torts final case

7/28/2019 Torts Final Case

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Case digest: TORTS

Phil. Bank of Commerce v. CA

G.R. No. 97626, March 14, 1997

The negligence must be the proximate cause of the loss

FACTS:

Rommels Marketing Corporation (RMC) maintained two separate current accounts with PBC inconnection with its business of selling appliances. The RMC General Manager Lipana entrusted to hissecretary, Irene Yabut, RMC funds amounting to P300,000+ for the purpose of depositing the same toRMCs account with PBC. However, it turned out that Yabut deposited the amounts in her husbandsaccount instead of RMC. Lipana never checked his monthly statement of accounts regularly furnished byPBC so that Yabuts modus operandi went on for th e span of more than one year.ISSUE:

What is the proximate cause of the loss Lipanas negligence in not checking his monthlystatements or the banks negligence through its teller in validating the deposit slips?

HELD:

The bank teller was negligent in validating, officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips preparedand presented by Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplishedcontrary to the self-imposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips,original or duplicate.

The bank tellers negligence, as well as the negligence of the bank in the selection and supervision of itsbank teller, is the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent, not the lattersentrusting cash to a dishonest employee. Xxx Even if Yabut had the fraudulent intention to misappropriatethe funds, she would not have been able to deposit those funds in her husbands current account, andthen make plaintiff believe that it was in the latters accounts wherein she had deposited them, had it notbeen for the bank tellers aforesaid gross and reckless negligence.

Doctrine of Last Clear Chance where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one isappreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid theimpending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. It means that theantecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the superveningnegligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by exercise of due diligence. (Phil. Bank of Commercev. CA, supra)

PLDT vs CA
http://scire-licet.blogspot.com/2010/02/phil-bank-of-commerce-v-ca.htmlhttp://scire-licet.blogspot.com/2010/02/phil-bank-of-commerce-v-ca.htmlhttp://scire-licet.blogspot.com/2010/02/phil-bank-of-commerce-v-ca.html


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G.R. No. L-57079 September 29, 1989

Facts:

A jeep driven by private respondent Esteban fell into an open trench, the excavation was due to theinstallation of an underground conduit system by PLDT, the said open trench was without cover and anywarning signs.

As a result the private respondent and his wife sustained injuries, and their vehicle was also damaged.

PLDT in its defense, imputes the injuries to the private respondents own negligence. Also, it alleges thatL.R. Barte and company acting as an independent contractor, should be responsible for the excavationwas performed by them.

As for Barte, they alleged that they have complied with the due standards in performing their work, andthat it was not aware of the accident involving the Estebans.

Court of Appeals held that respondent Esteban spouses were negligent and consequently absolvedpetitioner PLDT from the claim for damages.

Upon responde nts second motion to reconsideration, CA reversed its decision, following he decision of Trial Court and held PLDT liable for damages.

Issue:

Whether or not PLDT is liable

Held:

NO

We find no error in the findings of the respondent court in its original decision that the accident whichbefell private respondents was due to the lack of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was notimputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT.


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The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident; the only purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on the site. The privaterespondents already knew of the presence of said excavations. It was not the lack of knowledge of theseexcavations which caused the jeep of respondents to fall into the excavation but the unexplained sudden

swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the accident mound. As opined in some quarters, theomission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation, constitutesthe proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act would have prevented the injury. It isbasic that private respondents cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their own failure to exercisedue and reasonable care was the cause thereof. It is both a societal norm and necessity that one shouldexercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own protection. Furthermore, respondent AntonioEsteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence heimputes to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost everyday andhad knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there. It was his negligence that exposedhim and his wife to danger, hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence.

A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of suchfault or negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmativelyestablished by competent evidence. Whosoever relies on negligence for his cause of action has theburden in the first instance of proving the existence of the same if contested, otherwise his action mustfail.

Amo noy vs Spou ses Gu t i er rez

G.R. No. 140420 / February 15, 2001

Attorneys Fees

The case had its roots in special proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of the deceased JulioCatolos, involving 6 parcels of land situated in Tanay, Rizal. Amonoy was the counsel therein for Francisca Catolos, Agnes Catolos, Asuncion Pasamba, and Alfonso Fornilda. On January 12, 1965, theproject of partition submitted was approved and 2 of the said lots were adjudicated to Asuncion Pasambaand Aldonso Fornilda. The attorneys fee charged by Amonoy was P27,600.00 and on January 20, 1965,

Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Fornilda executed a deed of real estate mortgage on the said 2 lots infavor of Amonoy to secure the payment of his attorneys fees. But it was only August 6, 1969 after the

taxes had been paid, the claims of settled and the property adjudicated, that the estate was declaredclosed and terminated. Asuncion and Alfonso died, among the heirs of the latter was his daughter,plaintiff-appellant Angela Gutierrez. Thereafter, on Amonoys motion, the orders were issued for thedemolition of structures in the said lots, including the house of Gutierrez spouses. A complaint for damages in connection with the destruction of their house was filed by respondents against petitioner.
http://howardscasedigests.webs.com/apps/blog/show/5103986-amonoy-vs-spouses-gutierrezhttp://howardscasedigests.webs.com/apps/blog/show/5103986-amonoy-vs-spouses-gutierrezhttp://howardscasedigests.webs.com/apps/blog/show/5103986-amonoy-vs-spouses-gutierrez


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ISSUE: Whether or not the CA was correct in deciding that the petitioner was liable to respondents for damages.

HELD: Clearly , the demolition of respondents house by petitioner, despite his receipt of the TRO, was

not only an abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such right. In insisting on his alleged right, he wantonlyviolated this courts order and wittingly caused the destruction of respondents house. In the ultimateanalysis, petitioners liability is premised on the obligation to repair or to make whole the damage causedto another by reason of ones act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or punishable by law. The court ruled against Amonoy.

Amonoy v. GutierrezFebruary 15, 2001FACTS: The lot on which the Gutierrez spouses built their house was bought by Amonoy in an auctionsale. Amonoy was granted an order for the demolition of the house. However, a temporary restrainingorder was granted enjoining the demolition. The SC then made the TRO permanent. However, by thetime the decision was rendered, the house was already destroyed. The Gutierrez spouses then filed a suitfor damages.

ISSUE: WON Amonoy was liable for damages. YES

HELD: Even though Amonoys actions were legally justified at the start, their continuation even after theTRO was issued amounted to an abuse of his right.The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused,especially to the prejudice of others. Amonoys acts constituted not only an abuse of a right, but aninvalid exercise of a right that was suspended.

C L A S S N O T E S Rule: Action which was originally legal canbecome illegal if exercised abusively. The legal principle applied in this case is

damnum absque injuria. What we have here is an illegal act. There wasno more right for him to abuse! This is not acase of abuse of right. A19 presupposes an existing r ight; What

Amonoy did was contempt of court Problem: relied upon Testimony solely of Guitierrez (when it is self-serving)

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES vs. IACFacts: Catalina Pascua with several others boarded the jeep owned by spouses Isidro Mangune and

Guillerma Carreon and driven by Tranquilino Manalo bound for Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan.Upon reaching Tarlac the right rear wheel of the jeepney was detached, so it was running in anunbalanced position. Manalo stepped on the brake, as a result of which, the jeepney which was thenrunning on the eastern lane (its right of way) made a U-turn, invading and eventually stopping on thewestern lane and was hit by the petitioner companys bus causing the death of Catalina Pascua and twoother passengers.Issue: Wether or not the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in thecase at bar?Held: No, The principle about "the last clear" chance, would call for application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding


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vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from thecarrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable toexempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground thatthe other driver was likewise guilty of negligence."It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the actor's conduct is asubstantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or themanner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable. The busdriver's conduct is not a substantial factor in bringing about harm to thepassengers of the jeepney. It cannot be said that the bus was travelling at afast speed when the accident occurred because the speed of 80 to 90kilometers per hour, assuming such calculation to be correct, is yet within thespeed limit allowed in highways.The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in caseof breach of the contract of carriage. The rationale behind this is readilydiscernible. Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the carrier and thepassenger, and in the event of contractual liability, the carrier is exclusivelyresponsible therefore to the passenger, even if such breach be due to thenegligence of his driver. In other words, the carrier can neither shift hisliability on the contract to his driver nor share it with him, for his driver'snegligence is his. Secondly, if We make the driver jointly and severally liablewith the carrier, that would make the carrier's liability personal instead of merely vicarious and consequently, entitled to recover only the share whichcorresponds to the driver, contradictory to the explicit provision of Article2181 of the New Civil Code.

Bacarro vs. CastanoBacarro vs. Castano

(GR L-34597, 5 November 1982)

FACTS:

Respondent Castano boarded a jeep driven by Petitioner Montefalcon who thereafter drove it at around40 kilometers per hour. While approaching Sumasap Bridge at the said speed, a cargo truck coming frombehind, blowing its horn to signal its intention to overtake the jeep. The jeep, without changing its speed,gave way by swerving to the right, such that both vehicles ran side by side for a distance of around 20meters. Thereafter as the jeep was left behind, its driver was unable to return it to its former lane andinstead it obliquely or diagonally ran down an inclined terrain towards the right until it fell into a ditchpinning down and crushing Castanos right leg in the process.

Castano filed a case for damages against Rosita Bacarro, William Sevilla, and Felario Montefalcon.Defendants alleged that the jeepney was sideswiped by the overtaking cargo truck. After trial, the CFI of Misamis Oriental ordered Bacarro, et.al. to jointly and severally pay Castano. It was affirmed by the CAupon appeal.

ISSUES:


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1. Whether or not there was a contributory negligence on the part of the jeepney driver.2. Whether or not extraordinary diligence is required of the jeepney driver.3. Whether or not the sideswiping is a fortuitous event.

HELD:

1.) Yes. X x x. The fact is, petitioner-driver Montefalcon did not slacken his speed but instead continued torun the jeep at about forty (40) kilometers per hour even at the time the overtaking cargo truck wasrunning side by side for about twenty (20) meters and at which time he even shouted to the driver of thetruck.

Thus, had Montefalcon slackened the speed of the jeep at the time the truck was overtaking it, instead of running side by side with the cargo truck, there would have been no contact and accident. He shouldhave foreseen that at the speed he was running, the vehicles were getting nearer the bridge and as theroad was getting narrower the truck would be to close to the jeep and would eventually sideswiped it.Otherwise stated, he should have slackened his jeep when he swerved it to the right to give way to thetruck because the two vehicles could not cross the bridge at the same time.

2.) Yes. x x x [T]he fact is, there was a contract of carriage between the private respondent and the hereinpetitioners in which case the Court of Appeals correctly applied Articles 1733, 1755 and 1766 of the CivilCode which require the exercise of extraordinary diligence on the part of petitioner Montefalcon.

Indeed, the hazards of modern transportation demand extraordinary diligence. A common carrier isvested with public interest. Under the new Civil Code, instead of being required to exercise mere ordinarydiligence a common carrier is exhorted to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresightcan provide "using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons." (Article 1755). Once a passenger in thecourse of travel is injured, or does not reach his destination safely, the carrier and driver are presumed tobe at fault.

3.) The third assigned error of the petitioners would find fault upon respondent court in not freeingpetitioners from any liability, since the accident was due to a fortuitous event. But, We repeat that the

alleged fortuitous event in this case - the sideswiping of the jeepney by the cargo truck, was somethingwhich could have been avoided considering the narrowness of the Sumasap Bridge which was not wide

enough to admit two vehicles. As found by the Court of Appeals, Montefalcon contributed to theoccurrence of the mishap.

Bacarro vs. Castano (HR L-34597, 5 November 1982)First Division, Relova (J): 4 concur, 1 on leaveFacts: In the afternoon of 1 April 1960, Gerundio B. Castano boarded a jeep as a paying passenger atOroquieta bound for Jimenez, Misamis Occidental. It was then filled to capacity, with 12 passengers in all.The jeep was driven by Felario Montefalcon at around 40 kilometers per hour. While approachingSumasapBridge at the said speed, a cargo truck (owned by Te Tiong, alias Chinggim; and driven by NicostratoDigal)coming from behind, blowing its horn to signal its intention to overtake the jeep. The jeep, withoutchangingits speed, gave way by swerving to the right, such that both vehicles ran side by side for a distance of around


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20 meters. Thereafter as the jeep was left behind, its driver was unable to return it to its former lane andinstead it obliquely or diagonally ran down an inclined terrain towards the right until it fell into a ditchpinning down and c rushing Castanos right leg in the process. Castano filed a case for damages against Rosita Bacarro, William Sevilla, and Felario Montefalcon.Defendants alleged that the jeepney was sideswiped by the overtaking cargo truck. After trial, the CFI of Misamis Oriental ordered Bacarro, et.al. to jointly and severally pay Castano the sum of (1) P973.10 for medical treatment and hospitalization; (2)P840.20 for loss of salary during treatment; and (3) P2,000.00for partial permanent deformity, with costs against Bacarro, et.al.Transportation Law, 2004 ( 265 )Haystacks (Berne Guerrero)

Appeal was taken by Bacarro, et. al. to the Court of Appeals, which, on 30 September 1971, affirmed thatof the trial court. Hence, the appeal by certiorari.The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals; with costs.1. Contributory negligence of MontefalconHerein, driver Montefalcon did not slacken his speed but instead continued to run the jeep at about 40kilometers per hour even at the time the overtaking cargo truck was running side by side for about 20metersand at which time he even shouted to the driver of the truck. Had Montefalcon slackened the speed of the

jeepat the time the truck was overtaking it, instead of running side by side with the cargo truck, there wouldhavebeen no contact and accident. He should have foreseen that at the speed he was running, the vehiclesweregetting nearer the bridge and as the road was getting narrower the truck would be too close to the jeepandwould eventually sideswipe it. Otherwise stated, he should have slackened his jeep when he swerved it totheright to give way to the truck because the two vehicles could not cross the bridge at the same time.2. Jeepney driver failed to exercise extraordinary diligence, human care, foresight and utmostdiligence of a very cautious person ; Article 1763The jeepney driver failed to exercise extraordinary diligence, human care, foresight and utmost

diligence of a very cautious person, when the diligence required pursuant to Article 1763 of the Civil Codeisonly that of a good father of a family. Whether the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of thedriver of the truck, as alleged, is immaterial. As there was a contract of carriage between Castano andBacarro, et. al., the Court of Appeals correctly applied Articles 1733, 1755 and 1766 of the Civil Codewhichrequire the exercise of extraordinary diligence on the part of Montefalcon.3. Article 1733 NCC

Article 1733 provides that Common carriers, from the nature of t heir business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for thesafetyof the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.

4. Article 1755 NCC Article 1755 provides that A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for allthe circumstances. 5. Article 1766 NCC

Article 1766 provides that In all matters not regulated by this Code, the rights and obligations of common carriers shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by special laws. 6. Common carrier vested with public interest, required utmost diligence of very cautiouspersons;


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Presumption of faultThe hazards of modern transportation demand extraordinary diligence. A common carrier is vestedwith public interest. Under the new Civil Code, instead of being required to exercise mere ordinarydiligencea common carrier is exhorted to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight canprovideusing the utmost diligence of very cautious persons. (Article 1755). Once a passenger in the course of travelis injured, or does not reach his destination safely, the carrier and driver are presumed to be at fault.7. Sideswiping of jeepney foreseeable, not fortuitous eventThe accident was not due to a fortuitous event. The alleged fortuitous event in the case, i.e. thesideswiping of the jeepney by the cargo truck, was something which could have been avoidedconsidering thenarrowness of Sumasap Bridge which was not wide enough to admit two vehicles. Herein, Montefalconcontributed to the occurrence of the mishap.

PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL vs THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATECOURT and LEONARDO DIONISIOG.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987

FACTS:

Respondent Leonardo Dionisio was driving on his way home from a cocktail-and-dinner party, from whichhe had a shot or two of liquor. He had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General

Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati when allegedly his car headlights suddenly failed.

He switched his headlights on "bright" and saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away fromhis car. The dump truck, owned by and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc.("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street, facing the oncoming traffic. Italso did not have any lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices.

Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and hiscar smashed into the dump truck. Due to the event therefore the herein private respondent filed an actionfor Damages on the grounds that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Phoenix had allowed its truck to be parked.

Petitioners defense: that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in drivingfast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without a


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curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due rare in the selection andsupervision of the dump truck driver.

The petitioners Phoenix and Carbonel contend that if there was negligence in the manner in which the

dump truck was parked, that negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that privaterespondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening, efficient cause determinative of theaccident and the injuries he sustained.

Trial court rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against Phoenix and Carbonel.

Intermediate Appellate Court confirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Phoenixs negligence is the proximate ca use?

HELD:

YES.

We agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal andproximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner inwhich the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That there was areasonable relationship between petitioner Carbonel's negligence on the one hand and the accident andrespondent's injuries on the other hand, is quite clear. Put in a slightly different manner, the collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver'snegligence.

The truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an indispensableand efficient cause. The collision between the dump truck and the private respondent's car would in an

probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices.

We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate andproximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequentlyrespondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts(Article 2179, Civil Code of the Philippines).


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Turning to the award of damages and taking into account the comparative negligence of privaterespondent Dionisio on one hand and petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix upon the other hand, 17 webelieve that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80ratio.

Phoenix Construction Inc. v IACFACTS: A dump truck, owned by Phoenix, was parked askew on the right hand side of the street in sucha manner as to stick out onto General Lacuna St., partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There wereno early warning devices placed near the truck. At 1:30AM, Dionisio was on his way home when his car headlights allegedly suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on bright and saw the truck looming 2 meters away from his car. His car smashed into the dump truck.

ISSUE: What was the proximate cause of the accident?

HELD: The wrongful and negligent parking of the truck, and not the negligence of Dionisio, was theproximate cause of the accident. The truck drivers negligence was far from being a passive and static condition and was rather an indispensable and efficient cause.The collision of Dionisios car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of thetruck drivers negligence. The improper parking of the truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna St. and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be heldliable. What the petitioners describe as an intervening cause was no more than a foreseeableconsequence of the risk created by the negligent manner in which the truck driver had parked the dumptruck. Quoting Posser and Keeton on Foreseeable intervening causes : If the intervening cause is onewhich in ordinary human experience is reasonable to be anticipated, or one which the defendant hasreason to anticipate under the particular circumstances, the defendant may be negligent xxx because of failure to guard against it; or the defendant may e negligent only for that reason. Foreseeable intervening

forces are within the scope of the original risk, and hence of the defendants negligence. Note : Court mentioned foreseeability.

BUSTAMANTE vs. CAFacts: A collision occurred between a gravel and sand truck, and a Mazdapassenger bus along the national road at Calibuyo, Tanza, Cavite. The frontleft side portion (barandilla) of the body of the truck sideswiped the left sidewall of the passenger bus, ripping off the said wall from the driver's seat tothe last rear seat. Due to the impact, several passengers of the bus werethrown out and died as a result of the injuries they sustained, Among thosekilled were Rogelio Bustamante and his spouse and children, and severalothers.During the incident, the cargo truck was driven by defendantMontesiano and owned by defendant Del Pilar; while the passenger bus wasdriven by defendant Susulin. The vehicle was registered in the name of defendant Novelo but was owned and/or operated as a passenger bus jointlyby defendants Magtibay and Serrado, under a franchise, with a line fromNaic, Cavite, to Baclaran, Paranaque, Metro Manila, and vice versa, whichNovelo sold to Magtibay on November 8, 1981, and which the latter


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highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. Thepetitioner's driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacityof the jeepney. These are violations of the Land Transportation and TrafficCode. Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney withits body protruding two meters into the highway.

As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the itemsenumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. As an exception, suchdamages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in thedeath of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220.In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no factual finding by the appellatecourt that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage.

Ilocos Norte v CAFACTS: After a 2-day typhoon, Isabel went out of her house to check on her grocer store. She waded inwaistdeep flood and got electrocuted. According to the NPC Engr, there were no INELCO linemen whowere going around.HELD : Court said that contrary to petitioners claim, the maxim violenti non fit injuria does not applyhere. Isabel should not be punished for exercising her right to protect her property from the floods byimputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of personal in injury. A personis excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger, he must abideby the consequence, if an emergency is found to exist, or if the life or property of another is in peril or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property.

C L A S S N O T E S Rule is the Emergency Rule: A person isexcused from the force of the assumption of risk rule, that when he voluntarily assents to aknown danger he must abide by the

consequences, if an emergency is found toexist or if the life or property of another is inperil, or when he seeks to rescue hisendangered property.*SANGCO (pp.81-84)NOTES :VIOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA : applies to noncontractualrelations;3 requisites:

(1) plaintiff had actual knowledge of thedamage;(2) he understood an appreciated the risk fromdanger;(3) he voluntarily exposed himself to such risk.


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ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY VCA (LUIS ET AL)

179 SCRA 5PARAS; November 6, 1989

FACTS

- 5- 6AM June 29, 1967 - strong typhoon "Gening" inIlocos Norte brought floods and heavy rain. IsabelLao Juan, (Nana Belen) went to her store, Five SistersEmporium, to look after the merchandise to see if theywere damaged. Wading in waist-deep flood, Juansuddenly screamed "Ay" and quickly sank intothewater. Her companions, two girls (sales girlls)attempted to help, but were afraid because they sawanelectric wire dangling from a post and moving insnake-like fashion in the water. Yabes, the son-inlaw,upon hearing the electrocution of his mother-in-law,passed by the City Hall of Laoag to request thepoliceto ask Ilocos Norte Electric Company or INELCO to cutoff the electric current. The body wasrecovered abouttwo meters from an electric post.- 4AM June 29, 1967- Engineer Juan, Power PlantEngineer of NPC at the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant,noticed certain fluctuations in their electric meter whichindicated such abnormalities as grounded or short-circuited lines.- 6-6:30AM June 29, 1967- he setout of the Laoag NPCCompound on an inspection and saw grounded anddisconnected lines. Electriclines were hanging from theposts to the ground. When he went to INELCO office, hecould not see any

INELCO lineman.- Engr. Juan attempted to resuscitate Nana Belen buthis efforts proved futile.

Rigor mortis

was setting in. Onthe left palm of the deceased, there was a hollowwound. In the afternoon, the danglingwire was nolonger there

Dr. Castro examined the body and noted that the skinwas grayish or cyanotic, which indicated deathbyelectrocution. On the left palm, the doctor found an"electrically charged wound" or a first degreeburn.About the base of the thumb on the left hand was aburned wound. The cause of' death was,'circulatoryshock electrocution"- In defense and exculpation, INELCO presented thetestimonies of itsofficers and employees, which soughtto prove that (1) on and even before June 29, 1967 theelectric

service system of the INELCO in the wholefranchise area did not suffer from any defect thatmightconstitute a hazard to life and property. (2) The servicelines and devices had been newly-installedprior to thedate in question. (3) Also, safety devices were installedto prevent and avoid injuries to personsand damage toproperty in case of natural calamities such as floods,typhoons, fire and others. (4) 12linesmen are chargedwith the duty of making a round-the-clock check-up of the areas respectivelyassigned to them. (5) They alsopresented own medical expert and said that cyanosiscould not have beenthe noted 3 hours after the deathbecause it is only manifest in live persons. (6) Lastly,the deceased couldhave died simply either bydrowning or by electrocution due to negligenceattributable only to herself andnot to INELCO becauseof the installation of a burglar deterrent by connectinga wire from the main houseto the iron gate and fenceof steel matting, thus, charging the latter with electriccurrent whenever theswitch is on. The switch musthave been left on, hence, causing the deceased'selectrocution when shetried to open her gate that earlymorning of June 29, 1967- CFI: awarded P25,000 moral damages;P45,000 attysfees- CA: P30,229.45 in actual damages (i.e., P12,000 forthe victim's death and P18,229.45for funeralexpenses); P50,000 in compensatory damages,computed in accordance with the formula set intheVilla-Rey Transit case (31 SCRA 511) with the base of P15,000 as average annual income of thedeceased;P10,000 in exemplary damages; P3,000 attorney's fees

ISSUE

WON the legal principle of "assumption of risk" barsprivate respondents from collecting damagesfromINELCO


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HELD

NO

Ratio

The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon bypetitioner finds no application in the case at bar. Itisimperative to note the surrounding circumstanceswhich impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of aroof and brave the subsiding typhoon. As testified bythe salesgirls, the deceased went to the FiveStarEmporium "to see to it that the goods were notflooded." As such, shall We punish her for exercisingher right to protect her property from the floods byimputing upon her the unfavorablepresumption thatshe assumed the risk of personal injury? Definitely not.For it has been held that a personis excused from theforce of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to aknown danger he must abide bythe consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or propertyof another is in peril, or whenhe seeks to rescue hisendangered property. Clearly, an emergency was athand as the deceased'sproperty, a source of herlivelihood, was faced with an impending loss.Furthermore, the deceased, at thetime the fatalincident occurred, was at a place where she had a rightto be without regard to INELCOsconsent as she was onher way to protect her merchandise. Hence, privaterespondents, as heirs, may not

be barred fromrecovering damages as a result of the death caused byINELCOs negligence

Reasoning

- INELCO can be exonerated from liability sincetyphoons and floods are fortuitous events. While it istruethat typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person may be held responsible, itwasnot said eventuality which directly caused thevictim's death. It was through the intervention of petitioner'snegligence that death took place.- In times of calamities such as the one which occurredin Laoag City onthe night of June 28 until the earlyhours of June 29, 1967, extraordinary diligence requiresa supplier of

electricity

to be in

constant vigil

to preventor avoid any probable incident that might imperil life orlimb. The evidence does not show thatdefendant didthat. On the contrary, evidence discloses that therewere no men (linemen or otherwise)policing the area,nor even manning its office.- INELCO was negligent in seeing that no harm is doneto thegeneral public"... considering that electricity isan agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of carerequiredof electric companies must be commensuratewith or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercisingthis high degree of diligence and careextends to every place where persons have a right tobe" Thenegligence of petitioner having been shown, itmay not now absolve itself from liability by arguing thatthevictim's death was solely due to a fortuitous event."When an act of God combines or concurs withthenegligence of the defendant to produce an injury, thedefendant is liable if the injury would not haveresultedbut for his own negligent conduct or omission"

Disposition

CA decision, except for the slightmodification that actual damages be increased toP48,229.45, is AFFIRMED.


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CASUPANAN vs. LAROYA

Posted on February 12, 2011 by mclairgarcia

G.R. No. 145391 August 26, 2002

CASUPANAN vs. LAROYA

Facts:

Two vehicles, one driven by Laroya and the other owned by Capitulo and driven by Casupanan, figured inan accident. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damageto property. On the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict.

When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage. Laroya,defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum-shoppingconsidering the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion and dismissed the civilcase.

On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate civilaction which can proceed independently of the criminal case.

I SSUE:

WON an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously andindependently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case.

HELD:

Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by theoffended party even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend theprosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension inSection 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such civil action isreserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.

Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal casewhere the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil casefor quasi-delict without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceedsimultaneously and independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution of the criminalaction will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict . The only limitation is that the offended party cannotrecover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 whichstates that the counterclaim of the accused may b e l i t igated in a separate civi l act ion . This is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that isdeemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately hiscounterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict , the prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.
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Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, inthe same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action.To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict , while refusing to recognize hiscounterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and equalprotection of the law.

Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper. Theorder of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the ground of forum-shopping is erroneous.

Casupanan v Laroya

Posted by ladymaridel on June 20, 2008

Two vehicles, one (Laroya )

other owned by (Capitulo )driven by (Casupanan ) Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage topropertyCasupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict,When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage.FORUM SHOPPING-dismisssed civil caseCasupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate civil action which can proceedindependently of the criminal case.RTC>order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order which disposes of the case andtherefore the proper remedy should have been an appeal.The Capas RTC further held that a special civil action for certiorari is not a substitute for a lostappeal. Finally, the Capas RTC declared that even on the premise that the MCTC erred indismissing the civil case, such error is a pure error of judgment and not an abuse of discretion.

Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Capas RTC denied the samein the Resolution of August 24, 2000.

Issue raised is whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file,simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainantin the criminal case.

aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.

Clearly, the Capas RTCs order dismissing the petition for certiorari, on the ground that the proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous.

Forum-Shopping

The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the samecause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. Forum-shoppingis present when in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights of action and reliefssought.

However, there is no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law and the rules expresslyallow the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal action.


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they have different causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminalpunishable under the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa aquilianaactionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code.

Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by preponderance of evidence,that he has suffered damage because of the fault or negligence of another.

paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedu re (2000 Rules for brevity)expressly requires the accused to litigate his counterclaim in a separate civil action, to wit:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) x x x.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in thecriminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may belitigated in a separate civil action . (Emphasis supplied)

Conclus ion

Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by theoffended party even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend theprosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in

Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such civil action isreserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.

The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other.

Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code,in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminalaction.

One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000while the MCTC issued the order of dismissal on December 28, 1999 or before the amendmentof the rules. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given retroactive effect

HELD > Petition for review is GRANTED.Civil Case No. 2089 is REINSTATED.

KRAMER VS CA (TRANS-ASIA SHIPPINGLINES)

178 SCRA 289GANCAYCO; October 13, 1989

FACTS

- The F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by ErnestoKramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer, was navigating its

wayfrom Marinduque to Manila. Somewhere nearMaricabon Island and Cape Santiago, the boat figuredina collision with an inter-island vessel, the M/V AsiaPhilippines owned byTrans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc.

Asa consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank,taking with it its fish catch.- The Boardconcluded that the loss of the F/B Marjoleaand its fish

catch was due to the negligence of theemployees of Trans-Asia. The Kramers instituted aComplaint for damages against the private respondentbefore Branch 117 of the Regional Trial Court in PasayCity.


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Trans-Asia filed a motion seeking the dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of prescription. Hearguedthat under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, theprescriptive period for instituting a Complaint fordamagesarising from a quasi-delict like a maritimecollision is four years. He maintained that thepetitioners shouldhave filed their Complaint within fouryears from the date when their cause of action accrued,i.e., from

April 8, 1976 when the maritime collision tookplace, and that accordingly, the Complaint filed on May30,1985 was instituted beyond the four-yearprescriptive period.

Petitioners claim: -

that maritime collisions have peculiarities andcharacteristics which only persons with special skill,trainingand experience like the members of the Boardof Marine Inquiry can properly analyze and resolve- thatthe running of the prescriptive period was tolledby the filing of the marine protest and that their causeof action accrued only on April 29, 1982, the date whenthe Decision ascertaining the negligence of the crewof the M/V Asia Philippines had become final, and that thefour-year prescriptive period under Article 1146of theCivil Code should be computed from the said date.

ISSUE

WON a Complaint for damages instituted by thepetitioners against the private respondent arising fromamarine collision is barred by presciption

HELD

YES- Under A1146 CC, an action based upon a quasi-delictmust be instituted within four (4) years.Theprescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delictis committed. In Paulan vs. Sarabia, this Courtruledthat in an action for damages arising from the collisionof two (2) trucks, the action being based on aquasi-delict, the four (4) year prescriptive period must becounted from the day of the collision.- In Espanolvs. Chairman, Philippine VeteransAdministration, this Court held: The right of actionaccrues when thereexists a cause of action, whichconsists of 3 elements, namely: a) a right in favor of theplaintiff bywhatever means and under whatever law itarises or is created; b) an obligation on the part of defendant

to respect such right; and c) an act oromission on the part of such defendant violative of theright of theplaintiff ... It is only when the last elementoccurs or takes place that it can be said in law that acause of action has arisen. From the foregoing ruling, itis clear that the prescriptive period must be countedwhenthe last element occurs or takes place, that is,the time of the commission of an act or omissionviolative of the right of the plaintiff, which is the timewhen the cause of action arises. It is therefore clearthat in thisaction for damages arising from the collisionof 2 vessels the 4 year prescriptive period must becountedfrom the day of the collision. The aggrievedparty need not wait for a determination by anadministrativebody like a Board of Marine Inquiry, thatthe collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an action fordamages. Immediately after the collision the aggrievedparty can seekrelief from the courts by alleging suchnegligence or fault of the owners, agents or personnelof the other vessel. Thus, the respondent courtcorrectly found that the action of petitioner hasprescribed. The collisionoccurred on April 8, 1976. Thecomplaint for damages was filed in court only on May30, 1 985, wasbeyond the 4 year prescriptive period.

Disposition petition is dismissed.

Kramer v CAFACTS: 1976: 2 vessels collided- 1981: Phil Coast Guard concluded that the collisionwas due to M/V Asias negligence -1982: Coast Guard suspended 2nd mate of M/V Asia.


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-1985: Petitioners instituted complaint for damagesagainst respondent. Motion to dismiss was filed on thebasis of prescription.HELD: SC dismissed the case, saying that according to

Art. 1146, action based on quasi-delict must beinstituted within 4 yrs. Prescriptive period begins fromthe day the quasi-delict was committed.

NPC v CA (PHESCO INC.)294 CRA 209ROMERO; August 14, 1998NATUREPetition for review on certiorariFACTS- On July 22, 1979, a convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) leftMarawi City bound for Iligan City. Unfortunately, enroute to its destination, one of the trucks driven byGavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw. The incident resulted in the death of three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw, as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers.- The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated(PHESCO is a contractor of NPC with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latter'sprojects, but in this case it was alleged that they own the dump trucks).- The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of any liability. PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals,which reversed the trial court's judgment absolvingPHESCO and sentencing NPC to pay damages.ISSUEWON NPC is the employer of Ilumba, driver of the dumptruck, which should be solidarily liable for the damagesto the victimsHELDYES- In the provisions of the "Memorandum of Understanding" entered into by PHESCO and NPC, weare convinced that PHESCO was engaged in "labor only" contracting. In a "labor only" contract, theperson acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who isresponsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directlyemployed by him. Finding that a contractor was a "labor-only" contractor is equivalent to a finding that anemployer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the "labor-only"contractor, including the latter's workers.- Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides: "Employers shall be liable for the damages caused bytheir employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though theformer are not engaged in any business or industry." - In this regard, NPC's liability is direct, primary andsolidary with PHESCO and the driver. Of course, NPC, if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it, shallhave recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to theaction.

DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed.

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS V CA(GERONIMO)227 SCRA 292DAVIDE, JR.; October 18, 1993NATURE


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Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of theCourt of AppealsFACTS- Lydia Geronimo was engaged in the business of selling food and drinks to children in the KindergartenWonderland Canteen located in Dagupan.- August 12, 1989 - A group of parents complained thatthey found fibrous material in the bottles of Coke andSprite that their children bought from Geronimos store. Geronimo examined her stock of softdrinks and foundthat there were indeed fibrous materials in theunopened soda bottles. She brought the bottles to theDepartment of Health office in their region and wasinformed that the soda samples she sent wereadulterated.- Because of this, Geronimos sales plummeted with her regular sales of 10 cases day dwindling to about 2 or 3cases. Her losses amounted to P200 to P300 a daywhich later on forced her to close down her business onDecember 12, 1989.- She demanded payment of damages from plaintiff Coca-Cola but the latter did not accede to her demands.- The trial court ruled in favor of Coca-Cola, stating thatthe complaint was based on a contract and not a quasidelictbecause of pre-existing relation between theparties. Thus the complaint should have been filedwithin 6 months from the delivery of the thing sold.- The trial court however annulled the questionedorders of the RTC and directed it to conduct further proceedings in the civil case. According to the CA: the allegations in the complaint plainly show that it is anaction for damages arising from respondents act of

recklessly and negligently manufacturing adulteratedfood items intended to be sol for public consumption. It also noted that the availability of an action for breachof warranty does not bar an action for torts in a sale of defective goods.Petitioners Claim: - Coca-Cola moved to dismiss the complaint on thegrounds of failure to exhaust administrative remediesand prescription.- Since the complaint is for breach of warranty (under

A1561, CC), it should have been brought within 6months from the delivery of the goods.Respondents Comments:

- Geronimo alleges that her complaint is one for damages which does not involve an administrativeaction.

- Her cause of action is based on an injury to plaintiffs right which can be brought within 4 years (based on

A1146, CC).ISSUEWON the complaint is founded on a quasi-delict and pursuant to A1146(12), CC, the action prescribes in4


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yearsHELDYESReasoning - The vende es remedies against a vendor with respect to the warranties against hidden defects or encumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited to those prescribed in A1567. The vendee may alsoask for the annulment of the contract upon proof of error or fraud in which case the ordinary rule onobligations shall be applicable.- Under American law, the liabilities of the manufacturer or seller of injury-causing products maybe based on negligence, breach of warranty, tort or other grounds.DISPOSITION The instant petition is denied for lack of merit.

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. CA and MS. LYDIA GERONIMOCOCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. CA and MS. LYDIA GERONIMOG.R. No. 110295 October 18, 1993Petition for review on certiorari (under Rule45) the decision of the CADAVIDE, JR., J.:

FACTS : Private respondent was the proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen in Dagupan City.In August 1989, some parents of the students complained to her that the Coke and Sprite soft drinks soldby her contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances. She brought the said bottles for examination to DOH and it was found out that the soft drinks are adulterated. As a result, her per daysales of soft drinks severely plummeted that she had to close her shop on 12 December 1989 for losses.She demanded damages from petitioner before the RTC which dismissed the same on motion bypetitioner based on the ground of Prescription. On appeal, the CA annulled the orders of the RTC.

ISSUE: WON the action for damages by the proprietress against the soft drinks manufacturer should betreated as one for breach of implied warranty under article 1561 of the CC which prescribes after sixmonths from delivery of the thing sold.

RULING: Petition Denied.The SC agrees wit h the CAs conclusion that the cause of action in the case at bar is found on quasi -delict under Article 1146 of the CC which prescribes in four years and not on breach of warranty under article 1562 of the same code. This is supported by the allegations in the complaint which makesreference to the reckless and negligent manufacture of "adulterated food items intended to be sold for public consumption."

VALENZUELA v CA (LI and ALEXANDERCOMMERCIAL, INC.)253 SCRA 303KAPUNAN; February 7, 1996NATUREPetition for review on certiorariFACTS- Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving when she realizedshe had a flat tire. She parked along the sidewalk of Aurora Blvd., put on her emergency lights, alightedfrom the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a car driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc.


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- Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car of the defendant, which wasdestroyed, and then fell to the ground. She was pulled out from under defendant's car. Plaintiff's left legwas severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to the rest of thebody. She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg.She filed a claim for damages against defendant. - Lis alibi was that he was driving at 55k ph when hewas suddenly confronted with a speeding car coming from the opposite direction. He instinctively swervedto the right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped plaintiff's car, which he did not seebecause it was midnight blue in color, with no parking lights or early warning device, and the area waspoorly lighted. Defendants counterclaimed for damages, alleging that plaintiff was the one who wasreckless or negligent.-RTC found Li and Alexander solidarily liable. CAabsolved Alexander.ISSUE1. WON Li was grossly negligent in driving the companyissued car 2. WON Valenzuela was guilty of contributorynegligence3. WON Alexander Commercial is liable as Lis employer HELD1. YES- The average motorist alert to road conditions will have no difficulty applying the brakes to a car travelingat the speed claimed by Li. Given a light rainfall, the visibility of the street, and the road conditions on aprincipal metropolitan thoroughfare like Aurora Boulevard, Li would have had ample time to react tothe changing conditions of the road if he were alert as every driver should be to those conditions. Drivingexacts a more than usual toll on the senses. Physiological "fight or flight" mechanisms are at work,provided such mechanisms were not dulled by drugs, alcohol, exhaustion, drowsiness, etc. Li's failure toreact in a manner which would have avoided the accident could therefore have been only due to either or both of the two factors: 1) that he was driving at a "very fast" speed as testified by one of the witneses;and 2) that he was under the influence of alcohol. Either factor working independently would havediminished his responsiveness to road conditions, since normally he would have slowed down prior toreaching Valenzuela's car, rather than be in a situation forcing him to suddenly apply his brakes.- Li was, therefore, negligent in driving his companyissued Mitsubishi Lancer 2. NO

- Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to theharm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his ownprotection. Under the "emergency rule" adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Court of Appeals, an individualwho suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he failsto undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless theemergency was brought by his own negligence.- While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflective thought or the opportunity toadequately weigh a threatening situation is absent, the conduct which is required of an individual in suchcases is dictated not exclusively by the suddenness of the event which absolutely negates thoroughfulcare, but by the over-all nature of the circumstances. A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by aflat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to do soand which is not a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for

a parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her.- Negligence, as it is commonly understood is conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to others. It isthe failure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justlydemand, whereby such other person suffers injury.3. YES- Since important business transactions and decisionsmay occur at all hours in all sorts of situations and under all kinds of guises, the provision for the unlimiteduse of a company car therefore principally serves the business and goodwill of a company and onlyincidentally the private purposes of the individual who actually uses the car, the managerial employee or company sales agent. As such, in providing for a company car for business use and/or for the purpose of


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2. W/N Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence - NO

3. W/N Alexander Commercial, Inc. as Li's employer should be held liable - YES4. W/N the awarding of damages is proper. - YES.

HELD: CA modified with reinstating the RTC decision

1. NO

If Li was running at only about 55 kph then despite the wet and slippery road, he could haveavoided hitting the Valenzuela by the mere expedient or applying his brakes at the proper timeand distanceit was not even necessary for him to swerve a little to the right in order to safely avoid a collisionwith the on-coming car since there is plenty of space for both cars, since Valenzuela car wasrunning at the right lane going towards Manila and the on-coming car was also on its right lanegoing to Cubao

2. NO.

Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal causeto the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protectionemergency rule

o an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to actwithout much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid theimpending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequentlyand upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency wasbrought by his own negligence

She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark Street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her She stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether shehad a flat tire and to solicit help if neededshe parked along the sidewalk, about 1 feet away, behind a Toyota Corona Car

3. YES.

Not the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the master liable for acts of the servant(must be in the course of business), but that of pater familias, in which the liability ultimately fallsupon the employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in theselection and supervision of his employeesOrdinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent supervision of itsemployee during the performance of the latters assigned tasks would be enough to relieve him of

the liability imposed by Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.o situation is of a different character, involving a practice utilized by large companies with

either their employees of managerial rank or their representatives.Moreover, Lis claim that he happened to be on the road on the night of the accident because hewas coming from a social visit with an officemate in Paraaque was a bare allegation which wasnever corroborated in the court below. It was obviously self-serving. Assuming he really camefrom his officemates place, the same could give rise to speculation that he and his officematehad just been from a work-related function, or they were together to discuss sales and other workrelated strategies.


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Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised the careand diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li

4. YES.

As the amount of moral damages are subject to this Courts discretion, we are of the opinion thatthe amount of P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial court is in greater accord with the extent andnature of the injury -. physical and psychological - suffered by Valenzuela as a result of Lisgrossly negligent driving of his Mitsubishi Lancer in the early morning hours of the accident.

o the damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting, it would also bepermanently changing and adjusting to the physiologic changes which her body wouldnormally undergo through the years. The replacements, changes, and adjustments willrequire corresponding adjustive physical and occupational therapy. All of theseadjustments, it has been documented, are painful.

Read more: http://incessantlylearn.blogspot.com/2011/10/torts-and-damages-case-digest_20.html#ixzz1qrjxtOxM

UE v. Jader February 17, 2000FACTS: Jader was a law student at the University of the East. He failed to take the regular exam for Practice Court I so he was given an incomplete grade. He took the removals but he was given a grade of five. Jader attended the graduation and prepared for the bar. He later learned of his deficiency. Jader sued UE for damages. UEs defense was that Jader should have verified grade!ISSUE: WON UE was liable for damages. YESHELD: UE had the contractual obligation to informits students as to whether or not all therequirements for the conferment of a degree havebeen met . It also showed bad faith in belatedlyinforming Jader of the result of his removals, particularlywhen he was already preparing for the bar.ABSENCE OF GOOD FAITH MUST BE SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED FOR ASUCCESSFUL PROSECUTION BY THE AGGRIEVED PARTY IN A SUIT FORABUSE OF RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE 19 . Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from takingundue advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of the law, together with theabsence of all information or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious.On Art. 19 :-intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untoldmoral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law.-the ultimate thing in the theory of liability is justifiable reliance under conditions of civilized society-A person should be protected only when he acts with providence and in GF, but not when he acts withnegligence or abuseNOTES: -does not adhere strictly to the 3 elements-seems to say that Art. 19 can be committed vianegligence- abuse of duty is not a right

C L A S S N O T E S Schools and professors cannot just takestudents for granted and be indifferent to them,for without the latter, the former are useless. Petitioner (university) cannot just give out its
http://incessantlylearn.blogspot.com/2011/10/torts-and-damages-case-digest_20.html#ixzz1qrjxtOxMhttp://incessantlylearn.blogspot.com/2011/10/torts-and-damages-case-digest_20.html#ixzz1qrjxtOxMhttp://incessantlylearn.blogspot.com/2011/10/torts-and-damages-case-digest_20.html#ixzz1qrjxtOxMhttp://incessantlylearn.blogspot.com/2011/10/torts-and-damages-case-digest_20.html#ixzz1qrjxtOxM


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students grades at any time Can you sue professor for not giving grades ontime? No. Should be the school.

So Ping Bun v CAFACTS: Tek Hua Trading originally entered into a leaseagreement with DC Chuan covering stalls in Binondo.The contracts were initially for 1 year but were continued on month to month basis upon expiration of the1 yr. Tek Hua was dissolved, original members of Tek Hua formed Tek Hua Enterprises (THE) withManuel Tiong as one of the incorporators. However, the stalls were occupied by the grandson (So PingBun) of one of the original incorporators of Tek Hua under business name Trendsetter Marketing.-new lease contracts with increase in rent were sent to THE, although not signed.-THE through Tiong asked So Ping Bun to vacate thestalls so THE would be able to go back to business BUTinstead, SO PING BUN SECURED A NEW LEASE

AGEEMENT WITH DC CHUAN.ISSUE: WON So Ping Bun was guilty of tortuousinterference of contractHELD: Yes. A duty which the law on torts is concerned with is respect for the property of others, and acause of action ex delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful interference by one party of the enjoymentof the other of his private property. In the case at bar, petitioner, Trendsetter asked DC Chuan to executelease contracts in its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived respondent of the latters property right. - Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.

nontrespassory invasion of anothers interest in th e private use and enjoyment of asset if: a) the other hasproperty rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with; b) the invasion issubstantial; c) the defendants conduct is a legal cause of the invasion; d) the invasion is either intentionaland unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under the general negligence rules.- elements of tort interference:a) existence of a valid contractb) knowledge on the part of the third party of itsexistencec) interference of the third party is without legal

justification or excuse- Since there were existing lease contracts between TekHua and DC Chuan, Tek Hua in fact had property rightsover the leased stalls. The action of Trendsetter inasking DC Chuan to execute the contracts in their favor was unlawful interference.- The SC handled the question of whether the interference may be justified considering that So acted so le ly fo r the pu rpose o f fu r ther ing h i s own f inanc ial o r economic in t e res t . It stated that it is

sufficient that the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motivesto conclude that So was not a malicious interferer. Nothing on the record imputes deliberate wrongfulmotives or malice on the part of So. Hence the lack of malice precludes the award of damages.- The provision in the Civil Code with regard tortuous interference is Article 1314.

C L A S S N O T E S Did not include malice as one of the elements under A1314. Then discussedGilchrist in saying that to award damages, there should be malice but it was never mentioned in Gilchrist in the first place. Implied malice as an element. De Leon included malice as an element.


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Sir said as guidance: If we apply Gilchristand So Ping Bun, we need malice in 1314.But if question is just on the elements, justanswer the three elements given by SoPing Bun. So Ping Bun was okay had it not citedGilchrist Sir said that it seems this is the case rightnow: You can compete in BusinessContracts as long as intention is financialinterest and there is no malice. If this is thecase, then one cannot recover from 1314as against the third party.AQUINO, (pp. 795-801)Interference with contracts:A. Statutory provision and rationale: Under Article 1314 of the Civil Code, a third party may sue a thirdparty not for breach of contract but for inducing another to commit such breach. This tort is known asinterference with contractual relations. Such interference is considered tortious because it violates therights of the contacting parties to fulfill the contract and to have it fulfilled, to reap the profits resultingtherefrom, and to compel the performance by the other party. The theory is that a right derived from acontract is a property right that entitles each party to protection against all the world and any damage tosaid property should be compensated.B. History: This particular tort started in the UK inLumley vs, Gye in 1853 and was first adopted in thePhilippines in 1915 in Gilchrist vs Cuddy.C. Elements:1. Existence of a valid contract: This existence is necessary and the breach must occur because of thealleged act of interference. No tort is committed if the party had already broken the contract. Neither canaction be maintained if the contract is void. However, there is authority for the view that an action for interference can be maintained even if the contract is unenforceable. The view is that inducement, if reprehensible in an enforceable contracts, is equally reprehensible in an unenforceable one.2. Knowledge on the part of the third party of the existence of the contract: The elements donot include malice as a necessary act in interference. However, the Supreme Court in its various rulings

have held that the aggrieved party will only be entitled to damages if malice was present in thecommission of the tortious act. It was held that mere competition is not sufficient unless it is consideredunfair competition or the dominant purpose is to inflict harm or injury.3. Interference of the third party without legal justification or excuse: In general, social policypermits a privilege or justification to intentionally invade the legally protected interests of others only if thedefendant acts to promote the interests of others or himself if the interest which he seeks to advance issuperior to the interest invaded in social importance. Competition in business also affords a privilege tointerfere provided that the defendants purpose is a justifiable one and the defendant does not employfraud or deception which are regarded as unfair.D. Extent of liability: The rule is that the defendant found guilty of interference with contractual relationscannot be held liable for more than the amount for which the party who was induced to break the contractcan be held liable. This is consistent with Article 2202 if the contracting party who was induced to breakthe contract was in bad faith. However, when there is good faith, the party who breached the contract is

only liable for consequence that can be foreseen. In fact, it is possible for the contracting party to be notliable at all, as in the case where the defendant prevented him from performing his obligation throughforce or fraud.

So Ping Bun v. CA

314 SCRA 751 (1999)

Facts:


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Tek Hua Trading Co (THTC) through its managing partner, So Pek Giok, entered intolease agreements of 4 lots in Binondo with lessor DCCSI. Tek Hua used the areas tostore its textiles. When the contractsexpired, parties did not renew contracts but Tek Hua continued to occupy the premises. In 1976, THTCwas dissolved and replaced by Tek Hua Enterprising Copr (THEC) owned by original members of THTC.So Pek Giok died in 1986 and was replaced by his grandson, petitioner So Ping Bun who occupiedthewarehouse for his own textile business, Trendsetter Marketing. Soon however, THECthrough ManuelTiong, requested petitioner to vacate his business from the warehousefor the company will use it.Petitioner refused to vacate and requested formal contractsof lease with DCCSI in favor of his business.He claimed that after the death of hisgrandfather he had been occupying the premises for his textilebusiness and religiously paid rent. DCCSI acceded to petitioner's request. The lease contracts in favor of Trendsetter were executed. In the suit for injunction, private respondents pressed forthe nullification of the lease contracts between DCCSI and petitioner. They also claimedfor damages.

Issue

: Whether or not damages are to be awarded in this case.

Held

:Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and damages are therecompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. The elements of tortinterference are: (1) existence of avalid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the thirdperson of the existence of contract; and (3)interference of the third person is withoutlegal justification or excuse. This may pertain to a situationwhere a third personinduces a party to renege on or violate his undertaking under a contract. In thecasebefore us, petitioner's Trendsetter Marketing asked DCCSI to execute lease contracts inits favor, andas a result petitioner deprived respondent corporation of the latter'sproperty right.Petitioner argues thatdamage is an essential element of tort interference, and since thetrial court and the appellate court ruledthat private respondents were not entitled toactual, moral or exemplary damages, it follows that he oughtto be absolved of any liability, including attorney's fees. It is true that the lower courts did not awarddamages,but this was only because the extent of damages was not quantifiable. We had asimilarsituation in

Gilchrist

, where it was difficult or impossible to determine the extent of damage and there was nothing on recordto serve as basis thereof. In that case werefrained from awarding damages. We believe the sameconclusion applies in this caseand petitioner is guilty of tort interference as all the said requisites arepresent. Whilewe do not encourage tort interferers seeking their economic interest to intrude intoexistingcontracts at the expense of others, however, we find that the conduct herein

complained of did not transcend the limits forbidding an obligatory award for damagesin the absence of any malice. Lack of malice precludes damages. But it does not relievepetitioner of the legal liability for entering into contracts and causing breach of existingones. The respondent appellate court correctlyconfirmed the permanent injunction andnullification of the lease contracts between DCCSI andTrendsetter Marketing, withoutawarding damages. The injunction saved the respondents from further damage or injury caused by petitioner's interference.

G.R. No. 149149 October 23, 2003


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ERNESTO SYKI, petitioner,vs.SALVADOR BEGASA, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CORONA, J .:

Assailed in the instantthis petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the decisio n1 datedJanuary 31, 2001 of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision dated May 5, 1998 of the Regional TrialCourt of Negros Occidental, Branch 48, Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 7458 for damages. The trial courtawarded actual and moral damages to herein respondent Salvador Begasa who suffered injuries in anaccident due to the negligence of Elizalde Sablayan, the truck driver of petitioner Ernesto Syki.

The facts follow.

On June 22, 1992, around 11:20 a.m., near the corner of Araneta and Magsaysay Streets, Bacolod City,respondent Salvador Begasa and his three companions flagged down a passenger jeepney driven byJoaquin Espina and owned by Aurora Pisuena. While respondent was boarding the passenger jeepney(his right foot already inside while his left foot still on the boarding step of the passenger jeepney), a truckdriven by Elizalde Sablayan and owned by petitioner Ernesto Syki bumped the rear end of the passenger

jeepney. Respondent fell and fractured his left thigh bone (femur). He also suffered lacerations andabrasions in his left leg, thusas follows:

1. Fracture left femur, junction of middle and distal third, comminuted.

2. Lacerated wounds, left poplitial 10 cm. left leg anterior 2.5 cm.

3. Abrasion left knee .2

On October 29, 1992, res pondent filed a complaint for damages for breach of common carriers

contractual obligations and quasi-delict against Aurora Pisuena, the owner of the passenger jeepney;,herein petitioner Ernesto Syki, the owner of the truck;, and Elizalde Sablayan, the driver of the truck.

After hearing, the trial court dismissed the complaint against Aurora Pisuena, the owner and operator of the passenger jeepney, but ordered petitioner Ernesto Syki and his truck driver, Elizalde Sablayan, to payrespondent Salvador Beg asa, jointly and severally, actual and moral damages plus attorneys fees asfollows:

1. Actual damages of P48,308.20 less the financial assistance given by defendant Ernesto Syki toplaintiff Salvador Begasa in the amount of P4,152.55 or a total amount of P44,155.65;

2. The amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages;

3. The amount of P 20,000.00 as reasonable attorneys fees .3

Petitioner Syki and his driver appealed to the Court of Appeals. However, the appellate court found noreversible error in the decision of the trial court and affirmed the same in toto .4 The appellate court alsodenied their motion for reconsideration .5

Aggrieved, petitioner Ernesto Syki filed the instant petition for review, arguing that the Court of Appealserred in not finding respondent Begasa guilty of contributory negligence. Hence, the damages awarded tohim (respondent) should have been decreased or mitigated. Petitioner also contends that the appellate
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court erred in ruling that he failed to observe the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection andsupervision of his driver. He asserts that he presented sufficient evidence to prove that he observed thediligence of a good father of a family in selecting and supervising the said employee, thus he should notbe held liable for the injuries sustained by respondent.

The petition has no merit.

Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides:

. . . . . . . . .x x x x x x x x x

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers actingwithin the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

x x x x x x x x x

. . . . . . . . .The responsibility treated in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned provethey observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

From the above provision, when an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, a legalpresumption instantly arises that the employer was negligent, either or both, in the selection and/or supervision of his said employeeduties. The said presumption may be rebutted only by a clear showingon the part of the employer that he had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selectionand supervision of his employee. If the employer successfully overcomes the legal presumption of negligence, he is relieved of liability .6 In other words, the burden of proof is on the employer.

The question is: how does an employer prove that he had indeed exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee? The case of Metro Manila Transit Corporation vs. Court of Appeal s 7 is instructive :

In fine, the party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of presenting at the trial such amount of evidence required by law to obtain a favorable judgment. . .Inmaking proof in its or his case, it is paramount that the best and most complete evidence is formallyentered. 1vvphi1.nt

Coming now to the case at bar, while there is no rule which requires that testimonial evidence, to holdsway, must be corroborated by documentary evidence, inasmuch as the witnesses testimonies dwelt onmere generalities, we cannot consider the same as sufficiently persuasive proof that there wasobservance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. Petitioners attempt to proveits "deligentissimi patris familias" in the selection and supervision of employees through oral evidencemust fail as it was unable to buttress the same with any other evidence, object or documentary, whichmight obviate the apparent biased nature of the testimony.

Our view that the evidence for petitioner MMTC falls short of the required evidentiary quantum as wouldconvincingly and undoubtedly prove its observance of the diligence of a good father of a family has itsprecursor in the underlying rationale pronounced in the earlier case of Central Taxicab Corp. vs. Ex-Meralco Employees Transportation Co., et. al. , set amidst an almost identical factual setting, where weheld that:

The fail ure of the defendant company to produce in court any record or other documentary proof tendingto establish that it had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
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torts final case

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