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International Journal of Philosophical Studies

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The end of what? Phenomenology vs. speculativerealism

Dan Zahavi

To cite this article: Dan Zahavi (2016) The end of what? Phenomenology vs.

speculative realism, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 24:3, 289-309, DOI:10.1080/09672559.2016.1175101

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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES, 2016

VOL. 24, NO. 3, 289–309

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2016.1175101

© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

The end of what? Phenomenology vs. speculativerealism

Dan Zahavi

Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen, Denmark

ABSTRACT

Phenomenology has recently come under attack from proponents of speculativerealism. In this paper, I present and assess the criticism, and argue that it is eithersuperficial and simplistic or lacks novelty.

KEYWORDS Phenomenology; speculative realism; correlationism; idealism; naturalism

Te question o how to understand and respond to naturalism has been oconcern to phenomenology ever since its commencement. It figured centrally

in Husserl’s discussion o psychologism in Logische Untersuchungen¸ in his pro-grammatic maniesto Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaf , in his last work Die

Krisis der europäischen Wissenschafen und die transzendentale Phänomenologie,

and in his 1919 lectures Natur und Geist, to mention just a ew relevant texts.It was also at the oreront o Merleau-Ponty’s first major work La structure du

comportement. More recently, Francisco Varela’s work on neurophenomenology

has been decisive in rekindling interest in the issue and has led to an intensediscussion o whether it is possible to naturalize phenomenology (Varela 1996).

One important milestone in this debate was the landmark volumeNaturalizing

Phenomenology rom 1999, where Varela and his three co-editors argued thatit was crucial or the advancement o cognitive science that it adapted some othe methodological tools that were developed by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty(Petitot et al. 1999).

Seventeen years later, the discussion continues. In a number o previouspublications, I have argued that the answer to the question o whether a nat-uralized phenomenology is a desideratum or a category mistake very muchdepends on what one takes the question to be, and that it is urgent to be clear

on what notion o phenomenology and what notion o nature and naturali-zation one has in mind (Zahavi 2004a, 2010a, 2013). One obvious challenge

CONTACT Dan Zahavi [email protected]

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w n l o a d e d b y [ S e a t t l e U n i v e

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mailto:[email protected]

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290 D. ZAHAVI

to any happy marriage obviously derives rom the transcendental character ophenomenology. Contrary to some proposals, it is not naturalism’s classicalendorsement o some orm o physicalism that constitutes the main obstacleto a reconciliation. It is not as i matters would improve i naturalism opted or

some version o emergentism or property dualism. Te real problem has to dowith naturalism’s commitment to metaphysical realism, and with its treatmento consciousness as a mere object in the world.

Much o the recent discussion o these issues has taken place in the borderarea between phenomenology, cognitive science and analytic philosophy omind. Recently, however, a new discussion partner has appeared on the scene.One that very much wants to get non-human nature back on stage, whose rela-

tion to naturalism is complicated, and whose attitude towards phenomenology

can only be described as deeply hostile. Tis new partner, called speculative

realism, is heralded (by its proponents) as one o the most exciting and prom-ising new currents in Continental philosophy.

1. The end of phenomenology

In a recent book entitled Te End o Phenomenology , Sparrow offers an overview

o speculative realism and highlights its relation to phenomenology. Sparrow’sown explanation o his title is twoold. On the one hand, he argues that the rise

o speculative realism brings phenomenology to a close. Why is that? Becausespeculative realism delivers what phenomenology always promised, but neverprovided: a wholehearted endorsement o realism (Sparrow 2014, xi). On theother hand, however, Sparrow also argues that phenomenology never really got

started. It began and ended with Husserl. Since Husserl, according to Sparrow,was never able to settle on what phenomenology should become ‘it is not clearthat it ever was anything at all’ (Sparrow 2014, xi). In act, the case could be‘made that phenomenology never really existed’ (2014, 204), since no proponent

o phenomenology has ever been able to ‘adequately clariy its method, scope,and metaphysical commitments’ (Sparrow 2014, xiii). Tat many sel-declared

phenomenologists have ailed to realize this merely attests to the act that theyare a kind o living dead. Sparrow (2014, 187) even goes so ar as to suggestthat phenomenology is a orm o zombie philosophy , ‘extremely active, but atthe same time lacking philosophical vitality and methodologically hollow’.

Te harshness o Sparrow’s rhetoric is reminiscent o the work by omRockmore, whom Sparrow ofen quotes as a source o authority. In his bookKant and Phenomenology , or instance, Rockmore maintains that Husserl never

managed to make it clear precisely what he meant by phenomenology; that hewas unable to clariy his basic account o the relationship between phenom-enology and epistemology; that he repeatedly ailed to address his own ques-tions, and ofen just obscured the issues at stake. Tus, or Rockmore, Husserl’s

methodology, as well as most o his central concepts, including notions such

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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES 291

as intuition, essence, representation, constitution, noesis, noema and phenom-enological reduction, remain undamentally obscure (Rockmore 2011, 116, 127, 131, etc.).

Sparrow’s own interpretation is as tendentious as Rockmore’s.1 o select just

one example among many, consider Sparrow’s (2014, 48) claim that Merleau-Ponty in Phenomenology o Perception ‘affirms that yes, phenomenology isimpossible’. How does Sparrow reach such a conclusion? In his preace toPhenomenology o Perception, Merleau-Ponty characterizes phenomenologyas a perpetual critical (sel-)reflection. It should not take anything or granted,least o all itsel. It is, to put it differently, a constant meditation (Merleau-Ponty 2012, lxxxv). Merleau-Ponty’s point is that phenomenology is alwayson the way, but Sparrow equates this anti-dogmatic attitude with the view thatphenomenology can never get started. In addition, Sparrow also takes issuewith Merleau-Ponty’s (2012, lxxvii) amous assertion that ‘the most importantlesson o the reduction is the impossibility o a complete reduction’, and inter-prets it as amounting to the claim that the reduction is a methodological stepthat cannot be undertaken (Sparrow 2014, 48). I the reduction is crucial tophenomenology – as some would insist – it would again show that phenome-nology is impossible. As a closer engagement with the text will show, however,this is not what Merleau-Ponty is saying. Te reduction is a orm o reflectivemove (see Zahavi 2015), and Merleau-Ponty’s point is rather that we as finite

creatures are incapable o effectuating an absolute reflection that once and orall would allow us to cut our ties to our world-immersed lie and permit us tosurvey it rom a view rom nowhere. Even the most radical reflection dependsupon and is linked to an unreflected lie that, as Merleau-Ponty (2012, lxxviii)puts it, remains its initial, constant, and final situation. o say that the reduction

cannot be completed is not to say that it cannot be carried out. Afer all, it isonly by distancing ourselves, i ever so slightly, rom our world-immersed liethat we can describe it. It is only by slacking them slightly, that we can make the

intentional threads that connect us to the world visible (Merleau-Ponty 2012,lxxvii). But this procedure is something that has to be perormed repeatedly,rather than completed once and or all. o that extent, Merleau-Ponty’s remarks

about the unfinished character o phenomenology and about the incompletereduction are two ways o making the same point. None o this entails thatMerleau-Ponty should affirm that phenomenology or the reduction is impos-sible, which, o course, is also why he can insist that Heidegger’s analysis obeing-in-the-world presupposes the reduction (Merleau-Ponty 2012, lxxviii).

Sparrow’s misinterpretation o Merleau-Ponty aside, his main criticism is

obviously directed at what he takes to be the ambiguities o the phenome-nological method. Husserl’s inability to come up with a definite account ohis own method, the act that he never bequeathed us with something likeDescartes’s Regulae ad directionem ingenii is, according to Sparrow, a atal viceand weakness, since it entails that it is entirely unclear how phenomenology

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292 D. ZAHAVI

is supposed to be carried out (Sparrow 2014, 5–6). Tat subsequent phenom-enologists have rebelled against Husserl’s methodological requirements onlymakes matters even worse. Tere is or Sparrow no consensus, and no criteria,that will allow us to differentiate what is phenomenological, rom what is not

(Sparrow 2014, 3–4, 10).2

At this point, Sparrow starts to vacillate between three different positions.Te first is the one just mentioned, namely that phenomenology has no method

and stable identity. Te second is that phenomenology is indeed unified by itscommitment to a transcendental method: As he writes,

or a philosophical description, study, or conclusion to count as phenomenolog-ical – that is, to mark it as something other than everyday description, empiricalstudy, or speculative metaphysics – that description must take place rom withinsome orm o methodological reduction that shifs the ocus o description to

the transcendental, or at least quasi-transcendental, level. (Sparrow, 2014, 14)

According to Sparrow, however, the price or this methodologically uniyingtranscendental commitment is too high: it entails that phenomenology hasto abandon and prohibit metaphysics. But i that is the case, phenomenologycannot offer or provide a deence o ull blown metaphysical realism, or asSparrow (2014, 13) puts it: ‘when this book proclaims the end o phenomenol-ogy, it means that phenomenology as a method or realists has worn itsel out.’

Afer having argued at length that the execution o the epoché and tran-

scendental reduction prevents phenomenology rom making any judgmentsregarding the existence o things, or which reason phenomenology has toremain metaphysically neutral or agnostic, Sparrow (2014, 26) makes his finalmove and claims that phenomenology cannot remain neutral, but that it ulti-mately must align itsel with a orm o antirealism or idealism. It is not clearhow Sparrow can reconcile the claim that phenomenology has no method, that

it has a transcendental method that prohibits metaphysical commitments, andthat its method commits it to idealism, but given his general interpretationaltactics, it cannot wonder that he aults the phenomenologists (rather than hisown interpretation) or the inconsistency (see Sparrow 2014, 31, 80).

Let me not spend more time on Sparrow’s interpretation and accusations.His main conclusion and objection is that phenomenology cannot yield meta-physical realism. Despite its promise o returning us to the ‘things themselves’it keeps us chained to the phenomenal. o that extent, phenomenology remains

committed to a orm o Kantianism, rather than providing a real realist alterna-

tive (Sparrow 2014, 1). I we want to get out o ‘Kant’s shadow’ we shouldn’t turn

to phenomenology, but to speculative realism, since only ‘speculative realism

returns us to the real without qualification and without twisting the meaningo realism’ (Sparrow 2014, xii).

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2. Speculative realism

What is speculative realism? It takes its name rom a conerence held atGoldsmiths College, University o London, in April 2007. Te conerence ea-tured presentations by Ray Brassier, Iain Hamilton Grant, Graham Harman,and Quentin Meillassoux (Brassier et al. 2007). As quickly became apparent,these our protagonists diverged rather significantly when it came to their own

positive proposals. Teir philosophical progenitors included so diverse figuresas Whitehead, Latour, Heidegger, Churchland, Metzinger, Sellars, Nietzsche,Levinas, Badiou and Schelling, but they were united by what they opposed.Tey all had one common enemy: Correlationism.

Correlationism is the view that subjectivity and objectivity cannot be under-

stood or analysed apart rom one another because both are always already

intertwined or internally related. It is the view that we only ever have accessto the correlation between thinking (theory) and being (reality) and never toeither in isolation rom or independently o the other. On this view, thoughtcannot get outside itsel in order to compare the world as it is ‘in itsel’ withthe world as it is ‘or us’. Indeed, we can neither think nor grasp the ‘in itsel’in isolation rom its relation to the subject, nor can we ever grasp a subject thatwould not always-already be related to an object.3

It was allegedly Kant who introduced this type o philosophy.4 Prior toKant, one o the principal tasks o philosophy was to comprehend the universe,

whereas since Kant, its primary ocus and locus has been the correlationistcircle. Rather than engaging in straightorward metaphysics, the effort has inturn been devoted to investigations o intentional correlations, language games,

conceptual schemes, and discourses.Te speculative realists are unequivocal in their criticism o this develop-

ment, which is described as the ‘Kantian catastrophe’ (Meillassoux 2008, 124)that enduringly has ‘poisoned philosophy’ (Badiou 2009, 535). Teir hostilitytowards phenomenology is partially explained by the act that it very much is a

tradition ‘that seeps rom the rot o Kant’ (Bogost 2012, 4). Tat phenomenologyis indeed a orm o correlationism is easy to illustrate:

Te first breakthrough o this universal a priori o correlation between expe-rienced object and manners o givenness (which occurred during work on myLogical Investigations around 1898) affected me so deeply that my whole subse-quent lie-work has been dominated by the task o systematically elaborating onthis a priori o correlation. (Husserl 1970, 166)

Te genuine transcendental epoché makes possible the ‘transcendental reduc-tion’ – the discovery and investigation o the transcendental correlation between

world and world-consciousness. (Husserl 1970, 151)[O]ne must not let onesel be deceived by speaking o the physical thing as tran-scending consciousness or as ‘existing in itsel’ […] An object existing in itselis never one with which consciousness or the Ego pertaining to consciousness hasnothing to do. (Husserl 1982, 106)

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294 D. ZAHAVI

World exists – that is, it is – only i Dasein exists, only i there is Dasein. Only iworld is there, i Dasein exists as being-in-the-world, is there understanding obeing, and only i this understanding exists are intraworldly beings unveiled asextant and handy. World-understanding as Dasein-understanding is sel-under-standing. Sel and world belong together in the single entity, the Dasein. Sel and

world are not two beings, like subject and object, or like I and thou, but sel andworld are the basic determination o the Dasein itsel in the unity o the structureo being-in-the-world. (Heidegger 1982, 297)

Te world is inseparable rom the subject, but rom a subject who is nothing buta project o the world; and the subject is inseparable rom the world, but roma world that it itsel projects. Te subject is being-in-the-world and the worldremains ‘subjective,’ since its texture and its articulations are sketched out by thesubject’s movement o transcendence. (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 454)

Speculative realist, by contrast, insist that the ‘world in itsel – the world as it

exists apart rom us – cannot in any way be contained or constrained by thequestion o our access to it’ (Shaviro 2011, 2). Teir aim is to break out o the cor-

relationist circle, and once more reach ‘the great outdoors, the absolute outsideo pre-critical thinkers: that outside which was not relative to us […] existing in

itsel regardless o whether we are thinking o it or not’ (Meillassoux 2008, 7).Kant warned us ‘never to venture with speculative reason beyond the bound-

aries o experience’ (Kant 1998, B xxiv). Te speculative realists by contrast urge

us to do exactly that: ‘Pace Kant, we must think outside o our own thought;

and we must positively conceive the existence o things outside our own con-ceptions o them’ (Shaviro 2011, 2). Indeed, on Sparrow’s (2014, 22) view, onlyspeculative realism offers ‘the kind o speculation required or grounding real-ism in philosophical argument’. Although Sparrow does not explain why onlyspeculation should be able to ground realism philosophically, let us ollow hissuggestion and see where these speculations lead us.

According to Graham Harman, the only way to reverse Kant’s human-world

duopoly and the anthropocentric bias o phenomenology is by opting or equal-

ity. Te human-world relation is just a special case o the relation between any

two entities whatsoever, or as Harman and Bogost phrase it:All relations in the cosmos, whether it be the perceptual clearing between humansand world, the corrosive effect o acid on lime stone, or a slap-fight betweenorangutans in Borneo, are on precisely the same philosophical ooting. (Harman2005, 75)

[]here is no reason to believe that the entanglement in which a noodle findsitsel is any less complex than the human who shapes, boils, vends, consumes,or digests it. (Bogost 2012, 30)

At first sight, the claim that causal relations between non-human objects areno different in kind rom subject-object relations (Harman 2011, 198) seemsrather amiliar. It is strongly reminiscent o various reductionist attempts tonaturalize intentionality, i.e. attempts to account or intentionality in terms onon-intentional mechanisms. But appearances are (in this case) misleading.

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When insisting on equality, the aim is not to reduce the mind (and its cognitive

and affective relation to the world) to mindless mechanics. No, i anything theaim seems the reverse, namely to finally recognize that all objects, includingfireplaces, lawnmowers or slices o rotting pork possess an inner infinity o

their own (Morton 2012, 132). Indeed, as Harman (2005, 104) insists, the realweakness o phenomenology has precisely been its ailure to capture the ‘“I” osailboats and moons’. Phenomenology has been too restrictive, and has ailed to

recognize that it is entirely appropriate to ask ‘What’s it like to be a computer,or a microprocessor, or a ribbon cable? […] What do they experience? What’stheir proper phenomenology? In short, what is it like to be a thing?’ (Bogost2012, 9–10).

Pan- or (as Harman preers to label it) polypsychism emerges, on his view,‘directly rom the rejection o the Kantian Revolution’ (Harman 2011, 170).One might wonder how direct and necessary that link is. On closer considera-tion, however, one might also wonder whether such a move really underminescorrelationism, or whether it rather supports and expands it. Such worriesalso seem to have troubled Harman since he in other publications has arguedthat panpsychism and human exceptionalism share a common eature: theidea that the psyche is one o the key building blocks in the universe (Harman2005, 220). Tis is the undamental assumption that has to be rejected. Teremight indeed be a difference between humans and minerals, but there is also

a difference between the hum o a rerigerator and a bucket o yellow paint,and ultimately we just have to ace up to the act that consciousness is simplyone type o object among many others. Tere is no reason to prioritize it. Ianything has to be prioritized, it is sincerity . As Harman (2005, 220) writes,‘[R]ocks and dust must be every bit as sincere as humans, parrots or killerwhales’. Some readers will undoubtedly be puzzled by now. But there is morepuzzlement in store or us. As Harman (2008, 334) also declares, ‘philosophy’ssole mission is weird realism. Philosophy must be realist because its mandateis to unlock the structure o the world itsel; it must be weird because reality isweird’. Indeed, one reason to be dissatisfied with Husserl is that he is ‘neitherweird, nor a realist, and even looks like the opposite: a “non-weird antirealist”’(Harman 2008, 348).5

Despite his criticism o correlationist subjectivism, Harman is no riend onaturalist objectivism. In act, on his account, scientific naturalism is itsel aorm o correlationism. It is merely yet another attempt to squeeze and con-orm reality to our (current scientific) mindset: ‘Te thing as portrayed by thenatural sciences is the thing made dependent on our knowledge, and not the

thing in its untamed, subterranean reality’ (Harman 2011, 80). But i sciencedoesn’t reveal or disclose the mind-independent uncorrelated objects, how dowe then gain access or knowledge about them? We do not. We can only knowthe appearance o the thing and never its true being. On Harman’s account,the real objects, the things-in-themselves, orever remain inaccessible. As he

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296 D. ZAHAVI

remarks polemically against Heidegger: ‘o use a hammer and to stare at itexplicitly are both distortions o the very reality o that hammer as it goesabout just being itsel, unleashed in the world like a wild animal’ (Harman2005, 74). Importantly, this inaccessibility o the in-itsel is not due to some

specific human cognitive flaw or incapacity, since Harman also holds the viewthat objects are hidden rom and inaccessible to each other. Te wind blowingon the banana, the hail hitting the tent, the rock colliding with the window,the flame consuming the cotton: in each case, the objects recede and withdrawrom each other (Harman 2005, 19). Everything is isolated rom everythingelse; nothing is ever in direct contact with anything else. Tis principle holdsnot only on the inter-objective level, but even on the intra-objective level: anobject also withdraws rom and has no direct contact with its constituent parts(Harman 2005, 94, 172).

Harman criticizes phenomenology or its alleged anti-realism and arguesthat it chains us to the phenomenal. Whatever merit there is to this criticism,it certainly seems like a rather fitting description o his own position. Harman’s

ervent endorsement o realism goes hand in hand with a radical global scepti-

cism that orever makes reality inaccessible to us. A act that has not preventedhim rom making various claims about the structure and nature o this inac-cessible realm.

Not all speculative realists share Harman’s scepticism, however. Some o

them have a ar more positive view o science. In Afer Finitude, or instance,Meillassoux argues that phenomenology because o its commitment to correla-

tionism is unable to accept the literal truth o scientific statements concerningevents happening prior to the emergence o consciousness. When aced witha statement like ‘Te accretion o the Earth happened 4.56 billion years ago’,phenomenology is orced to adopt a two-layered approach. It has to insist onthe difference between the immediate, realist, meaning o the statement, and amore proound, transcendental, interpretation o it. It can accept the truth o the

statement, but only by adding the codicil that it is true ‘or us’. Meillassoux finds

this move unacceptable and claims that it is dangerously close to the position o

creationists (Meillassoux 2008, 18, c. Brassier 2007, 62). He insists that fidelity

to science demands that we take scientific statements at ace value and that wereject correlationism. No compromise is possible. Either scientific statementshave a literal realist sense and only a realist sense or they have no sense at all(Meillassoux 2008, 17).6 o put it differently, science gives us access to a realitythat cannot be contained in or captured by any correlationist ramework. More

specifically, Meillassoux endorses a kind o Cartesian rationalism and rehabili-

tates the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Te ormer aremathematically graspable eatures o the things-in-themselves. Mathematics is

consequently able to describe a world where humanity is absent; it can describe

the great outdoors; it can give us absolute knowledge rom a view rom nowhere

(Meillassoux 2008, 26). In the course o his argumentation, Meillassoux also

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deends the view, however, that everything is without reason and thereorecapable o becoming otherwise without reason. Meillassoux (2008, 53) takesthis ultimate absence o reason to be an absolute ontological property, anddescribes it as ‘an extreme orm o chaos, a hyper -Chaos, or which nothing is

or would seem to be, impossible, not even the unthinkable’ (2008, 64). As headmits himsel, it is quite a task to reconcile this view, which maintains that the

laws o nature can change at any time or no reason whatsoever (2008, 83), with

an attempt to secure the scientific discourse and the idea that mathematical sci-

ence can describe the in-itsel and permit knowledge o the ancestral (2008, 65).

An even more extreme orm o anti-correlationist scientism can be ound in

the work o Brassier. On his account, the ultimate aim and true consummation

o the Enlightenment project is a radical demolishment o the maniest image(Brassier 2007, 26). Brassier consequently lauds Churchland’s eliminativistcriticism o Folk Psychology, and sees speculative realism as a metaphysicalradicalization o eliminativism (Brassier 2007, 31); a radicalization that ulti-mately leads to nihilism:

Nihilism is the unavoidable corollary o the realist conviction that there is amind-independent reality, which, despite the presumptions o human narcissism,is indifferent to our existence and oblivious to the ‘values’ and ‘meanings’ whichwe would drape over it in order to make it more hospitable. (Brassier 2007, xi)

Te world as it is in itsel is inherently devoid o intelligibility and meaning.

o realize this, to realize the senselessness and purposelessness o everythingis a mark o intellectual maturity (Brassier 2007, xi, 238). Tis realization hasalso implications or our assessment o the value o philosophical thinking.As Brassier concludes Nihil Unbound : ‘[P]hilosophy is neither a medium oaffirmation nor a source o justification, but rather the organon o extinction’(Brassier 2007, 239). One inevitable wonders how such a verdict affects theassessment o Brassier’s own philosophy, just as one might wonder whetherone can consistently celebrate the virtue o intellectual maturity at the sametime as one denies the reality o sense, meaning, intelligibility and purpose.

3. Forms of realism

How atal is this criticism o phenomenology? How much o a threat to phe-nomenology does it constitute? Let us or a moment return to Harman, andconsider another statement o his:

We have seen that one o the worst effects o phenomenology was to cement thenotion that the dispute between realism and anti-realism is a ‘pseudo-problem.’

Since intentionality is always directed toward something outside itsel, perceivingor hating some object, phenomenology supposedly gives us all the realism we willever need, and without alling into the ‘naïve’ realism that posits entities beyondall possible perception. Te problem is that the objects o intentionality are by nomeans real, as proven by the act that we hate, love, or ear many things that turnout not to exist in the least. By confining itsel to sensual objects and leaving no

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298 D. ZAHAVI

room or real ones, phenomenology is idealist to the core, and cannot get awaywith dismissing as a ‘pseudo-problem’ a difficulty that happens to threaten itsown views about the world. (Harman 2011, 197)

Tis criticism is unconvincing. It is an obvious non sequitur to argue that sincesome objects o intentionality are non-existing, all objects o intentionality arenon-existing (or unreal). Furthermore, already in Logische Untersuchungen Husserl rejected any acile distinction between intentional objects (whichHarman terms sensual objects) and real objects, and argued that

the intentional object o a presentation is the same as its actual object, and onoccasion as its external object, and that it is absurd to distinguish between them .Te transcendent object would not be the object o this presentation, i it was notits intentional object. Tis is plainly a merely analytic proposition. Te object othe presentation, o the ‘intention’, is and means what is presented, the intentionalobject. (Husserl 2001, 127)

Tis is not to say that all intentional objects are real, but only that i the intended

object really exists, then it is this real object, and no other, which is our inten-tional object. In other words, or Husserl the distinction to keep unto is not the

one between the intentional object and the real object, but the one between the

merely intentional object, and the real and intentional object:

‘Te object is merely intentional’ does not, o course, mean that it exists, butonly in an intention, o which it is a real (reelles) part, or that some shadow o itexists. It means rather that the intention, the reerence to an object so qualified,

exists, but not that the object does. I the intentional object exists, the intention,the reerence, does not exist alone, but the thing reerred to exists also. (Husserl2001, 127)

What about Harman’s claim that the recurrent attempt by phenomenology todismiss the dispute between realism and anti-realism as a pseudo-problem isdisingenuous, since phenomenology is idealist to its core? Tis claim is notmerely quite controversial; it is also historically incorrect. Whereas it is truethat some phenomenologists have suggested that one should stay clear o therealism/anti-realism (idealism) controversy, it is certainly not a position shared

by all. Husserl ofen expressed his commitment to a orm o idealism – thoughthe precise nature and character o this idealism remains contested. Whetherit amounts to a metaphysical idealism or whether it is compatible with a ormo realism is debated in the scholarly literature (Zahavi 2008, 2010b). Moreimportantly, however, many early phenomenologists (including members othe Munich and Göttingen circles o phenomenology, i.e. figures like Reinach,Pänder, Scheler, Stein, Geiger, Hildebrand and Ingarden) were committed real-

ists who were quite disappointed by what they saw as Husserl’s turn towards

transcendental idealism. Tey considered this turn a betrayal o the realistthrust o phenomenology and very much saw themselves as deending real-ism (Smith 1997). Finally, to mention one urther example, Heidegger is ofenportrayed by the speculative realists as an even more fierce idealist and corre-lationist than Husserl (see Sparrow 2014, 36). Tis characterization, however,

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is by no means univocally accepted by Heidegger scholars. Many see him as arealist (Dreyus and Spinosa 1999; Carman 2003). Tere are even those whointerpret him as a scientific realist (Glazebrook 2001). Recently, even Husserlhas been interpreted along similar lines. In his 2014 book Nature’s Suit: Husserl’s

Phenomenological Philosophy o the Physical Sciences, Hardy deends the viewthat Husserl’s transcendental idealism and his claims concerning the depend-ence o physical objects on consciousness must be understood within a jus-tification-theoretic context and is wholly compatible with scientific realism(Hardy 2014, 201).

Matters are in short ar more complex than suggested by the speculativecritics, and ultimately one has to wonder whether they are reliable and knowl-edgeable interpreters o the tradition they are criticizing.7

But back to the main issue, the criticism o correlationism and the artic-ulation and deense o robust realism. Te speculative realists are certainlyright in their assessment o how widespread correlationism is. It has indeedbeen ‘the reigning doxa o post-metaphysical philosophy’ (Brassier 2007, 50),and although Husserl (1970, 165) in Krisis claims to have been the first toinvestigate the correlation philosophically, correlationism cannot be dismissed

as a Husserlian idiosyncrasy. o illustrate its presence also in recent analyticphilosophy, consider the case o Putnam.8

Putnam is known as a(n occasional) critic o metaphysical realism and has at

one point conceived o his own alternative – which he in turn labelled ‘internalrealism’, ‘natural realism’, ‘pragmatic realism’ or ‘commonsense realism’ – as anattempt to find a third way beyond classical realism and subjective idealism,and between ‘reactionary metaphysics and irresponsible relativism’ (Putnam1999, 5).

According to metaphysical realism, there is a clear distinction to be drawnbetween the properties things have ‘in themselves’ and the properties that are‘projected by us’ (Putnam 1990, 13). One can illustrate this way o thinking byway o the ollowing metaphor: Whereas reality as it is in itsel, independentlyo us, can be compared to a dough, our conceptual contribution can be com-pared to the shape o a cookie cutter. Te world itsel is fixed and stable, butwe can conceive o it in different ways. But as Putnam insists, this view suffersrom an intolerable naiveté:

What the Cookie Cutter Metaphor tries to preserve is the naive idea that at leastone Category – the ancient category o Object or Substance – has an absoluteinterpretation. Te alternative to this idea is not the view that, in some incon-ceivable way, it’s all just language. We can and should insist that some acts arethere to be discovered and not legislated by us. But this is something to be saidwhen one has adopted a way o speaking, a language, a ‘conceptual scheme.’ otalk o ‘acts’ without speciying the language to be used is to talk o nothing; theword ‘act’ no more has its use fixed by Reality Itsel than does the word ‘exist’ orthe word ‘object’. (Putnam 1987, 36)

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300 D. ZAHAVI

Tus, according to Putnam (1992, 120), it is an illusion to think that the notions

o ‘object’ or ‘reality’ or ‘world’ have any sense outside o and independently oour conceptual schemes. Putnam is not denying that there are ‘external acts’; he

even thinks that we can say what they are. But as he writes, ‘what we cannot say –

because it makes no sense – is what the acts are independent o all conceptualchoices’ (Putnam 1987, 33). Tis is not to say that our conceptual schemes create

the world, but they do not just mirror it either (Putnam 1978, 1). Ultimately,what we call ‘reality’ is so deeply suffused with mind- and language-dependent

structures that it is altogether impossible to make a neat distinction betweenthose parts o our belies that reflect the world ‘in itsel ’ and those parts o ourbelies that simply expresses ‘our conceptual contribution’. Te very idea thatour cognition should be nothing but a re-presentation o something mind-independent consequently has to be abandoned (Putnam 1990, 28).

Given this outlook, it cannot surprise that Putnam is sceptical when met-aphysical realists insist that there is a gap between epistemological and onto-logical issues, and when they deny that epistemological distinctions have anyontological implications. As Putnam (1988, 120) retorts, the ‘epistemological’and the ‘ontological’ are intimately related, and any serious philosophical work

must respect their interconnection.In his discussion o these issues, Putnam sometimes accuses scientific real-

ists o not being sufficiently realist. Occasionally the claim is being made that

science is the sole legitimate source o empirical knowledge. Tereby a certaintheoretical outlook is made the measure o what counts as real, and the existence

o everyday objects and events such as tables, marriages, economic crises, andcivil wars are denied, with the argument that none o them figures in the world

as described by physics (Putnam 1987, 12). Although scientific realism was once

heralded as a strong antidote against idealism and scepticism, Putnam conse-quently argues that it has joined orces with what it was supposed to combat.

When Putnam insists that the metaphysical realists do not take realismsufficiently seriously, and when he argues that it is the philosophers tradi-tionally accused o idealism, namely the Kantians, the Pragmatists, and thePhenomenologists, who actually respect and honour our natural realism(Putnam 1987, 12), he is ollowing in the ootsteps o Husserl. As Husserldeclared in a amous letter to Émile Baudin: ‘No ordinary “realist” has everbeen so realistic and so concrete as I, the phenomenological “idealist”’ (Husserl

1994, 16).Although the main speculative criticism o phenomenology concerns its

alleged ailure to be sufficiently realist, although Sparrow (2014, xii) insists that

speculative realism ‘returns us to the real without qualification and withouttwisting the meaning o realism’, it should by now be obvious that the realismon offer is o a rather peculiar kind. Harman deends a radical scepticism thatdenies us any glimpse o reality (while making various claims about the char-acter o this ungraspable reality-in-itsel), and whereas Meillassoux seeks to

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reconcile an old-style rationalism according to which only that which is amena-

ble to mathematization counts as real with the idea that chaos is the primaryabsolute, Brassier opts or a nihilist eliminativism. How robustly realist arethese divergent positions? I realism is about affirming the reality o everyday

objects, the speculative realists ail miserably.Husserl was in part led by similar considerations as Putnam. It was in order

to ward off scepticism, it was in order to save the objectivity o the world that we

know, that Husserl embraced transcendental idealism and insisted that realityinvolves a necessary intertwining o subject and object. Tus not unlike Kant,Husserl did not merely think that transcendental idealism and empirical realism

are compatible; he thought that the latter required the ormer. By developing asophisticated non-representationalist theory o intentionality, Husserl soughtto rule out the possibility o a gap between the world that we investigate andthe real world, thereby allowing global scepticism no purchase. In deendingsuch a view, it is again important to realize that Husserl isn’t a lone and lateexcrescence o German Idealism. Tere are striking parallels to views also ound

in analytic philosophy. As Davidson declares in ‘Te Structure and Content oruth’, realism – understood as the position that truth is ‘radically non-epis-temic’ and that all our best researched and established belies and theories may

be alse – is a view he considers incomprehensible (Davidson 1990, 308–309).As he would later write in Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective: ‘A community o

minds is the basis o knowledge; it provides the measure o all things. It makesno sense to question the adequacy o this measure, or to seek a more ultimatestandard’ (Davidson 2001, 218).9

It might be tempting to accuse the correlationists o committing hubris, bydefining reality in terms o what we can have access to. But as Braver (2012,261–62) has pointed out, one might also reverse this particular criticism. Notonly do the speculative realists make claims about that which transcends us, but

they (at least some o them) are also the ones who aspire to absolute knowledge.

It is no coincidence that Meillassoux’s book is called Afer Finitude. By contrast,

correlationism might be a way o acknowledging the finite and perspectivalcharacter o our knowledge.

4. The end of speculative realism

Given the hostility towards and proclaimed showdown with phenomenology,one might have expected more in terms o scholarly engagement with thetradition. As already mentioned, there are serious problems with the critical

interpretation being offered and it alls short o the best work done by scholarso Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty etc. One o the utterly puzzling eatureso the criticism is the ollowing. Te main point o contention is the allegedidealist or anti-realist orientation o phenomenology. Because o this metaphys-

ical commitment, phenomenology has come to an end. But the allacy o this

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302 D. ZAHAVI

argument should be obvious. Even i some o the phenomenologists did indeed

contribute to the realism-idealism debate, even i some o their analyses, inparticular those pertaining to the very status o the phenomenon or to the scope

o transcendental phenomenology, bear directly on this issue, it is certainly not

as i phenomenologists were exclusively concerned with this issue. What abouttheir investigations o intentionality, experience, emotions, sel-consciousness,

perception, imagination, social cognition, action, embodiment, truth, tem-porality, ethics, community, historicity, etc.? What about the ruitul interac-tion that is currently taken place between phenomenology and the (cognitive)sciences? What about the influence the phenomenological analyses have hadon such disciplines as psychiatry, architecture, education, sports science, psy-chology, nursing, comparative literature, anthropology, sociology etc? o what

extent are these analyses or contributions dependent upon phenomenology’stranscendental commitment? o what extent are they undermined by specu-lative realism’s attack on correlationism? o what extent is speculative realismin a position to offer its own more convincing analyses?

But – the critics might retort – even i speculative realism might lack theability to do the latter, you are just sidetracking the issue. You are not respond-ing to the ancestrality objection. Is correlationism really incompatible with the

findings o science? Does an endorsement o the ormer make certain inter-pretations o scientific findings nonsensical? And i yes, is that not a reductio

ad absurdum o correlationism? Tis would undoubtedly be the view o somescientists. As Hawking and Mlodinow put it in their book Te Grand Design:

New Answers to the Ultimate Questions o Lie: ‘Philosophy is dead’ (Hawkingand Mlodinow 2010, 5). I doubt many philosophers would endorse this verdict,

but ultimately we need to ask whether science ought to be the final arbiter odeep philosophical questions.10 Is it appropriate to dismiss Kant’s Kritik der

reinen Vernunf (or Husserl’s Ideen I ) by appealing to the findings o astrophysics

and evolutionary history (Brassier 2001, 28), or does such a ‘reutation’ merelytestiy to a conflation o levels and categories? Although I veer towards the latter

view, my aim is not to settle this issue here. My point is rather that regardlesso which choice one makes, it will leave the speculative realists in an uncom-ortable bind. I they simply deer to the authority o science, their criticismo phenomenology (and any other kind o correlationism) is not only berefo philosophical import, it also lacks novelty. I they do not take that route,they lose one o their supposedly weightiest arguments, and will then have tobuttress their criticism with proper philosophical arguments, or instance argu-

ments taken rom philosophy o science. But as Wiltsche has recently pointed

out in a critical discussion o Meillassoux’ work, the latter’s treatment o andengagement with philosophy o science is astonishingly sparse (Wiltsche under

review). In Afer Finitude, Meillassoux seems to take it or granted that scien-tific realism is the only available option. Tat, however, is hardly correct (oran inormative overview see Chakravartty 2011). Furthermore, most standard

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textbooks in philosophy o science contain more arguments or – and against– scientific realism than Afer Finitude (see Sankey, 2008).

o put it differently, speculative realism’s most substantial challenge to phe-nomenology is an old hat, and can be ound in more potent orm in analytic

philosophy. Russell (1959, 213) held the view that philosophers should strivetowards becoming undistorting mirrors o the world, and claimed that resultsrom astronomy and geology could reute Kant and Hegel by showing that themind is o a recent date and that the processes o stellar evolution proceededaccording to laws in which mind plays no part (1959, 16). I tempted by elimi-nativism, one can simply read the Churchlands, Metzinger, or Alex Rosenberg.

It is harder to find an analytic counterpart to Harman’s weird realism, but thatis less surprising, and might also – depending on one’s philosophical inclina-tions – be a good thing.

Let me try to take stock. Te allegedly devastating criticism that speculativerealism directs at phenomenology is flawed in various ways.

• It is too superficial: it misinterprets the classical texts and ails to engagesufficiently with relevant scholarship in the area

• It is too simplistic: it misses out on important differences internal to phe-nomenology, such as the difference between early realist phenomenology

and the transcendental idealism o Husserl, and claims to be able to assess

the value and significance o phenomenological analyses tout court bycriticizing what phenomenology has to say, or not to say, on the topic ometaphysics.

• It lacks novelty: the central objections have already previously beenraised by (some) phenomenologists, analytic philosophers, and empir-ical scientists.

My ocus has primarily been on the negative or critical contribution o spec-

ulative realism. Let me conclude with a ew remarks concerning its positivecontribution, with the obvious proviso that a definitive verdict would have toawait (somebody else’s) more exhaustive and thorough treatment and analysis:

• Its realist credentials are somewhat questionable, ranging rom Harman’sscepticism (with its paradoxical revival o something akin to Kant’s nou-menal realm) to Brassier’s radical nihilism. It is an open question whether

any o these positions are coherent.• It is epistemologically underdetermined. Even when rejecting Putnam’s

(and the phenomenologists’) claim that the ontological and the epistemo-

logical are deeply interconnected, many scientific realists would considerit o paramount importance to explain how human cognition can giverise to genuine knowledge o a mind-independent reality: how is knowl-edge possible? Te phenomenologists likewise were led to their viewsregarding the status o reality through a ocused exploration and analysis

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304 D. ZAHAVI

o intentionality. Te speculative realists, by contrast, do not really offermuch in terms o a theory o knowledge that could justiy their meta-physical claims.

• Given the significant divergence between the positive views o Harman,

Meillassoux and Brassier, one might finally wonder whether it at all makessense to employ the collective label speculative realism. Sparrow obviously

thinks so, although he does admit that the deenders o speculative realism

do not actually share a critical method (Sparrow 2014, 19). ‘What thenlegitimates its speculative claims?’ (Sparrow 2014, 19). Te answer givenby Sparrow is as brie as it is unsatisactory. He writes that the speculativerealists share ‘a set o commitments’, including a ‘commitment to spec-ulation’ (Sparrow 2014, 19). But this merely restates the problem. Whatis the justification or the various (outlandish) claims being made? Howshould we distinguish speculation rom ree phantasy? A question thatis particularly pressing when reading Harman. As Sparrow (2014, 20)continues, to different degrees the speculative realists are committed to‘a blending o fiction and act’, they have ‘a taste or the weird, the strange,the uncanny’, and their aim ‘is to clear the ground or new advances inthe thinking o reality. Tis is, afer all, the end o philosophy’ (Sparrow2014, 20). Perhaps speculative realism does indeed constitute the endo philosophy, or perhaps it has merely reached its own dead-end. I so,

Sparrow’s unounded verdict on phenomenology would turn out to be animpressively accurate assessment o speculative realism: It never really got

started and it is not clear that it ever was anything at all. Tis also seemsto be a conclusion eventually reached by Brassier:

Te ‘speculative realist movement’ exists only in the imaginations o a groupo bloggers promoting an agenda or which I have no sympathy whatsoever:actor-network theory spiced with pan-psychist metaphysics and morsels oprocess philosophy. I don’t believe the Internet is an appropriate medium orserious philosophical debate; nor do I believe it is acceptable to try to concoct aphilosophical movement online by using blogs to exploit the misguided enthu-siasm o impressionable graduate students. I agree with Deleuze’s remark thatultimately the most basic task o philosophy is to impede stupidity, so I see littlephilosophical merit in a ‘movement’ whose most signal achievement thus aris to have generated an online orgy o stupidity. (Brassier and Rychter 2011)11

As or phenomenology, I think it currently finds itsel at a crossroad. It contin-ues to remain a source o inspiration or other disciplines, and at least certaino its ideas have also been taken up by analytic philosophy and cognitive sci-

ence. At the same time, phenomenology remains under attack rom a varietyo different positions, including hard-nosed naturalism and neurocentrism,and afer the death o Henry, Levinas, and Derrida it is not clear who, i any,their natural successors are. It is not easy to identiy new thinkers who in equal

measures are innovating phenomenology. As shown by Te Oxord Handbook

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o Contemporary Phenomenology (Zahavi 2012b), what we rather find is a loto work being done in two directions: inward (and backward) and outward(and orward). On the one hand, we find a continuing engagement and con- versation with the ounding athers (and mothers). Te philosophical resources

and insights to be ound in Husserl’s, Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s workare evidently not yet exhausted. On the other hand, an increasing amounto dialogue is taking place between phenomenology and other philosophicaltradition and empirical disciplines.

It is hard to predict how many sel-avowed phenomenologists there will be100 years rom now. But I am quite confident that the basic insights ound inphenomenology will continue to appeal to and attract and inspire gifed think-

ers. In act, i there is any truth to phenomenology, it should be able to renewitsel, and continue to flourish in new orms and perhaps also under new names.

Notes

1 One o Rockmore’s (2011, 8) claims is that one should reject the ofen repeated‘myth’ that Husserl is the inventor o phenomenology and instead credit Kantas the first true phenomenologist. In act, Rockmore (2011, 210) even questionswhether Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty deserve being classified asphenomenologists. For a critical review o Rockmore’s book, see Zahavi 2012a.

2 On previous occasions, I have deended the coherency o Husserl’s transcendental

phenomenology (see Zahavi 1996, 2003, 2010b), just as I have also argued thatthere are a number o overarching concerns and common themes that unifies themajor figures o classical phenomenology (Zahavi 2007, 2008). I will not rehearsethese arguments here. When discussing the question o whether a philosophicaltradition is sufficiently unified to count as a tradition, it might, however, beunwise to adopt such rigid criteria that one ultimately risks proving just aboutany philosophical tradition out o existence. Were one to accept Sparrow’sapproach, it is hard to see how critical theory, hermeneutics, pragmatism oranalytic philosophy could survive. Indeed, i consensus concerning a fixed seto methodological tools is a necessary condition or the existence o a research

program, hardly any would exist. A somewhat similar remark holds true in thecase o individual figures. It is hard to point to any influential thinker in thehistory o philosophy whose work has not given rise to scholarly disagreementsand conflicting interpretations. A purist might insist that such disagreementsimply reveals that the thoughts o the philosopher under examination areundamentally conused and unclear, and that they thereore ought to be rejected.A contrasting and more sensible view would be that any philosophical workworth discussing decades and centuries later has a scope and depth to it thatallows or conflicting interpretations and that the continuing critical engagementwith the tradition is part o what philosophy is all about. Should one be so unwise

as to choose the first option, however, it should be obvious that one cannotthen single out a ew figures or condemnation, one should at the very least beconsistent, and then reject the whole lot: Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas,Descartes, Leibniz, Locke, Hume, Kant, Nietzsche, etc.

3 Although Meillassoux (2008, 5) is ofen credited with the coinage o the term,‘correlationism’ was in act used and defined much earlier. Here is Beck in 1928:

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306 D. ZAHAVI

‘“Korrelativismus” soll hier als erminus dienen zur Bezeichnung eines von Husserlund Dilthey erarbeiteten Standpunktes, der die alten Disjunktionen Idealismusoder Realismus, Subjektivismus oder Objektivismus, Immanenzphilosophie undPhänomenalismus oder Realphilosophie überwunden hat zugunsten der Tese:Weder existiert eine Welt an sich, unabhängig von einem Bewußtsein von ihr,

noch existiert bloß ein Bewußtsein, resp. Bewußtseinssubjekt und nur als desBewußtseins, resp. Subjekts bloßer Modus (Erlebnis, Funktion oder Inhalt) dieWelt. Und: weder erkennen wir die Welt, wie sie an sich, d. i. unabhängig vonunserem Bewußtsein ist, noch erkennen wir bloß eine Scheinwelt, jenseits dererdie eigentliche, wahre Welt an sich existierte. Die korrelativistische Gegentheselautet positiv: Bewußtsein und Welt, Subjekt und Objekt, Ich und Welt stehenselbst in einem derartigen korrelativen, d. i. sich gegenseitig bedingendenSeinszusammenhang, daß obige Disjunktionen überhaupt keinen Sinn haben’(Beck 1928, 611). I am indebted to Genki Uemura or this reerence.

4 Te act that Kant kept on to the idea o the thing-in-itsel was o course an

affront to the German Idealists, who saw it as an expression o Kant’s inabilityto carry through his own revolutionary project. Whereas Kant would claim thatthings outside o the correlation are nothing to us, Hegel would downgradethe ‘nothing to us’ to a ‘nothing at all’ (Braver 2007, 81). Whether Kant’s viewcommits him to a two-world theory is debated, however. For a recent rejectiono this idea, see Allais 2004.

5 Some o Harman’s ideas are reminiscent o ideas ound elsewhere, namely inphenomenology. Consider, or instance, Merleau-Ponty’s claim that idealism andconstructivism deprive the world o its transcendence. Had the ormer positionsbeen true, had the world really been a mere product o our constitution, the

world would have appeared in ull transparency, it would only have possessedthe meaning we ascribe to it, and would have had no hidden aspects. In truthhowever, the world is an infinite source o richness, it is mystery and a gif(Merleau-Ponty 2012, lxxv, lxxxv). Consider also Levinas’ claim that object-intentionality cannot provide us with an encounter with true otherness. WhenI study or utilize objects, I am constantly transorming the oreign and differentinto the amiliar and same, thereby making them lose their strangeness. Tis isalso why, according to Levinas, Husserlian phenomenology cannot accommodateand do justice to the transcendence o the other. Te other is exactly that whichcannot be conceptualized or categorized. Any attempt to grasp or know the

other necessarily domesticates and distorts what is ultimately an ineffable anduntotalizable exteriority (Levinas 1972). It is debatable whether Merleau-Ponty’scriticism o idealism is a criticism o Husserlian idealism, or whether it is rathertargeting Kant and French neo-Kantians like Brunschvicg. It is also a matter odispute whether Levinas’ criticism o Husserl is justified (see Overgaard 2003).In either case, however, it is important to realize that the criticism in questionis an internal criticism, it is a criticism pre-empted by and developed withinphenomenology.

6 Despite being sympathetic to Meillassoux’s criticism o correlationism, Brassierhas argued that the ormer’s ocus on ancestrality and on arch-ossils (materials

indicating the existence o events anterior to terrestrial lie) is unortunate.o ‘insist that it is only the ancestral dimension that transcends correlationalconstitution, is to imply that the emergence o consciousness marks some sorto undamental ontological rupture, shattering the autonomy and consistencyo reality, such that once consciousness has emerged on the scene, nothing canpursue an independent existence any more. Te danger is that in privileging

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the arche-ossil as sole paradigm o a mind-independent reality, Meillassoux isceding too much ground to the correlationism he wishes to destroy’ (Brassier2007, 60).

7 For an in-depth engagement with and criticism o Harman’s Heidegger-interpretation, see Wolendale 2014. For a more well-inormed, though in my

view still too uncharitable, critical reading o Husserl, see Sebold 2014.8 For a more extensive discussion o the relation between Putnam and Husserl,

see Zahavi 2004b.9 For more on the relation between Davidson and Husserl, see Zahavi and Satne

2016.10 In 1922, Moritz Schlick gave a talk where he argued that the general theory o

relativity had disconfirmed transcendental philosophy and vindicated empiricistphilosophy. Tis view has ound much resonance, but as Ryckman observesin Te Reign o Relativity: Philosophy in Physics 1915–1925, it happens to bequite incorrect. Te outstanding mathematician Hermann Weyl, who was

one o Einstein’s colleagues in Zürich, and who contributed decisively to theinterpretation and urther development o both the general theory o relativityand the field o quantum mechanics, did not only draw quite extensively onHusserl’s criticism o naturalism, but was also deeply influenced by Husserl’stranscendental idealism (Ryckman 2005, 6, 110). Another distinguished physicistheavily influenced by Husserl was the quantum theorist Fritz London (see French2002). Ultimately, one might wonder whether the decisive advances in theoreticalphysics at the beginning o the twentieth century really leave our standardconception o subjectivity, objectivity and knowledge untouched.

11 Brassier’s assessment points to an important aspect o speculative realism that I

have not been able to address: the specific sociological context o its emergenceand diffusion. What institutional establishment was it a reaction against, andwhy did it gain popularity at the time and in the way it did?

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict o interest was reported by the author.

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