THE POLITICAL ELITE OF

POST-INDEPENDENCE ARMENIA:

CHARACTERISTICS AND PATTERNS

OF FORMATION

YEREVAN 2014

1

The political elite of post-independence Armenia: characteristics

and patterns of formation. – Yerevan: Edit Print, 2014; 15 p.

The present study was conducted with the support of the Academic Swiss Caucasus

Net (ASCN). ASCN is a programme aimed at promoting the social sciences and humanities

in the South Caucasus (primarily Georgia and Armenia). Its different activities foster the

emergence of a new generation of talented scholars. Promising junior researchers

receive support through research projects, capacity-building training and scholarships.

The programme emphasizes the advancement of individuals who, thanks to their ASCN

experience, become better integrated in international academic networks. The ASCN

programme is coordinated and operated by the Interfaculty Institute for Central and

Eastern Europe (IICEE) at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland). It was initiated and is

supported by Gebert Rüf Stiftung.

The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not

necessarily represent opinions of Gebert Rüf Stiftung and the University of Fribourg.

This publication is not for sale

© Academic Swiss Caucasus Net (ASCN)

© AREG Scientific Cultural Youth Association (AREG SCYA) NGO

ISBN 978-9939-52-775-8

2

CONTENTS

Foreword ............................................................................................ 4

Overview of the Research on Political Elites .................................... 6

Research methodology ......................................................................14

Chapter 1. Patterns of political elite formation in post-Soviet

Armenia .............................................................................................17

Chapter 2 Characteristics of political elite: values and

preferences........................................................................................51

Chapter 3 Characteristics of future political elite ........................... 76

References ........................................................................................ 94

Appendices

Appendix A Topic guide for interviews.............................. 97

Appendix B Charts ............................................................ 101

Appendix C Tables........................................................ ...134

Appendix D Graphs ........................................................... 1

3

FOREWORD

This book presents the results of a study of political elites in Armenia.

This study was conducted by a research and analysis team from the AREG

Scientific Cultural Youth Association utilizing the framework from “The

formation of political elites in post-Soviet Armenia” project financed by

The South Caucasus Academic Network (АSCN) of Freiburg University. The

study was conducted during the period 2011–12 in the territories of the

Republic of Armenia (RA) and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR).

This study aimed to characterize the post-Soviet Armenian political

elite and the patterns of its formation. To accomplish these goals, the

following three sets of research objectives were identified:

1. Describe the main features of the process by which the political

elite is formed and identify the political elite’s salient

characteristics, including the composition of elite groups and the

patterns of elite recruitment.

2. Identify and analyze the political preferences, values and

behavioural characteristics and foreign policy positions of the

political elite’s representatives.

3. Explore the characteristics of potential representatives of future

political elites, including political culture, values and preferences,

among other characteristics.

This book consists of three main chapters, each devoted to the

examination of one of the three objectives. In addition to the three main

chapters, the book contains sections on literature review, research

methodology as well as a list of the used sources and appendixes.

This research project is unique in several ways. First, it summarizes

the entire postindependence period for both the Republic of Armenia and

the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. This timespan enhances the

comprehensiveness of the study and provides an opportunity to compare

political elite formation models in two countries. Moreover, the utilization

of qualitative research provided an opportunity to obtain data on the

peculiarities of the political culture of the NKR. This study is the first, to

our knowledge, to include the NKR because its non-recognized status

precludes its inclusion in international and regional research initiatives of

this kind.

The second advantage of this study is its extensive empirical data. For

nearly two years, both qualitative and quantitative research instruments

were utilized to collect and analyze a comprehensive and extensive

4

dataset on Armenian political elites, the implementation of which would

be impossible without the financial support of the funding organization.

This project also reviews modern scientific surveys of political elites,

concentrates on theories and methodologies recently developed in other

post-Soviet countries and selects the most effective approaches and

methods within the framework of such studies. However, this study only

partly relies on the methodologies of previous research on political elites.

One of the three major aspects of this study is its investigation of the

potential representatives of future political elites, which was conducted

by identifying and investigating the social groups that constitute the bases

of recruitment of current political elites. This approach revealed the main

features of the next generation of the political elites’ representatives. This

study also employs an experimental application of social network analysis

to identify and analyze influential groups and individuals within the

political elite, such as members of parliament.

This publication is the results of "Patterns of political elite formation

of post Soviet Armenia" research project implemented by the team of

AREG Scientific Cultural Youth Association NGO with following members:

Project Coordinator and Senior Research Analyst: Hamazasp Danielyan, PhD - Political Science

Assistants:

Armen Grigoryan - Political Scientist; Hayk Khanumyan - International

Relations Specialist

Research Project Director:

Adrine Babloyan, PhD - Sociology, AREG Scientific Cultural Youth

Association NGO, Vice President

Database Specialist:

Bagrat Harutyunyan, PhD – Sociology

Research Fieldwork Coordinator:

Tigran Harutyunyan - AREG Scientific Cultural Youth Association NGO,

Board Member

Overall Management and Control:

Hovhannes Keshishian - AREG Scientific Cultural Youth Association

NGO, President

5

OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH ON

POLITICAL ELITES

This section briefly analyzes the scholarly literature on elites that

addresses the evolution of this concept, the theoretical deliberation of

the role of political elites in defining the nature of regimes and the

transformation of perceptions of this role, as well as the characteristics

of elites in various political systems. These topics were selected on the

basis of their relevance to research on the Armenian political elite, and

these concepts and theories guided the formulation of a theoretical

framework for this study. This chapter contains three main sections

representing different periods of research on political elites, including

a review of recent scholarly publications on political elites in post-

Soviet countries. The chapter concludes with a brief overview of the

alternative operationalizations of the political elite in the scholarly

literature and defines the concept adopted in the framework of this

study.

Classical Elite Theory

The first generation of scholars began researching elites nearly a

century ago. The existence of small, organized groups of individuals

who control political power was considered a fact of life by scholars

including G. Mosca, V. Pareto and R. Michels (Michels, 2001; Mosca,

1939; Pareto, 1935). These three authors used different terms (“ruling

class,” “elites” and “oligarchy,” respectively) to refer to elites, but

they discussed various aspects of the same phenomenon.

Mosca described the ruling class as well as systems of elite

recruitment. He concluded that democracy, in the Aristotelian sense,

cannot exist in reality because the existence of elites constitutes an

aristocracy. Pareto discussed the aspects of an individual’s personality

that determine her social status. Following Machiavelli, Pareto

identified two types of elite representatives based on these qualities,

6

lions and foxes, who interchangeably rule societies. Pareto also

concluded that the existence of elites was inevitable in any society

due to the substantial differences in individual qualities. Michels’ work

analyzed political organizations, particularly leftist movements and

parties; he formulated “the iron rule of oligarchy,” which elucidated

the oligarchic tendencies of political organizations. Based on his

analysis, Michels argued that even political organizations that pursue

democratic goals inevitably become undemocratic: “The democratic

currents of history resemble successive waves. They break ever on the

same shoal. They are ever renewed. This enduring spectacle is

simultaneously encouraging and depressing. When democracies have

gained a certain stage of development, they undergo a gradual

transformation, adopting the aristocratic spirit, and in many cases also

the aristocratic forms, against which at the outset they struggled so

fiercely” (Michels, 2001, p. 245).

As illustrated above, these early scholars of elites not only agreed

on (a) the inevitability of the existence of small, organized groups that

rule a society but also concluded that (b) these groups are inconsistent

with democratic ideals and structures.

Such interpretations of elites and their effects on democratic

systems reappear in academic literature beyond the expositions of

Classical Elite Theory. For example, C. W. Mills located and described

the elite of the post-Second World War United States in his seminal

work, “The Power Elite.” Mills argued that a few hundred individuals

held power by interchangeably occupying positions in various

hierarchies, while “the images of the public of classic democracy are

still used as working justification of power in American society... [which] are not adequate even as an approximate model of how the

American system of power works” (Mills, 1956, p. 300).

7

Revision of the Role of Political Elites in

Democratization

However, a number of other social scientists do not consider the

existence of elites to be a challenge to democratic regimes. This

disagreement is not related to the concept of a political elite itself but

rather is related to a reconceptualization of democracy. Several works

have played an important role in the reconciliation of the two

concepts. One of the earliest of these scholars was J. Schumpeter, who

defined democracy as the institutional arrangements of competing

political elite representatives "who acquire power to decide by means

of a competitive struggle for people's vote" (Schumpeter, 1943,

p. 269). This minimalistic definition of democracy was substantially

different from the approaches of earlier scholars who possessed more

idealized understandings of the concept (e.g., Aristotelian democracy,

classical democracy).

The departure from this idealistic understanding of democracy was

one of the most important contributions of R. Dahl. Dahl developed

the concept of polyarchy to distinguish existing political regimes from

the ideal democracy. According to Dahl, polyarchies contain

representatives of small organized groups (political elites) who are

constantly competing for the support of the citizenry. In Dahl’s

polyarchic model, competition among elites and participation of the

masses are the two core characteristics, and the pluralistic nature of

the political elites in such systems is emphasized. Dahl’s other

important contribution to understanding the character of political

elites in polyarchies is the idea of a system of mutual security. The

existence of this system guarantees smooth transitions of political

power from representatives of the ruling political elite to

representatives of the opposition political elite. Such a system of

mutual security emerges in a country when the opposition political

elite representatives are too powerful to be repressed by the ruling

elite representatives. According to Dahl, such a system depends on the

existence of narrow differences in interests and manageable conflicts

8

among competing groups as well as a certain level of trust among

elites to guarantee transitions of political power without endangering

the vital interests of these competing elites (Dahl, 1971, pp. 15–37).

Contemporaneous with Dahl’s work, another article analyzing

historical transitions to democracy was published by D. Rustow

(Rustow, 1970). Drawing on an empirical analysis of several historical

and contemporary cases of democratization, Rustow emphasized the

development of certain attitudes among politicians, including the

willingness to compromise on certain rules of the game within

competing parties during the early stages of democratization. After an

initial, conscious agreement to adopt democratic rules is reached,

politicians and citizens gradually become accustomed to and follow

democratic rules. Rustow described the process (or habituation phase,

in the author’s words) that results in the establishment of a system of

mutual security and emphasized the gradual nature of this process.

However, according to Rustow, certain factors can accelerate the

development of such system (Rustow, 1970, p. 361): “Their trust will

grow more quickly if, in the early decades of the new regime, a wide

variety of political tendencies can participate in the conduct of affairs,

either by joining various coalitions or by taking turns as government

and opposition.”

J. Linz, a famous scholar of Latin American regimes, argued in his

empirical research on democratic breakdowns in the region that both

ruling and opposition elites play crucial roles in the process of

breakdown. Linz focused on the idea of democratic loyalty, that is,

elites’ commitment to democratic institutional norms and procedures

while rejecting nondemocratic alternatives, including the inclusion of

the armed forces in political disputes and crises (Linz, 1978, pp. 37–

40).

However, the transitions observed during the early years of the

third wave of democratization induced many scholars to further

examine the role of elites in these transitions. The 1970–80s were also

quite fruitful in producing empirical research on political elites in both

democratic and nondemocratic countries. Many prominent democracy

scholars continued to explain the nature of political regimes in

9

reference to the dominance of particular values among elites. To a

lesser degree, scholars also examined the behavioral patterns of

political elites in different polities, among other factors. A whole body

of literature was produced recognizing the special roles elites play in

the various phases and scenarios of such transitions. Consequently,

various models and theories were developed that concentrated on the

analysis of the choices and actions of political elite representatives

during democratic transitions. For example, two of the three most

common modes of transition to democracy (top-down elite-led

reforms and reforms resulting from pacts among competing elites)

depend on the actions of elites. These modes of transition were often

considered more effective, whereas the third mode, the breakdown of

authoritarian regimes due to mass movements, was considered less

effective in establishing democracies. T. Karl summarized this notion

while commenting on Latin American regimes, “To date, no stable

political democracy has resulted from regimes transitions in which

mass actors have gained control even momentarily over traditional

ruling classes” (Karl, 1990, p. 8). In some cases, political elites were

considered the most important explanatory variable of both

democratic transitions and the consolidation of democratic regimes in

any polity (Diamond, 1999; Huntington, 1991; O’Donnell & Schmitter,

1986).

This elite-centered paradigm, while influential, was contested

within the discipline. Theoretical debates among researchers over the

factors that explain democratization continued and intensified during

the 1990s and 2000s (Collier, 1999; Higley & Burton, 2006).

Meanwhile, scholars investigated the processes triggered by the

collapse of the Soviet Union, particularly the establishment of new

regimes and the nature and role of elites in these post-Soviet

republics.

10

Research on Post-Soviet Political Elites

The final years of communist regimes in Central and Eastern

Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union initiated a wave of studies

on political elites in communist and post communist countries.

Research on elites in the Soviet Union had been conducted by

Western scholars since the beginning of the Cold War period.

However, these studies concentrated on describing and analyzing the

nature of Soviet elites and rarely engaged the problem of elites’ roles

in democratization (Klugman, 1989; Urban, 1989). After the collapse of

the Soviet Union, research began to examine regime transformation

and the role that elites play in that process in the post-Soviet

republics. Elite-centered theories of democratic transition that were

developed based on the transitions that occurred in other regions

(e.g., Southern Europe and Latin America) were utilized to explain and

predict regime transformations in post communist spaces. Research on

the emerging political elites of this region comprised a significant

fraction of the academic literature during the early 1990s (for

example, Higley, Pakulski, & Wesolowski, 1998).

This interest in studying elites increased not only among foreign

scholars working predominantly on topics related to democratization

but also among local academics, who were finally able to conduct their

own research on elites, a taboo subject during the Soviet period

(Gel’man and Tarusina, 2000). The resulting body of literature on

contemporary political elites produced by both local scholars and

foreign academics can be categorized as follows:

• Research on a specific country or region concentrating on the

analysis of elite representatives’ characteristics, background, and

mechanisms of elite recruitment.

• Research on the values and attitudes of political elite

representatives in a specific country and, rarely, in neighbouring

countries (Steen, 1997). These studies are based mostly on

qualitative interviews with elite representatives (Hollander, 1999;

Miller & Hesli, 1997). Some of these studies also compared the

11

values and attitudes dominant in the elites and general populations

of the same country (Zimmerman, 2002).

• Comparative research involving many post-Soviet countries with

the aim of testing and improving general theories of the role of

elites in regime transformation. Such studies were often

conducted by foreign scholars and resulted in the revision of not

only the role of elites in democratization (Gill, 2000; McFaul, 2002)

but also of general theories of democratic transition (Carothers,

2002, Gel’man 2003).

The different outcomes of post-Soviet transitions had a direct

impact on research on elites. The direction of research on political

elites in countries where democracy was consolidated gradually shifted

and concentrated on topics that are common for comparative studies

of elites in Western democracies (Haller, 2008). For example, ex-

communist countries that became EU members were incorporated into

research projects such as the EurElite Project (for more on this project

see Best & Edinger, 2005). The empirical research of political elites in

nondemocratic post-Soviet countries (with a great emphasis on Russia)

tends to focus on specific cases (Cummings, 2005; Ergun, 2010; Horák,

2010; Urban, 2010), leaving the elites of other countries unexplored.

Very few scholarly works have touched upon the political elite of

Armenia, among which the most notable is M. Margaryan’s “Political

elite and the problem of democratic transiton in Armenia” (2006). The

author did extensive reivew of existing scholarly literature on elites

and particularly the role of elites in democratization and used this

therotical framework for interpretation and explanation of

developments in post soviet Armenia.

However, no separate studies have been conducted on the

political elites of post-Soviet Armenia with systematically collected

empirical data. Therefore, we designed a research project based on

similar studies conducted in other post-Soviet countries to understand

the structure of the elite, the evolution of recruitment patterns and

the social backgrounds of elite representatives, as well as the values,

political orientations and attitudes toward democratic ideals and

12

practices that predominate among the representatives of the political

elite in Armenia.

Definition of the Political Elite

Within the framework of this study, the political elite was defined

as a group of individuals holding strategic positions within a political

system, which enables these individuals to influence political decision

making directly and regularly. Following Higley and Burton, this

definition enables us to clearly distinguish at the theoretical level

members of the political elite from other actors that could exercise

political influence (Higley & Burton, 2006); we adapt this definition to

our study by limiting it to only those individuals who are associated

with political institutions and are directly engaged in the political

process, that is, individuals considered politicians.

In the social sciences, there are several methods of locating

political elites, including positional, reputational and decisional analysis

(Hoffmann-Lange, 2006). The present research project adopts the first

approach for two main reasons. First, this approach reflects our

definition of the political elite and is preferable for studying elites at

the national level. Second, information on political officials and public

figures is more likely to be archived and accessible to researchers. The

availability of information over the two and a half decades of the

study period is important.

The disadvantage of this approach is that it excludes politically

powerful individuals who do not hold political positions or who are

not publicly involved in politics. However, an initial screening of

biographies indicates that individuals tend to institutionalize their

influence by either running for public offices or being appointed to

mid- and high-level political positions. This strategy is particularly

observable among the wealthiest businessmen and, to a lesser degree,

former high-ranking military officers and family members of

influential politicians.

13

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This research project employed both quantitative and qualitative

methods to collect and analyze the data required to answer our

research questions. The main components along with the research

methods employed in each of these components are briefly described

in Table 1.

The initial research stage involved collecting and screening the

official biographies of political elite representatives since 1990.

Biographies were collected for most Armenian cabinet members and

regional governors and all members of parliament. For the NKR, a

scarcity of data limited the biographies to a majority of MPs and

cabinet members, most of the regional governors and the mayors of

the largest towns. The quantitative analysis of these biographical data

served two main purposes. First, it enabled the characterization of

typical members and groups of the political elite and revealed the

main patterns of political elite formation. Second, it enabled the

identification of seven different areas from which most political elite

members are recruited (public servants, members of political parties,

NGO activists, members of local governance bodies, student committee

members, academics/artists/athletes, top business owners and CEOs)

for subsequent study.

Field research began with the development and implementation of

in-depth interviews with past and current representatives of the

political elite. The interview guide (Appendix A) consisted of five main

sections:

• A general overview (gender, age, position, etc.);

• The life story of the respondent (childhood, family, education,

social background and networks, etc.);

• Their entry into politics (career, political membership and

dynamics, political orientations and initial motivations);

• Their views and value system (regime preferences, opinions on

elites, main values, decision-making practices, etc.), and

14

• A mandatory test including nine incomplete sentences to be

finished by respondents (results not presented in this study).

The sample for the in-depth interviews was based on survey

criteria for the political elite. An initial list of over 150 names of

political elite representatives selected through the snowball technique

was prepared. The final list of respondents included approximately 70

politicians who were targeted for appointments with the survey team.

Overcoming apprehension and building rapport were among the most

difficult phases of the survey. Social networks were utilized to

improve collaboration and obtain appointments with political leaders.

The data collection phase was implemented from April to August 2012.

The interviews took an average of 70 min to administer. Generally, the

respondents did not refuse to answer the entire questionnaire after

approving a date for the interview. However, in several cases, the

interviewers suspected biased or insincere answers from political

leaders. Those cases were identified and described by the

interviewers. The final narratives for analysis are based on the

information gathered from 51 transcripts. The procedure was

replicated in the NKR, and the analysis of those nine transcripts is

presented as a separate subchapter.

At the end of each interview, the interviewers evaluated the

politician’s level of sincerity on a five-point scale. Of the interviews,

20% were given scores of 3 or 2, and the remaining 80% received

scores of 4 or 5. None of the interviews received the lowest score for

sincerity. Based on this evaluation process, the level of sincerity was

quite high.

After completion of the in-depth interviews, a survey was

designed and distributed to 691 representatives (500 from Armenia

and 191 from the NKR) from the seven recruitment areas to examine

the political culture of potential political elites. A representative

sample was selected utilizing a multilevel approach that had been

previously designed and tested. Field work was implemented from

February to April 2012. The strategy included the following levels of

activities:

15

• At the first level—proportional sampling was employed to obtain

the required number of respondents in each of the seven sample

segments based on available statistical data;

• At the second level—proportional quota sampling was performed

to ensure representation of the marzes/regions of the RA and the

NKR within each segment;

• At the third level—units within each segment were selected based

on the targeted sampling of units from lists (offices of political

parties, addresses of NGOs, universities, etc.);

• At the fourth level—respondents were selected through the

random selection of floor, room and person in the

buildings/offices selected at the third level.

The questionnaire contained 56 questions divided into the

following seven sections (see Appendix B in Armenian version):

• Social background and networks;

• Social and political activities;

• Attitudes toward democracy and trust in political institutions;

• Assessment of political developments;

• Political values and preferences;

• Social wellbeing and trust;

• Social-demographic characteristics.

The final stage of the study utilized Social Network Analysis to

identify and describe the most powerful representatives of the

political elite within recent three convocations of the parliament of

the RA (final section of Chapter 1).

16

CHAPTER 1. THE PATTERNS OF POLITICAL

ELITE FORMATION IN POST-SOVIET

ARMENIA

This chapter describes the main characteristics of the political

elite, reveals the changes and trends in these characteristics and

compares political elites in the RA and the NKR. To achieve this goal,

the official biographies of political elite members provided the only

realistic option to systematically collect and analyze the required data.

For the RA, elite representatives’ biographies (all MPs, all ministers and

most regional governors or marzpets) were primarily collected through

the official Web sites of the parliament and government. As a result,

1280 cases were identified and entered into the database.

For the NKR, Web sites containing the biographies of officials from

previous years do not exist, and the main sources of information were

several publications containing biographies of the MPs and an

encyclopaedia on Karabakh that contained detailed information about

many individuals on our list. In total, the NKR database contained 262

cases. The difference in the number of cases is partially due to a lack

of data about the NKR, especially for The 1990 Supreme Council (only

37 of 81 biographies were available for MPs). However, the more

important reason is the differences in the number of MP seats (33 in

the NKR and 131 in the RA) as well as less frequent changes in

executive positions in the NKR.

The obvious advantage of utilizing official biographies is that these

documents usually contain information in a standardized format. For

the same reason, it is possible to collect information about certain

characteristics (gender, age, level of education, profession, years spent

in the office, political affiliation, etc.), whereas other types of

information (such as business affiliation, past political affiliations,

reasons for leaving office) are much less frequently available in such

documents.

17

The findings of the analysis will be presented in thematic blocks

and by comparing legislative/elected and executive/appointed

positions in both the RA and the NKR.

Legislators in the RA and the NKR

Political Composition

The single most important event in the transformation of post-

Soviet Armenia occurred just before the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In May and June 1990 and December 1991, Supreme Council (SC)

elections were held in both Soviet Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh

Autonomous Okrug (NKAO). These single-member district elections

were the first multiparty elections, and as a result, the representatives

of the Communist Party were outnumbered.

Initially, the two parliaments contained a substantial number of

independent MPs (at least half in Soviet Armenia). These independent

MPs represented two main groups. The first group included

communists who had been in politics before the movement, and who

sometimes were even elected as communists, but left the party during

the transition from August 1990 to September 1991.1 For example, in

the RA, 160 of 260 elected MPs were either members of the

Communist Party or had recently been members, including at least 114

bureaucrats. However, by 1991, the communist faction consisted of

only 25 MPs who remained faithful to the Party.2

The second group included individuals who began their political

involvement by participating in the Karabakh movement. The

representatives of this group eventually either joined political parties,

1 The “Declaration of Independence” was adopted by the SC of Soviet Armenia in

August 1990. However, this document was not an actual declaration of independence

but rather an expression of such an intention. Actual independence resulted from the

Referendum for Independence, held on September 21, 1991. 2 This was not the only instance when a large proportion of MPs rapidly changed

their political loyalties; this also occurred in 1997 and 2006.

18

most frequently the ruling parties of the time, or gradually left the

political arena. In 1995, only 28% of MPs were not members of political

parties by the close of the SC term at the end of the summer.

A fully majoritarian electoral system and a large number of seats

(Chart 1.1) enabled members of newly established and minor parties to

be represented in the SC or to create their own parties and MP

coalitions after the election. As a result, the loosely organized factions

and MP coalitions were not large enough to constitute a clear majority

in parliament. To date, the SC is the most politically diverse legislative

body, representing the largest number of parties and groups. At least

12 parties and factions were recorded in the SC, including all the

traditional parties from the diaspora3 that were quickly re-established

in the RA.

This fragmentation enabled the Pan Armenian National Movement

(PANM) to emerge as the dominant player in the SC in 1990 and to

remain influential in the political landscape until 1998. Initially, the

PANM was an umbrella organization uniting a variety of activists from

the Karabakh movement and enjoying overwhelming public support.

As a loose organization, the PANM produced a number of other parties,

including the most prominent opposition parties of the period. A

notable portion of representatives of the older generation of current

elite was also affiliated with the PANM.

At the first convocation of the NA elected in 1995, the PANM

dominated the Republican block, which included a significant

proportion of the independent MPs (40 of 117 coalition members) and

a substantial number of representatives from minor parties (16). This

structure contributed to the collapse of the block and the rapid loss of

the majority in parliament by October–November of 1997. In both

1999 and 2006, the MPs elected from FPTP districts were instrumental

in shifting the balance of political interests represented in parliament.

These FPTP MPs, typically from entrepreneurial backgrounds, were

3 It should be noted that MPs from these parties themselves were not diasporan but

rather citizens of soviet Armenia that quickly joined and often also quickly left these

organizations, with the exception of ARFD.

19

incorporated into the ruling parties in waves. For example, when the

Rule of Law party, a partner holding 20 seats, decided to leave the

coalition in May 2006, ten entrepreneur MPs also left their factions

and created an entrepreneur group that later joined the other ruling

parties (the RPA and the PAP). During the same week, nearly the same

number of independent MPs, again mostly entrepreneurs, who were

elected in FPTP districts joined the RPA and ensured the new

coalition’s control of parliament. The proportion of independent MPs

varied between 6.7 and 11.5% over the next four convocations (NA1-

NA4). In the current parliament, elected in 2012, these MPs constitute

only 2.2% of members and cannot influence the balance of political

forces to the same extent as previous independents.

In future parliaments, minor parties will likely be represented to a

lesser degree. Additionally, changes to the formal election rules

affected the mode of elections of such individuals. The growing

number of party list seats in parliament (Chart 1.1) has encouraged

both electoral blocks among minor parties as well as the involvement

of prominent figures from such minor parties in the lists of larger

parties that have higher probabilities of influencing the balance of

power.4

The result of these trends was the consolidation of the party

system, which can also be observed by examining the number of

parliamentary factions. Where there once existed 12 factions in the SC,

there were seven during the period 1995–9, eight during the period

1999–2003, seven during the period 2003–7, five during the period

2007–12 and six beginning in 2012. Furthermore, over the last decade,

the diminishing size of the opposition coalition indicates the

emergence of a single dominant party in the RA. For the first time

since independence, a single party controls a sufficient number of

seats to effectively pass legislation without seeking the support of

other parties or independent MPs. Compared to the PANM of the early

4 For example, more than 10% of current RPA coalition members are represen-

tatives from eight minor parties elected through the RPA party list.

20

1990s, the current RPA faction in parliament exhibits a much more

stable structure by heavily relying on party list MPs who are replaced

by other party members if they are disloyal to the party. Additionally,

FPTP MPs are generally members of the party who are connected to

the organization through various ties.

The party politics of the NKR took a different path during the

early years of independence. The initial composition of the SC was also

dominated by independent MPs and was characterized by competition

between supporters of the PANM and the Armenian Revolutionary

Federation Dashnaktsiutyun (ARFD). This legislative competition

translated into competition with the executive branch, which was

dominated by RANM supporters, whereas the legislative branch was

dominated by ARFD supporters. By the spring of 1992, this

competition sparked a conflict that resulted in the mysterious death of

the speaker of the SC, an ARFD member. Intensified large-scale

military action and increasing human and territorial losses diminished

party competition and resulted in the establishment of the State

Defence Committee in August 1992. Extraordinary powers were given

to this body, and the activities of the SC were suspended. The

committee was led by Robert Kocharyan, a young former Communist

Party member turned nonpartisan, who was elected as the first

president of the NKR after the war and later as president of the RA.5

The existence of an external threat and the primacy of national unity

were the main arguments against the establishment of political parties

in the NKR both during the war and after the cease-fire in 1994.

Instead, the first decade of independence produced a political field

dominated by nonpartisan war veterans. In addition to these veterans,

recruitment for political positions took place among civil servants,

members of the intelligentsia and, to a lesser degree, entrepreneurs

(Table 1.2b). The nonpartisan MPs won more than one-half of the

5 During his long political career, R. Kocharyan publicly stated his negative attitude

toward political parties a number of times and has never become a member of any

party.

21

legislative seats in all elections until 2005, when one-third of the seats

were allocated to party list candidates.

This negative view of political parties was also reflected in the

formal rules; unlike many regulations copied from Armenian electoral

law, the introduction of the party list system in the NKR took place

ten years later than in the RA. Thus, party politics arrived in the NKR

much later and in a less competitive form. Three major parties were

represented in the legislative body. Two of these parties (the

Democratic Party of Artsakh and the Free Motherland Party) have

dominated the parliamentary coalitions, whereas the third party, the

ARFD, has remained supportive of the executive’s policies, with the

exception of the short period 2005–7.

The two most recent convocations included the highest number of

re-elected MPs to date; this indicates that elite recruitment has

become less competitive and draws from a narrower circle. Compared

to the 2005 elections, a smaller number of candidates, including

independent candidates, registered for the 2010 elections; this

decrease is another indication of this trend. In the NKR, the political

opposition is represented by a few individual politicians both within

and outside of the legislative body with no institutionalized party

organization.

Age and Education

The generational composition of MPs in both the RA and the NKR

(Chart 1.2) indicates that the largest influx of young political elite

members (23–40 years old) occurred during the first years of

independence. MPs of this age constituted 40.2% of the SC in the RA

and 63.1% of the SC in the NKR. Similar numbers in this age range

were also recorded in 1995 parliamentary elections (RA, 39.8%; NKR,

51.4%). The same chart illustrates that the generational renewal of

political elite decelerated. As a result, both the NKR and the RA now

possess parliaments with larger proportions of MPs aged 51 years and

older (RA, 48.9%; NKR, 35.7%). In the current convocation of the RA

NA, the proportion of MPs aged 51+ years nearly doubled compared to

22

the previous convocation (from 29.3 to 49.9%), and this increase came

at the expense of middle-aged MPs (i.e., those aged 41–50 years old

decreased from 46.5 to 25.5% of the assembly). Overall, the modal age

of elected MPs in the RA increased from 42 years during the SC to

45 years during NA1 and NA2 to 47 years during NA3 and NA4 and

jumped to 53 years during NA5.

In the NKR, the modal age of MPs increased from 41 years during

the SC to 45 years during NA1 to 52 years during NA2, which is

another indication that individuals of the same generation who

entered politics during the Karabakh movement were recruited into

NKR politics during the first decade. A re-election of MPs occurred

during NA3 (modal age, 46 years) and NA4 (modal age, 42) and largely

reflects the success of the Free Motherland Party in electing a younger

generation of politicians with entrepreneurial and bureaucratic

backgrounds to join the leadership of the current prime minister,

Arayik Harutyunyan.

An initial analysis of MPs’ education did not reveal any significant

trends either within the RA or within the NKR. The distribution of the

level of education was quite stable throughout the period of

independence in both cases. The proportion of MPs in the RA without

a university degree varied from 2.5 to 4%, whereas nearly one-quarter

of all had achieved academic levels of Ph.D. candidate (kandidatskaya)

or full Ph.D. Compared to the RA, the number of NKR MPs whose

highest level of education was secondary school was greater than in

the RA (on average, 14% compared to 1.6%). Consequently, the

proportion of MPs with a university degree or higher was smaller in

the NKR.

We examined factors beyond general education levels to

understand the influence of education on political careers. We

attempted to determine the extent to which the proportion of MPs

who received their first university degree after being recruited into

the political elite had changed. We identified MPs who obtained their

first higher education degree at a relatively older age (after 35),

typically after achieving a certain level in their political career. The

number of such MPs in the RA increased from four (1.5% of total)

23

during the SC to eight (4.2%) in NA1, 22 (16.8%) in NA2, ten (7.6%) in

NA3, 19 (14.5%) in NA4 and 17 (12.9%) in NA5. The same analysis for

the NKR revealed that the number of such MPs is quite stable and

varies from one to two MPs for each convocation.

Further analysis of the education data revealed several other

trends in professions and subject areas. Nearly half of MPs during the

independence period received a university degree in either

engineering or economics (Chart 1.3). The number of economist MPs

increased over time, whereas the proportion of engineers gradually

decreased. This pattern might be explained by the fact that two of the

major higher education institutions in Soviet Armenia offer degree

programs in these fields. The next two most common disciplines were

law and history. MPs with law degrees became increasingly common

and almost doubled in number compared to the SC. The remaining

disciplines were grouped into three broader categories: social sciences,

natural sciences and other. The latter group contains a wide variety of

fields, including pedagogy, arts, athletics, veterinary science and

agronomy. The number of MPs with education in these fields has

doubled in the current parliament compared to the SC. In addition,

the number of MPs with degrees in the social sciences has decreased

significantly in the current convocation of the NA despite the

establishment and popularization of many new universities and

departments with social science programs (including political science,

public administration and international relations) since the mid-1990s.

In the NKR, the distribution of professions was more equally

divided among engineers, economists, historians, natural scientists and

pedagogues (on average, ranging between 12 and 19%). One notable

trend is the increased representation of economists (10.8% in the SC,

21.4% in NA4) and historians (5.4% in the SC, 14.3% in NA4) at the

expense of engineers (32.4% in the SC, 14.3% in NA4) and natural

scientists (28.6% in the SC, 10.7% in NA4).

Biographies also typically report the institution of higher

education. An analysis of these institutions revealed that a stable

pattern has been established; nearly four-fifths of MPs are graduates of

Armenian higher education institutions (Chart 1.4). The proportion of

24

graduates from Private Universities6 began to increase at the end of

the 1990s and is at its highest level in the current convocation (18.4%

of MPs). The previously stable proportion (12.7–16.4%) of MPs during

the previous five convocations who received their higher education at

the state universities of other Soviet Republics and CIS countries,

mostly from Russian universities, sharply decreased (5.1%) in the

current convocation, whereas diplomas received from the private

universities of CIS countries increased insignificantly (4.4%). Another

minor trend observed in the current convocation was the increased

number of MPs with degrees from Western universities (5.1% of MPs).

One might initially assume that these changes are related to a

generational change among the elite and the increased presence of

younger MPs; however, cross-tabulations indicate that MPs with

Western educations are equally represented across generational

groups.7

In the NKR, the composition of higher education institutions is

more stable. With the exception of the SC, in which 73% of MPs

graduated from local universities and 16% from universities of the

Soviet or CIS republics, at least 85% of MPs were graduates from local

universities in all subsequent convocations. In the current

convocation, this trend has become more pronounced; all MPs (96.4%)

are graduates of local universities with the exception of one middle-

aged MP who graduated from Penza State University of Architecture

and Construction in 1988. This similarity of educational background

may be related to fewer opportunities to obtain higher education

abroad. On the one hand, the NKR is increasingly isolated by its

unrecognized status; by contrast, the NKR benefits from increased

access to Armenian universities.

6 In the Armenian context, private universities are generally considered less com-

petitive and of poorer quality compared to state universities, including universities

based on intergovernmental agreements (the American University of Armenia, the

Russian Armenian University and the French University of Armenia). 7 There are two MPs aged 25–35 years old, three aged 36–50 and two aged 51–65.

25

Occupational Backgrounds of MPs

An analysis of the immediate backgrounds of MPs reveals that the

RA SC was composed of the largest number of newcomer MPs

(Table 1.2a). More than one-third of MPs were representatives of the

intelligentsia, including academics, teachers, and journalists. The share

of the intelligentsia continually decreased over the first decade and

stabilized during the second decade. The other large group in the SC

(42.5%) was composed of midlevel bureaucrats who generally had no

prior national political experience during the SC. The number of these

representatives significantly decreased in subsequent assemblies. In

both groups, some members left politics after the second round of

parliamentary elections (1995). Others transformed their political

activities into their main vocation by launching political careers and

reappearing in our database as elected or appointed officials.

Table 1.2a displays the formation and consolidation of political

classes in the RA. A growing proportion of professional politicians in

parliament occupied both elected and appointed political positions

(the share grew from 1.5% in the SC to 32.5% in the first convocation

of the National Assembly, 39.5% in the second, 49.6% in the third,

51.9% in the fourth and 57.4% in the fifth).

Similar trends are observable in the NKR (Table 1.2b); however,

bureaucrats have been well represented in parliament (nearly half of

the SC to at least one-quarter of NA4). This pattern might be

explained by the less competitive nature of party politics in the NKR,

which has enabled career civil servants to become MPs recruited into

the political elite. The introduction of party list seats in 2005 and the

increasing number of such seats explains the larger represenation of

party list MPs (21.4% of seats) in the fourth convocation of the NA. The

26

NKR also produces a more limited representation of businessmen in

parliament8 compared to the RA.

This increasing influence of professional politicians in the RA

parallels the proportion of entrepreneurs, which also grew beginning

in the mid-1990s and included one-third of parliament during the

period 2003–7. After this peak, the proportion of MPs recruited from

these occupationս decreased. However, this change does not imply

that that the number of entrepreneur MPs decreased. For example, 6%

of new MPs in the fifth convocation were entrepreneurs.9 This

proportion is merely an indication that a substantial number of

businessmen MPs were reelected and continued to secure seats in

parliament. Although entrepreneurs were always represented in party

lists, their proportion in parliament has increased substantially over

the last decade. However, the proportion of businessmen elected from

FPTP districts did not changed significantly. The main change in this

regard is that such MPs gradually bacame members of ruling parties.

For example only one non party member entrepreneur was elected in

2012 compared to at least 19 independent businessmen elected in

2003.

Comparing the backgrounds of MPs who held political positions

before elections reveals a few additional trends (Chart 1.5a).

Increasingly, party list MPs are reelected more often than single-

district MPs. In addition, the proportion of newly elected MPs who

were engaged in party work as their main occupation increased

slightly over the last two convocations. The increased ability of

political parties, especially the dominant Republican Party of Armenia,

to ensure the re-election of their candidates can only partially be

attributed to changes in the formal rules, such as increasing party list

8 This observation may be a coincidence, but the highest proportion of business-

men elected to parliament occurred during similar time periods (2003–7 in the RA and

2000–5 in the NKR). 9 Despite formal limitations on the type of work in which MPs may engage, inclu-

ding entrepreneurship, in practice, MPs often continue to be directly engaged in their

business activities and only formally delegate the management of their companies and

assets while holding elected public office.

27

seats in parliament. These trends strengthened during the fifth

convocation with no additional changes in the proportions of party list

and FPTP seats. We argue that the most important factors behind this

change are (a) the consolidation of the political party system with a

smaller number of contesting parties and (b) the more frequent

reappearance of individuals on party lists and FPTP districts both in

cases of parties with more seats (RPA, PAP) and smaller parties (ARFD,

RoL).

There are a few notable similarities and differences between the

parliaments of the RA and the NKR in terms of MPs with backgrounds

in political positions. In both the RA and the NKR, only 20–30% of all

FPTP members were reelected. Another similarity is the negligible

proportion of MPs who built their political career at the national level

after winning local elected positions (0.7–2.9%), which indicates that

recruitment of the political elite rarely draws from the political

preferences of local populations reflected in the official electoral

results.

In the NKR, particularly during the last two convocations, MPs

with prior experience in the executive branch at both the national and

regional levels (ministers and marzpets) have been common (Chart

1.5b). The NKR data also indicate the absence of MPs who were

engaged only in party politics before the elections. Unlike in the RA,

in the NKR, a party career is rarely an effective path to either a

parliamentary seat or the political elite. Rather, political elites are

drawn from among high-ranking civil servants with experience in

governance and public administration. This dynamic may change with

increasing numbers of party list seats in parliament.

28

The Executive Branch

Ministers and regional governors (marzpets10) are core political

positions appointed by the head of the executive branch.11 Despite

certain changes in the formal procedures of appointment to these

positions over the last two decades, in general, such appointments are

in the domain of the president, who may either directly appoint or, at

a minimum, approve appointments. Therefore, an analysis of the

characteristics of these officials was conducted to uncover the

recruitment principles of the political elite; the analysis not only

reveals the leadership decisions of ruling parties but also reflects the

preferences of the president. Cases were classified according to the

years during which each of three presidents in both the RA and the

NKR was in office, and characteristics were compared among periods,12

between the RA and the NKR and among MPs.

Age and Education

An age analysis of executive positions for both the RA and the NKR

(Chart 1.6) revealed general patterns that are similar to the findings for

MPs (Chart 1.2). First, and perhaps most important, is the consideration

of the generational dynamics among elite representatives. During the

early years of independence, a larger proportion of young officials

were recruited (during the Levon Ter Petrosyan [LTP] term in the RA

10 Administrative unit of NKR is “shrjan” (region) and official name of the head is

“varchakazmi ghekavar” However in the text a single term (marzpet) will be used both

for RA and NKR to describe executive positions with similiar roles and responsibilities. 11 Whereas ministers are responsible for the design and implementation of

executive policies in their respective sectors at the national level, marzpets ensure the

implementation of such policies in the respective administrative regions (ten in Armenia

and seven in the NKR). 12 Levon Ter Petrosyan (LTP 10/1991-01/1998), Robert Kocharyan (RK 01/1998-

04/2008), Serge Sargsyan (SS 04/2008-present) in the RA; Robert Kocharyan (RK 1992,

12/1994-03/1997), Arkady Ghukasyan (AG 03/1997-09/2007), Bako Sahakyan (BS

09/2007-present).

29

and during the Robert Kocharyan [RK] term in the NKR) compared to

the subsequent decade (during the RK term in the RA and the AG term

in the NKR). In addition, the proportion of older representatives (aged

51 years and above) has increased since independence in both the RA

and the NKR. This trend is especially notable among marzpet

appointments, in which presidents possess greater flexibility to

determine the cadres of recruitment (marzpets require less specialized

backgrounds). Additionally, during the last 5–6 years, the proportion

of marzpet and minister appointments (during the Serge Sargsyan [SS]

term in the RA and the BS term in the NKR) that are younger

representatives (31–40 years old) has increased in both countries. This

change indicates the gradual renewal of the political elite. As a result,

recruits who are currently middle-aged constitute the smallest

proportion of appointments compared to postindependence (except

ministers in the RA, age propotion of which remains stable).

The following chart (Chart 1.7) presents the level of education of

people appointed to executive branch positions. In both the RA and

the NKR, cabinet appointments consistently tend to have completed

academic degrees (PhD candidate or higher) compared to marzpets.

This difference indicates that a higher level of specialization is

important for the recruitment of ministers,13 whereas other factors are

considered more important for marzpets. Both the smaller proportion

of ministers with postgraduate degrees and the significantly higher

proportion of positions filled by ministers with secondary education in

the NKR suggest a notable difference in levels of education in the NKR

and the RA. Similar differences were observed between MPs of in the

NKR and the RA. A smaller proportion of elite members completed

13 Three Charts (from Chart 1.6 to Chart 1.8) present the age and education data.

There is a single outstanding case in the NKR: one minister with primary education was

appointed to a position in his 20s. This minister was Samvel Babayan, and his political

career was possible due to his exceptional military success. He began his career as the

leader of a voluntary detachment and became a military commander in the army during

the Karabakh war. As the minister of defense, his control and authority over the NKR

army made him the most influential individual in the NKR, especially during the second

half of the 1990s.

30

higher education in the NKR than in the RA, which may be explained

by the composition of the society, which includes an overall smaller

proportion of individuals with such degrees in the NKR.14

The types of university are described in Chart 1.8. In the RA,

cabinet appointments more frequently received their degrees outside

of Armenia (nearly one-third) compared with the NKR; this difference

also holds for MPs in both the NKR and the RA. Most universities

attended outside of Armenia were state universities in Russia and

other CIS countries. The proportion of executive appointments who

attended Western institutions is smaller than the proportion of current

MPs with such education. Interestingly, in absolute terms, the number

of people with Western education given executive appointments was

highest during the first two years of independence. This trend

reflected the LTP appointment of two diaspora candidates to

ministerial positions. Both of these ministers vacated their positions

relatively early, and the recruitment of professionals from the diaspora

to high executive positions ended. During the RK period, the only

minister with a Western education was also from the diaspora;

however, unlike the ministers of LTP, he had built his career within

the ministry of foreign affairs to which he was recutied during the LTP

period. This minister served throughout both terms of the RK

presidency and remained actively engaged in politics after leaving the

ministerial position and currently serves as MP. Despite the rhetoric

about the unity between Armenia and the diaspora and importance of

utlizing diasporas human capacity intesified during the RK and SS

periods (a special ministry for the diaspora was later established) it did

not translate into recrutment of such cadres in important political

positions. In general, the recruitment to political elite from the

14 For example, the proportion of teaching staff with academic degrees is smaller in

higher education institutions in the NKR (30.2%) compared to the RA, 48.4% (state

statistical services of the RA and the NKR, yearbook 2012 for the RA

(http://www.armstat.am/file/doc/99471448.pdf, p. 126) and yearbook 2005–11 for the

NKR (http://stat-nkr.am/files/yearbooks/2005_2011/6_krtut-mshak.pdf, p. 89).

31

diaspora was limited both in the RA and the NKR even in lower levels

of the bureaucratic hierarchy.

The first nondiaspora minister with a Western education was

appointed during the SS period which is an indication of growing

number of career beurocrates with western education. In addition to

the absence of Western-educated political elites, we note that a

relatively high proportion of individuals in the NKR were educated at

private universities locally or in the CIS countries. Many of these

degree recipients were older, which indicates that political elite

members gained political influence without a university degree and

later obtained diplomas from private institutions to legitimize their

political standing and career growth.

Political Composition

The total number of ministers in the RA database appointed by the

first president, LTP, was 76, whereas the second president, RK,

appointed 71, and the current president, SS, has appointed 30. The

differences reflect decreases in both the number of ministries (26 in

mid-1995 and 18 currently) and the frequency of new appointments.

Only 12 new marzpets were recruited by LTP.15 By comparison, RK

recruited 21 individuals and SS had appointed only ten positions as of

the fall of 2013.

During the earlier years of independence, party affiliation was a

less important factor for high-level political appointments. Over 90%

of all ministers who served during the LTP period formally were not

members of any political party; only half of marzpets declared a party

affiliation, and only one-quarter of these were members of the ruling

PANM. However, nearly half of the ministers and one-quarter of the

marzpets were former members of the Communist Party who had

15 Administrative changes establishing these positions were made in mid-1995,

nearly two years before the resignation of LTP.

32

acquired managerial experience in either regional administration or

specialized sectors.

Technocratic appointments were still common during the first RK

term, but party membership became a more frequent characteristic

among ministers. During the ten years of RK’s administration, 38% of

all appointed ministers and 68% of all marzpets were party members.

The party affiliation of newly appointed officials demonstrates that

nearly half of the marzpets (42.9%) and one-fifth of ministers were

from the RPA. Compared to LTP, RK did not rely on cadres with past

working experience in similar positions of the executive branch (less

than 10% of appointments). The emergence of several new parties that

were well represented in parliament (RPA, ARFD, RoL and,

subsequently, PAP) inevitably produced coalition governments, which

were major sources of renewal for political elites at the executive

level.

The trend in party-based appointments intensified after SS took

office and reached 80% of all newly appointed ministers and 70% of

marzpets. These executive appointments included both individuals

who had been loyal to the party for a long period and officials who

became party members on the eve of an appointment. The SS

recruitment policy also relied on long-serving, influential, nonpartisan

and high-ranking officials from the RK period. At the beginning of the

SS period, these officials were considered for technocratic

appointments to positions that required special professional skills,16 but

all of these officials became members of the RPA in two waves. In

November 2009, the prime minister and two other ministers joined

the party, and in December 2010, three additional nonpartisan

ministers also enlisted.17 The overall political composition of the

executive branch during the SS was more stable, and new

16 These officials were the prime minster and the ministers of finance, economic

development and justice. 17 Interestingly, only one or two months before these decisions, most of these

officials had publicly stated that they did not have intentions to become members of

any party.

33

appointments were triggered either by a changing coalition18 or

changes within a coalitional party, particularly ROL.

The combination of (a) a smaller number of new appointments, (b)

longer tenures of executive positions and (c) higher rates of party

membership, including the recruitment of appointed nonpartisan

ministers into the RPA, is a strong indication of a recruitment model

based on a closed circle of party members. The highest proportion of

single-party members both in the cabinet (ten out of 18) and among

marzpets (nine out of ten) in the current executive branch confirms

what was observed in the legislative branch: the consolidation of the

party system with a dominant party has reached its peak since the

independence of the RA.

Unlike RA, in the NKR, party affiliation had very limited influence

on the appointments of the executive branch. During the RK

administration, 90% of all executive positions were held by

nonpartisan officials. This figure decreased slightly (nearly three-

quarters of executive appointments were nonpartisan) during the

presidency of Arkady Ghukasyan, who was a party leader and

introduced party list seats in the NKR. All three parliamentary parties

were represented in the cabinet. However, this trend reversed after

the election of the third president, Bako Sahakyan, a nonpartisan with

a background in security services. Aside from the prime minister,

Arayik Harutyunyan, who is the leader of the largest parliamentary

party, none of the executive appointees selected during the BS

administration have declared party affiliations.

To understand the factors influencing elite recruitment in the

NKR, we examined the background of executive officials. Chart 1.9a

demonstrates that executive positions were initially given to political

insiders; most frequently, these positions were given to civil servants,

who were the main source of executive positions in the NKR (nearly

two-thirds of appointments). One-quarter of the ministers were

18 In 2009, three ARFD ministers left the coalition and were followed in 2012 by

four PAP ministers.

34

promoted after serving as an MP. The most diversified elite in the

executive branch was observed during the period of Arkady

Ghukasyan, during whose term nearly one-quarter of ministerial

positions were entrusted to people with no experience in public

administration but who had entrepreneurial experience. This group

was largely from the Free Motherland Party, which became the second

largest party during the 2005 parliamentary session and later

partnered with Arkady Gukasyan’s Democratic Party of Artsakh.

With the election of Bako Sahakyan, recruitment preferences

reversed: civil servants once again became the predominant source of

political elites (seven of nine appointments). However, four of six

newly appointed governors were long-serving police or security

service officers with no prior political experience. Only one of the 15

(6.7%) executive appointments made by Bako Sahakyan was a public

politician with prior electoral experience. In comparison, this figure

was 38.9% during the RK and 31% during the AG administrations.

In the context of a nonrecognized state, the increased presence of

security officers and the replacement of public politicians may be

explained by the existence of serious external risks, including the

renewal of military actions by Azerbaijan. However, we consider this

explanation primarily as a justification used by the president for these

appointments. A weakly developed party system facilitates the

appointment of nonpartisan individuals; BS, first and foremost,

attempts to reward individual loyalty with important positions. Such

individuals are bound to him by personal ties and are accountable to

him because they had not previously built political careers.

The background of individuals newly appointed to executive

positions in Armenia also reveals the political elite recruitment

preferences of the head of the executive branch at that time

(Chart 1.9b). All three presidents relied on a system of insiders to enlist

their teams. The largest group was drawn from former civil servants;

they constituted from 40.8 to 53.3% of all newly appointed ministers

and one-third of marzpets. After the introduction of a new system of

regional administration in 1995, LTP entrusted more than half of

marzpet positions to elected MPs, who often were from same region.

35

The proportion of such appointments halved during the RK and SS

administrations; other elected officials, including mayors, were also

promoted to marzpet positions (RK and SS appointed 14.3 and 10%,

respectively). Both RK and SS preferred to recruit officers to marzpet

positions (19 and 20%, respectively). The cadre of recruits drawn from

outside of the political system is from the intelligentsia and business

sector. These two groups have been well represented in cabinets: LTP

(29.9%), RK (18.3%) and SS (23.4%). Marzpets with such backgrounds

were recruited mostly during the SS period (20%, or two individuals).

This observation is not a notable trend, and it is difficult to assess

whether SS has considered external sources of regional governance or

whether these two appointments were motivated by other factors.

Career Transitions From the NKR Political Elite to the RA

Political Elite

A former NKR president, RK, who was first selected as the prime

minister of the RA and later was elected the president of Armenia,

spurred popular discussion of the role of the Karabakh elite in the

politics of the RA. To understand the extent to which this transition

occurred and the effects on the composition of the political elite, we

briefly document all cases of political elites shifting from the NKR to

the RA and vice versa.

It is easier to list individuals who were part of the political elite in

the NKR and then became part of the Armenian elite. For example,

former Prime Minister of the NKR Leonard Petrosyan moved to

Yerevan to join the RK team. He became a minister in 1999 but was

killed in the terrorist attack on the Armenian parliament that occurred

on October 27, 1999. The current Minister of Defense, Seyran Ohanian,

succeeded to this position after serving as the Minister of Defense in

the NKR. The best example of shifting from one political elite to

another is provided by the current Deputy Prime Minister of the NKR,

Arthur Aghabekyan. After relocating to Yerevan, the former Minister

of Internal Affairs in the NKR accepted the position of Deputy Minister

of Defense of Armenia. He was then elected an MP of the RA. In 2012,

36

he returned to Karabakh and was appointed to the position of Deputy

Prime Minister of Karabakh. Arthur Aghabekyan is the only

representative of the NKR elite who has move into the RA elite and

back into the political decision-makers of the NKR.

After leaving office in the NKR, some representatives of the

Karabakh elite continue their careers as Armenian diplomats. The

former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Former President of the

NKR, Arkadi Ghukasyan, is now a Special Mission Ambassador of

Armenia, and Oleg Yesayan, the former Speaker of the NKR National

Assembly, is the current Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

of Armenia in Russia. He previously held this position in Belarus.

There are fewer cases of a representative of the Armenian elite

becoming part of the NKR elite. The most vivid case is Tigran

Kyureghyan, the MP of the Supreme Council of 1990–5, who then

relocated to Karabakh. After accepting positions in LSG bodies,

Kyureghyan became an MP in the National Assembly of the NKR

during the period 2000–5. Compared to his colleagues, Kyuregyan was

not appointed to high political positions, immediately transitioning

from one political system to the other, but rather first relocated to the

NKR and built a local career before being elected to national

parliament.

Gender

The final section of this chapter is dedicated to a description of

the political elite’s gender composition. Female representatives

constitute a small portion of elites in both cases; however, certain

characteristics and trends were notable both in the RA and the NKR.

Overall, only 4.7% of all positions were held by females in the RA; a

significant portion of these women (61.7%) were MPs elected by party

lists. This pattern indicates that the representation of females within

the political elite of the RA would be lower if not for formal rules

37

reserving at least 20% of party list seats for female representatives.19

However, this use of gender quotas is relatively new in the RA, which

indicates that female politicians were frequently elected as MPs by the

proportional system before the introduction of these quotas. Only

2.6% of all FPTP MPs were women, a figure that has ranged from 0 to

4.7% over time. A similar proportion of female politicians (2.8%) were

also represented in the cabinet of the RA. Two female ministers were

recruited to all cabinets of each of the three presidents. Only one

female was ever appointed as a marzpet, constituting 2.1% of all such

appointments.

No major trends or differences in the age of recruitment between

male and female political elite representatives were revealed. Unlike

some male elites, none of the females were recruited into the political

elite without a university degree; the most frequent degrees were

earned in the social sciences (28.3% of females) and law (15%). Female

elite representatives also exhibited less diverse paths to the political

elite: more than half of female recruits were either part of the

intelligentsia (36.7% compared to 17.6% of males) or civil servants

(21.7%) before their political careers.

Females are represented in the NKR twice as often (8.8% of all

cases) as in the RA. The representation of females is significantly more

balanced across various positions (26% of all females were party list

MPs, 52% were FPTP MPs, and the remaining 22% were ministers), and

females constitute 8.5% of ministers and 10.5% of MPs. Female

representation has increased especially since BS took office as

president; 16% of all newly recruited elite members are female, a

significantly higher portion even without the introduction of quotas

for female MPs. However, marzpet positions remain less attainable for

females. The higher proportion of females with at least a university

19 Article 155.2 of the Electoral Code of the RA states that “The number of persons

of each sex shall not exceed 80% of any integer group of five candidates starting from

the second number of the electoral list (2–6, 2–11, 2–16, and so on up to the end of the

list) of a political party or alliance of political parties and of each party included in an

alliance.”

38

degree was also observed in the NKR (91.5% compared to 80.2% among

males). Another notable difference was that females received their

education in local universities (91.5% compared to 83.1% among

males). Female elites were drawn from less diverse professions: 52.2%

of females earned degrees in pedagogy and/or linguistics, and 17.4%

earned medical degrees. Female political elite members took similar

paths to the political elite as their peers in the RA: 39.1% were

appointed or elected to national political positions after years of civil

service, whereas 21.7% were part of the intelligentsia (teachers, poets,

etc.) before entering politics. Female political elite representatives

frequently possessed electoral experience before their election or

appointment to national political positions (69.6% compared to 56.3%

of males), which indicates that females are less frequently appointed

to such positions without political experience. Another indication of

the importance of experience for female elites is that in the NKR,

female representatives were entrusted to political positions at older

ages (43.1% were recruited at age 51 or older compared to 19.9% of

males). It is safe to conclude that despite their comparatively higher

rates of representation in the NKR, only females with certain

characteristics (university degrees earned during the early stages of

their life, successful and long careers in civil service or other white

collar employment) were likely to be recruited. One possible

explanation for the higher rates of female representation in the more

traditional NKR might be the relative scarcity of males in a postwar

society, specifically when a high proportion of working-age males are

recruited to the army in a society that has one of the world’s highest

rates of soldiers per capita.

39

Social network analysis as a tool for analyzing

political elites

Introduction

Naturally, not all individuals who hold formal positions are equally

influential members of the elite. To identify and describe the

dynamics within the elite, that is, among individuals and groups who

wield the most influence and power, we turn to social network

analysis.

Based on graph theory and advanced computing capacities,

network analysis methods have been employed in the hard sciences

for several decades. Over the last decade, network analysis has been

applied in many other academic disciplines as well as in other spheres.

Social scientists have gradually adopted these methods to describe and

analyze relationships among social actors both at the individual and

institutional level. A number of social network analysis (SNA) software

programs20

have been developed, enhancing the capacity of social

scientists to both analyze and visualize network data.

The core of this approach is the concept of a network (also

referred as a graph or sociogram) that consists of nodes (actors) and

ties or edges (relationships among those actors). The major difference

and, in the context of this study, advantage of network data over

conventional data are that the latter focuses on actors and attributes,

whereas the former focuses on actors and their relations (Hanneman &

Riddle, 2005).

Depending on the type of data, SNA can reveal various

characteristics of a social community, including the type, direction

and intensity of relationships among actors; the position of any given

actor within a network; and the existence of various segments

(clusters or components) in that network. SNA is considered a very

20

We utilized Gephi (https://gephi.org/), an open-source software for the

visualization and analysis of networks graphs, in our research.

40

effective tool for measuring the power relations among various actors.

Therefore, the application of SNA to political elites enabled us (a) to

look beyond the general characteristics of individuals who held

political positions in Armenia and identify and describe the most

influential individuals and groups among these elites and (b) to

visualize and present relations, and changes in these relations, over

time.

In our approach, the network is composed of political decision

makers (nodes) who were connected to each other in cases when (1)

they were able to pass a formal decision and (2) they cooperated with

each other for that purpose. The parliament and the laws passed by

that parliament are the most feasible, and most likely the only, source

of systematically collected data about formal political decisions that

indicate the authors of these decisions. This approach limits the

measurement of political influence of MPs to formally adopted

decisions, whereas other aspects of influence are not captured in the

network. Another limitation is the available data during this period;

information about the authors of passed laws was available only for

the RA21 and only beginning in 2003.

22

As a result, we created networks that include all MPs who

authored or coauthored bills that were passed by the parliament and

became laws. Each tie represented a bill that was coauthored by two

or more MPs, and the network represents all such cases. Consequently,

ties in the network are measured or weighted by the number of times

a given MP coauthored an adopted bill. This decision ensured an

interval measurement of relations, which is considered the most

“advanced” level of measurement allows us to discriminate among the

relations reported in ways that allow us to validly state that, for

21 Note that in the parliament of the NKR, this approach probably would be less

revealing of influential individuals and groups because the laws adopted by these

institutions are imported from the RA; thus, very few cases exist in which NKR MPs

actually author the bills themselves. 22

The author information of adopted laws can be found on the official webpage of

the National Assembly.

41

example, “this tie is twice as strong as that tie” (Hanneman and

Riddle, Chapter 1, 2005). Ties within this network are unidirectional

because coauthoring a bill is considered a symmetrical relation, that is,

it is impossible to identify the direction of the tie.23

Bills proposed to parliament by the executive branch are not

included24

in the network because it is impossible to identify who

authored those bills within the government. The government is

represented in the network only in exceptional cases when bills were

coauthored with individual MPs. When the network represents the

data of the full population of actors and their ties, it constitutes a full

network. These networks are very effective for description and

systemic analyses of a social structure because they anable to measure

many concepts within the SNA. Each node in the network was

assigned the following attributes: gender, party membership, faction

membership, political status (opposition/ruling party member) and

electoral status (FPTP/party list MP).

Initially, three networks were constructed to represent each

assembly of the parliament.25

The main analysis was conducted on

these three networks. However, a representation and comparison of

the data by convocations do not account for political changes,

specifically the composition of the ruling coalition. For an MP, being a

representative from the ruling party should greatly increase the ability

to pass bills in parliament. To reflect major political developments,

particularly changes in the ruling coalition, five separate networks

were created to represent the data for each period with changes in

the ruling coalition. Chart 2.1 displays all parliamentary parties since

23

Theoretically, it is possible to assign directions to ties in cases where it is clear

who was the main coauthor of the bill or who exerted greater influence over its

content, but this was not an option with our data. 24

Nearly 91% of all adopted bills during the third convocation, 83% during the

fourth convocation and 89% during the fifth convocation were authored by the

executive branch. http://parliament.am/parliament.php?id=parliament&lang=arm. 25

The third convocation (May 2003- May 2007), fourth convocation (May 2007-

May 2012) and current fifth convocation (May 2012-June 2013).

42

2003 and indicates the changes in the composition of the ruling

coalition (parties above the “opposition/ruling coalition” line).

As a result, eight networks were generated and compared. Three

of these networks represent the whole convocation (referred as Conv

3, 4, 5), and the additional five (Table 2.1) reflect periods of coalition

change (referred as Coal 1, 2, 3, 4, 5).

The most interesting findings from the SNA are presented in the

following pages. These findings merely scratch the surface of the

network data, which proved to be a very effective tool for elite

research. The SNA has the potential to advance elite research, and

experimentation with network data provides opportunities to innovate

in this field.

Basic Characteristics of Networks Representing

Entire Convocations

The size and density of a network is one its important parameters.

In most cases, the size is described by the number of nodes and ties,

the diameter or similar dimensions. Comparing these network features

for MPs enables conclusions on the overall picture of the decision-

making process in each of convocations to be drawn.

Table 2.2 presents the basic characteristics of the networks. The

number of nodes, ties and average degree demonstrates that the

largest proportion of MPs directly participated in policy formulation

during periods were MPs from ruling coalition parties. This finding

indicates that belonging to a ruling coalition had tangible implications

for the ability of MPs to formulate decisions in addition to affecting

other privileges.26

In this context, it is interesting that only during the

third convocation did the number of nodes exceed the number of MPs

26

Although voting on bills is also part of the decision-making process, in this

context, we considered decision makers to be only those MPs who directly and

proactively formulated public policies by drafting a bill and successfully passing it

through parliament.

43

from ruling coalition parties, that is, even oppositional MPs were able

to pass at least one law (Graph 1). Some oppositional MPs were almost

as effective in passing legislation as the most influential members of

ruling parties27

(the size of a node reflects the number of passed laws).

The smaller number of parties and MPs from ruling coalition parties

during the fifth convocation (75 of 131 seats) suggests that a smaller

number of MPs have been and will be able to effectively influence

formal parliamentary decisions.

Two other important factors, in addition to the size of the

coalition, influence the size of the network: (a) the duration of a

coalition and (b) electoral cycles. Naturally, in cases when a coalition

was of short duration or conducted its legislative activities on the eve

of national elections, a smaller number of laws (ties) were passed, and

the number of decision makers (nodes) was reduced. The two

networks characterized by these factors are Coal 2 and Coal 3. As

expected, these networks also have the smallest diameters (3), which

is the largest geodesic distance in the (connected) network. Such

networks are considered compact. This figure is simply explained by

the smaller number of laws (20 vs. eight, Table 2.1) and authors (27 vs.

13, Table 2.2); therefore, these two networks should not be compared

to the larger networks representing whole convocation.

Graph density, which illustrates the proportion of all possible ties

that are actually present, is an important indicator of the level of

interconnectedness in a network. The fifth convocation has the

highest graph density, which once again reflects the consolidation of

political power in the hands of a smaller group of MPs. The results

presented in the next four columns confirm this conclusion.

Modularity calculates the number of communities within a network

according to the position of nodes. The number of such communities

(in the context of our research, groupings within the elite) is higher

during the fifth convocation (8). However, this finding is related not

to a structural disintegration of the elite but rather reflects (a) the

27

See the next section on individual elite members for details.

44

departure and/or isolation of MPs representing ex-coalitional parties or

(b) a single nonpartisan MP who managed to pass a single law but was

not part of the main network (largest connected components). A

higher value of connected components (5), that is, the number groups

that have no ties to other groups, confirms the isolation of certain MPs

from the main network.

Moreover, this isolation occurs across party lines, with two

connected components representing members of a single party (PAP

and ARFD ex-coalition members) and two individual majoritarian MPs

(see Graph 2). Unlike the other convocations, even independent MPs

elected through the FPTP system are unrepresented in the network,

which indicates the diminishing opportunities of such MPs to directly

design their policies.28

Instead, such MPs, who often are either wealthy

businessmen or represent business interests, join a political party

(often either the RPA or PAP) and promote their interests in the

executive and legislative branches through party channels and

personal relations rather than directly initiating and designing

legislation.

Consolidation across party lines is also reflected in the average

clustering coefficient (highest during the fifth convocation, 0.955),

which measures the average of the densities of the neighborhoods of

all the actors, and in the average path length, which measures the

proximity of nodes, which are connected components (the shortest

paths occur during the fifth convocation, 1.653).

The fourth convocation provides a transitional picture of this

political power consolidation. As displayed in Chart 3, the number of

MPs who authored legislation is significantly larger than during the

fifth convocation, and in this regard, the fourth convocation resembles

the third convocation. These MPs represent a larger number of

political parties, which was also typical in the third convocation.

Moreover, these MPs are integrated into a single connected component

28

A quick glance at the titles of laws initiated by these MPs indicates that most of

these were related to economic and/or fiscal policies.

45

and are thus similar to the third convocation in terms of

interconnectedness. These connections represent cooperation on bill

authorship, often across party lines. With the exception of relatively

more interconnectedness among ARFD MPs (displayed in orange), no

significant clustering occurs along party lines. A final important

similarity with the third convocation is the existence of a substantial

number of independent MPs. However, compared to the third

convocation, these independent MPs are not grouped together but

rather are diffused within the network and cooperate with all

representatives of the ruling coalition. The most important difference

between the third and fourth convocations is the extent of

representation of opposition party MPs in the network. Unlike the

third convocation, which included a meaningful involvement of

opposition party MPs, such MPs became marginalized during the fourth

convocation. This trend continued and intensified during the fifth

convocation. As a result, the political elite has evolved from a diverse

and consensual group, where oppositional and coalitional party MPs

as well as independents cooperated to produce formal decisions, to an

exclusive and closed group representing a dominant party (and its

minor ally party) that limits policy formulation even among partners

from previous coalitions.

Identification of the Most Influential Elite

Representatives

SNA not only presents the overall characteristics of a network but

also enables the identification of the most influential or powerful

nodes within a network. Indeed, SNA contributes to the advanced

analysis of power relations. Hanneman and Riddle (2005) summarize

the role of SNA in research on power as follows: “Network thinking

has contributed a number of important insights about social power.

Perhaps most importantly, the network approach emphasizes that

power is inherently relational. An individual does not have power in

the abstract, they have power because they can dominate others.

46

Because power is a consequence of patterns of relations, the amount

of power in social structures can vary. Power arises from occupying

advantageous positions in networks of relations... Three basic sources

of advantage are high degree, high closeness, and high betweenness.

In simple structures (such as the star, circle, or line), these advantages

tend to covary.”

These three criteria are the basis of our approach to identifying

the most powerful elites in parliament. After a brief explanation of

these three concepts, the findings are presented and discussed,

concentrating on the qualities possessed by the 10–12 most influential

MPs. The results for the entire network are presented in separate

tables (Table 2.3 represents the third convocation, 2.4 the fourth and

2.5 the fifth). The degree is the primary criterion for identifying the

most powerful MPs; other criteria produce similar standings, that is,

MPs with higher degrees also tend to have to have better results when

employing weighted degree, closeness and betweenness measures.

The degree of a node represents its connections with other nodes.

In our network, this is the number of MPs with whom a particular MP

coauthored a law. Because ties in our network are weighted, it is also

possible to produce a weighted degree, that is, to measure not only

the number of laws but also how many times each MP coauthored

laws with other MPs. Closeness measures the proximity of a node to

other nodes. MPs who are able to reach other actors via shorter paths

or who are more reachable by other actors on these shorter paths

occupy favored positions. This structural advantage reflects a second

dimension of power. Betweenness is another measure of the position of

a node within a network. Betweenness indicates how often an MP

serves as an exclusive bridge between two other MPs, which reflects

an increased capacity to mediate between MPs and thus reflects that

MP’s power.

Table 2.3 indicates that the most powerful MPs of the third

convocation were quite diverse. This diversity is related to both

political and party preferences. MPs from all parliamentary parties and

the two independent MPs are included in this most powerful group. Of

the 11 most powerful MPs, four represent the parliamentary

47

opposition. The FPTP MPs included three of these 11. Gender is

unequally represented among the most powerful MPs; only one female

is included in this elite group.

The results of the fourth convocation indicate a significant shift:

opposition MPs constituted a much smaller portion of parliament and

were largely absent from the list of MPs who were able to pass a law.

Moreover, with one exception, even independent MPs were not on the

top of the list. That exception was Victor Dallaqyan, who managed to

be one of the top five most influential MPs during the third

convocation despite the fact that he was a member of the opposition

bloc; however, during the fourth convocation, he saw his power wane

even after he split with the oppositional parties to represent himself as

an independent MP.

Instead, only MPs from ruling parties were represented in the top

positions in the list of the most powerful MPs in the fourth

convocation. The frequency of appearance in the list was roughly

proportionate to the number of representatives of each ruling party in

parliament (RPA as dominant, PAP as the main partner and ROL and

ARFD as minor partners in the coalition). MPs representing these

factions were not always elected through a proportional electoral

system, and the representation of FPTP and party list MPs was

comparable to previous convocations. The main distinction was that

influential FPTP MPs, who are often reelected from the same districts,

were already party members. There was also a transition in terms of

gender between the third and fourth convocations, with female MPs

increasing in numbers and growing in influence.

When filtered based on a weighted scale of frequency of passed

laws, several other MPs29

would rise to the top of the list of most

influential MPs. All these MPs were elected by a proportional system,

and they represented each of the four ruling parties; at least three

were part of a smaller team that concentrated on shaping public policy

29

Hegine Bisharyan, Ara Babloyan, Ara Nranyan, David Harutyunyan, bold in the

list.

48

in a specialized field (economy, justice, healthcare) without significant

involvement from other MPs (resulting in a lower number of degrees,

i.e., a lower number of coauthor MPs). This finding indicates that as

the ruling parties consolidated in parliament, a certain type of division

of labor occurred within parties. In addition to influential MPs who

held formal positions (such as faction leader) and who frequently

authored laws with a large number of MPs in a wide variety of fields, a

group of party MPs was established that “specialized” in regulating

certain fields. Professional expertise and background were important

factors that enabled MPs to assume such roles in parliament.

Data for the current fifth convocation covers only a period of one

and half years, and the composition and structure of the network

might change by the end of the term. However, based on these data,

certain trends can be observed that are briefly discussed below.

One of the new trends is a greater number of coauthors; as many

as 21 MPs have been involved in coauthoring a single amendment.

Notably, those MPs who also hold positions in parliament30

(such as

deputy speaker, faction leader, head of committee) tend to appear in

these groups more frequently and tend, in particular, to cooperate

with one another. These developments might indicate the fusion of

real political influence with formal positions and the establishment of

an acknowledged hierarchy within the ruling party and/or an

increased motivation by a larger number of MPs to demonstrate a

certain type of parliamentary performance by joining various bill

initiatives, even when the possibility of influencing a policy outcome

is small.

Another (but not new) trend is the increased influence of party

list MPs compared to FPTP MPs, despite having the same proportion of

seats during the fourth and fifth convocations. This is a continuation

of a larger trend that began in 2003 that is described above. Another

continuing trend is the increased representation of females in the

30

Galust Sahakyan, Eduard Sharmazanov, Hermine Nagdalyan, Ara Babloyan, David

Harutyunyan.

49

network of decision makers; this figure rose from 6.3% during the

third convocation to 19% during the fifth convocation. Thus, although

the increased representation of females in parliament was achieved by

adopting formal rules (quotas), this finding indicates that it in fact has

translated into greater participation of women in decision making and

policy formulation.

The most obvious and probably the most important trend is party

consolidation and the establishment of a single dominant party in the

political system, which is indicated by the percentage of MPs in the

network who are affiliated with the largest faction in parliament. In

the most recent three convocations, the RPA was the leading faction,

but its percentage rose from 27.9% during the third convocation to

46.8% during the fourth convocation and to 66.7% of the MPs in

parliament during the fifth convocation (excluding coalition partners

from the R O L).

These general results from the social network analysis, including

identification of the most influential elite members within the

parliament, reinforce findings from statistical analyses, and they

deepen and refine our understanding of the elite composition in RA.

50

CHAPTER 2: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF

THE POLITICAL ELITE: VALUES AND

PREFERENCES

After Armenian independence, new political elites emerged; some

elites left the ranks over time, some elites were forced out, and new

figures have joined the group of political elites. Drawing from Samuel

Huntington’s argument that the system of beliefs and actions of the

elite are the most direct and significant variables explaining

democratic transitions,31 we attempt to reveal political elite

representatives’ values, beliefs, political orientations and preferences.

The selection of individuals for in-depth interviews was based on

the criteria that defined political elites in this study. Respondents were

selected using the snowball method. The final list of respondents

included more than 50 political figures targeted to participate in the

interviews. The most difficult task of this procedure was overcoming

representatives’ unwillingness to participate. Social networks were

leveraged to overcome difficulties in making final arrangements and

obtaining consent to participate. Interviewers selected for this study

were skilled in clarifying information and deepening responses. They

were also specially trained to overcome potential problems arising

from delicate questions addressed to politicians.

The in-depth interviews were conducted from April to August

2012. The main difficulties encountered during fieldwork were gaining

the approval of potential respondents and scheduling the meetings for

the interviews, especially given that this fieldwork coincided with

elections in Armenia. The average interview lasted 70 min.

Importantly, in most cases, the representatives did not decline after

initially agreeing to participate. However, interviewers noted a lack of

31 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Third Wave Democratization in the Late Twentieth

Century,” Norman: University of Oklahoma Press (1991), 36–38.

51

sincerity or bias in some responses. These specific cases were

identified and interpreted by the interviewer. At the end of each

interview, interviewers evaluated the level of the respondent’s

sincerity on a five-point scale. Twenty percent of the interviews were

given grades in the range of 2–3, and the rest received grades of 4–5.

Therefore, the interviewers perceived that a high level of sincerity

was exhibited.

After obtaining the consent of each respondent, the interviews

were recorded, and the interviewers took notes. Interviewers

produced literal transcripts without making any changes or

reformulations immediately after each interview. In cases of specific

opinions or observations, interviewers added their notes in the notes

section of the questionnaire. The tests that were administered and

completed by the respondents were also transcribed and coded.

Respondents are presented according to political party affiliation

to preserve their anonymity. Additionally, the main distinction in

approaches was made between two groups: the governing coalition

and the oppositional political parties.

It is noteworthy that three of 51 respondents were previous prime

ministers, two of whom served during the first presidential

administration, and the other served during the second administration.

The list also includes approximately 30 deputies, ten ministers and

three deputy ministers from the administrations of all three Armenian

presidents. Three respondents were leading presidential candidates in

1991, 1996 and 2013. Sixteen respondents, or one-third of the sample,

were women. The youngest respondent was 30 years old, and the

eldest was 70 years old. Fifteen respondents were 30–40 years old, 11

respondents were 41–50 years old, 15 respondents were 51–60 years

old, and ten respondents were 61 years old or above.

Twenty-one respondents were members of the Armenian

Republican Party, which is the ruling party in Armenia. Seven

respondents represented the Heritage party, three were from

Prosperous, Armenia, three were from the Armenian Revolutionary

Federation, three were from the Armenian National Congress, three

represented the NGO sector, and the others were from other

52

nonparliamentary political parties. Except for the Republican Party,

the remaining parties are oppositional.

Life Story

The first section of questions concerned the life story of the elite

representative. The aim of these questions was to discover their place

of birth, family social status and parents’ professions. Twenty-nine

respondents were born in Yerevan, seven were born in other

Armenian cities and towns, nine were born in villages, and the other

five were born in other countries. Therefore, more than 70% of the

respondents were born in a city, nearly 20% were born in villages, and

10% were from abroad. Approximately 55% of the Republican Party

representatives were born in Yerevan.

The parents of most respondents were employed in higher

education institutions and schools. The rest were employed in

construction, industry and state administration. Most of the

respondents’ parents were employed; only four respondents reported

that only one parent (in particular, their mother) was not working and

was engaged in housekeeping. Most respondents described the

socioeconomic situation of their families as normal or good, whereas

only two respondents considered their situation to be bad or difficult.

The respondents’ own answers indicate that, during the transition

phase in Armenia, the individuals who became part of the new elite

came from families that would be considered middle class.

Respondents were asked about their childhood role models who

played major roles in the formation of their personality and value

system. Almost all respondents described their parents as authorities

who influenced their lives and shaped their values. Respondents also

mentioned elder family members, especially grandparents. They

recounted the stories their grandparents had told about the Armenian

Genocide, which was cited as a major influence on the development of

their personality and values as well as a factor in their decision to

become politicians. All three members of the Armenian Revolutionary

53

Federation party reported that joining this particular party was closely

connected to hearing stories about the Armenian Genocide as a child.

A small group of respondents indicated the absence of role models

during their childhoods by emphasizing that they were quite active

and this shaped their future. Four respondents claimed to not have

thought about entering politics during their youth and that their

presence in politics was determined by chance.

Respondents often mentioned famous political and historical

figures as authorities in their lives. The following names were most

commonly mentioned: former prime ministers Vazgen Sargsyan and

Andranik Margaryan, King Tigran the Great, King Pap, Garegin Nghdeh,

Margaret Thatcher and Winston Churchill. One respondent mentioned

the president of the RA, Serj Sargsyan, and two respondents

mentioned former President Levon Ter-Petrosyan. One respondent

reported that his youth was very active and he was always creating

different initiatives. During these years, Samantha Smith was a role

model for him. Respondents generally referred to historical figures,

which may reflect the absence of political authorities in Armenia.

Fifty respondents had completed higher education (seven

respondents also had postgraduate education), and one respondent had

received a high school education. Three respondents received their

higher education abroad, and the rest were educated in Yerevan.

Nearly 10% of respondents obtained their educations partly in Armenia

and partly abroad, most frequently in Russia. Sixty percent of

respondents received their degrees in the humanities and social

sciences; many of these degrees were received in jurisprudence,

which represented one-third of the humanities and social sciences

degrees. The remaining 40% of respondents studied the natural and

technical sciences.

Respondents stated that their professional education played a

substantial role in their political activity. Even those who obtained

degrees in the natural and technical sciences held this opinion. One

respondent with a technical education reported that his life vision was

shaped in the university and that his profession taught him a realistic

approach to politics. Another respondent, who graduated from the

54

Polytechnic Institute named for K. Marx, reported that he would not

have become a politician without the knowledge from his field, which

he uses in his daily activities. One of the primary activists in the

movement that began in 1988, who was later a prime minister, stated

that the Soviet Union did not limit the development of the natural

sciences and that many of the free-thinking people who proposed

liberal ideas during the Soviet period were scientists. He gave physicist

Andrey Sakharov and mathematician Alexander Shavarev as examples.

Respondents also answered questions about their hobbies and their

preferences in leisure activities. The most common response was

reading. Other favorite pastimes included various types of sports. A

few respondents enjoyed the theater or played musical instruments.

One respondent noted that he liked to frequent the casino. Heritage

Party representatives reported that they enjoyed spending time in

their social networks and participated in political activism for human

rights and ethnic and environmental movements.

During the interviews, we attempted to determine how

respondents met their spouses, the meaning they attributed to family

and how family affected their involvement in politics. Four of the

respondents were not married. One-third of respondents reported

meeting their spouse at a university; the next most frequent response

was the workplace. Respondents often characterized the family as the

cell of a society, indicated that they valued family and stated that the

family is the environment in which a person lives and receives

spiritual sustenance. One respondent called his family his guardian

angel as well as his castle and refuge. Family was widely characterized

as a person’s home, a place where one can express oneself, an

important place for a person’s tranquility and the place where one’s

homeland begins. Only one respondent claimed that a social life is

more important than the family.

55

Entering Politics

The next set of questions explored the motives, situations and

circumstances that contributed to the decision to enter the political

field.

Nearly the half of the respondents over the age of 40 identified a

single key moment in their political awakening. The Karabakh

movement, which began in February 1988, encouraged a generation of

citizens to engage in politics and build political careers, many of which

have endured. The movement also greatly shaped these politicians’ life

visions, value systems and political behavior. A similar persistent effect

of early political activism related to the Karabakh movement was

observed by anthropologists studying mass political behavior in post-

Soviet Armenia (Abrahamian & Shagoyan, 2012).

One respondent claimed to have realized that he must become

involved in politics in 1987 but that the Karabakh movement forced

him to do so. He was a member of The Yerevan City Council during

the period 1999–2003 and later became a deputy in the National

Assembly; in 2012, he once again became a deputy in the National

Assembly. Another respondent noted that he entered politics during

the Karabakh movement and that the political party environment

played a role in his becoming a politician. Respondents frequently

reported that entering politics was closely connected to becoming a

member of a particular party. Some members of the Heritage Party

noted that their political activity was linked to being involved in that

party’s different structures. One respondent had first cooperated with

the party, joined the party list and become a deputy in the National

Assembly, only afterward considering a career in politics.

Of the 21 representatives from The Armenian Republican Party,

eight noted that their entry into politics was connected to joining this

particular party. Republican Party representatives also often reported

that they were handpicked by party leaders to carry out specific

political functions. Andranik Margaryan, a former prime minister, was

most frequently cited as mobilizing and motivating new members of

56

the party that would become the ruling party of post-Soviet Armenia.

To summarize, participation in the Karabakh movement and party

membership were identified as the two most frequent paths of

political elite formation. Whereas the former path was common among

the older generation of elites, people who entered into politics more

recently considered party membership to be the defining moment in

their political path.

The third, but less common, path into the political elite was taken

by nonpartisan individuals who were elected by constituencies or

appointed to positions because of their personal or professional skills.

However, most of these individuals faced the dilemma, after a certain

point in their political careers, of whether to join one of the dominant

parties or to leave politics. Interestingly, a number of interviewees

claimed that often, the decision to join a political party was

conditioned upon their ability to exert maximum influence and not

their ideological orientations or specific policy preferences.

We also asked the respondents to identify the factors that helped

them enter the political elite as well as to indicate which qualities and

skills a person should possess to succeed in Armenian political life.

Nearly one-quarter of the respondents said that education is important

for elite membership, and another quarter cited advantageous family

and social relationships. More frequently, families were considered

important to creating quality and competitive education and to

developing a stable system of values. One respondent noted that his

family played a major role in the formation of his personality and that

“the main role belongs to the family when growing up as a true

Armenian, whereas the family has little influence over his current

political activities.” Only one respondent noted that his family’s

influence on his political activity was negative. When asked whether

they would like their children or grandchildren to be engaged in

politics, most replied that their children were free to choose for

themselves and that they would not object to a decision to become

involved in politics. One respondent reported that he would like for

his children to be involved in politics because he considers politics to

be the art of arts. Only four respondents reported that they would not

57

like their children to be engaged in political activity without providing

much elaboration on the question. It is noteworthy that these

respondents were members of the ruling political party.

We also attempted to determine what the respondents consider to

be their role in politics upon entering this field and which objectives

they pursued at the beginnings of their careers. Respondents mostly

indicated quite general objectives: to raise questions that were

important for the progress of the society and to effect change in the

country. One respondent recalled that he entered politics to build the

motherland that he dreamed of. Another respondent said that she

attempts to demonstrate to her former colleagues, journalists, by

example that not all politicians suffer from the deficiencies that she

observed during her journalistic career and that it is possible to be a

different kind of politician. Another respondent described his role as

demonstrating the possibility of honesty in politics and raising

important national issues. Respondents frequently indicated that their

goals have not changed since their initial entry into politics. One

respondent stated that he wanted to demonstrate that democratic

governance could be implemented in Armenia and that this goal had

not changed over time. Independence and Nagorno-Karabakh were

issues of great importance for the respondents. The Heritage Party

representative stated that his sole purpose in politics was to build a

state with 42,000 km2 of territory (referring to the joint area of the

Republic of Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic), which is

“our motherland territory that will serve the needs of all Armenians of

the world.”

A primary goal of this study was to reveal the main components

and features of the political elites’ value system. Therefore, elites were

asked about two topics:

• Which universal values and principles they identify with as

politicians;

• Which behaviors are acceptable or unacceptable in the political

arena.

Respondents most often selected freedom and justice as well as

democracy as the universal principles they identified with as

58

politicians. They also cited family, the motherland and responsibility

toward the family and motherland as core values. One group of

respondents cited “Tseghakron” (nationalistic) ideology. Another

respondent stated that the most important principle for a human being

was to serve the nation in which he was born and that a man cannot

be a good person or espouse universal values if he fails to uphold

these values. Certain patterns were revealed by prioritizing values and

preferences. Nationalistic rhetoric was dominant among interviewees

who represented the ruling political party as well as many nonliberal

opposition members who place greater emphasis on national security

and economic prosperity than other goals. Commonly employed terms

in this group included “Motherland,” “nation,” “order,” “morality”

and “security,” compared to terms such as “statehood,” “democracy,”

“rule of law” and “freedom,” which were used more often by other

opposition members.

Respondents most frequently expressed that the use of all possible

means to achieve a goal or to enter into politics, the betrayal of

principles and disregarding the public interest were unacceptable. One

respondent considered political romanticism to be unacceptable.

Truthfulness, prioritizing the public interest, intelligence and the

ability to persuade the public were most often considered desirable.

The availability of a political team and the possession of a political

conscience were also considered important. Respondents stressed the

importance of fairness and honesty. One respondent stated that he

would never accept meanness or the use of manipulative technologies

in politics. Another respondent noted that of the universal values,

morality is primary and patriotism follows and that knowledge is a

precondition to enter the political arena.

The next question asked elite representatives whether they

consider themselves followers of any religion. The vast majority of

respondents, approximately 80%, identified as followers of the

Armenian Apostolic Church. These respondents traced their

membership to receiving sacraments, which was most often their

baptism in childhood. The others identified as Christian in a general

sense but expressed disappointment in the Armenian Apostolic Church

59

for various reasons and did not consider themselves to be members.

One respondent noted his belief in God but did not follow a religion.

Another respondent replied that he did not consider himself a

Christian but that Christian morals guide his behavior. Only one

respondent identified as an atheist.

Self-Perception of the Political Elite

Respondents were also asked to describe the current Armenian

political elite. The current elite was generally described in negative

terms, especially by the members of opposition parties, who often

distanced themselves from or did not consider themselves to be part

of the elite. The current political elite was generally described in

negative terms. The representatives of the ruling party stated that the

elite had experienced some recent, positive changes and presented

examples of such positive developments, whereas representatives of

oppositional parties relied on predominantly negative descriptions of

the elite. For instance, one oppositional party representative stated,

“there is no elite in Armenia because the main prerequisite for being

elite is having principles, but nowadays, the ruling class does not have

any.” A representative of the ruling party claimed that “to be a part of

the elite, one needs to be consistent, determined, knowledgable and

intelligent.” Many respondents not only assigned negative

characteristics to their colleagues, especially to the representatives of

competing parties, but also depicted politics itself as an immoral, zero-

sum game with far-reaching consequences both for elite members and

society in general. Of the 21 ruling party representatives, eight stated

that political fights are becoming more and more civilized and referred

to the National Assembly elections held on May 6, 2012 and other

examples to support their argument. Interestingly, there were also a

few interviewees who were disappointed in that same election and

referred to it as an example of the ruling class’s offenses.

The oppositional party representative who stated that there is no

elite in Armenia because the main prerequisite for having an elite is to

60

have principles and that politicians today do not possess any principles

also stated that “economic oligarchy dominates, and the level of the

elite is irrelevant and does not represent the development level of the

whole society.”

Elite representatives were also asked to identify the groups that

exist within the Armenian elite and their place within it. Once again,

respondents often noted that an elite with certain qualifications does

not exist in Armenia. One group of respondents distinguished between

progovernment and opposition groups as well as political party

membership to group elite representatives. One respondent identified

three groups: the first addresses serious politics, the second includes

the business elite, and the third group includes opportunists. Another

respondent also identified three groups: representatives who passed

through the Soviet school, activists who traced their origins to

independence and became the locomotive of the national movement

and active young people sharing postindependence aspirations who

received the patronage of the first two groups. One respondent

identified two groups: elites who understand national issues and elites

who do not. Still another elite representative described three layers:

the first layer acquires financial resources and does not care about

Armenia as a whole, the next layer does not have the resources but is

not prepared to engage in political fights, and the third layer consists

of those who are willing to sacrifice their interests in a struggle.

The respondents did not describe a homogenous Armenian

political elite but rather a structure with different layers, groups and

even subgroups. The responses indicated the absence of a unified elite

structure and, in fact, suggested the absence of general agreement on

underlying values, national priorities and political principles.

We also asked elite representatives to identify the factors that

helped them become part of the political elite as well as to note the

qualities and skills that a person should possess to remain in Armenian

political life. As expected, education was an important factor in joining

the political elite. Family and relationships were also important factors.

Many respondents also reported negative factors. One respondent

noted that it is necessary to be impolite and to betray to become a

61

member of the elite: “adulation, applying any means to one’s purpose,

mediocrity and the special skill of initiating intrigues are negative

features that can play a crucial role in advancing a political career.”

The respondents identified three important factors that influence

integration into the political elite: being a part of a political

organization, professing an ideology and possessing financial or other

means of control. One respondent noted the need to be consistent,

determined, knowledgeable and intelligent to become a part of the

elite. Other factors highlighted included working hard, desiring to

effect change and possessing social skills.

One representative of a oppositional party said that to represent

the ruling elite, one needs to be greedy, unscrupulous and dishonest.

In contrast, a representative of the ruling party stated that one must

possess deep ideological views and values.

We also asked the respondents to describe the nature of political

struggle in Armenia as well as to note which measures employed in

this struggle are justified in their view. Eight respondents of the 21

ruling party representatives stated that political disputes have become

increasingly civilized; these representatives referred to the National

Assembly elections on May 6, 2012 as evidence of this pattern.

Another representative of the ruling party said that an atmosphere of

tolerance is important for political competition but that no such

condition exists in Armenia. Most respondents were inclined to

compromise, but the political environment does not always allow

parties to be more constructive.

Representatives from the opposition political parties gave negative

evaluations of political competition in Armenia. They indicated that

competition is unfair and violates the principle of equal opportunity

and that, therefore, society cannot form a government, and political

struggle is just an imitation of government. Another respondent

claimed that no political struggle takes place because opposition

parties are not given equal opportunities.

The respondents were also questioned about the form of

governance they consider to be the most successful and that can serve

as an example for the Republic of Armenia. Most respondents cited

62

France, England, the United States, Germany and the Scandinavian

countries as the most effective forms of government. One ruling party

representative noted the importance of matching each country’s

political system to its needs; for the examples of the successful

management systems of England and the United States, their

effectiveness was stated only in terms of a particular country.

Respondents considered Western democratic political systems of

governance to be exemplary, but some of them stated that their actual

implementation in Armenia is not realistic for a variety of reasons.

The representatives of the political elite were asked about the

extent to which they were devoted to democratic values and

democratic governance. At least at the level of rhetoric, almost all

interviewees expressed positive views of democracy, and a majority

declared it the best alternative for Armenia’s future. Another

unsurprising pattern was observed in the responses to elite

assessments of the existing system. Representatives from the ruling

party held more positive opinions and often considered Armenia to be

a fully democratic country, or at least to be steadily moving toward

that state. In contrast, most interviewees from the opposition decried

the current regime as unlawful, corrupt and autocratic and indicated

that it should be altered even at the price of serious sacrifices.

Nonetheless, representatives from this group did not indicate

intentions to change the whole system but rather to enforce the

existing, formal rules of the game that are ignored by the ruling elite.

Very few interviewees considered the implementation of core

democratic components such as the rule of law, accountability, free

and fair elections and the protection of human rights to be their first

political priority. Representatives of the ruling parties also stressed the

importance of democracy, but they often said that democracy must

not contradict security issues or produce anarchy. One respondent

claimed to support democratic values to the extent they do not

endanger national security. The limitations of the democratic process

are very often justified by security issues. The restriction of citizens’

freedoms also often occurs under the guise of national security.

63

We also attempted to determine how political elites would act if

they faced a situation in which they would have to choose between

displaying loyalty to the party and protecting the interests of citizens.

One group of respondents said that they would remain loyal to

political power. The other group believed that situations of apparent

contradictions between the interests of public and political power

must be avoided. One ruling party respondent said that the party’s

interests could not differ from the public interest; he added that he

could never imagine that the interests of the whole society might

deviate from the ruling party’s interests. Ruling party representatives

tended to regard their own political interests and the interests of the

people as the same. Another group of respondents argued that only

the public interest should guide politicians.

We also attempted to determine whether these elites were ready

to compromise with political opponents. The ruling party respondents

were unwilling to compromise on national security or state interests.

Some expressed willingness to compromise on issues that do not risk

national and state interests. One ruling party member considered

compromise to reflect weakness. Some ruling party respondents

considered compromise to be risky. Oppositional party representatives

considered compromise to be an opportunity to stimulate the

development of the country. The majority is always ready to make

compromises, whereas others consider political compromises to be

necessary conditions to reach agreements in political activities.

Although the willingness to compromise was expressed often, it was

conditional. The political system grants the ruling party control over

all state institutions so the ruling party has no incentive to

compromise with other parties; the ruling party is able to impose its

will.

We also investigated opinions on the problems that elites consider

to be most important for Armenia and that require urgent solutions.

Most respondents indicated that one of the most important issues

facing the country is the poor socioeconomic situation. One

respondent stated, “The first and most important issue, of course, is

the social and economic situation.” Other respondents singled out the

64

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the improvement of Armenian-Turkish

relations and social justice among critical issues. Many respondents also

consider immigration to be a real threat to the country, requiring a

quick solution. One representative stated that “immigration,

corruption, social polarization, false elections, non-developed

democratic systems and injustice in all spheres” are the priority issues.

Respondents stressed the importance of democratic values but did not

consider democratization to be a priority for Armenia.

Respondents also provided descriptions of their ideal Armenia.

Elites emphasized the desire for an exceptionally free and democratic

country. They imagine an Armenia where Armenians from the diaspora

and emigrants would wish to live. One participant noted that his ideal

Armenia is a homeland where citizens have rights and opportunities to

obtain competitive and high-quality education and where safety and

security are dominant. One representative dreams of an Armenian

homeland that is founded on human rights and ensures the welfare of

its citizens. Representatives also stressed the importance of freedom of

expression, the primacy of law, equal opportunities and social, political

and economic justice. Respondents noted the primary importance of

socioeconomic problems, whereas the quality of democracy was not a

high priority. Socioeconomic issues were salient to both governmental

and oppositional group representatives.

Respondents did provide clear answers to questions regarding their

political careers and the future. Uncertainty of the future is very

common in transitioning societies. It is clear that, in this sense,

Armenia is characterized by political instability.

The in-depth interviews with the representatives of the Armenian

political elite produced multifaceted, unique qualitative information.

The interviews reveal the main characteristics and necessary

background factors of elite formation in postindependence Armenia.

They also reveal ideological perceptions and values, ideological and

political priorities and attitudes toward issues of public concern.

We conclude that Armenia’s current political elite is increasingly

disunited; as defined by Higley and Burton (2006), the elite lacks

structural integration and basic value consensus, and high levels of

65

distrust toward various groups exist within the political elite,

especially between representatives of ruling and opposition parties.

Disunited political elites are characteristic of unstable regimes such as

illiberal democracies and authoritarian regimes; this factor may be

useful in understanding the recent increasing instability in the

Armenian political system. Because of this growing disunity,

competition among various elite groups is considered a zero-sum

game. The fragmented structure of the elite and their distrustful

attitudes toward other members negatively affect the establishment of

Dahl’s system of mutual security, an important prerequisite for

institutionalizing democratic rules of the game in any polity and

transitioning power from one group to another through competitive

elections. In this context, prospects for power sharing among elites, let

alone transitioning political power to competitors, appear to be limited

over the short term in Armenia.

Female Representatives of the Political Elite

During the in-depth interviews with female representatives of

political elites, emphasis was placed on revealing their political

preferences; the peculiarities of starting their political careers; their

values and principles; and their approaches to the political elite, to the

political struggle in Armenia and to their vision of the country’s

overall development.

Before proceeding, we reflect on the political elites’ female

representatives’ approaches to the family. This introduction is

particularly relevant in the context of the public discussion of the

incompatibility of a certain level of female political engagement and

the effective realization of their role in the family. First, all surveyed

female politicians, without reservations, appreciated the role of family

in their lives; the vast majority of representatives did not believe that

family had ever hindered their political activities. Moreover, there are

several measures according to which the family (and family members)

substantially contributes to active political involvement. In this regard,

66

the following opinions are quite interesting: “My family has always

supported me; my husband never objected that I am into politics”

(female representative of the ruling party); “My family, thank God, has

always been on my side in the difficult political decision-making. If

my family, especially my husband, were not on my side, did not

approach with support and understanding, it would be very difficult

for me to effectively reinvent politics” (female representative of the

PA Party of the National Assembly); “I gave birth to my fourth child

when I was engaged in very active political initiatives, and if my

family did not support me at that time, I could not have combined

family and motherhood, the birth of my little miracle with my political

activities” (a female representative of the political opposition).

The other half of surveyed female participants did not have a

family or husband due to various circumstances (some resulting from

divorce or death). This fact supports the relevance of the above

discussion. It is evident that the tradeoff between family and political

activity is relevant to the family situations of our women politicians. It

is notable that the vast majority of male participants are married.

Unlike the men, the women politicians seldom noted historical,

state, public or cultural figures as influences in their political activities.

One respondent cited Margaret Thatcher as an authoritative figure.

Another young MP respondent was particularly impressed by

Churchill’s political activities, and a former minister cited the great

Armenian poet Silva Kaputikyan as a “spiritual mother.” Other

references were made, but it is clear that women are more reserved

than men in this regard. This phenomenon can be explained by a

unique kind of self-preservation instinct; most of the women do not

talk about their idols, perhaps because they suspect it would make

them vulnerable.

A number of features are outlined in the context of analyzing the

motives, factors and issues regarding female political elites’ entrance

into politics or engagement with professional political activities.

In this context, it is particularly important to understand the

arenas from which women transfer into politics and to track their

political career mobility. The respondents revealed three separate

67

arenas from which women enter into politics. First, they are recruited

from the public sector or, according to a classic definition, the civil

society sector. In other words, their political socialization began from

engagement in public activities during which they raised many issues

of public concern and implemented many targeted projects for the

protection of vulnerable groups. Most women who shifted from civil

society into politics primarily were engaged in human rights issues and

social problems, which have received a great deal of political

attention. This transition can be considered customary.

The second arena from which women transferred into the political

elite is public administration or civil service. As a rule, it is easier to

be noticed on this platform. This track is considered advantageous for

a political career as, at least, a slow but steady path toward the

political elite. In this sense, one of the young female deputies made an

interesting comment: “...as if it were normal, I’ve always been

engaged into processes, I have not been sitting in the distance to get

an official proposal one day; I always say that it was some kind of

evolution and it is not easy to say at what particular stage that

decision was reached.” This approach indicates that the transition from

this platform into active politics is smooth and natural.

Finally, the third arena is from within a political party. This case

should not be understood as a platform for entering active politics but

rather as a platform for replenishing the ranks of the political elite.

Although active political activity as a member of a political party is

considered one of the most effective ways to supplement the political

elite, the long-term membership and activities as a party member did

not result in membership in National Assembly or the government for

the vast majority of our women. Approximately half of the

respondents received invitations to join a political party or election

lists just two or three months, and in some cases up to six months,

before the elections. This pattern can be explained by the existing

formal rules mandating the political participation and representation of

women in general, and, in particular, the participation of women in

proportional lists according to a certain proportion: “The participation

of each sex in the electoral lists of The National Assembly proportional

68

party, alliance of parties and each party involved in the alliance should

not exceed 80 percent32

starting from the 2nd number to any whole

number in each five (2–6, 2–11, 2–16, and so on, until the end of the

list).”

Several interesting conclusions can be made by drawing parallels

between female and male political elite representatives’ entrances into

politics. Whereas men mostly transition into politics from the business

sphere and through political party channels, women transition through

civil society, state administration and political parties. This comparison

illustrates the social order that has formed the country’s political

landscape. Clearly, the main motivations of men who shifted from the

business sector into politics are to serve the interests not only of the

public but mostly of their own businesses.

The motivations of women entering politics are very similar to the

motivations of men. Most women did not imagine themselves actively

engaged in politics or decision-making. The women politicians have

found it difficult to specify the moments that were essential to

accessing the political area.

The human values and principles that women in particular noted

were the importance of fairness, honesty, humanity, tolerance and

peaceful coexistence. Women politicians are extremely sensitive to

these principles and values.

The female representatives’ assessments of the Armenian political

elite were rather pessimistic. One opposition deputy described the

elite as a “very indescribable, versatile and multi-layered

phenomenon.” Another representative of the oppositional party gave

the following formulation: “As our elites have already been closely

identified with so many truly unrelated ideas, unfortunately for me, it

is a kind of concept that has become unacceptable and abominable.”

One Republican deputy noted, “our political elite is fuzzy because the

expression ‘elite’ has been taken in a slightly different direction, and I

think it still has to go through the several stages of development.”

32

RA Electoral Code, Article 8.2.

69

Such assessments are reflected in the women’s observations of the

political elite groups/levels. As a rule, female representatives

experienced difficulties with clearly and correctly identifying the elite

strata and the historical and political background of its formation. In

some very uncertain cases, the so-called “detached context”

approaches were presented. One former member of the National

Assembly said, “There are both intelligent politicians and just

businessmen.” One ruling party representative gave the following

answer: “There is one layer that knows what the policy is and why it

is there, but there is a layer that appears random; this layer is exerting

great efforts to stay among the political elite; unfortunately, there is

also a layer that is not compatible with the concept of the elite in any

way but, unfortunately, there is no hope that they will change.”

Female respondents described political struggle in Armenia as very

tense, “life or death,” unhealthy and contaminated by “black PR”

strategies. Considering these phenomena unacceptable, female

respondents find that this situation contributes neither to the

development of a civil struggle nor to the strengthening of

competition principles.

There are no obvious differences in female responses regarding

issues that require urgent solution. They basically noted the same

issues that dominate the men’s responses.

Female respondents expressed strongly divergent opinions in

response to the question of which form of governance is most

successful and is exemplary for the Republic of Armenia. The most

common responses were the governments of France, Germany,

England, Sweden and the United States. Those who cited France

emphasized the semipresidential administration, which also operates in

Armenia (the amended version of the RA Constitution adopted in 2005

by a nationwide referendum was modeled on the French example). For

Germany and England, the particular emphasis was on

parliamentarianism traditions. The United States was cited as a country

with rich democratic traditions and a stable political system. For

Sweden, the female representatives emphasized the highly effective

operational model of the social state. While considering these specific

70

forms of governance as the most successful, the women did not

consider them exemplary for Armenia. The respondents expressed

interesting approaches. In particular, one of the former ministers said,

“Germany is very acceptable, but they are Germans, thinking that the

law is superior, what the law says the citizen should be subjected to.

We do not have such thinking, unfortunately.” One opposition deputy,

consistent with the previous logic, stated, “There are no ways that can

be exemplary for Armenia. In general, each country should have its

management model and form the basis for it considering the mentality

of its people, its customs and traditions, the region it is in and the

surrounding neighbors, and so on.”

On the one hand, similarities in terms of political preferences,

values, principles, evaluations of issues and Armenia’s future were

observed between women and men; by contrast, unique paths into

active politics, incorporation into the political elite and the platforms

from which people transition into politics exist for women. Whereas

men mostly enter the political elite from business and political party

channels, women enter from civil society, civil service and political

party platforms. An additional important conclusion relates to the

purposefulness of female representatives. Most participants were

clearly aware of their plans in politics, were ready to take on the

responsibility and were willing make tough political decisions.

Findings from Interviews with Representatives of

the NKR Political Elite

Nine in-depth interviews were conducted with representatives of

the political elite from Nagorno-Karabakh. Two participants are

deputies of the National Assembly. Six respondents are former

deputies, three of whom held previous positions as community

leaders. One respondent was a candidate during the NKR presidential

elections and a previous deputy minister.

Five participants were born in Stepanakert, three were born in

villages of NKR, and one was born in the RA. Three participants were

71

born into families of teachers; the parents of the other respondents

are highly qualified professionals such as construction workers,

farmers and veterinarians. Four respondents had higher pedagogical

education, one respondent had a higher medical education, and three

respondents had university education. Three respondents received

degrees in the social sciences, and six received degrees in the natural

sciences or related fields. Three respondents had worked in their

previous profession for a long time; two respondents had worked up

to a year, and the rest had not been employed in their profession at

all.

No respondents reported dreaming of becoming a politician during

childhood or adolescence. However, some respondents, by the force of

tradition, had been members of the Komsomol, the Communist Party’s

youth organization. Eight of the nine respondents indicated that the

Karabakh movement and the collapse of the USSR stimulated their

interest in politics and their active engagement in it.

Some of the interviewees named the intellectuals of the time as

their teenage authority figures, other respondents noted their families

and relatives, and one respondent could not indicate any authority

figure. For some respondents, Armenian writers had made an impact

on their political views.

Eight of the nine respondents entered into the political arena

during the mid-1980s as the Karabakh movement was developing.

Some respondents were members of different student groups

concerned with discussions of political issues, but the process of

becoming politicians on an institutional level started with the

Karabakh movement. Only one respondent was actively involved in

politics during the 2000s and transferred from the public sector. Four

respondents did not consider themselves politicians. However, all

respondents held political positions in legislative and local government

bodies either at the time of the interview or previously.

Six respondents indicated that family, acquaintances and friendly

relations had not played a substantial role in their political career,

whereas three others noted the important role of family. One

respondent indicated that friendship and kinship ties are important.

72

Among universal principles, respondents most often selected

human rights, humanism and sincerity. Most representatives stated

that they remained loyal to the principles and goals they had at the

beginning of their political career.

The issues needing urgent solutions among NKR respondents were

the establishment of justice and democracy, the rebirth of hope,

resettlement policies, the rehabilitation of the economy and the

encouragement of real political competition.

Almost all respondents believe that the NKR president and his

social environment have the greatest impact on the decision-making

process. One respondent attributed the greatest role in this process to

the RA authorities.

It is notable that three of the nine respondents considered

themselves left nationalists, one was left-orientated, one was in the

center, and four held liberal ideologies.

Most respondents did not name a specific governmental model.

One respondent mentioned the parliamentary governance model, one

respondent mentioned the presidential model, and another one

mentioned the semipresidential–semiparliamentary governance model.

Respondents often noted that it is possible to have effective

governance regardless of the model.

Most respondents considered themselves to be individuals

dedicated to and driven by democratic values. One respondent

supports conservatism and traditional values. Three respondents

believe that democratic values are acceptable to the extent that they

contribute to national and social development.

The vast majority of respondents emphasized the importance of

remaining loyal to the public in their political practice rather than

their commitment to the political forces with which they are affiliated.

The arguments in this regard value the national interest above

everything else and emphasize the need to side with citizens.

Two respondents considered compromising to achieve primary

goals to be impossible. One respondent supported compromises if

national interests demand it. The other respondents would be willing

to sit around the negotiating table and solve key problems in a

73

civilized way. However, respondents were more willing to compromise

on internal issues than on external issues.

Respondents described an ideal model of the Nagorno-Karabakh

republic as a democratic, internationally recognized state with a large

population, a stable future and stable perspectives.

Most respondents were willing to continue their current political

activities for the next six months, the next year and the next

five years. Some were considering being more proactive in their

political endeavors.

Most respondents considered themselves to be happy. Respondents

who were happy stated that their happiness derives from the

opportunity to participate in the Karabakh movement and their

contribution to the establishment of the republic of Nagorno-

Karabakh.

The Karabakh movement at all stages of its development has had

the greatest impact on the formation of the NKR political elite. The

political elite in the NKR can be called situational because it was

formed under the influence of a specific situation. All respondents

stated that they had had no intention of entering into politics, and

most respondents had entered the political arena due to the ongoing

processes resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union. In particular,

the rise of nationalism has provided motives and ideas that encourage

people to occupy a more active role in society. During the Soviet

regime, respondents likely would have pursued professional activities;

however, the creation of a national state through the independence of

Armenia (including the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic) opened the

political arena. The Armenian intellectuals of the time have had a great

influence on the ideological formation of these political elites.

Universal values and a commitment to human rights are close to

the heart of these elite representatives because the Karabakh

movement began as a struggle for human and social rights and has a

clear ideological definition. These values are strongly imprinted on the

participants of the Karabakh movement.

74

The notion of situational elites is supported by the fact that one

part of the elite does not foresee their ongoing active involvement in

politics, stating a preference to be engaged in professional activities.

75

CHAPTER 3. CHARACTERISTICS OF

FUTURE POLITICAL ELITES

Reviewing the biographical data of all cabinet members and MPs

elected to parliament since Armenia’s independence revealed seven

different segments (public servants, members of political parties, NGO

activists, members of local governance bodies, student council

members, academics/artists/athletes, top business owners and CEOs)

from which most political elites are being recruited. To study the

political culture of potential political elites, a survey was conducted

among 691 respondents from these seven segments.

The results of the survey were analyzed and grouped into the

following four sections:

• General profile of potential political elite members;

• Political culture (at three levels, as conceptualized by G. Almond

and G. B. Powell);

• Attitudes toward democracy, and

• General values (as conceptualized by Ronald Inglehart and

Christian Welzel).

The questionnaire included questions regarding age, gender, level

of education and income that could help to explain the variation in

responses.

General Profile

Respondents of the survey were distributed as follows: one-third

of respondents were civil servants; 23.4% were LSG body members;

22.5% were academics, athletes or artists; 9.6% were party members;

6% were NGO members; 3.5% were owners of large businesses and

CEOs; and 2% were student council members.

Of the respondents, 53.8% were female. Respondents aged 28 or

younger constituted 26.3%, and another 60% of respondents ranged

from 29 to 49 years old. Respondents aged 55 or above constituted

76

only 1% of the sample. In total, 65% graduated from secondary school

after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Of the respondents, 73.7 had

completed some level of higher education, and another 15.2% had an

academic degree (PhD candidate or higher), whereas only 1%, all of

whom were representatives of political parties and LSG bodies, had

only graduated from secondary school. Of the respondents, 99%

reported knowledge of Russian, and 61.9% reported knowledge of

English. Other popular languages included German (11%), French

(10.9%) and Turkish (2.2%).

One-quarter of respondents from Armenia were born in Yerevan,

18.2% in other Armenian towns, 15.5% in villages and 5.8% outside of

Armenia (mostly Georgia, Azerbaijan and Russia). Of the respondents,

51.7% reported that their parents were white-collar workers during

the Soviet period, 20.6% of parents were blue-collar workers, 7.4% of

parents were farmers, and 5% of parents were middle- and high-

ranking officials. When asked to rank the social conditions of their

families at that time, 30.6% considered their families to be fully

provided for, 62% had most of their needs provided, and 1.2%

considered their family to be needy.

Of the respondents, 81.2% were living in nuclear families with five

or fewer members. Regarding income, 31.5% identified themselves as

the main breadwinner of their family, 46.2% identified themselves as

one of the breadwinners, and 22.6% reported that their contribution

to family income was not considerable. Male respondents were more

often reported to be the breadwinner (51.4 vs. 14.5% of females). Of

the respondents, 34% reported lower per capita monthly spending

(one hundred ten $) than the official minimum consumer price index

and were close to or below the official poverty line. This figure is

roughly proportional to the poverty rates at the national level. The

largest portion of respondents, 43.6%, reported income in the range

110–220$ monthly spending per capita, whereas only 3.3% reported

monthly spending over four hundred forty $/month. The proportion

of lower levels of per capita spending was more frequent in the NKR

(38.9% with less than 110$ and 55.3% spending 110–220$ per month)

than in the RA (35.9% spending less than 110$ and 43.7% spending

77

110–220$ per month). Only 0.5% of respondents from the NKR

reported more than 330$ per capita spending per month compared to

9.4% of RA. The following groups reported less than 220$ in monthly

spending per capita: 86.9% of civil servants, 90.3% of party members,

86.4% of NGO members and 93.2% of LSG members. Interestingly, the

highest per capita spending (above 440 $) was reported by student

council members (38.5%) and business community members (17.4%).

We were also interested to learn how often representatives of

these segments travel outside of Armenia and to what destinations.

Respondents from Armenia were significantly more mobile than in the

NKR. Of the respondents, 43.4% in Armenia and 57.1% in the NKR

reported that they had not traveled outside of Armenia during the last

five years, and another 13.4% in the RA and 28.8% in the NKR had

traveled only once. Another 27 and 12.5% from the RA and the NKR,

respectively, had left the country between two and five times. The

remaining 14.3% of respondents from Armenia and 1.6% from the NKR

had traveled abroad more than five times. Of the respondents from

Armenia who traveled abroad, 75.3% had visited Russia and other CIS

countries, whereas only 17.7% reported visits to North America or

Europe. The proportion was much more unbalanced among

respondents from the NKR, where 94.8% of visitors had traveled to

Russia and other CIS countries, and only 3.1% had visited the United

States or European countries. Despite this general proximity to Russia

and other CIS countries, Armenians prefer EU integration (26% RA,

2.1% NKR) over integration with Russia and CIS countries (22.5% RA,

6.3% NKR) or a regional/Caucasian organization (0.8% RA, 0% NKR).

The difference in responses for the RA and the NKR may be explained

by considering the NKR’s very limited interaction with the outside

world due to its unrecognized status as well as additional options

(integration with RA) designed for NKR respondents (Chart 3.2). More

than two-thirds of those who preferred EU integration graduated from

secondary school after the collapse of the Soviet Union, whereas

58.4% of those who preferred integration with Russia and CIS

countries graduated before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Half of

the NGO members and more than one-third of the business sector

78

representatives favored EU integration, whereas LGB representatives

preferred (23.6%) integration with Russia and CIS countries.

Of the respondents, 94.4% reported being followers of the

Armenian Apostolic Church, another 1.3% identified with other

Christian denominations, and 3.5% considered themselves to be

atheists/agnostics. Additionally, 48.4% thought that religion always

helped them to make important decisions in their everyday life, 43.6%

thought that religion helped them only in some cases, and 8%

reported that religion was never helpful in making important decisions

in everyday life. Moreover, when asked about membership in various

organizations, only 1.3% indicated that they were active members of

churches or religious organizations, and another 4.5% identified

themselves as passive members of such organizations. However, the

Church was considered the second and third most trustworthy

institution in the RA and the NKR, respectively.

In general, active membership in various social organizations, such

as labor unions, sports and cultural clubs, consumer rights or

environmental protection groups and professional organizations, was

below 10%, with the exception of political parties (42.2% of responses

identified active members of political parties). Among the groups most

frequently identified as active members were party members (93.9%),

student council members (30.8%), LSG representatives (17.3%), civil

servants (18.2%) and NGO members (12.2%). Another 3% of party

members, 18.5% of LSG representatives, 10.4% of civil servants and

19.5% of NGO members identified themselves as not very active

members of political parties.

Only 5.2% of respondents considered themselves to be

uninterested in politics, most frequently athletes, artists and

academics, whereas 97% of party members, 84.6% of student council

members, 78.1% NGO members, 79.6% of local governance

representatives and 76.6% of civil servants were very or mostly

interested in politics. This high level of interest in politics was also

confirmed by participation rates in recent elections. A full 94.2% of

respondents confirmed that they had participated in recent

presidential elections, 90.1% had participated in parliamentary

79

elections, and 86.8% had participated in elections of local self-

governance bodies (more details on electoral participation are

presented in the next section).

Political culture

G. Almond (2010) identified three main levels of studying political

culture: system, process and policy. In the following section, we

attempt to describe the main characteristics of political culture of

potential political elite members by adopting this approach.

The system level of political culture involves the general

orientation toward the political system and includes components such

as national pride, identification with the system and the legitimacy of

the political system. In terms of national identification and pride

(Chart 3.1), the most dominant characteristic is ethnic identity (46 and

47% in the NKR and the RA, respectively), and identification with the

political system is second (26 and 30% in the NKR and the RA,

respectively). The third most common identity is religion, chosen from

among many options. However, religious self-identification is almost

twice as strong in the NKR (16%) as in the RA, 9%, which may be

related to the fact that Armenians in the NKR had the recent

experience of coexisting with a non-Christian population within a

Muslim-dominated society. The other notable difference is that there

are three times as many individuals who consider themselves first of

all to be citizens of the world in the RA, 7% compared with the NKR

(2%).

Another measure of the support for the political system can be

considered opinions on the future of the RA and the NKR (Chart 3.2).

A total of 50.4% of respondents in the RA and 58.1% in the NKR

preferred their respective republics to be fully independent rather

than integrated with the EU, a Russian/CIS block or a regional block.

Contrary to the widespread notion that the population of the NKR is

willing to be part of Armenia, only one-third of respondents indicated

such a preference.

80

Potential political elite members were also asked about their

preferences for the current political regime versus the Soviet political

regime. A majority of potential future political elite members in both

societies expressed a strong preference for the current political regime

(Chart 3.3). The difference between the RA and the NKR may be

explained by (1) the predominance of younger respondents in the

latter group and (2) a preference for the current status/situation over

being an autonomous region within Soviet Azerbaijan. By dividing

respondents into two main age groups representing those who

graduated from school during the Soviet Union (preindependence

political socialization) and those who graduated after

(postindependence political socialization), we found a significant

relationship for the support of current political regime among those

with postindependence political socialization (two out of three

supported the current political regime). The difference in the older

generation was less significant (53% support the current political

regime vs. 46% who support the Soviet political regime).

The process level represents (a) expectations of the citizens’ and

their role in political processes as well as (b) attitudes toward different

institutions of the political system.

The vast majority of potential political elite members in both

societies were very interested or quite interested in politics (70% in

NKR and 83% in RA). There was a much stronger interest toward

foreign politics in the NKR (30%) than in the RA, 18%, whereas the

latter were more interested in national (27%) and local level politics

(20%) compared to 19 and 10% in the NKR, respectively. Regional

political developments are of interest to 12% of NKR future political

elite members and 18% of those from the RA. As expected, the most

common type of political participation is voting; however, in both

societies, the voting turnout of future political elite members was

much higher than the average rates. A total of 93% of respondents

voted during the most recent presidential elections in NKR, and 95%

voted in Armenia, with 84 and 93% in parliamentary elections and 79

and 90% in local governance bodies, respectively. Those who did not

participate in all three types of elections most frequently (3.2–6.3%)

81

explained this behavior with objective reasons (e.g., absence from the

country), whereas another 1% considered elections not to be free and

fair. Interestingly, unlike local governance (1.6%) and parliamentary

elections (1%), none of the respondents identified the absence of

worthy candidates as a reason for not participating in presidential

elections.

Despite this interest in politics, almost half of the respondents

(47.3%) indicated that they were not planning to become involved in

politics directly. Frequent explanations for this decision included not

being interested in political activities (24.8%), the ability to reach

one’s goals without getting involved in politics (11%) and not believing

that one’s involvement would change anything (10.5%). Female

respondents were more often reluctant to become involved in politics

(62.4%) than male respondents (37.6%), and the proportion of

undecided respondents was similar (62% female compared to 38%

male). As could be expected from these data, male respondents more

often (55.1%) reported willingness to become involved in politics than

females (44.9%). At the same time, of those respondents who

considered themselves already involved in politics, 70.1% were male,

whereas 29.9% were female. This finding indicates that politics

continues to be largely dominated by men; however, in the future,

the proportion of women may be increased, as indicated by the

proportion of those women who indicated a willingness to become

involved in politics. We also examined the age differences of the

respondents. A total of 80.1% of respondents who decided to get into

politics were 38 years old or younger (post-Soviet socialization).

Representatives of the same generation constituted 57.2% of those

who did not plan to be involved in politics and 74.4% of those who

had not yet decided on that matter.

The distribution of responses among the segments with regard to

planning to become involved in politics is shown in Table 3.1. A total

of 25% of those who planned to become involved in politics identified

the executive branch as the area of their involvement, whereas 21.5%

indicated party politics, 12.5% indicated local governance, and 9.6%

indicated the legislative branch. The largest group (31.4%) of those

82

who planned to become involved in politics were not sure which

branch of politics they would pursue.

Regardless of this strong interest in politics and active electoral

participation, most future political elite members had very limited

experience in engaging in other conventional types of political

participation, and a very small portion of those had directly organized

this kind of action (Table 3.2.1). Boycotts and strikes had not been

experienced by most potential political elite members in either the RA

or the NKR, and more than half of potential political elite members

think that they will never be engaged in such types of actions.

A striking difference observed among respondents from the NKR

who organized or participated in peaceful demonstrations may be

explained by the Karabakh movement of the late-1980s. However, this

movement should be considered a distant and unique experience that

is not part of political practices (unlike in the RA); in recent decades,

few demonstrations have been organized in the NKR. Almost all of

these demonstrations were related to external issues and did not make

demands related to internal issues. However, there are significant

differences among the recruitment segments, where NGO activists and

political party members are the most actively engaged segments, and

public servants and members of local governance bodies are the most

passive segments (Table 3.2.2). Most future political elite members can

be characterized as subjects, who are aware of and interested in

politics but limit their public political participation to voting and,

unlike the small minority of participants, refrain from making

demands and actively engaging in promoting these demands through

the support of political forces.

The second dimension of describing political culture at the process

level is related to the measurement of the trust in social and political

institutions. The general characteristics of the level of trust in political

and social institutions observed among future political elite members

in the present study showed some differences compared to findings

from a survey among the entire population of Armenia conducted by

83

the Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC) in 2011.33

In general, in

the present study, potential political elite representatives exhibited a

higher level of trust in political institutions compared to the general

population and a lower level of trust in social institutions, such as the

healthcare system, the educational system and banks (Chart 3.4.4).

There were also similarities with regard to the level of trust among

the general population and potential elite representatives. For

example, the army was the most trusted institution among the

respondents of our survey. The level of trust among respondents from

the NKR (51% fully trust the army, whereas another 33% somewhat

trust the army) was higher than in the RA (42% fully trust, and 32%

somewhat trust). The level of trust in the army was slightly lower

among the general population (34% fully trust, and 32% somewhat

trust), and the army was the second most trusted institution, with the

Church being the most trusted among the population (46% fully trust,

and 32% somewhat trust the Church). Among the representatives of

political elite members in the RA, the Church is the second most

trusted institution (38% fully trust, and 29% somewhat trust), whereas

in the NKR, the Church is only the third most trusted institution (24%

fully trust, and 25% somewhat trust), following the president of the

NKR (30% fully trust, and 34% somewhat trust). Respondents from the

RA trust the president to a lesser degree (27% fully trust, and 26%

somewhat trust), in contrast to the much lower level of trust among

the general population (11% fully trust, and 25% somewhat trust). The

fourth most trusted institution among the NKR political elite

representatives is the police, where more than twice the number of

respondents fully trusted the police (21%) compared with political elite

representatives in the RA, 9%, whose trust level was similar to the low

level among the general population of the RA (Chart 3.4.1 contains

detailed information on the level of trust in these four institutions).

When comparing the four most trusted institutions among potential

political elite representatives of the RA and the NKR and the general

33

http://crrc.ge/oda/.

84

population of the RA, only two institutions (the army and the Church)

had high levels of trust from all three groups.

When comparing the levels of trust in the legislative, executive

and judicial branches and local self-government (Chart 3.4.2), the

latter was the most fully trusted institution both among potential

political elite representatives of the RA and the general population (20

and 11%, respectively), whereas in the NKR, local self-government was

trusted half as much (6%) as executive government and parliament (13

and 12%, respectively). The levels of trust both among potential

political elite representatives of the RA (8 and 7%, respectively) and

the general population (7 and 6%, respectively) toward these two

institutions were lower than in the NKR. Despite the low level of trust,

courts were trusted twice as much by the population of the RA, 7% as

by potential elite representatives of the RA and the NKR (3%).

Another difference was the higher level of mistrust toward

governance bodies among the general population compared to

potential elite representatives: in case of LSG, 21% of the general

population of the RA compared to 15% of the potential elite

representatives in the RA and 10% in the NKR reported full mistrust;

28% of the population of the RA compared to 19% of the potential

elite representatives in the RA and 11% in the NKR mistrusted

executive, 30% of the population of the RA compared to 22% of the

potential elite representatives in the RA and 8% in the NKR mistrusted

legislative body. The courts are the least fully trusted institution in

this group among representatives of the potential political elite in the

RA and the NKR (3%), whereas the level of full trust among the

general population of the RA in the courts is more than twice as high

(7%).

The levels of trust in political institutions that are crucial for a

competitive democratic society, including media, NGOs and

ombudsmen, were quite low among both groups and comparable to

the low level of trust recorded among the general population of the

RA (Chart 3.4.3). The most significant difference regarding these

institutions was the higher level of trust in the ombudsmen of the RA

(13% among the general population and 10% among potential elite

85

representatives of the RA reported full trust) compared to ombudsmen

of the NKR (only 3% fully trusted), with 17% expressing full distrust in

both groups of the RA compared to 25% expressing full distrust in the

NKR. Taking into account the fact that in the RA and the NKR, the

institutions were created almost simultaneously (2004 in the RA, 2005

in the NKR) and that the NKR Law on Human Rights Defender was

copied almost exactly from that of the RA, we infer that the

difference in trust is based on the personalities and performance of

the ombudsmen.

We also asked our respondents about their trust in political parties

and the electoral system. The percentage of respondents who trust the

electoral system is the same in the RA and the NKR (10%); however, in

the RA, 27% of respondents fully distrust the electoral system,

compared to 15% in the NKR. Political parties are slightly more often

trusted (7% in the RA, 4% in the NKR) and distrusted (27% in the RA

and 19% in the NKR) in the RA than in the NKR. Unfortunately, there

were no questions in the CRRC (2011) survey on the level of trust in

political parties or the electoral system to be compared with our

findings.

We also investigated the extent to which the level of trust in

institutions differs among representatives of those institutions versus

the general population. For this purpose, we measured the level of

trust among three segments representing these institutions, namely,

representatives of NGOs, political parties and local self-governance

bodies (Chart 3.4.5). As might be expected, experiences working in

any of these institutions at least doubled the level of trust in that

institution. The most significant difference was observed among

representatives of LSG bodies, 39% of whom fully trusted that

institution.

The respondents were asked indicate their level of trust in the EU

and the UN (Chart 3.4.6). In this case, the most significant difference

was among representatives of the potential elite of the NKR, their

counterparts from the RA and the general population of the RA. The

latter two groups had comparable levels of trust and distrust toward

both the EU and the UN, whereas respondents of the NKR distrusted

86

these institutions twice as much. This finding again shows a difference

in attitudes toward external political institutions in the RA and the

NKR. This difference may be explained by both the limited interaction

with those institutions in the NKR as well as the frustration resulting

from the lack of attention from the outside world, including a

reluctance to recognize and engage with the NKR.

At the policy level, political culture indicates the main policy

expectations from the government, which includes both the general

understanding of government’s role and areas of involvement as well

as formulations of particular policy goals.

To measure policy preferences, respondents were asked to rate on

a ten-point scale three questions about income equality, type of

ownership and the government’s responsibility in the sphere of social

security. These three questions were taken from a six-question set in

the World Value Survey.34

The details of findings on these six

questions, along with a comparison of World Value Survey data

collected in Armenia in 1995,35

as well as two questions from the

Caucasus Barometer of 2012 conducted by the CRRC36

in 2012 are

discussed below (for the results of separate questions, see Chart 3.5.1

to 3.5.6).

Based on the aggregated data, six main groups of policy

preferences were identified. Representatives of the group labeled

“leftist” gave leftist answers to all three questions, those who were

“left leaning” gave leftist answers to two out of three questions,

“neutrals” selected the middle point in at least two cases, the

“situational” group representatives gave at least one rightist answer

and one leftist answer, “right leaning” respondents chose two right-

leaning answers out of the three questions, and “rightist” respondents

indicated right-leaning preferences for all three questions. Chart 3.6

suggests that socialistic aspirations are still predominant among future

34

WVS questionnaire available at

http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder_published/survey_1995 35

Dataset available at http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSData.jsp 36

http://www.crrc.am/research-and-surveys/caucasusbarometer/documentation

87

political elite members both in the NKR and the RA; however, these

aspirations were more strongly expressed in the RA (34% leftists and

20% left leaning) than in the NKR (18% leftist and 21% left leaning).

Another interesting finding was that in both groups, a significant

portion (approximately 30%) did not have consistent preferences on

public policy issues. With regard to recruitment segments, leftist

preferences were the most frequent among civil servants (35%) and

LSG members (28.1%). Rightist preferences were the most frequent

among civil servants (37%) and political party members (25.9%). The

latter finding may partially explain why leftist preferences are not

translated into voting preferences in either the RA or the NKR and

why not a single leftist party has been elected to either parliament

since 1999. The only exception was the ARFD, which is predominantly

viewed as a nationalistic party, with its socialistic ideology often

forgotten.

Among the representatives of the younger generation of

respondents (post-Soviet socialization), leftist aspirations are weaker

(26.1%) compared to those with Soviet socialization (36%). At the same

time, situational policy preferences were rarer among the latter group

(26.8% among the Soviet socialization group vs. 31.6% among the post-

Soviet socialization group). Another interesting difference was found

when comparing policy preferences between genders. Female

respondents more often reported right and right-leaning preferences

(55.6 and 59% in RA and NKR), whereas most male respondents

favored leftist responses (55.7%).

Respondents were also asked about their opinions on the general

direction of internal policies (Chart 3.7). The largest group both in the

RA and the NKR (38.4 and 50.3%, respectively) considered that

internal policies were mostly moving in the right direction. The

second largest group of respondents (36.8 and 37.2%, respectively)

believed that policies were not being changed. However, in the RA,

respondents more frequently answered that internal policies were

mostly (12.4% compared to 6.3% in the NKR) or surely moving in the

wrong direction (8.1% compared to 2.1%, respectively). When answers

were separated among the recruitment segments, student council

88

members stood out as the most satisfied with developments regarding

internal policies, with 23.1% assured that those policies were moving

in the right direction and 38.5% believing that the policies were

mostly moving in the right direction. Artists (46.2%), party members

(28.8%) and NGO representatives (22.5%) considered that the policies

were mostly or surely moving in the wrong direction, whereas the

majority (56.5%) of business owners considered that the policies were

not being changed.

Attitudes Toward Democracy

Surveys measuring attitudes toward democracy have been

implemented in virtually all parts of the world during last two

decades, including in some of the post-Soviet countries. In the

framework of the survey conducted among future political elite

members, a separate section was designed to measure support for the

democratic regime, preferences for alternatives to democracy and

additional questions that would clarify perceptions on what constitutes

democratic values and ideals. Several of these questions were taken

from above-mentioned surveys (World Value Survey and Caucasus

Barometer) conducted in Armenia to be able to compare these

attitudes between potential elite representatives and the general

population. However, most of the questions in this section are not

comparable with the above-mentioned surveys because they were

specifically designed for this project or were taken from thematic

surveys that were not conducted in Armenia.

When directly asked about the importance of living in a

democratic country, respondents in the RA expressed stronger

sentiments (77% indicated that it is very important for them) than in

the NKR (58%). At the same time, both groups consider their

respective political regimes to be on approximately the same level of

democracy (RA Mean 4.30, NKR Mean 4.46). Thus, the gap between

democratic aspirations and reality is substantially larger in the RA than

in the NKR (Table 3.3). An analysis by segment demonstrated that NGO

89

activists, artists and student council members value living in a

democratic country the most (mean: 9.56, 9.54 and 9.54,

respectively), and representatives of these segments gave the lowest

ratings for the current level of democracy (mean: 3.61 and 3.92 for

activists and artists, respectively), whereas student council members

gave the highest ratings for the current level of democracy (6.23).

This contrast may be explained by the fact that student councils were

dominated by the representatives of ruling political parties and were

reluctant to criticize either the regime or the authorities.

To measure the level of support for democracy, another question

was asked regarding preferred alternatives to the democratic regime in

the RA and the NKR. A strong majority, 80% in the NKR and 82% in

the RA, indicated that there were no better alternatives to democracy.

Those who indicated that there might be better alternatives for the RA

and the NKR were asked to specify their preferences. The most

preferred alternatives were “the rule of a strong leader” (7% in the

NKR and 10% in the RA) and “the rule of the best educated experts”

(10% in the NKR and 2% in the RA). Remaining alternatives (including a

one-party system, rule by military officers, rule by clerics and a Soviet

regime) were considered alternatives to democracy only by 1–1.5% of

respondents in each group (Chart 3.8).

Despite the low levels of trust in political institutions that are

critical for the existence of any democratic regime (details of the level

of trust were presented in previous section), less than 10% of potential

future political elite members considered the elimination of those

institutions and limitations on civil liberties to be acceptable. A strong

majority (at least 60%) considered these kinds of undemocratic

developments to be completely unacceptable. The least supported

developments in the RA were bans on political parties (6.9%); the

dissolution of parliament and unrestricted rule of the president (5.5%);

bans on NGOs and the limitation of media freedom (2.6%); and the

announcement of martial law for an unspecified time period with the

limitation of political freedoms (0.8%). In contrast to this, in the NKR,

respondents more often would tolerate a ban on NGOs and a limitation

of media freedom (6.6%) and bans on political parties (6%) compared

90

to the announcement of martial law for an unspecified time period

with the limitation of political freedoms and the dissolution of

parliament and unrestricted rule of the president (both 2.2%).

This overwhelming support for democratic values and institutions

decreased to some extent when additional questions were asked to

verify the intensity of preferences for democracy. When asked to

choose between the two options, 38% in the NKR and 39% in the RA

prefer “to be governed by good and experienced individuals regardless

of the outcomes of elections,” whereas only slightly more than 60% in

each group believes that “authorities should be established as a result

of free and fair elections.” Another set of questions was asked to

identify the proportion of respondents who (1) believe that

government should be viewed as an employee and held accountable

by the people, (2) believe that people should participate in protests

against the government to demonstrate that the people are in charge,

and (3) believe that elections are important to defining the future of

the country (for details, see Chart 3.9.1 to Chart 3.9.3). Interestingly,

two-thirds of respondents representing potential political elites and

the general population provided answers that indicate a political

culture with democratic values and principles. However, support was

slightly higher among the representatives of the potential political

elite of the RA compared to elites in the NKR and the general

population of the RA. At the same time, a higher percentage of

respondents from the NKR considered elections important because

they define the future of the country (69.8%) when compared with

their colleagues from the RA, 62.2%. One possible explanation for this

variation might be the notion that elections conducted in the NKR are

not only important for choosing officials but also for securing the

legitimacy of the regime in the external world.

Despite this support for democracy, the picture changes

dramatically when democratic goals are compared to economic and

social achievements and security issues. When asked to prioritize the

goals for the development of the country, economic development was

the first choice in both the NKR (68%) and the RA, 62%, followed by

national security (NKR 28%, RA, 26%) and restoring order in the

91

country (NKR 4%, RA, 7%). Freedom of speech and public influence

over important government decisions were secondary priorities for 8

and 7%, respectively, in the NKR and 14 and 13%, respectively, in the

RA. These findings reflect the dominance of survival values over self-

expression values, which are very briefly presented in the next

section.

Values

Inglehart and Welzel developed a new theory of modernization

according to which the modernization process consists of two main

transitions: industrialization and postindustrialization. These transitions

produce substantial cultural changes in many countries, as observed

through an analysis of the World Value Survey data. Based on these

data, the authors concluded that industrialization replaces traditional

values with secular rational values (rationalization of authority),

whereas postindustrialization replaces survival values with self-

expression values (emancipation from authority). Although the authors

acknowledge that socioeconomic development is not a deterministic

process and cultural change is not irreversible or linear, they argue

that “cultural change is a major factor in emergence and survival of

democracies” (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 58, Pp. 46–47).

To provide a better picture of the value systems among potential

elite representatives, an attempt was made to determine the

composition of different worldviews based on five variables utilized by

the authors to measure the first group of values (traditional vs. secular

rational values) and three of five variables to measure the second

group of values (survival vs. self-expression values). Based on these

aggregated data, five groups were identified for the first set of values

and three groups for the second set of values.

Charts 3.10 and 3.11 reflect the proportion of values in both groups

(RA and NKR). An analysis based on gender, generation and level of

education revealed insignificant differences, indicating that a similar

proportion of values was represented across the respondents. The

92

most notable difference was related to the respondents with self-

expression values: 75% of representatives from this group had

undergone post-Soviet socialization. Some peculiarities were recorded

among the elite recruitment segments, where representatives of

political parties, NGO members and student council members had a

higher frequency of rational secular values, whereas athletes, civil

servants and business owners more frequently adhered to traditional

values.

The composition of traditional versus rational legal values was

similar among future political elites in the NKR and the RA, whereas

for survival versus self-expression values, significant differences were

observed. In the NKR, survival values were much more common (84%)

than in the RA, 75%, whereas self-expression values were almost

nonexistent (less than 1%) compared to 3% in the RA.

This distribution of values among political elites and the

established mechanisms of recruitment from certain groups makes it

highly unlikely that in a short term prespective a critical number of

individuals who are both capable of and willing to produce genuine

democratic changes in the political system will be incorporated into

the political elite.

93

REFERENCES

Abrahamian, L., & Shagoyan, G. (2012). From carnival civil society toward a

real civil society: Democracy trends in Post-Soviet Armenia. Anthropology &

Archeology of Eurasia, 50, 11–50.

Almond, G. et al. (2010). Comparative Politics Today. A World View, (9th ed).

New York: Pearson Longman.

Best, H., & Edinger, M. (2005). Converging representative elites in Europe? An

introduction to the EurElite Project. Czechoslovak Sociological Review, 41 (3),

499–510.

Carothers, T. (2002). The end of transition paradigm. Journal of Democracy,

13 (1), 5–21. doi: 10.1353/jod.2002.0003.

Collier, R. B. (1999). Paths toward Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in

Western Europe and South America. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Cummings, S. (2005). Kazakhstan. Power and the Elite. New York, NY:

I.B.Tauris.

Dahl, R. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven, CT: Yale

University Press.

Diamond, L. (1999). Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Baltimore,

MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Ergun, A. (2010). Post-Soviet Political transformation in Azerbaijan: Political

elite, civil society and the trials of democratization), Uluslararas li kiler,

7(26), 67–85.

Gel’man, V. (2003). Post-Soviet transitions and democratization: Towards

theory-building. Democratization, 10 (2), 87–104. doi: 10.1080/714000120.

Gel’man, V., & Tarusina, I. (2000). Studies of political elites in Russia: Issues

and alternatives. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 33, 311–329. doi:

10.1016/S0967-067X(00)00009-X.

Gill, G. (2000). The Dynamics of Democratization Elites, Civil Society and the

Transition Process. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press.

Haller, M. (2008). European integration as an elite process: The failure of a

dream. New York, NY: Routledge.

Hanneman, R. A., & Riddle, M. (2005). Introduction to Social Network Methods.

Riverside, CA: University of California Riverside. Retrieved from

http://faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman/.

Higley, J., Pakulski, J., & Wesolowski, W. (Eds.). (1998). Postcommunist Elites

and Democracy in Eastern Europe. London: McMillan Press.

94

Higley, J., & Burton, M. G. (2006). The Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy.

Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Hoffmann-Lange, U. (2006). Methodological Developments in Elite Research.

Paper for presentation at the 20th IPSA World Congress, Fukuoka Retrieved

from: http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/view/5308.

Hollander, P. (1999). Political will and personal belief: The decline and fall of

Soviet communism. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Horák, S. (2010). Changes in the political elite in Post-Soviet Turkmenistan.

China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, 8(3), 27–46.

Huntington, S. (1991). The third Wave: Democratization in the late twentieth

century. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.

Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2005). Modernization, Cultural Change, and

Democracy: The Human Development Sequence. New York, NY: Cambridge

University Press.

Karl, T . (1990). Dilemmas of democratization in Latin America. Comparative

Politics, 23 (1), 1–21. doi: 10.2307/422302.

Klugman, J. (1989). The new Soviet Elite: How they think and what they want.

New York, NY: Praeger.

Linz, J. (1978). Crisis, breakdown, and reequilibrium. In J. Linz & A. Stepan

(Eds.). The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins

University Press.

Margaryan, M. (2006). Political Elite and Problems of Democratic Transition in

the Republic of Armenia. Yerevan: “Petakan tsarayutyun” hratarakchutyun.

McFaul, M. (2002). The fourth wave of democracy and dictatorship.

Noncooperative transitions in the postcommunist world. World Politics, 54,

212–244. doi: 10.1353/wp.2002.0004.

Michels, R. (2001). Political Parties. A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical

Tendencies of Modern Democracy (Repr). Kitchener, ON: Batoche Books.

Miller, A., & Hesli, V. L. (1997). Conceptions of democracy among mass and

elite in Post-Soviet societies. British Journal of Political Science, 27(2), 157–

190. doi: 10.1017/S0007123497000100.

Mills, C. . (1956). The Power Elite. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Mosca, G. (1939). The Ruling Class. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

O’Donnell, G., & Schmitter, P. (1986). Transitions from Authoritarian Rule:

Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Vol. 4. Baltimore, MD:

Johns Hopkins University Press.

Pareto, V. (1935). The mind and Society: A Treatise on General Sociology.

(Repr.). New York, NY: Dover.

95

Rustow, A. (1970). Transitions to democracy: Toward a dynamic model.

Comparative Politics, 2(3), 337–363. doi: 10.2307/421307.

Schumpeter, J. (1943). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London, UK:

George Allen and Unwin.

Steen, A. (1997). Between past and Future: Elites, Democracy and the State in

Post-Communist Countries. A Comparison of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.

Urban, M. (1989). An algebra of Soviet power: Elite circulation in the

Belorussian Republic. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Urban, M. (2010). Cultures of Power in Post-Communist Russia: An Analysis of

Elite Political Discourse. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Zimmerman, W. (2002). The Russian people and foreign policy: Russian elite

and mass perspectives. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

96

APPENDIX A. TOPIC GUIDE OF

INTERVIEWS

General questions:

1. The code of the interview _______

2. The code of the assistant ______________

3. The date (dd/mm) ___________________________

4. The place_________________________________________

5. Duration /ex.` 65 minutes/`_____________

6. Respondent`s name and surname __________________

7. Respondent`s position___________________________________________

8. Respondent`s sex 1. male 2 female

9. Respondent`s birth date_________________

10. Respondent`s education

1. Secondary

2. Vocational

3. Bachelor

4. Graduate

5. Postgraduate

11. Respondent`s profession according to his/her__________________

Life story

Please let`s talk a little bit about your life

1. Where and when were you born? What kind of family do you have

/Interviewer. Nuclear/large family, children, the condition of

the house, social status/. Who were you your parents: profession,

education?

2. What kind of important memory do you have about your childhood,

which were conditional for your political activity and principles, Who

were role models for you at that time. Who had roles in the

formation of you identity and value system. /Inetrviewer. Family,

friendship, school, other eucation centers, organizations, parties,

other/

3. What is you first profession and where did you study? How did you

decided to chose that profession. Did you work according that

profession? If not, then why? If yes, the how long, where? How much

are important your profession and work experience for your today`s

97

work.

4. What is your hobby, if they have changed during the time, how do

you spend your free time during the evening, holidays and vacations.

With whom and how do you spend your leisure

5. Who are your friends, how do you chose them, do you have friends

at your work, who also are your friends.

6. How did you meet your wife/husband, his/her family which factors

were conditional to marry him/her. Tell us about your children, what

kind of school did they go, their hobbies and aim. Generally what

does it mean family for you and how it is related to your political

career?

Entry into politics

Now let`s talk about your political career

1. When and how did you recognize the need to enter into politics?

/Interviewer. Ask about concrete historical events, leaders and

persons impact/ Please describe your story in politics in which

parties, organizations did you participated, how have you held as a

politician. Which events do you consider crucial in your career.

2. What kind of role did your family, parents have in your career? Who

from your family helps you in your political activities? Would you

like your children and grandchildren enter into politics?

3. How did you see your role and what kind of aims did you pursue in

politics? How have they been changed during the years and why?

4. As a politician what kind of universal and political

principles/functions do you seclude for you? What do you consider

acceptable and not acceptable for entering into politics?

The value system and motivations of political elite

1. How would you describe political elite in Armenia? Who are the

representatives of elite?

2. What kind of clasters/groups can you seclude inside our political elite

and where is your position there? How well integrated do you feel

among them?

3. What kind of factors would you seclude that would help to become

part of elite? /Interviewer. Family, connection, origin, education,

friends/. Which skills/qualities a person should have in order to

consist in modern Armenian political life. According to this which

98

qualities do you consider important for you personally?

4. How would you describe political struggle in Armenia? What kind of

tools are used? /Which one do you think is justified?

5. When reaching your goals you encounter problems how persistently

do you struggle? What would disappoint you? While reaching the goal

when is it allowed to ignore others interest, when is it allowed to

take advantage of others weakness.

6. In your opinion today what are the problems that require primary

solutions in Armenia? Who are engaged in political decision making

process? Who have more impact on decision making: the leadership

of the country, local/regional elite, voters, active citizens, business

elite: /Interviewer: pay attention to:

local, regional, national, legislative, executive and judicial

decision making

election results.

7. Which political ideology do you adhere? In your political view do you

consider yourself rightist, leftist, centrist? /Interviewer: pay attention

to:

political orientation

membership in political groups

political stereotypes and attitudes

political values and norms

forms of political behavior

8. Which political regimes do you consider the most successful and

which are exemplary for Armenia.

9. How much are you devoted to democratic values and whether do

you consider them acceptable for Armenia.

Interviewer: pay attention to:

only a small group can govern the country and make decisions

everybody should participate

freedom of speech

10. In your opinion what is more important while making political

decisions: professional knowledge or political calculation/expediency

11. What would you do if in your practice a situation would be created

when you would have to choose to be loyal to citizens/community or

to your political party.

12. Are you ready for compromises with your political opponents? Why?

Are there dangers related to that?

99

13. Generally what do you think how much our society is

conflicting/compromiser?

14. According to you what is ideal Armenia? What kind of political system

should it have? How can Armenia achieve to that?

15. How do you see your future? Can you accurately predict your future

in 6 month, 1 year, 5 years?

16. Generally how much happy and secure do you feel as a person, as a

citizen, as a politician? Why?

At the end evaluate the honesty of the respondent.

1 2 3 4 5

totally not honest totally honest

100

APPENDIX B. CHARTS

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

108

109

110

111

112

113

114

115

116

117

118

119

120

121

122

123

124

125

126

127

128

129

130

Chart 3.9.1 Government like a parent vs like an employee

62.1% 67.9%69.5%

37.9% 32.1%18.5%

RA NKR CRRC'2012

Government is like an employee; thepeople should be the bosses who control thegovernment.

People are like children; the governmentshould take care of them like a parent.

Chart 3.9.2 People should vs should not participate in protest actions

68.9% 62.1%65.6%

31.1% 37.9%20.2%

RA NKR CRRC'2012

People should participate in protest actions against the government, as this shows the government that the people are in charge

People should not participate in protest actions against the government, as it threatens stability in our country.

131

132

Chart 3.10 Distribution of traditional vs. rational secular values

Traditional17%

Mostly traditional47%

Neutral3%

Mostly rational secular27%

Rational secular6%

Chart 3.11 Distribution of survival vs. self-expression values

Survival78%

Transitional20%

Self-expression2%

133

Tab

le 1

. R

esea

rch

com

pone

nts a

nd m

etho

ds

Rese

arch

com

pone

ntRe

sear

ch q

uest

ions

Met

hodo

logy

/ Da

taW

hat i

s the

stru

ctur

e of

pol

itica

l elit

e in

Arm

enia

and

ho

w it

has

evo

lved

dur

ing

last

two

and

half

deca

des?

Qua

ntita

tive

anal

ysis

of b

iogr

aphi

es o

f pol

itica

l elit

e m

embe

rs.

Wha

t are

the

mai

n ch

arac

teris

tics o

f typ

ical

mem

bers

an

d gr

oups

of t

he p

oliti

cal e

lite?

Anal

ysis

of le

gal i

nstit

utio

nal f

ram

ewor

k re

crui

ting

polit

icia

ns.

How

con

solid

ated

and

div

ersif

ied

is th

e po

litic

al e

lite

in

post

sovi

et A

rmen

ia?

In-d

epth

inte

rvie

ws w

ith p

oliti

cal e

lite

repr

esen

tativ

es.

Wha

t are

the

mot

ivat

ions

of i

ndiv

idua

ls fo

r pur

suin

g po

litic

al c

aree

r?

Wha

t are

the

pred

omin

ant b

elie

fs a

nd v

alue

s,

incl

udin

g:

·

regi

me

pref

eren

ces,

·

opi

nion

s on

the

role

of p

oliti

cal e

lites

,

·

p

erso

nal a

nd p

oliti

cal p

riorit

ies i

n th

e de

cisio

n-m

akin

g pr

oces

ses,

·

ext

erna

l pol

itica

l orie

ntat

ions

.W

hat a

re th

e m

ain

char

acte

ristic

s of p

oliti

cal c

ultu

re

amon

g va

rious

gro

ups f

rom

whi

ch ty

pica

lly p

oliti

cal

elite

mem

bers

are

bei

ng re

crui

ted?

How

futu

re p

oliti

cal e

lite

mem

bers

vie

w d

emoc

racy

an

d ho

w th

eir v

iew

s diff

er fr

om th

e ol

der g

ener

atio

n an

d ge

nera

l pop

ulat

ion?

Wha

t are

the

pred

omin

ant v

alue

s of p

oten

tial p

oliti

cal

elite

?

The

patt

erns

of p

oliti

cal e

lite

form

atio

n in

pos

t sov

iet

Arm

enia

and

NKR

The

valu

es, p

refe

renc

es a

nd

self

perc

eptio

n of

pol

itica

l el

ite re

pres

enta

tives

in p

ost

sovi

et A

rmen

ia

In d

epth

inte

rvie

ws w

ith p

oliti

cal e

lite

repr

esen

tativ

es.

Polit

ical

cul

ture

of

repr

esen

tativ

es o

f pot

entia

l po

litic

al e

lite

Repr

esen

tativ

e su

rvey

am

ong

indi

vidu

als f

rom

the

segm

ents

that

mos

t oft

en p

rodu

ce p

oliti

cal e

lite

mem

bers

(pub

lic se

rvan

ts, m

embe

rs o

f pol

itica

l pa

rtie

s, N

GO a

ctiv

ists,

mem

bers

of l

ocal

go

vern

ance

bod

ies,

stud

ent c

omm

ittee

mem

bers

, ac

adem

ics/

artis

ts/a

thle

tes,

top

busin

ess o

wne

rs

and

CEO

s).

APPENDIX C. TABLES

134

Incomplete Primary Secondary Higher (BA/MA) PhD candidate PhD and higherSCRA 0.70% 1.50% 1.10% 67.80% 23.00% 5.90%NA1RA 1.00% 3.10% 1.00% 73.00% 18.40% 3.60%NA2RA 1.30% 0.70% 2.00% 69.10% 17.80% 9.20%NA3RA 0.70% 1.40% 2.10% 72.30% 14.90% 8.50%NA4RA 1.30% 1.30% 2.50% 68.20% 21.70% 5.10%NA5RA 0.70% 0.70% 1.50% 74.30% 18.40% 4.40%Total 1.00% 1.50% 1.60% 70.40% 19.50% 6.00%SCNKR 0.00% 10.80% 16.20% 54.10% 18.90% 0.00%NA1NKR 0.00% 0.00% 14.30% 62.90% 20.00% 2.90%NA2NKR 0.00% 0.00% 8.80% 70.60% 20.60% 0.00%NA3NKR 2.80% 0.00% 16.70% 61.10% 16.70% 2.80%NA4NKR 0.00% 0.00% 14.30% 71.40% 10.70% 3.60%Total 0.60% 2.40% 14.10% 63.50% 17.60% 1.80%

Table 1.1 The level of education of MPs in RA and NKR

SC NA1 NA2 NA3 NA4 NA5Intelligentsia 35.70% 17.30% 16.40% 9.40% 10.90% 11.80%

Businessman 4.90% 15.70% 25.00% 34.50% 17.90% 5.90%

Bureaucrat/Civil Servant 42.50% 26.70% 11.80% 3.60% 14.70% 16.90%

Party boss/activist 0.00% 1.00% 2.00% 0.70% 3.20% 5.10%

Officer/War Veteran 4.50% 2.00% 2.00% 1.40% 3.80% 7.30%

Party list MP 0.00% 0.00% 7.20% 16.50% 20.50% 33.80%

FPTP MP 0.80% 29.30% 25.00% 28.80% 25.60% 15.40%

Minister/Marzpet 0.40% 0.00% 0.70% 2.10% 2.50% 0.00%

Mayor/City Council Member 0.40% 2.10% 4.60% 1.40% 0.00% 3.00%

Other 10.90% 5.80% 5.30% 1.40% 0.60% 0.70%

N of Cases 266 191 152 139 156 136

Table 1.2a Occupation of MPs of RA before being elected

135

SC NA1 NA2 NA3 NA4

Intelligentsia 16.20% 22.90% 8.80% 2.80% 3.60%

Businessman 5.40% 11.40% 17.60% 11.10% 10.70%

Bureaucrat/Civil Servant 48.60% 31.40% 35.30% 25.00% 28.60%

Party boss/activist 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.80% 0.00%

War Veteran 24.30% 8.60% 5.90% 8.30% 3.60%

Officer in Police/Army 5.40% 2.90% 2.90% 5.60% 0.00%

Party list MP 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 21.40%

FPTP MP 0.00% 20.00% 20.60% 33.30% 28.60%

Minister/Marzpet 0.00% 0.00% 2.90% 8.30% 3.60%

Mayor/City Council Member 0.00% 0.00% 2.90% 2.80% 0.00%

Other 0.00% 2.90% 2.90% 0.00% 0.00%

Table 1.2b Occupation of MPs of NKR before being elected

Covering periodComposition of

coalitionN of laws adopted

N of MPs in ruling

coalition/ in the network

Coal1 05.2003-06.2006 RPA/ARFD/ROL 183 71/75

Coal2 06.2006-05.2007 RPA/ARFD/ULP 20 57/27

Coal3 05.2007-03.2008 RPA/PAP/ARFD 8 104/13

Coal4 03.2008-04.2009 RPA/PAP/ARFD/ROL 54 112/70

Coal5 05.2009-05.2012 RPA/PAP/ROL 114 96/86

05.2012-06.2013 RPA/ROL 36

Table 2.1. Description of networks reflecting changes in the coalition

75/42

Network name

Conv

3Co

nv4

Conv5

136

Nod

esTi

esAv

. Deg

ree

Av. W

eigh

ted

Degr

eeDi

amet

erGr

aph

Dens

ityM

odul

arity

(c

omm

uniti

es)

Conn

ecte

d Co

mpo

nent

sAv

g Cl

uste

ring

Coef

ficie

ntAv

g. P

ath

Lent

h

Conv

379

465

11.8

504

0.15

17

20.

764

2.18

7Co

nv4

109

1111

20.4

42.8

40.

186

52

0.69

51.

98Co

nv5

4224

211

.518

.24

0.28

18

50.

955

1.65

3Co

al1

7545

012

50.8

40.

162

51

0.75

92.

168

Coal

227

614.

55.

23

0.17

46

40.

882

1.92

3Co

al3

1324

3.7

8.5

30.

308

32

0.91

81.

579

Coal

470

366

10.5

16.1

50.

152

72

0.77

42.

493

Coal

586

756

17.6

32.6

40.

207

51

0.77

72.

015

Tab

le 2

.2 B

asic

Cha

ract

erist

ics o

f Net

wor

ks

137

Nam

eGe

nder

Part

yList

/FPT

PPa

rty

Rulin

g/O

ppos

ition

Fact

ion

Degr

eeW

eigh

ted

Degr

eeCl

osen

ess C

entr

ality

Betw

eenn

ess C

entr

ality

Ecce

ntric

ity

Sam

vel B

alas

anya

nM

ale

FPTP

RoL

Rulin

gRo

L36

211

1.52

6315

789

567.

1568

177

2Vi

ktor

Dal

laky

anM

ale

FPTP

Inde

pend

ent

Opp

ositi

onJu

stic

e34

129

1.65

7894

737

405.

9684

361

3Ga

lust

Sah

akya

nM

ale

Part

y Li

stRP

ARu

ling

RPA

3220

81.

5921

0526

335

3.81

4185

53

Levo

n M

krtc

hyan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

ARFD

Rulin

gAR

FD28

210

1.63

1578

947

229.

8846

627

2Hr

anus

h Ha

koby

anFe

mal

eFP

TPIn

depe

nden

tRu

ling

RPA

2399

1.81

5789

474

91.2

2622

173

Grig

or G

onje

yan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

ULP

Opp

ositi

onU

LP21

106

1.88

1578

947

180.

2662

813

Vaha

n Ho

vhan

nisy

anM

ale

Part

y Li

stAR

FDRu

ling

ARFD

2110

31.

8421

0526

311

4.36

7453

53

Rudi

k Ho

vsep

yan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

ARFD

Rulin

gAR

FD21

129

1.90

7894

737

73.8

3275

698

3Vo

stan

ik M

arou

khya

nM

ale

Part

y Li

stAR

FDRu

ling

ARFD

2083

1.75

84.0

3445

362

3Sh

avar

sh K

ocha

ryan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

NDP

Opp

ositi

onJu

stic

e20

882.

0263

1578

945

.408

0604

3Va

rdan

Mkr

tchy

anM

ale

Part

y Li

stAD

PO

ppos

ition

Just

ice

2088

2.02

6315

789

45.4

0806

043

Rafik

Pet

rosy

anM

ale

FPTP

RPA

Rulin

gPe

ople

's M

P19

611.

8289

4736

814

7.67

9034

23

Gagi

k M

elik

yan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A19

321.

8421

0526

378

.293

0619

43

Suki

as A

vetis

yan

Mal

eFP

TPRP

ARu

ling

RPA

1941

1.86

8421

053

76.9

8455

661

3Ed

mun

d Ts

atur

yan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

ADP

Opp

ositi

onJu

stic

e18

381.

8815

7894

716

2.15

7785

93

Hovh

anne

s Mar

gary

anM

ale

Part

y Li

stRo

LRu

ling

RoL

1897

1.80

2631

579

93.5

4249

733

Hegh

ine

Bish

arya

nFe

mal

ePa

rty

List

RoL

Rulin

gRo

L17

901.

9210

5263

224

.428

7876

73

Mkh

rtic

h M

inas

yan

Mal

eFP

TPRP

ARu

ling

Peop

le's

MP

1710

31.

9605

2631

642

.452

3974

13

Vlad

imir

Bada

lyan

Mal

eFP

TPRP

ARu

ling

Peop

le's

MP

1685

1.97

3684

211

32.5

0347

985

3M

ushe

gh M

ovsis

yan

Mal

eFP

TPIn

depe

nden

tO

ppos

ition

Just

ice

1635

1.89

4736

842

82.1

5482

395

3Ar

men

Dan

iely

anM

ale

FPTP

Inde

pend

ent

Rulin

gRP

A15

621.

8684

2105

311

9.00

9931

73

Mek

hak

Mkh

itary

anM

ale

FPTP

RoL

Rulin

gRo

L14

932.

2631

5789

519

.239

6684

94

Hran

t Kha

chat

ryan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

CRU

Opp

ositi

onJu

stic

e14

202.

1447

3684

242

.169

2464

44

Hray

r Kar

apet

yan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

ARFD

Rulin

gAR

FD14

761.

9605

2631

640

.407

9170

93

Herm

ine

Nag

daly

anFe

mal

ePa

rty

List

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A14

331.

9210

5263

256

.545

6971

23

Hako

b Ha

koby

anM

ale

FPTP

Peop

le's

MP

1415

02.

1842

1052

60

3Sa

mve

l Nik

oyan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A13

681.

8947

3684

247

.292

2734

33

Mkr

tich

Mkr

tchy

anM

ale

FPTP

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A13

362.

0526

3157

914

.074

0939

43

Arar

at M

alkh

asya

nM

ale

Part

y Li

stRP

ARu

ling

RPA

1239

2.06

5789

474

13.3

6487

359

3Al

bert

Baz

eyan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

Repu

blic

Opp

ositi

onJu

stic

e12

782.

1842

1052

60

3Ru

ben

Hayr

apet

yan

Mal

eFP

TPIn

depe

nden

t - R

PA 2

006

Rulin

gN

one

1278

2.18

4210

526

03

Haru

tyun

Pam

buky

anM

ale

FPTP

Inde

pend

ent -

RPA

200

6Ru

ling

Non

e12

782.

1842

1052

60

3Sa

mve

l Ale

ksan

yan

Mal

eFP

TPIn

depe

nden

tN

one

1278

2.18

4210

526

03

Ham

let T

amaz

yan

Mal

eFP

TPIn

depe

nden

tPe

ople

's M

P12

782.

1842

1052

60

3Ga

gik

Tsar

ukya

nM

ale

FPTP

Inde

pend

ent

Non

e12

782.

1842

1052

60

3Le

von

Sarg

syan

Mal

eFP

TPIn

depe

nden

t - R

PA 2

006

Peop

le's

MP

1278

2.18

4210

526

03

Mna

tsak

an P

etro

syan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

ULP

Opp

ositi

onU

LP11

552.

3815

7894

729

.853

0663

84

Arm

en R

usta

mya

nM

ale

Part

y Li

stAR

FDRu

ling

ARFD

1176

2.02

6315

789

4.45

3044

572

3Va

hram

Bag

hdas

arya

nM

ale

FPTP

Inde

pend

ent

Opp

ositi

onPe

ople

's M

P11

562.

1842

1052

60

3Ar

am S

args

yan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

Repu

blic

Opp

ositi

onJu

stic

e10

102.

3815

7894

70

4Ta

tul M

anas

erya

nM

ale

Part

y Li

stIn

depe

nden

tO

ppos

ition

Just

ice

1010

2.38

1578

947

04

Serg

ey Is

reay

elya

nM

ale

Part

y Li

stIn

depe

nden

tO

ppos

ition

Just

ice

1010

2.38

1578

947

04

Grig

or H

arut

yuny

anM

ale

Part

y Li

stAD

PO

ppos

ition

Just

ice

1010

2.38

1578

947

04

Arsh

ak S

adoy

anM

ale

Part

y Li

stN

DCP

Opp

ositi

onJu

stic

e10

102.

3815

7894

70

4

Inde

pend

ent -

RPA

200

6

Tab

le 2

.3 D

istrib

utio

n of

pow

er w

ithin

3rd

con

voca

tion

of N

A

138

Step

an Z

akar

yan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

ADP

Opp

ositi

onJu

stic

e10

102.

3815

7894

70

4Vo

lody

a Ba

daly

anM

ale

FPTP

Inde

pend

ent

Non

e9

212.

1052

6315

847

.913

9166

43

Alva

rd P

etro

syan

Fem

ale

Part

y Li

stAR

FDRu

ling

ARFD

954

2.18

4210

526

03

Razm

ik M

artir

osya

nM

ale

Part

y Li

stRP

ARu

ling

RPA

925

2.10

5263

158

2.96

9104

929

3Le

rnik

Ale

ksan

yan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A8

222.

6710

5263

225

.045

9707

4Ar

arat

Mkr

tchy

anM

ale

Part

y Li

stRP

ARu

ling

RPA

826

2.42

1052

632

0.14

2857

143

4As

hot A

ghab

abya

nM

ale

FPTP

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A7

142.

4342

1052

60

4Ar

tak

Arak

elya

nM

ale

Part

y Li

stRo

LRu

ling

RoL

738

2.06

5789

474

1.88

2299

073

3M

ikay

el V

arda

nyan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

Inde

pend

ent

Rulin

gAR

FD7

72.

1447

3684

20

3Sa

mve

l Sah

akya

nM

ale

FPTP

Inde

pend

ent

Non

e7

72.

1447

3684

20

3Ag

hasi

Arsh

akya

nM

ale

Part

y Li

stN

UO

ppos

ition

NU

77

2.14

4736

842

03

Alek

san

Kara

pety

anM

ale

Part

y Li

stN

UO

ppos

ition

NU

77

2.13

1578

947

03

Vard

ges M

atev

osya

nM

ale

Part

y Li

stRP

ARu

ling

RPA

618

2.69

7368

421

04

Asho

t Ars

enya

nM

ale

Part

y Li

stRP

ARu

ling

RPA

618

2.69

7368

421

04

Man

vel N

azar

yan

Mal

eFP

TPIn

depe

nden

tO

ppos

ition

Peop

le's

MP

618

2.69

7368

421

04

Arth

ur B

aghd

asay

anM

ale

Part

y Li

stRo

LRu

ling

RoL

614

2.07

8947

368

0.79

6019

835

3Hr

ant G

rigor

yan

Mal

eFP

TPIn

depe

nden

tRu

ling

RPA

618

2.17

1052

632

03

Kare

n Ka

rape

tyan

Mal

eFP

TPIn

depe

nden

tRu

ling

Peop

le's

MP

624

2.34

2105

263

03

Gurg

en A

rsen

yan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

ULP

Opp

ositi

onU

LP5

262.

3947

3684

210

.964

3689

64

Man

uk G

aspa

ryan

Mal

eFP

TPIn

depe

nden

tO

ppos

ition

Non

e5

102.

5789

4736

80

4Ar

men

Mkh

itary

an

Mal

eFP

TPRP

ARu

ling

RPA

510

2.57

8947

368

04

Gegh

am M

anuk

yan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

ARFD

Rulin

gAR

FD5

402.

5657

8947

40

4Va

zgen

Kar

akha

nyan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A5

52.

4078

9473

70

4Ha

mle

t Har

utyu

nyan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A5

52.

4078

9473

70

4Ar

men

Ash

otya

nM

ale

Part

y Li

stRP

ARu

ling

RPA

55

2.40

7894

737

04

Mhe

r Sha

hgel

dyan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

RoL

Rulin

gRo

L5

172.

3947

3684

21.

3658

8411

63

Sam

vel S

hahg

aldy

anM

ale

FPTP

RoL

Rulin

gRo

L5

122.

4078

9473

70

3As

hot A

poya

nM

ale

Part

y Li

stIn

depe

nden

tRu

ling

ARFD

510

2.40

7894

737

03

Hrip

sime

Avet

isyan

Fem

ale

Part

y Li

stU

LPO

ppos

ition

ULP

428

2.76

3157

895

04

Tigr

an T

oros

yan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A4

93.

1052

6315

80

4Ar

thur

Pet

rosy

anM

ale

Part

y Li

stU

LPO

ppos

ition

ULP

48

2.76

3157

895

04

Aram

ayis

Grig

orya

n M

ale

FPTP

Inde

pend

ent

Opp

ositi

onN

one

48

2.52

6315

789

03

Vazg

en K

hach

ikya

nM

ale

Part

y Li

stRP

ARu

ling

RPA

412

2.26

3157

895

62.9

4595

127

3Ga

gik

Mkh

eyan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

RoL

Rulin

gRo

L2

10

00

Khac

hatu

r Suq

kias

yan

Mal

eFP

TPIn

depe

nden

tN

one

21

00

0

139

Nam

eGe

nder

Part

yList

/FPT

PPa

rty

Rulin

g/O

ppos

ition

Fact

ion

Degr

eeW

eigh

ted

Degr

eeCl

osen

ess

Cent

ralit

yBe

twee

nnes

s Ce

ntra

lity

Ecce

ntric

ity

Galu

st S

ahak

yan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A63

281

1.41

1215

730.

3989

12

Arm

an S

ahak

yan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A51

611.

5607

477

282.

7574

889

3Ha

kob

Hako

byan

Mal

eFP

TPRP

ARu

ling

RPA

5011

01.

5794

393

420.

2040

613

3Ar

am S

afar

yan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

PAP

Rulin

gPA

P47

137

1.57

9439

315

4.71

9963

13

Nai

ra Z

ohra

byan

Fem

ale

Part

y Li

stPA

PRu

ling

PAP

4712

61.

5981

308

197.

0840

733

Vard

an B

osta

njya

nM

ale

Part

y Li

stPA

PRu

ling

PAP

4521

51.

5887

8524

8.45

1827

43

Vikt

or D

alla

kyan

Mal

eFP

TPIn

dep.

Non

e43

631.

6635

514

148.

2428

207

3Ar

evik

Pet

rosy

anFe

mal

ePa

rty

List

PAP

Rulin

gPA

P42

761.

6448

598

123.

1177

461

3Sa

mve

l Sar

gsya

nM

ale

FPTP

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A41

491.

6261

682

79.6

7641

832

3Ar

sen

Avag

yan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

PAP

Rulin

gPA

P40

571.

6915

888

63.2

4651

573

3M

elik

Man

ukya

nM

ale

FPTP

PAP

Rulin

gPA

P37

421.

7196

262

36.3

6568

533

3M

artu

n Gr

igor

yan

Mal

eFP

TPPA

PRu

ling

PAP

3742

1.71

9626

236

.365

6853

33

Karo

Kar

apet

yan

Mal

eFP

TPPA

PRu

ling

PAP

3742

1.71

9626

236

.365

6853

32

Goha

r Eno

kyan

Fem

ale

Part

y Li

stPA

PRu

ling

PAP

3658

1.70

0934

675

.898

2038

53

Hovh

anne

s Mar

gary

anM

ale

Part

y Li

stRo

LRu

ling

RoL

3511

51.

7289

7231

9.88

5012

43

Vers

and

Hako

byan

Mal

eFP

TPPA

PRu

ling

PAP

3536

1.77

5700

991

.943

6472

73

Avet

Ado

nts

Mal

ePa

rty

List

PAP

Rulin

gPA

P34

381.

7383

178

106.

0429

562

3He

ghin

e Bi

shar

yan

Fem

ale

Part

y Li

stRo

LRu

ling

RoL

3312

11.

7009

346

261.

9170

687

3Ru

ben

Haru

tyun

yan

Mal

eFP

TPRP

ARu

ling

RPA

3349

1.77

5700

958

.395

4891

43

Mar

tin S

args

yan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A33

461.

7570

093

79.6

2251

269

3Ha

yk S

anos

yan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

Inde

p.Ru

ling

RPA

3233

1.80

3738

363

.494

8247

3Ar

a Ba

bloy

anM

ale

Part

y Li

stRP

ARu

ling

RPA

3111

51.

7102

804

108.

7368

104

3Ro

bert

Tov

mas

yan

Mal

eFP

TPPA

PRu

ling

PAP

3131

1.81

3084

133

.992

4182

43

Kare

n Av

agya

nM

ale

Part

y Li

stRP

ARu

ling

RPA

3070

1.79

4392

514

0.52

1089

33

Erne

st S

ogho

mon

yan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

SDHP

Rulin

gPA

P30

351.

8130

841

12.2

1972

087

3M

krtic

h M

inas

yan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A29

971.

7383

178

90.8

1082

074

3Va

rdan

Ayv

azya

nM

ale

Part

y Li

stRP

ARu

ling

RPA

2943

1.78

5046

765

.447

3526

43

Ara

Nra

nyan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

ARFD

Rulin

gAR

FD28

107

1.75

7009

313

1.93

5701

93

Herm

ine

Nag

hdal

yan

Fem

ale

Part

y Li

stRP

ARu

ling

RPA

2762

1.83

1775

783

.052

1607

93

Hran

t Grig

orya

nM

ale

FPTP

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A27

271.

8691

589

03

Nah

apet

Gev

orgy

anM

ale

FPTP

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A27

271.

8691

589

03

Rust

am G

aspa

ryan

Mal

eFP

TPPA

PRu

ling

PAP

2727

1.86

9158

90

3Ti

gran

Ste

pany

anM

ale

FPTP

PAP

Rulin

gPA

P27

271.

8691

589

03

Haru

tyun

Gha

ragh

yozy

anM

ale

FPTP

Inde

p.Ru

ling

PAP

2727

1.86

9158

90

3Ar

men

Pet

rosy

anM

ale

FPTP

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A27

271.

8691

589

03

Vahe

Hak

obya

nM

ale

FPTP

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A27

271.

8691

589

03

Tab

le 2

.4 D

istrib

utio

n of

pow

er w

ithin

4rd

con

voca

tion

of N

A

140

Arm

en A

brah

amya

nM

ale

Part

y Li

stIn

dep.

Rulin

gPA

P27

271.

8691

589

03

Arm

en M

elik

yan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

PAP

Rulin

gPA

P27

271.

8691

589

03

Hran

t Mad

atya

nM

ale

FPTP

PAP

Rulin

gPA

P27

271.

8691

589

03

Rafik

Grig

orya

nM

ale

Part

y Li

stRP

ARu

ling

RPA

2649

1.78

5046

753

.381

8406

33

Arts

vik

Min

asya

nM

ale

Part

y Li

stAR

FDRu

ling

ARFD

2584

1.83

1775

768

.567

4803

93

Sam

vel N

ikoy

anM

ale

Part

y Li

stRP

ARu

ling

RPA

2553

1.79

4392

542

.794

1577

23

Davi

d Ha

ruty

unya

nM

ale

Part

y Li

stRP

ARu

ling

RPA

2412

31.

8878

505

71.6

7376

436

3Su

kias

Ave

tisya

nM

ale

Part

y Li

stRP

ARu

ling

RPA

2339

1.81

3084

194

.852

0734

63

Kare

n Va

rdan

yan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

Inde

p.Ru

ling

ARFD

2338

1.82

2429

977

.421

8562

43

Vaha

n Ho

vhan

nisy

anM

ale

Part

y Li

stAR

FDRu

ling

ARFD

2268

1.83

1775

746

.096

4918

23

Gagi

k M

elik

yan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A22

341.

8504

673

67.0

2988

521

3Ar

ayik

Hov

hann

isyan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A21

551.

8691

589

35.3

5668

454

3Ga

gik

Min

asya

nM

ale

Part

y Li

stRP

ARu

ling

RPA

2062

1.84

1121

528

.755

9319

23

Vazg

en K

arak

hany

anM

ale

Part

y Li

stRP

ARu

ling

RPA

2049

1.85

9813

164

.453

3316

53

Hovi

k Ab

raha

mya

nM

ale

FPTP

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A20

321.

9158

879

29.8

4216

184

4Ar

tyus

h Sh

ahba

zyan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

ARFD

Rulin

gAR

FD19

681.

8878

505

25.4

1145

499

3Hr

ayr K

arap

etya

nM

ale

Part

y Li

stAR

FDRu

ling

ARFD

1951

1.88

7850

535

.079

0655

33

Mik

ael M

anuk

yan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

ARFD

Rulin

gAR

FD19

371.

9065

421

56.5

9830

147

3An

ahit

Bakh

shya

nFe

mal

ePa

rty

List

HPO

ppos

ition

HP18

591.

9158

879

24.4

6167

931

3M

isha

Step

anya

nM

ale

Part

y Li

stIn

dep.

Rulin

gRP

A18

231.

9719

626

60.4

4849

029

3Ho

vhan

nes S

ahak

yan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A17

961.

8691

589

55.8

4842

415

3As

hot A

rsen

yan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A17

192

10.3

2017

297

3Al

eksa

ndr S

ahak

yan

Mal

eFP

TPRP

ARu

ling

RPA

1719

210

.320

1729

73

Kare

n Ch

shm

arity

anM

ale

Part

y Li

stRP

ARu

ling

RPA

1719

2.02

8037

47.

8512

2410

94

Rafik

Pet

rosy

anM

ale

FPTP

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A16

961.

9719

626

30.8

0949

208

3Ka

rine

Ache

mya

nFe

mal

ePa

rty

List

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A16

471.

9532

7186

.638

3766

93

Alek

san

Petr

osya

nM

ale

Part

y Li

stRP

ARu

ling

RPA

1617

1.92

5233

644

.475

2977

13

Arm

en R

usta

mya

nM

ale

Part

y Li

stAR

FDRu

ling

ARFD

1548

2.10

2803

726

.254

8239

54

Bagr

at S

args

yan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

ARFD

Rulin

gAR

FD15

451.

9719

626

14.0

2311

848

3St

epan

Asla

nyan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

RoL

Rulin

gRo

L15

291.

9906

542

19.2

6029

332

3Ed

uard

Sha

rmaz

anov

Mal

eFP

TPRP

ARu

ling

RPA

1523

1.94

3925

234

.488

5874

73

Khac

hik

Man

ukya

nM

ale

FPTP

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A15

152.

0467

290

3As

hot T

onoy

anM

ale

FPTP

PAP

Rulin

gPA

P15

152.

0467

290

3Li

lit G

alst

yan

Fem

ale

Part

y Li

stAR

FDRu

ling

ARFD

1489

2.12

1495

311

.504

0814

3M

khita

r Mna

tsak

anya

nM

ale

Part

y Li

stIn

dep.

Rulin

gPA

P12

392.

0373

832

3.29

5903

309

3Ar

men

Mar

tiros

yan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

HPO

ppos

ition

HP12

372.

0560

748

7.06

6721

887

3Ru

zann

a Ar

akel

yan

Fem

ale

Part

y Li

stAR

FDRu

ling

ARFD

1236

2.07

4766

43.

6644

3531

44

Kare

n Ka

rape

tyan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A12

291.

9906

542

26.4

8543

858

3GO

VERN

EMEN

TN

/AN

/AN

/AN

/AN

/A12

281.

9719

626

12.0

0727

196

4St

yopa

Saf

arya

nM

ale

Part

y Li

stHP

Opp

ositi

onHP

1221

2.06

5420

63.

6714

2857

14

Arts

runi

Agh

ajan

yan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

RoL

Rulin

gRo

L12

152.

0747

664

17.3

6749

527

4Kh

achi

k Ha

ruty

unya

nM

ale

Part

y Li

stRo

LRu

ling

RoL

1121

2.24

2990

712

.714

7137

24

141

Volo

dya

Bada

lyan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

Inde

p.Ru

ling

RPA

1121

2.01

8691

66.

1085

1859

24

Areg

Ghu

kasy

anM

ale

Part

y Li

stRP

ARu

ling

RPA

1111

2.13

0841

10

4Ar

men

Ash

otya

nM

ale

FPTP

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A10

282.

0280

374

5.72

0796

302

4Sa

mve

l Bal

asan

yan

Mal

eFP

TPPA

PRu

ling

PAP

1012

2.23

3644

92.

6278

0987

44

Arta

k Da

vtya

nM

ale

Part

y Li

stRP

ARu

ling

RPA

935

2.04

6729

33.3

5489

733

3Hr

anus

h Ha

koby

anFe

mal

ePa

rty

List

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A9

152.

1588

785

7.77

0801

076

3Ar

shak

Mkh

itary

anM

ale

Part

y Li

stPA

PRu

ling

PAP

99

2.26

1682

20

4As

hot A

poya

nM

ale

Part

y Li

stIn

dep.

Rulin

gAR

FD9

92.

2616

822

04

Mik

ayel

Var

dany

anM

ale

FPTP

Inde

p.N

one

99

2.26

1682

20

4Ar

thur

Agh

abek

yan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

ARFD

Rulin

gAR

FD8

242.

1869

159

03

Laris

a Al

aver

dyan

Fem

ale

Part

y Li

stIn

dep.

Opp

ositi

onHP

818

2.06

5420

63.

7091

6161

13

Lyov

a Kh

acha

trya

nM

ale

FPTP

Inde

p.N

one

88

2.13

0841

10

3As

hot A

ghab

abya

nM

ale

FPTP

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A7

82.

1214

953

0.52

53

Mkh

itar V

arag

yan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

Inde

p.N

one

612

2.23

3644

90

3Is

hkha

n Kh

acha

trya

nM

ale

Part

y Li

stRo

LRu

ling

RoL

610

2.43

9252

32.

6115

5259

93

Tach

at V

arda

pety

anM

ale

Part

y Li

stIn

dep.

Rulin

gRP

A6

62.

3644

860

3Ga

gik

Gevo

rgya

nM

ale

Part

y Li

stAR

FDRu

ling

ARFD

66

2.36

4486

03

Mya

snik

Mal

khas

yan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A5

62.

5420

561

0.36

6666

667

3Ar

a Si

mon

yan

Mal

eFP

TPN

URu

ling

Non

e4

122.

3738

318

03

Vaha

gn M

akhs

udya

nM

ale

Part

y Li

stPA

PRu

ling

PAP

48

2.57

9439

30

3Le

von

Sarg

syan

Mal

eFP

TPRP

ARu

ling

RPA

44

2.38

3177

60

3Ru

ben

Sado

yan

Mal

eFP

TPRP

ARu

ling

RPA

44

2.36

4486

03

Arm

en M

khita

ryan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A4

42.

3271

028

03

Grig

or M

arga

ryan

Mal

eFP

TPIn

dep.

Rulin

gRP

A4

42.

1682

243

03

Kory

un N

ahap

etya

nM

ale

FPTP

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A3

92.

3738

318

03

Gagi

k Ts

aruk

yan

Mal

eFP

TPPA

PRu

ling

PAP

33

2.57

9439

30

3Kh

achi

k Pe

tros

yan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

RoL

Rulin

gRo

L3

32.

4112

150

3Ru

ben

Gevo

rgya

nM

ale

Part

y Li

stPA

PRu

ling

PAP

26

2.62

6168

20

3Ar

tak

Zaqa

ryan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A2

42.

9345

794

03

Tigr

an T

oros

yan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A2

20

03

Arta

shes

Avo

yan

Mal

ePa

rty

List

RoL

Rulin

gRo

L1

12.

7196

262

00

142

Nam

eGe

nder

List

/FPT

PPa

rty

Rulin

g/O

ppos

ition

Fact

ion

Degr

eeW

eigh

ted

Degr

eeCl

osen

ess

Cent

ralit

yBe

twee

nnes

s Ce

ntra

lity

Ecce

ntric

ity

Saha

kyan

Gal

ust

mal

ePa

rty

List

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A25

571.

1379

3103

418

82

Hovh

anni

syan

Arp

ine

fem

ale

Part

y Li

stRP

ARu

ling

RPA

2155

1.37

9310

345

13.5

3Ba

bloy

an A

ram

ale

Part

y Li

stRP

ARu

ling

RPA

2123

1.37

9310

345

13.5

3Ar

zum

anya

n Al

eksa

ndr

mal

ePa

rty

List

FDP

Opp

ositi

onHP

2020

1.41

3793

103

03

Khac

hatr

yan

Ishk

anm

ale

Part

y Li

stRo

LRu

ling

RoL

2020

1.41

3793

103

03

Man

ukya

n Ab

raha

mm

ale

Part

y Li

stIn

dep.

PAP

PAP

2020

1.41

3793

103

03

Min

asya

n Ga

gik

mal

ePa

rty

List

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A20

201.

4137

9310

30

3M

inas

yan

Mkr

tich

mal

ePa

rty

List

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A20

211.

4137

9310

30

3N

ahap

etya

n Ko

ryun

mal

eFP

TPRP

ARu

ling

RPA

2020

1.41

3793

103

03

Pogh

osya

n Ka

rine

fem

ale

FPTP

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A20

201.

4137

9310

30

3Va

rdap

etya

n Ta

chat

mal

ePa

rty

List

Inde

p.Ru

ling

RPA

2020

1.41

3793

103

03

Nag

hdal

yan

Herm

ine

fem

ale

Part

y Li

stRP

ARu

ling

RPA

2050

1.41

3793

103

03

Shar

maz

anov

Edu

ard

mal

ePa

rty

List

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A20

501.

4137

9310

30

3M

nats

akan

yan

Mna

tsak

anm

ale

FPTP

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A20

501.

4137

9310

30

3M

urad

yan

Ruza

nna

fem

ale

Part

y Li

stRP

ARu

ling

RPA

2050

1.41

3793

103

03

Avag

yan

Kare

nm

ale

Part

y Li

stRP

ARu

ling

RPA

2020

1.41

3793

103

03

Bade

yan

Man

vel

mal

eFP

TPRP

ARu

ling

RPA

2020

1.41

3793

103

03

Davt

yan

Arta

km

ale

Part

y Li

stRP

ARu

ling

RPA

2020

1.41

3793

103

03

Zaka

ryan

Art

akm

ale

Part

y Li

stRP

ARu

ling

RPA

2020

1.41

3793

103

03

Kara

pety

an N

aira

fem

ale

Part

y Li

stM

IAK

Rulin

gRP

A20

201.

4137

9310

30

3Ho

vhan

nisy

an A

rayi

km

ale

Part

y Li

stRP

ARu

ling

RPA

2020

1.41

3793

103

03

Mar

gary

an H

ovha

nnes

mal

ePa

rty

List

RoL

Rulin

gRo

L4

111.

8965

5172

478

3Ba

baya

n Ar

men

mal

ePa

rty

List

ARFD

Opp

ositi

onIn

de.

416

10

1Ho

vhan

nisy

an V

ahan

mal

ePa

rty

List

ARFD

Opp

ositi

onAR

FD4

121

01

Min

asya

n Ar

tsvi

km

ale

Part

y Li

stAR

FDO

ppos

ition

ARFD

416

10

1Ru

stam

yan

Arm

enm

ale

Part

y Li

stAR

FDO

ppos

ition

ARFD

412

10

1Ag

hvan

Var

dany

anm

ale

Part

y Li

stAR

FDO

ppos

ition

ARFD

416

10

1Ha

ruty

unya

n Da

vid

mal

ePa

rty

List

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A4

92.

3103

4482

80

4GO

VERN

MEN

TGO

V.GO

V.GO

V.Ru

ling

310

2.79

3103

448

04

Bish

arya

n He

ghin

efe

mal

ePa

rty

List

RoL

Rulin

gRo

L3

102.

7931

0344

80

4Ay

vazy

an V

arda

nm

ale

Part

y Li

stRP

ARu

ling

RPA

36

2.79

3103

448

04

Mar

ukya

n Ed

mon

mal

eFP

TPIn

dep.

Inde

p.N

one

21

00

0Gr

igor

yan

Man

vel

mal

ePa

rty

List

Inde

p.Ru

ling

RPA

24

10

1Sa

roya

n Se

drak

mal

eFP

TPIn

dep.

Rulin

gRP

A2

41

01

Farm

anya

n Sa

mve

lm

ale

FPTP

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A2

41

01

Hako

byan

Hak

obm

ale

FPTP

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A2

20

00

Ache

mya

n Ka

rine

fem

ale

Part

y Li

stRP

ARu

ling

RPA

24

2.06

8965

517

03

Tab

le 2

.5 D

istrib

utio

n of

pow

er w

ithin

5th

con

voca

tion

of N

A

143

Grig

orya

n Ha

ykm

ale

FPTP

RPA

Rulin

gRP

A2

42.

0689

6551

70

3Ba

bukh

anya

n Ha

ykm

ale

Part

y Li

stCL

URu

ling

RPA

22

2.06

8965

517

03

Gevo

rgya

n Ar

thur

mal

eFP

TPRP

ARu

ling

RPA

22

2.06

8965

517

03

Baba

yan

Vaha

nm

ale

Part

y Li

stPA

PPA

PPA

P1

11

01

Vard

anya

n El

inar

fem

ale

Part

y Li

stPA

PPA

PPA

P1

11

01

144

Civil Servants 25.20% 43.50% 19.60% 11.70%Political party members 15.20% 4.50% 6.10% 74.20%NGO members 22.00% 51.20% 19.50% 7.30%LSG members 14.20% 49.40% 24.70% 11.70%Student Council members 53.80% 15.40% 7.70% 23.10%Business owners 17.40% 60.90% 21.70% 0.00%Academics 16.80% 67.20% 13.00% 3.10%Athletes 8.30% 83.30% 0.00% 8.30%Artists 15.40% 69.20% 7.70% 7.70%

Yes No Undecided Already involved

Table 3.1 Do you plan to get involved in politics?

Signed a petition

Peaceful Demonstration

Strikes

4 2 0

23 29 3

35 29 35

38 40 62

2 6 0

10 68 3

54 18 42

34 8 55

Table 3.2.1 Types of political participations (in percents)

34

Did not participate and would never participatein such action 52 44

NKR

Organized it 0 0

Participated in it 7 5

Did not participate in such action, but mayparticipate in future 41 50

Did not participate and would never participatein such action 62 55

Boycott Other protest actions

RA

Organized it 1 1

Participated in it 11 10

Did not participate in such action, but mayparticipate in future 26

145

Proactive (5/5)

Active (4/5)

Participants (3/5)

Follower (2/5)

Passive (1/5)

Subject (0/5)

Civil Servants 3.10% 3.90% 13.20% 79.80%Politcal Party members 3.40% 10.20% 32.20% 10.20% 28.80% 15.30%NGO represenatives 14.30% 17.10% 14.30% 31.40% 22.90%LSG represenatvies 2.00% 13.10% 18.20% 66.70%Student Council members 42.90% 28.60% 28.60%Businness owners 25.00% 75.00%Academics 0.90% 2.60% 7.90% 14.00% 24.60% 50.00%Athletes 20.00% 80.00%Artisits 28.60% 28.60% 14.30% 28.60%

Segments

Table 3.2.2 Types of political culture among potential political elite represenatives seprated by segments.

QG1. To what extent it is important for you to live in a democratic

country?

QG2. To what extent you consider RA/NKR to be

democratic?(1-not important at all, 10- very

important)(1-not democratic at all, 10-

fully democracy)Valid 500 498

Missing 0 2Mean 9.29 4.3Valid 191 191

Missing 0 0

Mean 8.8 4.46

RA

NKR

Table 3.3. Frequencies for support of democracy and perception on the nature of the existing regime

146

APPENDIX D. GRAPHS

Graph 1. The political composition of network for the third convocation (MPs

from ruling parties in red, opposition in blue, independent and oppositional

MPs joint to ruling parties in green)

147

Graph 2. Party composition of the fifth convocation: (MPs from RPA in red,

ARFD in green, PAP in purple. RoL yellow)

148

Graph 3. Party composition of elite in the fourth convocation (each color

represents separate party, nodes in bluе are independent MPs, nodes in black

are MPs from oppositional parties)

149

THE POLITICAL ELITE OF

POST-INDEPENDENCE ARMENIA:

CHARACTERISTICS AND PATTERNS

OF FORMATION

AREG SCIENTIFIC CULTURAL YOUTH ASSOCIATION NGO

Kievyan str. 12/10, 0028 Yerevan, Republic of Armenia Tel./fax: +374 10 270873

www.ngoareg.am email: aregngo@gmail.com

Publication: Ofset. Size: 60x84 1/16 Paper: Ofset.

Publication size: 1000 examples

150