the role of the political elite culture in inefficiency of
TRANSCRIPT
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The role of the political elite culture in inefficiency of
NGOs in Iran
Mohammad Ali Khosravi
Assistant Professor, PhD in Political Sciences,
Central Tehran Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran
Shohreh Shahsavari Fard Ph. D Candidate in political sciences, Central Tehran Branch,
Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran Corresponding Author
Abstract: The aim of this study is to analysis the political culture of the ruling elite and its role in
inefficiencies of NGOs. In fact, the author has tried to show that the underdevelopment of NGOs
in governments after the revolution has close relationship with political culture of ruling elite of
these eras. In addition to questionnaire to assess the type of political culture, their performance
was examined based on Gabriel Almond model. To validate the reagents, in addition to previous
studies, we used the views of a number of sociologists and political science professors and after
confirmation of expert community and passing the validity stage to examine the internal
consistency of questionnaire items, Cronbach's alpha was obtained as 77 using SPSS software.
Then, political culture was examined by assessing the political participation, political trust,
citizenship rights, and tolerance. Freedom of speech was investigated in 9 components. Results
reflected the fact that the culture of ruling on elite is a allegiance with thick, tough, and stable
clusters closing the ways for political development. Reluctance to answer some questions and
lack of proportionality among some answers with performance of this population are strong
evidence in this regard.
Keywords NGOs, political culture, the ruling elite, centralization, allegiance culture
1- Introduction
Nowadays, there is no place for individual working independent from institutions, since
as the demands of the citizens from governments increase government cannot provide
all services alone. That is why due to the government's failure to provide adequate and
appropriate services in recent years, support and interest in NGOs have increased.
Accordingly, in majority of developed and developing countries, these civil institutions
are established to complement government efforts to political development of
governments. Studying political development has been a major concern of the political
thinkers in terms of ruling elite. However, since 1950 onwards, thinkers such as
Almond-Verba and Lucian Pye conducted direct and accurate investigation of political
culture in their comparative studies. They stated that elite political culture concerns
with "attitudes, feelings and behavior models of those who have achieved active roles
through workflow particular to political recruitment and have a direct impact on the
outcomes of regime" (Lucian Pye and et al, 2001).
As political culture described, if the entire people of society is divided into "elite" and
"mass", then we must ask that whether political culture of elite or political culture of
mass will have greater role in political development process and consolidation of civil
organizations. Historical experience shows that the development or fall of any society
depends on the role and culture of elite since their thought is effective in implementing
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political - social programs. While political elite is defined and explained as formal group
that is elected legally in West industrialized countries, the elite definition in developing
countries, including Iran, is still more consistent with the definitions of Pareto and
Mosca. Pareto consider in two general and specific meanings. In a general meaning, elite
refers to individuals who have achieved the highest scores in their activities. In other
words, they are small number of people that each of them has achieved success in their
own sphere of activity and high level of the professional hierarchy (Aron, 1998,
Bottomore, 1998). In specific meaning, it refers to "ruling elite" (Aron, 1998), the second
understanding of the elite has been folloed by Mosca and Lasswell, while Mosca uses
"ruling class" and Lasswell uses "political elites" terms (Badii, 2001). In this regard, to
recognize the political elite traditionally, it was started from government members since
government is an institution that its members are questioned by society and in terms of
performance, it is the only institution that takes major decisions (Harold, 2004).
It is claimed a type of allegiance and non-participatory political rather than
participatory political culture has been a major cause of serious political
underdevelopment." In fact, many of the political obstacles and problems has been due
to anti-development character and culture of political elite and despite extensive
developments in Iran and multiple change in political systems in the last few centuries,
the political culture of Iranians, including the political elite - has not been changed
significantly.
To evaluate the hypothesis, based on requirements of the studied problem and due to its
qualitative nature, the population of study was estimated 200 people in an estimation
conducted by some experts, that it was reduced to 75 people according to Cochran
equation, but the question is why 220 people? There is no right and convincing answer
for this question. All these 220 people can be regarded as the political elite as the
number of political elite can be limited to 5 people voluntary. Selection of this number is
not because that this number was simple and easy, but it is due the fact that we want to
face with a large mass group that is statistically valid on the Iranian political elite. As
Alexis De Tocqueville wrote: "The moral authority of the majority (in America) is based
in part on the fact that intelligence and wisdom are high in set of individuals who are
united and cohesive rather than alone and unique people". That is why we tried to give
verdict on elite political culture based on a majority of the ruling political elite (De
Tocqueville, 1954).
The statistical population of study includes:
- Deputy of ministers, general managers, and heads of departments of various ministries
in the period after the revolution - effective and politically influential members -
governors and heads of major departments and agencies of provinces –heads and
members of committees or central committees of political parties, political newspapers
and magazines publisher and responsible managers- universities presidents and their
deputies and prominent professors. The conceptual model of study was developed as
follows:
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Figure 1: The conceptual model of study was developed as follows:
2- Definition of concepts
A) NGOs: NGO is a concept that neither can we find a specific, accurate and
comprehensive definition for it, nor there is possibility of searching e specified history
since its creation.
However, the unprecedented growth of these organizations, especially in recent decades
has caused that its structure to be changed from almost unknown concept to fixed and
limited scope of tasks so surprisingly and become a powerful actor in national and
international arena and the ability to influence alongside governments and international
organizations. Perhaps, one of the main reasons for this change can be sought in the
development of "global civil society" concept in recent years. However, despite
remarkable history, NGO concept is not clear.
In a structure – operating study, Johns Hopkins University (1990) believes that an NGO
has five characteristics as follows: being organized (being established and stabilized),
being non-governmental, self-dependence or independence, being non-profit, being
voluntary.
B) Political culture:Almond Verba, that this study is based on it, believes that each
political system require a specified model from orientation to actions, or in other words,
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it has an organized subjective realm on policy giving meaning to society, institutions
and reliance of communities on individual actions (Almondm 1956). He believes that
four criteria must be considered in assessing the level of political culture of a given
society: (Palmer, M., Stern, & L., Garyl, 1988).
1. What knowledge a person does have about the nation, political system, history,
constitution, and so on?
2. What does he know about the structure and the role of the political elite and proposed
political policies and what is his feeling about these things?
3. What view and judgment does that person have on the implementation of policies in
low levels, structures, people, and decisions involved in this process, in addition to
knowledge and feeling?
4. How does he consider himself as a member of the political system and what is his view
on about his capacities? Which norms of participation does he know? In simple terms, it
can be said that political culture has three dimensions or basic components:
1. Cognitive dimension
2. Emotional dimension
3. Evaluative dimension
The first dimension indicates the knowledge and beliefs of the people and the elite, the
second dimension indicates their emotional orientation, and third dimension indicates
their judgment on political system and rules, roles, and input and output of system.
C) ruling elite: we should not forget that there are two political cultures: political culture
of elite and political culture of mass people. Elite political culture concerns with feelings
and behavioral models of those who achieved active role from political recruitment and
has direct impact on the outcomes of system. Political culture of mass also is formed with
attitudes and orientations of the people (as a whole) against policy that cannot control
outcomes of outcomes of system (Pye et al, 2001).
By understanding the concept of culture and political culture, the question arises how
political culture is in general and in particular among the elite as effective group in Iran.
James Rosenau believed that the main task of an academic person is to simplify complex
phenomena under the node of Iranian political culture from the perspective of current
international development (Sariolghalam, 2013).
In the case of political culture of Iran, many discussions have been made, but in general,
two approaches were published in this regard. One group that is largely dependent on
the flow of Iranian intellectuals that consider no positive point in the political culture of
pre-revolution in Iran. Authoritarianism, conspiracy, anti-culture, authority, tolerance,
open-mindedness, and violence are the main components of the political culture of Iran
before the revolution. However, another set of analyses that examines various cultural-
historical sources of Iran, including ancient Iran, Islam caliphate Sunni, Shiite and
modern thinking and tries to compare the pros and cons of each with each other.
Since the political elite are selected from public people and moral qualities of mass
people is flowing in their vessels. “Rene Gruseh" considers Iran as a country on the road
and crossing of cultures, groups, and major historical mainstreams. The fact that Iran is
located at the crossroads of events plays an important role in determining the Iraninan
personality, power structure, and the type of political. One of the sources of diverse and
beliefs and behaviors and sometimes conflicting of Iranians is geographical and
historical situation.
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From this perspective, a society that is passing through the history and civilization,
people face with two negative and positive personalities: on the one hand, they have
open, vision and flexible thought with new conditions, and on the other hand, they are
highly exposed with cultural metamorphosis (Abtahi, 2003). Therefore, the researchers
of Iranian culture introduce it as subordinate culture rather than participatory culture
due to several reasons.
In this culture, people are not able to have a strong cooperation and they have low trust
in each other. These issues that negative attitudes to political power - political passivity
-distrust in each other, a weak spirit of collective cooperation – getting the satisfaction
of ruler in anyway -fear of government actions- claiming the ownership of people lives
and properties by the government.
"Marvin Zonis": He considers four characteristics for Iranian political culture, especially
the political elite:Political pessimism, individual distrust, a sense of insecurity, and
interpersonal exploitation (abuse) . (Zonis, 2008),but how this culture has played
negative role in the realization of civil organizations and political development.
To answer this question, in addition to the questionnaire to assess the type of political
culture, we have considered three periods. Then, based on three periods, we selected
three examples of discourse on the impact of political culture of elite on performance of
NGOs. In questionnaire, it was tried that political participation, political trust, the view
of population on citizens' rights to freedom of speech, tolerance, and civil institutions
factors to be measured to assess the type of political culture. Reluctance to answer the
questions and considerations of population of study encouraged the author to assess the
answers with their performance.
3- Assessment of samples of study
Among 75 political elite, 69% of respondents were male and 31% of them were female. In
terms of age, 21% of them were up to 40 years old, 40% of them were 40-50 years old,
27% of them were 50-60 years old, and 8% of them were 60-70 years old. In terms of
education, 47% of them were graduate, 51% of them were undergraduate, 27% of them
were PhD, and 1% of them had Seminary educations. In terms of professional history, 61
of them had below 20 years of work experience, 19% of them had 20-30 years of work
experience, and 11% of them refused to answer this question. Regarding political
orientation, 70% of them belonged to independent party, 15% of them belonged to
conservative party, and 15 of them were reformists. In order to investigate the normal
distribution of research variables, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was used.
In the form of seven political options, It was tried that elite membership status of
various organizations to be investigated. It was hypothesized that there is a significant
relationship between being participatory and membership status.
Bar graph of the frequency distribution of the membership status of respondents in
different organizations and groups
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Figure 2 : frequency distribution of the membership status of respondents in different
organizations and groups
Additionally, the rate of use of information sources by population of study was
measured. It was hypothesized that there is significant relationship between
awareness of people and their use of these options. The significance number related
to the use of satellites was below 5 percent, which means that the null hypothesis of
equality of the first group and the second is not approved.
As the observed ratio of first group (less or equal to moderate) is 0.64, so it can be
concluded that satellite has a weak situation as a source of information on the daily
lives of the respondents. Regarding radio and television, the significance number is
not lower than 5 percent, so it can be said that two groups (less or equal to moderate
and higher than the moderate) are not significantly different, which means that
domestic radio and television, as satellite, does not have a proper place in everyday
life of respondents.
Regarding other sources of information, including newspapers, magazines and books,
as the significance number was lower that error level of 5% and the observed ratio of
second group (many) is higher than first group (less or equal to moderate), so it can
be said these sources of information have proper place in the daily lives of the
respondents.
3-1- Components of measuring political culture:
Political culture of the ruling elite were evaluated in nine components based on Gabriel
Almond so that type of political culture of population to be determined. This theorist
stated three political cultures –participatory, obedience, and tribal known as
authoritarian and democratic political culture about political elite.
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H1 :P1=P2
H0 :P1 P2
● Emotional orientation to system: a person states degree of his sense of pride to three
options of Iran history and art and characteristics of Iran people. Through these
questions, it was tried that the view and sense of elite to be examined.
Table 1 : Results of two-option test related to emotional orientation to system variable
Group of answers Observed value
Test value
Significance number
Less or equal to moderate (disagree) 0.11 0.5 0.000
More than moderate (agree) 0.89
As it is seen in table above, the obtained significance number is lower than error level of
5%. This means that the null hypothesis of equality of the two groups of respondents is
approved, so as the value of second group (those who were agree) was higher, we can
conclude that the respondents have a positive emotional orientation to system.
●Evaluative orientation to system: to assess this concept , the judgments of person with
respect to various aspects of the system, including political system performance, the
position of country in the international system, NGOs performance and parties were
developed and one person states that if he is agree or disagree on these items.
Table 2 : Results of two-option test related to evaluative orientation of system variable
Group of answers Observed value
Test value
Significance number
Less or equal to moderate (disagree)
0.49 0.5 0.001
More than moderate (agree) 0.51
As it is seen in table above, the obtained significance number is higher than error level
of 5%. This means that there is no reason to reject the null hypothesis of equality of the
two groups, so we can conclude that the respondents do not have a positive evaluative
orientation to system.
● Cognitive orientation of the system: to assess this concept, the understanding of one
person to type of government, and the relationship of government with political
participation were assessed.
Table 3 : Results of two-option test related to cognitive orientation of system variable
Group of answers Observed value
Test value
Significance number
Less or equal to moderate (disagree)
0.12 0.5 0.000
More than moderate (agree) 0.88
As it is seen in table above, the obtained significance number is lower than error level of
5%. This means that there the null hypothesis of equality of the two groups is rejected,
so we can conclude that the respondents have a positive cognitive orientation to system.
●emotional orientation to output (process): a person assesses his self-confidence to
political participation, political parties, and freedom of speech.
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Table 4 : Results of two-option test related to emotional orientation to input
Group of answers Observed value
Test value
Significance number
Less or equal to moderate (disagree) 0.88 0.5 0.000
More than moderate (agree) 0.12
As it is seen in table above, the obtained significance number is lower than error level of
5%. This means that there the null hypothesis of equality of the two groups is rejected,
so as the first group (those who were disagree) number was higher, it can be concluded
that respondents do not have a positive emotional orientation to input.
●cognitive orientation to input: a person states his recognition of his political duties in
the society.
Table 5 : Results of two-option test related to cognitive orientation to input
Group of answers Observed value
Test value
Significance number
Less or equal to moderate (disagree) 0.24 0.5 0.000
More than moderate (agree) 0.76
As it is seen in table above, the obtained significance number is lower than error level of
5%. This means that there the null hypothesis of equality of the two groups is rejected,
so as the second group (those who were agree) number was higher, it can be concluded
that respondents have a positive cognitive orientation to input.
●evaluative orientation to input: in this study, to assess this concept, individual
evaluations of political roles and channels of political participation of women in society
were developed in which one states that if he agree or disagree in this regard.
Table 6 : Results of two-option test related to evaluative orientation to input
Group of answers Observed value
Test value
Significance number
Less or equal to moderate (disagree) 0.88 0.5 0.000
More than moderate (agree) 0.12
As it is seen in table above, the obtained significance number is lower than error level of
5%. This means that there the null hypothesis of equality of the two groups is rejected,
so as the first group (those who were disagree) number was higher, it can be concluded
that respondents do not have a positive evaluative orientation to input.
● Emotional orientation to output: one person states his sense of optimistic to main
program and policy of system in terms of NGOs status
Table 7 : Results of two-option test related to emotional orientation to output
Group of answers Observed value
Test value
Significance number
Less or equal to moderate (disagree) 0.88 0.5 0.000
More than moderate (agree) 0.12
As it is seen in table above, the obtained significance number is lower than error level of
5%. This means that there the null hypothesis of equality of the two groups is rejected,
so as the first group (those who were disagree) number was higher, it can be concluded
that respondents do not have a positive emotional orientation to output.
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● Cognitive orientation to output: one person assesses his recognition of civil rights.
Tolerance and the role that these concepts can play in development of NGOs are
assessed.
Table 8 : Results of two-option test related to cognitive orientation to output
Group of answers Observed value
Test value
Significance number
Less or equal to moderate (disagree) 0.04 0.5 0.000
More than moderate (agree) 0.96
As it is seen in table above, the obtained significance number is lower than error level of
5%. This means that there the null hypothesis of equality of the two groups is rejected,
so as the first group (those who were agree) number was higher, it can be concluded that
respondents have a positive cognitive orientation to output.
●evaluative orientation to output: in this assessment, the evaluation of one person of
causes of inefficiency of NGOs as output is assessed.
Table 9 : Results of two-option test related to evaluative orientation to output
Group of answers Observed value
Test value
Significance number
Less or equal to moderate (disagree) 0.45 0.5 0.489
More than moderate (agree) 0.55
As it is seen in table above, the obtained significance number is higher than error level
of 5%. This means that there the is no reason to reject null, so it can be concluded that
respondents do not have a positive evaluative orientation to output.
3-2- analysis of "political culture impact on the efficiency of NGOs
H0 :P1=P2
H1 :P1 P2
Table 10 : Results of two-option test related to political culture impact on efficiency of NGOs
Row Text of statement Group of answers
Observed value
Test value
Significance level
1 Non-governmental organizations are
result of change in perspective from
centralization to decentralization
3 >=(disagree) 0.24 0.5 0.000
3( <agree) 0.76
2 Security view of political elites to
functioning of these organizations is
effective in their inefficiency.
3( >=disagree) 0.29 0.5 0.000
3( <agree) 0.71
3
Awareness of the political elite of
civil rights is one of the efficiency
factors of non-governmental
organizations
3( >=disagree) 0.15 0.5 0.000
3( <agree) 0.85
4
.
We must do our best to consolidate
these organizations as pillars of civil
3( >=disagree) 0.25 0.5 0.000
3( <agree) 0.75
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society
5
Considering more important issues,
"any spiritual and material
investment in the development of
these organizations is a waste of
time.
3( >=disagree) 0.89 0.5 0.000
3( <agree) 0.11
6 These institutions endanger
national security, despite their
deceptive appearance
3( >=disagree) 0.89 0.5 0.000
3( <agree) 0.11
7
As political elite believe that non-
governmental organizations are not
part of civil society, so they are
weak institutions.
3( >=disagree) 0.59 0.5 0.000
3( <agree) 0.41
8 Non-governmental are not efficient
due to reduced social capital and
public trust
3( >=disagree) 0.38 0.5 0.000
3( <agree) 0.62
9
Non-governmental organizations
have not achieved their main goals
and position because of political
obstacles
3( >=disagree) 0.25 0.5 0.000
3( <agree) 0.75
10 Everyone has the right to
participate in civic organizations.
3( >=disagree) 0.02 0.5 0.000
3( <agree) 0.98
Based on significant numbers calculated, it can be claimed that:
Given that significance number is lower that error level of 5% and frequency of agree
group is higher than disagree group, it can be concluded that respondents agree with the
statements inserted in rows of 1-2-3-4-8-9 and 10.
Given that significance number is lower that error level of 5% and frequency of disagree
group is higher than agree group, it can be concluded that respondents disagree with the
statements inserted in rows of 5 and 6.
Given that significance number is higher that error level of 5%, so frequency of agree
group has no difference with that of agree group, it means that respondents are neither
disagree nor agree.
In investigations related to political culture, the attitudes of population three political
levels of systems, processes and policy-making were assessed. At the system level, the
perspective on the people and leaders on values and strengthening organizations of
political system were assessed. At policy-making level, it was examined that political
elite has what goals and how they are achieved. In the process level, the tendency of
individuals to engage in the process, support requests from some groups and opposition
with other groups and forms of participation are examined.
4- The ineffectiveness of the political elite
-First paragraph: rotation of elite.
Various factors cause that elite cannot be dynamic, including, spirit and tyranny
character of political actors and their dependence on foreign powers, dependency of
classes and elites on government, and the lack of rotation by elite. However, the most
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important factor that was considered by political scientists is lack of rotation of elite due
to government structure.
In fact, elite rotation as balancing factor in social and political system can have a
decisive role in the stability of the political system. Therefore, if rotation cannot be done
successfully by elite in a society or it is done incomplete or in anon-democratic way, and
incomplete and undemocratic elite and characters participate in the ruling elite group
through legal partner institutions or the use of peaceful methods, they think that they
are forced see to struggle in armed way or peacefully overthrown the power of
incompetent elite. Finally, closed elitist system in Iran at all-time firstly shows the lack
of rotation by elite group and outer layer of the society, and secondly, it suggests
indifference and inaction in main actors of political power. In other words, we are seeing
a cyclical rotation direction rotation that is characteristics of the elite rotation in the
Third World, while the supplementary rotation is correct. (Azghandi, 1997).
Unlike the "modern industrial societies where certain types of the ruling class or the
political elite are created”, third world countries are lack of correct rotation. In these
countries, experts in various political, social, cultural, economic, sports areas are
eccentric and coaxial. It means that all elite groups and their life depend on position of
the ruling party, ruling party, or ruling class; otherwise, they lose their social status.
Accordingly, elite became the main tools of power. In such a structure, the elite do not
compete with each other and their only distinguishing characteristic of them is loyalty
to the ruling power or regime. While the circular rotation is complementary, the nature,
composition and performance of the elite is very different in Western countries and that
is why the elite turn, against the mentioned countries where it is often associated with
violence, occurs in another way. In these countries, elite find their base in the process of
social forces and within the society rather than confirming the ruling power, and
accordingly they complement each other, while they are compete with each other
.(Daheshiar, 2002).
-Second paragraph: The viability of partiality in Iran
The concept of "partiality" in the philosophy of history and political sociology of Ibn
Khaldun was introduced as a basic element (along with nature, civil, kingdom, etc.). Ibn
Khaldun used "partiality" as the main factors in explaining the rise and fall of power of
tribal powers and resulted governments from tribal authorities.
economic elite
social elite
cultural elite
political elite
ruling power
sport elite
political elite
cultural elite
social elite
economic elite
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Geographically, Iran is among the countries was the origin of tribal life and it has been
under the authority of alien tribal governance since old days. In this regard, we can use
the concept of Ibn Khaldun’s partiality in explaining the rise and fall of tribal authority
in Iran. The breakdown of tribal authority was not breakdown of Iran from its
traditional society and culture.
The breakdown that started from preparation period of Constitutional Revolution is
associated with some aspects of traditional society and their more and less compatibility
with conditions of the contemporary society. Partiality can be detected from the
elements that transferred from old traditional society to contemporary society.
Some features of new partiality can be considered as follows:
A) If the origin of the partiality was relative or tribal solidarity, the origin of modern
partiality is derived from the military elite or the mass movement.
The first modern partiality that challenged the old partiality and led to its overthrow
was observed in the military elite partiality commanded by Reza Shah and Cossack
Brigade that its result of emergence of the first modern partiality was the establishment
of Pahlavi Kingdom.
B) From an economic perspective, modern partiality, old partiality, is based on monopoly
of partiality’s God, but if the foreigner or domestic monopoly of old partiality was based
on direct involvement of police on looting, the modern partiality has relied more on
financial capital flow obtained from oil selling.
C) One of the differences of the modern partiality and old partiality is the nature of its
holder forces. Tribal authority partiality was relied mainly on support of military force of
states from central power, but in the modern partiality integrated police, especially
security police, at the national level or special groups are the main guardians of regime
and government.
D) Politically, modern partiality views society or considers it as a tribe. Therefore, it
assesses the policy issue as the framework of tribal policy. In short, tribe as a separate
and closed space has Khan that is the embodiment of relative soul of tribe and all must
follow and obey patriarchal authority.
E) In terms of legal system, it should be said that in accordance with Ibn Khaldun's
theory, the maintenance of a tribe depends on partiality not law and the social contract.
In fact, law or rule was a means in hand of Partiality Lord, while modern partiality that
live in conditions of law establishment, legal organizations, public area of social life, has
no escape either prevents from establishment of civil and social institutions, or deadlock
them, if failed in the first case. A very important means that modern partiality carries
out its extra legal actions is the multiplicity of decision centers in various areas of social
activity. It can be called as multi-government policy, government in government,
government beside government, government over the government, government guardian
of government, etc.
-From cultural point of view, the most important propaganda of modern of partiality is
patriarchy. Origins and sources of this patriarchy are rooted in past. In this regard,
modern and old partialities are common. However, old partiality looks at past to find
legitimacy, while legitimacy of modern partiality depends on past culturally, the past in
which myth is sacred to be ideological shield of partiality.
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- Psychologically, the reliance of partiality to arbitrary domination on people is based on
fear. However, the distinction between old and new nervousness is that the former
relies on a natural fear, tribal human fear of being isolated from his tribe that is his
main shelter, while the function of partiality is very complex in modern partiality. It is
the result of fear of helplessness compelling him to appeal modern partiality with his
satisfaction.
5- Conclusion
"The problem is when social actors see gap between what is and what should be.” When
in a society a problem become an issue, it will be necessary to do research in order to
discover the causes and social realities related to it. Form and structure of the problem
determine the way of finding the solution and making decision to face with it. Therefore,
studying it is one of the fundamental activities of the policy-making specialists. In our
country, since the period of the Third Development Plan, with emphasis on
decentralization, the way for reducing the size of government, development of public
participation, allocating of non-government affairs to the public and avoid the
government's tenure was paved. However, non-governmental organizations were not
institutionalized in Iran. In examining the cause of the inefficiency of non-governmental
organizations in Iran, there are several reasons, which all mentioned factors are
exaggerating factors in the failure of the NGO but they are not determining factor.
The problem is not only from internal structure of the organization, but it is from a
macro perspective, non-participation culture of political elite that has been an obstacle
in the political development. Elite political culture is attitudinal and intellectual
environment within which the political system works and this intellectual environment
in practice guides and shapes people choices in daily political life, since ordinary people
play less important in political investigations, while minority group (elite) is able to
develop movement.
In industrial societies, institutions that are allowed to have legal participation, that is
parties, Trade unions, the media, and universities are considered as the most important
centers fostering elite, while in Iran, due to type of structure if these centers, it has not
the major role in fostering the political thought. Therefore, elite political culture has
always been patrimonialism. Elite culture indicators include: allegiance and
authoritarianism versus legalism fear of government, subjectivism, imitation versus
wisdom and rationality, seeking submission, obstruction of speech, and behavior versus
tolerance due to polarized political culture with a vertical relationship.
The political elite culture and their performance are so that if there was any structure
that could be led into political development, was destroyed. Therefore, political culture
or political elite ideology has not been influenced by modern orientations due to political
culture arising from partiality, but it was mostly the continuation of patrimonialism
political culture. This modern partiality guided the society to deadlock that is cannot be
solved just by reviewing.
With an objective view, it must be said that there is a big capacity known as non-
governmental organizations and associations in the country as a reality, a capacity that
parts of it are operating actively in organizational missions. However, most part of them
have has case activity. Due to type of view of ruling elite, they have lost their
organizational cohesion and they have been led to passivity. These organizations are as
seeds needing a drink of water to germinate and flourish.
The role of the political elite culture in inefficiency of NGOs in Iran
Khosravi and Fard / Argos Special Issue, 2016/pp. 47-60
60
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