THE PHILOSOPHYOF SPINOZA

INTRODUCTION

HE two and a half centuries which have passesince the death of Spinoza have been prolific incriticism of his work. Much that has been writ-

ten about him, to be sure, seems to have sprung from nomore profound motivation than a wish to praise or defamebut even of serious commentary few philosophers besideAristotle can boast a larger critical library. Other detailsmoreover, of Spinoza's philosophic fortune suggest thecomparison of Aristotle: even if one were permitted to for-get that he has been rediscovered af.ter a comparative ob-livion, one would be led by the fervor with which he isacclaimed to expect a scholasticism in modern philosophyof which he is the Philosopher. Usually when he is notpassed by or execrated in philosophic writings, he is lookedto for a model of logical precision and acumen, and his per-vasive awareness of the implications of concepts has apotheosized him among metaphysicians. Under such circum-stances there is the danger that any further work seem atrifling or a presumptuous addition-either the swelling ofthe scholasticism with another glossary and commentaryr orthe undertaking of the magical enterprise of detailing pre-cisely what has been in these works for several centuriesFortunately the alternative is not exhaustive, and fortu-nately, so far as it holds, one may guide oneself by erring alittle on the side of presumption. But the situation is de-termined somewhat by circumstances other than only thesethe passing of centuries has altered the materials of theproblem; it has added questions, and at very least it haschanged the approach and so has changed the problem too.An age which boasts, as the present age does, of its scientificpragmatic, and positivistic attitudes may well have lostin forming itself, the sense of a phitosophy which saw the

I

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZApossibility of those postures and avoided them. The intel-lectualist predilections which are evinced through thewhole deductive length of Spinoza's system molds it as nosubsequent philosophy could be molded. It would be dif-ficult to ignore the consistent unity of purpose whichemerges in any analysis of it, and that unity seems to laybare in turn a metaphysical unity evolved and expoundedin a fortified deductive logic. The suspicion suggests itself,even at the outset, that the very fact of unity recurs, not asan accident of presentation, but as the solution of ethical,methodological and metaphysical problems. If, thereforeSpinoza is to be read for the body of doctrine which thehistory of philosophy has attached to his name, it may notbe without use to philosophy and to the history of philoso-phy to inquire into the meaning of this persistent striving.

Excellent reasons could be found, consequently, for add-ing one more to the large collection of books on SpinozaAfter so much criticism it can not be a question merely ofapproaching a work critically; the work must be seethrough the confusions and clarifications of two hundredand fifty years. If it seem profitable to study the unity ofSpinoza's thought, it is not merely because there are signof unity in his work, but further because his critics havefound such an amazing diversity there. It is difficult toseparate the two, since the history of thought is history and,although it be a question of the philosophy of Spinoza, thereflections of Freudenthal, of Gebhardt, and of Brunschvicghave entered the question as definitely as any of Spinoza'own ideas. This is a difficulty which leads in some caseto unhappy consequences. There are few doctrines thathave not been drawn by some critic from the body of Spi-noza's philosophyl and for a large part, the criticism of hisworks has played a game of horror and admiration witheach of the assorted themes it has found. Accusations gothe whole length from atheism to pantheism and god-intoxicated mysticism. Naturalism and idealism in turn,materialism and spiritualism, nominalism and realism havebeen drawn with astonishing legerdemain from the demonstratidns of the Ethics.'

1 It would scarcely be desirable to rarge the whole body of Spinozana accordingto the epithets employed in them. Apart from the fact that this has been done,

INTRODUCTIONConsequently, if there is a carefully conceived unity in

Spinoza's thought, it has been very little apparent in theworks of his critics. They have not lacked occasions thatpermitted them to admire, but their admiration has beenaroused for the most part by acute and subtle analyses or bysome particular doctrine. There has been universal praisefor Spinoza's examination of the passions; bits from thestudy of the understanding can be used illustratively, dis-connected from their metaphysical setting; the ethics maybe looked upon as a rare piece of reasoned ordering of in-timate experience; the physics can be passed over unex-amined, since it is antiquated and, so, unessential. Onlyrarely have they been stated as the inseparable parts of onesystem. Spinoza stated them so, but it is perhaps naturalthat after him there should be more interest in parts of hisphilosophy or in its development than in the dialectical in-terdependence of his doctrines. Yet it seems unfortunatethat so systematized a philosophy should be read in so frag-mentary a fashion and that the system of this thought should

though not literally nor exhaustively (Ernest Altkirch, Maledictus und Bened'ictus,Felix Meiner, Leipzig, r9z4), its philosophic importance would be dubious. Butlest the statement of the range of disagreement concerning Spinoza seem exag-gerated and rhetorical, some examples of each can be adduced with no difrculty.Atheism and pantheism are perhaps the most wide-spread and most frequentlyrepeated of the titles. It will sufrce therefore to refer, for atheism, to P. Lami'sAthiisme Renqtersie (Paris, 1696), or to P. Bayle's Dictionnaire Historiqae etCritique (article Sfinoza: "Il a iti un athie de slstime et tune mithode toutenouqtelle. .") or his Pensiies dioerses-sur les Comites de I'Annie t68o ("C'hoitle plus grand Athie, qui ait jamais tti . , ") (see Freudenthal, LebensgeschichteSlinoza's (Leipzig, 1889),'pp. z8 and,'g4, for the Bayle quotations); for pantheismto R. Avenarits, Ueber ilie beiden ersten Phasen des spinozischen Pantheismus(Leipzig, 1868), This list of either might be increased indefinitely,

Novalis is not only responsible for the phrase "God-intoxicated" but will servetoo as example of both idealistic and realistic tendencies in interpretation. (Frag'mente qrermischten Inhalts ed. J. Minor; Jena, r9o7. "27, Die wah:re Philosophieist durchaus realistircher ld.ealismus - oder Slinozismus (p. r8z) . . , 355.Spinoza ist ein Gott trunkener Mensch. 956 Der Spinozistn ist eine Uebersiittigungmit Gottheit." (p. zSz) For naturalism see Nourrison, Spinoza et le NaturalismeContemforain (Paris, 1886), p. v, "Or, critiquer les enseigmements de Sfinoza,Cest critiquer ces thiories m?mes, qui ne sont que des oariitis dt Spinozisme, etque I'on a?fellerait bien en leur afpliquant une dinomination commune, le natural'isme contemporain. Car to{tes elles concluent d n'admetfte Aaatre rialiti que lanature, c'est-d-dire d)autre ilalitt que I'Uni<ters des corps."

For nominalism see Pollock (Spinoza, His Lile and Philosophy,'London, 1899),p. r4z. "spinoza's nominalism which we have always to bear in mind, is a suf-fcient warniug against assuming that the 'eternal things' have anything to do withkinds, qualities or classification." Powell (spinoza and Rcligion; Chicago, 19o6),hopes (p. r5o, n. r) "that the traditional habit of referring to Spinoza ar a con-sistent Nominalist will soon be corrected."

6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZAhave sunk so far from view that when it is raised at all, itis only by

-wal of_ arguments which make it seem painfuily

forced and which state it finally in a language of mixedphilosophic dialects.2

Yet the signs of -rlattempted consistency are too frequenin the writings of Spinoza to be ignored wholly. Ev.nthe externals of his work would indicate a unified conception. Surely it would be an unprecedented piece of care-lessness in a philosopher to put off metaphysical, logical,and moral speculations, as Spinoza did when he interruptedwork on the Ethics and possibly on the Qorrection of theUnderstanding, to expound political and theological doc-trines at variance with his philosophy. There are com-mentators who would have him do that. And Spin oza was

zNeedless to say, these confusions of critics have by this time ail been madeconfusions of spinoza. It is remarkable to observe how ihe processes of his thoughtcan be accounted for, how antecedents for his doctrines can be found in history,and how the supposed weaknesses exposed in his philosophy can be traced iosimple-minded precautions which he did not have the wit to take ! spinoza hasfound few critics to follow the ideal which he laid in criticism: he could forgethis philosophic beliefs and obliterate himself behind Descartes when he ix-pounded him. There are few restatements of Spinoza's philosophy which advanceig as he advanced Descartes's, on its firmest grounds. See, for example JohnCaftd, Spinoza (Blackwood, Edinburgh, 1888), p. 3: ,,His philosophy is not acompletely homogeneous product. It may be said to be the composite iesult of con-ficting tendencies, neither of which is followed out to its utmost logical results.',This is then illustrated by the fact that in the part of his philosophy which is con-cerned with substance there is no place for finite things, and th" p".t concernedwith individual things has no place for the infinite t or see oito willmann,Geschichte des ldealismus (Braunschweig, 1897), 3 Band, p. ag4:,,Sfinozas Lehreitt llumper synkretitmus, ohne jeden organischen charaiter, jedei Mystik baarund der Religion entlremdet und gegnerisch. Bei ihr ist alles Mache, irzwungrn,arf den schein angelegt, uuolid; allerorts aufgerafften Anilchten wird durch-d.ensc'hniirleib der geometrischen Methode ainige Fason gegeben; uncterdaute Remi-niszensen aus durchbliitterten Biichern dienen ali Aifputz, lediglich die person-lichkeit ist der zusammenhaltende Faden; et ist recht eigentlich ein "prhtatsystemj'wat.hier <torleigt! ' Or _see_C. N. Starcke, Baruch'de Spinoza (Copenhagen,1923), p, tz, "9ein Gott irt ein Jehosa in qterbesserter und mod,ernitiertir Gesiatt.Ivelche Elemente er auch aut anderen Quellen in sich aufnahm, er blieb dochstets seiner Rasse treu. seine Modi sind. aristotelisch, seine Auribute cafiesianisch,aber die Substans ist jiidisch."

It ig a significant commentary on the vast body of spinoza criticism that onewould be at loss to know where to turn for an adequate treatment of spinoza'sphysical doctrines; that the English translations of his letters, both willis's andElwes's, omit almost everything concerned with science, even the very importantLetter vI on Bo5rle's treatise on salt-Petre; (see willis Benedict de spinozi, l-on-'don, r87o, p. l35r "The sequel of this letter is on the constitution of Nitre, the na-ture of its spirit, etc., which could not interest the general reader, and would bepassed over by the chemist"; there is no consideration of the fact that it containsalso significant statements concerning- the relation of reason and experimentation);fnally that couchoud (Bcroit de 9|iroza, Paris, r9z4), should thinl it worth em-

INTRODUCTION 7c-ertainly too economical and careful a craftsman to intro-d.uce metaphysical considerations into an ethical work, ifthe system of things as he conceived it were irrelevant tothe conduct of life which he wished to examine. There arecommentators for whom even such irrelevance is not enough,since they would have Book I of the Ethics, instead of serv-lng a pufpose to make moral action inteltigible, expound asystem in which conduct could not be conceived.s Theframework in which- Spinoza,s thought is set, even morethan this purpose, indicites a concern-with uniiv. The at-tempt to reduce an elaborate philosophy to a m;thematicalform such that all its doctrines can b; made to depend on afew postulates, could never have been made if t'he svsremwere not conceived as autonomous. The apparatus alone ofSpinozats demonstrations argues unmistat abty, since prop_ositions are referred to axioms, definitions, and propositionsthrough the whole length of the five books of th€ ntttics, thathe supposed his thought to follow through coherently and.consistently. The method would be a symptom oi thethought even if he were unaware of its implicriions, and theseventeenth century and spino za wete too much concernedwith method to have escaped the truisms concerning it.phasizing as the frst point of his method (preface, p. vii) that he will uie all thewritings of spinoza, including the non-philosophic tieatisis. yet couchoud so farmisinterprets the nature of spinoza's contribuiion to science as to account for hisatti^tu.de_-!y a supposed temperamental unfitness for the technique of science. (seep. 89) "Malgrd son disir, Slinoxa demeura, en sorntne, ltranier d l,ilaboration dccc. que ,rous appelons la "sciencc moderne,r, Il n'aqait du iaeant ni la patience,ni la modestie intellectuelle., Il pensait saisir sur le oif, immIiliatemini, le md-canisme des choses, et, far deld ce micanisme, il eoulait'ioucher I'intime iubtanccaes abes. La science moderne lroclde autrement." santayana, on the contrary,insists( rntroduction to the-Everyman edition of. the Ethicsl pp.'**-;ti ttot ,,th"highest part of his philosophy" ii not in spinoza's religion ot ior;tio ol.tni", uutin. his physics, yet santayana ,regards these scientific

-inquiries onry as badly ap-

plied.arguments brought up in the interest of symmetiy. ,,The details of thisscientific^speculation, though interesting and masterly,

"r. no* somewhat anti-

quated; for the status of mathematical physics can hardly seem, to a critical phi-losopher, the same as the status of seli-consciousnesE; and the bold assumpt-iowhich spinoza makes for the sake of system and symmetry, that there is conscious-ness wherever there is extension, is too sweeping arrd too paradoxical to recommenitself to a seientific mind." clearly spinoza{ achieveinent and intention havebeen open to misinterpretation, if the attributes can come to this.8 See Caird, Slinoza, pp. 3o3-3o+ .,The last word of Spinoza's philosophyseems to be the contradiction of the first. Not only does he often fuctuate be-tween principles radically irreconcilable, but he seems to reassert at the closeof hie speculations what he had denied at the beginniog. . . . at tte outset, inone word, we seem to have, a pantheiatic uuity in which-nator" and man, all'rtemanifold existences of the finite world, are swallowed up I at the clore, ari infinite

TFM PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA

The striving after unity has left signs more properlyphilosophic than these in Spinoza's works, since his phi-losophy orders itself nicely toward a single goal. No con-siderable porticn of it is wholly free from one preoccupation. There are numerous statements of that problemsince almost every consideration of man or the universyields at some time to it. The opening pages of theTreatise on the Correction of the Understanding arc char-acteristically eloquent: whether there is some Good whichis truly good and able to communicate its goodness and bywhich alone the mind could be affected after it had rejecteall other things. That question is reiterated with increasing emphasis. Clear knowledge in any human disciplinewould contribute to solving it. It is significant, too, thatthe work which contains the rnost complete statement ofSpinoza's philosophy, the one which treats of God and ofthe relations of man to man, to Nature, and to God, shouldhave been called rn Ethics. The unity of his thought isindicated there; the Ethics is a work of morals and, in thatobvious sense, practical. But to be practical it must statits problem fully. The discussion of physics, metaphysicsand psychology contributes always some bit of informationwhich is essential to a knowledge of the nature of man andof the manner in which he should live and act. The Ethicsis, though critical interpretations have almost neglectethat central aspect to emphasize others, an examination ofmoral ideals and of human potentialities and circum-stances; it is not the occasion only for metaphysical speculations and psychological and physical analyses. But ifany knowledge is to be derived from the sciences which maybear on man's powers and his opportunities, that knowl-edge will help organize ethical philosophy. "Ethicsshould,tt Spinoza says, ttas everyone knows, be based onmetaphysics and physics." a

The force binding Spinoza's philosophy in a unifiedwhole, then, is precisely the one which directs the scienceto a moral ideal. Obviously knowledge is indispensable forthe examination of ethical problems. It is impossible toself-conscious mind, in which all finite thought and being f,nd their reality and

explanation."aElistola XXVII (olin g8) to Blyenbergh; IV' r6er6r.

INTRODUCTIONengage in moral inquiry while the nature of good and evilis wholly unknown and unexamined. Even an elementarexperience of things suffices to show that the same objecmay be good in one set of circumstances and evil in anotherthat in itself alone it can not be good or evil, perfect or im-perfect, and that therefore there is no good or evil in thenature of things, But these are metaphysical considertions. Human abilities are unequal to a continued visionof things as they are in the eternal order and fixed laws ofNature. Life and experience lead man to conceive a hu-man nature more perfect than his own and to seek themeans that will lead him to such a perfection. This isthe origin of notions of good and perfection; whatever ad-vances man toward that ,more perfect nature is a truegood; tbe supreme good is that which enables him, to-gether with other men, to attain to that nature; all sciencand philosophy should be useful to that end. ('What thatnature may be," Spinoza says, "I shall show in its properplace, namely, that it is the knowledge of the union whichthe mind has with the whole of Nature. Therefore this isthe end to which I tend, obviously, to acquire such a natureand to endeavor that many acquire it with me I that is, it ispart of my happiness to take care that many others under-stand as I do, and that their understanding and desire agrethoroughly with my understanding and desire, and in or-der to achieve this it is necessary to understand as much con-cerning Nature as is needed to acquire such a nature, andmoreover it is necessary to form such a society as wouldbring about that as many as possible attain that nature aseasily and securely as possible. Again care must be takenconcerning Moral Philosophy as well as concerning theTheory of the Education of Children; and since health isnot an unimportant means to this end, the whole science ofMedicine must be arranged appropriately, and finally in-asmuch as many things which are difficult are renderedeasy by art and since we can gain a great deal of time andbenefit by it, Mechanics must by no means be despisedBut before all else a method must be thought out of healingthe understanding and of purifying it as much as is possible at the beginning that it may understand things fruitfully

ro TIitE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZAand without error and as well as possible. From all thisanyone will now be able to see that I wish to direct all sci-ence to one end and goal, namely, that the highest humanperfection, as we said, be attained, and so, all that does notadvance us in the sciences to the end and goal, must be re-jected as useless, that is, to say it in a word, ail our operations and also our thoughts must be directed to this end.tt EThis is reiterated in a foot note: "There is but one end inthe sciences to which all must be directed."

Consequently, if ethics is to pursue an inquiry into thenature of goodness and into the means of attaining thatwhich is good, it is unavoidable that it draw on metaphysicand the sciences. But it must be seen at the verv outset ofthe inquiry-in fact, it should have appeared in what hasbeen said-that there are two ideals involved in ethics, notonly the right conduct of living, but also the selection ofconduct that will fit to the higher ideal of living and thatwill lead to perfection. There is the good life which maybe led though one have no unusual powers of understanding, and there is the perfection which is the status and thereward of the well-guided intellect. One must live in awell-ordered state and according to the rules that lead togood health and friendship to live well. Such things, how-ever, are external and not in the control of man. To knowits highest perfection, mants nature must be considereapart from his circumstances in relation to the intelligiblenature of things; it would be tautology to say that knowl-edge and metaphysical speculation are needed to attain tothis perfection.

At no point, then, can ethics proceed certainly withoutthe aid of science. A knowledge of the nature of the body,of the mind, of human society must complement at eachstep the progress of the science of ethics. No question, onthe other hand, can come up which does not involve ethicalproflems. When John Bouwmeester writes to ask Spi-noza "if. some method is given or can be given by which wecan arrive unhindered and without weariness at the under-standing of the best of things, or are our minds, like ourbodies, subject to the vicissitudes of chance and our

6 Tract. de Int. Emend.,' II, 8-9.

INTRODUCTION rrthoughts ruled by fortune rather than by skill?',, Spinozareplies by detailing the "method by which our clear anddistinct perceptions may be directed and concatenated.,tThen he concludes his answer, ttit remains only to warn youthat assiduous meditation and a resolute and most constantmind are needed for all these matters, and to insure themit is before all necessary to set up a fixed mode and plan ofliving and to prescribe some definite end.,'0 The problemof ethics slips imperceptibly into the problem of logic andthe materials relevant to it are drawn from the metaphysicsof thought, since ideas which are formed from the neces-sity of our nature alone, depend on fixed laws and must betrue.? This is the metaphysical problem of the relation offixed and eternal things to contingent and changing things;it is the logical problem of the sufficient grounds of cer-tainty; it is the central problem of ethics since the contem-plation of the best things is exactly that knowledge of theunion of our minds with Nature, and such knowledgemakes human perfection. But meanwhile, even in a prob-Iem of logic, one must be reminded (by admonitions lo as-siduous meditation, to a constant mind and fixed mode ofliving) that to arrive at truth is part of a way of life andinvolves moral considerations.

fn the metaphysical reaches of thought the end of all activity will be single. There is no difficulry in the fact thatthe intellectual love of God is at once beatitude and thecontemplation of truth. In fact, this identity in the changing world is the source of the solution of ethical problernNot that action need be rational. nor need it even be subject to rational control, but logic on the one hand is a function of a living thing, and morality on the other is the de-duction of rules or means for the practical use of the facultyof knowing. Virtue is neither the reward of wisdom nor itsnecessary prerequisite; it grows with each item of knowl-edge, whether of the nature of the universe in which man isplaced or of his relation to its parts. It may be as unifiedas the source of being and as diversified as the sum of thesciences I for man is a part of a world and he is caught in its

eElittola X)O(VII to Bouwmeester; IV, r87-r89.? See Efittola XXXVU cited above.

il12 THE, PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA

logical implications, but he is affected directly too by thingin it other than himself, moved by his desires with respeto them, and helped and hindered variously by them in at-taining the ends he has set up. Consequently if one starwith a concern for man and his perfection, a completphitosophic inquiry has been initiated in all its logical andscientific ramifications. ('For the bounds of nature are notthe laws of human reason which are directed only to the in-terest and preservation of man, but other and infinite lawswhich regard the eternal order of all nature, of which manis a particle; all individuals are determined f rom the solnecessity of this order to exist and to operate in a fixedmanner. t t 8

The laws of human nature are to be considered; but thereare also laws which determine mants body and other bodiesand there are the laws which determine his relation to thethings of his environment. Finally, the nature of good issuch that goods will be developed proper to any field inwhich man engages: the improvement of his mind, the de-velopment of his body, the continuance of amicable rela-tions with other men in ordinary association, in politicalsociety, or in rel igion. But the summurn bonum must besought in none of these but in the law of them all, in thebeing of God which sets the order of the universe. TheEthics falls easily into a division of subjects which takes allthese into account, and it is not surprising to find that Spi-noza's contemporaries seem to have spoken of it in termsvery much like these. In 1676 Leibniz had not yet seenthe text of the Ethics, but he had spoken of itwith severaof Spinoza's friends, and from their conversation he knewthat it would be "about God, the mind, beatitude or the ideaof a perfect man, about the medicine of the mind, about themedicine of the body, etc." e

8 Polit. II, par. vIlI; llI, 279.s"Mons. Tschirnhaus m'a conti beaucou| de choses du liqtre d'e Spinoza. Il.

y a an marchand i Amsterdam, nommi Gillet Genit puto, qui cntletient SPinosa.

Le liqtre de Spinosa sera de Deo, mente, beatitudine seu petfecti hominis id.ea, d.eMedicina mentis, de Medicina corporis, ctc," Atts Leibniz' Papieren, Die Lebens'geschichte Spinozds, J. Freudenthal (Leipzig, 1899), p. zor. Somewhat before

this (November l'4, t675) Schuller had requested that Leibniz be permitted to seethe manuscript (Epiilola LXX; IV, 3o3) and Spinoza had refused (Epistola

LXXII; IV, goS).

INTRODUCTION t t

So intimate is the interdependence of all these strandsthat Spinoza would have had to beco,me a system-builder toexpress even a fragmentary part of his convictions. TheEthics was to have expounded that moral center of hisphilosophy, the knowledge of the union which the mindhas with the whole of Nature l th:e Qomection of the Under-standing was to supplement that with the medicine bywhich the mind may be brought to a condition in which itmight enter into that union. But the two had to encroachon each other unavoidably, since each as it proceeds be-comes more clearly incomplete without the other and eachcould be understood only if the other had already been ex-pressed. In both the Ethics and the Correction of the Un-derstanding, the inquiry is in the interests of the life andcareer of an individual being, but it is impossible to explainwhat a thing is or how it will act, if it be considered in termsonly of itself. . There are problems connected with it whichare problems of natural historyl to resolve them the con-sequences of the action of other things must be taken intoaccount. Other problems are involved which belong ratherto metaphysics, ancl in them are implicated the endless prin-ciples by which all things are. Whatever we do and what-ever we know is relevant to a universe of things acting uponeach other and bound by necessary and intelligible laws:ultimately each thing is not merely part of a cosmic orderbut an element in a logical unity.

The constant recurrence of God as an important principle of explanation in the philosophy of Spinoza has justhis significance. It is a manifesto that there could be noinsignificant event in the world which this philosophy is todescribe; it is scarcely to be wondered at that there willbe no inconsequential detail in the philosophy that is expounded. The fact is particularly important since this isthe philosophy of a man who would direct all the sciencto an ethical end: the Ethics and the Short Treatise begiwith an examination of the nature of God; the Treatise onthe Correction of the Understanding leads back to Godand examines the relation of the human mind to the metaphysical structures discovered in the Etftics; even the dis-cussions of the Political Treatise and the Theoloqico

ll

r4 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA

Political Treatise are carried very frequently to metaphysical principles and to God. There is finally an apparatuto bind the whole together; the politics, the theology, thelogic, and the ethics, are referred, all, by footnotes andscholia to the metaphysics. Moral and intellectual judg'ments are not to be comprehended fully without their metaphysicat implications: so the Ethicr opens with franklymetaphysical questions and the Treatise on the Correctioof the (Jnderstanding can proceed only by referring bacto ((my Philosophy" for further explanation.to A mathematical physics or a transcendental psychology may bedeveloped, but without their relation to each other they areincomplete, and that relation can be explained only by thdoctrine of God. Religion and politics will be misundestood and therefore misdirected if they are not considerin their proper subordination to God and the laws determined by his attributes. In a word, although informatioand details may be amassed from experience and may evebe constituted into a body to be called a science, that sciencwill not be true knowledge unless there is a sense of inneand logical necessity that binds it to other certainties: thaperception can come from no experience, but only from reflection. This conviction must be implicit in the statemeof any part of Spinoza's philosophy. To bring it out hehad to resort to constant reiteration: physics, psychology, anethics operate upon identical mechanisms. Any statemeis a partial statement, only partly, intelligible in itself I yeeach contributes to the illumination of other statements. Itis not difficult, consequently, to account for some of the misinterpretations to which Spinoza has been subjected: quotations can be found in his works to support most of them

Spinoza's philosophy would be a difficult and subtle onto siate even if it were completely formulated I as he left itthe articulation and dependence of its parts are not perfecDistinctions are frequently reiterated to become sharp onlygradually; sometimes it seems as if definitions are modifiein repetition. Extension and Thought are defined onlyafter repeated explanations have made clear how these attributes are to be distinguished from the traditional one

roTract. de Int. Emend. Notes to pages ro, t2, ar'd 14; alro page 36.

INTRODUCTION I5

and what correlation and what contrast there is to be be-tween them. Sometimes the difficulty seems to be one ofexpression, for though the language is tersely exact andbeautifully accurate, it bears the marks of painiul revision.Since there is so much misunderstanding ii seems probablethat the work of revision may not have been perfected brcompleted. Pot possibly the fault is not always Spinoza's,and if what he means by, say, idea seems to be labored toits final conception through the whole length of Book IIof the Ethics, the confusions may not have come ,from anyvagueness in his mind, but from the variety of senses inwhich we have been reading the word since his time.

In expression as well as ideas Spinoza stands betweentwo ages. \Mithin his lifetime even the language he usedhad come to have different meanings. He is 1 contem-porary of the first of the philosophers we have come tocall modern, but in a significant sense his intellectual fel-lowship is with the medievals. This place which he oc.cupies in the history of thought is another source for muchof the strange interpretation that has been found for hisdoctrine and his terminology. He was concerned largelywith problems which occupied the attention of his prede-cessors; and except in rare instances, the statements he citedwith approval from the works of his contemporaries pleasedhim for other reasons, and because of other impliiations,than those which their authors had tried most to bring out.The misfortune is that his generation and those that strc-ceeded it have faced about and that he expressed his con-victions partly in terms which they continued to use.

But even these readjustments do not leave the writingsof Spinoza formed in a perfect and coherent body in whichthere are no conflicting doctrines and no unfilled lacuneSometimes the difficulty and the confusion are genuine phil-osophic problems which evolved in the course of his workand which yield no solution. He was faced, to take oneexample, with the problem of the relation of finite bodieto God. In his first work, it seemed a simple problemand he disposed of it: "now to prove that thire is a bodyin Nature, can be no difficult task for us." 11 The proof

rt$hort Treatise, Pt. II, ch. xur, p. rr9.

t6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA

requires only a knowledge of God and of his attributesFifteen years later a correspondent, Tschirnhaus, 12 raisethat problem in almost the same terms: ttln the first placeI can conceive only with difficulty how the existence ofboclies which have motion and figure can be demonstratea priori; since nothing of the sort-occurs in extension, con-sidering the thing absolutely.n' Spinoza's reply takes upother problems raised in the letter, but in regard to thishe says only that if Extension be conceived as Descartes con-ceived it, that is, as a quiescent mass, it is not only difficultbut impossible to demonstrate the existence of things.Tschirnhaus recognizes and expands on the difficulties inthe case of Descartes, but asks Spinoza to indicate ('how thevariety of things can be shown a priori from the concepof Extension according to your meditations." 13 Spinozaanswers that the variety of things can not be demonstratefrom the concept of Extension alone, that consequentlDescartes had defined matter badly as extension, but thatit must necessarily be explained through an attribute whichexpresses eternal and infinite essence. This position andstatement were those which in the Short Treatise seemeto him the solution of the problem. ttBut," he adds now,

"I shall treat of these things with you more clearly somdaf if life be sufficient. For up to the present I have beenable to put nothing concerning these matters in order." ln

Since that reply, written on the fifteenth of July 1676, isthe next to last of the letters we have of him, life was notto sufif;ce for removing this difiiculty. But it had beenlong enough to indicate that the confident statement of theShort Treatise was the statement and not the solution of theproblem: bodies are related to the attribute of Extension;but the mechanism to mediate between bodies and Extensionwas never set in order. There are other such definite out-lines in the Ethics which were never to be filled in.

There are consequently enough elements of confusiogathered about the works of Spinoza. But it does not seetoo much to hope that the coherent logical form, whichSpinoza strove so definitely and consistently to confer upon

12 E?istolaLXXX (olim 69), May z, 16761 IV, s:t.rs Epistola LXXXII, (olim 7t); lY, 333.La Elistola LXXXIII (olim 7z) i IY, fil,

INTRODUCTION r7his philosophy, can be recovered in at least the detail that hegave it. Restatement of that unity is needed particularlysince it can be made with an emphasis determined by criti-cism to which, though he could not have anticipated it, Spinoza has given the implicit answer. From the method heemployed and from the confidence he had in the efficacy ofdeductive or synthetic reasoning, one is led to expect that theanswer will be a consistent and autonomous doctrine. Itmay be incomplete in some details, for the unity is a formaone, and concerned, therefore, not with the specific inclusioof everything that is known, but rather with the conceivable manner in which anything that may be known is tobe included. To say this is only to insist on Spinoza's firmconviction that the search for truths and goods could beconducted with profit only after one had investigated whatis implied in the fact that we can conceive a truth or cadesire that which we conceive to be good. Then one mayspeak of the power of the intellect and the strength of th-emotions. Such an insistence will bring out forcefullwhat is involved in his philosophy and will recognize, tooas a proper consequence of this philosophy that in the agwhich was to go into a madness of observation and experimentation, he could appraise Bacon's t'little stories" 15 andinsist that Boyle's experiments revealed and could reveanothing which was not already known about the nature ofthings.

In view, moreover, of this conviction that things in theiressences are articulated in a close system, there must in-evitably be rapid transitions and reduplications from partto part of Spinoza's philosophy. His dominant ethicaconcern leads through a metaphysics, and the unity of pur-pose takes on a philosophic significance in that it is baseon a unity found among the facts of physics and ethics andmetaphysics. Ethics must be preceded by an analysis ofexperience in terms of essence and existence. For a thingor for an idea to be, it is necessary not only that a set ofcircumstances and antecedent conditions prepare for it, butalso that it be and exemplify one of a system of essencwhich has come, in it, into existence. This is the metaphy

a6 "Mentis ive perceptionat4 hhtoriolam," Elistola XXXy1I (olin 42) ;[V, r89

I8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZAsical unity which is one of the important properties ofGod's nature; Spinoza devotes the first part of Book I ofthe Bthics to it. That the existence of God and his sim-plicity are necessary is a statement that there is an orderin nature; the order is all the implications and sequences ofthings, not in time but in essence, so that, in brief, the na-ture and the sum of things indicate a set of conditionsIthese properly analyzed follow directly from the natureand attributes of God.

This metaphysical background is so very important be-cause the ways of knowing and the nature of all things,including the passions, can be explained only in view ofit: they are in final analysis only the symptoms of the dis-tinction between things and the metaphysical basis ofthings. The nature of no thing save only God determinethat it must exist; that a thing is, is separate from what itis, save only that to be, it must be just that. Spinoza found,for this reason, no direct means of deduction of the exist-ence of things from God. It is the reverse of the modernproblem of logic - for whereas Mill found that any gen-eralization built on experience was only tentative andhypothetical, Spinoza working from general notions to ex-perience, found that experience is unreliable and that gen-eralizations reveal rather what a thing must be than whatit is. The whole problem which appears in various formsin different departments of philosophy is here: Spinoza'medieval predecessors would have said that a principle ofindividuation was needed I in essence a thing which existsis no different from a thing which does not exist I it is bodyor some equivalent principle which is the cause of all par-ticularity; its existence depends on physical antecedentbut to be, it must be something. For Spinoza the essencwhich in the realm of ideas and eternal things constitutethe thing that which it is, becomes in the realm of existenca tendency and inclination to persist in existence. In manthis is a conatus become self-conscious; it constitutes striv-ing and desire. The contribution of metaphysics to theethical problem is precisely in this restatement: how can theimpulse which comes from experience and from things bemade commensurate with the inclination which is the es-sence of the thing. To ask this is to inquire what the

INTRODUCTIONstrength of the passions and the power of the intellect areOr again, it is said that infinite modes proceed in infi.nitways from the divine efficacy: the tendency of a body tomove in a straight line, the tendency of ideas to follow ina sequence of associations, and the tendency of emotions tofollow in the fulfillments and frustrations of desires, allthese have explanations which are remarkably similarBut the similarity is to be anticipated in the metaphysictruth that extension and thought are attributes of God anthat the order and sequence of ideas is identical with thorder and sequence of things. An insistence on the unityof Spinoza's thought is an insistence only on the grounand intimacy of such interdependences.

Spinoza is, in the sense made clear by this persistent unityand implied in his constant cross-references, the best introduction to himself I he is, himself, his own best commentatoHis early works often contain fuller statements of histhoughts and not infrequently there are given the detailereflections in which he distinguishes what he says fromwhat would have been held traditionally. It is possiblto trace some conceptions through perceptible steps untilthey arrive finally at an adequate statement; the repeaterestatements of a doctrine, by rounding out different approaches to it, may indicate it clearly, though it be a doctrine which defies accurate exposition; sometimes anearly opinion is definitely abandoned. In the works expounded according to tlie geometric method, statementhat seem questionable or even unintelligible may be il-luminated by the necessary references to doctrines onwhich they depend. Or analogies may be carried fromone realm to another in which the inner continuity is thesame; so the Lemmas of the Second Book of the Ethicsnot only state the physical principles of all bodies, but illus-trate as well the fundamental principles of thought.

The plan which this study will follow is determined bythese facts. An attempt will be made first to indicate thepossible influences which entered into the intellectual for-mation of Spinoza. There are various materials whichmay be used to this end: first, what is known of his life andof his associates and his relations to them. and for this wehave testimony in the writings of some of his contempo

r9

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZAraries and in his own letters; second, what is known of thintellectual influences that helped mold his thought, andthese can be judged somewhat from the list of books left inhis library and from the citations of authors in his works andfrom the familiarity which he shows with some traditionaproblems and discussions. Such'an investigation shoulreveal at least the questions that recurred in his readinand his reflection; both the possibility and the utility ofdetermining definitely what philosophy inspired him toany particular ideal or what doctrine influenced him toany conviction, are rather dubious. But the broad lines ofmaterials to be used and problems to be considered maybe marked. Then, on this background, the purpose whichmanifests itself early in the works of Spinoza may be tracethrough the modifications of his statements. Finally inthe second part of. this study the thought of Spinoza maybe examined in a unity and entirety made more definitby this approach. This last can perhaps be done best bytracing the relations of the ideas in his mature works, so faras that is justified by his explicit statement, and rednforcewherever possible by reference to the earlier works. Aunity in his thought emerges out of the dominant purposwhich animates his investigations, but the coherence inwhich the final doctrine is set is not the outgrowth onlyof this conscious directing; in it the philosophic problemuncovered along the way find a metaphysical solution.