the pact that never was: the pacific pact of 1949

THE PACT THAT NEVER WAS: THE PACIFIC PACT OF 1949

Charles M. Dobbs

In the spring and summer of 1949, the idea of a Pacific pact emerged, peaked, and faded away. Supposedly similar in concept to the North Atlantic Treaty, ratified that year, the Pacific pact momentarily became a microcosm of the crosscurrents affecting Eastern Asia (and the Western Pacific) in that tumultuous period.

The proposed pact evoked strong feelings in the region. Its major proponents, Jiang Kai-shek, Syngman Rhee, and Elpidio Quirino, most likely sought to use the favorable sentiment surrounding the successful North Atlan- tic Treaty negotiations to secure continued United States military and economic assistance they believed might otherwise be denied; they saw the pact as anti-Chinese Communist at its heart. The United States government feared unwanted entanglements at a time when it was undergoing a thorough (and somewhat painful) review of its Asian policy and as it was considering re- quirements to open relations with Mao Zedong's victorious forces on the Chinese mainland. Great Britain opposed any sort of security arrangement that might replace--and make unnecessary--the British Commonwealth. Other area nations believed that Japan remained the major threat or they had no desire to stand squarely against the Chinese Communists. And, of course, one can only guess how communist leaders in the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics viewed the situation. In rare public statements, they made clear that they believed America had instructed its puppet regimes to organize an anticommunist pact in Eastern and Southeastern Asia.

Curiously, in the spate of new monographs, articles and dissertations on American-East Asian diplomacy in this tempestuous period, few scholars have given the Pacific pact even a brief mention. As of this writing--summer/fall 1984--the Pacific pact remains largely ignored. Nonetheless, it certainly provided a momentary scare for American diplomats and, for a few months, figured prominently in regional relations of Western-oriented and neutral nations. It deserves greater study.

It is difficult to determine the exact origins of the idea of a Pacific pact. Sometime between January and April of 1949, the concept began to appear in the diplomatic correspondence and public utterances of several nations on the Pacific rim.

Charles M. Dobbs is professor of history at Metropolitan State College in Denver, Colorado, and is the author of The Unwanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, the Cold War, and Korea, 1945-1950, and The United States and East Asia, 1945-1955 (forthcoming).

30 JOURNAL OF NORTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES / WINTER 1984

The Australian government was an early supporter of a regional security pact. A variety of factors was at work. Since the Japanese occupation of (parts of) New Guinea in 1942, Australian leaders sought military and economic ties with the United States. The Australian historian Dr. P.G. Edwards has written that "the idea of a Pacific Pact was pursued avidly by Australian Govern- ments until it finally emerged as the ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand, and the United States] Treaty of 1951, then and now at the basis of Australian foreign policy. Militarily the pact offered security as the sun began setting on the British Empire; economically it offered an opportunity to ease that nation's "dollar" problems. ''1

After a few trial balloons failed, the idea acquired a strong supporter in the president of the Philippine republic, Elpidio Quirino. On February 10, the New York Times had reported "growing Philippine concern over Communist victories in China." Later that month a Manila newspaper, the Manila Bulle- tin, editorialized about the need for a Pacific security pact, while the Manila Times ran an editorial titled "Me Too." In mid-March, Quirino initially raised the idea with the American charg6 in Manila, Thomas H. Lockett. Quirino urged that America "take the lead in the Far East and not concentrate her entire attention on Europe," noting that a Pacific pact "seems advisable." As Lockett wrote the State Department in Washington, it seemed that the government and media wanted assurances of U.S. support against external ag- gression, whether by bilateral treaty or in the form of a security pact. 2

Throughout the remainder of the month, Quirino continued to press the Pacific pact concept on Lockett and others. He told the American charg6 that only the United States could supply leadership to remedy "the moral and economic chaos existing in much of the Far East." Even dismissal of the pact idea by U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson on March 23 did not cool Quirino's ardor. He told the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks (in Manila), "The United States cannot afford to neglect the Pacific basin." The American embassy reported its belief that Quirino and the Philippine public were sincere; it suggested finding a means of assurance to quiet their fears. 3

Coincidentally, as Quh'ino began urging formation of an area security pact, the State Department was evaluating U.S. policy towards (Southeast) Asia. A Policy Planning Staff (PPS) paper recommended "contain[ing] and reduc[ing] Kremlin influence in the region," organizing, eventually, for multilateral collaboration, and integrating the region into the Free World (economy). But it noted problem areas for American foreign policy. No policy of the U.S. government could resolve "the immediate crucial issue in Southeast Asia-- that of militant nationalism in Indonesia and Indochina." But, to avoid charges of new Western imperialism, the paper discouraged open support for an area organization on the grounds that, at least temporarily, it was prema- ture. The paper undoubtedly caused Secretary Acheson to dismiss the idea. Later, as part of a more comprehensive review of Asian and Pacific policy, it

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formed the basis of a National Security Council document, NSC 48/2, ap- proved in December 1949, which set forth basic American attitudes to the region's complex problems. 4

However, Syngman Rhee seized upon the idea of a security pact to help bolster his tottering regime. In the six months or so since independence, the Republic of Korea had proven woefully inadequate to the great tasks before it; and, as president, Rhee also seemed leading the former American zone in southern Korea to economic collapse. Despite millions of dollars in U.S. aid, inflation continued to spiral upward; corruption and hoarding of scarce rice and fuel appeared endemic. Despite American rhetoric to the contrary, Rhee used conservative elements of society damned by wartime collaboration with the Japanese to oppress the peasantry and to avoid democracy. According to schedule, the last U.S. Army combat units would withdraw in June. Rhee needed to retain his American benefactors; Quirino's Pacific pact idea appeared to offer the best opportunity. 5

Soon after Quirino proposed the pact concept, Rhee and his government sought to pressure the U.S. government to support the pact and increase aid to Korea. On April 8, the Republic of Korea's ambassador in Washington, Dr. John M. Chang, approached the State Department about "the question of a Pacific counterpart to the Atlantic Pact." The department offered no encouragement. In mid-May, Rhee released a statement in which, "as a solution to the grave threat against Korea and all Asia by the aggressive forces of communism," he urged "formation of a Pacific pact similar to the Atlantic Pact" or a U.S.-R.O.K. mutual defense agreement. Several days later he told a press conference, " I think a Pacific pact will be beneficial not only to Asia but to the United States." He would combine public pronouncements with private suasion. 6

The pressure on the United States continued to mount. As Rhee continued his efforts, Philippine officials also returned to the issue. General Carlos Romulo, head of the Philippine delegation to the United Nations General As- sembly, called on the United States to "follow up NATO with measures to improve economic development of the nations of the Pacific and Asia" and "take the lead establishing an alliance following the lines of NATO." Quirino again raised the issue with Lockett in Manila at their regular meetings. The Australian government, which first had raised the issue in February, again promoted the pact idea. Prime Minister Joseph B. Chifley said that "plans for a Pacific pact were underway parallel with corresponding planning for the North Atlantic Pact." Lastly, Nationalist Chinese Ambassador C.V. Wel- lington Koo proposed "an Asiatic alliance that would provide a regional defense arrangement similar to the North Atlantic pact" to Secretary Acheson. 7

Several important regional powers opposed the pact. Indian Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru said that "a Pacific defense pact could not take shape until the present internal conflicts in Asia were solved. . , the time was un-


ripe." Nehru told journalists that the pact appeared anti-Chinese Communist at a time when Mao's prestige was high. He also believed that Japan's reorientation toward democracy had to continue and independence in the Dutch East Indies and French Indochina had to occur before a pact was possi- ble. The British government similarly sought to discourage a pact. Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin publicly remarked that he saw no reason to create an organization to rival the British Commonwealth; and there were too many internal conflicts in the area. But he did express interest in economic ties, re- marking "There is a good deal here which the West has to offer the East and a solid basis for cooperation." Privately, British officials approached their American counterparts to begin considering the issue of switching recognition of "China" from Jiang's defeated Nationalists to Mao's victorious Com- munists. Clearly a decision on a Pacific pact would have to await rethinking of policy towards China. s

On May 18, Secretary Acheson stated his firm opposition to a Pacific pact. He opposed a pact, at least momentarily, owing to conditions in the Pacific and Asia. He agreed with Nehru's view, calling it "an objective appraisal of the actual, practical possibilities at the present time." Privately, he wanted to retain his options toward the warring parties in China. InPat terns in the Dust ,

Nancy B. Tucker, while making scant mention of the pact controversy as it applied to China, convincingly argues that Acheson sought to play a waiting game until the Chinese civil war reached a resolution, rather than lock the United States into an anti-Chinese Communist policy that would force Mao into Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin's control. A Pacific pact almost inevitably would pit the United States against Communist China--something Acheson wanted to avoid. 9

During June, Rhee, Quirino, and Jiang quietly continued their activities on behalf of a Pacific pact. Rhee expressed official regret at Acheson's opposition. Quirino on July 5 called a Pacific union "our answer to the threat of Red imperialism." The next day Jiang told two U.S. journalists that " i f timely help is not given in China's anticommunist f igh t . . , if communism is not checked in China, it will spread over the whole of Asia."1~

In mid-July Jiang made secret arrangements to meet with Quirino to con- ceive a strategy for a Pacific pact. Both leaders wanted to secure U.S. ac- quiescence, if not outright support. On July 8, Quirino informed Lockett that he would meet with Jiang at Baguio (in the Philippines), coincidentally lo- cated near a U.S. Army facility, to create an "anticommunist bloc of Asian nations." On July 11, Jiang and Quirino announced that they had discussed formation of a Pacific front against communism. Starting with a nucleus of Philippines, Nationalist China, and Korea, the two men would invite Siam (Thailand), Indonesia (over which the Dutch still claimed control), India, Au- stralia, and New Zealand to join. They also "would look earnestly to the United States for leadership, guidance, and strength.'11

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The Jiang-Quirino communiqu6 provoked a quick response. Rhee, of course, heartily concurred: "A good start toward organizing the Pacific peo- ples in their fight against communism has been made by Quirino and Jiang." He added, "As I have made plain on several occasions, the Republic of Korea stands ready to join in the movement." American newspapers were divided about the merits of a pact. The New York Times, for example, noted that "un- like Europe and NATO, we have been unwilling to accept a similar commitment in As ia . . . [but] the march of events is bringing a decision closer. The Baguio meeting laid groundwork for a Pacific union on behalf of freedom and safety." The Christian Science Monitor, however, was less certain. "The forthcoming China White Paper . . . should make clear why most students of the Far East put little faith in the 'retired' president of Nationalist China as the leader of a new and enlarged crusade against communism . . . . Other elements are of more importance to a Pacific pact than the Jiang rump regime." The Netherlands government was upset with plans to invite "Indonesia" when the status of the Dutch colony--at least to the Dutch--remained to be resolved. The British and the Indians were unwilling to support the pact as well. 12

The strongest and fullest response came from the U.S. government. Jiang and Rhee must have suspected what was occurring. The government in Washington was beginning a broad review of policy in Asia, which would culminate in Policy Planning Staff Paper 51, substantially repeated in the Na- tional Security Council's NSC 48/2, and form the basis for the Asian section of NSC 68 early drafts in April 1950. The State Department had received the brunt of criticism by the so-called China lobby of conservative Republicans and some Democrats "for being allegedly without a policy in regard to the Far East." The department would change policies of the previous several years and begin anew reckoning with the power of emerging nationalism in Asia and the Pacific. Thus, release of the China White Paper, in the words of a PPS preliminary draft paper, would possibly "do much to provide a rational ex- planation of our policy of disengagement in China." The department wanted to separate the United States from Jiang's forthcoming debacle, establish conditions for relations with Mao's Communists, ease tensions in Indonesia and Indochina while speeding those areas to independence, and conclude a Japanese peace settlement. A pacific pact---especially if it acquired significant international and domestic support--would continue to tie the United States to old, discredited policy in Asia. 13

Based upon the reevaluation of policy in Asia, the department response was severalfold. Acheson sent a note to 18 embassies that the pact proposal was "primarily a Chinese Nationalist and Rhee initiative seeking supplementary means to appeal for U.S. military aid and influence U.S. public opinion." He noted that the department would welcome increasing economic and political ties between the noncommunist countries of South Asia and the Pacific but would remain "aloof" from the present proposal. He informed the embassies


to discourage interest in the pact in their host countries. The U.S. government invited President Quirino to visit Washington, at which time it would seek to allay his worries about Philippine security and to assure him of the strength of U.S.-Philippine mutual defense plans. It was hoped that the visit and accom- panying talks would mitigate his enthusiasm for the Pacific pact as urged by Jiang and Rhee. Lastly, expecting the China White Paper, perhaps, to lessen the influence of Jiang and his U.S. supporters, the department informed the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, "Tell Rhee the U.S. is not likely to be moved by maneuvers which appear designed to extract military commitments. ''14

Despite American antipact activity, Jiang, Quirino, and Rhee would not go away. Chinese Nationalist officials informed American diplomats that, as the Executive Yuan (one of five branches of government under the Republic of ChinaJGuomindang system) reported, "the proposed union of Far Eastern countries [was] consonant with the needs of both the current general situation in the Far East and the particular conditions prevailing in China." Quirino continued to urge the pact on Lockett while Romulo sought to alter its purpose from anticommunist and military to noncommunist and economic in order to overcome U.S. objections. Rhee made the most dramatic move. He invited Jiang to visit Korea " in the near future." He told a press conference on July 26 that Secretary Acheson did "not oppose a Pacific pact" despite Acheson's many statements to the contrary. 15

On August 7, Jiang met Rhee for several days of discussions at Chinhae Bay, on Korea's southeast coast not far from Pusan. They easily agreed that communist was the major evil facing them (rather than the inflation, corruption, and abuse of power their respective regimes caused). They called on Quirino to "summon a conference for the formation of an Asian union to combat communism." Publicly they stood united in their desire for a Pacific pact. 16

At the same time, Quirino traveled to Washington for talks with the U.S. government. In extending the invitation, the State Department had set two prior conditions. Given the difficulty in convincing the Congress to fund economic and military assistance for Western Europe, Quirino [could] not expect any new material aid." The department also wanted no discussion on the proposed Pacific Union. Subjected to conflicting pressures from Jiang and Rhee on one side and the U.S. government and Romulo on the other, Quirino ac- quiesced. He wanted the opportunity to defend the pact proposal; he accepted the restrictions. 1~

Quirino pleaded his case before a joint session of Congress. The New York Times front-page headline was, "Quirino Warns Congress of the Need for a Pacific Union." He told a joint session that, with or without American par- ticipation, a Pacific union was necessary. 18

Nevertheless, the Philippine president received no encouragement or support from the Congress or President Truman. In part, the reason was that the State Department had arranged for a brief visit, a mere appearance. And the

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briefing papers for the president urged him to give no sympathy to the idea of a Pacific union. The papers described Quirino as "moved by his vanity and the picture of himself as a leader of a bloc of Asiatic states." They also suggested that the Philippine leader was ignorant of Jiang's ulterior purposes. Although there are no official minutes of the meetings between Quirino and Truman, the postmeeting communiqu6 made no mention of a Pacific pact.19

The Jiang-Rhee talks and Quirino's visit to the United States marked the high tide of Pacific pact activity in 1949. For the next several weeks, the pact idea would provoke a great deal of comment--both favorable and unfavora- ble. Meanwhile, placed in a distinctly uncomfortable position, the U.S. government maintained public silence.

To be sure, the pact had additional proponents. The New York Times editorialized, "Jiang and Rhee have moved away from the field of specula- t i on . . , to lay the framework for an anticommunist Pacific alliance. It is in the right direction." The Thai government earlier had expressed approval. In mid-June, the U.S. ambassador in Thailand, Edwin F. Stanton, had reported Thai opinion: " I f the Western powers are both unwilling and unable to assist in resisting Soviet pressure. . . [then] grouping together of the nations of Southeast Asia in a common and solid front against communism would be a most desirable development." Now, the Thai ambassador, H.R.H. Prince Wan Waithayakon, informed the State Department that Thailand had accepted an invitation to participate in the forthcoming conference. Given poor relations with neighboring lands, Thai leaders wanted a big-power benefactor. Japanese officials, while believing that "no pact is likely to be successful that does not take in account Japan as a potential Pacific power," noted that " a Pacific Pact like NATO might be the best guarantee obtainable of continued Japanese sovereignty." Nancy Tucker and Michael Schaller have written articles explaining that, in return for inclusion in the U.S. defense perimeter, Japan received U.S. government help in creating a trade zone--a Greater East Asia coprosperity sphere?--in South Asia. Perhaps Japanese officials believed a defense pact along the lines of NATO would smooth the way for peaceful economic penetration underwritten by U.S. military assistance. Lastly, Australia and New Zealand expressed interest in the pact along with statements acknowledging their respective "dollar" problems. Along with such Commonwealth nations as Great Britain and Canada, the two countries had severe trade deficits with the United States. World War II had helped to finish the realignment of the international economy--a process begun with World War I. The Bretton Woods Monetary Agreement of 1944 substituted the dollar for the British pound as the international benchmark currency. Various World War II lendlease agreements had caused capital to flow from the commonwealth to the United States. Not unnaturally, as Great Britain steadily retreated from the obligations of empire during the late 1940s, Au- stralia and New Zealand looked to the United States, hoping it would help guarantee their securities while U.S. assistance to a Pacific union (as with the


Marshall Plan and Europe) would ease their currency, trade and economic difficulties. 2~

Opponents outnumbered supporters of the pact. The Christian Science Monitor continued to oppose the pact idea while the United Press noted, "Surely no more resounding fiasco has been recorded in diplomatic history." The Soviet Union publicly condemned the idea (although privately the Krem- lin must have welcomed the opportunity to tie the United States to discredited Asian dictators). A Pravda headline, "Forging an Aggressive Pacific Pact," led off a story that concluded, "The projected pact must be supplemented to the aggressive North Atlantic pact and directed against liberation movements in Asian countries." The U.S. Embassy in Moscow had reported that the So- viet press had alleged "gleefully"--according to the embassy report--that MacArthur's staff in Japan had helped "the Jiang-Quirino project." The alle- gation was unfounded, untrue, and damaging. Current Digest of the Soviet Press abstracts and translates 10 articles from Soviet newspapers during this period about the Pacific pact. Typical of the group is G. Petrov's "The Pacific Pact of the Warmongers," from the August 31, 1949, Literaturnaya Gazeta. The article begins with a condemnation of the "Atlantic P a c t " - - N A T O - - then claims that "Australian Prime Minister Chifley, with Bevin's blessing, sounded the call for the creation of an adventurous bloc composed of nations in the Pacific basin," and describes pact supporters like Quirino--"this small but well-paid man"- -and "his bankrupt colleagues--Jiang Kai-shek, Syngman Rhee, Bao Dai--the 'King of dives,' and similar poli-scum." The article is fearful and somewhat desperate. Perhaps the Soviets perceived the Marshall Plan as aiding Germany and this pact as assisting Japan to rebuild. Chinese Communists, meanwhile, based their anti-American hostility, in part, on the proposed Pacific pact. Members of a moderate-left Chinese group, the Democratic League, informed the U.S. consul general in Beijing, O. Edmund Clubb, that "communist revival of anti-USA attitude due to Gen- eralissimo's trip to Philippines which USA could have prevented [emphasis added]." Despite the U.S. government's public opposition to the pact, Chi- nese Communist leaders believed the United States chose not to block Jiang's journey to meet Quirino. The counselor of the U.S. Embassy, J. Wesley Jones, reported to the State Department that Chinese Communist Party (CCP) hostility was "implacable" and based on three factors: (1) continued U.S. military aid to the Guomindang, (2) continued U.S. support of the Nationalist government's blockade of Communist Chinese ports, and (3) obvious U.S. backing for "the anticommunist Pacific pact growing out of Jiang-Quirino talks." Perhaps blinded by their ideology, Chinese Communist leaders perceived a concerted U.S. policy where probably none existed and found Jiang's, Quirino's, and Rhee's continued Pacific pact machinations as part of a U.S. anti-CCP plot. The Soviets and Chinese Communists seemingly were incapable of viewing Jiang, Quirino, and Rhee as independent actors on the Asian diplomatic scene. Rather, they were seen as leaders of U.S. client states

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and, hence, American "puppets," who must have followed the orders of the U.S. government. 21

Asian lands had little enthusiasm for the pact. The Indian government, al- ready on record against the pact idea, commented that Mao Zedong had "tre- mendous prestige among the people of As ia . . . because of the success in establishing a new order and in defying the West. Thus any responsible government in South As ia . . . [had to] be very careful not to assume openly hos- tile attitude towards the new Chinese Government." Publicly, the Indian government called the idea"ill-t imed." The French government assured the U.S. ambassador, David K.E. Bruce, that it warned Vietnamese Emperor (and French creation) Bao Dai against associating his government with Nationalist China and the Pacific union. Great Britain's colony, Hong Kong, had little enthusiasm for the pact, because, as the crown colony's government noted, "regardless of the outcome of the Chinese civil war, Hong Kong is a part of China and must trade and have official relations with that country." Officials believed that Jiang was using Quirino's sincere desire for a regional security pact to obtain international diplomatic support for his position on Formosa. 22

As the debate over the pact idea reached its peak, Jiang managed to destroy the enthusiasm of his two other partners; consequently the pact threat faded away. The Chinese Nationalist leader philosophically was far more traditional than modern. He believed that despite the devastation of more than 100 years of endemic warfare and ineffective government China remained the "Middle Kingdom." He reviewed the countries along China's vast periphery more as "tributary" states than as independent and equal nations. During the early August meeting with Rhee at Chinhae Bay, Jiang angered and disappointed the Korean leader by treating the former Hermit Kingdom as a vassal land. Whereas the Korean delegation expected general discussions about a Pacific pact, the Chinese delegation arrived demanding not only air base facilities on Cheju Island to house three fighter-bomber groups to attack the Chinese mainland but also naval rights to help continue the blockade of Chinese Communist-held ports. Rhee was a fervent, though extremely conservative, Korean nationalist. Although his idea about resurrecting a Confucian society along the lines of the classic Yi dynasty were hopelessly out-of-date, he certainly had no intention of sacrificing (South) Korea's hard-won independence to kowtow to Jiang. Rhee recognized that providing Chinese Nationalist forces with Korean facilities was "tantamount to involving Korea directly in the Chinese Civil War." Thus, Rhee turned away from the pact and Jiang and looked to the Truman administration's Korean Assistance Act of 1949, which, in the summer of 1949, appeared to have good prospects of passage in the Congress. 23

Jiang's machinations and Romulo's insistent advice helped turn Philippine President Quirino against the idea of an anticommunist Pacific pact. During the Jiang-Quirino talks in July at Baguio, the Chinese leader had sounded out the Philippine government on two matters. In case he had to flee the mainland


(an increasing certainty by summer), Jaing wanted permission to move his government's gold to the Philippines for safekeeping; he also wanted to establish a government-in-exile should communist forces attack and conquer his final stronghold on Formosa. Quirino belatedly recognized that such assistance to Jiang would set the Philippine republic squarely against the Chinese Communists; it would be madness. Quirino also was disappointed by reports that the Chinese (according to a talk by Jiang's son) regarded the pact as a means to secure American assistance via the Philippines and Korea. General Romulo sought to find a middle ground between Quirino's original idea of a Pacific pact and staunch U.S. government opposition. His solution was to organize a pact of noncommunist rather than anticommunist nations for economic and cultural cooperation rather than military defense. American officials had expressed support for such an idea. Now that Quirino's ardor had cooled somewhat, Romulo raised his plan with his leader. Within a few weeks, Quirino converted. Jiang lost his other major supporter, z4

By early fall, with the desertion of Rhee and Quirino, the Pacific pact as originally proposed was dead. Rhee and Quirino looked for direct U.S. assistance. Jiang was preoccupied with the defense of Formosa, for communist forces were spreading throughout South China and threatening his final mainland defensive position around Guandung (Canton). Deputy Under- secretary of State Dean Rusk prepared a draft announcement supporting Romulo's plan for a pact centered on cultural and economic ties. India continued to refuse to accept a proposal by other Asian nations for a cooperative agreement, yet it could not or would not make a proposal of its own. By De- cember 1949, the time of the ratification of NSC 48/2, which established U.S. policy towards Asia, the Pacific pact was a bad memory, z5

What was the impact of Quirino's (Rhee's and Jiang's) call for a Pacific/ Asian version of NATO? It worried American diplomats seeking to reorient the nation's foreign policy toward Asia. Most important, they wanted to dis- engage from Jiang's debacle on the mainland and limit the commitment to Korea to economic assistance. If the Pacific pact became a reality, political pressure at home might force the administration to embrace the three Asian leaders. The pact might encourage Jiang or Rhee into military ventures that could bring about an unwanted American involvement. It also would divert attention from pressing domestic problems that had helped bring about Jiang' s downfall and that threatened Rhee and Quirino. Somewhat belatedly, the U.S. government was seeking to reach an accommodation with Asian nationalism in China, in Indochina, and Indonesia through evolutionary means. The Pacific pact would have prevented a clean break with old, discredited policy, it would have provided the Soviet Union with a propaganda device to appeal to newly independent Asian states to look up to the U.S.S.R. and not the U.S.A.

Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders apparently watched the pact pro- ceedings suspiciously. In duplicating NATO, the pact sought to contain com-

DOBBS 39

munism, but what did that mean? Mao and his fellow guerrillas probably wondered if the pact indicated a return of imperialism to the Asian mainland. It did not seem likely that Rhee and Jiang would have called for a pact without American approval, since communist doctrine considered them American "creations." Perhaps it signaled a change in the American policy of disengagement from China. And communist authorities stated their perception that the Pacific pact was as much a part of hated U.S. policy as continued military aid to the Guomindang. If Professor Tucker is correct, then the pact would have disappointed Mao greatly since, in discreet ways, he had signaled his desire for a Sino-American accommodation. Certainly the pact must have con- fused Chinese Communist leaders. The Soviets seemingly worried most, sus- pecting that the United States was preparing to use the pact nations in an attack on the U.S.S.R. Obviously, in Soviet eyes, Jiang, Rhee, and Quirino were American puppets. If the government in Washington did not approve of their actions, it would not have permitted them to call for a Pacific pact. As evidenced in public pronouncements, Soviet officials viewed such items as the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany, the rebuilding of Japan, the formation of NATO, and the call for a Pacific pact as part of a grand Ameri- can master plan to threaten their homeland. As it was, the pact controversy may have caused the Soviets to look favorably upon an invasion of South Korea to ensure an end to the threat (as suggested by George F. Kennan in the first volume of his memoirs).

Nonaligned Asian countries also worried about the implications of the Pacific pact. As Indian government officials repeated, it was unwise for any Asian leader to stand against Mao's victorious forces since many Asians perceived the communist conquest of China as a victory over Western imperialism. Many important Japanese questioned a policy of outright opposition to the new rulers of the mainland. Nationalist forces in Indochina and In- donesia, for example, must have doubted the "good offices" of the United States as they sought to wrest independence from the colonial powers. Had the Pacific pact become a reality, it would have had disastrous effects on Ameri- can foreign policy.

Despite the Pacific pact's (at least momentary) importance, in the years since, both participants and later scholars largely have ignored the issue in their writings. Thus, the second volume of President Truman's memoirs, Years of Trial and Hope, (Garden City, N.Y., 1956) and Dean Acheson's Present at the Creation (New York, 1969) are silent about the pact and the surrounding controversy. John M. Allison, of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs, in Ambassador from the Prairie, or Allison Wonderland (Boston, 1973) also is silent on the pact. And biographies add little. For example, Lewis McCarroll Purifoy's Harry Truman's China Policy (New York, 1976) and David S. McLellan's Dean Acheson: The State Department Years (New York, 1976) make no mention of the pact.

Older works published before the opening of document collections (and


publications of relevant volumes of the Foreign Relations series) overlook the pact and its importance. For example, in International Politics in East Asia Since World War H (New York, 1975), Donald F. Lach and Edmund S. Wehrle make no mention of the pact. Similarly, Cho Soon-sung in Korea in World Politics, 1940-1950 (Berkeley, 1967) overlooks Rhee's role in the Pacific pact, and Tsou Tang in America's Failure in China, 1941-1950 (Chicago, 1963) devotes several sentences in dismissing the pact.

Despite more than 100 pages in Foreign Relations, 1949, volume 7, part 2 (representing possibly hundreds of pages of documents in RG 59 of the State Department at the National Archives), frequent front-page stories in major American newspapers, and the many Soviet newspaper and magazine articles denouncing and decrying the pact and the United States, the pact has not received any more attention from recent scholars. General works on U.S.-East Asian relations in this period continue to overlook the pact. For example, Lisle A. Rose, Roots of Tragedy (Westport, Conn. 1976) studies American foreign policy and Asian nationalism from 1945 to 1954 yet writes nothing about the pact. Russell D. Buhite, Soviet-American Relations in Asia, 1945- 1954 (Norman, Okla., 1981) and Akira Iriye, The Cold War in Asia (En- glewood Cliffs, N.J., 1974) apparently believe the pact had no (potential) impact on Soviet-American relations in 1949. In The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New York and Tokyo, 1978), editors Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye bring together American and Japanese scholars to consider the problem. Not one of the contributors finds the pact worthy of attention. Bruce Cumings, editor, Child of Conflict (Seattle, 1983) again ignores the pact. In their highly regarded Uncertain Years: Chinese-American Relations, 1947-1950 (New York, 1980), editors Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs present articles by some of the finest scholars in Sino-American relations. None of them consid- ers the pact. Lastly, in his work--the author assumes that parallel discussion necessarily implies parallel development--The Road to Confrontation (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1981), William W. Stueck, Jr., seeks to provide an account of American policy toward China and Korea. Yet, as with such other matters affecting both areas as the assistance acts of 1949-50 and the electric- ity crisis of 1948, Stueck relegates the pact to one sentence.

It is difficult to understand why the Pacific pact, which received so much attention in 1949, now receives so little scrutiny. The pact admittedly faded away. Nonetheless, if only as an example of "the diplomacy of failure," it deserves study. And, certainly, it reflects the perceptions of, and the issues and problems for, U.S. foreign policy towards Asia in 1949.

NOTES

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1983 Northern Great Plains History Con- ference, September 30-October 2, 1983, at Grand Forks, North Dakota.

1. I wish to thank several Australian scholars for sharing the fruits of their research with me and for explaining Australia's paramount concern with a multilateral security pact including the

DOBBS 41

United States. They are Dr. John McCarthy, president, Association for the History of Au- stralian Defence and Foreign Policy, Royal Military College, The University of New South Wales, letter of November 14, 1983; Dr. P.G. Edwards, official historian, Australian War Memorial, P.O. Box 345, Canberra City, letter of November 17, 1983; and Dr. Eric Adams, Department of History, The University of New Castle, New South Wales, letter of November 25, 1983. The Australian government had raised the idea of a Pacific pact during defense talks with the British and New Zealand governments. The Australians had suggested "a Pacific defense act similar to the North Atlantic Alliance." It must have worried the British government; for several days thereafter the parliamentary undersecretary of the Foreign Office, Christopher Mayhew, had to deny any interest in a pact to questioning re- porters and opposition Leaders. See New York Times, March 15, 1949, p. 22; March 22, 1949, p. 19; and March 24, 1949, p. 17. Yet Winston Churchill endorsed the concept in a speech !n New York on March 25, 1949 (see Alan Bullock, ErnestBevin: Foreign Secretary, 1945-1951, [New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1983], p. 745).

2. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, vol. 7, The Far East, Au- stralasia, p. 2 [hereafterFRUS, 1949, 7, pt. 2] (Washington, 1976), pp. 1123-24. Record Group 59, National Archives & Records Service 890.23/3-2149 (hereafter just the decimal number), Lockett to Secretary of State. There is a need for a recent (based upon documentary sources) scholarly monograph of U.S.-Philippine relations during this period.

3. FRUS, 1949, 7, pt. 2, pp. 1125-28; 840.20/3-2249, Lockett to Secretary of State; 890.20/3- 2449, Lockett to Secretary of State.

4. Policy Planning Saff Files, PPS #51;FRUS, 1949, 7, pt. 2, pp. 1128-1133; there is no record of Acheson's response to PPS #51.

5. For several recent accounts of interwar American policy towards Korea at this time, see Bruce Cumings, ed., Child of Conflict, The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1953 (Seattle, 1983); Charles M. Dobbs, The Unwanted Symbol. American Foreign Policy, the Cold War, and Korea: 1945-1950 (Kent, Ohio, 1981); and William W. Stueck, Jr., The Road to Confrontation (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1981).

6. 890.20/4-849, Memorandum of Conversation by Director of the Office of Far Eastern Af- fairs, W. Walton Butterworth; FRUS, 1949, 7, pt. 2, pp. 1141-42; New York Times, May 18, 1949, p. 1 l; 740.00119 Control (Kerea)/5-1614, Telegram, Ambassador in Korea, Muccio, to Secretary of State.

7. New York Times, April 18, 1949, p. 11 ;FRUS, ~949, 7, pt. 2, pp. 1142-43;New York Times, May 16, 1949, p. 6; May 12, 1949, p. 7.

8. New York Times, May 12, 1949, p. 17;FRUS, 1949, 7, pt. 2, pp. 1139-40; Bullock, ibid., pp. 744-45.

9. Department of State Bulletin, May 29, 1949, p. 690; New York Times, May 19, 1949, pp. 1,10; Nancy Bemkopf Tucker, Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy, 1949-1950 (New York, 1983), passim.

10. New York Times, May 24, 1949, p. 4: Romulo said that "the United States and other Western powers were making a mistake in trying to secure the Atlantic while ignoring the security of the Far East." New York Times, May 21, 1949, p. 3: Rhee told his weekly press conference that he disagreed "sharply with Secretary Acheson's opinion that discussions leading to a Pacific pact were untimely." New York Times, July 5, 1949, p. 3; July 6, 1949, pp. l, 4.

11. 793.96/7-849, Telegram, Lockett to Secretary of State;New York Times, July 10, 1949, p. l; July 11, 1949, p. 8; July 12, 1949, p. 3;FRUS, 1949, 7, pt. 2, pp. 1154-55.

12. 890.20/7-1549, Muccio to Secretary of State; New York Times, July 12, 1949, 1949, p. 3; FRUS, 1949, 7, pt. 2, pp. 1152-53;New York Times, July 13, 1949, p. 26 (editorial); July 17, 1949, p. 10E (editorial); FRUS, 1949, 7, pt. 2, pp. 1165-66, 1156-57. For the problem of the Dutch East Indies/Indonesia and U.S, diplomacy, see Robert J. McMahon, Colonialism & Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1945-1949 (Ithaca, N.Y. 1981).

13. FRUS, 1949, 7, pt. 2, pp. l148;New York Times, July 28, 1949, pp. l, 4. 14. FRUS, 1949, 7, pt. 2, pp. 1170-71, 1177-78; 890,20/7-2049, Circular Telegram, Secretary

of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices; 890.20/7-2949, Telegram, Secretary of State to Embassy in Korea; Memorandum of Conversation, July 19, 1949, Visit of President Quirino to the U.S., President's Official File, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.


15. FRUS, 1949, pt. 2, pp. 1166-67, l l71;New York Times, July 26, 1949, p. 16; 890.20/% 2949, Secretary of State to Embassy in Korea.

16. New York Times, August 8, 1949, 1949, p. I;FRUS, 1949, 7, pt. 2, pp. 1184-85; 890.20/8- 849, Telegram, Ambassador in Korea to Secretary of State; 890.20/8-1249, Telegram, Am- bassador in Korea to Secretary of State.

17. New York Times, August 9, 1949, p. I; "Memorandum for the President, Subject: Visit of President Quirino," President's Official File, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Harry S. Truman (hereafter HST) Library, Independence, Mo.

18. New York Times, August 10, 1949, p. 1. 19. "Memorandum for the President, Subject: Visit of President Quirino," HST Library, ibid. It

is obvious that the U.S. government thought little of Quirino's visit by the paucity of material anticipating his arrival and covering his visit.

20. New York Times, August 9, 1949, p. 24 (editorial); FRUS, 1949, 7, pt. 1, pp. 50, 51,53, and pt. 2, l188-89; New York Times, August 17, 1949, p. IO;FRUS, 1949, 7, pt. 2, 1187-88; New York Times, August 10, 1949, p. 5.

21. New York Times, August 10, 1949, p. 3;FRUS, 1949, 7, pt. 2, pp. 1172-73; G. Petrov, "The Pacific Pact of the Warmongers," Literaturnaya gazeta, August 31, 1949, as quoted in So- viet Press Translations, vol. 4, no. 20, November 15, 1949, pp. 621-22; see alsoNew Times, March 30, 1949, p. 17, and May 25, 1949, p. 15; see also Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 1: 19, 33; 1: 20, 22; 1, 29, 29; !: 31,28; 1: 33, 31; 1: 35, 19; 1: 49, 18. Surely there are many more articles not available in English-language translation. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 8: Far East, China (Washington, 1978), pp. 444, 487; Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 9: Far East, China (Wash- ington, 1979), p. 70.

22. FRUS, 1949, 7, pt. 1, p. 69;Newyork Times, August 21, 1949, p. 20; August 10. 1949, p. 5. 23. FRUS, 1949, 7, pt. 2, pp. 1185; 501.BB Korea/802749, Muccio to Secretary of State;

895.001 RHEE/8-1249, Muccio to Department of State; Tsou Tang, America's Failure in China, 1941-1950 (Chicago, 1963), p. 507; FRUS, 1949, 7, pt. 2, p. 1081. For an account of the fate of the Korean Assistance Act of 1949, its successor, the Far Eastern Economic As- sistance Act of 1950, and the effect on American policy towards Korea and China, see Charles M. Dobbs, "No Room to Move: The Korean Assistance Act of 1949," Paper deli- vered at the 1982 Organization of American Historians Convention, Philadelphia, Pa.

24. New York Times, August 28, 1949, p. 7; FR US, 1 949, 7, pt. 2, pp. l 186, 1186- 87, I 189-90, 1191-92, 1192-93.

25. The pact would return, however, during the Eisenhower administration and Dulles' "pac- tomania" as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and, as Secretary Acbeson feared in 1949, help freeze Sino-American relations for two decades.

26. As Mr. Gibson Smith, archivist, Modem Military Headquarters Branch, National Archives & Records Service, has suggested, the Joint Chiefs of Staff either did not support or did not know much about a Pacific pact because records, accounts, planning, etc., went on a country-by-country basis. See The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. 2, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1947-1949, by Kenneth W. Condit, Historical Division, Joint Secret~at, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Modern Military HQ Branch, NARS.

the pact that never was: the pacific pact of 1949

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