the state of democratisation in zambia

This article was downloaded by: [Gebze Yuksek Teknoloji Enstitïsu ]On: 20 December 2014, At: 13:56Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number:1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street,London W1T 3JH, UK

Commonwealth &Comparative PoliticsPublication details, including instructions forauthors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fccp20

The state ofdemocratisation in ZambiaChisepo J.J. Mphaisha aa School of Government , University of theWestern Cape , South AfricaPublished online: 25 Mar 2008.

To cite this article: Chisepo J.J. Mphaisha (2000) The state of democratisationin Zambia, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 38:3, 131-146, DOI:10.1080/14662040008447829

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14662040008447829

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of allthe information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on ourplatform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensorsmake no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy,completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Anyopinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinionsand views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed byTaylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be reliedupon and should be independently verified with primary sources ofinformation. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses,actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages,and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fccp20

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/14662040008447829

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14662040008447829

or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the useof the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private studypurposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution,reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of accessand use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Geb

ze Y

ukse

k T

ekno

loji

Ens

titïs

u ]

at 1

3:56

20

Dec

embe

r 20

14

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

The State of Democratisation in Zambia

CHISEPO J.J. MPHAISHA

This article examines the progress of politics in Zambia following thedemise of the single-party state in 1991 and the adoption of newconstitutions to uphold human rights and democratic government.While President Frederick Chiluba and his MMD party haveintroduced much-needed political and constitutional reforms, at thesame time authoritarian attitudes and misuse of power may still bedetected among the government. Issues of continuing concern includethe compilation of electoral registers and the treatment of oppositionparties and other groups within civil society critical of government.The re-introduction of multiparty politics has not automaticallyresulted in democratic governance.

In the 1991 elections in Zambia, Frederick Chiluba and his Movement forMultiparty Democracy (MMD) reflected the hopes and aspirations of themajority of Zambians, supporting pledges of accountable democraticgovernance and a commitment to human rights. By early 1996 Chiluba waslargely a failed democrat because his performance and style, andinexperience in politics, encouraged authoritarian rule. This was reflected inhis inability to control autocratic colleagues in the cabinet and the nearabsence of active non-governmental organisations in the democraticprocess.1 Nonetheless, Chiluba held second multiparty elections inNovember 1996, which he and the MMD won; and it is widely expectedthat he is intending to run for a third term as President in 2001. Thus it nowseems an appropriate juncture to undertake a 'democratic audit' of how themultiparty democratic system has functioned.2

THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM

The system of rules and procedures governing the conduct of, andparticipation in, elections and public offices constitutes the framework

Chisepo J.J. Mpaisha, School of Government, University of the Western Cape, South Africa.

Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, Vol.38, No.3 (November 2000), pp. 131-146PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Geb

ze Y

ukse

k T

ekno

loji

Ens

titïs

u ]

at 1

3:56

20

Dec

embe

r 20

14

132 COMMONWEALTH & COMPARATIVE POLITICS

within which citizens exercise their right to choose among alternativeleaders and programmes. The electoral rules must command the respect ofall political players and they must be adhered to in order to retain that publicrespect. Hence, the democratisation of a political system must also involveconcomitant changes in the electoral regime.

Universal adult franchise obtains in Zambia. The 1996 Constitutionprovides that every citizen aged 18 or over, unless specifically disqualified,is entitled to register as a voter.3 The right to vote depends on whether aperson has a criminal record, is in lawful custody, and has satisfactorilyfulfilled the registration requirements. To date, parliament has notdisqualified any person from registering as a voter, the only way the statecan lawfully disenfranchise an individual. For those persons unable toregister as voters, the state has not only failed to advance their rights, buthas actually itself denied them the right to vote.

Registration as a voter, under the Electoral Act, requires a NationalRegistration Card. Upon registration, voters are given voters' cards, whichthey produce on election day. Those who lose their voters' cards cannot voteunless they get a 'voter's certificate' issued to polling districts by theElections Office in the capital, Lusaka. The polling district must, in turn,distribute the 'voters' certificates' to the various polling stations. There hasbeen much controversy over these certificates, owing to reports that somewere forged. There were also public complaints about the manner in whichthe Elections Office handled them. In certain cases, certificates in transit topolling districts were stolen by unscrupulous individuals, who thendistributed them only to their own party members, who might have lost theirvoter's cards. In addition, there were cases of party officials intimidatingvoters into giving them their voter's cards, destroying them and replacingthem with voters' certificates in the hope that this would encourage supportfor the party concerned.

The registration of voters opened in December 1995, and was concludedon 15 March 1996, following three extensions. Throughout 1996 there werenumerous reports of irregularities in registering voters. In August, 30,000names were reportedly omitted from the provisional voters' lists in theeastern province, and at least 4,000 names were sent back to Lusaka forcorrection, following the discovery of parallel errors in the provisionalregisters at eight centres. The Luangwa district provisional list also recordedmore than 3,000 extra names of voters and in Ndola a number of peoplewere barred from collecting their voters' cards because they were allegedlyregistered at several polling stations.

In September 1996, Nikuv Computers (Israel) Ltd, the companyawarded the electoral registration contract, admitted that 52,703 duplicatenational registration cards had been entered on its database. It said that these

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Geb

ze Y

ukse

k T

ekno

loji

Ens

titïs

u ]

at 1

3:56

20

Dec

embe

r 20

14

THE STATE OF DEMOCRATISATION IN ZAMBIA 133

errors did not originate from its computer but from wrong informationsupplied by individuals. By 13 September 1996, there were 2,162,907registrations, of which only 1,348,616 had received voters' cards.4 As thevoters' register verification exercise drew to a close, it was generallyreported that several thousand persons throughout the country could notvote in November because their voters' cards were not despatched to therelevant polling stations.5

The Electoral Commission, established under Article 76(1 )(2) of theConstitution as an autonomous and permanent organ, is legally responsiblefor the supervision and conduct of the registration of voters and elections. Ithas the power to make electoral regulations. The Lusaka-based ElectionsOffice, headed by a Director of Elections, is its executive arm. It relies oncivil servants from various government departments and on localgovernment authorities to undertake the work of registering voters andconducting elections.

Opposition parties unsuccessfully challenged Nikuv Computers'contract in the courts. The court interpreted Article 76 of the Constitution asimplying that the Electoral Commission did not have to undertake theregistration of voters or conduct elections itself.6 Nonetheless, the ElectoralCommission not only plays an active role in the conduct of the electionsthemselves, it also determines constituency boundaries. The Foundation forDemocratic Process, noting that the mission statement of the ElectoralCommission is 'to develop and maintain an effective and responsiveelectoral process in order to ensure the conduct of transparent, free and fairelections for the benefit of the people of Zambia', lamented that itscredibility as an independent, non-partisan professional body wasincreasingly being challenged by almost all the stakeholders other than theruling party. It consequently reminded the government that it had aninescapable responsibility for promoting and protecting the institutions andoperations of democracy through various legal and institutional reforms.7

Had the Electoral Commission been given the power to compile,maintain and revise the voters' register this could have assisted inengendering public confidence in it, given the political controversysurrounding the government's award of the contract to Nikuv Computers tocompile the voters' register. In similar fashion, had it been given the powerto hear and determine elections complaints before nominations and up topolling day, this would have reduced the frustrations and apparent injusticearising from the long time it normally takes the High Court and SupremeCourt to dispose of election petitions.

Nonetheless, almost one month before the November 1996 elections thegovernment passed the enabling Electoral Commission Act No. 24 of 1996to provide for the establishment of committees for the purpose of carrying

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Geb

ze Y

ukse

k T

ekno

loji

Ens

titïs

u ]

at 1

3:56

20

Dec

embe

r 20

14


out its functions and to delegate functions to them. Secondly, the Act statesthat the members of the Electoral Commission are to be appointed by thePresident, but subject to ratification by the National Assembly. And, thirdly,the Act states that the Electoral Commission will raise funds by grants,loans and donations, but subject to the approval of the President.

However, the reaction of opposition parties was that this legislationnegated the very 'independence and autonomy' that the ElectoralCommission was supposed to be accorded.8

Zambia had, at the time of the 1996 presidential and parliamentaryelections, about 35 registered political parties. The majority of these partieswere known as 'briefcase' parties without any serious basis of support. Themain opposition parties were the National Party, the Movement forDemocratic Process, the Zambia Democratic Congress, the National LimaParty, Agenda for Zambia Party, and the United National IndependenceParty. It was these opposition parties that were pitted against the rulingparty.

The 1996 Constitution stipulates that members of the NationalAssembly shall be elected by direct universal adult suffrage and through thesecret ballot. Article 77 (1) sets up a system of single-memberconstituencies. There are 150 constituencies and there are up to eightmembers that the President can nominate to the National Assembly.However, the Constitution bars various categories of public employees fromcontesting National Assembly seats unless they first resign from theirpositions. This requirement appears punitive. More importantly, it robs theelectorate of a wider choice of potentially capable individuals who mightdecide not to sacrifice their jobs for political office. In order to increasevoter options, the aspiring candidates for National Assembly elections couldbe allowed to resign their positions after being elected, but this would bringelectioneering to the workplace. Alternatively, the individuals concernedcould apply for and obtain leave of absence, where applicable, to enablethem to contest the elections.

The 1996 Constitution further states that a person shall be qualified to bea candidate for election as President if (a) he/she is a citizen of Zambia; (b)both his/her parents are Zambians by birth or descent; (c) he/she hasattained the age of 35 years; (d) he/she is a member of, or is sponsored by,a political party; (e) he/she is qualified to be a member of the NationalAssembly; and (0 he/she has been domiciled in Zambia for a period of atleast 20 years. The citizenship qualifications effectively barred formerPresident Kenneth Kaunda, who was re-elected UNIP president in June1995. His presidential candidature was also barred under Article 35 (2) ofthe Constitution, which states that the term of office of the president shouldbe five years, but he/she may be re-elected for one more five-year term.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Geb

ze Y

ukse

k T

ekno

loji

Ens

titïs

u ]

at 1

3:56

20

Dec

embe

r 20

14


Thus, Kaunda, who had twice been elected president, was not eligible forre-election to the post. The Law Association of Zambia, in its resolution of10 August 1996, went so far as to state that there was in fact 'no inbuiltconstitutional mechanism to prove citizenship of all Zambians by birth ordescent'.9 This was part of the widespread public feeling that the newpresidential qualifications were discriminatory at worst and bizarre at best.Still, parliament passed the Electoral (Amendment) Act No. 23 of 1996 toincorporate the new presidential qualifications.

Another apparently discriminatory provision in the 1996 Constitution isArticle 65 (3) (4), which requires chiefs who want to contest NationalAssembly elections to abdicate their chieftaincies prior to filing nominationpapers. It must be recalled that the Constitution stipulates that presidentialcandidates must be qualified for election as members of the NationalAssembly. The provision on chiefs also bars them from contestingpresidential elections.10 Thus, UNIP vice-president, Senior Chief InyamboYeta, was inadvertently affected, as he refused to file nomination papers inplace of Kenneth Kaunda.

The 1996 Constitution, while permitting 'independent' candidates tostand for the National Assembly, bars them from contesting the presidency,candidates being restricted to members or nominees of political parties. Thisrequirement might have been introduced to prevent disunity, not only withinthe ruling party, but also among opposition parties. On the other hand, theproliferation of political parties in Zambia can largely be attributed to aninsatiable quest for the presidency. If independent candidates were to bepermitted this would act as a political safety valve of sorts in situationswhere party nomination procedures tend to frustrate many presidentialhopefuls. After all, not all registered voters belong to political parties. Thisnon-partisan vote would be enough justification for allowing independentcandidates to stand where individual political parties, to find a presidentialcandidate that was acceptable to all interests in the party, never use themechanism of primary elections.

In the 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections five candidates,including Chiluba, stood for president, but the other four candidates werereally no match for Chiluba, who received 913,700 (72.6 per cent) out of atotal of 1,258,805 valid votes cast. None of the other candidates receivedmore than 13 per cent of the votes cast nation-wide. It is generally believedthat only Kaunda, had he been allowed to contest the elections, couldperhaps have posed a challenge to Chiluba.

Voter participation can be seen at the level of registration and at the levelof actual voting. The electoral process has been riddled with managerialproblems, voter disillusionment and political apathy. The 1991 electionsgenerated much excitement and expectations. Nonetheless, they were

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Geb

ze Y

ukse

k T

ekno

loji

Ens

titïs

u ]

at 1

3:56

20

Dec

embe

r 20

14


marked by a low voter turnout of 45 per cent of registered voters, 1.3million of the 2.9 million registered voters," significantly less than the 87per cent for the multiparty elections of 1968. Again, in the 1996 elections,the reported turnout of registered voters was 46 per cent or 41 per cent ofthose eligible to vote.

Opposition parties did not readily accept the results of the 1996presidential and general elections. They claimed that Chiluba and the MMDdid not win 'free and fair' elections and launched a civil disobediencecampaign to discredit the MMD government. The requirement of requestingand receiving police permission to hold meetings was amended rather thanabolished, but Chiluba dismissed opposition charges that the MMD'slandslide victory was rigged. He insisted that the elections were'transparent' and advised the opposition parties and other critics that thesecurity forces were prepared for any political unrest in the country.12

Adopting a more conciliatory tone, President Chiluba reiterated the needfor opening up lines of communication with groups opposed to hispresidency, pointing out that without dialogue democracy was at risk. Heinvited all opposition parties to enter into dialogue with him. At the sametime, he warned that improving communication did not mean that he wouldtolerate the mounting calls for civil disobedience campaigns against hisrule. He said that the efforts of 'anarchists' would be swiftly thwarted: 'Myresolve is to be firm but fair. I am in control and my government has a dutyto maintain law and order."3

The decision not to allow independent candidates to stand in thepresidential election restricts the electorate's choice and allows politicalparties to impose candidates on the electorate. This is considered the bestway to 'manage' democracy. In similar fashion, the MMD has not permittedcampaigns for election to its National Executive Council and thoseindividuals with presidential ambitions and their perceived politicalsupporters have experienced varied forms of victimisation. This prohibitionof open intra-MMD competition for party office has gone hand-in-glovewith subtle campaigns for Chiluba's undeclared wish to stand in theforthcoming 2001 elections.14 The ideal situation would be to leave peoplealone to elect a party-sponsored or independent candidate as president.Furthermore, proportional representation would enhance relatively smallparties in the multiparty elections, unlike the present system thatinadvertently fosters a one-party dominant Zambia.

OPENNESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF GOVERNMENT

Parties and parliament must flourish according to a set of rules for managinginter-group conflict in such a way that it results in compromises, consensus

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Geb

ze Y

ukse

k T

ekno

loji

Ens

titïs

u ]

at 1

3:56

20

Dec

embe

r 20

14


and agreement accepted by almost all stakeholders. This includes theevolving of institutions that are supportive of democratic processes, such asaccountable government, a responsible and independent legislature, and anindependent and efficient judiciary.

In the run-up to the first multiparty elections in 1991 the ruling partypromised the liberalisation of the economy, which was then largely understate control, and the democratisation of the political system. Thegovernment programme has to some extent reflected what the ruling partystood for in 1991 and 1996, especially in the economic sphere, despite theslow pace of the privatisation of the copper mines. Nonetheless, evenChiluba himself has publicly admitted that the level of poverty was on theincrease in Zambia, mainly as a result of the pursuit of structural adjustmentprogrammes.

Perhaps to counter this, in a recent address to parliament Chilubaannounced (a) that the government would invest $10 million in thedevelopment Bank of Zambia in the form of long term unsecured bondswhich would be sold to the public to enable them to participate in small-scale economic activity that would eventually eradicate poverty; (b) that thepresidential housing initiative would expand to Ndola, where 2,500 housingunits would be built; (c) that the government would rehabilitate more roadsin various parts of the country and set aside ten per cent of land to women,whilst the rest would be competed for between males and females; and (d)that the public reforms government had embarked on would continue in abid to restructure the civil service.15

The government has relied heavily on inter-party dialogue andconsultative group meetings with donors to consult with other stakeholders.In a briefing paper the government prepared on 25 April 1997 for a pre-consultative group meeting with the donor community in London, itportrayed itself as having made considerable progress towardsdemocratisation and implementation of good governance initiatives. Thekey measures that the government used to support its claim were itsdialogue with opposition parties; the establishment of a permanent electoralcommission; and the amendment of the Public Order Act to remove therequirement for obtaining police permits prior to addressing publicgatherings.16 In his speech to the London pre-consultative group meeting on5 April 1997, the Minister of Finance and Economic Development declared:'the President remains committed to the dialogue with opposition partiesand has invited several of them to exchange views with him on matters ofnational interest."7

On 9 June 1997, the Swedish International Institute for Democracy andElectoral Assistance (IDEA) facilitated discussions between thegovernment and opposition parties in Stromsborg, Stockholm. This

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Geb

ze Y

ukse

k T

ekno

loji

Ens

titïs

u ]

at 1

3:56

20

Dec

embe

r 20

14


roundtable aimed to 'systematically approach the short, medium and longer-term strategies for building sustainable democracy in Zambia'.18 Taking partwere representatives of the ruling party and some opposition parties, and inattendance were international observers from Sweden, Denmark, Germany,Finland, Malawi, The Netherlands, Norway, Japan, the UK, the USA, theEU, UNDP and World Bank. The political parties agreed on the following:the secretaries-general of all political parties in Zambia were to meet within21 days after the Stromsborg statement had been adopted to initiate an all-party meeting to establish the agenda and programme of action addressingthe sustainable democracy programme; the ruling party, the MMD, wouldinitiate the first meeting; and facilitator(s) from IDEA would be present atthe meeting to assist the process.

On 25 June 1997, an IDEA representative, B.T. Constantinos, met inLusaka with a coalition of 12 opposition parties called the National PatrioticFront (NPF), formed three days earlier, and attempted to dispel their fearsthat his coming to Zambia, at the invitation of the government, was 'stage-managed' for the consultative group.19 This followed the NPF's accusationof 24 June that the government's initiative to prepare the ground for a seriesof inter-party talks by presenting collective positions on various contentiousissues, was merely to impress the donor community.

The IDEA timing was just right given the dangerously sour ambiencethat surrounded relations between the government and the oppositionparties. However, the project proved difficult to implement for at least tworeasons. First, the government's apparently unilateral and exclusionistapproach to decision-making exhibited in the run up to the 18 November1996 elections made dialogue with opposition parties problematic.Secondly, the government attitude towards the major opposition partiestended to be an impediment to dialogue. The inter-party dialoguenecessitated that the government conceived the opposition parties aspartners in governance, rather than as political adversaries. This required thegovernment to be more accommodating and open.

As the discussion so far has clearly shown, the interactions between thegovernment and opposition parties were characterised by actions that wereirreconcilable with the principles of good governance.20 The inter-partydialogue was severely impeded by hostility and suspicion betweengovernment and opposition. The government's adherence to the principle of'winners take all', and its apparent intolerance to and mistrust of oppositionparties on national issues, resulted in the opposition responding in a lessconciliatory manner. In turn this restricted freedom of expression as thegovernment attempted to discredit dissenting views.

The problems of inter-party dialogue and the government's position onthe 1996 constitutional review process can safely be said to be a reflection

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Geb

ze Y

ukse

k T

ekno

loji

Ens

titïs

u ]

at 1

3:56

20

Dec

embe

r 20

14


of the inherently less just and less democratic characteristics of Zambia'sadopted representative democratic governance. This is a system prone topolitical conflicts and democratic degeneration in an environment wherepolitical conciliation and concessions do not characterise the stakeholders inthe political environment. Above all, the difficulties with inter-partydialogue highlighted the fact that Zambia's kind of representativedemocracy was one in which the government held the conviction that itsmajority in the National Assembly was a legitimate mandate to legislatemainly in the interest of that majority, regardless of whether or not suchlegislation conflicted with the concerns of opposition parties or suppressedthe voice of the minority. For example, only two MMD MPs supported aprivate member's motion urging the government to improve health servicesand the conditions of service for medical doctors.21

The News Media

While the Constitution permits individuals or organisations to invest innewsprint, radio and television, the media have not been free of governmentpressure. Despite the government's commitment to privatisation of theeconomy in its 1991 party manifesto and the recommendations of a mediareform committee, set up by the Minister of Information and BroadcastingServices in 1993, that all state-owned news media be privatised, this has nottaken place, and only three privately owned radio stations have beenlicensed. On the contrary, the government's apparently firm grip on state-owned electronic and print media make the local and internationalindependent mass media an important source of the public's right to knowand the right to make informed decisions on government actions and theeffects of its policies. But they are constrained in their operation by anti-media legislation inherited from the one-party state era and government'sproscription of public enterprises advertising in privately ownednewspapers. The former compels the press to spend much time in litigationand the latter adversely affects them financially.

Civil Society

Other important elements of civil society are the churches and civicwomen's groups. The Roman Catholic bishops issued a pastoral letterdecrying the apparent conspiracy of silence in the face of injustice, violationof human rights and rampant corruption, which has reached epidemicproportions, endangering the very fabric of Zambian society. The Ministersof Community Development and Social Services and of Information andBroadcasting Services were quick to denounce the Catholic bishops as'liars'.22 But in support of the bishops, other clergy called for the rejectionof Chiluba's so-called 'donations' from his presidential discretionary funds.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Geb

ze Y

ukse

k T

ekno

loji

Ens

titïs

u ]

at 1

3:56

20

Dec

embe

r 20

14


The government has been quite sensitive in the face of publicdemonstrations. Some 39 prominent women were arrested when they triedto demonstrate against police failure to stem rising crime, particularly theraping and killing of young girls. The demonstrators claimed their actionwas in response to government and police calls for public support to helpthem curb escalating crime in Zambia.23 Civil society organisations face thesame difficulties as opposition parties in obtaining police permits to holdpublic meetings, the provisions of the Public Order Act being applied tothem and never to the MMD.

Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)

NGOs are registered under the Societies Act, currently under revision by theMinistry of Home Affairs. They operate throughout the country, but are tobe found principally in urban areas. As well as championing economic,social and cultural rights, several NGOs operate in the areas of democracyand human rights, concentrating in particular on the monitoring of elections.They have compelled the government to listen to their advice on occasion,but the relationship has been strained.24 The Washington-based NationalDemocratic Institute for International Affairs, which had helped fund grass-roots organisations and political parties with a view to enhancing their civiceducation activities, pulled out of Zambia in June 1996, stating that thepolitical environment was hostile to its operations.25

The National Assembly

The Constitution allows the President considerable powers of patronage. Inaddition to selecting his cabinet, he has the right to appoint major officersof state, judges and the director of the Bank of Zambia. Although theseappointments are subject to ratification by the National Assembly, inpractice, it has never rejected a presidential nomination.

The President also has the power to initiate legislation for submission toand consideration by the National Assembly. This includes taxation billsand the national budget. The National Assembly does not delve into thebudget details, while other Bills are rushed through parliament by thegovernment without allowing sufficient time for the opposition to debatethem. This has led to protests by MPs, who have demanded a 'total overhaul[of the legislative system] to be fully representative';26 among the areasrequiring urgent attention were the committee system and support providedto MPs. Assembly members are paid sitting allowances only, together withgovernment contracts for maize and fertilisers from the Ministry ofAgriculture's Food Reserve Agency.27 There is particular need toprovide adequate funds to enable MPs to undertake research andconstituency work.28

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Geb

ze Y

ukse

k T

ekno

loji

Ens

titïs

u ]

at 1

3:56

20

Dec

embe

r 20

14


Despite these restrictions, MPs do use parliamentary immunity and theright to criticise the government to condemn budget statements if they areseen to favour some sections of society.29 In practice, however, thegovernment's parliamentary majority and its reliance on party caucusesensured its legislation is approved in the Assembly.30

While political parties do not receive any funding from government, theruling party has increasingly used its incumbency during elections to accessstate resources, to the detriment of opposition parties. Although all leadersare required to conduct themselves in accordance with a code of conductpromulgated by parliament, a former Minister of Legal Affairs, Dr RemmyMushota, was dismissed after being found guilty of abuse of office by aCode of Conduct tribunal.31 It would appear that the electorate, rather thanlooking for morally sound and competent representatives, tend to acceptcandidates for the 150 National Assembly seats imposed on them by partyleaders. Voting for a party rather than a candidate is characteristic of allparties, and helps explain the MMD's parliamentary dominance. Evens so,complaints at constituency level about the lack of effective representationby MPs, and inadequate access to them, are widespread.

The Judicial System

The Constitution upholds the independence of the judiciary. If the executiveseeks changes to the judicial system it has to do so by parliamentarylegislation. In practice, however, the judiciary has been fragile and itsindependence threatened. It was only a threat by senior judicial personnel toresign en masse that forced the government to drop a proposal in parliamentto amend the Constitution so as to allow the President, subject to ratificationby the National Assembly, to remove Supreme Court judges for 'grossmisconduct'. Senior ruling party officials left no doubt about their feelingstowards those lawyers who had opposed the Constitutional Amendment Billand sought to defend the independence of the judiciary.

Despite this opposition success, the government invoked itsconstitutional powers to suspend Justice Kabaso Chanda of the Lusaka HighCourt in January 1997, allegedly for professional misconduct, and to set upa tribunal of two Supreme Court Judges and a Judge from the SupremeCourt of Malawi to investigate the matter.32 Many, particularly among theopposition, saw this as an attempt to intimidate outspoken members of thejudiciary who had stood up to the government over its poor human rightsrecord. In March 1996, Justice Chanda had overruled the efforts of theSpeaker of the National Assembly to sentence two journalists, FredM'membe and Bright Mwape, to indefinite prison terms for being incontempt of parliament, arguing that neither the Speaker nor the NationalAssembly had the power to imprison people. On another occasion he

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Geb

ze Y

ukse

k T

ekno

loji

Ens

titïs

u ]

at 1

3:56

20

Dec

embe

r 20

14


released 53 prisoners on the grounds that the prosecutor failed to bring themto court speedily, thus denying them justice. The Magistrates' and Judges'Association of Zambia called the government's action in the Chanda case anattempt at intimidation, and warned that the investigative tribunal was set upto undermine the independence of the judiciary.33

The judiciary also came under pressure from ruling party leaders. InAugust 1996, Dr Remmy Mushota (who was himself subsequentlydismissed ministerial office for misconduct) called for a publiccommission of inquiry to probe the professionalism of judges and thefinancial indiscretions of certain judges and magistrates. In November1996 he renewed his attacks on the judiciary, arguing that 'there shouldbe no government by the judiciary in this country. And foreigners mustnot interfere with our human rights. Zambia is for Zambians'." Neitherthe government nor the MMD condemned him. At the same time,opposition parties have also questioned the independence of the judiciaryand the legal profession. Justice Chalendo Sakala's declaration thatformer head of state, Kenneth Kaunda, born in Malawi, was stateless onthe grounds that he illegally ruled Zambia, was seen as a governmentinspired action.

Opposition parties frequently complain that the electoral playing field isuneven, the compilation of electoral registers particularly being seen asfavouring the MMD. This prompted them to challenge in the courts theaward of the electoral registration to Nikuv Computers. Judgment wasdelivered in May 1996 in a High Court civil case between Sebastian Zulu ofUNIP and Roger Chongwe of the Liberal Democratic Front on the one part,and the Attorney General and Nikuv Computers on the other. The judgeobserved that the lack of transparency in the award of the contract to NikuvComputers and its classification as 'secret' were wrong. He also tookjudicial notice of the fact that the registration exercise had to be extendedon three occasions in order to allow more eligible voters to register.However, he ruled that he could not nullify the recently completedregistration of voters on the grounds that doing so would be disruptive andwould not serve any useful purpose for the country.

In addition, opposition parties on 11 November 1996 challenged in theSupreme Court the nomination of Chiluba as a presidential candidate on thebasis of his citizenship and the nationality of his parents. They also appliedfor an interim injunction to block the elections until the court had disposedof the petition. On 14 November 1996, the Supreme Court ruled the petitionto be premature and that it could only be heard after the elections. After theelection, which they boycotted, the opposition once again petitioned theSupreme Court, challenging the election results and President Chiluba'sclaim to office. Again, the petition did not succeed.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Geb

ze Y

ukse

k T

ekno

loji

Ens

titïs

u ]

at 1

3:56

20

Dec

embe

r 20

14


Officials of the ruling party also had recourse to the courts under thePenal Code, especially against members of the independent press,particularly The Post and The Chronicle. For instance, the editor-in-chiefand some of the senior editorial staff of The Post newspaper have at onetime or other spent weeks in detention; several of them faced the prospectof 21-year maximum jail terms in on-going court cases. These are routinelyheard outside Lusaka District so that the defendants are forced tocourthouses in remote districts. This has made it extremely difficult foreditors to publish their papers, as journalists spend days in court rather thangathering news. In addition, such court cases are financially crippling to theindependent press. Some individuals who were politically prominent duringthe one-party era have also had access to the courts. In August 1994,William Banda, a senior UNIP leader, was deported to Malawi on thegrounds that he was not a Zambian. He appealed to the Supreme Courtagainst his deportation, but the latter upheld the original court judgment.

Central and Local Government

Although in principle appointments in the public service are based on merit,in practice, judging from comments and debates in the newspapers,employment depends more on political affiliation, favouritism and evenbribery.35 'Blind loyalty' to the President is expected of such appointees. Forexample, when Chiluba created the position of District Administrator in thecivil service, he appointed exclusively MMD cadres to these posts. He alsofavoured men over women.36

Local government does not have an independent constitutionalexistence. The Constitution simply states that there 'shall be such system oflocal government in Zambia as may be prescribed by an Act of Parliament'.The system of local government is based on democratically elected councilsand universal adult suffrage, although political apathy is a prominent featureboth of local as well as of presidential and parliamentary elections. Thismay be related to the fact that local government is very much prone to thecontrol of central government and its functioning relies to a significantextent on financial subventions from Lusaka.

CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

Civil and political rights are the cornerstone of a democracy. They affirmthe democratic values of freedom, equality and human dignity of allcitizens. The state must respect and promote these rights. The 1991Zambian Constitution (Part III, Article 20 (1)) states that 'no person shall behindered in the enjoyment of his/her freedom of expression, includingfreedom to hold opinions without interference, freedom to receive ideas and

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Geb

ze Y

ukse

k T

ekno

loji

Ens

titïs

u ]

at 1

3:56

20

Dec

embe

r 20

14


information without interference, freedom to impart and communicateinformation without interference, whether the communication be to thepublic generally or to any person or class of persons'. Part I of the 1996Constitution likewise affirms Zambia to be 'a unitary, indivisible,multiparty and democratic sovereign state'. Yet the enjoyment of theseconstitutional rights, especially in respect of political affiliation, has beenproblematic in practice. Several publicly prominent individuals haveexperienced difficulties as a result of their political beliefs and expressions,and assembly, association and movement. For example, the government insubtle ways made every effort to undermine the reputation of defencelawyers of opposition parties by questioning their Zambian citizenship. Yetin speeches and policy pronouncements the government has not beenlacking in pledging its commitment to upholding the Constitution. It isextremely difficult to assess the extent to which citizens are effectivelyinformed of their rights and how to exercise them. Some non-governmentalorganisations have tried to play this role, but the impact of their operationshas been quite limited.

On the whole, there has been confidence in the prevailing multi-partypolitical system, but at the same time government has exercised emergencypowers to restrict civil rights, as occurred after plots against it in 1993 and1997. In February 1993, the government allegedly uncovered a plot, knownas the 'Zero Option Plan', and pronounced a state of emergency. This waslifted ahead of the 1996 elections. These were won by Chiluba and the MMDbut evoked a wave of protests and litigation on the part of defeated oppositionparties. They warned of chaos if the election results were not nullified and anew register of voters drawn up and the 1996 Constitution revised.

In the wake of these warnings a handful of disgruntled soldiersattempted a coup in October 1997, leading the government to re-introducea state of emergency. This allowed the government to detain or restrict themovement of suspected individuals and to deport or exclude from Zambiapersons who were not citizens. The same sweeping powers permitted theauthorities to enter and search premises. Several opposition party leaderswere swiftly detained. These included former President Kenneth Kaunda,who was accused of being behind the failed coup. The President alsodetained Nakatindi Wina, a member of his cabinet, accusing her of fundingthe failed coup through bank accounts she held in the Finance Bank. Thusthe failed coup incident seemingly offered President Chiluba an opportunityto use ambiguous laws and the security services to smash perceived threatsto his leadership within the MMD and from strong critics among theopposition. The government subsequently charged all the political detaineeswith treason and they faced a long trial that lasted throughout 1998. Kaundawas released, mainly due to international pressure.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Geb

ze Y

ukse

k T

ekno

loji

Ens

titïs

u ]

at 1

3:56

20

Dec

embe

r 20

14


Notwithstanding these events, popular confidence in the multipartysystem remained. There were no uprisings or widespread industrial unrestfollowing the attempted coups and clamp-downs by the authorities and theMMD was able to win subsequent general and by-elections. While oneshould not confuse the return to multipartyism with full democratisation, itis felt that the new constitutional system has guaranteed an albeit fragiledemocracy.

CONCLUSION

This article has examined the progress of politics in Zambia following thedemise of the single-party state in 1991 and the adoption of newconstitutions to uphold human rights and democratic government. Therecord is uneven and uncertain. The MMD government led by PresidentChiluba has made efforts to maintain openness and accountability ingovernment. It has largely adhered to its election promises; it has tried toconsult with other stakeholders in policy making; the National Assemblyhas played a role in the ratification of appointments where this was arequirement and has exercised its legislative powers in scrutinisinglegislation and public expenditures; and the courts have been accessible tovarious interests.

However, at the same time, the controversy surrounding the compilationof the electoral registers has eroded opposition confidence; and this hasbeen further weakened by the dominance of the MMD in the NationalAssembly and its attempts to restrict discussion in the chamber. Secondly,civil and political rights enshrined in the new constitution are not alwaysupheld by a government that seems to place a higher value on politicalallegiance than on even-handedness in its exercise of office. A fair and fullycompetitive political system, notwithstanding the return to multi-partyelections, is hard to reconcile with the powers of incumbency enjoyed byPresident Chiluba and the attitude towards political opposition found inleading government circles. Finally, there is the unresolved issue of whetherChiluba is intending to seek a third term in office in 2001, and theconstitutionality of such a decision should he decide to contest.

NOTES

1. C.J.J. Mphaisha, 'Retreat from Democracy in Post One-party State Zambia', Journal ofCommonwealth and Comparative Politics, 34/2 (July 1996), 65-84.

2. B. Baker, 'The Quality of African Democracy: Why and How It Should be Measured',Journal of Contemporary African Studies 17/2 (1999), 273-86.

3. The Constitution (Amendment) Act No. 18 of 1996 (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1996),Article 75.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Geb

ze Y

ukse

k T

ekno

loji

Ens

titïs

u ]

at 1

3:56

20

Dec

embe

r 20

14


4. The Times of Zambia (Lusaka), 18 Oct. 1996.5. The Monitor (Lusaka), 13, 6-12 Sept. 1996.6. The Post (Lusaka), 3 April 1996.7. 'FODEP Asks Government to Broaden Composition of Electoral Body', The Post, 10 Feb.

2000.8. The Post, 10 Oct. 1996.9. G.F. Lungu, 'Some Bizarre Clauses in Noble Documents: Critical Observations on the

Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 18 of 1996', Zango (Lusaka), 21/11 (1997).10. The Post, 13 Aug. 1996.11. The Times of Zambia (Lusaka), 5 June 1996.12. Reuters, 21 Nov. 1996.13. The Zambia Daily Mail (Lusaka), 22 Nov. 1996.14. 'MMD adopts Muyamba for Mbalala', The Post, 1 Feb. 2000, and 'Editorial Comment:

Chiluba's Third Term', The Post, 6 April 1999.15. 'FTJ's Parliament Speech was Empty, Says Sichinga', The Post, 24 Jan. 2000.16. Zambia: Brief on the Government's Governance and Economic Reform Programme (Lusaka:

Government Printer, 9 May 1997).17. Report of the Proceedings of the Meeting with Donors, held in London on 25 April 1997

(Lusaka: Government Printer, 9 May 1997).18. IDEA, The Stromsborg Statement on Building Sustainable Democracy in Zambia

(Stockholm: IDEA, 1997).19. The Times of Zambia, 26 May 1997; The Zambia Daily Mail, 25 May 1997; and The Post,

25 May 1997.20. 'Chiluba Advised to Consult Opposition before 2001 Polls', The Post, 2 Feb. 2000.21. 'MMD Not Concerned', The Post, 29 Feb. 2000.22. 'Editorial Comment: Lies about our Bishops', The Post, 7 Feb. 2000; and 'Shun FTJ's Slush

Fund, Pastor Urges Churches', The Post, 18 Feb. 2000.23. 'Editorial Comment: Beginning of the End', The Post, 18 Jan. 2000.24. The Chronicle, 25 Nov. 1996, and The Post, 25 Nov. 1996.25. Statement by NDI President Kenneth Wollack on the Suspension of Program Activities in

Zambia (Washington DC: NDI/Carter Center, 1996).26. 'Mumba Complains about Fast Track Bills', The Post, 31 Aug. 1999.27. 'Food Reserve Agency List Exposes Government Fund Scam', The Post, 13 Jan. 2000;

'Ministers, MPs Face Probe over Food Reserve Agency Debts', The Post, 24 Jan. 2000; and'Zambia Rated 33rd Most Corrupt Nation', The Post, 24 Sept. 1998.

28. 'Zambia: The Reality Amidst Contradictions: Human Rights Since the 1996 Elections',Human Rights Watch/Africa Report, 9/3A (July 1997).

29. 'Tembo Withdraws Pensions Bill, The Post, 2 March 2000.30. 'Mumba Complains about Fast Track Bills', The Post, 31 Aug. 1999.31. The Post (Lusaka), 25 Nov. 1996.32. The National Mirror (Lusaka), 12-18 Jan. 1997.33. The Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), 24 Jan. 1997, and The National Mirror, 12-18 Jan.

1997.34. The Post, 25 Nov. 199635. 'National Citizens Coalition Accuses Chiluba of Creating Jobs for Cadres', The Post, 3 Dec.

1999, and 'Chiluba Appoints more District Chiefs', Zambia Daily Mail, 27 Dec. 1999.36. 'Women for Change Accuses Chiluba of Gender Insensitivity on District Administrators'

Appointments', The Post, 6 Dec. 1999; 'Favouring Women Kills Initiative', The Post, 2March 2000; and 'Editorial Comment: Chiluba Opposes Women's Rights', The Post, 2March 2000.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Geb

ze Y

ukse

k T

ekno

loji

Ens

titïs

u ]

at 1

3:56

20

Dec

embe

r 20

14