the serbian orthodox church as a political actor in the aftermath of

The Serbian Orthodox Church as aPolitical Actor in the Aftermath ofOctober 5, 2000

Milan VukomanovicUniversity of Belgrade

Abstract: This study tackles the place and role of the Orthodox Church in

Serbian society, state, and political life after October 5, 2000. Owing to its

present “symphony” with the state, the church now offers a new ideological

framework and value-system for state institutions such as the armed forces

and public education. This new role of the church is particularly emphasized

in the current legislation. One could probably refer to the “etatization” of the

Serbian Church, with some negative consequences for non-traditional

religious communities. The relations with the Macedonian and Montenegrin

Orthodox churches have also been discussed in this context. In post-

Milosevic Serbia, religious rights and freedoms have been considerably

extended, but there is still a great deal of arbitrariness, even completely

partial interpretations of the church-state relations. In the concluding section,

this article deals with the church’s traditionalist perception of society as

narod (the people), with some recommendations as for the possible

cooperation between the church and civil society in Serbia.

The Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia, a highly secularized

society in the 1960s and 1970s, in which the Communist ideology left

its mark on the political, as well as on the cultural, national, and religious

levels, suddenly faced, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a massive

ethno-mobilization, the ghost of nationalism and the politically

imposed identification of religion and nation. As a result of this “cultural

shock,” one quasi-religious system (communism) gave way to another

Address correspondence and reprint request to: Milan Vukomanovic, Faculty of Philosophy,University of Belgrade, Cika Ljubina 18-20, 11000 Belgrade, Serbia. E-mail: [email protected]

This article was written as part of the research project “The Serbian and Montenegrin Army andSerbian Orthodox Church: The Search for a New Identity,” supported by the Norwegian governmentand conducted by the Centre for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) a non-partisan non-political andnon-profit association of citizens seated in Belgrade.

237

Politics and Religion, 1 (2008), 237–269. Printed in the U.S.A.# 2008 Religion and Politics Research Section of the American Political Science Associationdoi:10.1017/S1755048308000199 1755-0483/08 $25.00

terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048308000199Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 54.39.17.49, on 11 Apr 2018 at 21:08:09, subject to the Cambridge Core

https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048308000199

https://www.cambridge.org/core

(nationalism). At the same time, the secular Serbian society under

Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic faced its own semi-literacy regard-

ing religious matters, providing, thus, a secure refuge for an ecclesiastical

nationalism and nationalist populism. Thus, in conditions of war and the

long-lasting politicization of religion, one witnessed a consequent, sec-

ondary “sacralization” of politics and interethnic conflict. This, of

course, gave rise to theories concerning the allegedly religious roots of

the Balkan wars. These wars resulted, however, primarily from political

and inter-ethnic conflicts, arising in conditions of economic deterioration

and systemic crisis. Religion appeared as a significant element of ethni-

city (even ethno-manipulation during the Milosevic government), and

this is probably the reason why these wars are sometimes labeled

inter-religious conflicts.1

However, in the perception of some churches (such as the Serbian

Orthodox Church), the war was also experienced as involving a territorial

issue. In such a perception, it gained legitimacy, because it was necessary

to “defend,” as it were, sometimes at the cost of war-crimes, one’s pre-

sence, one’s physical and spiritual survival in the “fatherland.” In this

context, the destruction of religious facilities was primarily a symbolic

act of demonstrating political and military dominance: temples were

not destroyed so much as religious objects, but as the national and

ethnic symbols of a community’s presence on a certain territory.

The first post-Milosevic, democratic government of Serbia, headed by

the late prime minister Zoran Djindjic,2 attempted to create a sort of sym-

bolic distance from the ideological heritage of the previous regime and

thus secure the support of the electorate by referring to a set of traditional

values and confirming a modern, democratic, pro-European orientation.

Accordingly, his government introduced confessional religious education

as an elective subject in public schools. Djindjic’s vice-president,

Cedomir Jovanovic, admitted that the decision itself was completely

pragmatic, stemming from the government’s attempt to appease the

Serbian Church after the extradition of Milosevic to the Hague

Tribunal. But this liberal government was never genuinely attached to

the church, and the Serbian higher clergy knew that.

The current government, under its conservative prime minister,

Vojislav Kostunica, is probably the best that the Serbian Church could

have hoped for in many decades since the end of World War Two.

Kostunica offered a real symphony with the church; so it seems that what-

ever his government decided, the church would accept, and vice versa.

During the four years since he took office (in 2004), the Serbian

238 Vukomanovic



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048308000199


Orthodox Church (hereinafter, SPC3) has become a powerful player in

political, cultural, and economic sense. Both the prime minister and the

church have a very similar, conservative view of the Serbian society.

THE SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH AND THE STATE AFTEROCTOBER 5, 2005

In what context can we speak about the SPC4 as a political subject after

the fall of the Milosevic regime in Serbia? The SPC is certainly not a pol-

itical party in itself or an organization formally standing behind a party.

Under Serbia’s Constitution, religious communities are separate from the

state, the SPC is not a state church, and the structures of political auth-

ority do not coincide with religious structures (as is the case, for

example, in Iran). However, religious communities in the central and

eastern European countries, many of which are already Eupopean

Union (EU) members, have gained a new place and role for themselves

in the post-socialist period, and become far more prominent in the

public sphere.

Nevertheless, there is public discussion in Serbia about de-secularization

of society and the state and even a process of clericalization (Djordjevic

2005a, 15–18), referring not just to an increased importance and influ-

ence of religion (particularly the SPC) in Serbian society, but also to

greater participation of the church in political and state affairs. This

impression is widespread not only among the local “civic intellectuals,”

NGOs and independent thinkers in Serbia (who are traditionally critical

of the SPC role in public life), but also among the foreign media, political

figures and European institutions, such as the OSCE or the Council of

Europe.5

This study will focus on the place and role of the SPC in Serbian

society, state, and political life after October 5, 2000, tackling also its

pronounced symbolic and normative function. The church now offers a

new ideological framework and value-system for state institutions such

as the armed forces and public education.

The state and the church in Serbia established an unprecedented

relationship almost overnight. Dealing with a young and fragile demo-

cratic society is a completely new experience for the SPC, after a

decade of authoritarianism in the Milosevic era, and another four

decades in which a single party and ideology held a structural monopoly

over state and society. Before the Second World War, the SPC co-existed

The Serbian Orthodox Church 239



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048308000199


with the then monarchy in a relatively “symphonic” relationship in which

the SPC was the “first among equals” among the recognized religious

communities. A multitude of open issues and problems concerning

democracy, the character of a democratic state, and church-state relations

enter the agenda under new circumstances.6

For example, which social problems are within the jurisdiction of the

church and its constitutional frameworks and ramifications? How

capable are religious organizations of dealing with those problems and

what is their capacity to solve them? How relevant are the religious com-

munities’ responses to the contemporary political and social issues?7

What is the church’s vision of the modern world? What is its relationship

with civil society: do religious communities see themselves as an integral

part of civil society?

During the socialist period, the state one-sidedly determined the char-

acter of its relationship with religious communities from a position of

total political and ideological supremacy. In the post-socialist era,

however, religious rights and freedoms have been considerably extended,

but this immediately brought into play the question of their increased

responsibility in many areas. In Serbia, there is still a great deal of arbi-

trariness in this respect, even completely partial interpretations of the

church-state relations, on both sides. Already in 2001, the controversy

and inconsistencies became apparent when religious education was intro-

duced in the public school system as a regular subject.

Religious Education as a Litmus Test for the FutureChurch-State Relations

Direct contact between the SPC and state institutions was established in

November 2000 when the Bishops’ Assembly requested that religious

education become part of standard state school programs. The introduc-

tion of religious education in schools and the permission (later that

year) that clergymen could enjoy access to members of the armed

forces were the demands indicating other, more important problems.

Religious education in public schools (both primary and secondary)

was not just an issue of the model of religious education proposed for

a new and liberated society in which religious communities have much

more room and a much better relationship with the state; this immediately

highlighted numerous other questions in connection with religious rights

and freedoms in a more general sense.

240 Vukomanovic



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048308000199


Before a new Constitution could be passed, and also before the adoption

of a law on religious organizations, a government regulation became effec-

tive, defining, already in its preamble, the status of the seven traditional reli-

gious communities; in this regard, the authors of the law obviously sought

to assert legal continuity with the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.8 This introduced

bias into the area of religious freedoms and church-state relations: for

example, if only seven religious communities are entitled to organize

religious education in public schools, how can we speak about equality

of religious communities before the law and the Constitution? If they are

truly equal, why can only some of them exercise these rights?9 Is this

discrimination or even injustice against some, and, more importantly, how

will their status be regulated in the future?

Another problem was the attitude toward lay state institutions, such as

public schools: is school in Serbia still a lay institution? Is the public

school space still “inviolable,” non-confessional, does it still enjoy

some autonomy, so that religious communities cannot participate in the

education process and the possible recruitment of new young believers

without major changes in legislation?

Not surprisingly, the religious education decision of 2001, sub-

sequently confirmed by a Government regulation, very soon found

itself before the Constitutional Court of Serbia: several NGOs and

private law firms10 challenged its constitutionality. The hearing in the

Court, held on June 24, 2003, featured a synthesis of the arguments

which had preceded the July 2001 regulation and attended its issuance.11

According to its critics, the regulation did not comply with the

Constitution of the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and inter-

national conventions because the introduction of religious instruction and

an alternative subject placed national minorities and small religious com-

munities in an unequal position as only the “traditional” religions were

allowed to conduct those classes. As a result, education in primary and

secondary schools is not accessible to everyone under the same con-

ditions (Popovic and Vitorovic-Umicevic 2003, 1). The second principal

objection dealt with the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia (Article

41, § 2): given that only religious communities can organize religious

instruction, the state cannot participate in those activities. The third com-

plaint challenged the right of religious communities to perform their

mission in public schools: although religions may recruit believers,

they may not do so in public schools. A further problem was the descrip-

tive grading system, as the existing law on secondary-school education

did not provide for this form of evaluation.




https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048308000199


These and some other objections voiced during the hearing led to the

following Court assessments: (1) a possible violation of the constitutional

separation of church and state; (2) equality of religious communities

before the law and the Constitution; (3) a possible violation of laws on

primary and secondary school education; (4) a threat against the

freedom of religious confession of schoolchildren’s parents and guar-

dians, who had to choose between the two offered school subjects; (5)

a possible violation of religious freedoms and the equality of religious

communities before the law in those cases where the seven traditional

religious communities, along with the Ministry of Education and the

Ministry of Religions, draw up religious education plans and programs.

The final outcome of the debate was that on November 4, 2003, the

Constitutional Court confirmed the constitutionality of the Government

regulation.12 In any case, the Serbian Government chose an optional, con-

fessional, multi-denominational model of religious education. The

reasons for such a decision were most likely political and pragmatic.

The then Prime Minister of Serbia, Zoran Djindjic, consulted only the

religious communities, completely bypassing the most competent repub-

lican authority, the Ministry of Education, while the Ministry of Religious

Affairs, which had from the outset unreservedly protected the interests of

the SPC, welcomed the Prime Minister’s decision, thereby contributing to

an unusual division in Djindjic’s Government. Cedomir Jovanovic, a

Deputy Prime Minister at the time, admitted later that the decision had

been pragmatic and a result of efforts to placate the SPC after the extra-

dition of Slobodan Milosevic to the Hague Tribunal.13 Regardless of the

political and pragmatic character of the entire process, some believe that

the parallel introduction of religious and civic education in the 2001 edu-

cational reform could also be seen as part of the then Government’s pol-

itical strategy to make a kind of “symbolic deflection” from the

ideological heritage of the preceding regime and thereby win support

from the electorate by opting for “traditional” values as well as confirm-

ing their modern, democratic, and pro-European orientation. When the

Government regulation took effect in July 2001, two deputy ministers

of education offered their resignations. At that moment no one could

say for certain whether there would be a sufficient number of trained

religious instructors at the beginning of the school year in September,

or whether the Government would be able to secure the necessary

funds (in, or outside, the budget) to pay them, notwithstanding the

level of training and experience of the teachers needed for work in

public schools.

242 Vukomanovic



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048308000199


The SPC has, therefore, succeeded in becoming an equal partner of the

state in the educational process. The subsequent restoration of the status

of the Theological Faculty of the SPC as a faculty of the University of

Belgrade was also problematic with respect to the academic criteria

and the autonomy of the university, but even more so in regard to the

observance of human rights in its enrolment policy, as it only admits

Orthodox Christian students who receive a bishop’s blessing.

Legal and Political Aspects: The New Law

The political commitment of the new Serbian Government, headed by

Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica, to further strengthen ties with the

SPC (this time far more on ideological than pragmatic grounds),

reached its full expression in the Preliminary draft of the Law on the

Freedom of Religion, Churches, Religious Communities and Religious

Associations (released in July 2004) in which the state makes major con-

cessions to the church, including immunity of the clergy from civil auth-

orities.14 However, after numerous objections were voiced in public, the

first preliminary draft was thoroughly revised. In this draft law, the SPC

was euphemistically defined as primus inter pares in relation to the other

religious communities, but it was clear that in practice, the SPC would,

with the logistical assistance of the state, be granted far more extensive

powers than any other religious community. The new Ministry of

Religious Affairs of Serbia assumed a role of an external state

“service” of the SPC. For the first time since October 5, 2000, the struc-

tures of political power were beginning to adjust to religious structures,

and vice versa.

Interestingly, the law’s discriminatory intent was evident from the

preliminary draft, in which religious communities were classified into

three categories, which, as was clear from the text, would be treated dif-

ferently in the registration procedure. Moreover, the text even included

theological phraseology, so completely alien to contemporary legis-

lation.15 According to the document, the state had an obligation to

secure or guarantee to churches a number of guarantees (e.g., religious

instruction in public schools), whereas the religious communities and

their officials were relieved of the obligation to pay tax and afforded

immunity from civil authorities.16 Even in the pre-war Kingdom of

Yugoslavia churches hardly enjoyed so much autonomy and so many

privileges.




https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048308000199


Since 2004, the Serbian Ministry of Religious Affairs has worked on a

number of other legislative projects — the drafting of which was

accompanied by a similar amount of silence concerning the identities

of their authors and their competence, and they were completely inaccess-

ible to the professional public. Although the Ministry had done nothing to

stimulate a debate of any significance, strong reactions came from inde-

pendent intellectuals and NGOs who claimed that the SPC would be

granted far more privileges than other institutions. This time the state

made a series of concessions to the church, which the latter apparently

had not even sought, in particular with regard to the immunity of the

clergy, which has no precedent in similar legislation. This also applies

to other issues dealing with newly-established rights of the church.

Suddenly, the church became a public institution financed from the

state budget; one provision of the draft law even obliged local self-admin-

istrations to organize referenda if so requested by a church or religious

community. It seemed as if the difference between the church and state

institutions was diminishing.

The 2005 interview of the Minister of Religions, Milan Radulovic,

published in Pravoslavlje (Radulovic 2005), shows clearly that the

biggest dilemma of his ministry was how to reconcile the modern prin-

ciple of the equality of religious communities before the law and the par-

allel efforts to give the SPC a special status and primacy.17 In the

meantime, the law proposal was revised a few times, and Radulovic

announced that the full Draft Law would be “submitted” to the competent

Government committees in January 2006.18

The Law on the Churches and Religious Communities was indeed

adopted in the Serbian parliament in April 2006. This was the first

such law after 1993, when the previous, socialist law was abolished by

the Milosevic government. In its Articles 10–15, this new law defines

the status of the traditional churches and religious communities as reli-

gious organizations with the centuries-long historical continuity, whose

legal subjectivity was acquired through special laws adopted in the

period between 1914 and 1930 (i.e., in the Kingdoms of Serbia and

Yugoslavia). Thus, the traditional churches and religious communities

are as follows: the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic

Church, the Slovak Evangelical Church (of the Augsburg Confession

— A.C.), Reformed Christian Church, Evangelical Christian Church

(A.C.), the Islamic Community, and the Jewish Community.

On the other hand, Article 16 of the same law defines the status of the

so-called “religious communities” (konfesionalne zajednice), registered

244 Vukomanovic



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048308000199


by the socialist laws in the period between 1953 and 1977. They are not

explicitly mentioned in this article, but from the Law Proposal we learn

that they are: the Christian Baptist Church, the Christian Adventist

Church, the Evangelical Methodist Church, the Pentecostal Church, the

Evangelical Christian Churches and “other religious organizations,” regis-

tered between 1953 and 1977. The Law Proposal does not specify those

“other religious organizations” and we may only speculate about their

identity. But this is only one of the numerous ambiguities of this Law.

The most important rights given to the first group of religious commu-

nities is that they may organize confessional religious education in public

schools and that they are to be registered automatically, on the basis of

their legal continuity with previous laws. The members of the second

group, however, are not allowed to administer religious education in

public schools, and have a separate and more complicated registration

procedure. At the same time, the new constitution of Serbia, adopted in

October 2006, stipulates freedom of religion, equality of all citizens

based on their religious persuasion, and forbids any discrimination what-

soever (Articles 21, 43, and 44).

Aware of those inconsistencies, several non-governmental organiz-

ations in Serbia launched their objections to various drafts of the

Serbian “Law on the Churches and Religious Communities.” We have

noted that the first draft appeared in the summer of 2004 and, since

then, six different versions had been drafted before the Proposal of the

Law found itself in the Parliament. However, even the last draft, which

evolved into an official proposal of the Law, was sharply criticized by

a group of NGOs, including the Belgrade the Center for Human

Rights, the Center for Peace and Democracy, the Center for the

Advancement of Legal Studies, Youth Initiative for Human Rights, the

Center for Peace and Democracy, and many others. In their joint state-

ment issued in April 2006, the month when the Law Proposal was

passed in the Parliament, they stated that this Law would “heavily com-

promise Serbia.” They asked the members of the Parliament to boycott

the debate on this “unconstitutional, uncivilized and worthless text.”

These organizations also objected that the Law Proposal entered the

Parliament without any public discussion. Hence, the process of “clerica-

lization” has continued in Serbia, while the state allowed the SPC to

become not only a political organization participating in the executive

power, but one of the most powerful economic institutions as well.19

The Law, thus, contains some discriminatory aspects, preventing the

registration of a religious organization the name of which includes at




https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048308000199


least part of the name of another religious organization that has already

been registered. This practically prevents the registration of all denomina-

tions with alternative names and epithets such as Orthodox, Baptist,

Adventist, etc. Applied to political parties, this would mean that no

new political party could be labeled as “democratic,” “liberal,” “civic,”

etc. — which is absurd. It is even more absurd when it comes to churches

and religious communities that frequently create new denominations.

Even more so, if we take into account the Article 6 of the Law stating:

“Churches and religious communities are free and autonomous in deter-

mining their own religious identity.”

The Law does not clarify whether an organization, which has not been

registered with the state body, still maintains its legal status, including its

right to religious organization and practice. Considering the registration

requirements, it seems that they were denied this right. Finally, the

Law leaves too much discretionary power to the state executive insti-

tutions in making decisions on many aspects of religious organization,

which is contrary to the constitution and basic religious rights and free-

doms. For example, the so-called “confessional” and “other religious

organizations” (we may only guess that the law-maker is thinking of

Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, Hare Krishna, Buddhists, Sai Baba,

Unification Church, etc.) should submit a load of documents to the

Ministry of Religious Affairs in order to be considered for registration.

Those documents include: their establishment act; the statute explaining

many details regarding their way of organization, list of organizational

units, way of administration, etc.; a summary of their religious teachings,

rituals, goals and basic activities; and the information on their sources of

funding and income (Article 18).

On the level of general objections to the new Law, I would be inclined

to submit several other arguments. In its Article 31, the new Law protects

the religious services in public institutions, such as the public schools,

but does not protect the inviolability of the autonomous and non-

denominational character of a public school. One may rightfully ask:

Where are the priorities — in the school autonomy, or protection of reli-

gious service in a public school? Why should the public school refrain

from its own inviolability and non-denominational character, in order

to protect the inviolability of the school church service?

My additional objections against this Law could be formulated as

follows: (1) A complete non-transparency of the drafting process (includ-

ing the credentials of the legislators themselves); (2) A complete lack of

the public debate; (3) An obvious partiality of the Minister of Religious

246 Vukomanovic



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048308000199


Affairs of Serbia who, albeit a state official, publicly advocated the inter-

ests of the majority religious organization — the SPC. The Minister

himself, in his interviews, speaks about four branches of authority: the

legislative, executive, judicial, and spiritual branch.20

In practice, this Law led to an “etatization” of the Serbian Church, with

an apparent partiality of the state executive power in favor of this church,

even within the group of “traditional” religious communities, not to speak

of the non-traditional ones.21

The SPC’s Experiences with Democracy

We mentioned earlier that the SPC’s first true experience with democracy

began after October 5, 2005, since when diverging views in this respect

have been voiced by high-ranking church figures and Orthodox youth

organizations. In the words of renowned theologian Radovan Bigovic:

“In the Serbian Orthodox Church there are various political ideas and

opinions on democracy. Some reject it out of hand, some accept it

without reservation, and others favor democratization, but with con-

ditions attached” (Bigovic 2000, 262).

This diversity is also visible in the official line taken by the SPC. On

the one hand, there are theologians and archbishops like Amfilohije

Radovic, who oppose western liberal democracy and favor “theo-

democracy” and “Christian democracy” (Bigovic 2000, 264).

Accordingly, the SPC’s Information Service stated: “The lethal conse-

quences of democracy are already being felt on the corpus of the Serb

people.” The Proposed National Program of the Serb Youth for the

21st Century22 also states that “genuine democracy is practically at

death’s door. The Serbs do not accept pseudo-democratic politicians

who do not respect morality (point 11)” (Anastasijevic 2004). Soon

after the October 2000 changes, the Office for Religious Education of

the SPC’s Patriarchate said that “the state must protect its essence and

its nation, to which end it must proclaim Orthodoxy as the national reli-

gion — our state must verify itself as an Orthodox state” (Brkic 2000, 8).

On the other hand, there are far more sober and better-founded views

about the church and democracy put forth by modern theologians. In his

book Crkva i drustvo (The Church and Society), Radovan Bigovic says

that “Orthodoxy is neither monarchist nor republican, neither democratic

nor republican. Orthodoxy is the Church. The church cannot be identified

with any type of state. But if we speak about principles and forms, it is




https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048308000199


quite certain that the principles and the form of a democratic state — be it

a monarchy or a republic — are far closer to the Orthodox Church than

the principles of any other state. If a state is truly law-based, free and

democratic, then the Church in it also enjoys freedom of mission and

action” (Bigovic 2000, 270).

In a purely practical and political sense, SPC clergy have not refrained

from occasionally interfering directly with democratic procedures at the

state level; one example was the election held in Kosovo in the fall of

2004, when the Synod publicly urged “all political factors in Serbia”

to “refrain from calling Serbs living in Kosovo and Metohija to take

part in elections for the authorities there.” In October 2004, Patriarch

Pavle issued a personal written appeal to the Serbian President, Boris

Tadic, and Prime Minister, Vojislav Kostunica, “not to call the remnants

of the persecuted and tormented Serb people in Kosovo and Metohija to

take part in elections for the authorities there.” Kostunica replied posi-

tively, but Tadic did urge the Kosovo Serbs to vote on October 5,

2004. On the same day, Bishop of Raska and Prizren Artemije sent out

an open letter describing Tadic’s call as “shameful” (Nosov 2005, 510).23

Interference by the church in state affairs on this scale had not been

seen since the establishment of democracy in Serbia. The SPC is now

one of the main political protagonists on the Serb side in Kosovo. The

SPC Assembly said in a message about the negotiations on the future

of Kosovo held in November 2005 that “the act of seizing Kosovo and

Metohija from Serbia, however well concealed, would be essentially tan-

tamount to occupation.”24 Moreover, during this period Bishop Artemije

aimed unusually strongly-worded and insulting words at UNMIK chief in

Kosovo Søren Jessen-Petersen.25 For the time being, the Serbian

Government does not appear to see anything wrong in the SPC’s active

and partial interference in state policies.

The Church and “Foreign Affairs”: The SPC and Orthodoxy inMacedonia and Montenegro

In spite of the outspoken opposition to Europe, the West, and the inter-

national community voiced by numerous SPC bishops, mainly in a

local context, the highest level of interference by the Serbian Orthodox

Church in affairs of the state and politics in the past few years took

place in connection with numerous inter-church and inter-state (inter-

republican) incidents in neighboring Macedonia and Montenegro; this

248 Vukomanovic



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048308000199


is all the more puzzling as both are former Yugoslav republics with

Orthodox majorities in their populations.

Let us first look at Macedonia, where we are dealing with extremely

complex inter-church relations with the canonically unrecognized

Macedonian Orthodox Church (MPC26), including the infusion of the

ecclesiastic problems and state politics in Macedonia and Serbia.

Details of the conflict can be fully understood only by experts who

have investigated it thoroughly — OSCE and Council of Europe repre-

sentatives have usually remained silent or ill-informed about the matter.27

Soon after the establishment of the Republic of Macedonia within the

Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia, the Orthodox clerics of the

church in Macedonia made their first steps toward the formation of an

Independent Macedonian Orthodox Church. At the church-national

council in Ohrid in 1958, three bishoprics seceded from the Serbian

Church. The following year, the SPC granted the use of Macedonian

language in church service and the election of the local, Macedonian

bishops. However, the Serbian patriarch remained the head of the

church. Discontent with the reactions of the SPC and contrary to the

Orthodox ecclesiastical canons, the MPC unilaterally proclaimed its auto-

cephaly in July 1967. Not surprisingly, both the SPC and the Ecumenical

Patriarchate refused to recognize this non-canonical autocephaly. The

problem was still unresolved in the early 1990s, when the Former

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was established as an independent

state. In 1995, the negotiations between the SPC and MPC were

resumed. At its own archbishops’ synod, the SPC confirmed the 1967

decision to break liturgical and ecclesiastical ties with the MPC. In

1998, negotiations between the two churches continued, this time

through the mediation of the Greek Metropolitan Hristodulos. In early

2000, Macedonian Prime Minister Georgijevski appealed to the

Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomeios to recognize the autocephaly of

the MPC, and it seems that the Greek Orthodox Church was willing to

acknowledge the MPC as the Archbishopric of Ohrid in exchange for

altering the name of the Macedonian state, which had been the major

obstacle in the diplomatic relations between Greece and Macedonia.

On the other hand, the tensions between the SPC and MPC remained.28

The essence of the current conflict between the SPC and the MPC was

aptly defined by religious analyst Mirko Djordjevic, who has described

the situation as paradoxical in many ways: “There are two churches in

Macedonia and the canonical status of neither has been resolved, while

the status of the newly-established archbishopric in the state of




https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048308000199


Macedonia also remains undefined. The paradox may be illustrated by the

following case: Archbishop Jovan, appointed from Belgrade, has been

arrested by the Macedonian authorities, his activities have been curbed,

he has no canonical territory, he has no churches and no clergy, is not

registered with the state and does not collect regular revenue in the

form of the so-called “parochial,” or tax. On the other hand, “the cano-

nically unrecognized MPC has a canonical territory on which it is

active, clergy, churches and church structure, its Synod and Assembly

. . .” (Djordjevic 2005, 9).

The unrecognized MPC is, therefore, seeking autocephaly — a full

canonical split from the SPC — while all the SPC is prepared to offer

it is autonomy. When the Macedonians refused this offer, Serbian

Patriarch Pavle issued a tomos29 from the Assembly granting autonomy

to the Orthodox Archbishopric in Ohrid,30 while the SPC suspended

communication with the MPC and “liturgical communication” with

those in Macedonia who support the MPC. After Archbishop Jovan,

who is a Macedonian citizen, was arrested again this year, a storm of

protest came from the state authorities in Serbia, which went so far

that at the request of Minister for Capital Investment, Velimir Ilic, JAT

Airlines grounded two planes leased out to Macedonia over “unpaid

debts.” By this action, Ilic assumed the authority to “implement unilateral

international sanctions” in the name of Serbia and for the SPC

(Bogdanovic 2005, 12). At the same time, when they arrested the arch-

bishop, the Macedonian authorities, even according to an independent

arbitration of the Council of Europe, violated the Constitution and

grossly breached religious freedoms.31

It would perhaps be too easy to say that the Serbian church should,

recognizing reality, by a more sober ecclesiastical policy (which would

take account of the fact that in Macedonia, the SPC does not enjoy the

support of the people, the state, believers, or the church) offer the

MPC autocephaly in exchange for a legal provision under which other

Orthodox churches (including the SPC) may be active in Macedonia.

But what then would be the reaction of the Russian church, which has

a similar canonical dispute in the Ukraine, and how would this affect

not only the SPC and the MPC, but also Russia’s relations with the

Ecumenical Patriarchate, which would have to confirm this canonical div-

ision? It is clear that things do not depend entirely on the SPC.

What was, however, within the purview of the SPC and for no good

reason turned into an international incident was the prevention of a

Macedonian state delegation, as well as Serbian state representatives,

250 Vukomanovic



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048308000199


from organizing a gathering in the Monastery of Prohor Pcinjski on

August 2, 2003, the anniversary of Macedonian statehood. A group of

Serbian Radical Party members, headed by Archbishops Irinej and

Pahomije, blocked access to the monastery and violated a bilateral agree-

ment concluded by Macedonia and Serbia.32 Relations with the state

of Macedonia improved somewhat in 2004 when (in a letter to

Macedonian President Crvenkovski) Patriarch Pavle officially authorized

a Macedonian delegation visit to Prohor Pcinjski. Especially encouraging

were the Patriarch’s words: “We open the gates to this holy place and to

our hearts,” but the very fact that the Serbian Patriarch had to give his

permission for a state visit, and that Kostunica’s government saw

nothing amiss in this meddling by the SPC in state affairs, speaks

volumes about the degree of involvement of the church in state policy.

The case with the also unrecognized Montenegrin Orthodox Church

(CPC33) is a little different. In Macedonia, the SPC has little overall

support, but in Montenegro, it has a powerful Metropolitanate and

backing among the people and in the political establishment. Both the

SPC and CPC enjoy significant political support, except that the former

also gets it from Serbia, while the latter is backed by the ruling political

structures. Those structures, in fact, legalized the activity of the CPC in

January 2000, after this church was officially registered by the police

in the historic town of Cetinje. This was a culmination of the process

which had started already in 1993, by the establishment of the Council

for the Renewal of Autocephalous Montenegrin Orthodox Church.

Again, with the political support of the Montenegrin pro-independence

Liberal Party, the Council proclaimed the autocephaly of the CPC, elect-

ing an SPC priest from Canada as the bishop of the Montenegrin Church.

However, in mid-1995, this Council ceased to exist. The new head of the

CPC, priest Miras Dedeic (who was enthroned as Metropolitan Mihailo in

1998) is also a problematic church figure, because only a year before he

had been excommunicated by the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical

Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople.34

Needless to say, the SPC never accepted the formation of the new,

Montenegrin Church. The SPC Archbishops Synod and Patriarch Pavle

repeatedly condemned this “non-canonical,” “political” entity, whereas

Metropolitan Mihailo was condemned and excluded from the Serbian

Church at the Synod session in May 1998. The SPC’s most prominent

voice in Montenegro is Metropolitan Amfilohije, outspoken just as

much against those causing divisions among Orthodox believers in

Montenegro and the local politicians. The situation was made even




https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048308000199


more complex by the Army of Serbia and Montenegro,35 which provided

logistical as well as political support for the SPC’s Metropolitanate. The

Montenegrin authorities, who were advocating full independence for the

republic, also improperly interfered in church matters and instrumenta-

lized the CPC and its non-canonically elected head, Metropolitan

Mihailo (Miras Dedeic).36

Metropolitan Amfilohije certainly did not remain beholden to anyone

when he said that Serbia and Montenegro could separate from each

other only “against the will of the people, through violence, theft, black-

mail and threats. For this reason the SPC will ignore any independence

decision in Montenegro” (Vecernje novosti, January 10, 2002).

Amfilohije openly demanded religious instruction in Montenegrin

schools, against the will of the Ministry of Education, and called

Montenegrin Parliament Speaker Krivokapic a “pseudo-brainiac”

(Amfilohije 2005, 13). He accused him of “turning the Parliament into

the private preserve of his party and creating new divisions among the

people, disgracing Montenegro before Europe and the world” (Vecernje

novosti, November 7, 2003).

In this rather unusual debate between church and state authorities,

Krivokapic replied that the SPC no longer had the privilege of deciding

who would be invited to the Parliament, and that “he [Amfilohije] is

coming from the civilizationally defeated side, both in the Second

World War and the latest Balkan war which is now on trial at The

Hague” (Danas, November 10, 2003).37 The Montenegrin media also

described the Serbian metropolitan as the “informal leader of the

Serb opposition in Montenegro and even of the People’s Party.

United with the tribal assemblies, headed by Amfilohije, the parties

of the Serbian bloc are turning Montenegro into Iran. Amfilohije is

nothing else but the Ayatollah of the Serbian Montenegro” (Monitor,

January 21, 2005).

The situation in Montenegro is additionally complicated by unofficial

tribal “guards and corps,” such as Tapuskovic’s “Serbian Corps,” alleg-

edly made up of “brigades and battalions from Vasojevici, Kolasin,

Durmitor, Boka, Zeta.” Facing them are the “Lovcen guards” of pro-

independence author Jevrem Brkovic. If we add to this the very proble-

matic nomination of nine priests from Pljevlja as martyrs of the SPC

(at least two of them are claimed to have committed crimes during

World War Two), one can well say that the SPC Metropolitanate in

Montenegro was pouring fuel on the fire ahead of the 2006 referendum

in that republic.

252 Vukomanovic



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048308000199


The role of the armed forces leadership is also problematic. The place-

ment of a tin-plate church on top of Mt. Rumija with the help of an Air

Force helicopter represents much more than the customary logistical

assistance of the military to the church, while the reaction of former

Minister of Defense Davinic that no sensationalistic importance should

be attributed to the act was a political understatement, to say the least.

How sensitive the Montenegrin authorities were to this incident can

best be gauged from this statement by the Deputy Parliament Speaker,

Dragan Kujovic: “This is not any form of sensation-seeking, but direct

and open interference in church-state relations in Montenegro. This is

an instance of open siding of the armed forces openly siding with the pol-

itical activity of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro.”

The epilogue of this religious-political quandary was that the state of

Montenegro proclaimed its independence in June 2006, while the

Serbian government (Ministry of Religious Affairs) rejected the CPC

application for registration in Serbia on December 22, 2007. The

Ministry briefly explained that the non-canonical CPC is just an associ-

ation of citizens, not a religious community, and as such it may not be

registered as a religious organization in Serbia.38 On the other hand,

the CPC operates legally in Montenegro, side by side with the Serbian

Church.

A NEW IDEOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

The Program of De-Secularization

A fear that the “true faith” will come to ruin is quite evident in the SPC

and is being manifested through open resistance to the secularization of

the contemporary world, in particular, the western world. Instead of

entering into a dialogue with that world, which it does only rarely, the

SPC opts for condemning secularization. A program for de-secularizing

Serbian society was recently announced from a high place in the SPC

hierarchy — the Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral.

Moreover, in November 2000, the SPC Information Service said that

“secularization has reduced Serbia and its people to poverty . . . and as

far as the democratic system is concerned, the bruises it has inflicted to

the body of the Serb people are still to be revealed.”39 The problem is

therefore not being seen so much in the destructive and suicidal policies

of Serbia in the 1990s, which should also be investigated by the SPC.




https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048308000199


On the other hand, enforcement — with the help of the state — of some

sort of program of de-secularization as a new political ideology is very

reminiscent of the communist era and its utopian belief that seculariza-

tion and atheism can be forced on people.

“Srpske dveri,” an organization acting with the blessing of the SPC

Patriarchate and organizing regular panels at Belgrade University’s

Faculty of Mechanical Engineering with the support of the church

periodical Pravoslavlje and the SPC Information Service, has been

openly advocating the “formation of an Orthodox public opinion.”40

Moreover, just like those of socialist realists before them, the views

of the members of Srpske dveri on art are very much ideology-based:

“In order for art to make sense it must have an Orthodox dimension”

(Lazic 2005).

The late 1980s and early 1990s in Serbia could be described sociologi-

cally as a period of de-secularization, where the phenomenon was under-

stood primarily as a social process. In this latest period under Prime

Minister Vojislav Kostunica, a significant shift is also taking place in

the direction of politicizing religion and sacralizing politics, if not even

open clericalization.41 The church is becoming increasingly visible in

the domain of politics and affairs of the state. For its part, the state is

far more cooperative toward the church than one would expect in a

secular society.

There is now a close two-way political cooperation between church

and state, although the people would perhaps expect the SPC to

involve itself more in the numerous social issues and problems burden-

ing Serbia. However, no coherent social thought is evident in the Serbian

church. There is also the problem of unresolved relations with the crim-

inalized state — the SPC does not, however, appear to see any major

problem here, instead focusing its efforts on speaking out against secu-

larization, democratization of society, the civil sector and NGOs. If we

examine statements made by high-ranking SPC figures and those

issued by the Information Service, it is clear that the church sees secu-

larization as an evil which has befallen society. The statements are

sometimes ambivalent and even contradictory. If, however, we look at

their cumulative effect, we may observe a demonization of secular

society and small religious communities, as well as a negative attitude

toward democracy and secularization. All of this is present in the official

phraseology of the SPC. It is, in fact, an orientation and direction which

indicates the manner in which the church views this society and

perceives the state.

254 Vukomanovic



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048308000199


The Church, the Military, the Media

It has already been mentioned that the Army of Serbia and Montenegro

(and now — Army of Serbia) almost overnight embraced Orthodoxy, a

new ideology and cultural and historical mission. It is clear that immedi-

ately after the October 2000 shift, a long-term link was established, while

several events attracted the attention of the public, the media, and ana-

lysts. Late in December 2000, immediately after the SPC demanded

that religious education be introduced in Serbian public schools as a man-

datory subject, the Office for Morale of the General Staff of the then

Army of Yugoslavia (VJ) organized a round-table gathering at which it

called for Orthodox chaplains to be attached to VJ units. Speakers in

the forum emphasized the importance of Orthodox Christianity for

national culture and history, as well as the state-building role of the

SPC. Soon after this formal VJ-SPC meeting, the church named

Bishop Porfirije as its official representative for relations with the

armed forces. In April 2002, Porfirije headed a group of fifty VJ officers

visiting Mt. Athos (the Chilandar and Vatoped monasteries and Saint

Sava’s hermitage in Karyes).42 Some activities of the military in this

period are listed in a text entitled “The Army in Chilandar” published

in the weekly Vojska after Christmas 2003:

“It will certainly remain on record that several organized visits of groups

of VJ officers were made to Mount Athos and the Chilandar monastery.

They also took part in welcoming the Patriarch of Alexandria Peter VII

when he visited the Serbian Orthodox Church, in the Holy Savior’s Day

procession in Belgrade, in the reception of the icon of the Virgin in the

monastery of Grgeteg on Mount Fruska Gora, the transfer to Krusevac

of some of the relics of the Holy Prince Lazar from the Ravanica monas-

tery, and in other church festivities. They unselfishly helped in the restor-

ation of numerous churches and monasteries and the construction of roads

or water-supply systems to them, and provided a major contribution to the

marking of the 750th anniversary of the Moraca monastery.”43

Activities of this sort continued in 2004, in the Vavedenje monastery near

Cacak, when the first official post-World War Two collective baptism of

officers and soldiers of an army unit in Serbia took place. But the greatest

public impact in this period was certainly that of the army officers present

at the celebration of the 200th anniversary of the First Serbian Uprising

against the Turks in Belgrade on February 14, 2004. One of the speakers

at the so-called “spiritual commemoration,” hosted by the Srpski sabor




https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048308000199


Dveri organization, was Colonel Rade Rajic, Professor at the Military

Academy.

Featuring much nationalist rhetoric, Colonel Rajic’s address fit very

well into the overall atmosphere of the gathering: “After the First

World War . . . it is a fact that among the Slovenes, and especially

among Croats and the then Serbs of Muhammadan faith, there never

was any affinity or mutual military and historical assistance, but only

waging war against the Serbs and Serb-hood as a whole . . . universal

treason in the army above all by a majority of Croats, but also

Slovenes, ethnic Hungarians and ethnic Albanians, and Serbs of

Muslim faith, became a reality . . . During World War Two the foun-

dations of a new Yugoslavia and a new social and political order were

laid. As in the First World War period, there was a pronounced tendency

to suppress and minimize the achievements of the Serbs in the fight

against the enemy . . . We must also not forget the war events between

1991 and 1999, the officers and soldiers, volunteers who laid down

their lives in the defense of their own people and their ancient hearths.

These brilliant people, those who are known and those who are not,

can proudly stand shoulder to shoulder with Karadjordje, Milos, God

and the people” (Anastasijevic 2004).

Officers of the VJ, and later the Army of Serbia and Montenegro and

still later the Army of Serbia, who until very recently served the idea

of Yugoslavism and its ideology of brotherhood and unity and drew

credit from an anti-fascist tradition, seem to be gradually changing

their outlook on religion and nation. Instead of brotherhood and

unity, now only the historical achievements of the Serbian people

are being emphasized, and the contributions of the fascists and of

the anti-fascists in World War Two are — quite in the spirit of the

new state policy — now being viewed as equal. From looking

toward the future as a classless society and communism, the army’s

ideology is gradually shifting toward religion and eschatology:

toward the testament of Kosovo, the tradition of Saint Sava and the

heavenly Serbia. But although a significant ideological transformation

is taking place, an antagonistic terminology has been preserved and the

difference between us and them is always emphasized. In this context,

the SPC can offer an almost dualistic rhetoric which can often be

heard at para-religious gatherings and spiritual commemorations.

Like the “special war” that was constantly being waged against the

then Yugoslavia during Tito’s era, in some so-called “national”

media and interviews with SPC elders, another “special war” is

256 Vukomanovic



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048308000199


mentioned which new “anti-religion ideologues, atheists and New-

Agers” are waging against the church and the army.44

In the past year, the media also focused on the links between SPC cler-

gymen and paramilitary groups which committed war crimes in Bosnia.

The most controversial case was that of hieromonk Gavrilo, based in Sid,

who had blessed members of the “Scorpions” group some time before the

war crimes were committed near Srebrenica; that video footage was

shown in the War Crimes Tribunal at the Hague as part of evidence

against the “Scorpions” and the shots of the execution of young

Bosnian Moslems were widely broadcast.

Members of the “Scorpions,” blessed by monk Gavrilo from the

Privina glava monastery in the aforementioned footage, soon after exe-

cuted a group of Moslems they had captured. Of additional concern

was the fact that the church did not see any need to speak out in connec-

tion with the case immediately; it took more than ten days for the SPC to

issue a statement entitled “Gospode, ne ponovilo se” (Lord, Let it Never

Happen Again) which only partially eased the shock felt by those who

had watched the horrific footage and asked themselves if the SPC had

anything to do with the said crime. As a rule, the SPC never sees any

need to make additional comments, or, for that matter, to interpret official

communiques issued after assemblies and its media statements, thereby

placing the people of Serbia in a completely passive position.

Concerning the SPC’s relations with the media, it is interesting to note

that Bishop Porfirije liaises not only with the armed forces, but also with

the media. The Bishop is a member of the Serbian Radio Broadcasting

Council in charge of religious media, but is also empowered to participate

in decision-making in connection with the lay media. In his capacity as a

representative of the SPC, Bishop Porfirije also represents the other, non-

Orthodox religious communities and, despite the church-state separation,

he takes part in making decisions regarding the non-religious public

media.

The SPC has its own Information Service, but, according to the influ-

ential Bishop of Backa Irinej Bulovic, it suffers from serious personnel

problems preventing it from improving its relations with the media

(Bulovic 2004, 170). Well known for a relatively rigid stance toward jour-

nalists, Bishop Irinej has complained that “some domestic media are

casual, even excessively free, in their approach to cooperation with the

Church or other religious communities — as if there was no serious onto-

logical or existential difference between any public organization and the

Church as an institution sui generis. . . (Ibid).




https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048308000199


Notwithstanding excessive sycophancy of the media and their journal-

ists toward SPC clergy (far more pronounced than in the case of poli-

ticians, show business figures and sports celebrities), Bishop Bulovic

demands a special status for the church in the media. At the same

time, at his initiative, the SPC has for some years barred a religious

affairs correspondent of the daily Danas from attending its events,

most probably because she had written a portrait of the Bishop he had

not found especially flattering. At the same time, the Bishop does not

find it necessary to reflect on the language of hatred and insults hurled

out in public by some other SPC bishops from time to time.45 But they

are the ones who, much more than journalists, should protect the repu-

tation of the SPC as an institution sui generis.

THE SPC AND SERBIAN SOCIETY

From the People to Society

In the aftermath of October 5, the SPC began increasingly offering a new

ideological framework for state institutions such as the army and the edu-

cation system, filling — at its own initiative, but also with the support of

the state — the ideological void created after the fall of communism. But

its more important, social role remains far from clear. A lot of public

space available for religious communities (philanthropy, endowments,

humanitarian and social work, etc.) remains unfilled, while both conser-

vative politicians and church hierarchy are finding it easy to politicize or

instrumentalize the church.

An even more serious problem is the lack of genuine contact between

the SPC and society in Serbia, i.e., civil society of autonomous individ-

uals with their rights, separate interests and diverse identities created by

living in the contemporary plural world. Although the SPC has managed

to establish very solid relations with the Serbian state since October 5, it

still has no real contact with (civil) society, as for example, the Roman

Catholic Church had in Poland before the fall of communism. SPC

clergy do keep talking about the people, but this is an almost metaphys-

ical category, an undifferentiated collective, a “mass,” which is a concept

that apparently suits the current “tribal” character of the SPC very well

(Rak 2005), not to mention any sort of more positive perception of

secular society and its organizations and initiatives that are often demo-

nized in public.46

258 Vukomanovic



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048308000199


But what are the real problems and interests of society in Serbia, what

are the political, social, economic, and cultural proclivities of its citizens?

No coherent debate has been voiced in the SPC on such issues, at least not

an open debate. Official SPC documents make only scanty references to

the citizens of Serbia, or, for that matter, to society, almost always refer-

ring to the people. On the one hand, this points to a certain level of

inability within the SPC to cope with the new circumstances, but on

the other, there is a visible and well-defined political philosophy and

ideology which, for decades, stood far in the background while the

church remained hidden from the public eye in socialism. What ideology

are we talking about?

We have already mentioned the interview the Minister of Religious

Affairs gave to Pravoslavlje. Besides its emphatically “patriotic” and

“traditionalistic” tone, and the classical incomprehension of the contem-

porary concept of religious freedoms (in an institution which should have

more knowledge of those freedoms than any other), the minister’s orga-

nicistic perception of the church in the spirit of Nikolaj Velimirovic’s

essays from the 1930s, is also of note:

“The problem is therefore to enact a law which will be modern, which will

have to say that every normal democratic state today understands that the

Church organization is more powerful, more profound and older than any

other organization, because the Church has outlived numerous states and

remained one and the same, while society changed all the time. There is

now awareness that democratic society has to recognize the Church as a

constant. It is an organism which is permanent and a guidepost for the

state (emph. M.V.). In any case, although the state does not want to

guide itself and organize relations according to the teachings of the

Church, it may under no circumstances bring into question the organiz-

ation of the Church” (Radulovic 2005).

Several things may be of interest to an unbiased reader of this excerpt.

The Minister — in his capacity as a civil servant in a democratic and

secular Government in which the church is separate from the state —

utters, from his official position, an entirely clerical view that the

church is a guidepost for the state. The minister certainly referred

mainly to the SPC when he said that “every normal democratic state

today understands that the Church organization is more powerful, more

profound and older than any other organization.”

Where is the source of such organicistic views about the church and the

state that have found a place for themselves as guiding ideas in state




https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048308000199


institutions? In a lecture entitled “Saint Sava’s nationalism” held in

Belgrade in 1935, Nikolaj Velimirovic (besides his most often cited

panegyric to Hitler) presented a perception of the Church that has appar-

ently deeply affected Minister Radulovic. Here is an excerpt from

the speech:

“This Saint Sava’s nationalism encompasses the people’s church, the

people’s dynasty, the people’s state, the people’s education, the people’s

culture and the people’s defense. The foundation and centre of all of

Saint Sava’s nationalism is the people’s church. It is like a spirit which

revives the entire people’s organism . . . History books say that nationalism

in Europe awakened and became reality starting from the Hungarian upris-

ing in 1848. If that is true, then Serbian nationalism is no less than 600

years older than European nationalism. Not only older, but more perfect,

because it is evangelical and organic” (Djordjevic 2003, 57ff).

Just like modern SPC theologians and the Minister of Religious Affairs,

Velimirovic sees Serbian society as a people’s organism encompassing

the church and the state (monarchy), including state institutions like the

armed forces and the education system, with the SPC as the center of

that organism. As we have seen, not only some very important decisions

of the authorities in Serbia, but the increasing involvement of the SPC in

the sphere of education, culture and national defense are founded on the

ideology of this leading theologian and recently canonized saint. Views

of this kind are now often heard at Orthodox-national youth gatherings

and in the rhetoric of SPC elders — Patriarch Pavle, Metropolitan

Amfilohije, Bishop Atanasije and others.47 In an interview to Danas

given on the eve of Christmas 2002, Patriarch Pavle asked, in a similar

spirit: “Are the parties sufficiently mature for social relations to be

organic, like in a body where every organ performs its own function

with which it is tasked for the overall benefit of the organism? And the

organism as a whole has no other interest than the good of each of its

organs . . . the Church has always favored such organic relationship in

society” (Danas, January 5–7, 2002).

The Church and Civil Society

As we have seen, the SPC improved its contacts with the Serbian state

and its institutions very soon after the democratic changes. But the com-

plexity of the modern Serbian society was understood much less.

260 Vukomanovic



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048308000199


Concepts like citizenry and civil society are almost completely absent

from the speech of SPC clergy, its media and Information Service, and

when they do appear they are almost always used in a negative context.

Public statements of some NGOs about SPC activities are in a similar

tone. One could in fact say that the gulf between the SPC and civil

society organizations (especially NGOs involved in human rights) is

bigger than that existing between the platforms of any two political

parties in Serbia. At issue here is prejudice and distorted views on both

sides, whereas a less biased debate about existing structural ties and simi-

larities between religious institutions and civil society organizations

could open up new room for cooperation and dialogue between these

two important segments of society. In that context, we can also view

the linkage between the concept of religion and the concept of civil

society, as a collective concept based on the notion of a free and con-

scious individual, a citizen with inalienable human rights who partici-

pates together with other free and conscious individuals in initiating

and realizing various civic initiatives (Molnar 2003, 48).

Let us first consider some parallels and overlaps which certainly exist

between religious institutions and civil society organizations, both of

whom are part of the “third” sector, the non-profit and non-governmental

segments of society. Institutionally, both are independent from the state

(except in the case of state religions and churches) and have an important

place in local communities, where citizens, believers meet daily. Both are

involved in different ways in social work, humanitarian activities, charity

activities; both establish foundations and stimulate a philanthropic spirit.

Where there is no political pluralism and the civil sector is weak, reli-

gious organizations can assume a more overt political role, for

example, in Latin American dictatorships (e.g., liberation theology), or

in Russia, where religious dissent was pronounced in the 1970s and

1980s. In both these cases, Christian churches assumed at least part of

the burden shouldered in other countries by civil society organizations,

especially those with a human rights agenda.

Religious freedoms and rights are part of the set of universal human

rights (freedom of thought, conscience and religion), which means that

churches and NGOs could also find common ground and cooperate

here. The Enlightenment, at least where western civilization is concerned,

certainly represented one of the turning points in the modern, and later

also post-modern, perception of religious pluralism as a desirable frame-

work in which the concept of religious freedoms and rights, including the

legal distinction between the state and religious communities, comes




https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048308000199


into its full expression. By its nationalism, secularism and religious indi-

vidualism, the Enlightenment certainly contributed to the expansion of

the concept of religious tolerance and its more positive definition (in

contrast to the minimalistic definition of tolerance as merely enduring

the existence of others, including other religions). In modern liberal-

democratic states and their religious freedoms legislations, inter-religious

tolerance has that more positive and broader definition, implying a more

active and dynamic attitude toward religious diversity in the state.

One should finally point out the importance of religious organizations

and peace-building NGOs in the sphere of inter-religious dialogue and

reconciliation. In the 1980s and 1990s, a significant change took place

in the perception of religion as a factor of reconciliation and conflict.

Three major factors are usually mentioned: the expansion of fundamen-

talist tendencies in world religions; the role of Christian churches in

radical changes that took place in some central and eastern European

countries (in particular Poland); and the expansion of ecumenical pro-

cesses worldwide in the 1980s (Stobe 1999, 29). The consequence

today is that religious conflicts no longer have chiefly non-religious

causes, but are also seen as an independent factor, emphasizing an

increased importance of inter-religious dialogue.

CONCLUSION

Unlike the Roman Catholic Church, the Eastern Orthodox Church is not

an independent political entity; historically, it has always been dependent

on the state. And the state is a more powerful partner in that relationship.

During the four years of Kostunica’s rule in Serbia, the SPC has become

a major player in Serbian politics. More importantly, Kostunica and the

SPC have a very similar, conservative vision of the Serbian society.

During the last four years, such conservatism has already resulted in

slowing down the political and economic reforms in Serbia, worsening

bilateral relations with the neighboring states and hindering the country’s

accession to the EU. In one of his recent statements, Metropolitan

Amfilohije, the most powerful Serbian bishop, stated pretentiously,

with much exaggeration, that “all that is healthy in Europe was born on

the soil between Jerusalem, Athens and Constantinople, and that is

what was translated into what we call Western Europe” (Amfilohije

2005, 14). Consequently, since Serbia was always in Europe and has

had its place there, there is no reason to rush into the EU.48

262 Vukomanovic



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048308000199


In political as well as ecclesiastical circles in Serbia, one may witness

an open inclination toward the etatization of the SPC. Officially, it is not

a state church, but de facto it enjoys all the privileges of such an insti-

tution. Within the SPC, there is a lot of resistance to democracy and

Europe manifested through emphasizing the anti-European discourse of

bishops-saints such as Nikolaj Velimirovic. Today, some SPC bishops

attack the so-called Serbian “Euro-whiners” (i.e., the ones that “thirst”

for Europe) and receive ovations at the public panels. One may also

observe fierce criticism of civil society and non-governmental organiza-

tions, as well as ordinary citizens who want to take part in European

values and standards. The church opts for a monistic pattern that

reminds one of Communism — notwithstanding the condemnation of

the Communist heritage within the church circles: the same authoritarian

pattern and model are visible there, it seems that only ideology is

different.

According to this pattern of political philosophy, an authoritarian

model (Communism and the Milosevic regime) should be replaced by

another — patriarchal, quasi-democratic model of sobornost (conciliar-

ity, congregationalism). This ecclesiastical ideology has all the elements

of a conservative, right-wing nationalism, with the elements of an ethnic

and religious fundamentalism. The revival of the monistic testamentary

model at the outset of the twenty-first century by returning to the ninteeth

century Slavophile principle of sobornost, very much embraced by Prime

Minister Kostunica’s government,49 is a consequence of abandoning the

modern pluralistic concept of society which is the heritage of the

European Enlightenment. No wonder, then, that the Serbian government

and the SPC have recently oriented themselves heavily toward Putin’s

Russia.

In line with this pro-Russian, anti-Western policy, the greatest criticism

is now reserved for Serbian educators, or “new ideologues,” “Euro-

whiners,” “New-Agers,” independent intellectuals and activists in NGOs.

In a completely new metaphysical and Manichean tone, the views of

those “New-Agers” are rejected as non-Christian, anti-Christian, pro-

globalization and pro-western, even pro-Communist.50 The concept of

pluralistic society, which is, contrary to the archaic concept of congrega-

tionalism, being advocated by those “anti-church ideologues,” implies, cer-

tainly, political, social, cultural and religious pluralism as the heritage of

the Enlightenment and the modern liberal-democratic state.

Apart from its Euro-skepticism, the SPC expresses an anti-ecumenical

stance toward inter-church and inter-religious dialogue. Roughly speaking,




https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048308000199


the SPC today is dominated by two attitudes toward ecumenism. The first

of them is an extreme (and minority) view of ecumenism as a “pan-

heresy,” while, in turn, heresy is everything that is not Orthodox. The

second viewpoint opens some space for developing the ecumenical

relations with the Roman Catholic Church, and perhaps some other tra-

ditional religious communities in Serbia (e.g., the Lutheran and

Reformed Christian churches). However, it is difficult to observe any open-

ness toward the new religious minorities even within the limited number of

liberal church circles. This applies mainly to evangelical denominations

that are publicly discriminated by both the church and the state and

labeled as sects or even the Satanist influence of the West. Concerning

the Muslims and Jews in Serbia, one could occasionally witness anti-

Jewish and anti-Muslim discourse coming from the ranks of some extre-

mist SPC priest or even bishops.

Altogether, such a conservative church position on political, social and

cultural issues, wholeheartedly supported by Kostunica’s government,

has recently brought Serbia close to the edge of a new international iso-

lation. In fact, the current government, in symphony with the SPC, seems

to opt for its own political and cultural self-isolation. This post-

communist church-state symbiosis entirely depends on the will of the

current political structures. Much like the Milosevic government during

the last years of his reign, Kostunica’s cabinet keeps itself alive

through the reproduction of crises. After the political and diplomatic sol-

ution of the Kosovo stale-mate, Kostunica will have to take his “last

stand”. And Serbia will have to choose, once again in its recent

history, between the pro-Western, pro-European future and pointless iso-

lation in the heart of the Balkans.

NOTES

1. If the religious elements were more important in this context, religion should have been singledout, as a significant factor, in the process of stabilization of South Eastern Europe. This would, atleast, apply to official documents, such as the Dayton Agreement or the Stability Pact for SouthEastern Europe. Interestingly enough, religion is mentioned only a few times in the DaytonAgreement in a rather general context (in the Constitution and Annex on Human Rights), whereasin the Stability Pact religion and churches are not mentioned at all.

2. Djindjic was assassinated in March 2003 by the members of the former Milosevic’s secretpolice. This assassination caused a significant turmoil in the Serbian political life, the consequencesof which are still felt today.

3. From the Serbian, Srpska Pravoslavna Crkva.4. In this text the Serbian Orthodox Church is viewed primarily as a religious organization whose

doctrines, as well as the social and political position, are promoted by its highest institutions (theBishops’ Assembly, the Bishops’ Synod and others), and by its elders — the Patriarch and other

264 Vukomanovic



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048308000199


SPC bishops. This is, therefore, a article about the church in a sociological and politological, ratherthan theological or metaphysical context.

5. See, for example the London Economist: “Rendering unto Caesar” (The Economist, September8, 2005), or, for example, Ambassador William Montgomery’s article “The Threat of ReligiousNationalism in Serbia,” Danas (September 24–25, 2005). OSCE envoys voiced their criticism con-cerning several versions of the preliminary draft of the law on religious freedom in July andSeptember 2004, while the Council of Europe has recently included the SPC activities in its moni-toring of this country.

6. In the Kingdom of Serbia the SPC was a national church, while in the Kingdom of Yugoslaviathere was no constitutional separation of church and state.

7. For example, if accession to the EU is Serbia’s goal, can the SPC, or any other religious com-munity, speak out against Europe and thereby cause confusion and divisions among the believers inSerbia?

8. For the list of those seven traditional religious comunities see the next section of this article. Inits request of November 2000, the SPC did not specify which communities should be granted theiraccess to religious education in public schools. The Bishops’ Assembly just presented the request ofits own church (SPC).

9. For example, the Christian Adventist Church and the Baptist Church in Serbia could also beconsidered traditional, due to their historical presence in this country. They even have a theologicalfaculty in Novi Sad where they educate ministers for teaching catechism. However, they were notallowed to conduct religious education in public schools.

10. The Yugoslav Committee of Jurists for Human Rights (JUKOM), the FORUM IURIS, civicassociation based in Novi Sad, and a Belgrade-based lawyer.

11. See Popovic Ljubomir and Zorica Vitorovic-Umicevic: Referat za javnu raspravu (2003) u pre-dmetima IU-177/01, IU-213/02 i IU-214/02, Constitutional Court, Belgrade.

12. Veronauka, Danas online, November 5, 2003. ,http://www.danas.co.yu/20031105/frontpage1.html.; Izbor odbranio ustavnost, Dnevnik online, November 6, 2003 ,http://www.dnevnik.co.yu/arhiva/06-11-2003/Strane/drustvo.htm..

13. TV interview with Cedomir Jovanovic, Insajder, B 92 ( April 13, 2005).14. There was an inherent ambiguity related to Article 16 of the 2004 draft and the Minister

himself interpreted it differently on various occasions. For example, one version of this draftstated (Article 17): “The clergy and religious dignitaries enjoy the same immunity as national depu-ties and judges. Their immunity can be revoked only by the Supreme Court of Serbia acting on ajustified request from a public prosecutor.” One of the subsequent interpretations, which came as aresult of a fierce polemics with the Minister and law-maker, was: immunity related to confessiononly. Eventually, the entire draft was withdrawn as biased and ambiguous. The final, 2006 versionof the Law (Article 8) reads: “Priests and religious officials are free and independent in administeringtheir religious services in accordance with the law and autonomous right of a church or a religiouscommunity. . .Priests and religious officials cannot be held responsible before state bodies for theirreligious services conducted in accordance with line 3 of this Article” (i.e., previous line — M.V.).

15. Terms like “bogosluzbeni, bogomolje, svestenosluzitelji, verski dostojanstvenici, zaristaduhovnosti, duhovna misija” [Note: untranslatable into English while preserving the originalOrthodox spirit] are part of the Christian Orthodox vocabulary much more than of the normal every-day spoken language.

16. The integral text of the preliminary draft from 2004 is available at: www.sanoptikum.org.yu/drustvo/o_nama/pravni_akti/zakon_o_slobodi_vere.html.

17. In the words of the minister: “The problem is not in that they [the minor religious commu-nities] should be given that freedom, but in that they believe that the SPC must be brought downonto their level, that it must be equal with them. All the discussions which we have amount totrying to show them that all in Serbia have the same rights, but that they are not equal, theycannot be equal. This is not allowed by tradition, people do not allow it. We cannot fulfill thewishes of the two per cent of the population who are adherents of new religions and do ill to the98% of those who belong to traditional churches. It is a veritable seesaw on which we are still strug-gling, but the essential thing is the following: this Government is determined, at least I am deter-mined, not to enact a law which will not recognize our tradition, which will not recognize theSPC as the exponent of a nation-building and cultural conscience of the Serb people, which willnot recognize our entire tradition; we will not adopt a law which will not establish continuity




https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048308000199


between the laws of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and this modern law, and we will not accept whateveryone else has accepted, even the Russians — a law on religions dictated by the Americans”(Radulovic 2005).

18. Danas (January 11, 2006), p. 7.19. For example, the SOC had already come forth as a political actor with its interference in the

Kosovo negotiations, and the diplomatic relations with Macedonia and Montenegro. In all thesecases, its role was counterproductive and detrimental.

20. No wonder, then, that he was recently decorated with the Medal of Saint Sava, the highest dec-oration of the SOC.

21. The latest example of open violation of religious freedoms and rights by the SerbianGovernment is its Regulation published in Sluzbeni glasnik late in 2005 on an obligatory postal sur-charge from January 11, 2006 in the form of a postage stamp revenue from which would go for theconstruction of the St. Sava Temple in Belgrade. The 8-dinar stamp will be mandatory until July 8,2006 and will have a monthly circulation of three million. Revenue will be sent directly to the SPCSynod and earmarked for the completion of the works on the interior decoration of the Temple. TheRegulation states that the revenue will be used in accordance with a program adopted by the Synodand approved by the Serbian Government. By this regulation the state has imposed on all its citizenswho use postal services (letters, postcards, greetings cards etc.) an obligation — whether they want toor not (!)— to finance the building of a religious facility used by only one religious community inSerbia. Freedom of religion is being threatened here in several ways: all those using the saidpostal services are forced to support a single religious community, whether they want to or norand whether or not they are religious believers. Secondly, non-Orthodox believers in Serbia, along-side all others, are forced to pay for the construction of an edifice of a community to which they donot belong. In this case the Serbian Government has unambiguously breached the Constitution — theprinciple of separation of church and state — and also the principle of equality before the law andnon-discrimination of non-Orthodox religious communities. Accordingly, the citizens of Serbiamay file a complaint against their own Government with the Constitutional Court of Serbia in con-nection with violations of freedom of religion, and could thereafter look for a remedy from theEuropean Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg!

22. For more details of the Program, see 2.1.23. In his interview for the Serbian daily Glas javnosti, Bishop Artemije commented, again, on

President Tadic’s refusal to defend Kosovo by armed forces, calling this openly an act of“treason.” See Glas javnosti, October 25, 2007.

24. Danas, November 5–6, 2005, p. 3.25. Pescanik B92, October 18, 2005.26. From the Serbian, Makedonska Pravoslavna Crkva.27. Only recently (October 21, 2005) has the Council of Europe spoken out in connection with the

arrest of Archbishop Jovan in Macedonia, in written declaration No. 271. The Council demanded thatthe authorities of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia “stop exerting pressure on” BishopJovan. The Council also stated that the arrest had resulted in gross violations of the principles embo-died in Articles 9, 14, and 15 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights andFundamental Freedoms, as well as relevant UN documents and even the Macedonian Constitution(Source: HRWF.net, International Secretariat Brussels).

28. For more historical details regarding the Macedonian church schism see Ramet and Pavlakovic2005, 268–271.

29. A religious decree regulating doctrinal issues in the area of Christology.30. Nominally, the archbishopric has jurisdiction over three monasteries and about 30 monks and

nuns in Macedonia. In 2003, the archbishop was appointed exarch for the territory of Macedonia, atitle suggesting non-recognition of Macedonia as an independent state and arousing in the publicmemories of territorial aspirations once voiced in Bulgaria.

31. In the past, a number of SPC clergymen trying to travel through Macedonia, wearing their cle-rical attire, encountered problems from the Macedonian authorities.

32. For more about this incident and its consequences, see Micunovic 2005.33. From the Serbian, Crnogorska Pravoslavna Crkva.34. The facsimile of the “Anathema on Miras Dedeic” with signatures of members of The Holy

Synod of the Ecumenical Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople is available at: http://www.njegos.net/en/studies/mirasdedeicanathema/index.html?=mirasdedeicanathema.html.

266 Vukomanovic



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048308000199


35. Now Army of Serbia.36. Dedeic first entered the Montenegrin Parliament on Saint Peter of Cetinje day, in 2003. He

claims that the SPC clergy in Montenegro express no loyalty at all for Montenegro and hopes that astate based on law will turn them in that direction, as, in his words, the SPC finds it hard to relinquishclericalism, clerical nationalism, counter-secularity and philetism (Srbija 2004, 2005, 60). According tohim, the SPC “cannot rid itself of its re-feudalized, inquisitional conscience aiming to enslave every-thing outside its own preserve and abolish it in a human sense.”

37. Ljudska prava i odgovornost, 2004, 60.38. Danas, January 8, 2008, 4.39. Novosti of the SPC Information Service (November 24, 2000).40. First Assembly of Orthodox Journalists, held at the Faculty of Theology in Belgrade.41. We must of course differentiate between the colloquial use of the term clericalization in texts

and media statements (where it is used rather loosely to designate the Government’s efforts bringingthe SPC closer to the state) and the purely terminological use of clericalism and clericalization (e.g.,in Slobodan G. Markovic: Klerikalizam u Srbiji: mit ili stvarnost? Markovic 2005). For example, theterm pluralism is often used colloquially to designate plurality (e.g., of religious or ethnic commu-nities), while terminologically pluralism means more than mere plurality or diversity: it is a positiveattitude to plurality as such. In the Serbian context, a more proper designation for the current church-government relations would, in my opinion, be etatization of the SPC. For a more precise use of theterms clericalism and clerical democracy see Sabrina P. Ramet (2007, 71–72).

42. Vreme, No. 609 (5 September 2002).43. Vojska, No. 571 11 (January 1, 2003).44. See, for example, Bishop Porfirije’s interview in Evropa nacija, No. 925, published under the

title ‘People Thirst for a True God’.45. It is of very much concern that figures in the SPC, and in particular its para-clerical organiz-

ations, have become very lax to use a language full of abuses, insults and unfounded accusations,dominated by bias, rudeness, lack of tolerance for different thinking and proscribing people and insti-tutions not fitting in their own model of the true faith and Serb-hood. It is sufficient to look at thewebsites of organizations such as ‘Obraz’ or ‘Srpske dveri’. Not only that they reek of racism anddiscrimination against people on religious and ethnic grounds, but are also packed with a completelynew type of aggressiveness whose framework probably represents the program of desecularization ofsociety, recently broadcast by church elders (Metropolitan Amfilohije, Bishop Atanasije, BishopFilaret and others), themselves very keen to use terms like preudo-brainiac, Euro-whiners, traitors,scoundrels, rascals and similar. An NGO called Gradjanske inicijative (Civic Initiatives) has filed acriminal complaint in connection with an anti-Islamic racist speech made by Bishop Atanasije Jevticin Valjevo in the spring of 2004 (See also the next footnote).

46. In a communique dated November 24, 2000, the SPC Information Service reacts to a statementof the Helsinki Human Rights Committee in Serbia that “the initiative of the Serbian OrthodoxChurch and FRY President Vojislav Kostunica to introduce religious instruction in the educationsystem is a serious violation of the principle of a secular state.” Employing archaic medieval termi-nology, the SPC describes the disputed statement as “the fear of Satan and all his followers in the pastsix decades — manifested in every place under the heavens of a land which only in name representedwhat the concept of Serbia comprises in the all-encompassing sense of that word” (Novosti,November 24, 2000.).

47. For the religious origins of Serbian organictistic thinking see Djordjevic 2003.48. Criticized for supporting “[Prime Minister] Kostunica’s snail’s pace towards Europe,”

Amfilohije answers readily: “What is quick is always half-baked. One should always consider verycarefully where one is going . . . I think that in this journey Kostunica is the most sober becauseEurope as well does not need lackeys, beggars and manipulators . . . Must we be sycophants tothat Europe by renouncing that by which we are recognizable?” (Amfilohije 2005, 14).

49. The term “concentration government” and similar notions are very much in the spirit of thestyle of the current Serbian government. This, actually, means that all the political parties, notwith-standing their ideological and political differences should unite in a single “national salvation” gov-ernment in the times of crisis. Kostunica expressed this view shortly after the assassination of PrimeMinister Zoran Djindjic in March 2003.

50. This mainly relates to their secularism, which is misinterpreted as a remnant of Communistatheism.




https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048308000199


REFERENCES

Aleksov, Bojan. 2004. Veronauka u srbiji (Religious Education in Serbia). Nis: JUNIR.Amfilohije, Metropolitan. 2005. “Nisam sposoban da upotrebim blagu rec” (I Am Not

Able to Use a Kind Word). Evropa, August 25.Anastasijevic, Dejan. 2004. “Kruna, mac i mantija” (Crown Sword and Uniform). Vreme,

February 19.Bigovic, Radovan. 2000. Crkva i drustvo (Church and Society). Belgrade: Hilandarski

Fond.Biserko, Sonja. 2004. Ljudska prava i odgovornost: Srbija 2003 (Human Rights and

Responsibility: Serbia, 2003). Belgrade: Helsinski odbor za ljudska prava U Srbiji.Biserico, Sonja. 2005. Srbija 2004. Belgrade: Helsinski Odbor Za Ljudska Prava U Srbiji.Bogdanovic, Srboljub. 2005. “Bog i batina” (God and Baton). NIN, August 4.Brkic, Aleksandra. 2000. “Veroucitelji spremni da drze dnevnik” (Religious Instructors

and Ready for Class). Politika, December 3:8.Bulovic, Irinej. 2004. “Srpska pravoslavna crkva, mediji i demokratija” (Serbian

Orthodox Church, the Media and Democracy). In: Crkva, verske zajednice, mediji idemokratija, ed. D. Valic-Nedeljuovic. Novi Sad: Medijske.

Dejzings, Ger. 2005. Religija i identitet na Kosovu (Religion and Identity). Belgrade: XXVek.

Djordjevic, Mirko. 2005. “Borba za kanonske teritorije” (Fighting for CononicalTerritieries). Republika, August 31: 362–363.

Djordjevic, Mirko. 2005a. “Sekularizam i klerikalizam” (Secularism and Clericalism).Republika, December 31: 370–371.

Djordjevic, Mirko, ed. 2003. Srpska konzervativna misao (Serbian Consevative Thought).Belgrade: Helsinski Odbor Za Ljudska Prava.

Lazic, Nikola. 2005. “Sabor pravoslavne omladine jugoistocne Srbije: Krivac hari poter”(The Assembly of the Orthodox Youth of Southeastern Serbia: Harry Potter is Guilty).Danas, September 24.

Markovic, Slobodan. 2005. “Klerikalizam u srbiji: Mit ili stvarnost?” Nova srpskapoliticka misao, Analize 4:15–27.

Micunovic, Dragoljub. 2005. “Ciji je beli andeo? (Where is the White Angel?). In Zasto se ucrkvi sapuce?, eds. S. Lukic, and S. Vukovic. Belgrade: Fabrika knjiga.

Molnar, Aleksandar. 2003. “Civilno drustvo” (Civil Society). In Kriticki pojmovnikcivilnog drustva (I), eds. Vukadinovic Djordje and Krstic Predrag, pp. 484.Belgrade: Gupta.

Nosov, Andrej, ed. 2005. Journalists Can Do It, Belgrade and Prishtina: Youth Initiativefor Human Rights. Novosti Informativne sluzbe Srpske pravoslavne crkve, November24, 2000.

Popovic, Ljubomir, and Zorica Vitorovic-Umicevic. 2003. Referat za javnu raspravu upredmetima IU-177/01, IU-213/02 I IU-214/02. Belgrade: Ustavni Sud RepublikeSrbije.

Pudar, Miroslava. 2005. “Sta cemo mi u evropi” (Why should we be in Europe). Danas,May 23:16.

Radulovic, Milan. 2005. “Prednacrt zakona o verskim slobodama” (The Draft on the Lawon Religious Freedom). Pravoslavlje, December 15:930.

Rak, Pavle. 2005. “Isus je mlad i jak!” (Jesus is Young and Strong!). In Pescanik FM:Zasto se u crkvi sapuce?, eds. S. Lukic and S. Vukovic, pp. 86–93. Belgrade:Fabrika Knjiga.

Ramet, Sabrina P. 2007. The Liberal Project and the Transformation of Democracy: Thecase of East Central Europe. College Station, TX.: Texas A&M University Press.

268 Vukomanovic



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048308000199


Ramet, Sabrina P., and Vjeran Pavlakovic, ed. 2005. Serbia Since 1989: Politics AndSociety Under Milosevic and After. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press.

Stobe, Heinz Guenther. 1999. “Religijske implikacije sukoba u Centralnoj i istocnojevropi” (Religious Inplications of the Conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe). InHriscanstvo, drustvo, politika, eds. Zorica Kuburic, and Milan Vukomanovic. Nis:JUNIR.

Tribina na Masinskom Fakultetu Univerziteta u Beogradu (The Panel Discussion at theFaculty of Mechanical Engineering). December 2, 2004 (Audio Rec.)

Vucetic, Violeta. 2005. “Pronadeni identitet stvara integritet.” Pravoslavlje 907/908:12–14.

Vukomanovic, Milan. 2001. Sveto i mnostvo: Izazovi religijskog pluralizma (The Sacredand the Many: Challengers of Religious Pluralism). Belgrade: Cigoja stampa.




https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048308000199


the serbian orthodox church as a political actor in the aftermath of

Documents