spinoza's metaphysics

“Unaquæque res, quantum in se est, in suo esse persverare conatur” “Each thing, as far as it can by its power, persevere in its being”

-Baruch (Benedict) de Spinoza

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STRIVE TO SURVIVE

By: John Raphael Calongcagon

Baruch (or in Latin, Benedict) de Spinoza (1632-1677) was one of the most influential

rationalist philosophers in the early modern period in line with Descartes and Leibniz. Spinoza is

also considered to be one of the most controversial Atheist (someone who rejects the Traditional

Biblical views concerning God and His relation with nature) during that time. He argues that

there is no Transcendent God, no free will, no eternal life and that the our very existence and

universe has no ultimate purpose or goal. He then argues that human being is not so special for

we and also the whole of natural world follow the same natural laws and the universe is one

inherently active totality conceived of as either “God” or “Nature”.

Most of Spinoza’s Metaphysics can be derived from his book Ethics Demonstrated in

Geometrical Manner. Assumptions say that Spinoza used Geometrical method in proving to offer

conclusive and incontrovertible proofs which no rational person could reject. Spinoza’s Ethics is

very well explained that the context Spinoza wanted to show is already on the surface and no

need to think deeply.

In this study we will be using Ethics as the main source of Spinoza’s Metaphysics. When

citing Ethics begin with the Part number then use the following short hand

a— Axiom

d— Definition

l— lemma

post. — postulate

c— corollary

D— demonstration

s— schollum

exp. — explanation



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This study examines the most fundamental part of Spinoza’s Metaphysics, The three

most difficult theories: Substance Monism, Attributes and Conatus.

The Basic Metaphysical Picture: Substance, Attributes, and Modes

E1d3: By Substance I understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, that is,

that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed.

A substance is something that is both ontologically and conceptually independent.

Ontologically I say because a substance is what exist in itself. Other things exist as features of a

substance but never can a substance be feature of anything else. By conceptually independent I

mean that a substance is what is conceived through something else and that the idea of a

substance does not involved the idea of any other thing.

E1d5: By mode I understand; a state of substance, i.e. something that exist in and is

conceived through something else.

Modes exist as a modification or an affection of a substance and cannot be conceived

apart from it. Modes are ontologically and conceptually dependent.

To further understand the connection of substance and mode this kind of example can be

made: being hungry, furry and orange are modes that need a substance that is hungry, furry and

orange. Hunger and color cannot exist floating around on their own, but rather, hunger and color

nee something (substance) to be hungry and have color.



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E1d4: By attribute I understand what the intellect perceives of a substance as

constituting its essence.

Substance Monism

The most distinctive and controversial part of Spinoza’s Metaphysical system is his

theory of Substance Monism—one infinite substance(God/Nature) is the only existing substance.

For better understanding we will make use of (Waller, 2009) simplified version of Spinoza’s

argument.

1. Every substance has at least one attribute.(E1d4)

2. Two substances cannot share the same nature or attribute. (E1p5)

3. God has all possible attributes.(E1d6)

4. God exist. (E1p11)

5. Therefore, no other substance other than God can exist. (E1p14)

Spinoza concluded that there is only one substance (God/Nature) which has all the

attributes(3). No other substance an exist because if another substance exist it necessarily

follows that it should have an attribute(1) which is basically impossible in accordance to

Premise 2. Spinoza defends each of his assumptions as follows.

E1d4: By ‘attribute’ I understand: what the intellect perceives of a substance as

constituting its essence.



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A substance cannot exist without an attribute because by the definition given the

substance would not have essence and it is absurd for a substance to exist without having

essence. Thus, every substance must at least have one attribute.

E1p5: In Nature there cannot be two or more substance having the same nature

or attribute.

If two substances (A and B) share the same attribute (C) then there is no way to separate

these two substances apart. Since no cause can be given for their distinction, Spinoza then

infers that they must actually be the same.

Leibniz however refuted Spinoza’s second premise and gave a situation to prove that it is

possible for two substances to share an attribute and yet differ by each having another

attribute that is not shared. For example, if substance A has attributes C and D and substance

B has attributes C and F. the two substance can be distinguished by the attribute that the other

lacks, but both substance would nevertheless share an attribute (in the given example it

would be attribute C).

E1p11: God, or a substance consisting of infinite attribute each of which

expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exist.

In premise 4, Spinoza provides a number of different proofs for the existence of a

substance with infinite attributes in which can be better shown in three arguments.



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Ontological Argument (Waller, 2009)

1. When two things have nothing in common, one cannot be the cause of the

other. (E1p3)

2. It is impossible for two substances to have the same attribute. (E1p5)

3. Two substances with different attribute have nothing in common. (E1pD)

4. Thus, one substance cannot cause other substance to exist. (E1p6) from 1, 2, 3

5. Either substance is caused to exist or they exist by their own nature. (E1p7D)

6. Thus, substance must exist by their own nature. (E1p7) from 4, 5

Causal Argument (Lin, 2007)

1. If something exists, there must be a cause of its existence and if something

does not exist, there must be a cause of its nonexistence. (E1a3)

2. The cause or reason for the nonexistence of anything is either internal (its

nature involves contradiction) or external.

3. A thing necessarily exists if there is no reason or cause that prevents it from

existing.

4. If God didn’t exist, there would be an internal or external cause.

5. If it were internal then God nature involves contradiction.

6. God nature does not involve contradiction.



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a. Contradiction must involve something of the form ‘P and –P’ (e.g. a

‘square circle’ would be something that is ‘square and not square’

because ‘not square’ is contained in the meaning of circle). It is then

absurd to say that an absolutely infinite being (God) involves a

negative nature

7. No external cause can prevent or take away God’s existence.

a. By E1p2 ‘No two substance can share the same attribute, one can infer

that there is no other substance can have something in common with

God and so could not give nor take away the existence of God.

8. God necessarily exist.

Power Argument (Bennet, 2004)

1. To be able to exist is to have power and being able not to exist is to lack

power.

2. If a finite thins exist and an infinite thing does not, then a finite thing is more

powerful than an absolutely infinite thing.

3. It is impossible that a finite thing possess more power than an absolutely

infinite thing.

4. It is either nothing exists of or an absolutely infinite thing exists.

5. We exist.

6. Therefore, an absolutely infinite being (God) necessarily exist.



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The Modal System

After presenting proofs for Substance Monism, Spinoza claims that every existing thing

is a mode that inheres in God.

E1p15: Whatever exists is in God and nothing can exist or be conceived without God.

Earlier discussion on Substance Monism secures that apart from God no other substance

exists. But modes can’t exist or be conceived without a substance in which they are mode of. So

modes can only exist in divine nature and be conceived through that nature. But substance and

modes are all there is (E1a1). Therefore, everything is in God and nothing can be conceived

without God. (E1p15D)

Two types of Modes

i. Infinite and Eternal

Universal features of reality which follows from the absolute nature of one or

another of God’s attribute. Examples include motion and rest under extension and infinite

idea under thoughts

ii. Finite and Temporal

Singular things that populate the universe which follows from God’s attribute as it

is modified by modification that is itself finite and temporal. Examples include individual

bodies under extension and individual idea under thought.



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Spinoza explains that the laws of nature are embedded in the infinite and eternal modes, he

thought of these modes as governing the manner in which finite modes affect one another. For

example, if laws of impact are somehow embedded in the infinite and eternal mod motion and

rest, then the outcome of any particular collision will be determined by that mode together with

the relevant properties (speed, direction, size, etc.) of the bodies involved. If this is correct, then

Spinoza envisions every finite mode to be fully determined by intersecting lines of causality a

horizontal line that stretches back through series of antecedent finite modes and a vertical line

that moves up through the series of infinite modes and terminates in one or another of the

attributes of God.

Causal Determinism

However, it may be that Spinoza ultimately conceives of the relation between infinite and

finite modes, he is clear about one thing—the system of modes is an entirely deterministic

system in which everything is fully determined to be and to act.

E1p29: In Nature there is nothing contingent, but all things have been determined from

the necessity of the divine nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain way.

Causal Parallelism

E1a4: the knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, the knowledge of its cause.

Given this axiom, if a finite mode falling under one attribute were to have God as its

cause insofar as he is considered under a different attribute, i.e., if it were to cause by a finite

mode falling under a different attribute, then the knowledge of that mode would involve



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knowledge of that the other attribute. Since it does nit, that mode cannot have God as its cause

insofar as he is considered under some attribute. In other words, it cannot be caused by a finite

mode falling under some other attributes.

When applied to modes falling under those attributes of which we have knowledge—

thought and extension—this has an enormously important consequence. There can be no causal

interaction between ideas and the bodies. This does not mean that ideas and bodies are unrelated

to one another.

Conatus

In latter part of Ethics, Spinoza introduces the word Conatus (Strive). Spinoza argues that

each mode (every physical and mental thing ‘strives to persevere in its being. (E3p6) from that

claim, Spinoza infers that each mode’s Conatus is the actual essence. (E3p7) That is, what it is to

be a man is just to strive in a certain man-like way. What is it to be a table is for the complex

body to strive in a certain table-like way Everything that exist—every particle, rock, plant,

animal planet, solar system, idea, mind, etc.—is striving to survive



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Conatus and Purposive Action

Spinoza denies the claim that God has a purpose or plan for the universe. The universe

simply exists it could not fail to exist. God did not make the universe and created man with any

predetermined goal or plan in mind; instead the universe simply follows from God’s essence.

[People] find—both in themselves and outside themselves—many means that are very

helpful in seeking their own advantage, for example, eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing,

plants and animals for food, the sun for light, the sea for supporting fish. Hence, they

consider all natural things as means to their own advantage. And knowing that they had

found these means, not provided them for themselves, they had reason to believe that

there was someone else who had prepared the means for their use … And since they had

never heard anything about the temperament of these rules, they had to judge from

themselves. Hence, they maintained that the gods direct all things for the use of men in

order to bind men to them and be held by men in the highest honor. … But while they

sought to show that Nature does nothing in vain (that is, nothing not of use to men), they

seem to have shown only that Nature and the gods are as mad as man. … Not many

words will be required to show that Nature has no end set before it, and that all final

causes are nothing but human fictions (E1, Appendix.)

The earth is not created and existing so that we may live on it. The universe is not

designed for our good. Everything has no purpose; everything simply exists.



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Bennett 1984, 240-251 provides an example to better understand the impact of the

conatus claim:

If I walk across the room to get a drink of water, we might believe that this

activity is purposive or goal-oriented. I am walking across the room in

order to get a glass of water. My behavior is partly explained in the

common sense view by my goal or purpose (that is, getting a drink of

water.)

But when the theory of conatus is applied here this kind of explanation is wrong.

According to Bennett’s Spinoza:

I do not walk across the room in order to get water. Rather I walk across

the room because my organs were organized in a certain way such that

when light strikes my eyes, it moves certain parts of my brain, which in

turn moves certain tendons in my legs, which in turn causes my legs to

move back and forth in certain ways, carrying my body to the counter,

moving my hand toward the water fountain, etc. That is, my behavior can

be fully and completely understood mechanistically, just like a watch. The

springs inside a watch do not move so that the watch may indicate the

correct time, rather the clock indicates the correct time because the

springs and levers move in a certain way. Similarly with human beings,

they do not walk in order to get to certain places; they get to certain

places because they walk. (When considering a human being under the

attribute of thought, Spinoza would claim that certain ideas follow



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logically from other ideas in just the way that certain effects follow

necessarily from certain causes in the physical world.) In just the way

that the universe exists without any purpose or goal, so every action

performed by every human similarly is done for no purpose or goal. We

do what we do simply because we could not fail to—our actions simply

follow from the organization of our many complex parts.

Conatus Argument (Garret, 2002)

1. The definition of a thing affirms and does not deny, the thing’s essence, or it

posits the thing’s essence, and does not take it away.

2. While we attend only to thing itself, and not to external causes, we shall not be

able to find anything in it which can destroy it. from 1

3. Nothing can be destroyed except through an external cause. From 2 (E3p4)

4. If (things insofar as they can destroy one another) could agree with one

another, or be in the same subject at once, then there could be something in the

same subject which could destroy it.

5. (That there could be something in the same subject that can destroy it) is

absurd. From 3

6. Things are of contrary nature, that is, cannot be in the same subject, insofar as

one can destroy the other. From 4, 5 (E3p5)

7. Singular things are modes by which God’s attributes are expressed in a certain

and determinate way (E1p25c)

8. God’s power is his essence itself. (E1p34)



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9. Singular things are modes that express, in certain and determinate way, God’s

power, by which God is and acts. From 7, 8

10. Nothing has anything in itself by which it can be destroyed, or which takes its

existence away. From 3

11. [Each thing] is opposed to everything can take its existence away. From 6

12. Each thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its being.

From 9, 10 (E3p6)

Major Problems in Spinoza’s Metaphysics

On Substance Monism

The second premise for the Substance Monism argument is being rejected by most

contemporary philosophers. Leibniz presented a sound argument against this premise:

It might be impossible for two substances to have all of their attributes in

common (because then they would be indistinguishable), it may be

possible for two substances to share an attribute and yet differ by each

having another attribute that is not shared. For example, one substance

may have attributes A and B and another substance has attributes A and

C. The two substances would be distinguishable because each has an

attribute the other lacks, but both substances would nevertheless share

an attribute.



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This objection was presented to Spinoza by Leibniz himself. Though Spinoza did not find the

objection persuasive, he never offered an explicit reply.

On Modal System

In the Substance Monism, Spinoza stresses God as the cause of all things and that

everything follows from God. Spinoza then argues on his modal systems that finite modes

necessarily follow from finite mode. If God is the only substance and is absolutely infinite, how

can everything follow from God if finite modes follow finite modes? Won't the alleged gap

between finite and infinite modes mean that finite things do not, after all, follow from substance?

And won't that violate one of the most basic features of modes, namely their dependence on

substance?

(Curley, 1969)proposed an elaborate answer in this problem.

Curley believes the relationship between God and modes are exclusively causal, which

implies a greater distinction between God and modes than more traditional, pantheistic

interpretations allow.) Curley suggests that Spinoza's finite modes are only partially determined

by other finite modes. They are also partially determined by infinite modes, which Curley

understands to be general features of the world described by the laws of nature. My desk follows

partly from infinite modes and partly from other particular finite modes. In more familiar terms,

a given state of the world is determined by both the laws of nature and a prior state of the world.

Each source is necessary but neither alone is sufficient, and so Spinoza can have it both ways.



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Particular finite modes follow partly from God's nature (in virtue of following partly from

infinite modes) and they also follow partly from other finite modes. Admittedly, Spinoza does

not say that finite modes follow only partly from other finite modes, but neither does he

explicitly say that they follow entirely from other finite modes either.

On Conatus

Many critics of Spinoza argue that Spinoza done so many invalid inferences and that he

also committed fallacy of equivocation. (Bennett, 1984) briefly discussed the problem:

The first occurs right at the beginning of the argument. In the first three

lines, Spinoza infers that since a definition of something does not contain

anything inconsistent with the thing, that a thing contains nothing contrary to its

own nature. But this inference seems invalid. If we understand a definition to be

a statement of a thing’s essence (see E2d2), then it does validly follow that the

essence includes nothing inconsistent with itself (if the essence were internally

inconsistent, then it could not exist.) But it does not follow that a thing cannot

have certain accidental properties (not mentioned in the definition) which are

capable of destroying the thing. Thus, Spinoza seems to mistakenly infer a claim

about the whole thing (both essential and accidental properties) from a premise

which merely concerns the essence. Another invalid inference occurs toward the

end of the argument in lines 6 and 11. Spinoza infers that since two things

cannot both be parts of the same whole, they must actively oppose one



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another. However, perhaps they could simply be in a passive relation to one

another. It is one thing to passively resist, and it is quite another to actively

resist.

Conclusion

The summary of Spinoza’s metaphysics can be done easily. First his Substance

Monism theory states that there is only one absolutely infinite substance in which is God

and that everything (extension or thought) follow his existence as per his notion of modal

system. And the existence of things is not based on a certain predetermined plan or

purposive action rather everything exists due to its necessity to exist and a thing’s essence

is how it strives to survive.



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Bibliography

Bennet, J. t. (2004). Ethics Demonstrated in Geometrical Manner. Hackett.

Bennett, J. (1984). A study of Spinoza's Metaphysics. Indianapolis: Hackett.

Curley, E. (1969). Spinoza's Metaphysics. Harvard University Press.

Garret, D. (2002). Spinoza's conatus argument. Spinoza: Metaphysical theme, pp. 127-158.

Lin, M. (2007). Spinoza's argument for the existence of God. Philosophical and

Phenomenological Research, 1-29.

Waller, J. (2009). Retrieved September 04, 2013, from Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

www.iep.utm.edu/spinoza-m/

spinoza's metaphysics

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