THE NEUTRON WARHEAD:STORMY PAST~ UNCERTAIN FUTURE

by

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ALEX A. VARDAMIS, US ARMY

T he neutron warhead exploded in aheadline on page one of TheWashington Post .on 6 June 1977:"Neutron Killer Warhead Buried in

ERDA Budget." The most controversialweapons system since the hydrogen bomb wasthus introduced to an unwitting public, press,Congress, and President. I The reader learnedthat the United States was about to beginproduction "of its first nuclear battlefieldweapon specifically designed to kill peoplethrough the release of neutrons." The themethat the "neutron killer warhead" is "anti­people," that it is more "inhumane" thanother nuclear weapons, was repeated innumerous press releases in the summer of1977. In an editorial in the Post on 8 June, itwas described as a "precise killer" whichcould be construed as a "grisly" chemicaland biological weapon, and "just about thelast thing anyone should want for theAmerican arsenaL'" An editorial in TheChristian Science Monitor on IS Julyincluded the comment that "There is noquestion the neutron bomb, which is designedto wreak more destruction on people thanproperty, is morally abhorrent.'"

What made the neutron warhead appeareven more insidious was the allegedemployment of secrecy to slip it past anunwary President and Congress. On 21 June,an article in the Post headlined "SenatePressed for Killer Warhead" stated that"Neither President Carter nor DefenseSecretary Harold Brown knew that money forits production was in the fiscal 1978 budgetthey had reviewed until news reportsappeared two weeks ago.'" On 24 June, Postreaders learned that "The Pentagon isproceeding in great secrecy to produce

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neutron 'killer' shells for its nuclear artilleryforces in Europe.'" On 25 June, the Postheadlined an article: "Pentagon WantedSecrecy on Neutron Bomb Production.'" In afollow-up article on I July, the Post,following a lead from the Pentagon, nowreferred to the warhead as an "enhancedradiation weapon" and quoted freely from anArmy publication to graphically describe howradiation kills. 7

Congress was divided on the issue. On IJuly, Senator John Stennis told reporters thatthe neutron warhead was "the best news Ihave heard in years." But Senator JohnHeinz found the weapon "even morerepugnant than usual ... literallydehumanizing." Senator Mark Hatfield, whowas to lead Senate opponents of the warhead,declared that "Everything up to this point hasbeen more by discovery than by information.We discovered that it was in the budget. Wediscovered that no President had everapproved it. This whole thing has stumbledinto our life." He concluded that "Myultimate hope is that this weapon never entersthe arsenal.'"

In a press conference on 6 July,Presidential Press Secretary Jody Powelldefended development of the new weaponand denied the suggestion that it might havean adverse effect on SALT negotiations.When asked if a neutron warhead could bemounted on a strategic missile, he testilyreplied: "If you wanted to put a peanut on atrailer. "9

In an extraordinary closed-door session,Congress voted 43 to 42 to permit thePresident to decide whether to go ahead withproduction. Despite this congressional actionand executive support, the controversy still

Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College

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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Neutron Warhead: Stormy Past, Uncertain Future

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flared. On 7 July, a group of demonstrators,after an overnight vigil, flung vials of bloodagainst Pentagon entranceway pillars toprotest the new weapon. On 8 July, The NewYork Times described the weapon as "avirtual death ray." 10 Finally, during a newsconference on 12 July, the President statedthat he felt the neutron bomb should be "oneof our options," but he "allowed that any useof this type of weapon could lead toworldwide holocaust." II On that very sameday, General Alexander Haig, SupremeAllied Commander, Europe, told reportersthat the neutron warhead was "needed tomodernize NATO's tactical nuclear weaponsin Europe."12

By and large, members of the press andperhaps a significant portion of ourpopulace remain unconvinced. In an

ironic, black-humor article appearing in TheNew York Times on 26 July, YorickBlumenfeld adopted the persona of a victimof one of "NATO's neutron nukes" who stillhas a few moments before his death toscribble out a farewell to the world:

1 realize that I have much to be grateful forto the Americans. My life may have beenterminated, but even the clothes on my backare intact. So are my compositions. Thehouse I have lived in, with all its books,paintings and photographs-my life's work,as it were-are untouched. What more can aman ask for from a war? ... Why shouldthe buildings and real estate suffer? Letpeople kill people-if necessary-but there isno reason we should take the planet withUS. 13

As perceived by some, the neutron bomb isthe ultimate weapon of capitalism: It killspeople but preserves property. But recallingPremier Khrushchev's bellicose threats toblow up the Parthenon, if necessary, in anuclear attack on culture, one realizes thatpossible future use of neutron weapons maynot be restricted to capitalist nations. Onewonders whether the civilized world wouldhave recoiled with such horror hadKhrushchev threatened to destroy Athenians

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but to leave Athens intact? In such an Alice­in-Wonderland world of logic, so runs theargument, the city is more valuable than itscitizens. Better that Parisians die than Parisbe destroyed; better New Yorkers than NewYork.

From such extremes has the controversyraged. Battlelines of emotion have beendrawn in the Congress, the press, andconsequently in the public mind. Those at thePentagon, in attempting to explain rationallythe military advantages of a neutron weapon,have often unintentionally fueled thesimmering debate. For example, consider theselection of the nomenclature. The"enhanced radiation weapon" could havebeen as easily-and as truthfully-labelled a"reduced blast" warhead. But it wasn't. Orconsider the hasty explanations that theneutron bomb "would not be fired alone, butas a part of a package of perhaps 30-50nuclear shells and warheads, possiblyincluding some of the enhanced radiationvariety.'''' Such a scenario can hardly becalled reassuring.

Partly because of the anger and emotionthat has surrounded this issue, someimportant questions have not been addressed.Will introduction of neutron warheads intoour nuclear inventory in NATO increase thechances of escalating a conventional war intoa nuclear war? Will they increase NATO'sdeterrence against a Warsaw Pact attack?Are the warheads militarily effective? Howwill their deployment affect our NATOallies? How are the Soviets apt to react to thisnew development? Such questions areadmittedly more prosaic than discussions of"death rays" and "killer warheads," butthey should be addressed before we go aheadwith production, and particularly before theweapons are deployed in Europe. The futureof the neutron weapon is, at the time of thiswriting, by no means secure. Since itrepresents an innovative technicaldevelopment in tactical nuclear weapons, itposes some real and immediate issues dealingwith our concept of limited nuclear war andour deterrence in Europe; it deserves a sober,careful consideration, not only as a weaponof war, but also as an instrument of foreignpolicy.

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BY DEFINITION

What is the neutron bomb? It might beeasier to state what it is not. First of all, it isnot technically a bomb, but a missilewarhead. The weapon is not a new concept;the neutron principle has been around sincethe first atomic bomb. The neutron warheadis not a chemical-biological weapon. Tocompare it with poison gas, as someopponents of the neutron bomb have done, isto confuse the basic distinction betweennuclear weapons and chemical-biologicalweapons. The neutron warhead releases asingle, lethal flash of radiation which leavesvirtually no residual contaminatingradioactivity. Finally, the weapon is notstrategic. It is currently designed to be usedon the tactical battlefield against enemytroops, not against enemy population centers,fixed installations, airfields, and the like.

Simply stated, the neutron principleswitches a greater portion of the energy of anuclear explosion away from blast, heat, andradioactive fallout towards instant, high­energy radiation. Unlike the current crop oflow-yield fission weapons, the neutronwarhead derives its effects primarily fromnuclear fusion. As explained in a recent issueof The Bulletin oj the Atomic Scientists:

Fission warheads release only about 5percent of their total yield ... in the formof prompt nuclear radiation, while[enhanced radiation] warheads release about80 percent of their yield in the form of veryhigh doses of neutrons and gammaradiation. These new warheads are alsodifferent because of the low proportion ofenergy released in the form of blast andthermal radiation.... IS

From the military point of view, theneutron warhead is perceived as particularlyuseful against a Warsaw Pact armor threatagainst NATO, for it kills tank crews withgreater precision than can the current fissionweapons. A small neutron warhead involves ablast and fireball effect for only a relativelyshort range, while releasing a stream ofneutrons which can penetrate live cells over a

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much greater area. If a current nuclearweapon were used to achieve the sameradiation effect, its blast and heat effectswould kill people and destroy buildings farbeyond the range of the killing neutrons.

A term frequently used to describe the sideeffects of a nuclear explosion is collateraldamage. Undesirable collateral damage is,obviously, the destruction of civilians orfriendlY troops in the proximity of a nuclearblast. Target analysts, in accordance withUnited States policy, attempt to restrictundesirable collateral damage. But, in orderto destroy a target with a fission weapon, thedestructive radius would sometimes includefriendlY people and property. The neutronwarhead improves targeting options andwould greatly reduce the problem ofcollateral damage. It could be used effectivelyon advancing Soviet tank columns withoutharming nearby cities and towns.Comparatively speaking, the neutronwarhead is more efficient. Coupled with theLance missile, for which one version of theweapon has been designed, the neutronwarhead can be detonated with lower yieldsthan the standard fission version over anadvancing tank column. An added advantageis that because the level of radioactivecontamination is low, the target can bereoccupied very rapidly.

Lieutenant Colonel Alex A. Vardamis, a native ofBangor. Maine, graduated from the US MilitaryAcademy in 1957. Since then, he has held a variety ofcommand and staff positions, including the commandof an artillery warhead support group in Europe;exchange officer with the German Army; liaison withthe British Army of the Rhine; Assistant Professor ofEnglish at the US Military Academy; and Professor ofMilitary Science at the University of Vermont. Agraduate of the US Army Command and General StaffCollege, Lieutenant Colonel Vardamis holds a master'sdegree and a Ph.D. in Englishand Comparative Literaturefrom Columbia University. Heis participating this year in theUS Army War College'sResearch Associate Programand holds an appointment asResearch Fellow in HarvardUniversity's Program forScience and InternationalRelations.

Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College

The current inventory of tactical nuclearweapons in Europe could cause considerablecollateral damage; so much so, argue some,that it makes them almost unusable. TheUnited States Army, which has alreadyreplaced the aging Honest John imd Sergeantmissiles with Lance, sees the advantages ofthe neutron warhead as greater flexibility,improved accuracy, smaller yields, and lesscollateral damage. It is considered to be aplausible, practical, and usable weapon onthe European battlefield. But characterizingthe neutron warhead as usable causesopponents of the weapon to tremble.

PRO AND CON

Proponents of the neutron warhead, whotend to be believers in the possibility oftactical nuclear war, argue that because thewarhead is more precise, "cleaner," and lessdestructive as an explosive-because it issmaller and more controllable-it is moreusable than a fission weapon. In the face of aWarsaw Pact armor thrust into NATO, it ismore apt to be given a green light from theNational Command Authority than wouldimprecise, "dirty" tactical nuclear weapons.Furthermore, argue proponents of theneutron warhead, it is more humane. Currentnuclear weapons kill primarily from blast,heat, and collapsing buildings; the neutronwarhead accomplishes its killing through highdoses of radiation. Therefore, proponentsargue, it is more humane because it wouldcause fewer civilian deaths; because thecasualties, mostly enemy soldiers, would beselected with "surgical" precision; becausethe destruction would be confined to thatnecessary to thwart the enemy advance; andbecause the collateral damage to populationcenters adjacent to the battlefield would beheld to a minimum.

Opponents of the weapon argue, quite tothe contrary, that it is an inhumane weaponwhich, because it is usable, is to beparticularly dreaded. They conceive that aslow, painful death by radiation is hardlymore humane than an instant death by blastor heat. An enemy soldier's death by neutronradiation would depend on the radiation dose

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he were to receive, which would varydepending on his particular proximity toground zero. On one extreme, he wouldbecome almost immediately incapacitatedand remain so until his certain death in one ortwo days. However, if he were on the outerperiphery of the radiation kill radius, hemight become functionally impaired withintwo hours of exposure and not die for severalweeks." In any event, the victim's terminal"illness" would be painful and slow. Yetdeliberations on the preferability of onemanner of dying over another, reminiscent ofFrost's poem, "Fire and Ice," are for mostmilitary planners quite pointless. They replythat we should not ignore the ultimatepurpose of weapons of war.

Critics of the neutron warhead also fearthat erroneous perceptions of the weapon's"humanity" will drag us into a nuclear war,because it gives rise to the plausibility of acontrollable, tactical nuclear war. SenatorHatfield outlined this argument to reporters:

There is a feeling that this is a more humaneweapon because it is more precise in itstarget. Because it is more precise, however,there is more temptation to use it ... andonce we introduce nuclear weaponry intoconventional warfare, we're on our way. l'

The corollary to this argument is that thecurrent fission weapons cause a high level ofcollateral damage and are thus unlikely to beused; consequently, they act as an inhibitor tolimited nuclear war. Whereas the neutronwarhead blurs the distinction betweenconventional and nuclear warfare, ourcurrent nuclear inventory clearly does not.Therefore, say critics, the neutron warheadlowers the nuclear threshold.

To counter this fear, proponents of theneutron warhead point out that the Presidentof the United States retains final authority torelease US nuclear weapons, including allneutron warheads. His decision to resort tothe use of any nuclear weapon, anywhere inthe world, would be of such immenseconsequence that whether the first US nuclearweapon fired in anger is a neutron warheadwould be a very minor perturbation, in

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relation to the overshadowing decision to gonuclear. As long as our chief executive clearlyunderstands that neutron warheads do notblur the distinction between conventional andnuclear warfare-that the neutron warheadis, indeed, a full-fledged nuclear weapon­the nuclear threshold is not lowered.

On the other hand, if neutron warheads areavailable, the President might, in adeteriorating military situation in Europe, bemore vigorously urged by NATO politicaland military leaders to go nuclear. One of theattractive features of neutron warheads is,supposedly, that they are more usable.Clearly, though, President Carter fullyunderstands the implications of the neutronwarhead and would only resort to the use ofnuclear weapons-of any variety-in thegravest of circumstances. As he stated in anews conference on 11 July: "The ownershipof atomic weapons and their potential use issuch a horrifying prospect ... that it is adeterrent to a major confrontation betweennations who possess atomic weapons."18 Butwhat of a future President, perhaps lessconcerned with the distinction between largeconventional weapons and small neutronwarheads? Tempting, it would certainly be,to use a "clean," humane neutron weapon onan enemy force attempting to occupy friendlyterritory-particularly with the assurancethat collateral damage would be nil. To gainperspective, it is interesting to speculatewhether there might have been a role forneutron warheads in Vietnam. The battle ofKhe Sanh, for example, where tacticalnuclear weapons were an option, comes tomind. At any rate, some argue that over thelong term the introduction of neutronwarheads into our nuclear inventory willlower the nuclear threshold because,curiously, they are less objectionable, moreprecise, "cleaner," and cause less collateraldamage than do current fission weapons.

DETERRENCE AND MILITARYEFFECTIVENESS

Does the neutron warhead increaseNATO's deterrence against a Warsaw Pactattack? Proponents of the weapon say thatbecause it is perceived to be more usable it is a

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more credible deterrent. And, we remindourselves, it is more usable principallybecause it reduces collateral damage. Sovietmilitary doctrine, however, gives littleevidence of concern for collateral damage,particularly on West German soil. And,unlikely as the prospect of a Soviet militaryattack on NATO now appears, we can becertain that should it occur, it will be violentin execution. The sudden, overwhelmingannored blitzkrieg the Soviets envisionreveals little regard for restricting damage tothe immediate battlefield. Such a scrupulousconcern for a "clean," humane war istypically one-sided. However, since theNATO alliance is defensive in nature, anywar will necessarily take place on allied soil,where we are understandably more interestedin reducing collateral damage than are theSoviets. Perhaps we, too, would be lessconcerned, if the locus operandi wereWarsaw Pact territory. We must conclude,though, that proposals of reduced collateraldamage will do little to deter Warsaw Pactaggression.

On the other hand, that the neutronwarhead is more usable than fission weaponsand more effective against tank formationsmust give the Soviets pause. Not surprisingly,Soviet leadership has opposed ourdevelopment of a weapon that threatens theirpresent four-to-one superiority in tankdivisions; they perhaps recognize that we arelikely to use the neutron warhead on thetactical battlefield. If the Soviets truly fearthat the neutron warhead could play animportant role in stopping an attack, theycould either be deterred against aggression orthey could launch preemptive strikes againstour nuclear ammunition sites and thenproceed as planned. To the degree that theSoviets believe that the neutron warhead ismilitarily effective, usable, and survivable,they will be that much deterred. Not much,one suspects. But as unlikely, even insane, assuch an attack may appear, should theWarsaw Pact decide to carry it out, they willnot hesitate very much because we possess theneutron warhead. In their planning, it ismerely another nuclear weapon that will haveto be dealt with if and when the time comes.

How militarily effective is the neutron

Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College

warhead? Will it kill tank crews andpersonnel in armored personnel carriers as itis reputed to be able to do? Predictions of itseffectiveness must, necessarily, remain in therealm of conjecture, because we cannot besure what percentage of an advancing tankcolumn will be immediately incapacitated.Certainly with the greater precision the Lancemissile affords over the Honest John,coupled with the reduced blast and heateffects of the neutron warhead, we cananticipate that an armored attack can beengaged with precision, relativelyunrestricted by the concern over collateraldamage to friendly population centers. Weknow that a one-kiloton neutron warheaddelivers about 8000 rads to exposedindividuals within one-half mile of theexplosion, and that someone subjected tosuch a dose is incapacitated within minutesand dies in one or two days." The tankprovides next to nothing in the way ofprotection against neutron radiation. CurrentSoviet armor, although possessing somedefense against chemical, biological, andradiological effects, simply cannot handleprompt neutron radiation. To significantlyreduce the penetrating power of neutrons,protective layers of metal, concrete, andboron would have to be incorporated into thetank or armored personnel carrier, thusmaking it far too cumbersome to move.Under the current state of the art of radiationprotection, including all the materialscurrently known to man, very little can bedone to protect tank and armored personnelcarrier crews from prompt radiation.

On the other hand, the destructive force ofthe neutrons rapidly diminishes with distancefrom ground zero. Whereas tank crews nearthe center of the blast will be immediatelyincapacitated, those on the periphery, whileperhaps receiving a lethal dose, probably willbe physically able to continue the attack.

Herbert Scoville, formerly deputy directorof the CIA, is among those who question theweapon's military effectiveness. He pointsout that casualties "receiving even 10 times alethal neutron radiation dose would stillcontinue to fight effectively for about half anhour and only die a day or so later."

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Additionally, those "receiving just a lethaldose will continue to function for severalhours and would not die for weeks."" Acurious residue of terminally ill Warsaw Pactsoldiers would be instantly created by thedetonation of an enhanced radiationweapon-potential suicide squads, bereft ofhope, perhaps psychologically disoriented tothe point of ineffectiveness but, on the otherhand, probably bent on revenge. The neutronwarhead could spawn a new variety ofwalking-wounded, soon to die, but wellenough to fight. New technology hasenhanced the kill radius of the neutronwarhead over that of earlier versions;however, because it remains more benign asan explosive, it cannot completely destroy anenemy armored attack. The point is, it is notthe ultimate weapon and would, most likely,be employed in conjunction with fissionwarheads as part of an overall defensive planinvolving a cluster of nuclear weapons.

No one can possibly predict the course of alimited tactical nuclear war in Europe. If onebelieves in the concept of such a war, then theneutron warhead, mated to the Lance missile,could be an effective tool in helping to defendagainst a Warsaw Pact armored threat.However, questions of field deployment,command and control, security,transportation, and US custody should beaddressed. Before we can be certain that theneutron warhead will be militarily effective inNATO, we should carefully reexamine theentire US Army tactical nuclear supportstructure to insure we are not merely putting"new wine in old bottles."

THE VIEW FROM NATO

How will the introduction of the neutronwarhead into the US nuclear inventory inEurope affect our NATO allies? First of all,we should avoid treating NATO as a uniformentity speaking with one voice. Who speaksfor NATO? The Council of Ministers? Thenational political leaders? The military? Andof which country? Great Britain? WestGermany? Obviously there are manyopinions, many voices. Probably themajority of Europeans are not fully aware of

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the large US nuclear presence in Europe, andcertainly the average citizen. was notconsulted to begin with. One would assume,however, that the Europeans would select,given an either-or choice, the neutronwarhead over any other nuclear weapon inour current inventory. Certainly this wouldhold true for citizens of those countries whoare likely to find themselves the hosts, as itwere, of a tactical nuclear war. For example,a lO-kiloton fission weapon would levelnearly every building for a mile or more­densely urbanized Western Europe wouldsuffer heavily in a tactical nuclear war.

Tony Geraghty, defense correspondent ofThe London Sunday Times, points out thestaggering loss of life to be expected in WestGermany in the event of a tactical nuclearwar with fission weapons. Quoting from theresults of a NATO nuclear war game,Geraghty notes that "355 nuclear bombswould be used within three days and ... 268of them would descend on West Germany,killing more than 1.5 million people."" AGotterdammerung! But Germany would notsuffer alone. The Netherlands, for example,has the highest population density of anycountry in Europe. The greatly reducedcollateral damage to be expected fromneutron warheads would, one assumes, winfor them high approval from Europeancivilians, at least. Self-interest being a strongmotive, though, the further removed one'sown country is from the anticipated nuclearbattlefield, the less influenced one will be bythe prospects of reduced collateral damage.

If our European allies perceive that we willmore readily use the neutron warhead in theirdefense, they may conclude that it is a moreeffective deterrent against a Soviet attack.However, we must realize that our NATOallies view the role of US tactical nuclearweapons in Europe somewhat differentlythan we do. This was as pointed out in areport prepared for the Committee onForeign Relations of the United States Senatein April 1977:

The European NATO members havetraditionally considered theater nuclearforces ... a key connection between the

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conventional forces and the United Statesstrategic deterrent. Because of this, theEuropeans are less interested in battlefield[tactical nuclear] weapons ... but ratherfavor longer-range systems capable of eitherdelivering strategic strikes, if necessary, or atleast capable of extending the battle beyondthe immediate battlefield."

Since NATO is already heavily committedto the protection of US nuclear forces, it ishard to see why they would object to theintroduction of the US neutron warhead ontoEuropean soil. So far as our allies' pastactions permit us to predict the future, we canbe reasonably sure that they ultimately will besupporters of the neutron warhead. TheUnited States, on the other hand, should notact unilaterally in introducing it into Europe.We should clearly explain to our NATO alliesthat the neutron warhead is merely anotheroption, another tool with which to fight atactical nuclear war. We should clearlycommunicate to them that any claims that theweapon is cleaner, more humane, and moreprecise may be subsumed into irrelevancy bythe greater dangers it may spawn. But sinceour allies are perhaps as realistic andclearheaded about the dangers of nuclear waras we are, and since they understand thenature of the Communist threat at least aswell as we do, we probably will not have totell them anything. They already know.

Because of real economic and politicalproblems on the domestic front, somemembers of NATO may be only too eager toseize upon the neutron warhead as a pretextto cut back on conventional forces. If the newweapon is as effective as its proponentsclaim, then why not, they will argue, relyupon it to replace NATO troops on line inWestern Europe? Few would dispute that astrong NATO conventional military forceacts as a powerful deterrent against a WarsawPact attack. In a news conference on 12 July1977, President Carter even went so far as todeclare that NATO has "adequate forcestrength to stop an invasion by Warsaw Pactforces" with or without nuclear weapons. 23

Allowing for a measure of political hyperbolejustified, in part, to reassure our friends and

Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College

caution our foes, we are counting on at best aconventional parity in Europe and at worstWarsaw Pact supremacy discounted by UStactical nuclear weapons. Our allies mightconclude that if our deterrent force isdramatically improved through theintroduction of the neutron warhead, thenconventional force can be reduced. Such aconclusion could lead to a dangerousweakening of NATO's conventional forcewhich would, in the long run, be a moreserious blow to the collective security of theWestern World than would the loss of a singlewarhead system. The United States mustreemphasize that nuclear weapons, enhancedradiation or otherwise, are not a substitutefor conventional forces. They are asupplement.

SALT, MBFR, ANDLARGER ISSUES

Will the introduction of US neutronwarheads into Europe adversely affect SALTand MBFR? Probably not. First of all, sincethe neutron warhead is not a strategicweapon, it poses little threat to SALT. Itobviously offers no direct nuclear threat tothe Soviet Union. As for MBFR, it is difficultto see why a reduced blast and heat weaponwhich reduces collateral damage by some 80percent would meet with objection, since itsatisfies arms control objectives of reducingthe destructiveness of a tactical nuclear war.Furthermore, no limits have ever been agreedto in deploying tactical nuclear weapons, sono treaty can be violated by the introductionof the neutron warhead into Europe. Armscontrol impact statements submitted to theUnited States Senate clearly illustrate that theofficial US view perceives the neutronwarhead as no threat to our arms controlnegotiations with the Soviets.

The weapon does provide the Soviets with aconvenient pretext for moral outrage, andthey probably will seize upon it as apropaganda device. Why should they ignorethe publicity value in condemning a weaponthat would subject Soviet soldiers to a slowand painful death? But in the long run, theirblustering will probably have little effect, forone cannot help but remind them that their

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soldiers will be perfectly safe if they stay offNATO soil.

Does the neutron warhead, as atechnological breakthrough, raise any largerissues that transcend the NATO battlefield?'First of all, because it is perceived as lessdangerous and cleaner than other nuclearweapons, it is well suited to limited war in anumber of areas of the globe. A nuclearweapon which reduces collateral damagewhile maintaining lethality against personnel,and which can be employed incounterinsurgency operations withoutsubjecting friendly villages to destruction,would be a useful tool in certain conflicts inSouth America, Africa, the Middle East, andother areas. We should expect that, over thenext decades, the neutron principle willcontribute to nuclear proliferation. And theremay be nothing we can do to prevent it.

There is probably little value in the Sovietsdeveloping a tactical neutron warhead for theEuropean battlefield. Assumedly, theirtheater nuclear weapons are planned for deepinterdiction against preplanned targets. Here,low yield weapons would be inadequate, andcollateral damage is not a factor. The Sovietstockpile of over 5000 warheads is fine fortheir purposes. But a strategic neutronwarhead, even though such a developmentmay lie far in the future, is another matter.What could be more desirable, from the pointof view of a nation bent on conquest, than aweapon which kills the enemy but spares hiscities, military installations, factories, mines,and communications networks? As ProfessorEric Burhop, a nuclear weapons pioneer,argues: "It is the weapon par excellence ofthe aggressor who is determined to take overintact cities and industries of anothercountry."" If past experience in the armsrace is a guide, we can be almost certain thatingenious scientists will further develop theneutron warhead to make it suitable for astrategic role. It is simply too lucrative aweapon of aggression to pass up.

Where does that leave us? One suspectsthat the production of neutronwarheads has a momentum of its own

that cannot be slowed. From a military pointof view, they will provide, at least in the

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midterm, an improvement in the effectivenessof our nuclear delivery systems. Althoughthey are somewhat more credible than thefission weapons in our current inventory,their presence, alone, will not substantiallydeter a Warsaw Pact attack. Shoulddeterrence fail, they might represent anincrease in NATO's ability to deny the enemyhis military objectives, temporarily at least,with comparatively low levels of collateraldamage.

However, with the risks involved, beforewe deploy the neutron warhead to NATO weshould review our entire policy concerningUS tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Canwe really defend, as the President suggests,without our nuclear delivery systems? As aminimum, we should carefully reexamine ourconventional and nuclear force posture inEurope and, with the full participation of ourNATO allies, decide exactly what we proposeto do with these weapons. The introductionof the neutron warhead into the pUblicconsciousness now permits a free and opendebate, not only on the warhead itself, but ona broader question: Do we really believe in acontrollable, limited, tactical nuclear war?

NOTES

1. Walter Pincus, "Neutron Killer Warhead Buried inERDA Budget," The Washington Post, 6 June 1977, p. AI.

2. HA New Warhead We Don't Need," The WashingtonPost, 8 June 1977, p. A22.

3. "The neutron bomb," The Chris/ian Science Monitor,15 July 1977, p. 28.

4. Walter Pincus, "Senate Pressed for Killer Warhead,"The Washington Post. 21 June 1977,p. A2.

5. Walter Pincus, "Pentagon Pushes Neutron Shell forArtillery Forces," The Washington Post, 24 June 1977, p. AI.

6. Walter Pincus, "Pentagon Wanted Secrecy on NeutronBomb Production," The Washington Post, 25 June 1977, p.AI.

7. Walter Pincus, "Details Emerge on Effects of NeutronWeapon," The Washington Post, 1 July 1977, pp. AI, A5.

8. Martin Tolchin, "Neutron Bomb Fund Debated bySenate in a Secret Session," The New York Times, 2 July 1977,pp. 1,5.

9. "Decision on Neutron Arms Output Likely in August,Carter Aide Says," The New York Times, 7 July 1977, p. AlO.

10. Bernard Weinraub, "Pentagon Hopes to DeployNeutron Weapons by 1979," The New York Times, 8 July1977, p. A5.

II. "Carter: U.s. needs option of neutron bomb," TheChristian Science Monitor, 13 July 1977, p. 1.

12. "NATO allies seek neutron bomb in Europe," TheChristian Science Monitor, 14 July 1977, p. 3.

13. Yorick Blumenfeld, "The Moral Superiority of theNeutron Bomb," The New York Times, 26 July 1977, p. 29.

14. Walter Pincus, "Production of Neutron ArmsBacked," The Washington Post, 12 July 1977, pp. AI, A2.

15. Jorma K. Miettinen, "Enhanced radiation warfare,"The Bulletin ofthe A tomic Scientists, 33 (September 1977), 33,

16. Ibid., p. 35.17. Toichin, p.l.18. Bernard Weinraub, "Carter Says He Backs Production

of Neutron Arms," The New York Times, 13 July 1977, p.All.

19. Miettinen, p. 35.20. Tony Geraghty, "Neutron bomb: How Europe sees it,"

Boston Globe, 18 August 1977, p. 15.21. Ibid.22. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,

Analysis of Arms Control Impact Statements Submitted inConnection with the Fiscal Year 1978 Budget Request, 95thCong., IstSess., April 1977, p. 344.

23. "Carter: U.S. needs option of neutron bomb," TheChristian Science Monitor, p. 1.

24. Geraghty, p.IS.

48 Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College