibc, 1963).

In sum, superstitious belief 1: seem to have a fair amount of stability.If they are no t challenged they are maintained. Even if moder atedegrees of challenge are made to established superstitions, the individualis likely to prefer distorting facts or logic to discarding the superstition(Coh en, Breh m and Latane, 1959). O f course, there are interestingindivid ual differences in this regar d: ' Th e passion for unity andsmoothness is in some minds so insatiate that, in spite of the logicalclearness o f .. . reasonings and conclus ions, m an y will fail to be influen-ced by them ' (James, I, 1890, p. 162).

6. Another Function of Superstitions

A tertiar y functional significance of uncerta inty m ay give use tosupe rstition. Jam es lias said that uncer tainty m ust exist in orde r form an to hav e a sense of personal significance. M an y ' classic al'psychologists wo uld agree with hi m. (For instance, France, 1902).The essence of Kierkegaard's philosophy is that man must cope withuncer tainty and unpredictability. If ma n were to have true vision ofcause and effect relationships, there would follow, according to some,a com plete abroga tion of hum an responsibility. It is the uncertaintieswhic h give life its vigo ur and interest. Othe rs of a less romanticpersuasion view this line of thinking as a severe restriction on theprogress of scientific knowledge, and openly propose that we seek toestablish a com pletely controlled and predictable universe. Theflavour of this issue is conveyed in this statement by Skinner (Rogersand Skinner, 1956).

A world in which people are wise and good, without trying, without' having to be ' or without ' choosing to be ', could conceivably be afar better world for everyone. In such a wo rld we should not have to' give anyone credit' we should not need to admire anyoneforbeing wise and good. From our present point of view we cannotbelieve that such a world would be admirable. W e do not permit

ourselves to imagine what it would be like (p. 1060).W e do not propo se to discuss this issue here. Ho wev er, it shouldserve as a caution to those who would cavalierly declare that human

1 1 * ' 155


14/16


beings should be relieved of their uncertainties and ofthe superstitionswhich are their product.

To recapitulate:First, a superstition maybe considered to be a special kind of ex-

pectancy that can be codified as a major premise. Starting with theassumption of objective un certainty, it has been argued that some extra-logical propositions, suchas superstitions, are necessaryguides to action.

Though initially superstitions may beacquired in a manner analogousto the process of operant conditioning, sucha model does not do w ell indescribing most superstitions, especially those for which the originalconfirmation is historically obscure. W e have suggested the possibilitythat superstitions may be acquired by direct tuition on condition of

uncertainty of outcomes, where the outcomes arc highly valued.If a superstition goes unchallenged by another and ' stro ng er'

superstition, it will not just wither away. Superstitions do have theeffect of reducing cogn itive strain and thus are self-maintaining. Theyalso exhibit a high degree of inertia, in that once they are installed, theythen remain until dislodged bya much strongerbelief. Individuals andcultures may differ in the extent to which they can tolerate the ambiguityof contradictory superstitions.

It should be clear that the necessary con ditions for the application ofthe superstition label are locatedboth in the actor and in the observer.If the actor has an operative belief that the observer believes to be false,then the observer may say that the actor's beliefis a superstition. If

the beliefs of the observer are not derived from empirical or inductiveprocedures, his allegation that a belief is a superstition w ill not hold upamongst scientists. W e, as scientists, are wo nt to label as superstitionsthe beliefs that differ from scientifically supported propositions.

How about scientific theories about which there is disagreement?Or how about scientists who persist in believing discredited theories?Should the la bel ' superstition ' be applied in these cases? In one sense,it certainly should. Beliefs in invalid theories that belong under theinstitutional aegis of Science are of precisely the same logical andpsychological sort as beliefs in the most primitive and mundane ritual.

But this brings up the point ofthe social psychological significanceof calling a belief superstitious. Since the term superstition carries astrong pejorative meaning in our culture, one may run the risk ofoffending another if he charges him directly with being superstitious.In actual practice it is not the custom to apply the term to individualswith whom some social contact must be maintained, or who are

156


15/16


present in person. The term is usually applied to absent persons, toihc hypothetical Masses, or to distant cultures. This usage conventioninvolves little risk or retribution, and is properly discreet.

A final point should be made that may seem surprising, in view ofthe title of this paper. Instead of using the term superstition m orefrequently, as would be necessary if we were to apply the term at allconsistently, it should be used less frequently, and perhaps not at alLAccording to the major points outlined earlier regarding the psycho-logical nature of superstitions as a category of beliefs, it should beapparent that they are ubiqu itous; that evenscientists have them thoughhere they are often clothed in the dignified fabric of irreproachablemathem atical or verbal symbolism. Moreover, superstitions, i.e.

beliefs that are not inductively derived and not empirically checked,are psychologically necessary for existence. Thus, even though thecategory of beliefs called superstitions is a distinct and meaningfulcategory, it turns out to be too inclusive a class of beliefs to bear thesocially reprehensible label of Superstition. For the sake of equityand fairness, the term should be used not more, but less.

Wcsleyan University aud University of California,Berkeley

REFERENCES

A. R. C ohen, J. V. Brehm and D . Latane, ' Choices of Strategy and VoluntaryExposure to Information', J.Pcrsotuility, 1959, 27, 63-73.

J. Cohen, Chance, Skill and LucU, Penguin Books, i960.Elaine Cumming and J. Cumming, ' Mental Health Education in a Canadian Com-

munity ' in B. D . Paul (ed.)Health, Culture, and Community, Russell Sage Founda-tion, New York, 1955.

F. C. Do ckeray and W . L. Valentine. An Analysis of the Elementary PsychologyCourse at Ohio State University,J. Appl. Psycho!., 1935, 19, 503-520.

J. Eaton,' Folk Obstetrics and Pediatrics : A Case Study of Social Anthropology andMedicine ' injaco, E. (cd.).Patients, Physicians, and Illness. Free Press, Glencoe,1958.

C. J. France, ' The Gambling Impulse ',Amer.J. Psychol, 1902, 13, 364-407.J. G. Frazer, Th e Golden Bough : A Study inMagic and Religion (abridged cd.), Mac-

millan, London and New York, 1925.Else Frenkel-Brunswik, ' Intolerance of a mbiguity as an emotional and perceptual

personality variable '. / .Personality, 1949, 18, 108-143.A. R. Gilliland, ' A Study of the Superstitions of College Students',J. Abu. & Soc.

Psychol., 1930, 24, 472-479.C. S. Hall and G. Lindzey,Theories of Personality, Wiley, New York, 1957.

15 7


16/16

K A R L E . S C H E I B E A N D T H E O D O R E R . S A R B I N

F. Heider, ' Social Perception and Phenomenal Causality ',Psychol. Rev., 1944, 51 .358-374-

W . James, Principles of Psychology, Vols. I and II, Henry Holt, New York, 1890.J. Jastrow, Fact and Fable in Psychology, Macmillan, New York, 1900.R. Lewinsohn, Propliets and Prediction, Seeker & W arbu rg, Londo n, 196 r.B. Malinowski, ' Anthropology ',Encyclopedia Britannica, First Supplementary Vol-

ume, London and New York, 1926.R. K. Mcrton, Social Theory and Social Structure. Glencoc, 111. : Free Press, 1957.A. E. M ichotte, The Perception ofCausality (trans, by T. R. and Elaine Miles), Methuen,

London, 1963.J. J. B. Morgan and J. T. Morton,' The Distortion of Syllogistic Reasoning Produced

by Personal Convictions',]. Soc. Psycho!., 1944, 20, 39-59.W . H . Morse and B. F. Skinner," A Second Type of Superstition in the Pigeon ',

Amer.J. Psychol., 1957, 70, 308-311.

Jean Piaget, Th e Construction of Reality in theChild (trans, by Margaret Cook), BasicBooks, New York, 1955.Carl R. Rogers and B. F. Skinner, ' Some Issues Concerning the Control of Human

Behavior : A Symposium ',Science, 1956, 123, 1057-1066.M. Rokcach, ' Generalized Mental Rigidit) as a Factor in Ethnocentrism ',/.Aim. &

Soc. Psychol., 1948, 43, 259-278.J. B. Rotter, Social Learning an d Clinical Psychology, Prentice-Hall, New York, 1954.T. R. Sarbin, R. Taft and D. Bailey,Clinical Inference an d Cognitive Tlieory, Holt,

Rinehart & Winston, New York, i960.T. R. Sarbin, Role-Theoretical Analysis of Schizophrenia, Ms. 1962.L. Saunders, ' Healing W ays in the Spanish Southw est'. In E . Jaco (ed.),Patients,

Physicians, and Illness, Free Press, Glencoe, 1958.K. E. S cheibe, ' On the Relationship B etween Beliefs and Values, unpublished

doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1963.B. F. Skinner, ' Superstition in the Pigeon',]. Exp. Psychol, 1948, 38, 168-172.

Smoking and Health, report of the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General of thePublic Health Service, 1964, Washington, D.C.

D . Thistlethwaite, ' Attitude and Structure and Factors in the Distortion of Reason-ing ', J. Abn. & Soc. Psychol., 1950, 45, 442-458.

R. H. Thoulcss, ' The Effect of Prejudice on Reasoning ',Brit. J. Psydwl., 1959, 5289-293-

E. C. Tolman, Behavior and Psychological Man, University of California Press, 1958.E. B. Tylor, Primitive Culture (2 vols.). Holt, New York, 1888.R. R. W illoughby, ' Magic and Cognate Phenomena : An hypo thesis', in C.

Murdiison (ed.), Handbook ofSocial Psychology, Clark UniversityPress, Worcester,Mass., 1935.

158

towards a theoretical conceptualisation of superstition

Documents