the structure and subject of metaphysics Λ

The Structure and Subject of "Metaphysics "Author(s): Helen S. LangSource: Phronesis, Vol. 38, No. 3 (1993), pp. 257-280Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182447 .Accessed: 23/02/2015 12:56

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The Structure and Subject of Metaphysics A HELEN S. LANG

Introduction

Metaphysics A has long puzzled its readers not only in the particulars of its arguments, but in its very subject: what is Metaphysics A about? Indeed, perhaps A deals with several topics; we should not immediately assume that it concerns only one. Ross claims that it is theology, a proof of a first mover, god, culminating in a vision of divine life.' Along with this claim, he argues both that in relation to the rest of the Metaphysics, A "must be considered an entirely independent treatise" and that "Book A is rightly regarded as the coping-stone of the Metaphysics."2 More recently, Graham follows Ross, asserting without argument that Metaphysics A is indeed theology.3

But Owens has argued that Metaphysics A is "a study of Entity [o',oaL], first in sensible Entity and then in immobile Entity".4 On this view, theology disappears, replaced by a science of first sensible and then separate Entity, which includes god.' His claims, like Ross', appear to rest on the particular arguments of Metaphysics A. (Although we shall not take them up here, the same case can be made for claims about the chronology of the particular arguments, the best known being Jaeger's claim that Metaphysics A, 8 is a late insertion breaking the continuous argument that begins in 7 and is completed in 9.)6 So Owens points to the sections of Metaphysics A

' W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics: A Revised Text with Introduction and Com- mentary vol. I, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), pp. xxix, cxxx-cliv. 2 Ross, pp. xxix, cxxx. - D. Graham, Aristotle's Two Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 266. 4 J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1978), p. 453. s Ibid. 453-54. 6 Werner Jaeger, Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development trans. with the author's corrections and additions by Richard Robinson. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948) p. 346. Phronesis 1993. Vol. XXXVIII13 (Accepted April 1993)

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that deal with "sensible Entity" and "immobile Entity", while Ross points to arguments about god.

But in fact, these claims about the logos as a whole do not derive from its particular arguments but are prior to and determinative of these arguments. For example, the claim that it is theology presupposes that the arguments concerning god in Chapters 6-8 somehow dominate the book while those concerning sensible things, Chapters 1-5, prepare for, lead to, or are completed by these arguments. The topic of Chapters 9 and 10 must be understood as god, even though god is never mentioned in them. Likewise, Owens' claim that A concerns first sensible and then separate substance divides the logos in half (with little sense of how, or if, the halves are related) and so, produces two quite independent arguments within A as a whole. In both these cases, the logical structure assumed (without specific evidence or argument) for the whole is reflected in the force and domain assigned to particular arguments within that whole.

I shall assume that Metaphysics A should be examined as a unified piece of reasoning. As I shall argue, Aristotle announces the subject of the logos immediately and unambiguously: an investigation of substance. He then divides it into two parts, sensible substance and unmoved substance, and examines them in order. Within each part, as with the larger whole, the main topic is announced immediately and is then followed by its analysis. The main topic, substance, and its rubrication raise two further problems that are not addressed until after the analysis of substance is complete. But their solution is crucial to the investigation of substance and Aristotle's return to them provides further evidence for the overall structure of Meta- physics A.

Indeed, these problems conclude the investigation of substance. The first concerns voig and the second how nature as a whole contains the good and the best. The relation of these problems, especially vovs, to the investigation of substance is problematic. Traditionally, the argument about vovf; (A, 9) is understood as a return to the account of god in A, 7 - an argument that has been interrupted by the separate (and out of place) argument concerning how many gods there are (A, 8). I shall argue that A 8 continues, indeed completes, the analysis of god begun in 7; hence A, 8 is in the right place. A, 9 begins "there are some problems concerning mind"; hence it does not consider specifically god's mind, but broader problems concerning voi; raised by but left unanalyzed in the argument in A, 7. The final problem, how nature contains the good and the best, completes the account of substance by returning to a problem raised at the outset of the logos before substance was rubricated into sensible and separate substance. This view of A makes better sense of it as a logical whole and makes better sense of its

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particular arguments than do traditional readings.7 Two brief points before turning to Metaphysics A. (1) Although the issue

itself lies beyond the bounds of this paper, the claim that Aristotle announces his topic immediately is supported by oft repeated speculations that these writings are, or are based on, teaching texts. Within an oral setting, an- nouncing the main topic first provides a mnemonic device for remembering what follows.8 (2) The claim that Metaphysics A possesses substance as its primary topic does not deny that arguments about god, and hence theology, appear in the logos. Such a denial would be absurd in the face of the text. But it does deny that the main purpose of the argument is to prove the necessity and nature of god and divine life; rather, god appears within a larger investigation of substance. So, the investigation of substance and what such an investigation entails is at stake in the question of the structure and subject of Metaphysics A.

A. The Topic of Metaphysics A

The opening words of Metaphysics A announce: "The inquiry concerns substance; for the principles and causes we seek are of substances." JrlHQiL T'g o0'utWg f OEwQ(a- TIWV yaQ oboCdv Ca excRi XCTt Ca 'TLUL 41]TOv- TM] (Metaphysics A, 1, 1069al8). Without pause, Aristotle indicates the importance of the subject. Philosophically, the investigation is important because whether "the all" (To ru&v) is some sort of whole or a succession [of parts], substance must be first.9 Even though contemporaries rank universals as substance, the ancients bear witness, Aristotle claims, to the importance of substance. Hence the most respected opinions confirm his view of the importance of this investigation. And with his next words he goes to work on his announced subject: "oCoIal be TQ Lg, .. ." In short, the introduction is over, the investigation begins.

Aristotle, master of efficiency, has done considerable work in just over ten lines. He announces his subject and its importance: substance because

7 Although a full development of the point clearly lies beyond the bounds of this paper, Dr Sharples has suggested that the concerns of Theophrastus' Metaphysics make better sense with this interpretation of A than that of others. I would like to take this opportuni- ty to thank Dr Sharples for his thoughtful and constructive criticisms of this paper. ' For a full account of this thesis, cf. John P. Lynch, Aristotle's School: A Study of a Greek Educational Institution (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of Cali- fornia Press, 1972), pp. 75-86 and I. During, "Notes on the History of the Transmission of Aristotle's Writings" Aristotle and His Influence. Two Studies (New York and Lon- don: Garland, 1987), pp. 37-70. 9 Aristotle, Metaphysics A, 1, 1069al9-20.

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however "the all" is constituted, substance must be first. But herein lies a question. "The all" remains unknown - is it some sort of whole [4); bXov Tn To Tav] or a succession [T ' fj;pEt] of parts? No indication of Aristot- le's answer appears here, perhaps because in either case substance must be first and the importance of this investigation rests on the priority of substance. Hence an answer to this question is not required in order to proceed with the investigation. But the meaning of "first" and hence our under- standing of substance as prior to all else cannot be complete without knowing the construction of "the all"; at the same time, the construction of "the all" cannot be known without knowing substance, which is first. In this sense, an investigation of substance and the nature of "the all" are insepa- rable and both are announced in the opening lines of A.

Aristotle demarcates his topic and affirms its importance when he notes its priority for the ancients. Critical of his contemporaries - they (probably Plato or his followers) rank universals as substance -, his link with the ancients emphasizes the superiority of his own view. This reference to the ancients serves almost as a punctuation mark: it declares the importance of the subject with the force of a tradition (with which Aristotle explicitly connects himself) that establishes the worthiness of an examination of substance. So concludes the announcement of the topic at hand. The first moment of the logos is complete.

B. The Rubric of the Analysis

Turning to substance, Aristotle immediately subdivides it into three kinds, two sensible and one unmoved.'0 This division presents the rubric within which substance will be treated. As such, it presents not the primary topic of the logos, but a first step in the argument. However, although the topic properly speaking of Metaphysics A is established as obia( prior to this division, the immediacy of this division implies both that there is no oioGCt apart from or in addition to sensible and unmoved substance and that an investigation of substance must set out from these three "kinds", i.e. from beings rather than some generic category apart from or prior to these kinds and the beings that they present.

But this division of substance into three kinds raises a second question and Aristotle turns to it directly. Sensible substances are the subject of physics because they involve motion, while unmoved substance belongs to a different theoria, if this substance has no common principle with the two

10 Aristotle, Metaphysics A, 1, 1069a30-33.

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sensible substances." Is there such a common principle? Again, Aristotle gives no indication of his view - either of what this first principle might be or even if there is one. Rather, the examination of the immediate topic at hand, sensible substance ('H 6' acdCOriTi o0io(ta tcaT3XpkT), begins without pause.12

The methodological question concerning sensible and unmoved substances - whether they belong to the same theoria - rests upon a meta- physical question - whether they possess a common principle. And in this question we see what is at stake in defining the larger structure of the logos. If Metaphysics A considers first sensible and then unmoved substance, a division between these different kinds of substance is presupposed at the outset and the need for a common principle is muted - the three kinds seem grouped loosely together and so the examination of them is sequential, first sensible and then unmoved. But if, as I am arguing, the subject of the inquiry is substance, a topic recognized even by the ancients, then the division of substances into kinds is the first step in implementing the inquiry into substance. Consequently, these three kinds must possess a common principle sufficient to include them within a single investigation, i.e. the investigation of substance announced in the opening lines.

The problem posed here by A appears as an explicit topic in other books of the Metaphysics. So Metaphysics E mentions mathematics, physics and theology as separate sciences bearing on different objects and specifies "the first science" as that which concerns immovable and separate things.'3 Fur- thermore, Aristotle continues, if there is a science of immovable substance, this science will investigate being qua being and the things that belong to it qua being [xai iTci oIOV 6VTOg j OV TcUOTln] Ev ' OE awpOcCL, Xcal T tOTL XcLi Tlt fAdovra fi 6v. (Metaphysics E, 1, 1026a31-2; cf. also K, 7, 1064a28-bl3)]. The mention of being qua being and its possible identification with theology, cannot but in its turn recall us to Metaphysics F."4 Is Metaphysics A the science of immovable substance, theology, mentioned in Metaphysics E and so, by implication, the science of being qua being described in Metaphysics F? Aristotle himself never addresses this question, but his readers find it irresistible. And the topic and rubrication of Meta- physics A provide food for speculation. A investigates both sensible and immovable substance as well as answering an important question about the

" Aristotle, Metaphysics A, 1, 1069a36-1069b2. 12 We may note here that the chapter division does not altogether coincide with the division of the argument. Chapter 2 begins some five lines into the argument concerning sensible substance. 3 Aristotle, Metaphysics E 1, 1026al5-20.

'4 Aristotle, Metaphysics F 1, 1003a21.

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construction of "the all". Hence, insofar as the "theology" mentioned in E seems restricted to an investigation of separate and immovable things, Metaphysics A cannot be this theology. It certainly contains theology, but it is not just theology. Metaphysics A presents an investigation of substance, first sensible and then immovable.

But what of the science of being qua being in Metaphysics f? Setting aside the problematic relation between E and F, we can ask how the topic and rubrication of A relate to the account of the science of being qua being in Metaphysics r. There Aristotle argues that being falls immediately into kinds and therefore the sciences follow these kinds [ibrd&Q%t y&e EOiV; Ey'vr {xov no fv [xcd t6 Ev]J 6L xai at EOTiiJT aL dxoXovUO1ouoL

totitoLg (Metaphysics r 2, 1004a5-6)]. Thus he accounts for the so-called special sciences, i.e. each takes up some "part" of being (Metaphysics F 1, 1003a24-25). But there is another science, the science of being qua being that investigates being as such (Metaphysics r 1, 1003a21). He declares unambiguously that all beings are related - and so insofar as they are related presumably fall under one science - because there is one central point, a tQo Ev, for all (Metaphysics r 2, 1003a31-b18). Whatever this relation entails, it reappears, as we shall see, at the end of Metaphysics A.'5 Here we may note that the methodological point of F, i.e. there is a science of being qua being even though all beings fall immediately into kinds, reflects the procedure of A which declares an investigation of obmoWt, immediately divides it into kinds and concludes by referring all things together as tQo; tv.

In Metaphysics A, I the question of a common principle among substances returns us to "the all". If it is some sort of whole, then there must be a common principle among the three kinds of substance because substance is "first" in its constitution; but if "the all" is a succession of parts, then either there is no common principle or only a very weak one. As with the question of "the all" and of how substance is first, an immediate answer to the question of whether there is a principle common to all substance may be unnecessary because the argument can (and should) proceed without it. However, if the theoria of Metaphysics A concerns otoC(a, the unity of this logos and the coherence of its analysis rests squarely on the answer to this question. Consequently, the integrity of Metaphysics A re- quires that it be addressed at some point within the logos. And, as we shall see, it is addressed when Aristotle concludes this book with the claim that all things in the world are indeed related "7rQbo Ev".'6

'5 Aristotle, Metaphysics A 10, 1075a 1 8. 16 Aristotle, Metaphysics A 10, 1075a18-20.

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Here the second moment of the logos is complete. Aristotle has subdivided the topic announced in the introduction and so presented the rubric of the upcoming analysis. Oboia is divided into three kinds, two sensible and one unmoved. They are now considered in order.

C. Sensible Substance

The examination of sensible substances now begins, and like the logos as a whole, begins immediately with the topic at hand. "Sensible substance is changeable," Aristotle begins, and his analysis establishes first that the causes and principles of sensible substance are three, namely form, matter, and privation and, second, that neither matter nor form comes to be, but only their combination. With these terms he analyses sensible substance as changeable and in so doing establishes and spells out the claim with which the argument begins.

When the analysis of sensible substance as changeable is complete, one might expect this section of the logos to conclude. But before concluding, Aristotle raises a broader question: in what way are the causes and principles of different things different and in what way are they the same? In order to answer this question, he characterizes substances generally - and this characterization is telling: "Since some things can be apart while others cannot, the former are substances. And because of this the same thing is a cause of all things because without substances, affections and motions will not be." ['EJTFA b' TI Ta [LEV XwQ^Toa TC b' oib XWQLCTcL, oOfCxLaL b(dIva. xcc &Q TO^ITO TUaVTWV ctLTLLa TcTa , 6TUL T W V ObUCILWV &VE10 Ob)X ECOTL Ta 3Td01 xl at xLvrw;Lg. (Metaphysics A, 5, 1070b36-1071a2)]. In this sense, he concludes, the principles of things are the same by analogy, for example, form is always actuality and matter potency.17 This is not to say that these things, i.e. form and matter, are universally, (for example some one form "man" causing all men, as Plato would have it) because an individual is a source of individuals.'8 Rather, within individuals actuality and potency always operate analogously and in this sense are the same.

Although the immediate topic of this part of A is sensible substance this question and its answer return to the two problems raised but left unresolved at the outset of the logos. (1) Is there something common to all substances? Yes. They can all be apart. Furthermore, in all substances actuality and potency are the same by analogy. (2) In what sense is "the all" one? Analysis of sensible substance shows that because substances can be apart,

" Aristotle, Metaphysics A 5, 1071a4-5. 18 Aristotle, Metaphysics A 5, 1071 a 19-20.

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affections and motions depend upon them. Consequently, everything is one insofar as everything depends upon substance and in this sense, substance is first.

As we noted, because these issues are entailed both by the announced subject, substance, and by the rubrication of the argument into an analysis of first sensible and then unmoved substance, they must be addressed if the larger analysis is to be coherent. The completion of the account of sensible substance as changeable presents the first set of substantive conclusions within the logos. And these conclusions return the account immediately to the broader issues conceming substance and the nature of "the all". As we shall see, these issues will be addressed again in terms of the results of the analysis of unmoved substance and finally as a conclusion to the logos as a whole. In short, the conclusions of "local" arguments within Metaphysics A are consistently returned to the topic raised at the outset of the logos: substance. And this fact supports the claim that as a unified piece of reasoning Metaphysics A concerns substance.

Now, at the end of Metaphysics A, 5 the argument about sensible substance (along with the implications of this analysis for the inquiry concerning substance) concludes unambiguously: what and how many the &QXCct of sensible things are, how the same and how different, has been stated.'9 The third section of the logos, the analysis of sensible substance as changeable as well as the implications of this analysis for substance as first and the construct of "the all", is complete.

D. Unmoved Substance

Aristotle turns immediately to the remaining kind of substance established by his division of substance into three kinds. Again, he begins by asserting the topic of the upcoming analysis: since there are three o&o(uiL, two of them natural and one unmoved, concerning the unmoved we must say that there must be some eternal unmoved substance. ['Eti 6' iGoav TQEg o0b6- JLCL, biio IE'V at qAJOLXai Cia 6 L i etXL'V1TO5, 7tEQL TlUTlg XEXTE0V 6TL

dEvayx1J EwVQL dtL6Lov tVa otActv &xLCVT]TOV. (Metaphysics A, 6, 1071b3-5)]. And he now establishes this claim by showing first that such substance must be and then what its nature must be.

An analysis of motion, i.e. actualization always occurring in sensible substance, reveals both that there must be an unmoved mover and the nature of this substance. Its substance must be actuality because it causes eternal

'9 Aristotle, Metaphysics A 5, 107 1b-2.

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motion in sensible substance while something else (the first heaven) causes differences; these two together cause eternal variety.20 Why, then, seek other causes?2'

Here we see that the order of the arguments in A is not arbitrary. Because the principle of sensible substance as changeable and the analogical unity of potency and act is established first, motion in sensible things may be treated as an effect of unmoved substance. Given that such a cause must be, Aris- totle identifies the nature of this cause: pure actuality that causes as an object of thought and desire. "Since then, there is some mover being itself unmoved, being actuality, this mover is in no way able to be other than it is" [?tEAL &e UOTL TL XLVO1V ctnTo &XLiVfTOV 6v, tVEQYELa 6v, TOUTO obVx tV&TXETaL dk(Xw EYX6LV O0168%t6. (Metaphysics A, 7, 1072b7-8)]. There- fore, it is necessary and, insofar as it is necessary, it is good and in this sense a first principle [t &viyxr;g &iQC LIWOT'V 6v a Xcd v vyxV xck;, xcaL ob-Twg Q (Metaphysics A, 7, 1072b10-1 1)].

As with the logos as a whole and the analysis of sensible substance, the opening assertion establishes the immediate topic of analysis: that there must be a first mover and what its nature must be. Following the account of sensible substance as changeable, this account rests on the dependence of motion in sensible things upon a prior cause. Given Aristotle's definition of motion, this dependence shows both that there must be a first mover and that this mover must be pure actuality acting as an object of thought or desire. And the analysis continues with just these points. "And on such a principle depend the heavens and nature" [Ix TOUWtfl T diQa &Q)xn; IQT1qVL 6 obQavog xac f cpiVoi. (Metaphysics A, 7, 1072b13-14)]. That is, because unmoved substance causes motion, both kinds of movable substances depend upon it. This point echoes the conclusion of the analysis of sensible substance: without substance, affections and motions will not be and in this sense they depend upon substance.

In short, substance must be first and all things must share a common principle, unmoved substance. This conclusion appears here as an immediate implication of the analysis of unmoved substance. It articulates the opening claim that there must be such a substance and leads to the closely related question: what is the nature of unmoved substance?

This substance is life at its best, actuality fully actualized, thought which thinks itself [1 &e vO6i]ot f XcL0' acbTTV TOr xaO' ATO &dQioToU, xaXl [aULctLX TO' [uaktWLa. (Metaphysics A, 7, 1072bl8)]. An account of this thought now follows and at its conclusion it is identified as god. Each

20 Aristotle, Metaphysics A 6, 1072al5-17. 21 Aristotle, Metaphysics A 6, 1072b I 0- 1.

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moment in the development of this account is defined by the topic at hand, unmoved substance. Aristotle first shows that it must be - it is required by motion in sensible substance - and what its nature must be. The force of the analysis is to establish a full characterization of unmoved substance. There- fore, characteristics such as "life at its best" and "thought thinking thought" appear as predicates revealed by an analysis of unmoved substance, god. For example, thought thinking thought is active when it possesses its object and so possession rather than receptivity seems to be the divine element of thought (Metaphysics A, 7, 1072b22-23). And the analysis retums immediately to god because god is the proper subject here: if god is always well, as we are sometimes, we must marvel .. . (Metaphysics A, 7, 1072b24-25). Finally, Aristotle concludes, "Therefore, we say that god is living, eternal, best, so that life and duration, continuous and eternal belong to god; for this is god" [a(Ev b6i T'OV OEOV Evai lJov &t6lOV 6QLoTOV, (oTe 4wi1 xati ctbWv ouVcxiTg xai dtLbLog ftaQXt& T( OF^ UoUTO yaQ 6 0O6; (Metaphysics A, 7, 1072b28-30; cf. N. Ethics X, 8, 1178b21-23)].

After this characterization, Aristotle criticizes Pythagoras and Speusip- pus: their views are inferior because they think that "the most beautiful and best are not in the first principle" [TO6 XcLXXLOTOV xait tQLOTOV [d tV &QX11 EtvaL (Metaphysics A, 7, 1072b31)]. He then summarizes his arguments. This summary returns us to the claim with which the analysis of unmoved substance began. "It is clear from what has been said that there must be some substance eternal and unmoved and separate from sensible things.. . And it is clear 'why' unmoved substance must be in this way." [6TL [ItV OVV {OTLV O1bOLa TLg etLbLo Xa dQXLCVTog Xai XEXWQLCFE1 TlOV atcoOrT6Ov, qxLvEQOv tx T6)V dQ?SVOV ... T.C. u Ta pEV OWV 6iXCa 6LOT TOUTOV 9XEl T'OV TQO3Erov. (Metaphysics A, 7, 1073a3-5; 1073a13)I.22

But a question remains about unmoved substance, god, and Aristotle raises it now: is it one or many and if many, how many (Metaphysics A, 8, 1073al4-15)? We need not consider the chronology of Aristotle's writings in order to consider the proper topic of this argument: 1-lTEQov bE [ILLV OETEoV T'iV ToLaUTriv oboiav f 3TXE?oUg, xacf JToCtg, b86 [dl kavOdvELv . . . "Such substance", i.e. unmoved, is his topic and insofar as this argument concerns unmoved substance it continues the analysis developed thus far.23 Aristotle concludes that the primary tbO t' iV ELVaL does not have

22 We may note that in Ross' translation this sentence appears as the opening sentence of A 8, even though in his Greek edition (cf. note 29) it is the closing sentence of A, 7. Jaeger also makes it the closing line of A 7 in the OCT. 23 Speaking of A, 8, Owens concludes that "the necessary connection of the passage with the immediately preceding argument seems very apparent", The Doctrine of Being, p. 448.

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matter but is fulfillment; therefore the first mover, being unmoved, must be one in both definition and number [Ev dQa xatL koyw xati dQL0[aC to 3TQCOYrOV XLVOUV LV1ITOV 6v (Metaphysics A, 8, 1074a36-38)].

With this conclusion, Aristotle tums to the ancients and their treatment of this problem. In a suddenly expansive style, he explains that the most ancient of our elders have handed down in the form of a myth the view that there are gods and that the divine surrounds the whole of nature (Meta- physics A, 8, 1074b-4). If, Aristotle argues, we separate their view from later (inferior) additions, we can see that it is inspired and so has been preserved. And the ancient truth here becomes clear in the light of this account of substance (Metaphysics A, 8 1074b4-14). And, of course, it thereby attests to Aristotle's own (superior) position.

What is the function of this fourteen line encomium to the ancient past? Obviously it adds further weight to Aristotle's view, especially in contrast to his opponents. But it does more: like the earlier reference to the ancients, it provides a punctuation mark indicating the completion of a major seg- ment of the logos. Throughout Metaphysics A, Aristotle frequently refers to various philosophers, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Plato, but never in this expansive style. And these lines refer neither to a Presocratic nor a contempo- rary; they cast back to the most ancient and noble opinion - one that both accords with and can be interpreted by Aristotle's position.

Aristotle underscores the virtues of his position by turning to the light of eternal truth known first (however intuitively) by the ancients. And in doing so, he implies that the argument concerning unmoved substance is complete. Indeed we know both that there must be such substance, and what its nature must be (pure actuality, thinking about thinking, life at its best, activity) and that it must be one in both number and definition. The topic announced at the beginning of this section of Metaphysics A, i.e. unmoved substance, has been analyzed. This section of the logos is now complete.

In the rubrication of his analysis, Aristotle divides substance into three kinds, two sensible and one unmoved. Since all three kinds have been examined, it would seem that the analysis of substance is now complete. The excursion into noble ancient opinion appears as a punctuation not only of the analysis of unmoved substance but also of the analysis of substance as such. It is complete.

E. Metaphysics A, 9: Mind or God?

But the logos is not complete. Two chapters, Metaphysics A 9 and 10, remain. Here we reach the most problematic part of the logos, especially 9. How we construe the overall topic of the logos is crucial not only for the

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particulars of these arguments, but even for defining their topics. We can consider A, 9 and its topic first. There are two views of this argument.

(1) If we think that the unmoved mover, god, is the topic of Meiaphysics A, two consequences follow for these particular arguments. First, the argument concerning mind and its object is out of place - it picks up and develops the account of A, 7, where god is characterized as thought thinking itself.24 Or alternately, A, 8, the discussion of whether the first mover is one or many, is out of place; indeed, on this view A 8 is largely eliminated from any meaningful role in the logos - and as there is no other "obvious" place for it, it can be dismissed altogether as early and immature.

Second, the subject of the argument is at stake here. For if the proper subject of the argument is god, thought thinking thought, then the introduction of mind and its relation to its object in effect furthers the analysis of divine being, namely god's mind and the relation of divine mind to its object. Because god stands as the subject of this argument and divine thought is thought at its best, this account of mind provides a model for what thinking is at its best and hence for what all thinking should be.25 When we turn to the analysis itself, we shall encounter a startling example of the interpretive force of this view.

(2) If, however, with the conclusion that there must be separate substance, a first mover unmoved and one, the argument about unmoved substance, god, is complete, and with it the analysis of first sensible and then unmoved substance - a completion "marked" by the reference to the ancients - then this argument concems a different (albeit related) topic. In- deed, we saw that in the analysis of unmoved substance, "thinking about thinking" appears as a predicate but is not analyzed apart from its immediate implications for god. Indeed, it cannot be analyzed because the argument presents a characterization of god. In effect, the strict definition of the analysis of unmoved substance - it is solely about god - leaves Aristotle with unfinished business. On the one hand, god has been described as "thought thinking thought" and so the topic of mind in relation to its object has been raised and its immediate implications for god developed; on the other hand, further problems involved in mind could not be pursued earlier because that argument concerns unmoved substance (god) and such pursuit would change the subject. But with the analysis of unmoved substance (and substance) complete, Aristotle can consider, as a subject, a topic, vovs, raised by that analysis. In so doing, he will complete the unfinished busi-

24 W. Jaeger, p. 346. 2S Ibid. Owens seems to assume this view, moving from A 7 to 9 without comment. Cf. Doctrine of Being, p. 444, n. 33.

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ness raised by, but not formally a part of, the analysis of unmoved substance. And he turns to this subject immediately after praising the ancients.

On this view, different conclusions follow. Because voig presents a topic raised but left unexamined by the analysis of unmoved substance, it is in the right place - properly presented within the logos, but postponed until after the account of unmoved substance, is complete. Co-relatively A, 8 is also in the right place because it continues and completes the account of unmoved substance by asking if it is one or many.

Furthermore, if the analysis of unmoved substance is complete at the end of A, 8, then A, 9 cannot, strictly speaking, develop further the account of divine being and cannot present an account of god's mind as a model for all thinking. Rather, divine mind raises some general problems concerning mind. By considering mind and the relations obtaining between mind and its object, the special case of divine mind can also be considered. In short, divine mind on this view is not a model for all thinking, but a special case of thinking.

On both views, A, 9 furthers the development of the analysis of god; consequently, on both views it belongs to the larger account of Metaphysics A. But on the first view it does so by developing a new step and further conclusions for the argument begun in A, 7; that is, the subject of A 9 is divine mind, i.e. god. On the second view, A 9 resolves a problem involved in and raised by what has already been established in A 7 - god is a thinking on thinking; but it reaches this resolution by presenting an analysis of voi,; - now taken as a topic in its own right - that includes divine mind as a special case.

Here we can see quite clearly how decisions about the topic of Meta- physics A as a whole effect decisions about the topic and status of particular arguments within that whole. How can we decide what the argument of Metaphysics A 9 is about? We have already seen some evidence: (1) the coherence and efficiency of the argument concerning unmoved substance from its announcement in A 6 to its conclusion in A 8 that the first mover must be one in both definition and number and (2) the larger structure beginning with the claim that the investigation concems substance, the immediate division of substance into its kinds, the completion of the analysis of each kind and the encomium to the ancients as a closing "punctuation mark" to the argument as it has proceeded thus far.

To this we may add as further evidence the opening sentence of A 9. The first words after the excursion to the ancients announce the topic at hand: Ta 6E JEP T'OV vo'v 4EL TnVog aToQL'Ctg- 8oXEl [V yaQ ,vLL TOV

QaLVoEvWv OE6OTaov. .. "There are some problems concerning mind - for it seems to be the most divine of things observed" (Metaphysics A, 9,

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1074b15-16). Aristotle does not say that there are some problems concerning unmoved substance, or god; rather, he says there are some problems concerning mind. And he is entitled to be taken at his word. Therefore, voug now constitutes the topic of analysis.

But if vovs; is now the topic, we face a new problem: what is the relation of this topic, vovsg, to substance and why should a discussion of vovs; be included within an investigation of substance that has been divided into sensible and unmoved? As I shall now argue, the analysis of mind and its relation to its object appears here as a topic because it has been raised by the characterization of god and involves difficulties that remain unresolved within that analysis. Consequently, A, 9 takes up a predicate established within the analysis of the unmoved substance (A, 6-8), considers it in and of itself, and narrows the analysis of thinking to the special case of immaterial eternal thinking.

Herein lies the sense in which Metaphysics A, 9 belongs to the investigation of substance even though it does not develop a further step in the analysis of unmoved substance - an analysis that has been completed. A 9 takes up a problem raised by the characterization of god as the actuality of thought, namely the relation between mind and its object. This problem could not be considered earlier (A 7 and 8) because the topic there is unmoved substance and as its topic unmoved substance strictly defines that analysis. With its close, Aristotle can take up a problem raised by it and consider this problem in itself. Finally, the solution to the problem of the relation of mind to its object is applied to eternal thinking as a special case. Let us briefly consider Metaphysics A 9.

Several questions are now raised concerning what mind thinks about and, although neither unmoved substance nor god are mentioned, these questions clearly seem to bear upon the special case of thinking at its best. In this sense, they review and amplify the account of mind developed to character- ize god. Does it think about nothing? If so, where is the dignity in such thought, for it resembles someone who is asleep (Metaphysics A, 9, 1074b17-18)? What does it think about? For if it thinks about something else, then it depends on that object for its activity and so cannot be the best (Metaphysics A, 9, 1074bl8-20)? Does it matter what it thinks about or if the object of its thought changes (Metaphysics A, 9, 1074b21-24)? Answer- ing these questions, Aristotle concludes "therefore, it thinks itself, if it is the most excellent thing, and this thinking is a thinking about thinking" [t5bTOv dia vo'i, EticEQ toi to xT rtXCUTov, xaiL ?QTLV f v6joats voijoEW; vO6qMg (Metaphysics A, 9, 1074b33-35)].

We seem here to be exactly where we were in A, 7. So why is this argument not a return to Metaphysics A, 7 and its argument concerning

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god? A, 7 is part of an analysis of unmoved substance - an argument that begins in 6 and ends in 8 - and as such it reaches conclusions about unmoved substance. Metaphysics A, 9, as Aristotle announces at the outset, is about mind, i.e. the problems of the relation of mind to its object. Hence, neither unmoved substance nor god are mentioned in 9. Insofar as both unmoved substance and mind at its best turns out to be a thinking about thinking the arguments clearly go together and the argument about mind belongs within Metaphysics A, i.e. an investigation of substance. Never- theless, the topics being analyzed in A, 7 and A, 9 are different: what comes out in the analysis of unmoved substance as a necessary predicate, thinking about thinking, now forms a topic of analysis in its own right, mind in relation to its object. And the conclusions reached by an analysis of the problems concerning mind do not develop further the argument about god; rather, they resolve problems involved in a predicate of unmoved substance. Hence A, 9 possesses a different topic, mind, than does A, 7, which concerns unmoved substance, but both are included within an investigation of substance because mind, the subject of A, 9, is a predicate of god, the subject of A, 7.

The problems concerning mind and its relation to its object are serious in part because they involve not just thinking about thinking, but all forms of thinking. In the next sentence Aristotle's language shows how broadly he casts these problems. The different kinds of thinking involved here are emphasized by the repetition of the conjunction "and" - a rhetorical device called polysyndeton that lengthens and slows the pace of the sentence: "But, it seems, knowledge and sensation and opinion and thought are always of another and of themselves only indirectly" [tcqxivTcaL 6' &d('L ?iXOV o ftJTLCT'[tTI xcii f CifoOfloCL xCai ft 866a xL h &6LVOWa, ctfig 6' tv tctQE`Qy (Metaphysics A, 9, 1074b35-36)]. Generally, to think and to be thought are not the same; in virtue of which does "goodness" belong to mind [Ett F d ko 10 vosiv xaL TO voELoOcu, xacTct m6TTEQov (naTy To E?t ftcnQx?L; 06? yCpQ 'tct0rr T6O ELVaiL VOiJOEL XCii VOU[LTVp. (Metaphysics A, 9, 1074b36-38)]? In some cases, e.g. the productive sciences, the knowledge is the object [ij ?r' tVLwV f t 1JTLCTijn] TO 7rQy&Lca, tTIL [tEV TJV JTOLTITLIXV 6iVEU R5Yr ft oCWLa xcai To 'T i~v alvaL ... (Metaphysics A, 9, 1074b38-1075a2)]. But in the case of the theoretical sciences, the act of thinking is the object of thought; in short, thinking and the object of thought do not differ when matter is absent and, therefore, such thinking is one with the object of thought [tni 6E TOV OwQTITLXOwV 6 kXdo0g T0o aQ&yic xciit f VOTJOLg; o?iX TE'QOU OrV 6VtO; TOlU VOOiU[tEVOU xai toi5 VoU, 6ota [i1 iXknV 9y(c1, T6o CdTo go-TctL, xcii f v6rToTL TqO VOO'U[Vp [iAa. (Metaphysics A, 9, 1075a2-5)].

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This analysis is not about god in any obvious sense. It concerns what is announced at the outset of A 9: an aporia concerning mind, namely the problem of its relation to its object. And as such it is cast quite generally. Indeed, although a full examination lies beyond the scope of this paper, the analysis of mind in A, 9 most obviously compares with the analysis of vov'g in De Anima F. Thinking here includes perception and opinion - fonns of thinking that cannot possibly apply to immaterial divine mind.26 Only within a general account of thinking, do we arrive at science, both productive and theoretical. Although science is a more specialized form of thinking than the very broad formns including perception and opinion, nevertheless it is a human activity and as such proves that we have not yet arrived at the narrowest case of thinking, uniquely divine activity; thus, the brief characterization of science is narrower than the class of all thinking but still does not apply exclusively to god.

These sciences bring us to the special case of thinking in which there is no matter (or in which thinking may exclude matter as such). Since unmoved substance, god, is a thinking on thinking that also cannot involve matter, we reach here the kind of thinking appearing within and required by the earlier account of unmoved substance. And one sentence concludes the argument: when there is no matter, thought and the object of thought will not be different, in this case thinking will be one with its object [ob)x

TErQOi OV'V 6VTog TOVi VOOU[EVOU xal O1J v, boct [t'U Iv PXEL, To rnlTo 90Tiza, xal f V6Oriot TO VOOtU[EVp [RCC. (Metaphysics A, 9, 1 075a3-5)] .27

Although unmoved substance or god is not mentioned, this case certainly seems to return us to this substance - or the subset within all thinking of which this substance is a member - and the account of god as a thinking on thinking. If we are to account for Metaphysics A as an investigation of substance, then we must be able to explain both why there is no mention of unmoved substance, god, and why we seem to be back to it. God is not mentioned because, properly speaking, the subject of this argument is mind, voV5. We seem clearly back to god because god is thought thinking

26 Cf. De Anima F, 3, 427b7-26 where perception [a'LcGOr(cJL is compared and contrast- ed with opinion [b66Ej, knowledge [I LQPlIj, thought [&6voLC] and imagination [qQavTaoJa]. 27 It seems impossible not to compare this line to the account of mind at De Anima F 4, 430a2-6: "And mind itself is among things that are thought. For in the case of things that are without matter, the thinking and the thing thought are the same. For theoretical knowledge and the thing thusly known are the same." xCf rnrlr6;g & voI]T6q t0TLV 6&MEQ Pi voiTd. tni tFEv yYQ T7V &VFV VXilg T0 OT6 to?TL To VOOVV XaLi To VOOWEVOV 1 (AQ 2tOT?UTf OEW?T1TLXf Xacl TO OiT0 g tOTELCT1TOV T1 CUTW6 0tLV.

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thought: the predicate appearing in the analysis of unmoved substance, god, is identical with the special case of mind to which this argument narrows. Hence, this argument both concerns a different topic (vovs; rather than obki(ct) and completes business left unfinished within the analysis of obiMLta. By considering problems involved in vovs, Aristotle can complete the argument concerning substance. For this reason, the argument of A 9 is both properly postponed until after the account of unmoved substance in 6-8 and included within A, which as a whole concerns substance.

A further tnoQica about the object of thought [in these cases] remains, and Aristotle with his next words turns to it: is it composite? (MT bl 6iFL- rrETaC 6CROQAtc, &t 0iVV0ETOV TO VOO'uvov (Metaphysics A, 9, 1075a5-6).28 Because it is without matter, such an object of thought must be indivisible - "just as human vovs; (or the vov5g of composite things) is in some time" (Metaphysics A, 9, 1075a7-8). Thus too is "the thought having itself [as its object] for all time" [oDiTwg 6' EXEL wbTi1 CtiT'c ij vOTCtg ToV &TnaVTa atLWva;] (Metaphysics A, 9, 1075alO). Here the argument clearly concludes (as does the chapter); the next line begins a different topic (and opens A, 10).

Again this &tJoQLa - Is the object of thought [when there is no matter] composite? - does not seem to be exclusively about unmoved substance, god. First, the principle cited in support of the solution, absence of matter makes a thing indivisible, applies to all cases in which there is no matter. Secondly, the concluding sentence reflects both on human mind and its object of thought as well as eternal thought having itself as its object. Indeed, these two look very much alike - eternity being the only difference cited. Aristotle does not call this eternal thought substance, or god; rather, he extends the point about thinking and the object of thought to the case in which the activity is thinking and the object of thought to the case in which the activity is eternal. Structurally, this argument too seems to be a general account of thinking when there is no matter present narrowing to a special case, i.e. when such thinking is eternal. That is, the proper subject is thinking and the special case to which the account narrows is unmoved substance and this special case reveals why this topic (yoV) appears in Metaphysics A.

In short, Metaphysics A 9 does not possess unmoved substance as its topic and is not a return to the account of god in Metaphysics A, 7. Rather, the topic here is exactly that announced at the beginning of Metaphysics A,

28 'ET! be regularly introduces new moments in the argument. Cf. Physics A, 1, 208a34, b8, 209aI8, 23. 'ETi also introduces lists of arguments by itself, cf. Physics A, 8, 215al4, 19, 22, 24.

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9: problems concerning vovs. Problems concerning mind follow the completed argument about unmoved substance because they have been raised by that account but could not be treated within it (without changing the topic). And the analysis of these problems narrows to the special case of eternal immaterial thinking. Indeed, they appear after the account of substance is complete precisely because, although they do not concern substance per se, they are occasioned by that analysis and are intimately linked to its conclusions.

Before turning to Metaphysics A, 10, I would like to consider a striking example of what is at stake in these decisions about the subject of the argument and ultimately Metaphysics A as a piece of reasoning. Ross argues that A, 9 continues the argument of 7: "Aristotle now turns to the consideration of 6 voV5;, i.e. of the supreme intellect, which has in ch. 7 been shown to be implied as the cause of the movement of the heavens."29 The identification of 6 voV5 with "the supreme intellect" is absolute for Ross. So when Aristotle begins "Tat be rQiL TOV VOUV 9XtEL TLVQ dL- toQeit" Ross translates (the Oxford translation) "The nature of divine

thought involves certain problems" (Metaphysics A, 9, 1074b15). Indeed, because he identifies vovsg with god so absolutely, Ross finds the next words ("for it seems to be the most divine of observable things") "strange" because divine reason is presumably not found among observable things; perhaps, he suggests, the phrase "observable things" could also apply to things examined by reason."

Again, when Aristotle concludes that in the absence of matter, thought and the object of thought are one, the text reads: oiix TlEQOU o1&v 6VTo; TOvU VOO1EVOU XaL TOU Wov, boa IAf iIXkIV 9yEL, To a?Tho 9OTC, xaC 9 VO6loiL Ti VOOu[tFiVW [da. But Ross translates: "Since, then, thought and the object of thought are not different in the case of things that have not matter, the divine thought and its object will be the same, i.e. the thinking will be one with the object of its thought." But the word "divine" does not appear here.

Finally, when Aristotle asks if the object of thought is composite, Ross translates "eTT 6I XELJtEnaL 3To(La, Ect C5V0OETV 10 voov[tevov" as "A further question is left - whether the object of the divine thought is composite". Again, there is no reference to the divine here. Indeed, as we have just seen, the duTopia and its solution could hardly be cast more generally.

How can we account for this extraordinary translation? Ross introduces

29 W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics: A Revised Text with Introduction and Com- mentary vol II, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1953), p. 397. 30 Cf. his comment on Metaphysics A, 9, 1074bl6, p. 397.

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words (indeed a subject) not found in Aristotle because he identifies 6 vovs so radically with "supreme intellect." And he makes this identification because he presupposes that Metaphysics A 9 continues the argument of A 7. But Aristotle does not introduce god or divine thought here and the Greek cannot on any account be translated as Ross proposes.

Ross, like Jaeger, (and more recently Graham) assumes that Metaphysics A is theology.3' Because as theology the logos possesses god as its subject, particular arguments must be interpreted relative to this subject. And when the particulars do not fit the larger whole, as Ross defines it, they must be changed. And these changes include (1) rearranging the order of the arguments by largely eliminating A 8 from the treatise, (2) expanding the translation so that the text discusses what is required of it, i.e. divine mind rather than mind, and (3) interpreting away difficulties that remain, e.g. how divine mind can be found among observable things. Virtually no aspect of the logos is untouched. Prima facie such a view can only be suspect. Finally, the origin of the difficulties that generate such changes lies in a misfit between the presupposed topic of Metaphysics A - the logos is theology culminating in the account of god in chapter 7 - and the logos itself, which announces an investigation of obo(tC.

The opposite results obtain from identifying the subject of the logos as an investigation of substance. (1) The arguments are in the right order, i.e. Metaphysics A, 8 continues and completes the analysis of unmoved substance, (2) the text reads as it stands, i.e. without introducing "divine", and (3) the arguments form a consistent pattern, a general problem of thinking narrowed to the requisite special case. I shall suggest in conclusion that on this construal the logos is remarkably coherent and well-ordered.

F. How The World Contains The Good And The Best

Metaphysics A, 10 raises a final problem: "Let us consider also in which way the nature of the whole contains the good and the best, whether as something separate, namely itself in virtue of itself or as the order. Or [is it] both ways, as does an army?" ['E7aLdXETTnEOV 8E' xai 7totEQw; gXF-L i TOi?

Xov (ptUCoL TO &vycO6v xC T6 dQLOTOV, TO6TEQOV XEcxwQt[EVOV Tt X CtfTo xct0' act6, i 'iv TdIev. I &totK wg 4DoJ?Q Org tTia; (Meta- physics A, 10, 1075a 1-13)]. The good, Aristotle concludes here, is found both in the order and in the general, although more in the latter because the order depends on the general but not the converse. All things, e.g. fishes,

3' W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics: A Revised Text with Introduction and Com- mentary vol I, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1953), pp. cxxx-cliv.

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fowls and plants, are somehow ordered together, all things are nQoQg tv. This fifteen line argument completes Aristotle's analysis. The remainder

of the chapter, except the last line, consists exclusively of criticisms of other views. Hence, these fifteen lines raise and solve the final problem of the logos: in some sense all things are ordered together.

In one sense, this problem parallels that of mind: the problem of the good and the best has been raised by the characterization of unmoved substance but, as a topic in its own right, it lies outside the direct examination of substance. Thus it too presents unfinished business, the completion of which is closely tied to the account of god in Metaphysics A, 7. But in a more important sense, this problem alone forms a suitable conclusion to the investigation of substance: it returns us to the nature of "the all", - an issue raised before substance was subdivided into sensible and unmoved - and to the related question of whether the three kinds of substance have a common principle.

However one interprets the metaphor of the general and the army (followed by another concerning the householder and the household), the main point is clear: all things are ordered together, connected, rQog tv. The nature of the whole is not just a succession of parts; it must be unified in a stronger sense.

But there is no mention here either of substance or of god. The reader and the reader alone must connect this account to the preceding analysis: the general is presumably the unmoved mover, god, while the other things mentioned, fishes, fowls and plants, are sensible substances. And on the basis of this identification an interpretation follows directly. Although the three kinds of substance are not derived from some one, and so cannot be known by an examination of it, nonetheless in the one to which they all relate, all things possess a first principle. In this sense, "the all" is one and there is a common principle for all substances.

These fifteen lines provide a conclusion to the whole of Metaphysics A by returning us to the problems and subject of the opening lines of the logos. The analysis that follows upon the division of oOocLt into its kinds is formally complete at A 8. Problems concerning mind that are raised by the analysis of unmoved substance, namely the relation of mind to its object and the nature of that object are solved in A 9. The metaphor of the general and the army (and the householder and the household) shows the good and the best as related to "the all". Again, a predicate appearing in the analysis of unmoved substance appears as a topic in its own right. This identity founds the conclusion that this argument completes the account of substance and presents the relation between unmoved and sensible substance and the whole as ordered to a common principle. Hence this argument both

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reflects on the highest characteristic of god and provides a fitting conclusion to the constructive analysis of the logos as a whole.

Again, the related argument of Metaphysics F 2 seems irresistible. There Aristotle argues that when things are related pQo6; lv they fall under one science. Such a science deals with what is primary, because other things depend upon these and even derive their names thence.32 "If therefore substance is this, then the philosopher must grasp the principles and the causes of substances" [1 oiv TOI,T' ?(oTiLV f oboCC, TGv otaLO'v 6Wv &OL T-ag &QXag xacl TaS cdTiag 9xELv TOV qtlkOOoPOV (Metaphysics F, 2, 1003bl7- 19)]. And in Metaphysics A we seem to do that by grasping the "primary instance", namely the general, and, so, if we identify the general with god, god.

Here we face the question of the topic of Metaphysics A in its most extreme form: if it is primarily about god, then why not understand it as theology? Theology (a word apparently coined by Plato) means the study of god.33 Aristotle uses the related word 0?oEk0YoX only twice and in both cases considers three kinds of theoretical science, physics, mathematics, and theology.34 And these texts agree: if natural substance is the only substance, then physics will be the first science; but if there is an immovable substance, then the science of this will be first.35 But Metaphysics A is not, strictly speaking, the science of immovable substance. It announces an investigation of substance and, as we have seen, includes both sensible and immovable substance.

At the opening of A, 1, the primacy of substance immediately raises the problem of "the all". And however one interprets its details, the intent of describing things in Metaphysics A 10 as JTQo; tv is to establish a science of many different (and different kinds of) things, sensible as well as immovable. Here we see what is at stake in determining the subject of Metaphysics A: theology gives us god and a science of separate substance, but a rQpO; lv relation gives us both the one and the world, "the all", as ordered to it. And the problem that opens Metaphysics A 1, the problem addressed by the metaphors of the general and his army, the householder and the household, is a problem that concerns both the primacy of substance and the structure

32 Aristotle, Metaphysics F, 2, 1003b16-17. '" Cf. Plato, Republic II, 379a5. `4 Aristotle, Metaphysics E 1, 1026a19 and K 7, 1064b2; cf. also Physics B 2, 193b25- 194al 1 for a parallel account of mathematics and physics but no mention of theology. We may note that although Aristotle refers to "the theologians" [ot Oox6yot] twice in Metaphysics A (6, 1071b27 and 10, 1075b26) no other form of this word occurs in A. The word Ocokoy(a occurs only once in Aristotle according to Bonitz, Meteorologica B, 1, 353a35. 35 Aristotle, Metaphysics E 1, 1026a28-3 1; Metaphysics K 7, 1064b9-13.

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of "the all". Indeed, as an investigation of substance that begins and ends with this problem, Metaphysics A appears to be not the science of separate substance, theology, but the science indicated in Metaphysics F 2, the science of being qua being.

In the remainder of Metaphysics A, 10 Aristotle criticizes alternative, inferior views, especially those of Plato and the Platonists. Insofar as these views differ from his own, they lead (Aristotle tells us) to impossibilities (68vvaTa) and paradoxes (dToAa).36 And pathologies of these problems further support Aristotle's superior position.

In its last line, the logos ends grandly with a quotation not from the Presocratics or Plato, but from the most ancient and revered author, Homer. Homer, expressing an eternal truth, confirins Aristotle's own position: "The rule of many is not good; one ruler let there be" ["oibx &ya0ov nroXtixoL(avL* ctg xoiQavoS 90TOr." (Metaphysics A, 10, 1076a4)]. As Aristotle refers to the ancients at the end of his introduction and at the close of the analysis of the three kinds of substance, so too - and in this case without further ado - an ancient returns us to and completes Aristotle's view of substance as first and providing a common principle for the all.

Conclusion

The overall logical structure of the logos may be briefly summarized. Aris- totle announces his subject first, oboCra, and confirms its importance - and his view in making it important - by reference to the ancients. The priority of substance leaves open the question of the structure of the all; however the all is structured, substance must be first and the analysis of substance can proceed. With this subject in place, Aristotle subdivides obiCra into three kinds, two sensible and one unmoved. Again, a question arises but is left unanswered: do these three kinds share a common principle and so fall under a single investigation? The answer to this question will determine the coherence of the logos, since it is an investigation of substance.

The examination of first sensible substances and then unmoved substance follows directly. Within the analysis of sensible substance (A 2-5) Aristotle also announces his subject first and concludes by returning to the general problem of substance. An examination of unmoved substance (A 6-8) begins with an announcement of its subject and ends with an extended excursion to most ancient opinion. As in the introduction, ancient opinion, confirming Aristotle's view, closes the argument.

36. Aristotle, Metaphysics A, 10, 1075a25-27.

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Analysis of two topics raised within but different from the analysis of unmoved substance concludes the logos. The first concerns mind and its relation to its object. This analysis takes up as its subject a predicate (thinking about thinking) that appears in the analysis of unmoved substance. Several conclusions follow about the relation of mind to the object of thought and the nature of that object. These conclusions apply both to theoretical science and to eternal immaterial thinking that has itself as its object. Neither substance nor god is explicitly mentioned in this analysis.

Finally, in A, 10 Aristotle considers how the nature of the whole contains the good and the best. Since unmoved substance has been characterized as "life at its best", this topic seems to return us to substance as first and the constitution of "the all". The metaphors of the general and the army, the householder and the household, address the ambiguity raised in the opening line of the logos. Again, unmoved substance, or god, is not mentioned in this chapter; so when Aristotle concludes that the good is found both (and more) in the general, because he does not depend upon anything else, and in the order of the parts that depend upon him, the reader must provide the connection to unmoved substance and ultimately the problem of the all with which the logos begins. With the primacy of the general (and the householder) it would seem that all things do relate to a one, to some common principle. Herein lies not only the coherence of the world but also the coherence of the logos as an investigation of substance. Having thus completed his own account, Aristotle criticizes opposing views and the logos, like its most important parts, closes with a quotation from an ancient, in this case the most noble of all - Homer.

This proposed structure raises two questions that must be answered if this analysis is to be persuasive. (1) What, finally, is Metaphysics A about? (2) How can we understand the order and unity of the logos, especially if it includes two arguments (A 9 and 10) that do not even mention substance and (on my account) concern different topics?

(1) What is Metaphysics A about? Although it contains a discussion, i.e. A 7, in which unmoved substance is identified as god, it is about substance (ouo(a) properly speaking. Metaphysics A is an investigation of substance as first, however "the all" is constituted. While it is true that substance cannot be examined except as three kinds of substance (two sensible and one unmoved), nevertheless the subdivision of substance into these kinds comes after the identification of the subject of the theoria. Hence, this division and its resulting kinds constitutes not the subject of the logos but the first step in its analysis. Finally, the conclusions about substance (first as sensible and then as unmoved) are consistently referred back to the problem of substance as first and its relation to "the all".

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(2) How can we understand the order and unity of the logos as a fully developed formal argument? The investigation of substance unifies the logos. It is announced in the opening line and subdivided into two parts, which are taken up in order. Each part announces its "local topic", i.e. first sensible and then unmoved substance, analyses this topic, and refers its conclusions back to the broadest problems associated with substance. Meta- physics A, 8 further develops the argument started in A 6 and continued in 7; at the end of 8 and only at the end of 8 do we find the conclusion of the argument about unmoved substance and the conclusion of the analysis of substance.

Within the analysis of unmoved substance, two predicates appear, "thinking about thinking" and "life at its best". However, each of these is also a topic in its own right; "thinking about thinking" raises problems concerning the relation between vovsg and its object while "life at its best" raises the issue of the independence of what is best and the relation of the best to the all. These topics and the problems entailed by them present unfinished business, unresolved ambiguities, for the investigation of substance. Hence they are raised and analyzed in their own right as soon as the account of substance is complete. Although neither unmoved substance nor god appears in either of these arguments, the fact that predicates established in the analysis of unmoved substance appear here as subjects attests to the role of these arguments in the logos. They function solely within and as a completion of the investigation announced in the opening line: the investigation of substance.

Herein lies the order, the unity, indeed the remarkable efficiency of this logos. It is dominated the topic announced in the opening line. Even when the examination of substance leads to topics that must be treated in their own right, the analysis of these topics is radically restricted by the require- ments of an examination of substance. Indeed, for this reason Metaphysics A may be offered as a perfect example of an investigation of substance.

Trinity College, Hartford, Connec ticut

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Article Contentsp. 257p. 258p. 259p. 260p. 261p. 262p. 263p. 264p. 265p. 266p. 267p. 268p. 269p. 270p. 271p. 272p. 273p. 274p. 275p. 276p. 277p. 278p. 279p. 280

Issue Table of ContentsPhronesis, Vol. 38, No. 3 (1993), pp. 229-350Front MatterAnaximander's Conception of the "Apeiron" [pp. 229-256]The Structure and Subject of "Metaphysics " [pp. 257-280]Epicurus on the Telos [pp. 281-320]Review ArticlesReview: Knowing the "Theaetetus" [pp. 321-336]Review: Zur Frhgeschichte der Aussagenlogik [pp. 337-344]

Book NotesReview: Aristotle and Hellenistic Philosophy [pp. 345-350]

Back Matter

the structure and subject of metaphysics Λ

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