the international law commission fifty years afterthe international law commission fifty years...

THE INTERNATIONALLAW COMMISSIONFIFTY YEARS AFTER:

AN EVALUATION

Proceedings of the Seminar held to commemorate thefiftieth anniversary of the International Law Commission,21-22 April 1998

LA COMMISSION DUDROIT INTERNATIONALCINQUANTE ANS APRES:

BRAN D'ACTIVITESActes du Seminaire organis6 pour commemorer lecinquanti~me anniversaire de la Commission du droitinternational, 21-22 avril 1998

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIESNEW YORK, 2000

UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONSales No. E/F.00.V.3ISBN 92-1-033081-1

PUBLICATION DES NATIONS UNIESNum~ro de vente : E/F.00.V.3

ISBN 92-1-033081-1

Copyright © United Nations, 2000 - Copyright © Nations Unies, 2000All rights reserved - Tous droits r6serv6s

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE DES MATIIRES

Page

PREFACE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THEUNITED NATIONS, MR. KOFI ANNAN ................ vii

PREFACE PAR LE SECRTAIRE GtNRAL DES NATIONSUNIES, M. KOFI ANNAN ............................ viii

FOREW ORD ......................................... ix

AVANT-PROPOS ..................................... x

SECRETARIAT OF THE COLLOQUIUM ................. xi

SECRETARIAT DU COLLOQUE ........................ xii

OPENING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE FIFTI-ETH SESSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMIS-SION, MR. JOAO CLEMENTE BAENA SOARES ......... 1

REMARQUES LIMINAIRES DU PRItSIDENT DE LA CIN-QUANTIEME SESSION DE LA COMMISSION DU DROITINTERNATIONAL, M. JOAO CLEMENTE BAENA SOA-R E S ... .. .... ... .. .... .. .. .. .. .... .... .. .. .... ... .. 1

WELCOMING REMARKS BY THE LEGAL COUNSEL OFTHE UNITED NATIONS, MR. HANS CORELL .......... 3

REMARQUES D'ACCUEIL PAR LE CONSEILLER JURIDI-QUE DES NATIONS UNIES, M. HANS CORELL ......... 3

I

AN OVERVIEW OF THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONALLAW COMMISSION: 1948-1998 ....................... 5

APER(QU DES TRAVAUX DE LA COMMISSION DU DROITINTERNATIONAL: 1948-1998 ........................ 5

Introduction par i'animateur, M. Doudou Thiam ........ 5

Exposk par M. Ahmed Mahiou ....................... 6

Presentation by Mr. John Dugard ..................... 13

Exposk par M. Constantin Economides ................. 16

Presentation by Mr. Qizhi He ......................... 19

Open-floor discussion/ddbat .......................... 21

II

,INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY":cOMMENTS ON THE COMMISSION'S APPROACH ..... 29

<<RESPONSABILITI DES tTATS ET RESPONSABILITt IN-TERNATIONALE >> : COMMENTAIRES SUR L'APPRO-CHE DE LA COMMISSION ........................... 29

Introduction par l'animateur, M. Jorge Illueca .......... 29

Expos6 par M. Christian Dominick ..................... 30

Presentation by Mr. Bruno Simma ..................... 43

Presentation by Mr. Emmanuel Akwei Addo ............ 47

Open-floor discussion/dibat .......................... 50

III

"STATE IMMUNITIES": CURRENT PROBLEMS INHERITEDFROM THE PAST? ............................... 55

((LES IMMUNITES DE L'ITAT >: PROBLEMES ACTUELSHtRITtS DU PASSE ................................ 55

Introduction by the Chairman, Mr. Raul Goco ........... 55

Presentation by Mr. Lucius Caflisch ................... 56

Presentation by Mr. Robert Rosenstock ................ 62

Presentation by Mr. Enrique Candioti ................. 64


IV

"LAW OF TREATIES": QUESTIONS REMAIN OPEN ....... 73

((LE DROIT DES TRAITES >> : QUESTIONS NON RkSOLUES 73

Introduction by the Chairman, Mr. Mochtar Kusuma-Atm adja ......................................... 73

Exposk par M. Marcelo Kohen ........................ 74

Presentation by Ms. Lori Fisler Damrosch .............. 90Presentation by Mr. Ian Brownlie ..................... 96

Presentation by Mr. Peter C. R. Kabatsi ................ 99

Presentation by Mr. Bernardo Sepulveda ............... 101


V

FUTURE TOPICS AND PROBLEMS OF THE INTERNA-TIONAL LEGISLATIVE PROCESS .................... 11

LES SUJETS jk VENIR ET LES PROBLtMES DU PROCESSUSLEGISLATIF INTERNATIONAL ...................... II1

Introduction par l'animateur, M. Guillaume Pambou-Tchi-vounda ......................................... 11

Expose par M. Yves Daudet .......................... 113

Presentation by Mr. Vaughan Lowe .................... 122

Presentation by Mr. Gerhard Hafner ................... 138

Presentation by Mr. Zdzislaw Galicki .................. 142


VI

USES AND PERILS OF CODIFICATION .................. 163

LES USAGES ET LES DANGERS DE LA CODIFICATION .. 163

Introduction by the Chairman, Mr. Igor Ivanovich Luka-shuk ............................................ 163

Presentation by Mr. Georges Abi-Saab ................. 164

Presentation by Mr. Didier Opertti-Badan .............. 173

Presentation by Mr. Awn AI-Khasawneh ............... 176


CLOSING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE FIFTI-ETH SESSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMIS-SION, MR. JOAO CLEMENTE BAENA SOARES ......... 197

REMARQUES DE CLOTURE DU PRESIDENT DE LA CIN-QUANTIEME SESSION DE LA COMMISSION DU DROITINTERNATIONAL, M. JOAO CLEMENTE BAENA SOA-R E S ............................................... 197

ANN EXES ........................................... 198

AN N EX ES ........................................... 198

A. - CURRENT MEMBERSHIP OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAWCOMMISSION ................................. 198

A. - MEMBRES DE LA COMMISSION DU DROIT INTERNATIO-N AL ......................................... 198

B. - STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION. 200

B. - STATUT DE LA COMMISSION DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 207

PREFACE

The International Law Commission, established pursuant to Gen-eral Assembly resolution 174 (11) of 21 November 1947, is a uniquebody, composed ofjurists and diplomats, professors and practitioners. Itreflects the diversity and interdependence of today's world.

In 1997, the Commission marked its fiftieth anniversary with aUnited Nations colloquium on the "Progressive Development and Codi-fication of International Law". And in April 1998, fifty years after its firstmembers were elected, it organized a seminar in Geneva, focused mainlyon an evaluation of its work up to that date. This publication contains theproceedings of that seminar.

During its first half-century, the Commission made an immensecontribution to the codification and progressive development of interna-tional law. Not only did it draft global conventions on major topics, rang-ing from diplomatic relations to the law of treaties, without which theconduct of international relations as we know it today would be unthink-able, but the Commission also left its mark on the evolution of contempo-rary international law, contributing to its dissemination and its better un-derstanding. And it was instrumental in fostering aspects of law whichsubtly but undeniably pervade many different areas of international life.

I am confident that this trend will continue, and indeed will becomemore widely recognized in the new millennium. I believe, moreover, thatthe statements of those who took part in the seminar included in this pub-lication will make an important contribution to that process.

Evaluating such a rich and diverse achievement is no ordinary task.The seminar, like the colloquium that preceded it, should be seen as partof a continuous review process, emanating from the Commission itself.The Commission, in other words, does not rest on its laurels but reviewsits own work critically, with an eye to the future. That only strengthensmy confidence that its next fifty years will be as rich and fruitful, as diver-sified and wise,-and therefore, no doubt, as hard to evaluate-as thefirst fifty have been.

Kofi A. Annan

PREFACE

La Commission du droit international, cr66e par la r~solu-tion 174 (II) de 'Assembl6e g~n~rale en date du 21 novembre 1947, estun organe unique, compos6 de juristes, de diplomates, d'universitaires etde praticiens, qui refl~te la diversit6 et l'interd6pendance du monde con-temporain.

En 1997, la Commission a tenu un colloque des Nations Unies surle d~veloppement progressif et la codification du droit international il'occasion de son cinquantime anniversaire. En outre, en avril 1998, cin-quante ans apr6s l'6lection de ses premiers membres, elle a organis6 i Ge-n~ve un s~minaire essentiellement consacr6 i l'6valuation des activit~squ'elle avait entreprises jusqu'ici. La pr~sente publication contient uncompte rendu des travaux de ce sdminaire.

Au cours de ses cinquante annmes d'existence, la Commission a ap-port6 une contribution inestimable i la codification et au d~veloppementprogressif du droit international. Elle a non seulement 6labor6 des con-ventions internationales sur de grandes questions, allant des relations di-plomatiques au droit des trait~s, sans lesquelles la conduite des relationsinternationales, telles que nous les connaissons aujourd'hui, serait im-pensable. La Commission a aussi laiss6 sa marque sur l'6volution du droitinternational contemporain, favorisant sa vulgarisation et sa compr6hen-sion. Par ailleurs, elle a contribu6 pour beaucoup i d~velopper des as-pects du droit qui interviennent subtilement, mais n~anmoins incontesta-blement, dans une multitude de domaines trs divers de la vie intematio-nale.

Je suis certain que cette tendance se poursuivra et m~me s'affirmeraau cours du nouveau mill6naire. Je crois d'ailleurs que les d~clarationsdes participants au s6minaire, reproduites dans la prsente publication,faciliteront consid6rablement ce processus.

Evaluer une oeuvre aussi riche et diverse n'est pas une tiche aisle.Le s6minaire, tout comme le colloque qui l'a pr6c6d6, devait 6tre consi-d6ri comme faisant partie d'un processus d'examen continu 6manant dela Commission elle-mime. En effet, la Commission ne se repose pas surses lauriers mais proc&de i un examen critique de ses propres activit6s enne portant pas de vue sur l'avenir, ce qui me conforte dans ma convictionque ses cinquante prochaines ann6es seront aussi riches, fructueuses, di-versifi6es et 6clair6es, et donc certainement aussi difficiles i 6valuer quel'ont 6t6 les cinquante premieres.

Kofi A. Annan

FOREWORD

This two-day Seminar was held pursuant to General Assembly reso-lution 52/156, which welcomed the decision of the International LawCommission to hold the Seminar to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary ofthe Commission. It took place on21 and 22 April 1998, during the fiftiethsession of the Commission, at the United Nations Office in Geneva.

Participants included academics and current and former members ofthe International Law Commission. In order to facilitate a full and frankexchange of views, it was understood that all who took part did so in theirpersonal capacity, and not on behalf of any State, organization or institu-tion.

The Seminar took the form of successive discussions of six topicspertaining to the core theme of an evaluation of the Commission afterfifty years of work.

At the Seminar, the panellists made a presentation on their individ-ual topics, which was followed by comments from other designated pan-ellists. The floor was then opened up for discussion. These presentationsand comments, as well as the open-floor discussions, are included in thispublication under their topics in the order in which they occurred.

The publication also contains two annexes, in order to provide thereader with information on the International Law Commission. The firstannex contains the present membership of the International Law Com-mission, and the second annex contains the Statute of the Commission.

The present volume has been edited and prepared for publication bythe staff of the Codification Division of the Office of Legal Affairs of theSecretariat of the United Nations.

AVANT-PROPOS

Ce s~minaire de deux joumres a &6 organis6 en vertu de la r~solu-tion 52/156 de l'Assemble g~n~rale, dans laquelle l'Assembl~e s'est f6-licit~e de la dacision de la Commission du droit international de tenir ces~minaire pour c~l~brer son cinquantenaire. II a eu lieu i l'Office des Na-tions Unies i Gen~ve, les 21 et 22 avril 1998, pendant la cinquanti~mesession de la Commission.

II a r~uni des universitaires ainsi que des membres, actuels ou an-ciens, de la Commission du droit international. Afm de favoriser un6change de vues franc et sans reserve, il 6tait entendu que tous les partici-pants 6taient presents A titre individuel, sans representer tel ou tel Etat, or-ganisme ou 6tablissement.

Le s~minaire s'est dhroulk sous forme de discussions consacr~es isix themes lies au theme central du bilan de cinquante ans d'activit6s de laCommission.

Les experts ont pr~sent6 leurs themes particuliers, apr~s quoi d'au-tres participants d~sign~s ont fonnulM leurs observations. Un dabat ouverta ensuite eu lieu. Ces exposes et observations ainsi que le dabat ouvertsont pr~sent~s ici selon les diffrents themes, dans l'ordre chronologique.

Le present document comporte deux annexes, qui informeront lelecteur sur la Commission du droit international. La premiere contient lacomposition actuelle de la Commission et ]a seconde en pr~sente le statut.

Le present volume a 6t6 mis au point et pr6par6 pour la publicationpar la Division de la codification du Bureau des affaires juridiques du Se-cretariat de I'Organisation des Nations Unies.

SECRETARIAT OF THE SEMINAR

Mr. Hans Corell, Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, LegalCounsel

Mr. Roy S. Lee, Director, Codification Division, Office of Legal Affairs

Mr. Manuel Ramna-Montaldo, Deputy Director, Codification Division,Office of Legal Affairs

Ms. Sachiko Kuwabara-Yaniamoto, Principal Legal Officer, Codifica-tion Division, Office of Legal Affairs

Ms. Mahnoush Arsanjani and Mr. Mpazi Sinjela, Senior Legal Officers,Codification Division, Office of Legal Affairs

Ms. Christiane Bourloyannis-Vrailas, Mr. David Hutchinson,Mr. George Korontzis, Ms. Virginia Morris and Mr. VladimirRudnitsky, Legal Officers, Codification Division, Office of LegalAffairs

Ms. Darlene Prescott, Mr. Arnold Pronto and Mr. Renan Villacis, Associ-ate Legal Officers, Codification Division, Office of Legal Affairs

With the editorial assistance of Mr. George Korontzisand Ms. Darlene Prescott

of the Codification Division, Office of Legal Affairs,and Ms. Barbara Masciangelo of the Treaty Section,

Office of Legal Affairs

Transcribing and editing of the tapesof the International Law Commission Seminar,

21-22 April 1998, in Geneva,by Ms. Milena E. Bellini, assisted by Ms. Taniatti Ludivine

SECRETARIAT DU SlMINAIRE

M. Hans Corell, secr~taire g~nral adjoint aux affaires juridiques,Conseiller juridique

M. Roy S. Lee, directeur de la Division de ]a codification du Bureau desaffaires juridiques

M. Manuel Rama-Montaldo, directeur adjomt de la Division de la codifi-cation du Bureau des affaires juridiques

Mine Sachiko Kuwabara-Yamamoto, juriste principale de la Division dela codification du Bureau des affaires juridiques

Mine Mahnoush Arsanjani et M. Mpazi Sinjela, juristes hors classe de laDivision de la codification du Bureau des affaires juridiques

Mine Christiane Bourloyannis-Vrailas, M. David Hutchinson, M. Geor-ges Korontzis et Mine Virginia Morris, juristes de la Division de lacodification du Bureau des affaires juridiques

Mine Darlene Prescott, M. Arnold Pronto et M. Renan Villacis, juristesadjoints de preniiere classe de la Division de la codification du Bu-reau des affaires juridiques

Avec l'assistance 6ditoriale de M. Georges Korontzis et Mine Dar-lene Prescott, de la Division de la codification du Bureau des affairesjuri-diques, et de Mine Barbara Masciangelo, de la Section des trait~s du Bu-reau des affaires juridiques

La transcription et l'&dition du s~minaire de la Commission du droitinternational i partir des bandes sonores a 6t6 effectue i Gen~ve parMine Milena E. Bellini, assist~e par Mine Tamiatti Ludivine.

Paragraphs Page

4. Counts 1 to 5: The common plan orconspiracy to commit wars of aggression

(a) The object or purpose of the common planor conspiracy to wage aggressive war

(b) Tactics used by the conspirators

(c) The war against China

(d) Japan's alliance with Germany and Italy

(e) The wars against the Soviet Union, theUnited States, the British Commonwealth,France and the Netherlands

(f) The criminal nature of the common planor conspiracy to wage aggressive war andthe criminal responsibility of theparticipants

(g) The common plan or conspiracy to wagewars in violation of international law,treaties, agreements and assurances

5. Counts 27 to 36: Waging aggressive wars

(a) The charges of waging wars in violationof international law, treaties, agreementsor assurances and the charges of murder

(b) The war against China

(c) The war against the Soviet Union

6. The Pacific War

(a) The war against France

(b) The wars against the United Kingdom, theUnited States and the Netherlands

(c) The alleged war against Thailand

(d) The war against the BritishCommonwealth of Nations

297-304 175

297-298

299

300

301

305-

307-

309-

317-

319-

302 178

303 179

304 180

-316 181

306 181

-308 183

-316 183

-323 188

318 189

-320 190

321 193

322 194

Paragraphs Page

(e) The war against the Philippines (UnitedStates) 323 195

7. Individual responsibility of the accused 324-378 196

(a) Araki, Sadao 325-326 196

(b) Dohihara, Kenji 327-328 197

(c) Hashimoto, Kingoro 329-330 198

(d) Hata, Shunroko 331-332 199

(e) Hiranuma, Kiichiro 333-334 200

(f) Hirota, Koki 335-338 201

Defence claim: advocated disputesettlement 336-338 202

(g) Hoshino, Naoki 339-340 203

(h) Itagaki, Seishiro 341-342 204

(i) Kaya, Okinori 343 206

(j) Kido, Koichi 344-345 206

(k) Kimura, Heitaro 346 208

(1) Koiso, Kuniaki 347-349 209

(m) Matsui, Iwane 350 210

(n) Minami, Jiro 351-352 210

(o) Muto, Akira 353-354 212

(p) Oka, Takasumi 355 212

(q) Oshima, Hiroshi 356-358 213

Defence claim: diplomatic immunity 357-358 214

(r) Sato, Kenryo 359-360 214

High-levelposition and knowledge 360 215

(s) Shigemitsu, Mamoru 361-363 216

(t) Shimada, Shigetaro 364-365 217

Self-defence claim

(u) Shiratori, Toshio

(v) Suzuki, Teiichi

(w) Togo, Shigenori

Defence claims

(x) Toji, Hideki

Self-defence claim

(y) Umezu, Yoshijiro

IV. The United Nations

A. The Security Council

1. Southern Rhodesia

2. South Africa

3. Benin

4. Tunisia

5. Iraq

B. The General Assembly

1. The Definition of Aggression

2. Resolutions concerning situations involvingaggression

(a) Korea

(b) Namibia

(c) South Africa

(d) Territories under Portugueseadministration

(e) The Middle East

(f) Bosnia and Herzegovina

C. The International Court of Justice

Paragraphs

365

366-368

369-370

371-373

372-373

374-376

375-376

377-378

379-450

381-404

383-388

389-398

399

400-402

403-404

405-429

409-414

415-429

415

416-417

418-420

421

422-428

429

430-450

Paragraphs Page

1. The functions of the principal organs of theUnited Nations with respect to aggression

(a) Advisory opinion

Certain expenses of the United Nations

(b) Contentious cases

2. Provisional measures

3. Legal disputes concerning the use of force oraggression

Annexes

Introductory note

1. Tables 1 to 4 concerning aggression by a State

Table 1. Aggression by a State: Categories ofaggression and war

Table 2. Aggression by a State: Forms ofaggression

Table 3. Aggression by a State: Factors indetermining the aggressive character of conductby a State

Table 4. Aggression by a State: Defence claims

II. Tables 5 to 9 concerning individual criminalresponsibility

Table 5. Individual criminal responsibility:High-level position

Table 6. Individual criminal responsibility:Knowledge

Table 7. Individual criminal responsibility:Intent

Table 8. Individual criminal responsibility:Participation

Table 9. Individual criminal responsibility:Defence claims

432-443

432-433

432-433

434-443

444-447

448-450 262

265

265

267

268

274

283

302

313

314

339

364

370

417

Preface

The question of defining aggression has been under considerationwithin the framework of the United Nations since the earliest days ofthe Organization. In 1974, the General Assembly adopted a definitionof aggression to provide guidance to the Security Council indetermining, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, theexistence of an act of aggression.1 In 1996, the International LawCommission adopted the draft Code of Crimes against the Peace andSecurity of Mankind, which articulated the principle of individualcriminal responsibility with respect to a leader or organizer for thecrime of aggression based on their participation in aggressioncommitted by a State without providing a detailed definition of thiscrime.2 In 1998, the United Nations Diplomatic Conference ofPlenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International CriminalCourt adopted the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Courtwhich provided that the Court shall have jurisdiction over the crime ofaggression once a provision has been adopted defining the crime ofaggression and setting out the conditions under which the Court shallexercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. The Rome Conferencealso adopted resolution F establishing a Preparatory Commission toprepare, inter alia, proposals for a provision on aggression, includingthe definition and the elements of crimes of aggression as well as theconditions under which the Court shall exercise its jurisdiction withregard to this crime.4 At its third session, in 1999, the PreparatoryCommission established the Working Group on the Crime ofAggression to prepare such proposals.5 At the eighth session of thePreparatory Commission, in 2001, the Working Group requested theSecretariat to prepare a paper on the subject.

The Historical Review of Developments relating to Aggressionwas presented to the Working Group on the Crime of Aggression at the

1 General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974.2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1996, vol. II (Part Two), chap. I.D,

para. 50.3 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted on 17 July 1998,A/CONF.183/9, art. 5.4 Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on theEstablishment of an International Criminal Court, done on 17 July 1998,A/CONF.183/10, annex I, resolution F.5 PCNICC/1999/L.5/Rev. 1, para. 16.

ninth session of the Preparatory Commission, in 2002.6 The paperprovides an objective, analytical overview of the history and majordevelopments relating to aggression before and after the adoption of theCharter of the United Nations. It reflects developments relating toaggression as of mid-2001.

Parts 1, 11 and III review the major developments resulting from theestablishment of tribunals to consider crimes against peace after theSecond World War, including the constituent instruments and thejurisprudence of the tribunals. These parts of the paper sought toprovide relevant information on a number of issues that were raised inthe Working Group on the Crime of Aggression with respect to: (a) theconduct by a State that constitutes aggression for purposes of individualcriminal responsibility (e.g., the categories of aggression that may becommitted by a State, the types of conduct by a State that mayconstitute aggression at various stages of a military operation, thefactors that determine the aggressive character of such conduct as wellas possible defences); and (b) the essential elements required for anindividual to be held responsible for the crime of aggression (e.g., highlevel position, knowledge, intent, participation as well as possibledefences). This information is also reflected in a series of analyticaltables included in the annexes to the paper to facilitate a more focusedelement-by-element consideration of the two aspects of aggression.

Part IV reviews the major developments resulting from theestablishment of the United Nations after the Second World War,including the relevant provisions of the Charter which prohibit thethreat or use of force and provide a role for some of its principal organswith respect to international peace and security. This part of the papersought to provide relevant information on a number of issues that wereraised in the Working Group on the Crime of Aggression with respectto the role of the United Nations, including: the practice of the SecurityCouncil in condemning action by a State as aggression; the practice ofthe General Assembly in condemning such action, particularly inrelation to the Definition of Aggression; and the jurisprudence of theInternational Court of Justice with respect to the functions of theprincipal organs of the United Nations concerning aggression as well aslegal issues relating to the prohibition of aggression. The law andpractice of the United Nations and its principal organs, particularly as itmay relate to aggression by a State and the conditions for the exercise

6 PCNICC/2002/WGCAJL. 1 and Add. 1.

of jurisdiction by the International Criminal Court, was not reflected inthe analytical tables accompanying the paper due to time constraints.

The Working Group expressed its appreciation for the paper,which was considered to constitute a valuable contribution to itsdeliberations and a useful resource for those interested in the subject.The Working Group, therefore, requested the Secretariat to ensure thewidest dissemination of the paper and proposed that it be forwarded tothe Assembly of States Parties in connection with further work on thetopic. The Preparatory Commission included the paper in its report andtransmitted it to the Assembly of States Parties.

Following the entry into force of the Rome Statute on 1 July 2002,the work on proposals relating to the crime of aggression has beencontinued by the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute. Byresolution ICC-ASP/1/Res.1, adopted on 9 September 2002, theAssembly of States Parties decided to establish the Special WorkingGroup on the Crime of Aggression, open on an equal footing to allStates Members of the United Nations or members of specializedagencies or of the International Atomic Energy Agency, for the purposeof elaborating proposals for a provision on aggression. The SpecialWorking Group is scheduled to meet for the first time at the secondsession of the Assembly of States Parties, to be held in September2003.

Codification DivisionOffice of Legal Affairs16 June 2003

Introduction*

The present paper was prepared in response to the request ofthe Working Group on the Crime of Aggression at the eighthsession of the Preparatory Commission, held from 24 Septemberto 5 October 2001.

The paper consists of four parts: part I. The NurembergTribunal; part II. Tribunals established pursuant to ControlCouncil Law No. 10; part III. The Tokyo Tribunal; and part IV.The United Nations. In addition, annex I contains tables 1 to 4relating to aggression by a State and annex II contains tables 5 to9 relating to individual responsibility for crimes against peace.

The purpose of the paper is to provide an objective, analyticaloverview of the history and major developments relating toaggression. It covers the developments prior to the adoption of theCharter of the United Nations and those subsequent to theadoption of the Charter. It includes the constituent instruments andthe jurisprudence of the tribunals that considered the crimesagainst peace committed in Europe and the Far East during theSecond World War, namely: the Charter and Judgement of theNuremberg Tribunal, which was established to try the major warcriminals of the European Axis; Control Council Law No. 10 andthe judgements of the tribunals which conducted the subsequenttrials of other war criminals in Germany; and the Charter andJudgement of the Tokyo Tribunal, which was established to try themajor war criminals in the Far East.1 The constituent instrumentscontain relatively brief definitions of crimes against peace. Thejurisprudence of the tribunals clarifies and further addresses anumber of important issues relating to two aspects of aggression:(a) the conduct by a State that constitutes aggression, and (b) theessential elements required for an individual to be heldresponsible for crimes against peace. The relevant informationcontained in the constituent instruments and the jurisprudence ofthe tribunals with respect to the various issues relating to the twoaspects of aggression is also reflected in a series of tables

2contained in the annexes to the present paper.

The paper also reviews the major developments resulting fromthe establishment of the United Nations after the Second World

Introduction to document PCNICC/2002/WGCA/L. 1.xx

War, including the relevant provisions of the Charter whichprohibit the threat or use of force and provide a role for some ofits principal organs with respect to international peace andsecurity. The paper reviews the practice of the Security Counciland its resolutions condemning specific acts of aggression; thepractice of the General Assembly and its resolutions condemningspecific acts of aggression, some of which refer to the Definitionof Aggression adopted by the Assembly; and the practice of theInternational Court of Justice and its jurisprudence concerning thefunction of the principal organs of the United Nations with respectto aggression, requests for interim measures to address allegedacts of aggression which threatened to interfere with pendingcases involving other issues and cases involving claims of allegedacts of aggression.

The relevance of the constituent instruments and thejurisprudence of the tribunals established after the Second WorldWar with respect to wars of aggression or wars in violation ofinternational agreements, such as those providing for a declarationof war, could be questioned in the light of further developmentsculminating in the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations,which prohibited the use of force. 3 The instruments that providedfor trials after the Second World War defined crimes against peacewith reference to wars of aggression or wars in violation ofinternational agreements. However, the tribunals that appliedthose instruments to determine the lawful or unlawful character ofthe wars first considered whether the wars were aggressive ordefensive in character. They considered it unnecessary to decidewhether the wars violated international agreements after findingthat they constituted the even greater crime of aggressive war.Attention may also be drawn to the similarity between the type ofconduct by a State which the tribunals found comprised aggressivewar and the type of conduct by a State which the Security Counciland the General Assembly have condemned as acts of aggression.

The paper seeks to be as comprehensive and yet as concise aspossible. It is a factual description and to the extent possiblereflects the terminology used by the decisions of the courts,tribunals, commissions and the resolutions of the Security Counciland the General Assembly. The paper does not draw or suggestany conclusions with regard to the issues it covers, nor does itsuggest whether the use of the word "aggression" with regard to a

particular act by, for example, the Security Council or the GeneralAssembly was or was not intended to be in the context of Article39 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Notes

' The paper does not include the national legislation or the jurisprudence of national

courts with respect to crimes against peace after the Second World War.2 The Rome Statute provides for the elaboration of a definition of the crime of aggression,

but it does not specifically provide for the elaboration of the elements of this crime. Someof the more detailed aspects of the elements of individual criminal responsibilityaddressed in the jurisprudence of the tribunals may be considered more appropriate forthe inclusion in the elements of the crime of aggression.3 The United Nations War Crimes Commission concluded that the irrelevance of adeclaration of war was the main development of international law represented by theCharter of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals as well as the judgement of theNuremberg Tribunal; see paragraph 269 of the present paper.

OPENING REMARKS' BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE FIFTIETHSESSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION,MR. JOAO CLEMENTE BAENA SOARES2

REMARQUES LIMINAIRES PAR LE PRlSIDENT DE LA CIN-QUANTIME SESSION DE LA COMMISSION DU DROITINTERNATIONAL, M. JOAO CLEMENTE BAENA SOARES

The International Law Commission was established pursuant toGeneral Assembly resolution 174 (), on 21 November 1947, in responseto Article 13, paragraph 1 (a), of the Charter of the United Nations. Thefirst election of the Commission took place on 3 November 1948 and theCommission opened its first session in April 1949. The Commission has,therefore, three birthdays. In 1997, the General Assembly celebrated theestablishment of the Commission in a colloquium at United NationsHeadquarters in New York,3 with the participation of legal advisers,members of the Commission, government officials, non-governmentalorganizations, members of academia and professional associations. Thisyear, the Commission celebrates its birthday through a less formal gath-ering, with more emphasis and reflection on substance and greater focuson issues of special interest to the Commission, which are reflected in theSeminar's programme.

The progressive development of international law and its codifica-tion are very important activities of the United Nations. The InternationalLaw Commission has played a central role in this process. The Commis-sion has produced over 20 sets of draft articles, setting forth basic rules inmost of the areas of international law. Many of these sets of draft articleshave become international conventions. A number of these conventionshave become fundamental to the very conduct of the relations betweenStates. Works of the Commission, even before reaching the final stage,have been cited by authoritative sources as existing law or custom. Thereference made by the International Court of Justice in the recent case be-

I Translated from Spanish.2 Member of the International Law Commission.3 See the proceedings of the United Nations Colloquium on Progressive Development

and Codification of International Law in Making Better International Law: The Interna-tional Law Commission at 50 (1998) (United Nations publication, Sales No. E/F.98.V.5).

tween Hungary and Slovakia4 to some of the draft articles on Stateresponsibility, adopted on the first reading by the Commission, is oneexample.

The Commission was born 50 years ago and, like any institution, theCommission should remain relevant in the changing environment inwhich it operates and should be responsive to the needs of the interna-tional community. In fact, in the last several years, the Commission hasbeen re-evaluating its work and has endeavoured to revitalize itself andremain an efficient and productive institution. This task, of course, restsbasically on the shoulders of the members of the Commission. Any insti-tution is only as good as those who serve in it. Their commitment anddedication, their knowledge and expertise, and their hard work make theCommission what it ought to be.

4 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment of 25 September1997.

WELCOMING REMARKS BY THE LEGAL COUNSELOF THE UNITED NATIONS, MR. HANS CORELL

REMARQUES D'ACCUEIL PAR LE CONSEILLER JURIDIQUEDES NATIONS UNIES, M. HANS CORELL

I should first like to congratulate the Commission on its fiffiethbirthday. My predecessor as Legal Counsel of the United Nations and Ihave always considered the work of the International Law Commissionof great importance to the United Nations and the international commu-nity. Consequently, servicing the Commission constitutes an importantand essential function of the Codification Division of the Office of LegalAffairs. This Division has always viewed its work for the Commission asespecially important and has served the Commission over the last 50years with commitment and devotion. The current team under Mr. RoyLee's leadership will, I can assure you, continue with the same commit-ment.

Mr. Chairman, as you noted, the Commission indeed has three birth-days. Since last year, marking the first birthday of the Commission, anumber of activities have taken place to commemorate the Commission'sfiftieth anniversary. For this particular occasion, we have prepared anumber of background papers and materials, including a programmeof the Seminar and a copy of the introduction to a book prepared bythe Commission that is entitled International Law on the Eve of theTwenty-first Century.5 This introduction represents an attempt to evalu-ate the contribution of the work of the Commission and might serve as areference for our first session of the Seminar. The third background papercontains ideas and suggestions for enhancing the work of the Commis-sion and for making the Commission more efficient. These ideas and sug-gestions were put forward during the October Colloquium, to which theChairman has referred. They have been extracted from the proceedings ofthe United Nations Colloquium on Progressive Development and Codifi-cation of International Law. The proceedings have been published underthe tile Making Better International Law: The International Law Com-mission at 50.

6

5International Law on the Eve of the Twenty-first Century: Views from the Interna-tional Law Commission (1997) (United Nations publication, Sales No. E/F.97.V.4).

6 See footnote 2.

In addition, for this occasion, the Secretariat of the United Nationshas also prepared information on the status of the 14 main internationalconventions that originated in the International Law Commission. As afifth item, the Secretariat of the United Nations has prepared an Analyti-cal Guide to the Work of the International Law Commission, 1949 to1997.7 This is a comprehensive annotated guide to the substantive workof the Commission. Each topic is subdivided into categories and stages ofconsideration within the Commission. This guide is intended to serve as aresearch tool to facilitate readers in tracing the development of a particu-lar topic from inception to conclusion. While the guide will be useful tothe members of the Commission, it is aimed primarily at those involvedin research with a special interest in the Commission's work on the pro-gressive development of international law.

7 Document ST/LEG/GUIDE/I; United Nations publication, Sales No. E.98.V. 10.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAWCOMMISSION: 1948-1998

APERQU DES TRAVAUX DE LA COMMISSION

DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL: 1948-1998

Introduction par I'animateur, M. Doudou Thiam8

J'ai le plaisir de d~clarer ouverte la premiere session du s~minaire.Nous c616brons aujourd'hui, chers coll~gues et amis, mesdames et mes-sieurs, le cinquanti~me anniversaire de la Commission du droit interna-tional. C'est avec une certaine fiert6 que j'y participe depuis bient6tvmgt-huit ans. J'ai 6t6 rapporteur sp6cial pour le projet de code des cri-mes contre la paix et la s6curit6 de l'humanit6 de 1982 i 1996. Je suisdonc tr~s honor6 d'avoir 6ti choisi pour pr6sider la premiere session dus6minaire portant sur le sujet suivant: une vue d'ensemble de I'ceuvre dela Commission du droit international.

Comme M. Corell l'annongait tout i l'heure, le Secr6tariatde l'Organisation des Nations Umes a distribu6 un extrait d'un docu-ment sur l'ceuvre de la Commission du droit international. Ce documentcontient une ivaluation des travaux de la Commission pendant ces cin-quante dernires ann6es. Je suis tout i fait d'accord avec le Conseillerju-ridique pour dire que ce document constitue la base de notre discussionsur le sujet qui nous int6resse.

Notre premier orateur est M. Ahmed Mahiou qui a tA membre de laCommission du droit international de 1982 i 1998, pr6sident de sa qua-rante-huiti~me session et 6galement pr6sident du Comit6 de r6daction,un organe extr~mement redout6 et tr~s important de la Commission. Jedonne donc la parole A notre ami Ahmed Mahiou.

8 Ancien ministre de laI justice du S6 ngal, membre de ]a Commission du droit intema-tional, 1970-1999.

Exposk par M. Ahmed Mahiou9

En laissant de c6t6 les sujets actuellement en discussion devant laCommission (responsabilit6 des Etats, responsabilit6 internationale pourles cons6quences pr~judiciables dicoulant d'activit~s qui ne sont pas in-terdites par le droit international, la nationalite en relation avec la succes-sion d'Etats et les reserves aux trait~s) et le sujet abandonn6 en 1992 (pri-vilkges et immunit~s des organisations internationales), la Commission aexamine 25 sujets dont 2 ont fait l'objet d'un double examen: la questionde la juridiction p6nale internationale (rapport en 1950 et projet de statuten 1994) et le code des crimes contre la paix et ]a s~curit6 de l'humanit6(projet de 1954 et projet de 1996).

Sur ces 25 sujets, 3 ont simplement fait l'objet d'un rapport:- Les moyens de rendre plus accessibles la documentation relative

au droit international coutumier (1950)10;- Les reserves aux conventions multilat~rales (1951)"1;

- La question d'une plus large participation aux traitts multilat&raux conclus sous les auspices de la Societ6 des Nations (1963)12;

Sur les 22 sujets ayant donn6 lieu i l'61aboration de projets de textes,3 d'entre eux n'ont pas 6 proposes pour devenir des conventions, maispour servir de source d'inspiration ou de module pour les Etats:

- La declaration des droits et devoirs des Etats (1949)'";- La formulation des principes de Nurembert (1950)14;- Le module de r~gles sur la procedure arbitrale (1958)'". Notons

que, dans un premier temps (1953)16, ce projet avait 6t6 recom-mand6 en vue d'en faire une convention, mais, devant les rtser-ves et critiques, la Commission a chang6 de position pour sugg6-rer un module de r~gles.

Pour les autres sujets recommandts pour devenir des conventions:Un sujet n'a pas obtenu l'aval de l'Assemblte g6nrale: le projetrelatif i la clause de la nation la plus favoriste (1978)17;

9 Professeur de droit, ancien doyen de la Facult6 de droitd'Alger, ancien membre de laCommission du droit international, 1982-1996.10 Documents officiels de l'Assemblie gdndrale, cinquime session, Supp1mment no 12,document A/113116, par. 24 A94.

11 Ibid., sixieme session, Suppidment no 9, p. 3.12 Annuaire de la Commission du droit international, 1963, vol. II, document A/5509.13 Documents officiels de I'Assemblde gdndrale, quatri~me session, Suppldment n' 10,

p. ll.14 Annuaire de la Commission du droit international, vol. II, par. 95 A 127, document

A/1316.15 Ibid., 1958, vol. II, document A/3859, par. 10 1 43.16 Ibid., 1953, vol. I1, p. 201 A 212, document A/2456, et ibid., p. 208, par. 55.17 Ibid., 1978, vol. 11 (deuxi~me partie), p. 19 A 81, document A/33/10.

- Deux autres sujets sont toujours en attente devant l'Assembl~egdnerale et pour certains d'entre eux de fagon dilatoire : le statutdu courier diplomatique et de la valise diplomatique non accom-pagnie par un courrier diplomatique (1989) 1'; les immunit&s ju-ridictionnelles des Etats et de leurs biens (1991)'9;

- Le projet de code des crimes contre la paix et la scurit6 del'humanit620 n'a W transmis A 'Assemblke g~n~rale qu'en 1996et il est dorc normal qu'il y ait un certain temps pour son examen;

Un autre, enfin, va ftre soumis enjuin 1998 a une conference diplo-matique : le projet de statut d'une Cour p6nale intemationale 21.

Finalement, 11 sujets ont donn6 naissance i 14 conventions dontcertaines sont accompagn6es de protocoles facultatifs sur le r~glementdes diff~rends ou d'annexes. Sur ces 14 conventions, 11 sont en vigueur.

D'un point de vue statistique, on a donc les r6sultats suivants : sur25 sujets traits par la Commission, il y a eu 14 conventions (soit 55 %)dont 11 sont en vigueur (soit 45 %); sur une p~riode de cinquante ans,cela fait une moyenne d'un projet tous les deux ans et d'une conventiontous les trois ans et demi.

Quelques commentaires sur ce bilan statistique:

1) En examinant les domaines codifies, on constate qu'il y a uneconcentration sur certains sujets qui sont amsi enti~rement couverts. IIs'agit des domaines suivants :

- Le droit de la mer: les quatre Conventions de 1958 ont port6 surla plupart des aspects du droit de lamer, m~me si la largeur de lamer territoriale n'a pas pu 8tre codifi6e en 1960; la Convention de1982 est venue complker et reviser F'ceuvre de la Commissionmais en conservant l'essentiel de cette ceuvre pour tout ce quiconceme les aspects classiques;

- Le droit diplomatique : c'est sans doute le secteur o6 le travaila 6 le plus important avec l'61aboration de sept textes,c'est-i-dire les quatre Conventions sur les relations diplomati-ques (1961), les relations consulaires (1963), les missions sp6cia-les (1969) et la repr6sentation des Etats (1975); la Convention surla protection du personnel diplomatique (1973); et les deux pro-jets concernant le courrier et la valise diplomatiques, d'une part,et les immunit6s juridictionnelles, d'autre part. Et si la Commis-sion avait poursuivi ses travaux sur les immunit6s et privilges

Is Ibid., 1989, vol. I1 (deuxieme partic), p. 16 a 53, document A/44/10.

19 ibid., 1991, vol. II (deuxitme pattie), p. 13 164, document A/46/10.20 Docwum n Offiiels de 'Assemble gindrale, cinquante et unime session, SupplM-

mentnO 10 (A/SI/10), p. 30 A 144.21 Annuaire de la Commission du droil international 1993, vol. II (deuxidme pattie),

p. 104 a 136, document A/48/10.

des organisations internationales, elle aurait codifi6 1'ensembledu droit diplomatique de mani~re complete;

- Le droit des traitts est 6galement codifi6 presque enti~rement,puisque les deux traitis de 1969 et de 1986 auxquels s'ajoute laConvention sur la succession d'Etats en mati~re de traitts (1978)couvrent l'ensemble de la mati~re, malgri l'6chec du projet sur laclause de la nation la plus favoriste.

A c6t6 de ces trois domaines classiques du droit international,l'attention de la Commission s'est portte sur le droit penal internationaloi les r~sultats se font encore attendre. En 6laborant les principes de Nu-remberg, le premier code des crimes, la Convention sur la protection dupersonnel diplomatique, le projet de statut d'une Cour p~nale intematio-nale et le second projet de code des crimes, elle a bien balis6 le cheminpour apporter une contribution A la codification du droit penal internatio-nal. Cela explique l'int~r~t et l'importance de la prochaine conference surle statut de la Cour p~nale intemationale pour consacrer cette contribu-tion.

Donc, A bien des 6gards, le bilan de la Commission apparait fonda-mental dans certains domaines du droit international, ce qui n'emp~chepas de se poser la question : aurait-elle pu faire plus et mieux ? On va es-sayer d'y r pondre bri~vement par quelques remarques sur ce bilan.

2) La premiere remarque conceme la productivit6 et les mithodesde travail de la Commission. De ce point de vue, il semble bien qu'elle a6t6 plus active dans la premiere p~riode que dans la seconde. Ainsi, il afallu moins de six ans (1950 i 1956) pour 61aborer un projet de 73 articlessur le droit de la mer et moins de quatre ans pour 6laborer un projet de45 articles sur les relations diplomatiques (1954 A 1958) ou un projet de71 articles sur les relations consulaires (1957 i 1961); or, il a fallu dix anspour 6laborer un modeste projet de 32 articles sur le courrier et les valisesdiplomatiques (1979 i 1989) et treize am (1978 i 1991) pour le projet de22 articles sur les immunitts juridictionnelles. Si l'on prend l'exemple dusujet sur la responsabilit6 des Etats dont l'ampleur et la difficult6 permet-tent de comprendre le retard des travaux de codification, en revanche, ilest difficile de justifier leur longueur et lenteur : l'examen du sujet ayantcommenc6 en 1955, il ne s'ach~vera qu'A l'horizon 2000, soit une durteproche du demi-si~cle 22.

Certes, le retard n'ncombe pas i la seule Commission, car le calen-drier de travail depend aussi des reactions de l'Assemblte generale et desEtats; mais les mtthodes de travail ont rtv616 leur limite, et ce n'est que

22 DjA, le droit des traitds avait occupd la Commission du droit international pendantdix-sept ans (1949 A 1966) et, en ajoutant A ce ddlai celui de I'adoption (trois ans) et deV'entr~e en vigueur (onze ans), on abouti i un total de trente et un ans entre le moment oii ladecision de codifier est prise et le moment oia la convention s'applique.

recemment que la Commission a montr6 qu'elle pouvait 8tre plus rapideet plus efficace clans la gestation de ses projets (6laboration du projet de

statut de la Cour p6nale mtemationale et calendrier de travail sur la natio-nalite et les reserves).

3) La seconde remarque concerne la difficult6 de plus en plus

grande rencontrie par les projets de la Commission pour devenir des

conventions. U aussi une comparaison entre deux periodes aboutit auconstat paradoxal suivant: les projets ont eu davantage de succ6s pendant

la p~riode des grandes divisions de la societ6 intemationale (confronta-tion Est-Ouest et clivage Nord-Sud) que pendant la p~riode de disparitionou d'att~nuation de ces divisions. En effet :

- Du milieu des annes 50 au milieu des ann6es 80, tous les projets

proposes par la Commission sont devenus des conventions, i

l'exception du projet sur la clause de la nation la plus favoris6e;

- Du milieu des anines 80 i aujourd'hui, aucun projet n'a encore

&6 adopt6 et un seul sur cinq va Etre soumis prochainement uneconf6rence de codification.

4) La troisi~me remarque est relative pr~cis~ment i l'acceptationdes conventions par les Etats. Sur les 14 conventions adopt~es, on note

que le nombre de ratifications est tris variable, en allant du strict mini-mum de 15 pour la Convention sur la succession d'Etats en matire detrait~s i 178 pour celle sur les relations diplomatiques.

Si l'on prend comme crit~re l'acceptation par un nombre significatifd'Etats composant la communaute mternationale, quatre conventions

seulement repondent i cette condition: celles portant sur les relations di-plomatiques (178), les relations consulaires (157), la protection du per-

sonnel diplomatique (96) et le droit des trait6s (83). Encore faut-il noter

que la Convention sur le droit des traits, pourtant consid~ree comme la

meilleure ceuvre de la Commission, n'a pas encore atteint le seuil majori-

mire de ratifications. En outre, le dlai entre l'adoption et l'entrae en vi-

gueur a eu tendance i s'allonger de plus en plus pour passer de quatre i

cinq annes i plus d'une dizame d'ann6es.

Cette situation est pr~occupante en posant le probl&me de savoir ce

que les Etats sont prts i accepter. On peut notamment se demander s'ils

ne sont pas devenus tr6s r6ticents ou oppos6s aux projets de la Commis-sion au motif que le domame classique de la codification est en voie

d' puisement et que le daveloppement progressif prodomine de plus en

plus alors que les Etats ne sont pas prets i aller dans ce sens. Si tel est le

cas, le probl~me prendrait alors une dimension grave pour les travaux fu-

turs de codification, dans la mesure oii pr6cis~ment les progr~s accomplis

par elle roduisent la part de codification au sens restreint pour laisser da-

vantage de place au daveloppement progressif. C'est toute la mission de

la Commission qui est enjeu ainsi que sa fonction i la veille du troisi~me

mill6naire, surtout si les Etats pensent qu'il faut laisser le temps au tempset permettre aux r~gles coutunii~res de se manifester.

5) La quatri~me et demi~re remarque concerne justement les rela-tions entre la codification et la coutune. La codification est normalementle processus de parach~vement de la r~gle coutumire qu'elle consacre etconsolide, en l'6noncant de maninre claire et sous forme 6crite, et en luiassurant une reconnaissance solennelle sous la forme conventionnelle.On sait qu'il y a parfois une r6sistance ou une opposition i vouloir toutcodifier, i remplacer les r~gles coutumi~res souples et 6volutives par desr~gles rigides et solennelles qui risquent de contrarier la n6cessaire flexi-bilit6 exig6e par les relations intemationales. En r6alit6, si la codificationabsorbe la plupart des r~gles coutumires, celles-ci i leur tour peuventnaitre de la codification et notamment de l'ceuvre de la Commission, qu'ils'agisse des conventions entr6es en vigueur ou non, ou qu'il s'agisse desprojets23 .

S'agissant des conventions entrees en vigueur, le probleme pos6 estcelui de leur port~e vis-a-vis des Etats qui ne les ont pas ratifi~es. S'il estexact de dire que leurs r~gles s'imposent aux seuls Etats qui les ont accep-t6es, il est difficile de conclure qu'elles n'ont aucune cons6quence pourceux qui ne les ont pas ratifi6es. Darts la mesure oi ces r~gles ont obtenuune acceptation largement majoritaire et correspondent i une abondantepratique, ne doit-on pas considarer qu'elles passent du droit convention-nel au droit international g6n~ral et qu'elles acqui~rent valeur de normescoutumi~res au regard des autres Etats ? A titre d'exemple, les r~gles desconventions sur les trait~s oii les relations diplomatiques et consulairessont invoqu6es, m~me entre les Etats qui ne les ont pas ratifi6es, parcequ'elles exercent une telle attraction, qu'elles deviennent progressive-ment les principes constitutifs des relations entre les Etats et forment lesocle logique et technique de la sociWt6 intemationale2 4. Par ailleurs, cesmemes conventions sont susceptibles de g6n6rer des r~gles coutumi~resparce que tout simplement la codification ne peut ou ne veut pas rggirtous les aspects et d6tails des rapports intemationaux (le pr6ambule debeaucoup de conventions reproduit la formule de sauvegarde selon la-quelle << les r~gles du droit international coutumier doivent continuer ir6gir les questions qui n'ont pas 6 expressement r6gl6es dans les dis-

2 3 Voir J. Salmon, e Changements et droit international public v, M6langes Rigaux,

Nouveaux itin4raires en droit; hommage h Francois Rigaux, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1993,p. 134.

24 Voir M. Virally, ((A propos de ]a lexferenda n, Mdlanges P. Reuter (Paris, Pedone,

1981 p. 523). Scion ]a remarque de H. Caminos, le traitd ratifi par un grand nombre d'Etatse devient une attestation puissante de I'Etat du droit international ,) et il produit, dansces conditions, des effets i 1'6gard des Etats qui n'y sont pas parties )>. aLes sources dudroit de lamer ) , dans R. J. Dupuy et D. Vignes, TraitM du nouveau droit de la mer (Paris,dd. Economica, 1985, p. 70).

positions de la pr6sente convention 2>); il y a des interstices et parfoisdes lacunes rv~les par la mise en oeuvre des r~gles codif~ees; il y a aussides dispositions de compromis codifies de fagon ambigUe. Pour toutesces raisons, on renvoie aux Etats le son de les completer par des pratiquesconstitutives de couturnes, en attendant leur 6ventuelle codification par

revision des conventions existantes. A cet 6gard, l'exemple du droit de la

mer est int~ressant puisque l'encre des Conventions de 1958 n'6tait pasencore s~che que les Etats ont amorc6 des pratiques visant i completer lesr~gles adopt~es et parfois i en susciter d'autres entrainant la nouvelle co-dification de 1982.

S'agissant des conventions non encore en vigueur, on a parlk i leurpropos de codification inachev&e. En effet, voili des r~gles qui semblentr~pondre aux besoms de la communaut6 intemationale au point d'obtenirla signature de la plupart des Etats mais sans obtenir le nombre appropri&de ratifications. On peut paler ici de droit mou ou soft law car il s'agitbien de droit voulu par les Etats qui ont accept6 sa codification mais d'undroit virtuel, mou, qui attend pour se concr~tiser, se durcir; or, cette con-cretisation ou ce durcissement peuvent se manifester soit par la ratifica-tion, soit par la pratique des Etats; dans ce dernier cas, les Etats peuventprogressivement se conformer aux normes 6dictdes par la convention, se

laisser guider par eUes et assurer ainsi leur passage de l'univers conven-tionnel en direction de l'univers coutumier. Cela s'est produit pour ledroit de la mer (notion de zone 6conomique exclusive, droit de transit

dans les d~troits intemationaux etc.) et il semble se produire, mime si

c'est moins net, pour le droit de la succession d'Etats.

Enfm, la naissance des r~gles coutumires peut trouver quelque aideou fondement dans les projets de la Commission et parfois dans ses tra-vaux. II est incontestable que les travaux de codification exercent une in-

fluence qui drpasse les cercles acadamiques et les preoccupations doctri-nales. Les rapports des rapporteurs speciaux, les d~bats de la Commis-sion et de la Sixiime Commission et 6videmment les projets d'articles de

la Commission constituent une source d'inspiration non seulement pour

la r~flexion doctrinale mais aussi pour 'argumentation et la justification

de certames positions ou de certains comportements des Etats; parfois

l'intdret se manifeste jusque chez le juge ou l'arbitre comme le montrent

les arr~ts de la Cour intemationale de Justice ou des sentences arbitrales

qui semblent avoir 6t6 inspires par les travaux relatifs i la responsabilit6

des Etats (affaires du Nicaragua, du personnel diplomatique et consulaire

i Th~ran, du Rainbow Warrior) et au droit de la mer (affaire du plateau

continental Tunisie-Libye oii la Cour d~clare, en reprenant sa formula-

25 Par exemple, le pr6ambule de ia Convention de Vienne sur les relations diplomati-

ques et consulaires ou de la Convention de Vienne sur le droit des trait~s.

tion de l'arret de 1969 sur le plateau continental de lamer du Nord26, maiscette fois i propos d'un projet de codification, qu'elle v ne saurait n6gli-ger une disposition du projet de convention si elle venait i conclure quesa substance lie tous les membres de la soci~t6 internationale du faitqu'elle consacre une r~gle de droit coutumier pr~existante ou en voie deformation 27 >>. Notons aussi que la Cour a diclar6, i propos de la Conf-rence de codification du droit de la mer de 1960 qui n'avait pas abouti,que celle-ci avait permis l'6mergence des notions qui « se sont cristalli-sees ces derni~res ann~es en droit coutumier par l'effet de l'assentimentg~n~ral apparu i cette conference 28 >>. I1 semble aussi que les d~batscontentieux se r~f~rent de plus en plus aux projets de la Commission pouraider i mieux discerner la gestation ou l'6mergence des principes, des r6-gles ou des crit~res qui, i d~faut de s'imposer, se diffusent et permettentd'expliquer ou de justifier telle ou telle conduite des sujets du droit inter-national, ce qui contribue i brouiller davantage la ligne de dimarcationentre la lex lata et la lexferenda. I1 s'agit en somme d'un juste retour deschoses, car la Commission s'inspire beaucoup des travaux doctrinaux, dela pratique des Etats et des solutions jurisprudentielles pour avancer dansla codification, et il est normal qu'i son tour elle exerce une influence sureux dans le cadre d'un enrichissement r6ciproque.

26 Voir Affaires du plateau continental de la Mer du Nord, Arrt du 20fvrier 1969,

CL. Recued, 1969, par. 61-62.2 7 Voir Affaire du plateau continental, Arrt du 24fevrier 1982, CI.J. Recueil, 1982,par. 24.

2 8 Voir Affaire de la competence en matiwre de pcheries, Arrt du 28juilet 1974,

C.J. Recueil, 1974, par. 44.

Presentation by Mr. John Dugard 29

Any overview of the work of the International Law Commissionnecessarily involves an assessment of that work.

In assessing the Commission's contribution to the development

of international law, it is essential to consider not only its successes (theVienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 196930), failures (its draft

articles on the most-favoured-nation clause) and delays (its work on State

responsibility), but also the extent to which the Commission has contrib-uted to international law-making in the post-Second-World-War period.

The Commission has played no part in the drafting of many of themost significant treaties that have been adopted since 1945, in particular,the Geneva Conventions of 194931 and the 1977 Protocols to those Con-

ventions;32 the 1966 international covenants on human rights,"3 as well as

a host of other human rights treaties; environmental treaties; and a num-

ber of international criminal law instruments, including the Conventionfor the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft of 1970,34 the Con-vention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil

Aviation of 197 1,3 the International Convention against the Taking ofHostages of 1979,36 the United Nations Convention against Illicit Trafficin Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988,"3 the Interna-tional Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings of 199738and the 1990 United Nations Model Treaties on extradition 39 and mutualassistance in criminal matters °

There are a number of reasons why the Commission was excludedfrom the drafting of these instruments. Some have been drafted byspecialist bodies. Thus, the International Civil Aviation Organization(ICAO) was responsible for the drafting of the Hague41 and Montreal42

29 Member of the International Law Commission, 1997.30

United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331.

31thid., vol. 75, p. 5.32 Ibid., vol. 1125, pp. 3 and 609.33 See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in ibid.,

vol. 993, p. 3, and International Covenant on Civil and Political ights, ibid., vol. 999, p. 1 7 1 .

34 ibid., vol. 859/860, p. 105.351bid., vol. 974, p. 177.

361bid., vol. 1316, p. 205.37 Document E/CONF.82/l5, Corr.l and 2 (English only).38 Document A/RES/52/164.39 For text of Model Treaty on Extradition, see annex of General Assembly resolution

45/116 of 14 December 1990.4OFor text of Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, see annex of

General Assembly resolution 45/117 of 14 December 1990.4 1 See footnote 30.42

See footnote 31.

Conventions on aerial hijacking and sabotage, the International Commit-tee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for humanitarian conventions and a numberof intergovernmental bodies specializing in the fields of human rightsand the environment (aided by non-governmental organizations) for con-ventions in those areas. Other topics have probably been withheld fromthe Commission because their political nature rendered them inappropri-ate for a group of independent experts, as opposed to States' representa-tives. No doubt, other considerations have also played a part, such as theCommission's ponderous procedures, which are widely perceived to beunconducive to the preparation of treaties of immediate concern, and apro-statist bias on the part of the Commission, which renders it unsuitableto the handling of socially sensitive subjects.

Some of these reasons are valid; others are founded on unjustifiedperceptions of the Commission. The Commission is quite capable ofdealing with politically sensitive topics, as evidenced by its drafting ofthe 1994 Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court,43 the DraftCode of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind" and the1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes againstInternationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents.45 That itis prepared to take the initiative in this area is, moreover, demonstrated byits controversial proposal for State criminal responsibility contained inarticle 19 of its draft articles on State responsibility.'

The perception that the Commission is incapable of responding tothe immediate needs of the Sixth Committee is also unwarranted. Whilethe Commission has moved slowly in its treatment of major topics wherethere is no apparent urgency-such as the law of treaties and State re-sponsibility-it has responded promptly when the Sixth Committee hasgiven it a special assignment, as illustrated by its drafting of the 1973Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Interna-tionally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents and the 1994Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court. In both these instances,the Commission dispensed with the appointment of a Special Rapporteurand forwent compliance with its usual cumbersome, but thorough, proce-dures and instead appointed a working group which successfully com-pleted its task in a short period of time.

43Se the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the UnitedNations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an Interna-tional Criminal Court on 17 July 1998; for text of the Rome Statute, see documentA/CONF. 183/9.

44 Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-first Session, Supplement No. 10(A/51/10), pp. 19-120.

4 5 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1035, p. 167.46 See most recent discussion in Official Records of the General Assembly. Fifty-first

Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/53/10), pp. 118-147.

There is, however, substance in the view that the Commission dis-likes the speedy response to special assignments. Thus, Sir Ian Sinclair4 7

states:"One can detect a certain lack of enthusiasm within the Com-

mission for the matters referred to it by the General Assembly byway of special assignment, particularly those with a high politicalcontent." 48

If the Commission is to become more relevant, it will have to overcomethis lack of enthusiasm for special assignments of a political nature fromthe Sixth Committee.

The demand for "relevance" is, of course, one that serious scholarsreject. Undoubtedly, it is a demand that has been overdone, to the neglectof general principles of international law, in favour of subjects such ashuman rights, environmental law, and feminism and international law.Nevertheless, it is a demand from which the Commission cannot remainaloof. Certainly, it must continue with its work on such grand interna-tional law subjects as State responsibility, diplomatic protection and treat-ies, but it must mix this with topics of more pressing concern. If it doesnot respond in this way, it will be judged by historians as having failed totake the lead in the building of a legal order in which respect for humanrights, good governance and peace prevail.

47 Former member of the International Law Commission, 1982-1986.

48 Sinclair, Sir ., The International Low Commission (1987), p. 56.

Expos6 par M. Constantin Economides49

Je d6buterai ce brefcommentaire en rendant hommage a la Commis-sion du droit international qui est devenue au cours des cinquante ann6esde son existence un 616ment, pour ne pas dire un rouage, pr6cieux du sys-tbme international actuel.

Ce succ~s, elle le doit i trois facteurs essentiels- La Commission du droit international est, en premier lieu, un or-

gane ind6pendant, compos6 de sp6cialistes du droit international.11 s'agit donc d'un organe juridique de haut niveau, qui op6re ex-clusivement dans le domaine du droit international.

- Sa mission, en second lieu, consiste A assurer la codification dudroit international et A promouvoir son d6veloppement progres-sif. C'est donc elle qui identifie, interpr6te et pr6cise les normescoutumi~res existantes et propose de nouvelles r~gles pour satis-faire les besoins au niveau des relations entre Etats.

- Enfm, son ceuvre, qui a fait sa r6putation, est consid6rable, aussibien sur le plan quantitatif que qualitatif.

Nous allons essayer d'en donner un aperqu tr~s succinct:I) Nous devons A la Commission du droit international des tra-

vaux tr~s importants, d'une grande valeur scientifique, qui ont connu uner6ussite ind6niable dans la pratique. Dans cette premiere cat6gorie, quir6unit des ceuvres remarquables, citons son projet sur le droit de la merqui a donn6 naissance aux quatre Conventions de Gen~ve de 1958, lestravaux sur les relations et immunit6s diplomatiques et consulaires, aux-quels nous devons les deux Conventions de Vienne de 1961 sur les rela-tions diplomatiques et de 1963 sur les relations consulaires, respective-ment. La Convention de Vienne de 1969 sur le droit des trait6s estpeut-8tre le point culminant de l'ceuvre cr6atrice de la Commission dudroit international. Ce texte juridique, qui r6git une des mati~res les plusvitales du droit international, la vie des trait6s, est, selon nous, un des plusimportants de ce si~cle.

Dans la cat6gorie des grandes ceuvres de la Commission du droit in-ternational, on pourrait 6galement classer le projet sur le droit relatif auxutilisations des cours d'eau internationaux A des fins autres que la naviga-tion, lequel s'est transform6 r6cemment en convention internationale.

Il y a eu encore d'autres travaux de la Commission du droit interna-tional qui, bien qu'ayant 6 sur le plan juridique, du moins i l'6poque deleur 61aboration, parfaitement valables, n'ont cependant pas eu, pour di-verses raisons, le succ~s qu'ils auraient m6rit6o Je citerai ici, t titre

49 Membre de la Commission du droit international, 1997-; ancien conseillerjuridiqueau Minist~re grec des affaires 6tranghres.

d'exemple, le projet de declaration sur les droits et devoirs des Etats(1949), le Projet de code des crimes contre la paix et la s6curit6 del'humanit6 (1954) et le Projet sur les immunit6s juridictionnelles desEtats et de leur proprite, lequel est encore en examen dans le cadre del'Assemble gen~rale5° .

2) Mais, i c6t6 de ces resultats tr~s positifs, d'autres travaux de laCommission du droit international se sont sold6s par un 6chec. Je citeraiici deux cas : le Projet d'articles sur le statut du courrier diplomatique etde la valise diplomatique non accompagn6e par un courrier diplomatique,ainsi que le Projet d'articles sur les clauses de la nation la plus favoris&e.

La raison essentielle de l'&chec, clans ces deux cas, se trouve, selonnous, dans le fait que la Commission du droit international n'a pas dfi-ment tenu compte de la pratique des Etats en ces miti&es et ceci pour desraisons qui semblent re plus politiques que juridiques. Ceci nous amnei la conclusion qu'il est de l'int6r&t de la Commission du droit internatio-nal de rester aussi loin que possible du domaine politique.

3) D'autres travaux de la Commission du droit international n'ont

pas eu le succ~s escompt& Citons ici, i titre d'exemple, la Convention surles missions sp6ciales et la Convention sur la repr6sentation des Etats au-pr&s des organisations internationales de caract re universel. Dans cescas, l'explication du (( non-succs >> semble r6sider dans le fait que laCommission du droit international a voulu aller trop loin, notammentdans l'octroi des privileges et immunit&s, alors que la pratique intematio-nale n'en ressentait pas vraiment le besoin. Il faut en tirer la legon qu'il

est n6cessaire de mesurer trxs attentivement les besoins des Etats et de lapratique internationale avant de proposer des solutions concretes concer-nant le d6veloppement progressif du droit.

I1 en va de m~me, dans une certaine mesure, des deux Conventions

de Vienne sur la succession d'Etats de 1978 et de 1983, qui, lorsqu'elles

ont 6t6 61abordes, ne rtpondaient pas i des besoins 6vidents de la socidtiinternationale.

I1 faut signaler, clans le bilan n6gatifou mons positifde la Commis-

sion du droit international, les grands retards qu'elle a parfois pris dans

l'6tude de divers projets. Nous pensons ici, en particulier, aux travaux sur

la responsabilit6 intemationale.

50 Rsolution 52/151 de I'Assemblie gdn&rale du 15 d~cembre 1997.

En conclusion, nous croyons que la Commission du droit internatio-nal devrait utiliser l'exp~rience qu'elle a acquise au cours des cinquantederninres annes pour remplir encore plus efficacement son r6le positifetbienfaiteur d'organe d'6laboration des normes de droit international pourla communaut6 d'Etats. Pour cela, elle devrait revoir, sur la base de cetteexperience, son statut et, surtout, son organisation et ses m~thodes de tra-vail, afin d'affronter, dans les meilleures conditions possibles, les probl-mes juridiques du si~cle qui est devant nous.

Presentation by Mr. Qizhi He5

This Seminar was held in order to celebrate the fiftieth anniversaryof the International Law Commission. It follows the New York Collo-quium which was organized last autumn in accordance with the decisionof the General Assembly.52

Both events are of great significance for the enhancement of thework of the International Law Commission. While the Colloquium wasdedicated to broader issues, such as the role of the Commission in guidingthe overall international law-making process, delimiting the spheres inwhich the Commission is to play a direct role in law-making, selectingtopics on which the Commission is to work and improving workingmethods of the Commission, the current Seminar is devoted to an over-view of the work of the Commission with particular emphasis on currentproblems arising from the major topics in the codification and progres-sive development of international law. A proper solution of these prob-lems will undoubtedly pave the way for advancement of the Commis-sion's work. The Seminar and Colloquium are complementary to eachother, then, and both will no doubt prove conducive to the efficient under-taking of new endeavours in fulfilling the Commission's mandate.

Looking back over the past 50 years, the Commission has no reasonto be shy of its achievement. It has carried out a great deal of work in vari-ous fields of international law. The Geneva Conventions on the Law ofthe Sea and Optional Protocol of 1958, 53 the Vienna Convention on Dip-lomatic Relations of 1961,-" the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-tions of 1963, 5 the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 196956and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes againstInternationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents of197357 are the most important examples. The international rules in thesefields are contained in the relevant texts, which constitute a clear advancein inter-State relations and show the continued and important value of anorderly process of codification and progressive development of interna-tional law.

51 Member of the International Law Commission, 1994-.52See footnote 2.

53Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, United Nations, TreatySeries, vol. 516, p. 205; Convention on the High Seas, ibid., vol. 450, p. 11; Convention onFishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, ibid., vol. 559, p. 285;Convention on the Continental Shelf, ibid., vol. 499, p. 311; and the Optimal Protocol ofSignature concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, ibid., vol. 450, p. 169.

54[bid., vol. 500, p. 95.55 Ibid., vol. 596, p. 261.56See footnote 26.5 7 See footnote 41.

On the other hand, changes in the international arena, particularlythe proliferation of bodies with special law-making mandates, both per-manent and ad hoc, have reduced the scope of the Commission's work.As a result, the Commission was bypassed in the codification of such im-portant areas of international law as the law of the sea, the law of outerspace and the law of economic relations. In this context, criticism hasbeen expressed that the Commission has been divested of its main task aswork on the major topics traditionally identified as ripe for codificationhas been completed.

Such a view can hardly hold water, since, at the international level,codification and the progressive development of international law are acontinuing process. In view of the Commission's mandate and vocation,as well as its unique position in possessing the ability to liaise and main-tain a dialogue with Governments and the Sixth Committee of the Gen-eral Assembly of the United Nations, the need for the Commission tocontinue to serve as a main organ in the international legislative processis clear. Such a view was expounded in the section entitled "Programme,procedures and working methods of the Commission and its documenta-tion" in the Commission's report of 1996.5'

Against this background, it seems necessary for the Commission tomake some response to the wealth of ideas which have been generated bythese two events. The need for improvement of the Commission's workfor the purpose of further enhancing its contribution to the codificationand progressive development of international law is generally recog-nized. The Commission could consider these issues through its planninggroup or through a working group specially established for the purpose,in order that it might study, analyse and assimilate relevant ideas. On thebasis of all the enlightened views that have been expressed, most ofwhich are not entirely new, the Commission could undertake the recon-sideration of the best possible ways of creating international law. By ab-sorbing such valuable ideas, the Commission, under the guidance of theGeneral Assembly, could use its authority to assist the community ofStates in finding the necessary regulatory response to the new challengesof international relations in the twenty-first century. There is every rea-son to suppose that the International Law Commission will remain, as ithas been for the past 50 years, the main organ established by the GeneralAssembly for the codification and progressive development of interna-tional law.

5 8Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-first Session. Supplement No. 10(A/5 1/10), pp. 196-230.

Open-floor discussion

* * *

Dbat

Mr. Gerhard Hafner.59 First of all, I want to thank the speakersfor their comments on a very pertinent issue. Currently, there is no doubtthat the International Law Commission is in a crisis. This has alreadybeen highlighted in the General Assembly in the Sixth Committee, and italso seems to be the basis of today's discussion.

I particularly want to raise a question which in my view is funda-mental to the general crisis of the Commission and which also has beenaddressed by some of the other speakers, in particular, by Mr. JohnDugard. My experience in the international legislative process showsthat there is a major difference between a body like the InternationalLaw Commission, which consists of independent persons, acting inde-pendently from States, and other international bodies whose mandatesare restricted and which are composed only of States representatives. Ifwe take a quick look at all the different bodies engaged in the interna-tional legislative process, we see that the International Law Commissionis the only body composed only of independent specialists. In compari-son, the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the United Na-tions Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) are com-posed of States representatives. States have a different attitude andapproach to these different organs. In my view, they are more willing andprepared to submit certain issues, in particular political issues for codifi-cation, to an organ composed of State representatives who can directly in-fluence the negotiation process, rather than submit them to the Interna-tional Law Commission. The more we are confronted with issues that arenot subject to already established patterns, the more we are confrontedwith divergent attitudes in the approaches of States and the more suchbodies become part of the negotiation process. Only a body consisting ofStates representatives is, in the view of some States, appropriate to takeup and conduct the negotiation process. This has been my experience inthe last decade and I would be interested in knowing whether it is alsoshared by the others.

M. Alain Pelet6o. J'ai trois braves remarques. La premiere sesitue dans la ligne de ce que vient de dire M. Gerhard Hafner. Je ne crois

59Member of the International Law Commission, 1997-.60 Professeur, Universit6 de Paris-X (France); membre de ]a Commission du droit in-

ternational, 1989-; president de la Commission pendant sa quarante-neuvi~me session.

pas, personnellement, qu'il y ait une crise de la Commission du droit in-ternational. Et je me reserve de revenir 6ventuellement li-dessus. En se-cond lieu, je m'inscris en faux contre ce qu'a dit M. Ahmed Mahiou j plu-sieurs reprises concemant l'6valuation du succ~s de la Commission il'aune de la conventionnalisation de ses textes. Personnellement, je suisconvaincu qu'on ne peut pas se fonder sur le nombre de conventions con-clues, sur le nombre de ratifications, et que l'influence de l'ceuvre de laCommission est beaucoup plus difficile i appr~cier que cela. Et c'est, imon avis, une facilit6 qu'il s'est donne. Bien sfir, il a dit ensuite quel'influence exerc~e par les textes de la Commission d~passe la simpleconventionnalisation. Mais je trouve ennuyeux de v~hiculer cette ideque le travail de la Commission doit n6cessairement d~boucher sur desconventions et que dans le cas contraire c'est un 6chec. Par exemple, jesuis oppos6 i ce que le projet sur la responsabilit6 d~bouche sur uneconvention et je crois qu'on aurait bien tort de consid6rer que, s'il ne &bouchait pas sur une convention, la Commission aura connu un 6chec. Jepense que d'ores et d~ji le projet sur la responsabilit6 constitue un succ~s,quoi qu'il arrive, quel que soit son sort futur.

Et la troisinme chose que je veux dire c'est que, selon M. John Du-gard et M. Constantin Economides, lorsque les projets sont trop politi-ques, la Commission doit les 6viter. Je crois d'abord que tout est poli-tique, dans ce sens que, lorsqu'on fait du droit, in6vitablement le proces-sus de fabrication du droit est un processus politique. Le problme n'estdonc pas tellement de savoir si un th6me est politique ou non mais de sa-voir si un thnme est mfir ou nest pas mfir pour la codification, c'est-i-direde savoir s'il implique une negotiation intertatique ou alors la mise enforme de normes qui sont d~ji dans lair, soit en tant que normes coutu-mitres, soit en tant que tendances que la Commission peut se permettrede cristalliser. Etje suis d'accord avec ce qu'a dit M. Hafner, elle ne peutpas se permettre de cristalliser n'importe quoi, du fait qu'elle est com-pos6e de juristes md6pendants. Le vrai problme pour savoir si un projetva ou non r6ussir me parait 8tre un probl~me de maturit6 du sujet et puisaussi un problkme de modalit6 de la coop6ration de la Commission avecles organes politiques, d'abord avec les gouvemements et ensuite avec laSixi~me Commission. Je crois que, si un certain nombre de projets ontconnu un 6chec, c'est probablement parce que la Commission, d'unepart, et ]a Sixi~me Commission et les gouvemements, d'autre part, n'ontpas suffisamment collabor6, la Commission n'a pas suffisamment pris encompte ce que les Etats souhaitaient ou les Etats n'ont pas compris ce quela Commission voulait faire. Mais je pense qu'il faudrait rechercher laraison de ces 6checs dans des malentendus entre la Commission et les or-ganes politiques. Et je crois que ce problkme de coop6ration entre lesdeux piliers de la codification et du daveloppement progressifest absolu-ment fondamental et que IA rside sans doute ]a clef du succis ou del'6chec.

M. Mohamed Bennouna 61. Je regrette aussi qu'on ait parI tropde codification et pas assez du d~veloppement progressif. Alors tout sim-plement il ne s'agit pas de dire qu'ils sont distincts mais qu'au contraireils forment un bloc. La couturne n'est en effet pas quelque chose de gel6qui tr6ne quelque part sur un pi~destal sacr6 et que nous, membres de laCommission du droit international, viendrions cueillir. Non, ce n'est pasde la poisie. C'est quelque chose qui est nicessairement 6volutif, quibouge, qui vit, qui se trouve au sein de la vie internationale. Et lorsque laCommission recherche la coutume, elle cr~e un peu elle-meme la cou-tume. C'est l ie problkme. C'est que les membres de la Commissionn'ont pas cette neutralit6 extraordinaire qui serait celle des experts. Et li,pour r~pondre i M. Gerhard Hafner, le fait m8me qu'on dise dans le statutqu'ils sont choisis pour 8tre repr~sentatifs des principaux syst~mes juridi-ques dans le monde signifie qu'on tient compte pr~cis~ment de la diver-sit6 des Etats; ils ne sont pas de personnes abstraites. C'est vrai que noustrainons avec nous nos Etats, nos sentiments, nos nationalit~s, notre sub-jectivit6. Le problme est qu'il ne faut pas que les membres de la Com-mission, et il y a parfois eu des daviations, que les rapporteurs sp~ciaux,

viennent faire de la doctrine ou de la guerre doctrinale i la Commissiondu droit international. Je crois que c'est surtout ga le problkme, et il faut,comme le dit une affiche d'une association i l'ext~rieur du Palais des Na-tions, o oublier l'ego et devenir 6gaux >. II faut ainsi parfois que les rap-porteurs spiciaux oublient leur 6go et donc qu'ils se pr8tent i un travailcollectif.

Le deuxi~me point quej'aimerais souligner est la question de savoir,

d'apr~s 1'expos6 de M. Ahmed Mahiou qui a 06 bien complt6 par lescommentateurs, comment se fait-il que certaines conventions n'aient pas

recueilli le nombre de ratifications suffisant ? II faut se mettre i la place

des Etats. Peut-8tre que les Etats veuillent disposer de plus de libert6. Je

crois que l'expos6 de M. Mahiou 6tait assez &quilibr6, d'une part, en se

demandant pourquoi certaines conventions n'ont pas recueilli leur nom-

bre de ratifications, ce qui est quand meme leur objectif, et en montrant,

d'autre part, qu'il y a une prise en compte de ces projets de conventions

par la jurisprudence interationale en tant que base technique et logiquedu droit international. Si certaines conventions n'ont pas obtenu le

nombre de ratifications exig6, c'est parce que les Etats veulent garder

plus de libert&6 La question qui se pose i nous estjusqu'oil est-il possible

d'aller dans l'61aboration des principes juridiques g6n6raux en fonction

des sujets ? C'est notamment le cas de la succession. Lorsque nous avons

6tudi6 ici les diff6rents cas de succession, y compris en mati~re de natio-

61 Professeur agrdg des facult6s de droit; directeur g6neral de I'lnstitut du monde

arabe i paris; membre de l'Institut de droit international; ancien membre de la Commission

du droit international, 1987-1998; juge au Tribunal pnal international pour l'ex-You-

goslavie, 1999.

nalit6, nous savons qu'il n'y a aucun cas qui ressemble i un autre. Et on avoulu les mettre dans des categories g~ndrales. Je crois que li c'est un desprobl~mes. L'autre exemple est celui des fleuves, qu'a compl& brillam-ment notre coll~gue M. Rosenstock, o i on est vraiment alld vers la softlaw, les principes les plus mous et les plus fluides, pour laisser aux Etatsla possibilit6 d'intervenir et de les adapter r~ellement au cas par cas. Jecrois que c'est une des raisons qui font qu'il y ait certains sujets oA lesEtats, i mon avis, souhaitent garder une certaine marge de libert6. Et donclorsque les Etats envisagent de ratifier, leurs conseillers juridiques leurdisent qu'ils n'ont pas inttrt i le faire. Est-ce-qu'on a toujours intlrt iratifier ? C'est une des questions qui se posent dans ce domaine.

M. Guillaume Pambou-Tchivounda62 . Merci, Monsieur le Pr6-sident. J'aurai seulement trois observations i faire.

La premire part, comme l'a fait M. Alain Pellet, de cette preoccu-pation qu'exprime M. Gerhard Hafher, concemant la crise de la Comnmis-sion du droit international. Cette question de la crise deviendra certaine-ment bient6t un ddbat et ce n'est peut-etre pas le lieu pour donner uner~ponse, si r~ponse il y a, i cette question. Je suis de ceux qui ici ont eu,peut-8tre un peu de fagon discourtoise, i daplorer le conservatisme de laCommission du droit international etje salue M. Hafner lorsqu'il appellel'attention des uns et des autres sur une recherche des causes 6ventuellesde la crise de la Commission du droit international. Etje voudrais ajoutera cela que, de mani~re implicite, lorsque M. Constantin Economides con-clut son propos en nous appelant, pour saisir les questions d'avenir, i re-voir les statuts de la Commission, I'organisation de la Commission et deses mnthodes de travail, c'est vraisemblement pour tenir compte des cau-ses du malaise, pour ne pas dire de la crise de la Commission du droit in-ternational elle-m~me.

Le deuxinme point d'observation que je voudrais retenir concerne ler6le de la politique dans l'ceuvre de la Commission du droit internationalet dans l'orientation m~me de la Commission du droit international parrapport i l'avenir en particulier. Et lorsque M. Mohamed Bennouna ditqu'on a pas suffisamment pard de daveloppement progressif c'est certai-nement une maninre de dire qu'il ne faudrait pas avoir peur de la poli-tique. Mais la politique est aussi, d'ailleurs il nous l'a dit, dars la codifi-cation. Je voudrais dire par i qu'on aurait tort de considarer que la priseen compte de la pratique des sujets du droit international est axde sur desimples comportements ou de simples faits. Car les faits imputables oum~me les comportements imputables i tel ou tel sujet du droit internatio-nal sont toujours pr~dtterminds par des considarations, des motivationspolitiques. Comment voudriez-vous qu'on fasse le point sur la politique

62 Professeur agrtgd A I'Universit6 de Libreville, membre de la Commission du droitinternational, 1992-.

suivie par tel ou tel groupe d'Etats si on doit faire abstraction des d~termi-nants prcisement de ces politiques, de ces comportements ? Donc, im-plicitement dans l'euvre de codification, pour autant qu'elle soit ancr~esur la valorisation et la pratique, il y a forc6ment prise en compte des mo-tivations qui sont i la base de la pratique, c'est-i-dire prise en compte dela politique. A fortiori, devrais-je dire, cela est encore plus tenace lors-qu'il faut s'int6resser au d6veloppement progressif. Lorsque M. Econo-mides, en introduisant son propos, pr6sente la Commission du droit inter-national comme (< un organe de proposition de nouvelles r~gles pourrepondre aux besoms de la communaut& internationale >, c'est vraisem-blablement une mani~re de nous dire que la reponse, par proposition der~gles interpos6es, aux besoms de la communaute internationale est aussiun exercice qui consiste i saisir le caract~re politique des besoms de lacommunaut6 internationale. Car cette communaut6 internationale, pourautant qu'on la situe au seul niveau des composantes classiques que sontles Etats, exprime des besoins qui v6hiculent telle ou telle vision que telou tel groupe d'Etats a des rapports intemationaux, a un moment donn6,et cela toujours sur la base des preoccupations individualis6es, je n'osepas dire individuelles, ou en tout cas regroup6es autour de certains int6-rkts. Donc, la politique est au centre de l'ceuvre de la Commission dudroit international. Et l'on pourrait m~me dire, A l'instar de M. Pellet, quel'ceuvre de la Commission du droit international est une oeuvre i forteconnotation politique.

Je voudrais terminer par un troisi~me point d'observation concer-nant une interrogation soulev6e par M. John Dugard. Comment l'avenirjugera-t-il le travail de la Commission du droit international et la Com-mission du droit international elle-meme par rapport A un certain nombrede sujets au regard desquels la Commission se serait montr6e indiff6-rente ? Est-ce parce qu'il s'agit de sujets politiques ? Ce serait revenir A laquestion pr~c6dente : il n'y a pas de question juridique en soi, il n'y a pasde question juridique A l'6tat pur, la politique et le droit (( se donnent lamain >) et le droit international est au confluent de cette conjugaison. Jepense plut6t que pour r~pondre A cette question pos6e par M. Dugard, ilfaut avoir pr6sents A l'esprit les rapports qui existent entre la Commissiondu droit international et l'Assembl6e g6n6rale. Car, premi~rement, si laCommission du droit international est telle qu'elle est aujourd'hui, c'estparce qu'on a mis A mal son caract~re neutre, son caract~re d'expertise, etparce que les r6dacteurs de la Charte de l'Organisation des NationsUnies, en 1945, avec l'Article 13, ont coinc6, confm6 la Commission dudroit international dans la situation qui est la sienne par rapport A l'As-sembl6e g6n6rale. Seulement dans cette m~me situation, il est quasimentimpossible A la Commission du droit international de forcer la main il'Assembl6e g6n6rale. Et je crois que dans la d6termination des contoursde la mati~re dont la Commission du droit international a A s'occuper,l'Assembl6e g6n6rale a elle-m~me un r6le ijouer et cela A la lumi6re des

rapports statutaires qui s'6tablissent entre l'Assemble g~n~rale et laCommission du droit international. VoilA, Monsieur le President, quel-ques remarques que je voulais faire autour de ces trois points.

M. Igor Ivanovich Lukashuk6 3 (traduit du russe). Je vous remer-cie, Monsieur le President. Mes coll~gues ont bien montr6 queUes 6taient

les r~alisations de la Commission, ils ont montr6 6galement quelles6taient les difficult~s de son travail. M. Gerhard Hafner a parlk d'une

crise et il me semble qu'il faut parler d'une crise de croissance dans lamesure oi notre commission se voit confront6e , des tiches complete-

ment nouvelles et d'importance. Nous ne codifions plus le droit consu-

laire ou le droit diplomatique, mais nous nous aventurons dans des

domaines nouveaux etje songe ici au droit de la responsabilit6 intematio-nale, qui n'existait pas auparavant, ou au droit p6nal international. La

nouveaut6 de ces domaines introduit, bien 6videmment, de nouvelles dif-

ficult~s, mais ce n'est pas ici le seul point. En effet, on a dit que la codifi-

cation occupe de nombreux organes et d'ailleurs notre commission et

l'Assembl~e g~n~rale ont la mission d'6viter la fragmentation du droit in-

ternational. 11 faut 6viter qu'il soit d~membr6 en diverses branches sp-

cialis~es, et cette tiche doit 8tre l'apanage principal de notre Commis-sion.

Et enfm, un theme, qui a W abord6 i tr s juste titre, est celui de la

politique des Etats. Et pour nous, en tant que juristes et experts, il s'agit

d'une question d'importance, qui m6rite qu'on s'y attarde, qu'on en dis-

cute et ce que l'on a pu entendre ici, en d6pit des difficult6s ivoquies,montre bien que la Commission poursuit un difficile chemin et qu'elle a

fait beaucoup par rapport i tout ce qu'on a pu faire avant. On dit que les

conventions que nous avons 61abor6es ne recueillent pas un grand nom-

bre de ratifications. Mais nous agissons sur le droit international non pas

uniquement de manire formelle, par le biais des conventions. La Cour

intemationale de Justice, apr~s tout, a su utiliser nos documents commeinstruments de droit. Par exemple, il n'y a pas encore de convention sur laresponsabilit6 des Etats et pourtant la Cour utilise le Projet d'articles sur

ce sujet et les Etats s'en inspirent. Enfin, nos travaux, nos projets, sontre-

fl6t6s, non seulernent dans la pratique des Etats, mais aussi dans les ma-

nuels sur la base desquels des g6n6rations d'enseignants et d'6tudiants se

pr6parent et qui s'inspirent ainsi de nos travaux. Voili notre influence surle droit international, sur la conscience juridique intemationale. Vous

voyez que cette influence est prot~iforme. Et essayer d'6valuer les tra-

vaux de la Commission i l'aune des seules ratifications serait errone.

63 Membre de la Commission du droit international, 1995-.

Mr. Zdzislaw Galicki. 64 Today's first topic is closely connectedwith tomorrow morning's topics which deal with future topics and prob-lems of the international legislative process. So having the opportunity tocontinue tomorrow, I will limit myself here to very short remarks.

Certain statements made here concerned a crisis in the Commis-sion. I think that this crisis, and I agree with Mr. Igor Lukashuk, is con-nected to the new tasks the Commission has to confront. So this crisismay have a very positive effect: it can prompt us to look for new methodsand new ways. As I have already mentioned during the Colloquium inNew York, the time when we had very spectacular, straightforward topicsbefore the Commission is gone. What is left are topics that are more diffi-cult. However, I agree with Mr. Mohamed Bennouna. These topics,which we will develop during our work, belong more to the realm of pro-gressive development than to codification. And this is the practical resultof the recent developments which we have observed. Progressive devel-opment is going to play, at least in my opinion, an increasingly importantrole in our future work.

Another remark was that our work is less effective because we are abody of independent persons, not representatives of States. We may sayyes; we may say no. There are examples of such bodies making very con-structive contributions to international law. Last March, I attended thefourth session of the International Seabed Authority. The legal and tech-nical committee, which consists of independent specialists, had just final-ized its work on a very important document on the Mining Code, whichwill play an important role in the future exploration and exploitation ofseabed resources. On the other hand, in 1994, the Convention on theSafety of the United Nations and Associated Personnel65 was elaboratedin a very short time by a Committee of States' representatives. I agreewith Mr. Alain Pellet's point that the maturity of topics is most importantfor us. If we manage to combine the choice of topics with the politicalneeds of States and if we achieve cooperation between the InternationalLaw Commission, the Sixth Committee and States, then there will nolonger be a crisis.

64 Member of the International Law Commission, 1997-.65 The Convention was adopted by consensus in General Assembly resolution 49/59

on 9 December 1994 and opened for signature at United Nations Headquarters in New Yorkon 15 December 1994. The Convention came into force on 15 January 1999. For text of theConvention, see document A/49/742; it is also reprinted in International Legal Materials,vol. 34 (1995), p. 482.

M. Vaclav Mikulka". Je vais essayer d'etre aussi bref que pos-sible. Je voudrais me joindre aux commentaires faits par M. Alain Pelletet M. Mohamed Bennouna i propos des crit~res par lesquels on peut 6va-luer le succ~s ou I'6chec du travail de la Commission du droit internatio-nal. Je suis enti~rement d'accord avec eux. Ni la forme conventionnelleni le nombre de ratifications ne sont des crit6res sirs pour 6valuer le suc-c~s du travail de la Commission. Ce qui est plus important c'est de savoirsi les r~gles telles que formules par la Commission sont suivies ou nonpar la pratique des Etats ou 6ventuellement, lorsqu'il s'agit de d~veloppe-ment progressif, si elles inspirent au moins la pratique conventionnelledes Etats. A cc propos, je voudrais faire un bref commentaire sur deuxexemples qui ont 6t6 mentionnis comme des exemples d'ichec : la Con-vention de 1975 sur la representation des Etats, qui n'est pas entree en vi-gueur, et la Convention de Vienne sur la succession d'Etats en mati~re detraitts qui, malgr6 le fait qu'elle soit entree en vigueur, a 6 qualifi&ecomme un 6chec du travail de la Commission. Tandis que la premiereConvention sur la representation des Etats n'a donn6 aucune suite ni dansla pratique ni dans la jurisprudence internationale et a W g~n~ralementconsid~r~e commie tr~s ambitieuse en cc qui concerne l'6tendue des privi.lages et immunitts qui ont &6 accord~s, la Convention de 1978 a, au con-traire, 6t6 ratifite, en particulier par des Etats successeurs. Quelle autrepreuve de l'utilit6 du travail de la Conmission pourrait-on chercher, si-non le fait que les Etats auxquels cette convention est directementadress~e l'aient ratifi~e ? 11 y a aussi certains Etats qui ne l'ont pas ratifi~emais qui d~clarent i chaque occasion qu'ils se sentent inspires et obligesde suivre les r~gles de la Convention, comme par exemple la R~publiquetch~que. I1 y a aussi une pratique de la Commission Badinter qui s'est lar-gement inspir6e de cette convention. Et finalement, la d6cision de la Courinternationale de Justice tout i fait rtcente dans l'affaire relative au ProjetGabcikovo-Nagymaros constitue une preuve de l'application de certai-nes rtgles, en particulier de l'article 12 de la Convention.

Je voudrais conclure en disant que c'est surtout la question de savoirsi les r~gles sont suivies par les Etats dans leur pratique ou si elles les ins-pirent clans leur pratique conventionnelle, qui devrait 8tre retenue commele crit~re le plus important pour 6valuer le succts ou 1'6chec du travail de]a Commission.

66Membre de Ia Commission du droit international, 1992-1998; reprdsentant sup-pleant de Ia Rdpublique tch.que A Ia Sixi~me Commission de I'Assembl6e gtndrale des Na-tions Unies; directeur de Is Division de Ia codification du Bureau des affaires juridiques desNations Unies, 1999-.

"INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY":COMMENTS ON THE COMMISSION'S APPROACH

SRESPONSABILIT_ DES _TATSET RESPONSABILITt INTERNATIONALE >):

COMMENTAIRES SUR L'APPROCHE DE LA COMMISSION

Introduction67 par I'animateur, M. Jorge lllueca 68

Apr~s le premier chapitre de ce s~minaire, oA l'on a parl de ]a pers-pective gnirale des travaux de la Commission du droit international de-puis cinquante ans, nous allons aborder maintenant la question de la res-ponsabilit internationale sous ses deux aspects : la responsabilit6 desEtats darts le cas de commission d'actes illicites et la responsabilit6 inter-nationale pour les consequences pr~judiciables d~coulant d'activit~s quine sont pas interdites par le droit international. Pour cela nous avons leprivilege d'avoir la presence de M. Christian Dominic6 qui a pr~par6 unremarquable document sur ces deux sujets. M. Dominic6 participe active-ment aux questions juridiques intemationales en sa qualit6 de secr~taireg~n~ral de l'Institut du droit international. I1 a, i ce titre, apport6 une con-tribution efficace i la diffusion et i une meilleure connaissance du droitinternational par le biais de cet institut. D'autre part, pendant de nom-breuses armes, il a W professeur i l'Institut universitaire de hautes 6tu-des internationales de Gen6ve.

6 7 Traduit de 'espagnol.

6 Membre de ]a Commission du droit international, 1982-1991, 1997-, ancien prsi-dent de la R&publique du Panama.

Exposk par M. Christian Dominic669

Observation liminaire

II est 6videmment impossible, en quelques brefs propos, de proc~deri une 6valuation, meme sommaire, du travail considerable accompli paria Commission du droit international, au cours de plusieurs d~cennies, enmati~re de responsabilit6 intemationale des Etats. Ce serait m~me pr6-somptueux de pr~tendre le faire.

Ayant &6 invit6 A presenter un bref commentaire sur la vision g~n6-rale (approach) adopt~e par la Commission, l'auteur des pr~sentes obser-vations a d~cid6 de s'arr~ter i la perspective g n6rale des travaux, auchoix fait par la Commission de s6parer l'6tude des r~gles juridiques rela-tives au fait illicite de celle d'autres probl6mes intressant la riparationde dommages, A l'autre choix fait par elle d'mclure dans son projetd'articles une partie consacrie au r~glement des diff6rends.

Il s'agit A de trois aspects caractiristiques de l'orientation des tra-vaux de la Commission.

Deux autres questions seront encore 6voqu6es, concernant la res-ponsabilit6 internationale en g6n~ral et la terminologie.

Ce sont des choix qui peuvent prater A discussion, mais on peut sou-haiter que, malgr6 son caractre in~vitablement lacunaire, ce commen-taire pourra fournir une contribution utile A une discussion int~res-sante.

A. - UN TRAVAIL DE CODIFICATION UTILE

La longue aventure des travaux de la Commission du droit interna-tional sur la responsabilit6 internationale des Etats, si l'on peut souhaiterqu'elle s'ach~ve dans un d6lai raisonnable, pr6sente d'ores et dejA desmrites qui doivent 8tre reconnus.

L'6laboration doctrinale, libre d'une tradition liant trop 6troite-ment la responsabilit6 internationale A la violation du droit des 6trangers,a fait progresser d'une mani~re tris sensible la comprehension du sys-tame du droit des gens relatif A la transgression de ses normes. La distinc-tion entre normes primaires et normes secondaires, qui parait aujourd'hui6lmentaire, a marqu6 un pas important vers une meilleure analyse desr~gles concernant la responsabilit6.

Souligner les mirites de l'orientation g~nrale des travaux et laquantit6 d'ensemble des r~sultats obtenus, malgr6 quelques faiblessesponctuelles, n'est pas uniquement un hommage rendu aux principaux ar-

69 Professeur A Ilnstitut universitaire de hautes 6tudes intemationales de Gen6ve et Ala Facultd de droit de I'Universitd de Gen6ve; secr~taire g6n'al de l'institut de droit inter-national.

tisans de ce travail, singulirement M. Roberto Ago70, ainsi que ses suc-cesseurs, c'est aussi i'expression du vceu que, bient6t, l'on puisse saluerl'achivement d'une ceuvre qui certainement fera date.

L'autorite acquise par les travaux de la Commission sur la responsa-bilit6 des Etats se mesure sans doute i la large attention qu'ils ont suscit6edans la doctrine et, on peut le dire, a la forte influence qu'ils ont exerc~esur elle, principalement la premire partie du Projet d'articles.

Cette influence est aussi attestee par la jurisprudence, et non desmoindres.

On rappellera particulinrement l'importance de la sentence de NewYork, du 30 avril 1990, rendue entre la France et la Nouvelle-Zlande 1 ,qui se r~fere express6ment aux articles 31, 32 et 33 du Projet d'articles.

I1 faut surtout mentionner, tout rcemment, l'arr~t de la Cour inter-nationale de Justice du 25 septembre 1997 dans I'affaire du ProjetGabcikovo-Nagymaros entre la Hongrie et la Slovaquie72, dont le para-graphe 50 cite l'article 33 du Projet d'articles, et dont les commentairessubs~quents de la Cour donnent i penser qu'elle tient cette dispositionpour 1'expression du droit coutumier. On observera que cet arr~t fait enoutre allusion au commentaire de 'article 41, ainsi qu'aux articles 47 i 50du Projet d'articles (paragraphes 79 et 83, respectivement).

Ces observations permettent de souligner que la vertu premisre destravaux de la Commission est de r~aliser une oeuvre s~rieuse de codifica-tion. Contrairement i certains domaines sp cifiques de droit substantieloit la codification doit 8tre accompagn~e, au titre du d~veloppement pro-gressif, d'innovations, la mati~re dElicate de la responsabilit6 des Etatsexige au premier chef que l'ensemble du syst~me, tel que la pratique desEtats ]'a davelopp6, soit 6nonc6 dans un faisceau de r~gles claires quin'apportent pas des nouveaut6s. SeuLs des aspects ponctuels vraiment in-certains peuvent faire l'objet de formulations nouvelles.

I est vrai qu'une question comme celle des crimes internationaux del'Etat est controvers~e. La majorit6 de la Commission estime toutefoisqu'il s'agit d'une notion qui, dans son principe, car on peut discuter la ter-minologie, a 6t6 consacr6e par le droit international coutumier. Un fortcourant de la doctrine est du meme avis. La pratique parait le confirmer,car elle montre que, face i des comportements particuli~rement gravesd'un Etat, d'autres Etats, non directement affect6s, prennent unilatirale-ment des mesures coercitives pour faire cesser les comportements rpr6-

70 Ancien membre de ]a Commission du droit international, 1957-1978.71 Affaire concemant les problbmes n;s cntre la Nouvelle-Zlande et la France relatifs

i 'interpr6tation ou A I'application de deux accords conclus le 9 juillet 1986, lesquelsconcernaient les problnes d6coulant de I'affaire du Rainbow Warrior, Revue ginerale dedroit international public, t. 94, 1990, p. 838.

72 Affaire relative au projet Gabdikovo-Nagynaros, CUJRecuel 1997.

hensibles. On l'a vu clans le cas de l'Afrique du Sud, oii quelques Etatssont aliks bien au-deli des mesures ordonntes par le Conseil de s~curiti,ou encore dans le cas de la Pologne apr s l'instauration de la loi martiale.

La perspective du Projet d'articles est bien essentiellement la codifi-cation, et il est judicieux qu'il en soit ainsi.

Cette apprehension rev~t une importance particuli~re si l'on en vienti penser qu'en d~fimitive l'aboutissement des travaux de la Commissiondu droit international ne devrait pas ntcessairement prendre la formed'un trait6 international.

Les hsitations que l'on peut 6prouver A l'dgard de cette solutionsont sgrieuses. Le texte issu d'une conference diplomatique pourrait per-dre de sa coherence scientifique; les Etats ne verront pas ntcessairementun grand inttr~t i procdder A la ratification, etc.

I1 est possible que l'adoption par l'Assembl~e gtnrale des NationsUnies d'une dtclaration sur les principes et r~gles gouvemant la respon-sabilit6 des Etats dans leurs rapports mutuels soit une meilleure solution.Une oeuvre s~rieuse de codification, reprenant, avec quelques retouches,la question de l'origine de la responsabilit6 et celle de ses consequences,soit les deux premieres parties du Projet d'articles, serait peut-8tre plusrapidement mente A chef, avec, peut-on penser, autant de rayonnementou d'influence qu'un trait6 qui mettrait de longues annges A recueillir uncercle apprtciable de Parties contractantes.

I1 est vrai que l'on pourrait objecter A cette solution qu'elle laisse dectt6 le probl~me du rglement des diff~rends. Cette question est abordteplus loin (infra D).

B. - UNE DISTINCTION JUDICIEUSE : L'EXAMEN StPARt DE LA RES-

PONSABILITt INTERNATIONALE POUR LES CONStQUENCES PRE-JUDICIABLES DtCOULANT D'ACTIVITPS QUI NE SONT PAS INTER-

DITES PAR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL

I1 n'y a pas lieu de s'arr~ter longuement A cette question que la Com-mission a rtsolue, et bien rsolue, il y a longtemps dtjA.

D'une part, il y a le droit de la responsabilit6 en raison de la trans-gression du droit international. C'est tout le ph~nom~ne de l'illicite et deses consequences. On est en presence de normes secondaires destiniesprtcisement i cemer de pros la question de la violation, A indiquer lesconditions dans lesquelles elle se produit et A d6finir les effets juridiquesqui en rtsultent.

D'autre part, et c'est l'autre 6tude, radicalement distincte, on s'ef-force de dterminer les circonstances dans lesquelles un dommage quin'est pas la consequence d'un fait intemationalement illicite doit 8tre r6-par6 par un Etat. I1 s'agit d'identifier ou d'6noncer des r~gles primaires,

r~gles qui imposent ou qui imposeraient aux Etats une obligation de r6pa-rer totalement dMtach6e de toute violation du droit international.

Ce sont deux questions enti6rement distinctes, et les efforts m6ritoi-res mais souvent mal compris des rapporteurs successifs sur le second su-jet ont bien montr6 qu'avec celui-lui on se trouve sur un terrain bien diff6-rent de celui qui caract~rise la responsabilit6 pour fait internationalementillicite.

Les deux sujets doivent 8tre tenus s~paris.

C. - UNE ADJONCTION DISCUTABLE: LA TROISIP-ME PARTIE DU PRO-

JET D'ARTICLES CONSACRP-E AU RP-GLEMENT DES DIFFtRENDS

On peut 6prouver des doutes s6rieux quant i l'opportunit6 et il'utilit6 de la troisi~me partie, consacr6e i la question du rglement desdiffrends relatifs & l'interpr6tation ou I'application des articles sur la res-ponsabilit6 des Etats.

I1 faut rappeler que d~s le debut de ses travaux, la Commission alaiss6 ouverte la question de savoir si la troisi6me partie 6tait opportune,comme le rappellent encore les discussions rdcentes qu'ont tenues lesmembres de la Commission73 . I1 n'est pas certain que les arguments avan-c6s en faveur de cette troisi~me partie aient emport6 la conviction de tous.

On observe au passage que l'insertion de cette troisi~me partie rendn6cessaire l'adoption de la forme du trait6 international pour conclure lestravaux de la Commission (sauf si l'on fait suivre une d6claration d'unerecommandation sur les procedures de rglement des diff~rends, maisl'effet n'est pas le m~me). Cette question a ddji t6 voqu~e.

Ce sont cependant des arguments plus fondamentaux qui doivent re-tenir l'attention.

Sans pr6tendre couvrir enti~rement une question tr~s complexe, lesquelques observations qui suivent peuvent indiquer une orientation.

On doit souligner tout d'abord que les questions de responsabilit6,incluant les consequences qui en d6coulent, ne se posent pas dansl'abstrait. Elles surgissent dans un contexte, qui est celui du d6saccordsurvenant sur la violation d'une r~gle de droit, dont I'existence peut 8trecontest6e, dont le contenu exact peut 8tre controvers6, etc.

En bref, il parait difficile d'isoler le litige portant sur des r~gles se-condaires de celui qui en est l'occasion, le diffirend impliquant des rbglesprimaires.

On peut penser qu'il est artificiel de vouloir isoler pour lui-m~me un<< contentieux de la responsabilit6 >> qui dans un cas d'esp~ce porterait

73Annuaire de la Commission du droit international, 1993, vol. 1I (deuxi~me partie),p. 36 49,

uniquement sur l'mterpr6tation ou l'application des (< normes secondai-res >>, ce qui parait 8tre l'intention de la troisiime partie.

I1 faut observer que, si sur la question qui est au centre d'un dif-f6rend les parties A ce diff6rend sont li6es par ailleurs par une obligationjuridictionnelle (clause compromissoire ou autre type d'obligation), latroisieme partie est inutile, car i l'6vidence le contentieux de la responsa-bilit6 est inclus.

En revanche, si les parties i un litige n'ont pas entre elles de lienju-ridictionnel applicable, le probl~me se pose en termes diff~rents, et c'estalors que l'on peut avoir des doutes quant au contentieux limit6 i ]a ques-tion du droit de la responsabilit6. N'est-ce pas, partiellement tout aumoins, une vue de l'esprit ? Les Etats seront-ils pr~ts i se lier i un tel sys-tame ?

A vrai dire, la question fondamentale, qui explique les h6sitationsde la Commission, nous parait 8tre celle que pose la perspective del'adoption par un Etat de contre-mesures, sans que la confornit6 de cel-les-ci aux exigences du droit de la responsabilit6 soit expos6e i une formesatisfaisante de contr6le.

Cette question m6rite qu'on s'y arr~te.

A juste titre, la Commission a montr6 sa pr6occupation que lescontre-mesures soient plac6es, d'une mani~re ou d'une autre, sous unecertame forme de contr6le.

On en trouve l'indication particulirement dans l'article 48. Cettedisposition, en son paragraphe 2, lie la liciit6 des contre-mesures au res-pect des obligations de r~glement des diff~rends, ce qui est au demeurantconforme au principe voulant que les contre-mesures soient pr6c6d6esd'une o demande vaine de r6paration >> (sommation infructueuse). Quantau paragraphe 3, il prescrit l'obligation de suspendre des contre-mesuresau cas oii certaines conditions d'une proc6dure juridictionnelle sont r6u-nies.

On observera aussi que l'article 58, paragraphe 2, du Projet 6tablitune obligation d'arbitrage dans l'hypothise o des contre-mesures ont6t6 prises.

C'est dire que le probl~me est important, et la suggestion du presentcommentaire est d'indiquer qu'il peut trouver une solution dans le cadredu droit existant, interprt d'une manire modeme et i la lumire des in-dications fournies par la pratique.

La r~gle de base, dont la consecration en droit international coutu-mier n'est plus i d~montrer, a d~ji W 6voque. Elle est pr~sent~e dans ladoctrine traditionnelle comme une condition de la licdit6 du recours auxcontre-mesures : l'exigence de la demande de reparation reste vaine.

C'est cette r~gle qui mdrite de se voir donner un profil prdcis. A cet6gard, deux hypotheses doivent etre envisag~es, selon que les parties i un

litige sont likes entre elles, i l'6gard de ce litige, par une obligation de r6-glement arbitral ou judiciaire, ou ne le sont pas.

Lorsqu'une telle obligation de riglement juridictionnel existe, il pa-rait 6vident que, dans son principe, l'exigence de la somnmation infruc-teuse inclut le devoir de mettre en ceuvre, ou de tenter de mettre en euvre,la procdure pr~vue, avant que le droit de prendre des contre-mesurespuisse 8tre exerci. C'est bien ce que semble exprimer le paragraphe de1'article 48, encore que sa formulation ne soit pas heureuse.

Cependant, cette r~gle de l'6puisement pr~alable des recours exis-tants ne saurait 8tre absolue, car ce pourrait cr~er, dans certaines circons-tances, des d~savantages excessifs pour l'Etat 16s6. Si le fait internationa-lement illicite a cr i une situation illicite qui persiste, ii faut reconnaitrei l'Etat 16s6 le droit de prendre des contre-mesures de caract~re conser-vatoire, i condition de mettre en euvre la proc6dure de r~glement juri-dictionnel qui existe entre les parties. Ainsi, dans l'affaire du personneldiplomatique am~ricain i Th6ran, les contre-mesures, de caractre con-servatoire, prises par les Etats-Unis d'Am~rique A l'encontre des avoirsbancaires iraniens 6taient sans doute conformes au droit, ds lors que legouvernement qui les avait ordonn~es s'6tait simultan6ment porto de-mandeur devant la Cour internationale de Justice74 .

On peut 6galement 6voquer, dans ce contexte, la sentence arbitralerendue entre les Etats-Unis et la France le 19 dicembre 1978, sur la ques-tion des services a~riens 75.

Assur6ment, si, dans un cas de ce genre, l'Etat difendeur participe ila procdure et respecte les mesures provisoires arret~es par le tribunal,les mesures unilat~rales doivent cesser, de meme si le tribunal d6cidequ'il n'y a pas lieu i mesures provisoires.

C'est d'ailleurs le principe que parait exprimer l'article 48, para-graphe 3, du Projet d'articles.

En bref, en affinant les contours de l'exigence de la sommationvame, on reste dans l'esprit d'une codification satisfaisante.

Reste l'hypoth~se plus delicate oii n'existe entre les parties au litigeaucune obligation de r~glement juridictionnel.

I1 nous parait que, de nos jours, l'exigence de la vaine demande dereparation doit inclure l'offre de nfgocier, assortie de l'offre de recourir il'arbitrage ou au r~glement judiciaire.

74 Voir Affaire relative au Personnel diplomatique el consulatre des Etats-Unts aTahran (demande en indication de mesures conservatoires), Ordonnance du 15 decembre1979, C.LJRecueil 1979, p. 7, et Personnel diplomatique et consulaire des Etats-Unis 6T dhran, Arrit du 24 mai 1980, C.J.J. Recuedl 1980, p. 3.

75.Affaire concernant 1 Accord relatif aux services adriens du 27 mars 1946 entre lesEtats-Unis d'Amerique et la France, Nations Unies, Recueil des sentences arbitrales,vol. XVIII, p. 454.

I1 nous semble que, sans interpr6ter au-deli des limites du raison-nable la r~gle coutumi~re exigeant une vaine demande de reparation, ondoit admettre que celle-ci inclut le devoir d'offrir une procedure de r~gle-ment juridictionnel.

Le syst~me envisag6 est donc bien different de la clause d'arbitrageobligatoire sugg6rie par le Projet d'articles (le paragraphe 2 de 'arti-cle 58), qui doit tre accept~e, et s'inscrit dans le cadre de la mise au pointd'un instrument conventionnel.

En conclusion, on peut envisager que la deuxi~me partie du Projetd'articles, codification du droit couturmier, rappelle, d'une part, commeelle le fait dji, l'exigence du respect des obligations de r~glement desdiffrends en correlation avec les contre-mesures, en 6nongant avec prT-cision le principe et les exceptions strictement definies, et rappelle aussi,d'autre part, dans des dispositions distinctes, qu'en I'absence d'obliga-tion de r~glementjuridictionnel les contre-mesures doivent etre assortiesd'une offre de r~glement juridictionnel. Si l'Etat vis6 par les contre-mesures 'accepte, ce sera au tribunal de se prononcer, y compris sur lemaintien ou la suspension des contre-mesures. S'il la refuse, les contre-mesures sont licites, pour autant que, par ailleurs, elles soient conformesaux conditions posses par le droit international.

On observera qu'il n'a pas k6 question jusqu'ici d'autres modes dereglement que les procedures juridictionnelles. Pourtant, nigociations(qui sont de toute manire exiges par le droit coutumier), midiation etconciliation sont 6galement incluses dans la troisi~me partie du Projetd'articles.

Assur~ment, le r~glement politique peut jouer un r6le capital, lors-qu'il porte sur l'ensemble d'un litige. Un excellent exemple en est fournipar les accords d'Alger de janvier 1981 mettant fim i la crise des otagesentre I'Iran et les Etat-Unis 76 . Obtenus en partie grice i la mediation del'Alg~rie, ils comprennent plusieurs aspects diffirents, dont une proc6-dure arbitrale pour le r~glement d'une partie du contentieux.

Cependant, pour un contentieux limit6 uniquement aux probl~mesde responsabilit6, clans la mesure ofi il est concevable, les problmes juri-diques sont A ce point dominants que l'on s'est concentr6 ici sur le rapportentre contre-mesures et procedures juridictionnelles.

D. - POUR UNE VISION PLUS LARGE DE LA RESPONSABILITt DES ETATS

Chacun conviendra que le ph~nom~ne g~n~ral de la responsabilit6internationale, c'est-i-dire le syst~me des cons6quences de la violationdes normes du droit international, ne limite pas son champ d'action auxrelations entre les Etats. D'une part, parce que les r~gles du droit intema-

76International Legal Materials, vol. 20 (1981), p. 230.

tional imposent des obligations i d'autres sujets que les Etats, qui vontdonc pouvoir les transgresser et, d'autre part, parce qu'elles conferent6galement des droits i d'autres que les Etats, de sorte que les victimes dela violation du droit international peuvent etre d'autres sujets que lesEtats. Les organisations internationales, par exemple, jouent un r61e quiva croissant.

On rappellera d'ailleurs que la Commission avait procede de lam~me manifre, mutatis mutandis, en mati~re de trait~s intemationaux, enlimitant son premier projet aux traitds entre Etats.

Il devrait Etre relativement facile d'indiquer dans une dispositionsp6ciale, ou un priambule, que les articles sur la responsabilit6 des Etats,bien que revtus d'une importance fondamentale, ne rendent pas comptede toute la mati~re de la responsabilit6 intemationale.

Cependant, il y a un aspect de cette question des autres dimensionsde la responsabilitd internationale qui est en contact ftroit, sur un pointpr6cis, avec le Projet d'articles relatif aux relations entre les Etats, c'estcelui que touche l'article 22 dudit Projet. 11 m6rite qu'on s'y arr~te.

On sait que c'est en voulant d6terminer le moment o/i est consacr6ela violation d'une r~gle du droit des 6trangers que la Commission s'esttrouv6e devant un dilemme. En fixant ce moment l'acte, ou au fait ini-tial, elle se heurtait i l'objection que, du fait de l'existence de la r~gle del'epuisement pr6alable des voies de recours intemes, la violation n'en-gendrait aucune pritention internationale dans le chef de l'Etat nationalde la victime, ce qui est illogique, car i la responsabilit6 internationaledoit correspondre une pr6tention internationale. C'est donc i l'autre solu-tion que s'est arrWtee la Commission, en fixant, selon l'article 22 du Pro-jet, le moment de la violation, et par cons6quent la naissance de la respon-sabilit6 intemationale, i l'issue de l'6puisement par les particuliers desvoies de recours internes. L'acte initial ne serait donc pas une violation dudroit international, ce qui n'est pas satisfaisant, car une arrestation arbi-traire, des coups et blessures graves inflig6s par un agent de police, laviolation d'un trait6 conferant des droits aux particuliers, sont bien destransgressions du droit international au moment oii elles se produisent.D'ailleurs, la Commission elle-m~me en arrive i 6noncer (le paragra-phe 3 de l'article 25 du Projet) qu'en cas de succession d'actes (< le tempsde perpetration de la violation s'6tend sur la p6riode enti~re allant ducomportement qui a amorci la violation A celui qui l'a parachev6e )). I1nous semble que la violation n'est pas seulement amorc6e, mais con-sacr~e par la violation initiale. I1 reste cependant i r6soudre le problemed6ji signalk, i savoir qu'il est difficile de concevoir qu'une violation dudroit international ne produise aucun effet juridique lorsqu'elle est r6a-lisde, en termes de responsabilit6 et de pr6tention internationale corr6la-tive.

C'est ici que vont intervenir des observations likes i ce que l'on peutconsidrer comme une vision plus large de la responsabilit6 intematio-nale de l'Etat. Comme le montrent certains systmes conventionnels, parexemple dans le domaine de la protection des droits de l'homme, certai-nes normes, d'origine interktatique quant i leur source, obligent les Etatvis-a-vis des particuliers. On peut pretendre que c'est le cas de nombreuxtrait~s (en matiere d'6tablissement, de double imposition, etc), mais ausside r~gles du droit coutumier, particuli~rement dans le domaine du droitdes 6trangers (et des droits de l'homme en g~ntral).

Or, si les Etats assument des obligations intemationales de ce type,ils sont exposes i les transgresser, le cas 6chtant. Avec quelles cons6-quences ?

Bien que le probl~me doive encore itre 6tudii de manire appro-fondie, on peut pr~tendre, ou du mons l'on ne peut pas exclure, que leparticulier ls6 dispose d'une pr~tention internationale contre I'Etat qui atransgress6 son droit. Le sort de cette pr~tention est incertain, car son titu-laire dispose rarement d'une voie de procedure qui lui permette de la fairevaloir. C'est 6videmment devant les tribunaux de l'Etat en cause qu'ildoit la presenter, et c'est l'une des significations de la r~gle de l'pui-sement des voies de recours internes. Assur~ment, le juge interne, biensouvent, ne peut pas statuer sur des problkmes de droit international. Celan'est pas dicisif pour le probl me qui nous occupe, car l'existence d'uneprttention (claim), qui est un problkme de fond, est distincte de la ques-tion de savoir s'il existe un moyen judiciaire de ]a faire valoir.

En bref, il est simplement sugg~r6 ici qu'entre le fait initial, quiconsacre la violation du droit international, et le moment oit, i l'issue del'Npuisement des recours internes, on sait que prend naissance la preten-tion internationale d'Etat i Etat, il n'y a pas le vide. Une pr~tention duparticulier fondae sur le droit international existe. I1 lui appartient de lafaire valoir devant le juge interne, et c'est seulement lorsqu'il a 6puis6les recours internes que sa pr~tention devient une pr~tention 6tatique.Celle-ci, qui est caract~ristique de la protection diplomatique, prend le re-lais de la prttention du particulier lorsqu'il n'a plus la possibilit6 de lafaire valoir. Lorsque le particulier dispose, par l'effet d'un accord inter-national, d'une voie de recours intemationale, la pr6tention 6tatique n'estpas actuelle, ce qui indique bien que la pr~tention individuelle precede lapr~tention 6tatique et ne s'efface devant celle-ci qu'en cas de dafaut, oud'6puisement de voies de recours.

Il n'est pas question d'ouvrir ici un d6bat complet, qui serait long etcomplexe, sur la dimension exacte du problme de la responsabilit6 inter-nationale de l'Etat vis-i-vis du particulier. La question n'a pas encore Wvraiment explor6e. Le seul propos des observations pr6sent6es ici estd'indiquer que, dans le Projet d'articles, il serait judicieux et justifi6 demontrer d'une manibre appropri6e que la responsabilit6 internationale

d'Etat i Etat est parfois imbriqude dans d'autres cons6quences juridiquesde la violation du droit international.

Puisque l'exemple emprunti au Projet d'articles est celui de la vio-lation du droit des &rangers, on pourrait suggdrer une formulation diff6-rente de celle qui a 6t6 retenue. Plut6t que d'indiquer que la violation dudroit international ne se produit qu'apris la demire dcision sur recours,alors qu'elle se produit manifestement au moment du fait initial, il seraitpr~f rable d'indiquer que la responsabilit6 internationale d'Etat i Etatprend naissance a l'issue du dernier recours, sans prejudice des cons6-quences que la violation du droit international, lorsqu'elle est r~alise, estsusceptible de produire dans les rapports entre le particulier ls6 et l'Etatqui a port6 atteinte i ses droits.

E. - POUR UN EXAMEN ATIENIIF DES PROBLtMES DE TERMINOLOGIE

La terminologie est parfois au ccaur des malentendus ou des difficul-t~s parmi les plus graves. Elle s'attache i la denomination de concepts quidoivent 8tre clairs quant i leur signification.

La Commission a sufflisamment d6battu de la notion des crimes in-ternationaux de l'Etat pour qu'il ne soit pas utile d'y revenir. On rappel-lera simplement que quant i la terminologie, le fond 6tant laiss6 de c6t6,les difficult~s sont venues principalement de deux 0l6ments.

Tout d'abord, m me si l'on estime qu'il estjuste d'identifier une ca-t6gorie sp~ciale d'infractions particuli~rement graves, on a pu regretterl'utilisation du terme crime, riserv6 en principe i des infractions des par-ticuliers et qui les exposent i des sanctions pinales.

En second lieu, c'est pr~cisement cette connotation penale qui faitprobleme, car il est bien evident qu'il ne s'agit pas de (( criminaliser )o laresp nsabilith de I'Etat. La perspective g~ndrale est au premier chef d'au-toriser la communaut6 internationale, soit les Etats, i prendre des mesu-res destindes i faire pression sur l'Etat vis6 pour qu'il mette un terme iune situation illicite particuli~rement grave.

Quoi qu'il en soit, depuis que l'article 19 a 6t6 proposa, l'expressions'est imposde. I1 parait difficile de lui substituer un autre terme, d'autantque certaines expressions ont dji leur signification propre. Ainsi, parexemple, l'expression (( infraction grave ,. Faudrait-il dire (( infractionserga omnes > ? I est probablement trop tard pour faire machine arrire,mais ce n'est pas certain.

En revanche, il est un point sur lequel le Projet doit 8tre revu. Ils'agit de la d~finition de l'(( Etat ls6, telle qu'elle figure i l'article 40.

La question est importante, car cette expression ou notion a d'ores etdeja, et depuis longtemps, une signification precise: il s'agit de l'Etat qui,du fait du comportement d'un autre Etat, subit une atteinte a son droit.

C'est au demeurant ce qu'indiquent la plupart des dispositions figurant il'article 40 du Projet d'articles.

Cependant, ce m~me texte, on le sait, pretend dlargir la notion d'Etatls6 au-deli de son sens traditionnel : c'est le fait du paragraphe 3 deP'article 40 qui stipule : << En outre, l'expression "Etat ks6" d~signe, si lefait internationalement illicite constitue un crime international, tous lesautres Etats. ))

On peut trouver une proposition allant dans la meme direction dansle paragraphe 2, e, iii, de l'article 40 relatif aux trait~s multilat~raux enmati~re de protection des droits de l'homme.

Ce texte est probablement flacheux. II est de nature i crier des diffi-cult~s.

I1 faut relever tout d'abord qu'il est g~n6ralement inopportun de mo-difier le sens d'une notion d~ji 6tablie, car cela peut entrainer des confu-sions diverses (par exemple, en l'occurrence, en ce qui conceme la qua-lite pour agir devant un tribunal). II y a 6galement des motifs plusimportants encore qui font apparaitre cette orientation i la fois inadequateet inutile.

Elle est inadaquate car elle soulkve des questions non r~solues.Ainsi, par exemple, le chapitre II de la deuxi~me partie du Projet d'ar-ticles est consacr6 aux << Droits de l'Etat ls6 et obligations de l'Etat au-teur du fait intemationalement illicite )>. Faut-il comprendre que, lorsquel'on est en prisence d'un crime international, tout Etat va pouvoir reven-diquer l'un ou l'autre des droits 6nonc~s dans ce chapitre ? Poser la ques-tion suffit i montrer les difficult6s susceptibles de surgir.

II semble au demeurant que, nolens volens, la Commission en aitbien eu conscience. En effet, dans le chapitre IV de la deuxi~me partie,consacr6 aux crimes intemationaux, l'article 53 du Projet indique les<< obligations incombant i tous les Etats )>. Mais ceux-ci ne sont-ils pastous des Etats 16s6s au sens du Projet ? Alors, pourquoi utiliser deux ex-pressions diff~rentes ?

Peut-8tre trouve-t-on ici une piste vers une meilleure solution : ilfaut en effet distinguer P< Etat ls6 )>, d'une part, les v autres Etats )),d'autre part.

Si l'on conserve i l'expression << Etat 16s6 )) son sens traditionnel, enenlevant de sa d~fmition (article 40) ce qui l'6largit de mani~re inoppor-tune, les droits de cet Etat peuvent etre 6noncs sans qu'aucune ambiguitise pr~sente. En substance, les articles 41 i 50 du Projet d'articles con-viennent en ligne gin~rale et donnent un reflet 6quilibr6 du droit cou-tumier.

Reste la question des consequences d'un crime international.I1 parait judicieux de conserver le principe, illustr6 par l'article 52 du

Projet, voulant qu'il y ait des consequences sp~cifiques pour l'Etat ,mais entendu ici dans sa signification stricte.

I parait 6galement judicieux d'6noncer, comme le fait l'article 53du Projet, que diverses obligations incombent i tous les Etats, mais alorsils apparaissent en tant que membres de la communaut6 internationale etnon pas en tant qu'Etats l6s~s.

Enfin, il serait judicieux, et conforme au droit, de consacrer un ar-ticle sp~cifique au droit de tous les Etats de prendre des mesures de con-trainte. 11 devrait stipuler, en substance, que face i un crime internationald'un Etat, tous les Etats peuvent prendre contre celui-ci des contre-mesures analogues A celles qui sont autoris~es pour l'Etat 16s6, i seule find'obtenir la cessation de la situation illicite qui persiste.

Si ce retour a une terminologie traditionnelle et plus adequatemarque peut-8tre une modification sensible au plan conceptuel, il ne setraduit finalement pas par un bouleversement du Projet d'articles. Seulsquelques ajustements sont rendus ntcessaires.

F. - CONCLUSIONS

Les quelques observations, sommaires et incompltes, pr6sent&esici conduisent a la synthese suivante :

1) Ayant essentiellement axi son travail sur la codification, laCommission du droit international parait etre en mesure de mettre aupoint un texte qui, en ce qui conceme les deux premieres parties du Projetd'articles, donne un reflet convamcant du droit coutunier d'aujourd'hui.Cela permettrait de renoncer, le cas 6ch6ant, a la nigociation d'un traiteinternational, pour donner pr~f6rence i une d6claration de l'Assembl6eg6n6rale des Nations Unies.

2) En ce qui concerne le r~glement des diff6rends, l'id6e d'uncontentieux limit6 A la question de la responsabilite n'emporte pas laconviction.

De toute manire, s'il existe, relativement au litige qui les oppose,un lien juridictionnel entre deux Etats, ils doivent respecter cette obliga-tion. Seule l'hypoth~se de contre-mesures conservatoires, paralklementi la mise en ceuvre de l'obligation de r~glement, est acceptable.

S'il n'existe pas de lien juridictionnel entre les Etats en litige, l'ob-ligation de rechercher une solution par des moyens pacifiques s'impose ieux. Si l'un des Etats estime 8tre en droit de prendre des contre-mesures,l'exercice de ce droit n'est licite que s'il est accompagn6 par une offre der~glement arbitral ou judiciaire, ce qui constitue l'interpr6tation modernede l'exigence coutumiire de la vaine pr6sentation d'une demande de r6-paration.

3) Le texte finalement retenu devra rappeler, d'une manire oud'une autre, que le phdnom ne g6n6ral de la responsabiliti pour violationdu droit international n'est pas entirement couvert par des regles gouver-nant les relations des Etats entre eux. Une partie des r6gles valables entre

les Etats s'appliquent probablement aussi aux organisations intemationa.les. En outre, il faut riserver la question de savoir si, lorsque le droit inter.national impose une obligation i un Etat vis-i-vis des particuliers, la vio-lation d'une telle obligation produit des effets d~s qu'elle survient, desorte qu'il faudrait distinguer le moment de la violation des conditionsqui font que la responsabilit6 intemationale de l'Etat soit engag~e vis--vis de l'Etat national du particulier 16s6.

4) Enfin, il est souhaitable que la Commission du droit internatio-nal soit attentive aux problmes de terminologie. En particulier, la d~fmi-tion large de l'Etat 16s6 soul~ve d'importants probl~mes.

Presentation by Mr. Bruno Sim ma"

I would like to start with the observation that, however controversialthe work of the International Law Commission on State responsibilityhas been, I regard it as the doctrinally and theoretically richest topic ofcodification. I think that if we really consider the number of difficultquestions tackled by the Commission and partly answered, in my view, itis not the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties7" and the work theCommission has done on that topic, but rather the topic of State responsi-bility that deserves to be called the most interesting, maybe the most im-portant, advance in codification. Because, as we know, the debate onState responsibility is on the other side of every coin; it represents a blue-print of the current status of international law. IfI had to characterize thecurrent status of international law, I would call it, not surprisingly tosome of you, international law on the move from bilateralism to commu-nity interest. I think that the law of State responsibility shows, and has toshow, the movement of adaptation. Therefore, it is not possible for me toagree with Mr. Christian Dominici when he says in his presentation: < Lamatiere dalicate de la responsabilit6 des Etats exige au premier chef que1'ensemble du syst~me, tel que la pratique des Etats l'a d~velopp6, soitinonc dans un faisceau de r~gles claires qui n'apportent pas de nou-veaut6s. )) I disagree with the last part of this statement, but this is theonly point on which I disagree with him. I think that codification and pro-gressive development of State responsibility at the end of the century hasto take into account the move away from the traditional law on State re-sponsibility towards more community-directed structures and processes.

Of course, for a member of the International Law Commission it isvery difficult, at this stage, to comment on its ongoing work because Ihope that we will have happy and animated weeks of debate on the draftthat we are going to receive within the next days. Let me just sort outthree or four points. One characteristic of the draft, as it now stands, isthat in some areas it is too comprehensive. For instance, articles 20, 21,23 and 24 to 26 can only be seen as expressions of idiosyncrasy of indi-vidual Special Rapporteurs. I cannot imagine a Commission like the one Iknow, the one I have known for a year now, to really get excited aboutthat kind of rule. On the other hand, there are provisions, like article 1 towhich I am going to turn in a moment, or article 35, the simplicity ofwhich is really misleading because it opens the famous Pandora's box.And I think that it will be necessary to work toward a more balanced out-come.

A second observation on the way in which the draft attributes re-sponsibility, that is, the provisions on acts of the State, seems to me to be

"Member of the International Law Commission, 1997-.7 8 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331.

posited on an image of the State as an impermeable unit. I wonderwhether this view of the State and the view of the relationship betweenorgans of States and individuals with regard to responsibility has not be-come obsolete with the move towards privatization of public functions,globalization and the outsourcing of State activities. Therefore, anotherpoint the Commission will have to keep in mind is the necessity ofpayingmore attention to the interface between State activities and private activi-ties and to really improve what is now in articles 8 and 11, and there isvery little there.

The main point I want to make is the following: during the first ses-sion, somebody noted that too little had been said on progressive devel-opment compared to codification. I think the draft, as it stands now, asadopted at the first reading, 9 represents a fine piece of progressive devel-opment of State responsibility. Because the draft establishes a system ofobjective responsibility, article I cannot be understood differently; everyinternationally wrongful act entails responsibility. This is not responsi-bility in the private law sense, whereby two landowners face each otherand say if you hit me, I will hit you, and if you trespass on my property,you owe me compensation. This is really a community approach. Thereis an international legal community which sets up its legal system anddevelops what Mr. Alain Pellet in a recent publication has called ordrepublic. That is the understanding underlying the draft as it now stands.And to ask, as several States have done in their observations on the draft,that the Commission focus on damages is fundamentally wrong. It is as ifsomeone were to enter a vegetarian restaurant and then complain that nomeat is served there. The Commission, in its draft, is serving a specificdish, and this dish is not based on the ingredient of "damages".

However, the system is still flawed. I would go so far as to call it"schizophrenic" because it posits a system of objective responsibility,based on subjective elements, namely, on the element of injury. That issomething to which Mr. Dominic6 has just drawn our attention. The coreproblem is the famous article 40 on the injured State. Of course, the Com-mission has realized that there is a lack of community institutions and thatit is a very incomplete international community. Therefore, for the imple-mentation of an objective responsibility, it had to rely on individualStates pursuing community interests ut singuli. It is very interesting tonote that this construction came from Mr. Roberto Ago8" who, in one ofhis reports, expressly stated that in international law, vis-A-vis domesticlaw, "every correlative right entails an obligation and every obligationentails a correlative right". This is really a codification of traditional Stateresponsibility, which the Commission and Mr. Ago then wanted to over-

79 For text of draft articles adopted at the first reading, see Official Records of theFifty-first Session, Supplement No. IO(A/SI/IO), pp. 121-169.

"°Former member of the International Law Commission, 1957-1978.

come. It is a highly problematic notion, and I think that it goes beyond theterminology element mentioned by Mr. Dominic6. The notion of injury,the concept of the injured State, goes far beyond terminology. Becauseevery debate in the Commission or in the literature necessarily goes backto a differentiation between directly injured and indirectly injured States,we see a return to the traditional bilateralist paradigm.

My next observation about responsibility concerns article 1 of thedraft on State responsibility: "every internationally wrongful act givesrise to international responsibility". Is this really true? I have been amember of one of the United Nations Human Rights treaty bodies for 10years, and I have had the opportunity to note that some of the obligationsrepeatedly breached by States were obligations to report and obligationsto respond. If I had stood up in this human rights committee and said,"Ladies and gentlemen, we are in the presence of an internationallywrongful act, would you please take a look at the International Law Com-mission's draft", I would have provoked a hearty laugh indeed. I thinkthat we really have to reconsider another axiom of the State responsibilityconstruction, namely, the axiom of the distinction between primary andsecondary rules. And I think that it is not sufficient, as the draft has pro-vided, to provide for lege specialis for subsystems only with regard tosecondary rules as in article 37. The question I ask myself now is: Couldit be the case that objective responsibility, in the sense of responsibilitygoing beyond the traditional bilateralist delict-damage pattern, is, in allcases, based on subsystems or lege specialis? This is a question weshould address.

Just a few words on international crimes. I think that the concept ofinternational crimes illustrates the problem that I have just sketched. Poli-tically speaking, the notion goes back to the cold-war period, which hasnow ended. But the notion of crime will never lose its punitive connota-tion; therefore, it should be discarded. I think that the time has come forthe establishment of a system of State responsibility that (1) gives ade-quate rule to lege specialis, which is not the case with the draft as it standsnow; and (2) recognizes the central yet limited place of the draft, betweenwhat I think the late Mr. Willem Riphagen s' once called the super-systemof the Charter of the United Nations on top and the new law on interna-tional criminal responsibility of the individual at the bottom-a "sand-wich approach" to State responsibility. But I think that in 1998 we can af-ford the elimination of any notion of crime or criminal connection withState responsibility. I think that the Commission should instead recog-nize that besides rights and obligations between States, international lawnow provides for obligations erga omnes based on the interest of the in-ternational community as a whole. The Commission should provide for a

81 Former Member of the International Law Commission, 1977-1986.

regime for violation of obligations erga omnes recognizing that this re-gime will have to be residual, in the sense of taking into due account theexisting super-system of the Charter of the United Nations and the exist-ing subsystem or lege specialis that I have mentioned.

A last word on the outcome of this exercise: I agree with Mr.Dominic6 that we should give up the idea of producing a draft conven-tion. I would prefer what could be called a "soft" solution in the form of adeclaration or even a code, probably a declaration, because the chances ofobtaining an adequate number of ratifications for a convention on Stateresponsibility are slight indeed, and going the non-treaty way wouldeliminate that stigma of failure which unratified or insufficiently ratifiedcodification conventions carry. I agree very much with Mr. Pellet whosaid that "conventionalization" does not really mean success. I think"conventionalization" of the topic of State responsibility really meansputting the topic into an unnecessary straitjacket. This danger should beavoided. Of course, going the non-treaty way would do away with all theproblems raised concerning the settlement of disputes.

Presentation by Mr. Emmanuel Akwei Addo"

Let me begin by thanking the various Special Rapporteurs whose in-defatigable work has produced this monumental piece of work on Stateresponsibility. I also would like to compliment my predecessors, mem-bers of this Commission, who in several ways have contributed to theadoption of the set of 60 draft articles on international responsibility andliability which are before us for consideration. It is quite clear that theCommission has concentrated on the progressive development and codi-fication of secondary rules, aimed at determining whether a breach of theobligation imposed by the primary rules has taken place and if it has whatwould be the result of that breach. One can recall that the General Assem-bly at its twenty-seventh session, by its resolution 3071 of 30 November1973, recommended, inter alia, that the Commission should continue, ona priority basis, its work on State responsibility with a view to the prepa-ration of a set of draft articles on responsibility of States for internation-ally wrongful acts and, at an appropriate time, to undertake a separatestudy of the topic of the international liability for injurious consequencesarising out of the performance of other activities. Therefore, the set ofdraft articles developed by the Commission deals solely and strictly withresponsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts.

Part one of the draft articles is divided into five chapters. Chapter I,concerning general principles and comprising four articles, is devoted tothe definition of a set of fundamental principles, including the principleattaching responsibility to every internationally wrongful act. Althoughthis has been criticized, I am not going to comment on it now. Chapter IIof part one on the acts of State under international law is concerned withthe subjective element of the internationally wrongful act. And the provi-sions of draft articles 5 to 15 address the determination of the conditionsin which particular conduct must be considered as an act of State underinternational law. The various aspects of the objective element of interna-tionally wrongful acts are dealt with by the provisions of draft articles 16to 26, comprising chapter III and termed "breach of an international obli-gation".

Part two of the draft articles is designed to deal with matters relatingto the content and forms of international responsibility, and is dividedinto four chapters comprising articles 36 to 53. Chapter I, comprising thetext of draft articles 36 to 40, spells out the general principles relating to

the content, form and degree of international responsibility. Draft article

37 entitled "lex specialis" states that the provisions of part two govern the

legal consequences of any internationally wrongful act of a State except

where and to the extent that those legal consequences are being deter-

mined by other rules of international law relating specifically to the inter-

S2Menber of the International Law Commission, 1997-.

nationally wrongful act in question. Draft article 38 on customary inter-national law provides that customary international law shall continue togovern legal consequences of an internationally wrongful act of a Statenot set out in the provisions of the present part. Draft article 39 on the re-lationship to the Charter of the United Nations states that the legal conse-quences of an internationally wrongful act are subject, as appropriate, tothe provisions and procedures of the Charter, relating to the maintenanceof international peace and security.

Draft article 40 defines the term "injured State" to mean any State aright of which is infringed by the act of another State. Paragraph 2 of arti-cle 40 enumerates six situations in which the infringement of a right mayoccur, such as a breach of a bilateral treaty or a multilateral treaty or a ruleof customary international law, or non-observance of a decision of an in-ternational court or tribunal. Where an internationally wrongful act con-stitutes an international crime, paragraph 3 of draft article 40 providesthat the term "injured State" means all other States. The rationale is that itis absolutely necessary to determine which State or States are legally con-sidered injured State or States because only that State or those Stateswould be entitled to invoke the legal relationship as described in part two.

Draft article 41 on cessation of wrongful conduct is the first of a se-ries of provisions dealing with the new relations which arise from an in-ternational delict between the author State and the injured State, The newrelations involve new obligations. The new obligations of the authorState consist in the redressing of the situation arising from the breach of aprimary obligation, that is to say, an obligation embodied in a primaryrule. The obligation to make reparation is the most frequently invoked ofthe new obligations. This is dealt with in article 42. The obligation tomake reparation may be discharged in a variety of forms as expressed inarticles 43, 44, 45 and 46. These articles are, therefore, to be read to-gether. Draft article 42 provides that the injured State is entitled to obtainfrom the State which has committed an internationally wrongful act fullreparation in the form of restitution in kind, compensation, satisfactionand assurances and guaranties of non-repetition, either singly or in com-bination. In the determination of reparation, account shall be taken of thenegligence or the wrongful act or omission of(a) the injured State, or (b)a national of that State on whose behalf the claim is brought which con-tributed to the damage. The term "reparation" is generic and describes thevarious methods available to a State for discharging or releasing itselffrom such responsibility. It is observed that paragraph 1 of article 42 ex-pressly provides that a State which commits an internationally wrongfulact is under an obligation to provide full reparation for the injury sus-tained as a result of the internationally wrongful act. But what happens ifthe injury is a result of concomitant factors among which the wrongful actplays a decisive part but not an exclusive part? In such case, to hold theother State liable for reparation of the whole injury would be neither equi-

table nor in conformity with a proper application of the causal link theory,which has been dealt with extensively in the commentary to article 44.

One may recall that in article 42 restitution in kind was the first of the

methods of reparation listed as being available to an injured State. There

is, however, no accepted definition of what constitutes restitution. It has

been variously defined as re-establishing the situation that existed prior

to the occurrence of the wrongful act in order to bring the relationship be-

tween the parties to its original state, as well as establishing or

re-establishing the situation that would have existed if the wrongful act

had not been committed. Fortunately, the Commission's approach has

been to opt for the purely restitutive concept, or restitution in kind, which,

apart from being confined to the assessment of a factual situation, in-

volves a new theoretical construction of what the situation would have

been if the wrongful act had not been committed. The Commission's ap-proach is limited to the restoration of the status quo ante, which is easy todetermine without any prejudice to any possible compensation forlucrum cessans.

Chapter III of part two on countermeasures deals, inter alia, with is-

sues relating to resort to countermeasures, proportionality and prohibited

countermeasures. The four draft articles comprising this part deal with

the most difficult and controversial aspects of the whole regime of Stateresponsibility.

In the period allotted, which I am sure I have exceeded, it is

well-nigh impossible to touch on every article. But allow me to say just a

few more words about the notion of imputability or attributability. The

process of imputability involves two stages: the determination of the

breach of an obligation and the decision whether such breach is imput-

able to the State. If the breach is imputable, the State becomes interna-

tionally responsible. Responsibility, therefore, begins where imputability

ends. Therefore, a precise notion of imputability in international law is

absolutely essential in order to separate the process at the municipal-law

level from the process at the international-law level. The notion of

imputability supplies guidance through complex matters arising from the

very fact that there are different obligations under municipal law and un-

der international law. Through the notion of imputability, the principles

of law relating to the exhaustion of local remedies become clearer and

more precise. Therefore, confusion between substantive and procedural

law is avoided.


Dkbat

Mr. Georges Abi-Saab.8 3 I have a comment and a question. Thecomment concerns not only the Commission's accomplishments on Stateresponsibility, but also the demonstration that international law is devel-oping in a complex pattern and that we are going from a simplistic regimeof responsibility towards one divided into different sub-regimes whichhave some common denominators. For example, there is the liability sub-ject; there is the crimes subject which, after all, even though it is personalresponsibility, it is still internationally determined. And I would like toknow to what extent is the relationship between these different varietiesof responsibility being taken into consideration and will be taken intoconsideration in the work of the Commission.

Mr. Bruno Simma. I think that the Commission has not had, atleast when I was present, any debate on the relationship between individ-ual criminal responsibility and so-called international crimes of State. Atleast, it has not had such a debate since the Special Rapporteur was ap-pointed last year. So maybe we should give him the floor.

Mr. James Richard Crawford.s I think that we should give thefloor to our invitees rather than have members of the Commission talk toeach other. However, Mr. Bruno Simma is right. I am pleased to take thefloor to say that even if I do not agree with everything Mr. ChristianDominic6 said on the subject of State-to-State responsibility, nonethe-less, I do agree with his proposition that we need to make clear that therecan be other forms of responsibility especially of, and possibly to, inter-national organizations, even though I know that this is an unpopular idea.This issue has to be discussed in response to Mr. Georges Abi-Saab. Italso has to be made clear that this is entirely without prejudice to the re-sponsibility of individuals under international law. Where I think the im-pact of individual criminal responsibility is felt is that it has changed theoverall scene within which article 19 has to be discussed.

Ms. Williams. I would like to hear some comments on the inter-face between the work of the Commission on State responsibility for con-

83Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva; Global Professor, New York

University Law School.84 Member of the International Law Commission, 1992-; appointed Special Rappor-

teur for State responsibility at the Commission's forty-ninth session, 1997.

duct in violation of international law, on the one hand, and internationalliability for activities not in violation of international law, on the other.

Mr. Christian Dominic& Je crois que la question de la responsa-bilite internationale pour des actes ou des dommages causis par des acti-vit~s qui ne sont pas iilicites en droit international est un problme tout ifait distinct de la responsabilit6 internationale pour acte illicite par d~fmi-tion mime. I1 ne peut s'agir que d'obligations tr~s ponctuelles. Vous nepouvez pas obliger un Etat i roarer tous les dommages causes a partird'activitds qui prennent leur source sur son territoire, ce serait une res-ponsabilite absolument considerable. Je crois donc qu'il est bon de regar-der de pres les domaines oii l'on pourrait imposer une obligation de rpa-rer lorsque l'Etat n'a aucun acte illicite i se reprocher.

Prenons le probkme de la prevention. Je pense ici i Tchemobyl etau domaine des accidents nucldaires. Consid~rons qu'on impose auxEtats, et on commence a le faire, des standards tr~s techniques, tr~sstricts. Prenons le cas d'un Etat qui, i un moment donn6, ne respecte pasces standards et ces mesures de prevention. A ce moment-li on peut dire icet Etat qu'il se trouve dans une situation oA il ne respecte pas ses obliga-tions. Et comme prdcisdment la responsabilit6 internationale n'exige pasle dommage, on pourra dire qu'un Etat se trouve en situation illicite dufait meme qu'il ne prend pas les mesures prdvues. A ce stade de la pr&vention on retombe dans la responsabilite internationale pour acte illicite.Mais alors ceci pose le probleme du contr6le international et des mesurescontre cet Etat: on l'obligera i fermer une centrale nucl~aire en attendantqu'il ait pris les mesures de prevention.

En r~sum, les deux sujets sont totalement spar~s, mais si on veutmaitriser le probl~me de la prevention, il faut le reprendre dans la respon-sablit* pour acte illicite dans la mesure o i, au titre de la prevention, onimpose des standards, des comportements, des codes de conduite tr&sprecis.

Mr. J6rn Griebel. I am a student at the Graduate Institute of In-ternational Studies in Geneva. Mr. Bruno Simma has mentioned articles8 and 11 of the draft articles, and he has considered these articles to behighly superficial. I think that it is quite true and I would like to know ifanything can be done to rectify the situation.

Mr. Bruno Simma. Mr. Crawford, you should turn around andtell the young student what you are going to do about it. And I hope you

are going to do something about it.

Mr. James Crawford. Well, part of the problem is that it is clearthat articles 5 through 15, which deal with attribution, contain some prob-

lematic elements. Some of the later articles, the negative articles, seem tobe particularly problematic, for example, the one on international organi-zations, which simply excludes one possibility in the context of attribu-tion, which is a possibility that no one would actually think of. The rela-tionship between article 5 and article 8 is a necessary relation. Much ofthe criticisms one hears about article 5 ignores the coexistence of article 5and article 8. Article 8 is a general backup rule about attribution, in re-spect of activities in fact imputable to the State. It is true, of course, thewhole suite of articles assumes a distinction between State and non-Stateactivities. But article 8, properly applied, can remedy some of the defi-ciencies that have been pointed out which that distinction produces. Andin any event, in the context of State responsibility the distinction is, Ithink, inevitable. Article 11 needs and will receive treatment in this ses-sion. But my own provisional view is that the balance between article 5and article 8 is broadly correct. And much of the criticism of one of themignores the existence of the other one.

Mr. Bruno Simma. I have one question for the Special Rappor-teur. Would you, for instance, consider that articles 5 and 8 are adequatein the light of a practice in some regions of the world where Governmentshire private firms for purposes of what they call defence? I do not want togo into details as I think that we are all familiar with those practices.Would you say that the draft articles, as they stand, are sufficient in thatregard?

Mr. James Crawford. The dilemma is that, on the one hand, it isimpossible to come up with a definitve statement of necessary govern-mental activities, as we see in the field of Statc immunity. On the otherhand, the contemporary consensus about necessary governmental activi-ties will undoubtedly influence the way in which article 8 will be applied.For example, in the context of private prisons, it seems to me inconceiv-able that a Government could exclude its responsibility for prison condi-tions by contracting out prison services. It will be a question of making itclear in the text or the commentary that article 8, in particular, is capableof applying in such cases. On the question of superficiality, I am afraidthat there is another balance to be struck and this is the general desirewhich I share to complete the reading of the draft articles in the next foursessions, and the need not to produce 150 draft articles. These are neces-sarily general draft articles, and I must say that I totally agree with Mr.Bruno Simma on the location of the lex specialis article. I think that it isperfectly clear that the lex specialis article has to apply to part one and notonly to part two. So there are various things like that that have to be done.But we should be careful not to try to anticipate every contingency.Where, for example, I disagree with Mr. Simma is that he underestimates

the flexibility of article 1. 1 think that article I is as near a piece of geniusas the Commission has ever come to.

M. Luigi Ferrari Bravo' 5. Je suis totalement d'accord avec leRapporteur g6n~ral, mon cher aim, M. Christian Dominic6, parce que jepense, en effet, que les articles sur la responsabilit6 n'ont pas besoin dedevenir une convention internationale. C'est vraiment inutile et domma-geable d'en faire une convention internationale, cela va morceler le projetd'articles dans des quantites mfinies pour finalement obtenir une conven-tion sign~e et ratifi~e par une trentaine de petites iles. Les grands Etats nela ratifieront jamais. Le produit de la Commission du droit internationalexiste d6ji et est appliqu6 de plus en plus par les juridictions intemationa-les. J'espere que la Commission, dontje fais partie, ne se mettra pas a trople changer; ce projet fait d6ja partie du droit international applique. IIs'agit I, a mon avis, d'un point fondamental.

L'autre point sur lequel je suis tout i fait d'accord avec le Rappor-teur g6n6ral, c'est que ]a responsabilit6 des Etats est une chose et la res-ponsabilit internationale pour faits licites est une chose totalement diff6-rente. L, on est vraiment dans le domaine des r~gles primaires, et chaqueregle a ses exigences. Je l'ai vu personnellement lorsqu'on m'a pri6 defaire une petite risolution sur l'environnement. Quelques r~gles, vrai-ment tris modestes, ont pu trouver une place dans la r6solution del'Institut du droit international, parce que le droit de l'environnement r6-git des r6gimes tirs diff~rents, comme celui de l'industrie nucl6aire oucelui des cours d'eaux internationaux qui nicessitent des rigles spHcifi-ques. Et la Commission d'ailleurs s'en est rendue compte en 6tablissantdes s6ries de regles diff6rentes sur l'un et sur l'autre. II est N raunent vainde croire qu'on peut avoir un beau syst~me avec d'un c6t6 la responsabi-lit6 pour fait llicite et de l'autre c6t6 la responsabilit6 pour fait licite.

Une derm6re remarque, je suis d'accord avec le Rapporteur g6nirallorsqu'il dit qu'il faut 6iminer les articles sur le riglement des diffrrends.A quoi servent-ils ? Croyez vous qu'il peut y avoir une d6cision de justiceseulement sur la responsabilit6 ? Je ne I'ai jamais vu dans la jurispru-dence internationale. Par contre, j'ai vu la jurisprudence internationale seservir de ces regles en les appliquant A des faits concrets. Mais une justiceuniquement sur la responsabilit& internationale, c'est quelque chose quin'existe que dans la fantaisie de certains auteurs.

M. Jorge Illueca (traduit de l'espagnol). Je vous remercie,M. Luigi Ferrari Bravo. Je crois que nous avons eu une discussion utile

sur des th&mes qui vont susciter nos r6flexions. Et nous avons 6t6 enrichis

$5 Membre de la Commission du droit international 1997-1998, ex-juge A ]a Cour in-

ternationale de Justice de La Haye et a la Cour europ&-nne de conciliation et d'arbitrage;juge i la Cour europ&,nne des droits de I'homnme

par tout ce que nous avons entendu. Je remercie M. Christian Dominic6de sa contribution qui a 6t6 trs utile i tous points de vue. Merci, cherscollgues, de vos observations sur la responsabilit6 intemationale. Je re-mercie 6galement nos invites qui sont venus assister i ce d~bat. J'esp&requ'ainsi on ne nourrira plus de fausses ides sur la crise de la Commissionet sur son caract~re << schizophr~ne . Je lve la seance.

"STATE IMMUNITIES": CURRENT PROBLEMS INHERITEDFROM THE PAST?

((LES IMMUNITIS DE L'ITAT ):

PROBLIMES ACTUELS HIRITIS DU PASSe

Introduction by the Chairman, Mr. Raul Goco 8 6

We have very interesting speakers to discuss the topic of State im-munities. To introduce the subject, we have Mr. Lucius Caflisch from theGraduate Institute of International Studies and Legal Adviser to theSwiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a very familiar figure to us all.

The first commentator will be our friend and colleague, Legal Ad-viser to the United States Permanent Mission to the United Nations, andmember of the International Law Commission since 1992, Mr. RobertRosenstock.

Mr. Enrique Candioti from Argentina will be the second commenta-tor. He has occupied the posts of Ambassador to the United States, toAustralia, to New Zealand and to the former German Democratic Repub-lic, and is a member of the International Law Commission since 1997.

S6Member of the International Law Commission, 1997-.

Presentation by Mr. Lucius Caflisch"7

Historical evolution

For international lawyers, State immunity is an unusual topic inmany ways. Its roots lie in a rule of domestic law: the prohibition to suethe State which can do no wrong. Many aspects of State immunity arestill governed by domestic legislation or practice and most questions re-lating to it are handled by domestic courts. The evolution of the law inthis field has been determined essentially by politico-economic factors,specifically, the emergence of the idea of State-run economies and theirsubsequent partial collapse.

The exemption of foreign States from local jurisdiction is based onthe principle that the Prince and, later on, the modem State and its instru-mentalities were immune when performing their duties. As a gesture ofcourtesy-remember the Schooner Exchangeg--and later on, as a matterof law, this rule was extended to the international level: the courts of aState cannot sit in judgement on the acts of another State. In the earlydays, this rule could be applied across the board, for State activities wereessentially confined to the performance of public functions. This situa-tion changed when States began to engage in trading after the nationaliza-tion, occurring in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries andwhen State-run economies, emerged. Why should the State, in itsday-to-day trading activities, enjoy an advantage over its private compet-itors with a grant of immunity? This question led some States with capi-talist economies to limit immunity to acts performed by other States intheir sovereign capacity. Hence, the term "sovereign immunity". A paral-lel evolution occurred regarding the fate of State vessels where a distinc-tion was increasingly made between trading and non-trading ships andimmunity confined to the latter (Brussels Convention of 192689). How-ever, the practice of the States embracing this restrictive view raised threeissues:

(1) What is meant by "State": only the State in the narrow sense ofthe term, or also its instrumentalities, such as central banks, political sub-divisions-provinces, cantons and municipalities-or even individualsacting on its behalf-private customs-collecting agencies, for instance?

(2) How can acts performedjure imperii-that is, in the exerciseof public functions-be distinguished from acts accomplished juregestionis-that is, in a trading capacity?

S7See introduction.58

The Schooner Exhange v. McFaddon, I I U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).89

For text of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to the Immu-nity of State-owned Vessels, see International Legislation, vol. Ill, Nos. 134-185 (CarnegieEndowment for International Peace, Washington), pp. 1837-1845.

(3) Should the limitations imposed on immunity from suit betransposed to the law relating to immunity from execution and, if so, towhat extent?

A number of Western European States applied the rule of State im-munity restrictively, from the early days of this century-Italy, Belgiumand Switzerland were early leaders in the field-whereas other countries-the United Kingdom and the United States, in particular-hesitated fora long time on account of the three issues just mentioned, particularlywith the difficulty of separating acts performed jure gestionis from thoseperformed jure imperii. Starting in the 1950s, these two countries gradu-ally converted to the Western European view, first, through judicial deci-sions and executive action, later, through the enactment of legislation(United States, 1976; United Kingdom, 1978). The conclusion in 1972 ofa European Convention9

0 on the subject may have spurred this evolution.Another important contribution to the emergence of restricted State im-munity was the recent political evolution in the community of socialistStates, which led to the fall of an important bastion of State trading.

These convergent tendencies seemed to have paved the way towardsa universal agreement limiting State immunity to governmental activi-ties, notwithstanding the resistance that might arise from some develop-ing countries endowed with important States trading sectors. The Interna-tional Law Commission was accordingly entrusted by the United NationsGeneral Assembly with the task of preparing a set of draft articles on thesubject. The Commission's final draft was ready in 1991.9'

The International Law Commission's draft articles

The draft articles adopted by the Commission will now be brieflydiscussed in the context of the three issues identified earlier, namely, thedistinction between public and private activities, the determination of thebeneficiaries of State immunity and the scope of the immunity from exe-cution.

The distinction between acts donejus imperii and acts donejus gestionis

On this point, the Commission essentially followed the lead pro-

vided by the 1972 European Convention, by maintaining the principle ofimmunity from suit and by limitatively enumerating the exceptions

thereto, namely, contracts of employment (article 11), claims resulting

from personal injuries and damage to property (article 12), movable and

9OFor text of the European Convention on State Immunity and Additional Protocol,

see Ameican Journal onternatona vol. 66, p. 923; European Treaty Series No. 74.91 For text of the "Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their

Property", see The Work of the International Law Commission, fifth edition (United Na-

tions publication, Sales No. E.95.V.6), pp. 205-214.

immovable property (article 13), intellectual and industrial property (ari-cle 14), participation in companies and other businesses (article 15), theoperation of trading vessels (article 16) and, as a catch-all clause, "com-mercial transactions" (article 10).

It is, of course, the last of these categories-"commercial transac-tions"-which was the most difficult to circumscribe. The term "com-mercial transactions" is defined in article 2 (1) (c) of the Commission'sdraft. The definition includes "contracts or transactions" for the sale ofgoods and services; loans and other financial deals; and "any other con-tract or transaction of a commercial, industrial or professional nature, butnot including a contract of employment of persons"-another catch-allclause. It was not this formulation which was going to cause the main dif-ficulty, however, but the rider in paragraph 2 of article 2, which reads asfollows:

"In determining whether a contract or transaction is a 'commercial transaction' reference should be made primarily to the nature of the contract or transaction, but its purpose should also betaken into account if, in the practice of the State which is a party to it,that purpose is relevant to determining the non-commercial charaGter of the contract or transaction."

This formula was intended to strike a compromise between theStates whose legislation or judicial practice relies exclusively on the na-ture of the transaction-whenever the foreign State does what, by law, anindividual could equally well do, the transaction is deemed "commercial"-and those which base themselves on the purpose of the act of the for-eign State-wherever the transaction is performed for the benefit of thecommunity in the exercise of public functions (for instance, when Stateauthorities purchase uniforms for their armed forces, it is deemed to be"non-commercial" and so is covered by immunity).

This formula, however, was of little use to those who wished to re-strict immunity from suit, because its application would have resulted inperpetuating the status quo: the characterization of the transaction as pub-lic or commercial was simply delegated to the domestic law and practiceof the State whose immunity was at issue. The intended compromise,thus, turned out to be no compromise at all.

The definition of "State"

According to article 2 (1) (b) of the Commission's draft, the expres-sion "State" includes, in addition to the State and its organs, the constitu-ent units of federal States, such as the German Lander or Swiss cantons,the political subdivisions of the State entitled to perform public functions,and other agencies, instrumentalities and entities called upon to exercisesuch functions. This definition seems to be straightforward and in keep-ing with State practices, but as will be shown later on, it has attracted crit-

icism both from some highly centralized States, which wish to reduce thelist, and from decentralized countries, which seek to expand it.

Immunity from execution

Articles 18 and 19 of the Commission's draft address the tricky

question of immunity from execution. Here, again, immunity is to be the

rule and is to extend to all the State's assets, but some exceptions are

made. The rule of immunity does not apply if the foreign State has ex-

pressly agreed to its waiver, if the property in question has been ear-

marked for satisfying the claim forming the object of the proceedings, or

if it is specifically intended for commercial purposes and localized in the

forum State and is connected to the claim- The property thus excepteddoes not, however, include any assets used by diplomatic or consular

agencies, assets earmarked for military purposes, property of the centralbank or objects forming part of the country's cultural, historic or scien-tific heritage.

The list of items which are not covered by immunity from executiondrawn is very restricted. Its acceptance would mean that immunity from

execution would remain almost as absolute as it is now in many countries.The solution offered by the Commission's draft is in no way satisfactoryfor those countries whose courts hold, on the basis of reasoning which has

at least the appearance of logical consistency, that immunity from execu-tion should be limited to situations where there is also immunity fromsuit.

The work of the General Assembly's Sixth Committee

After a summary discussion in the framework of the Sixth Commit-tee, the Commission's draft was referred to an open-ended workinggroup of the Committee. This group, which was placed under the chair-manship of Mr. Carlos Calero-Rodrigues,9 held two sessions, in 1992

and 1993, to prepare the draft for discussion and adoption by a conferenceof States. While the working group succeeded in identifying sticking

points in the text submitted by the International Law Commission, it was

unable to work out any solutions.

The first point at issue was, of course, the definition of "commercial

transactions". For the reasons already given, the combined reference to

the nature and purpose of the transaction embodied in article 2 (1) (c) of

the draft proved unacceptable to those States whose laws or courts exclu-

sively rely on the nature of the act, all the more so since the criterion of

the purpose of the act was to apply whenever the practice of the State

claiming immunity relied on it. The Commission's formula did not even

find acceptance among the States which use the criterion of the purpose

92FomeT member of the nternablonal Law Commission, 1982-1996.

of the transaction. Objectively speaking, the Commission's solutionseems questionable in that it relies on different standards for answeringthe same question.

In an attempt to overcome these difficulties, the chairman of theworking group suggested maintaining the "nature-of-the-act" criterion inall cases, except where the parties to the transaction have agreed on itsnon-commercial, that is, its public character, or where the State which isparty to it has asserted its public character and the other contracting partyhas not objected. This proposal is unacceptable to a group of industrial-ized countries because its acceptance could entail that, prior to obtainingtheir contracts, foreign enterprises would have to recognize the immunityof their partner State. Accordingly, the very purpose of the entire opera-tion which is to ensure that commercial transactions are not immune fromjurisdiction would be frustrated.

The second point was the definition given to the word "State" in arti-cle 2 (1) (b) of the Commission's draft. Some participants insisted that lo-cal subdivisions, including municipalities, should be included among thebeneficiaries of sovereign inmunity. Others challenged the grant of thestatus "State" to the constitutive units of federal States or suggested thatthey should be given such status only upon the express request of the fed-eral State concerned.

The third point to be mentioned is the Commission's conception ofimmunity from execution, which remains very broad and is rejected bythose States which hold that there should be no immunity from executionwhere there is no immunity from suit. It also is opposed by those coun-tries which hold that immunity from execution must remain absolute.

These are clear and major disagreements, which the working groupwas unable to overcome. It would be regrettable, though, not to try againafter all the work that has been done. This was the conclusion reached bya meeting of legal advisers of United Nations Member States that tookplace in New York in late October 1997. This conclusion was reiteratedin the Sixth Committee, which decided to re-examine the entire issue in1999, at the fifty-fourth session of the General Assembly.

What way out?

The second difficulty-that of the definition of "State"-seems tobe the least aggravating. In this respect, the Commission's draft is fully inline with existing practice, and it would seem that general agreementcould and should ultimately by reached on the basis of the present text.

By contrast, the first issue-the definition of the term "commercialtransactions"-may prove intractable. Clearly, the existing text does notcommand large measured support, nor does the compromise suggestedby Mr. Calero-Rodrigues. The only possible solution might consist in adefinition relying principally on the legal nature of the transaction, but

admitting that its purpose may also be taken into consideration. Any for-mula along these lines would unquestionably be a vague one, but one thatmight possibly salvage the entire exercise and one which, objectivelyspeaking, is not that far removed from practice.

The issue of immunity from execution is almost equally difficult.Some countries still practise immunity from execution in its absoluteform, while others make that immunity coincide with jurisdictional im-munity. The practice of yet other States is erratic or uncertain. In such asituation, it is difficult to come to any conclusion at all. The truth of thematter probably is that the issue is not ripe for codification or progressivedevelopment. It proved most elusive in the negotiations leading to theadoption of the 1972 European Convention and it is likely to be the"straw which breaks the camel's back" if the present text of the Commis-sion draft is maintained. A simple solution to a complex problem wouldbe to eliminate the part relating to immunity from execution from thedraft.

Conclusion

These are a few-admittedly, tentative and incomplete-thoughtson the main difficulties presented by the Commission's Draft Articles onJurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property and on the direc-tion in which one might look for possible solutions. While some newideas might well emerge between now and 1999, it is less certain that theywill prove acceptable to a large majority of States. One should rememberthat the views of States not only still diverge on some major aspects of thedraft, but also that, in this matter, many States are loyal to the practice oftheir courts. While States are free, of course, to put an end to nationalpractices by assuming treaty obligations, they may find it difficult to doso in a field which on the internal level is as vital and sensitive as the cur-rent one.

Mr. Raul Goco. Thank you very much, Mr. Lucius Caflisch, for avery incisive presentation of the subject. It is important and timely be-cause the General Assembly has come up with resolution 52/151 of 15December 1997, urging States, if they have not done so, to submit theircomments to the United Nations Secretary-General on the subject of theDraft Articles on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Prop-erty.

We have two remaining commentators for this subject. I will firstcall on the Legal Adviser to the United States Permanent Mission to theUnited Nations, Mr. Robert Rosenstock.

Presentation by Mr. Robert RosenstoCk 93

As is very often the case, I find myself in almost total agreementwith Mr. Lucius Caflisch. I certainly agree that the nature and purposes,the definition of the State and execution are the three main issues. A pos-sible fourth issue might be article 10 (3) of the International Law Com-mission's draft which speaks of the immunity of a State enterprise thathas been given independent legal personality. Potentially, problems inthat area are on capitalization after a problem arises draining the fundsfrom the entity. I think that there are a number of States which would re-gard it as essential to "pierce the corporate veil" and go after the State it-self when the entity has been grossly undercapitalized or the money hasbeen drained after the disaster occurred. I think that this problem has thepotential to be as big a problem as the other three. The two meetingscalled by Mr. Carlos Calero-Rodrigues failed to solve the problem.

I agree that the question of the definition of a State is solvable, but Idoubt the question of execution is solvable, despite the fact that, unchar-acteristically illogically and characteristically moderately, the UnitedStates Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act94 strikes a balance somewherebetween the two positions. The Act mandates that execution is possibleonly when there is a nexus between the claims and the State property. Per-sonally, I think that the British have it right: If there is no exemption forthe substance, there should be no exemption for the property and then thenexus is unnecessary. But if we were to look for a middle ground, the ap-proach offered by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act would possiblyprovide it. However, in 1992 and 1993, there seemed to be little interest inthat approach by either side. I am reasonably confident that the nature andpurpose of the struggle will not be resolved. I do not think that any Statewould want to pay the price of giving up its position on that issue to sal-vage the exercise. There are numerous middle points that can be elabo-rated, but I do not think that they will be acceptable to anyone on eitherside of that issue. In my view, prospects for solving this issue, in the fore-seeable future, are very close to zero.

Moreover, without going into details, there also are quite a numberof small and medium-sized issues that remain to be resolved. They willnot be resolved in the absence of the resolution of the major issues; theywill provide a sufficient degree of undergrowth to make the prospect foragreement in any early time extremely unlikely. I, therefore, cannot agreewith the view that it is a useful idea to restart this exercise soon. Mr.Calero-Rodrigues's efforts to bridge the gaps was a tour de force. I do notthink I have ever seen a better conducted, more energetically pursued andmore creatively run operation than his efforts to bridge the gaps. Yet, it

93 See introduction.9428 U.S.C.A. sect. 1605 (1976).

did not get anywhere. I think it is not appropriate to think that we can suc-ceed after the effort of two years of failure. We can solve a few occasionallittle issues here and there; we can give an occasional sophisticated exam-ple of what would be a via media if anyone was interested. Is there anyharm in trying, even if the prospects are as bad as I think they are? Well, itis a waste of time, a waste of energy, a waste of money, though presum-ably that need not be dispositive, but it can also create a failure; a proba-ble failure will create ill will and frustration and discourage that evolutionof practice over the next decade which might, conceivably, in due course,become the basis for agreement. I do not think that the base exists now. Ido not think that we should try to force it now. I think that we should putthe exercise on the shelf and take another look at it in five or six years tosee whether there will be more grounds for optimism. In this way, theremay be a chance of success, but if we try to force the issue in the next yearor two, there is no chance of success and after that very few of us willhave the courage to take it up again later.

Therefore, my conclusion is that the International Law Comnis-sion's work on this issue was an interesting effort to reach a compromiseon an issue in which compromise was not available. There are trends anddevelopments in the world which may have progressed far enough to givethe impression that a solution is at hand, but, in this case, an important mi-nority is not prepared to accept the nature test, pure and simple, and alarge majority is not prepared to accept any infusion of the notion of thepurpose of the transaction. Therefore, until the majority is overwhelmingone way or the other, the exercise should not be aggressively pursued.

Presentation by Mr. Enrique Candioti 95 96

First of all, I should like to thank Mr. Lucius Caflisch for his clearand illustrative presentation on the subject. He described the historicalbackground and the highly sensitive political and economic implicationsthat must be considered in establishing the scope and nature of State im-munity.

The International Law Commission devoted many years (1977 to1991) to the study of the subject and to the preparation of the Draft Arti-cles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property. The suc-cessive Special Rapporteurs, Mr. Sompong Sucharitkul and Mr. MotaOgiso, produced excellent and exhaustive reports. Unfortunately, how-ever, the reaction of States to the Draft Articles has reflected profounddifferences of opinion, and the situation today is marked by uncertaintyand, as Mr. Rosenstock comments have shown, a degree of pessimism.

Mr. Caflisch identified the most controversial issues:-The scope of the definition of a State;-The criteria for distinguishing acts performed by the State in the

exercise of its public functions from acts of a private nature; and-The extent and limits of measures of "constraint", meaning pre-

cautionary measures and measures of execution, in respect ofState property.

The International Law Commission's Draft Articles form a struc-tured whole, containing many sensible and unobjectionable rules. Theyare intended to reflect the trend in international law towards restrictiveand functional immunity. However, the Draft Articles do not fully reflectthat trend, especially on the last two points highlighted by Mr. Caflisch,because of the limitations and conditions they impose on the distinctionbetween acts jure imperii and acts jure gestionis.

The introduction of the idea that the purpose of an activity or trans-action should be used as a criterion for characterizing it asjure imperii orjure gestionis-along with the truly decisive criterion of its nature-and,moreover, the idea that the characterization of the purpose should dependon the practice of the particular State invoking immunity represent athrowback to a previous stage of the problem's development, because itmay be argued that any State activity always has an end or purpose relat-ing to the public interest. Therefore, any activity would be exempt fromthe jurisdiction of the State of the forum and this would imply a return toabsolute immunity.

Thus, the formulation of article 2 (2) is not satisfactory. On the con-trary, it represents a setback in relation to the development of national

95 See introduction.96Translated from Spanish.

legislation and of the decisions handed down by courts in many countries,which also are those in which disputes concerning immunity are most of-ten settled.

The Draft Articles also fail to give satisfactory treatment to the issueof immunity from execution. The counterpart of the State will have littleassurance that his rights and claims are genuinely recognized and giveneffect, unless the limited nature of immunity from execution is alsoclearly established, since such immunity should run parallel to jurisdic-tional immunity, although immunity from execution is, in general, moreextensive.

These difficulties could not be resolved, despite the efforts of theopen-ended working group chaired by Mr. Carlos Calero-Rodrigues.Nevertheless, efforts to devise consensual solutions must continue, pur-suant to the General Assembly's recent resolution 52/151 of 15 Decem-ber 1997, on the item "Convention on jurisdictional immunities of Statesand their property".

Despite some discrepancies, overall developments in the interna-tional community in this era of globalization, accompanied by a declinein the State's role as a protagonist of economic activity, indicate that thecorrect solution lies in the limitation of State immunity to those cases inwhich its action and independence as a public authority must be effec-tively respected and safeguarded. However, while the interests of theState as such must be protected, the interests of private individuals whointeract with the State in the sphere of private law also must be preserved.A balance between the two should be struck on the basis of equitabletreatment, in the interest of juridical security and of clarity and predict-ability in international relations.

There is still an opportunity to launch new efforts and to create con-ditions for arriving at a convention which is likely to enjoy broad accept-ance. Should this prove impossible in the short term, it must be hoped thatfuture developments will strengthen the trend towards restrictive andfunctional immunity. I am sure that this trend is the correct one and that itwill ultimately prevail.

Meanwhile, the implementation of modem principles concerningjurisdictional immunity and immunity from execution must continue to

be regulated primarily by national legislation and case law and by exist-

ing and future bilateral and regional treaties.


Dbat

Mr. Gerhard Hafner.97 First of all, I would like to congratulateMr. Lucius Caflisch for his presentation today on the main issues relatingto State immunity. In my view, this question of State immunity is an idealexample to illustrate the lack of appropriate interrelationship betweenStates, the epistemic community and the International Law Commission.Since the Commission took up this subject, responses from the States tothe questionnaires were very low. Therefore, in my view, the Commis-sion did not have sufficient information about what was acceptable toStates at that moment. As a consequence, the draft was formulated andsubmitted to the working group under Mr. Carlos Calero-Rodrigues inthe Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, and only then, within theSixth Committee, did the States make clear their attitude on this issue. Sothe negotiations had to start from zero, all over again, particularly on theissues that were raised by Mr. Caflisch. The purpose of the workinggroup was to find an agreement on the most salient points. The questionwas then raised whether the States were really prepared to make the ma-jor concessions needed. Before the conference starts, we cannot expectStates to be prepared to make concessions; it will only happen after nego-tiations, at the last moment, particularly on the issue of the test concern-ing the distinction between acts jure imperii and acts jure gestionis.Therefore, to take this particular situation as proof that it is impossible toreach agreement is, in my view, not appropriate.

Another problem with this issue is that the International Law Com-mission had a committee working on State immunity. When this same is-sue was discussed at the General Assembly, there was no interaction orexchange of information between the International Law Commission'scommittee and the work carried out in the Sixth Committee. I very muchregretted this, as this attitude leads to a certain fragmentation of the vari-ous approaches to the same issue. A future task of the Commission shouldbe to overcome this type of fragmentation and to avoid this type of situa-tion.

As to the substantive issue, which will be on the agenda of the SixthCommittee this year, I agree with the points raised by Mr. Caflisch, but Ido not agree with the pessimistic view of Mr. Robert Rosenstock. I ampersonally a little more optimistic, particularly concerning the criteria of

97 Member of the International Law Commission, 1997-.

the distinction between the two types of State acts. As far as I remember,the last proposal made by Mr. Calero-Rodrigues seemed already to openthe way to an agreement between States. It has then fallen into abeyancebecause of the other problems. On the other hand, I totally share the viewof Mr. Caflisch concerning the immunity of execution. It is also my viewthat it would be best to drop this point, to exclude it from the proposed in-strument, whatever its nature, so that a solution could be arrived at on theother issues. In this regard, I am also more optimistic since I have a feel-ing that some States are interested in having a convention irrespective ofthe content. The industry seems interested in having a certain degree ofcertainty concerning the regulation, whatever the content may be. Wehave had this situation in other instances, such as the law of the sea in re-lation to seabed matters. It was most desirable to have an agreement, irre-spective of its content. I, therefore, have some hopes for the outcome ofthis year's discussions of the Sixth Committee, which I hope will thenlead to a conference the following year.

Mr. Lucius Caflisch. I would like to make two comments. Thefirst pertains to the point just made by Mr. Gerhard Hafier on the lack ofresponse from States. It is true, there is a lack of response of States to thedraft. Accordingly, the idea then was that everything was all right andthat we could go along with the working group. This was entirely wrong;the lack of answers reflected deep divisions. The lack of response and theensuing lack of realization that there was disagreement is, ifI may say so,a general problem of the Commission. The lack of response lulls theCommission and other organs of the United Nations into a false sense ofsecurity. We have seen it happen recently in quite a different negotiation,also connected with the Commission, related to international water-courses. Almost everybody seemed to agree on the Commission's draft,yet the negotiation over this issue broke out into what was probably thebloodiest battle I have ever experienced in a conference. Perhaps this hasa bit to do with the idea that States have to hide their weapons until thenight of the long knives, but, more prosaically, it may also have to do withthe fact that States are constantly solicited, not once, not twice, but threeor four times, at all stages of every draft. I think that there should be betterorganization.

If I may briefly make a second point. The resolution of the GeneralAssembly defers the issue for two years and invites States to make com-ments. At this stage, we have an abundance of comments; we have all hadthem during the two meetings of the working group, and I wonder if it isnot more divisive to have further comments of States on that issue. It maybe possible to find a more cooperative way of dealing with the difficultyif, indeed, we want to take it up in the next two years.

Mr. Raul Goco. Well, Mr. Caflisch, there is a problem becauseStates are not too keen to contribute comments despite the General As-

sembly resolution of 15 December 1997, mentioned earlier, which urgesthose States which have not done so to make comments on this issue.

Mr. Mohamed Bennouna." Je voudrais poser une question auxorateurs sur un point que je n'ai pas vraiment suivi, car je ne suis pas unsp6cialiste des questions des immunit6s. Ce matin nous sommes venusavec l'id6e, g~n6ralement accept6e, que fmalement, sur le sujet de la res-ponsabilit6 des Etats, il vaudrait mieux faire une d6claration plut6tqu'une convention. Et j'ai d'ailleurs appris ce matin, par M. Yves Dau-det, qu'il s'agit en r6alit6 d'une ide de la Sixisme Commission. Je n'aipas d'id6e tr~s pr6cise i ce sujet, et puisqu'on vient de nous proposer celace matin de fagon aussi claire, je demande i r6fl6chir. Je souhaiteraisqu'un tel travail, comme Pa dit M. Robert Rosenstock, apr6s tant d'ar-gent, tant d'6nergie, ne termine pas quelque part dans un vague tiroirpoussi6reux des Nations Unies. La question que je voudrais poser est lasuivante : est-ce que ce projet sur les immunit6s des Etats pourrait avoir,lui aussi, une r6orientation vers une d6claration ? Pourrait-on faire autrechose qu'une convention ? Je vous pose cette question, 6tant entendu quenous sommes tous conscients qu'il y a aujourd'hui des difficult6s i par-venir i une convention. Peut-on faire autre chose qu'une convention, une6tape interm6diaire pour capitaliser tout ce travail, pour qu'il ne soit pasperdu ijamais ?

Mr. Robert Rosenstock. I would not rule it out as a possibility,for the reasons given, but I have the feeling that this is a kind of hard lawissue which comes up in very tangible terms that have to be decided by acourt and which does not lend itself to the declaration or restatement ap-proach, like many other issues. Therefore, my instinct tells me that whatyou suggest is not a very useful way of dealing with the problem, though Iwould be interested in arguments to the contrary since I am beginning tofeel excessively pessimistic.

Mr. Lucius Caflisch. I am afraid this time I share your views, Mr.Rosenstock. A declaration will obviously be feasible in a certain sense, ina sense that is agreeable to some and disagreeable to others. That in itselfwould not be very worrisome, but it does become so because of the natureof sovereign immunity. It is a law that is applied mostly by internal tribu-nals, and internal tribunals could be influenced by a statement, even if it isonly a declaration, and, therefore, a Government that would subscribe tohaving this text turned into a declaration might commit a kind of treasonvis-i-vis its national jurisdictions. Of course, a State can always over-come what its own jurisdictions have done. That is one of the reasons to

98 Ancien membre de la Commission du droit international 1987-98, directeur g~ndralde l'Institut du monde arabe (Paris), juge au Tribunal p~nal pour 1'ex-Yougoslavie.

conclude treaties. But this is a particularly sensitive issue on which, atleast in my country, courts have very definite views. If the Governmentwere to accept even only a declaration, I would be afraid that that Govern-ment might be in trouble.

Mr. Ian Brownlie.99 I have listened to this debate with some in-terest and a great deal of sorrow because I was the Rapporteur of theInstitut de Droit International when we struggled with these familiarquestions. I came to the rather radical view that these things often happenin domestic courts. The paradox for me was that the practice of domesticcourts-not the least in those countries in which, according to the books,the restrictive theory is applied by the courts-the practice of those courtsis far more eclectic than many people believe and there is no question ofa definition of jure imperii and its alleged opposite. The problem is thateverybody agrees that absolute immunity has, as it were, that particularfence; that picket fence is being lifted away. It does not follow that thereis no frontier; there is a different one. The question is which? Where is it?It was my view, just based on studying the decisions of courts, not least inplaces like Switzerland, Italy, the Netherlands and elsewhere, that whatmunicipal courts had to do-because the courts had to face these prob-lems, not just produce formulations which could be the subject of diplo-matic bargain, but to come up with real decisions on real facts-was toacknowledge the existence of countervailing factors and then balancethem up in relation to the given set of facts.

And my view, ultimately, was that the idea that one can come upwith a formula is hollow. Of course, one can come up with a formula, onealways can, including in the context of the United Nations Convention onthe Law of the Sea of 1982.110 The formula then has to be applied andit seems to me that cataloguing the various countervailing factors whichdecision makers have regularly applied is more of a way forward thanlooking for some simple definition- But the Institut's solution has notaroused much interest. I am the only one who has mentioned it in this andin last year's meeting, and I, of course, have an interest in the matter.

Mr. James Crawford.'0 1 I would like to ask Mr. Lucius Caflischto comment on the development in the practice of State immunity, subse-quent to the conclusion of the Draft Articles, whereby certain States arenow creating further exceptions to immunity, based upon considerations,such as torture and other forms of offences to general propriety, in whichthey are then allowing jurisdiction for individual claims.

9 9 Member of the International Law Commssion, 1997-.100 Document A/CONF.62/122 and Corr. I to 11.101 Member of the International Law Commission, 1992-.

Mr. Bruno Simma.10 2 I have three rather technical questions forMr. Lucius Caflisch. The first one is the following: He spoke about im-munity of execution. He mentioned that among Western industrializedcountries, and apparently in his country, the view is that there should beno immunity of execution where there is immunity from suit. The mean-ing of that statement is not quite clear to me. In Germany, for instance, wehave had the case of a State which defaulted in paying the rent for an em-bassy building, and the private party obtained a judgement in his favourbut was not able to make it effective against the embassy's bank account.I would like to have some clarifications on where Mr. Caflisch sees thenexus between immunity of execution and immunity from suit. Mr. Rob-ert Rosenstock then mentioned the United States Foreign Sovereign Im-munities Act, and my question to him is: Do you think that the solutionthe act proposes is a good solution?

My second question to Mr. Caflisch is the following: You men-tioned the necessity of agreeing on a definition of "commercial transac-tion" and you said in your paper that, in your opinion, the solution couldlie in the nature of the activity test, but, under certain circumstances, thepurpose of the activity should also be taken into account. Is that not pre-cisely the solution that the International Law Commission proposes in itsDraft Articles?

The third question is a procedural one. There seems to be a view thatit is best to let the issue rest, to let domestic courts develop things further,for example, to create new exceptions as the United States courts createdapparently with regard to torture and, if the information I have is correct,the legislation then followed and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Actwas revised accordingly. That is the first possibility. The dominant viewamong the States represented in the Sixth Committee seems to be, to usethe words of Mr. Rosenstock, that "the issue should not be aggressivelypursued". I like that expression. I wonder whether one way of pursuingthe issue, less aggressively as is apparently the case in New York, wouldbe to hand things back to the International Law Commission, an institu-tion capable of following the trends in the various domestic jurisdictions,which could, at the appropriate stage, work on the draft again and mayberevise it. I could be totally wrong, but do you not think that the Interna-tional Law Commission is the best-suited body for an exercise in thatfield and that it would be most likely to come up with an eventual solu-tion?

Mr. Lucius Caflisch. That is a very long series of questions. Ishall try to be as concise as possible. What I have said about thecoextensiveness of the immunity from suit and immunity of execution is


that it is indeed a doctrine followed by the supreme courts of some West-ern industrialized States. I emphasize "some" and I would add "particu-larly my own". The Swiss Supreme Court is of the opinion that, if there isno immunity of jurisdiction, then there should be no immunity of execu-tion. Of course, there are exceptions; one exception occurs when wemove into the realm of the Vienna Conventions on diplomatic and con-sular relations, 10 3 which, incidentally, is a field excluded from the DraftArticles of the International Law Commission. I think that, in the case ofdiplomatic relations, immunity of execution should remain close to abso-lute. This is my answer to the first question.

To answer the second question, Mr. Bruno Simma perhaps shouldnote that I was extremely prudent in not stating how the combination offactors could be articulated because I frankly do not know. What we havenow is not even what the International Law Commission proposes. Stateshave to apply the law and practice of the foreign State, whatever it is, andthis is what I object to. This is not a combination; this is an absolute pre-sumption which is made in favour of the system of the State claiming im-munity.

To the third question, whether it is opportune to "hand back thebaby" to the International Law Commission, I respond yes, why not? Imust say that I was rather surprised to see what the Sixth Committee pro-posed to the General Assembly and what followed. I believe I have al-ready had the occasion of saying that I do not think that what was decidedis very fruitful. I think it is divisive to ask States for more comments; withmore comments, we will have more disagreement, not less. Yes, I cer-tainly think that it would make more sense to hand it back to the Commis-sion. Whether the Commission would accept the "baby" is another ques-tion.

.Mr. Mochtar Kusuma-Atmadja. ' We had a very lucid exposi-tion by Mr. Lucius Caflisch, followed by more explanations by Mr.Enrique Candioti and Mr. Robert Rosenstock. We have some optimisticand some pessimistic views. This reminds me of a story: When the Allieswere retreating from Stalingrad, two generals were asked to comment onthe situation. The first one said "the situation is hopeless but not desper-ate". The second one said "the situation is desperate but not hopeless".This is how I feel about the debate we have just had.

i03 For text of Conventions, see, respectively, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 500,p. 95, and vol 596, p- 261.


"LAW OF TREATIES": QUESTIONS REMAIN OPEN

((LE DROIT DES TRAITS )) QUESTIONS NON RtSOLUES

Introduction by the Chairman, Mr. Mochtar Kusuma-Atmadja'0 °

I declare this session open. The first speaker will be Mr. MarceloKohen followed by Ms. Lori Fisler Danrosch. Mr. Ian Brownile will thencomment, followed by Mr. Peter Kabatsi and Mr. Bernardo Sepulveda.

105 Member of the international Law Commission, 1992-.

Exposk par M. Marcelo G. Kohen' °6

Le droit des trait6s :questions restkes ouvertes aprks la codification

INTRODUCTION

La complktude fait partie des vceux de toute ouvre de codification.Pour le moins, dans les domaines que le 16gislateur a voulu aborder lors-qu'il a d6cid6 d'entreprendre cette d6marche. Le sujet qui nous a 6t6 im-parti est celui de 1'examen des questions laiss6es ouvertes par la codifica-tion du droit des trait6s. L'6nonc6 m~me du sujet pourrait ainsi 8tre perqucomme une critique voile i 1'effort qui a abouti i l'adoption des Con-ventions de Vienne portant sur le droit des trait6s (ci-aprs CV 1969), surla succession d'Etats en mati~re de trait6s (ci-apr~s CV 1978) et sur ledroit de trait~s entre Etats et organisations internationales ou entre orga-nisations internationales (ci-apr~s CV 1986).

Nous ne ferons pas ici un bilan global de l'ceuvre de codification enmati~re de trait6sn' 7 . Dans le cadre limit6 de cette contribution, nous exa-minerons d'abord ce qui a d6lib6r6ment 6t6 6cart6 du champ d'appli-cation des trois conventions (I), ensuite ce que la doctrine pr6sentecomme 6tant d'autres domaines non couverts par l'ceuvre de codifica-tion (II) et enfm si certaines des questions abord~es pr6sentent des <( lacu-nes )> (III). A partir de cette analyse nous tirerons quelques conclusionssur la pertinence des choix op6r6s en dernier ressort par les trois Conf6-rences de Vienne quant i l'opportunit6 d'inclure ou non certains pointsparticuli~rement controvers6s du droit des trait6s.

I. - QUESTIONS DELIBEREMENT tCARTEES PAR LES TROIS CONVENTIONS

Choisissant de r6gir exclusivement les trait6s conclus par 6crit etentre Etats ou entre Etats et organisations internationales ou entre ces der-nitres entre elles, les Conventions de Vienne ont 6cart6 de leur champd'action les accords qui revetent une forme non 6crite et ceux conclus pardes sujets autres que les Etats et les organisations internationales (arti-cle 3). Dans d'autres matinres, les Conventions se sont bom6es i affirmerqu'elles ne pr6jugent d'aucune question qui pourrait se poser i leur 6gardi propos des trait6s, i savoir le domaine de la responsabilit6 internatio-

106 Professeur adjoint de droit international A I'lnstitut universitaire de hautes 6tudes

internationales, Gen6ve.107 Voir A ce propos : M.G. Kohen; o La codification du droit des traitts : quelques

616ments pour un bilan global >); Revue ggngrale de droit internationalpublic, 2000; t. 104,n* 2 (A paraitre).

nale et celui de l'ouverture d'hostilites (article 73 CV 1969, article 39 CV1978, article 75 CV 1986). Enfin, pour ce qui est de la CV 1986, elle en-tend exclure de sa port~e les consequences pour les Etats membres dela conclusion d'un trait6 par une organisation internationale (article 74,paragraphe 3). Nous exammerons i tour de r6le ces diffrents probl6-mes.

Les accords non icrits

Personne ne me i ce stade que des accords puissent etre conclus enforme orale ou par le comportement des parties. Si ces accords ont encommun avec les trait~s conclus par 6crit le fait d'exprimer une manifes-tation de volont~s concordantes, il n'en demeure pas moins que les uns etles autres relvent de dynamiques diffrentes. Les trait~s conclus par ecritse caract~risent par leur aspect formel. Leur conclusion suit un proc&d6,quelle que soit en dafinitive la forme employee. Le trait fondamental desaccords oraux et de ceux 6tablis par le biais du comportement des sujetsest en revanche l'absence totale de formalisme. Ces accords s'identifienti plusieurs 6gards aux actes unilatraux, i la difference pros que les actesdes uns et des autres concourent i la formation d'un accord. Bien que cer-tamines r~gles du droit des trait6s leur soient applicables (en mati6re de nul-lit6, par exemple), d'autres en revanche restent du ressort exclusif de laforme 6crite (conclusion, r~serves, interpretation). Pour cette raison, lechoix de la Commission du droit international de limiter la codificationaux accords conclus par 6crit se justifie amplement.

Traitds conclus par des sujets autres que les Etats et les organisationsinternationales

La position ingale des sujets de droit international autres que lesEtats par rapport i ceux-ci a entrav6 durablement l'6largissement de lacodification aux trait~s conclus avec ces autres sujets. Rien n'empchecependant que des sujets ingaux quant a l'6tendue de leur personnalit6juridique internationale puissent conclure des trait~s sur un pied d'6ga-liti. Au fond, ce sera cette 6galit6 des parties qui constituera, avec le droitapplicable, 1'un des traits permettant de distinguer les trait6s d'autres ty-pes d'accords et qui exclut par consiquent de la qualiti de trait6 interna-tional les contrats entre Etats et entreprises 6trang~res.

La pratique r~cente fournit de nombreuses illustrations d'accordsdans lesquels l'une des parties est une entit6 repr~sentant un peuple qui nes'est pas encore dote de structures 6tatiques, ou des rebelles ou encoreune partie j un conflit interne. Les accords conclus par I'OLP et Israel etensuite par I'OLP au nom de l'Autorit6 palestinienne avec de nombreux

Etats et organisations internationales constituent des exemples de la pre-

miere situation mentionne. Le r~glement d'un certain nombre de con-flits internes sous l'6gide des Nations Unies, prenant la forme d'accords

auxquels des mouvements rebelles ou partis politiques sont parties (Am6-rique centrale, Angola) permettent de d6crire la seconde situation envi-sag6e. L'Accord-cadre g~n6ral pour la paix en Bosnie-Herz6govine du14 d6cembre 1995 (dit << Accords de Dayton/Paris ))) r6v~le pour sa partune situation non pr6vue par la CV 1969 : celle d'un Etat (la R6publiquef6d6rative de Yougoslavie) qui conclut un accord au nom d'une entit6 quifait partie d'un autre Etat (la Republika Srpska) "'. En dehors de ce cas to-talement in6dit, il y a lieu de se demander i cet 6gard s'il aurait fallu pr6-voir pareilles situations dans un texte de codification. Le droit interneconnait en effet la figure du mandat ou de la procuration. De telles insti-tutions renferment en droit international une certaine situation de su-bordination (cas des protectorats ou autres r6gimes coloniaux) qui nes'accommodent pas des d~veloppements du droit international contem-porain.

La CV 1978, pour sa part, n'a trait qu'aux effets de la successiond'Etats sur les trait6s. De la sorte, les successions li6es aux autres sujetsdu droit international n'ont pas 6 englob6es dans la tiche de codifica-tion. On relvera ici trois cas de figure : le sort des trait6s conclus par desorganisations internationales qui sont substitu6es par d'autres, de ceuxconclus par des mouvements de lib6ration nationale ou des entit6s re-pr6sentant un peuple qui deviennent plus tard les responsables du gou-vernement d'un nouvel Etat et des trait6s conclus par les membres d'unEtat f6d6ral qui se constituent ult6rieurement en Etats ind6pendants. Pource qui est du premier cas susmentionn6, la CV 1986 envisage seulementle cas de la dissolution d'une organisation internationale, pour affirmerqu'elle ne pr6juge aucune question qui pourrait se poser i propos d'untrait6 en raison de la terminaison de 1'existence de l'organisation intema-tionale' 09. La doctrine, pour sa part, penche plut6t pour l'impossibilit6 desuccession en mati~re de trait6s, que ce soit pour les Etats qui 6taientmembres de l'organisation intemationale ou pour l'organisation in-ternationale qui succde a celle qui cesse d'exister' . Si la solution re-tenue quant aux Etats membres parait correcte, on peut se demander tou-tefois si la r~gle g6n6rale ne serait que les trait6s conclus par l'ancienneorganisation internationale continuent d'Etre en vigueur i l'6gard de

108 Pour le texte, voir Nations Unies, Doc. A/50/790 et S/1995/999 du 30 novembre

1995.109 Article 74, paragraphe 2, de la CV 1986. La Commission du droit international,

dans son comrmentaire A cet article, explique qu'elle n'a pas souhait6 parler de <( successiond'organisations internationales > et qu'elle n'a pas cru opportun d'entrer en matiere (An-nuaire de la Commission du droit international, 1982, vol. II, 2e partie, p. 71-72).

1 10 Voir P. Reuter, Introduction au droit des traitds. 3e dd. par Ph. Cahier, Paris,

P.U.F., 1995, p. 104-105, 108-109 et 137-139 et P.R. Myers, Succession between Interna-tional Organizations. Londres, P. Kegan, 1993, p. 83-84. Plutdt en faveur de ]a succession:R. Ranjeva, La succession d 'organisations internationales en Afrique. Paris, Pedone, 1978,p. 205-257.

l'organisation rnternationale qui lui succ&le, avec les mmes exceptionsque l'on pr~voit en cas de succession d'Etats (incompatibilite de la suc-cession avec l'objet et but du trait&, changement radical des conditionsd'execution du traiti, traite multilateral restreint, accord des parties ensens contraire).

En e qui concerne les accords conclus par les entit6s reconnuescomme les repr~sentants ligitimes des peuples non dot6s d'un Etat ind&pendant, aucun mconvnient n'existe pour affirmer comme r~gle gend-rale la subsistance des droits et obligations r~sultant de ces accords unefois l'inddpendance acquise. La Namibie constitue un cas special, lesconventions pass&es par le Conseil des Nations Unies pour la Narnibieliant la Namibie, a moins que l'Assemblke nationale en dcide autre-mendt'.

La troisiime hypothese susmentionn~e constitue une separationd'une partie d'un Etat et devrait Etre r~gie par les r~gles relatives i ce casde succession. I1 s'agirait donc d'un cas particulier tombant sous le coupde l'article 34, paragraphe 1, lettre b de la CV 19782.

f y a lieu d'ajouter encore d'autres hypotheses de succession, qui seproduisent i l'intreur d'un Etat f&l&al et qui ont des repercussions surle plan international. 1 s'agit des cas de separation et d'unificationd'Etats membres d'un Etat f6&lral ayant conclu des accords mternatio-naux. II nous semble que les rigles applicables pour les cas de separationet d'unification d'Etats peuvent s'appliquer par analogie i ces cas de suc-cession interne, i defaut de prescriptions constitutionnelles contraires oud'accord des parties intdressees .

Le projet d'article 5 sur le droit des traites 61abori par la Commis-sion du droit international comprenait un paragraphe 2 qui 6tablissait que(( []es Etats membres d'une union f~ddrale peuvent avoir la capacit6 deconclure des traitds si cette capacit6 est admise par la constitution fdd6-rale et dans les cas mdiquds dans ladite constitution >>4. La Conference

i I I Article 143 de la Constitution nanibienne. Pour un examen de la situation des trai-t~s conclus avant, durant et apres ]a fin du mnudat sud-africain, vorr K Goy, (( L'md&-pendance de la Narmbie . Annuairefran'ais de droit international, 1991, vol. XXXVII,p. 401-404.

112 ((Tout traitt en vigueur A la date de la succession d'Etats A I'&ard uniquement de

la partie du territoire de I'Etat pr6d6cesseur qui est devenue un Etat successeur reste en vi-gueur i 1'6gard de cet Etat successeur seul. ,

113 Pour un exemple concret, voir Y. Lejeune, ( La succession du nouveau canton duJura aux traitts internationaux du canton de Berne a. Revue gdn%ale de droi international

public. 1978, t. 82, p. 1051-1074. L'auteur penche plut6t pour ]a non-succession, i 'ex-

ception des traites termtonaux. et preconise I'adhesion du nouveau canton aux trait~s con-clus par le canton prdecesseur, afin d'eviter des incerttudes. Ses conclusions sont dues au

fait qu'il consid ire la regle de la table rase applicable darts les situations de denembrementd'Etats.

114 Annuaire de la Commission du droit international, 1966, vol. 11, p. 208.

de Vienne de 1968-1969 n'a pas retenu ce paragraphe, et celui qui est de-venu l'article 6 de la CV 1969 se circonscrit i affirmer d'une mani~re g6-n6rale que << [t]out Etat a la capacit6 de conclure des trait6s >>. Ce sont cer-tains Etats i structure f6d6rale, tout particulirement le Canada, qui ont6 l'origine de la remise en cause du paragraphe 2 propos6 par la Com-

mission du droit international. L'omission est i regretter car la proposi-tion de la Commission du droit international, 6quilibr6e quant au respectdu droit interne, refl~te une pratique de plus en plus croissante dans les re-lations internationales, qui va au-deli mEme des Etats membres d'une f6-d6ration pour comprendre 6galement d'autres entit6s d6centralis6es (desregions, par exemple), des Etats organis6s sous des formes diverses"5 .Lacoop6ration transfrontali~re dans des domaines divers et les 6changesculturels ou autres ont produit dans ce domaine une multiplication d'ac-cords entre Etats et entit6s membres d'un autre Etat ou entre deux entit6sappartenant i des Etats diff6rents, qui n6cessairement sont r6gis par ledroit des trait6s. La reconnaissance de cette r6alit6 n'implique cependantpas l'attribution aux composantes de l'Etat d'une personnalit6 juridiqueinternationale quelconque. Pour cela, il restera i savoir qui engagera saresponsabilit6 internationale en cas de non-respect des obligations pr6-vues par le trait6 ou qui pourrait faire valoir les droits de ce trait6 sur leplan international.

Questions touchant la responsabiliti internationale

Lorsque la CV 1969 a t6 adopt6e, l'ide g6n6ralement admise 6taitque les r~gles relatives a la responsabilit6 internationale avaient essentiel-lement trait aux cons6quences des actes illicites intemationaux, tout par-ticulirement aux diff6rentes modalit6s de r6paration. C'est dans ce sensque l'on doit interpr6ter l'affirmation de son article 73 selon laquelle laConvention o ne pr6juge aucune question qui pourrait se poser A proposd'un trait6 (...) en raison de la responsabilit6 internationale d'un Etat )).En d'autres termes, les nouvelles obligations qui naissent de la violationd'une obligation conventionnelle ne seront pas r6gies par les CV, maispar les r~gles relatives A la responsabilit6. Cela explique que les CV 1969et 1986 aient inclus la violation substantielle d'un trait et la force ma-jeure comme causes d'extinction ou de suspension des trait6s. En effet, il

115 Les constitutions de certains Etats ftdtrZuxreconnaissentexplicitementetd~limi-tent la capacith des Etats membres de conclure des trait~s [cf. par exemple ]'article 32, para-graphe 3, de la loi fondamentale allemande, 'art. 124 de ]a Constitution argentine de 1994,Part. 9 de la Constitution f~d~rale suisse, les articles 127 (par. 3), 128 et 130 (par. 4) de laConstitution beige de 1994, qui octroie sans doute les compktences les plus larges aux enti-t6s composantes d'un Etat f6ddral pour conclure des trait6s]. 11 est enfin i relever la capacit6des entitds composantes de la Bosnie-Herz6govine pour conclure des trait6s et < entretenirde relations spdciales parallles avec des Etats voisins )). Article 2, lettres a et dde ]a Consti-tution, annexe IV de l'Accord-cadre g 6nral pour la paix en Bosnie-Herzhgovine, Paris,14 d6cembre 1995.

ne s'agit pas, dans la conception classique de la responsabilit6, des ques-tions tombant sous le coup de cette derni~re.

Le choix oper& par le Rapporteur special de la Commission du droit

international sur la responsabiliti de l'Etat d'alors, Roberto Ago, consis-tant i codifier ce qui serait un troisiime 6lment constitutifdu o fait inter-nationalement illicite ., les <( circonstances excluant l'illicdit6 > (ou plu-

t6t leur absence), et son interpretation toute particuli~re de la distinctionentre r~gles primaires et secondaires sont i la source de l'ornbre qu'en-toure aujourd'hui les rapports entre droit des traitis et droit de la respon-sabilit.

11 n' a pas lieu d'entrer ici dans ce dibat lourd de consequences prati-

ques1 6. Nous devons en revanche nous interroger sur le bien-fondi de

l'inclusion des articles 60 et 61 des CV 1969 et 1986 et sur l'in-terpr~tation qui semble l'emporter quant aux rapports qu'ils entretiennent

avec le droit de la responsabilit6, suite i la sentence arbitrale du 30 avril1990 rendue dans 'affaire entre la France et la Nouvelle-Zalandel 1

7 et al'arret du 25 septembre 1997 dans l'affaire du Projet Gabcikovo-Na-

ItsgymarosDans la logique de leur article 42, paragraphe 2, les CV 1968 et 1986

se devaient d'6tablir toutes les causes d'extinction et de suspensiondes iait~s que l'on peut licitement invoquer en droit international. La

rigle inadimplenti non est adimplendum et la force majeure constituent a

116 La question dtait au ceur des deux diff6rends soumis au rtglementjuridictionnel "

l'affaire Nouveile-Z4lande/France sur les suites de l'incident du Rainbow Warrior [R.SA.,vol. XX, p. 215 (texte firangats dans Revue gbenrale de droit international public, 1990,

L 94, p. 838)] et celle du Projet Gabcikovo/Nagymaros entre )a Hongrie et 1a Slovaquie

(CJ. Recuel 1997, p. 7). En doctrine, cf. D. Bowett, "Treaties and State Responsibility",dams Le droit international au service de la paix, de lajustice et du d~veloppement Mdlan-

ges Michel Vitally. Paris, Pedone, 1991, p. 137-145; Troisi&ne Rapport sur la responsabi-

lit des Etats, par M. Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, rapporteur sp.&ial. Annuaire de la Commis-

sion du droit international. 1991, vol. 11, Ir e partie, p. 1.37 (en particulier p. 23-26); L.-A.

Sicilianos, "The Relationship Between Reprisals and Denunciation or Suspension of a

Treaty". EJ.I.L./J.E.D.J., 1993, vol. 4, p. 341-359; A. Yahi, < La violation d'un traite

r'articulation du droit des traites et du droit de la responsabilit6 intemationale ), Revue

beige de droit international. 1993. vol. XXVI, p. 437-469.; P. Weil, Droit des traiths et

droit de la responsabilite ,, dans M- Rama Montaldo (6d.), Le droit international dars un

monde en mutation. Liber Amicorurn en hommage au professeur Eduardo Jiminez de Ar-

chaga. Montevideo, F C.U., 1994, t I, p. 523-543; P.-M. Dupuy, o Droit des trait6s, codifi-

cation et responsabilit internationale -. Annuairefranfais de droit international, 1997,

L XLIII, pp. 7-30; Ph. Weckel; v Convergence du droit des traitns etdu droit de la responsa-

bilitd mternationale A la lumi4re de I'arrfet du 25 septembre 1997 n. Revue generale de droil

international public, 1998, t. 102, p- 647-684; D. Reichert-Facilides, "Down the Da-

nube: the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the Case concerning the

Gabdikovo-Nagyrnaros Project". International Comparative Law Quarterly, 1998, vol. 47,

p. 837-854.117 Nations Unies, Recuell des sentences arbitrales, vol. XX, p. 215.

Its Voir notamment le paragraphe 75 de la sentence arbitrale et le paragraphe 47 de

I'arrt, C.IJ. Recueil 1997.

coup stir de telles causes et rel~vent par l m~me du domaine du droit destrait~s.

Le probl~me est n6 lorsqu'on souhaite justifier l'extinction ou lasuspension des obligations conventionnelles en vertu des <( circonstancesexcluant l'illic~it6> >. La r~gle de l'article 60 et les <( contre-mesures )) sechevauchent, tout cormne l'article 61 et la force majeure du projet de laConnission du droit international sur la responsabilit6 des Etats. Affir-mer que l'on doit d'abord examiner le droit des trait6s pour savoir si untrait6 est ou non correctement 6teint ou suspendu et ensuite le droit de laresponsabilit6 pour savoir s'il existe une cause d'exon~ration 6quivaut i61argir les possibilit~s d'extinction ou suspension des trait~s. En effet, lesconditions pour I'exercice des contre-mesures ou pour l'invocation de laforce majeure sont plus souples dans le (( droit de la responsabilit6 >) quedans le droit des trait~s. Nous ne voyons pas de coharence dans 'argu-mentation qui veut qu'on examine les conditions de l'article 60 sur leplan de l'infraction et, si celles-ci ne sont pas runies, que l'on puisse in-voquer ensuite la justification de la suspension d'un trait6 en riposte i saviolation par l'autre partie i titre de << contre-mesures >>. Du point de vueontologique, l'article 60 et les contre-mesures ne pr~sentent pas de diff6-rences substantielles. II en va de meme pour << la force majeure du droitdes trait~s >) et la << force majeure du droit de la responsabilit6 >). D'autres<< circonstances excluant I'illic6it6 >>, telle que l'Etat de n~cessit6 parexemple, auraient pu 8tre 6galement retenues comme causes de suspen-sion ou extinction des trait~s. II n'en fat pas ainsi car dans la logique dudroit des trait~s, le codificateur a privilgi6, autant que possible, le main-tien du lien conventionnel. De toute 6vidence, la difficult6 apparait parI'ordre logique d'analyse qui sous-tend la distinction faite par RobertoAgo et accueillie par la Commission du droit international, qui voit dansles causes d'exon~ration de la responsabilit6 des r~gles diff~rentes et nondes exceptions contenues dans les r6gles (< primaires )> elles-m~mes.

Les effets de l'ouverture des hostilitds sur les traitds

Cette question d6lib6r6ment exclue des trois CV exige cependantdes r6ponses du syst~me juridique. L'Institut de droit international, danssa r6solution d'Helsinki de 1985, a d6fmi les effets fondamentaux deshostilit6s sur les trait6s" 9 . Ils comprennent deux r~gles fondamentales enla matire : 1) le d6clenchement d'un conflit arm6 n'entraine pas ipsofacto l'extinction ou la suspension des trait6s en vigueur entre les parties;2) les hostilit6s rendent applicables les trait6s qui privoient express6mentleur application en cas de conflit arm6. L'article 7 de la r6solution de

119 Voir Annuaire de l'Institut de droil international, Session d'Helsinki, 1986,vol. 61-11, p. 278-283. Voir igalement le rapport compl6mentaire de Beng Broms et lesobservations de certains membres dans ibid., 1985, vol. 61-1, p. 1-27.

l'Institut de droit international soulkve cependant des critiques. I1 dtablitqu'un Etat qui agit en l~gitime d6fense i titre individuel ou collectifpeutsuspendre l'application d'un trait6 incompatible avec l'exercice de cedroit. II ne parait pas appropri6 d'introduire de distinctions entre agres-seur et victime du point de vue du droit des traitis. Les consequencesd'une telle distinction, au demeurant tr~s importantes, se trouvent ail-leurs, c'est-i-dire dans le ius ad (ou contra) bellum et dans le domaine dela responsabiite internationale.

A notre avis, c'est encore l'objet et le but du traite qui fournit le cri-t~re pour tirer les consequences de l'ouverture d'hostilit~s sur les trait~s.Celle-ci produira la suspension des trait~s dont l'objet ou but est incom-patible avec l'existence d'un conflit arm6 entre les parties. On trouve unexemple dans un trait6 d'assistance ou de cooperation militaire, ou devente d'armements.

Consequences pour les Etats membresde la conclusion d'un traitipar une organisation internationale

Les cons6quences pour les Etats membres de la conclusion d'untrait6 par une organisation internationale ont suscite des controverses.L'article 36, his du projet de la Commission du droit international, quipr6voyait que des obligations et des droits pour les Etats membres nais-sent des dispositions d'un trait6 auquel l'organisation est partie 20 , fut re-jet6 par la Conf6rence de Vienne de 1986. Le souci de la Commission dudroit international visait i d6finir la situation de ces Etats, qui ne peuventatre considar6s ni comme parties au trait6 ni comme de simples tiers. Celarevient j affirmer que les articles 34 i 37 des CV 1969 et 1986 ne leur sontpas applicables. L'absence de consensus et de pratique uniforme au seindes diff6rentes organisations internationales n'a pas permis de d6gagerune r~gle g6n~rale applicable en la mati~re. La CV 1986 se borne ainsi ipriciser au paragraphe 3 de l'article 74 qu'elle ne pr6juge < aucune ques-tion qui pourrait se poser i propos de l'6tablissement des obligations etdes droits des Etats membres d'une organisation internationale au regardd'un trait& auquel cette organisation est partie ). I1 s'agit d'une solutionregrettable car l'article 36, his tel que propose finalement par la Commis-sion du droit international couvrait les diff6rentes hypotheses dans les-quelles les accords conclus par les organisations internationales pou-vaient cr6er des droits et des obligations envers leurs Etats membres, enpartant du consentement exprim6 sous des formes et i des moments di-vers par ceux-ci. L'intransigeance sovi6tique, d'une part, et la crainte de

120 Voir le texte de I'at- 36, bis et Ic corunentaire de la Commission du droit interna-tional dans I'Annuaire de la Commisson du droit international, 1982, vol. I, 2e pa-tie,

p. 4448.

certaines organisations internationales, d'autre part, ont eu raison de cetteproposition de la Commission de droit international qui exprimait le mi-nimum admis par les pratiques souvent diff~rentes d'entit~s telles que lesCommunaut6s europ~ennes ou les organisations internationales <( classi-ques )) 121.

II. - QUESTIONS OMISES PAR LES TROIS CONVENTIONS

A la difference de la cat6gorie pr~c~dente, les CV restent muettessur d'autres questions qui 6taient pourtant apparues dans la pratique et ladoctrine intemationales. Dans certains cas, ]a Commission de droit inter-national avait propos6 d'en inclure certaines. Les Conferences de Vienneen ont cependant d6cid6 autrement. Nous examinerons conjointement lapratique ult6rieure, la coutume nouvelle contradictoire et la disutudecomme des 6ventuelles causes de modification ou extinction des trait6snon pr~vues par les CV de 1969 et 1986 et, ensuite, la doctrine des trait6s(( in6gaux >).

Modification ou extinction des traitispar la pratique subsdquente, par I'dmergence d'une rbgle coutumibrede contenu opposd ou par disudtude

La Conference de Vienne de 1968-1969 s'est 6cart6e du projet de laCommission du droit international, qui attribuait i la pratique subs6-quente valeur interpr6tative et modificatrice 22, pour ne retenir que la pre-mire. Ce choixjudicieux s'explique par la nature m6me des trait6s. I1 nes'agit pas d'un simple comportement 6tatique de plus. 11 s'agit d'unesource du droit international, ayant des proc6d6s pr66tablis. La cons6-quence logique qui s'ensuit est que ce qui a exig6 une n6gociation, la si-gnature, parfois l'approbation parlementaire, la ratification et 1'6changedes instruments de ratification par des organes dfiment autoris6s nesaurait 8tre modifi6 par le simple comportement, -fit-il accompli par desfonctionnaires subaltemes ou par des agents ayant capacit6 pour conclure

121 Voir sur la question P. Reuter, op. cit., (supra, note 4), p. 107-108; Ph. Manin, <( LaConvention de Vienne sur le droit des trait~s entre Etats et organisations internationales ouentre organisations intemationales )). Annuaire frangais de droit international, 1986,vol. XXXII, p. 469-472; G. E. do Nascimento e Silva, "The 1969 and the 1986 Conventionson the Law of Treaties: A Comparison", dans Y. Dinstein (6d.), InternationalLaw ata Timeof Perplexity. Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne. Dordrecht, M. Nijhoff, 1989, p. 484et 486; R. Huesa Vinaixa, "Algunas consideraciones sobre el Convenio de Viena de 1986sobre tratados celebrados entre Estados y organizaciones intemacionales o entre organiza-ciones intemacionales". Revista Espahola de Derecho Internacional 1989, vol. XLI,p. 63-66; M. Schr6der, "Die Kodifikation des Vertragsrechts internationaler Organisatio-nen". Archiv des Vlkerrechts, 1985, vol. 23, p. 403-408.

122 Article 38 du projet. Voir son commentaire dans I'Annuairede la Commission dudroit international, 1966, vol. II, p. 257.

des trait s z3. Dars l'affaire du Projet Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, la Cour m-ternationale de Justice vient de confirmer que le comportement des par-ties ne met pas fin au trait. L'intirt de cette prise de position de la Courest d'autant plus grand que le trait6 en cause n'6tait pas r~gi par la CV1969124. En revanche, le comportement subsequent peut sans probl~me6tre analys6 comme un des 6lments i prendre en consideration pour i'm-terprtation d'un trait . Cela est en effet coherent avec le choix de Fin-terprttation textuelle. Ainsi, la pratique ult~rieure sera prise en compte enm~me temps que le contexte du traitd lorsqu'elle t~moigne d'un accorddes parties.

Le projet d'article 68, lettre c, adopt& provisoirement par la Com-mission du droit international en 1964, comprenait 6galement un para-graphe dtclarant que les trait6s pouvaient 8tre modifis par l'apparitionultdrieure d'une nouvelle rgle de droit coutumierlis. En rdalit6, 1'6mer-gence d'une regle coutumi~re contraire au trait6 n'implique pas non plusla caducit6 ou la modification automatique de celui-ci : ]a regle specialel'emportera sur la r~gle genrale, qu'elle soit anterieure ou postdrieure.En effet, seule l'6mergence de nouvelles r~gles imperatives operera l'ex-tinction des trait~s en vigueur qui sont en contradiction avec celles-ci,commne le prtvoit l'article 64 des CV 1969 et 1986.

L'absence de toute rif~rence dans les CV i ]a dasu~tude commecause d'extinction des traitis ne constitue pas non plus une lacune. Le faitqu'un traiti ne soit pas appliqu6 durant un laps de temps considerablen'implique pas ndcessairement sa caducit6. Les raisons de sa non-ap-plication peuvent en effet etre multiples, allant d'une simple consid&ra-tion d'opportunit politique circonstancielle, jusqu'i 'absence purementet simplement d'occasions pour I'appliquer. Une toute autre chose est la

123 Parmi les critiques qui se sont 61evbes au sein de la Conf6rence, on peut mention-net celles du reprdsctant francais, M. de Bresson, qui a relevd trois difficult6s majeures :

'une d'ordre cons titutionnel, une autre quanti la signification des conditions pr~cises ct se-v 'es prevues par la Convention pour l'expression de la volont6 des Etats, si on accepte enm'rne temps une modification ult6fieure des uaits simplement par lapratique. Enfin, le faitque la proposition n'Wtait gure conforrme A l'harmonie des relations internationales. Le re-pr~sentant arnt-icain, M. Kearney, a soulign6 sa preoccupation de voir que des fonctionnai-res de rang relativement peu &lev6 puissent suivre tun comportement qui, A l'insu des gou-vernements, pourrait ainsi aboutir a une modification du traitd. Le repr~sentant uruguayen,M. Alvarez, a mis en relief que toute pratique qui entrainerait )a modification d'un tanisupposerait "cessairement la non-application, c'est-i-dire la violation des dispositions dutwait6, cc qui serait en contradiction avec ]a rtgle Pacta sint servanda (voir Documents offi-ciels de la Confrence des Nations Unies sur le droit des traitis. Documents de la Confe-rence, F,70.V.5, p. 226-230). Pour un examen de la question ailant plutht dans le sens de Iareconnaissance de la pratique subs~quente comme moyen de modifier les traitas, voir G.Distefano; (<La pratique subs&quente des Etats parties A tin traitd u. Annuairefranvais dedro i international, 1995, vol. XL, p. 41-71.

124 Ci Recuei 1997, arret du 25 septembre 1997, par. 100 et 114.125 Annuaire de 1a Commission du droit international 1964, vol. 11, p. 209.

disparition de l'objet du trait6, du fait des changements intervenus dans lesyst~me juridique ou des r~alit~s auxquelles il devait s'appliquer.

Les traitds e inegaux ))

Invoqu6s par certains Etats et une partie de la doctrine comnime uneautre cause de nullit6 des trait6s, les trait~s dits < in~gaux > n'ont pas requde consdcration conventionnelle. I1 ne s'agit pas d'une question laiss6eouverte par la codification. Celle-ci n'a tout simplement pas retenu la(l 16sion >>, figure juridique existant dans certains droits internes permet-tant d'attaquer la validit6 des contrats du fait de l'in~galit6 des prestationsdes parties, conne cause de nullit6 des trait~s 26 , solution qui entend pri-vil~gier autant que possible le maintien du lien conventionnel. Par ail-leurs, d'autres causes de nullit6 ou d'extinction des trait~s pourraient6ventuellement couvrir certaines situations vis~es par ceux qui invoquentI'existence de trait~s o in~gaux >, telles que la contrainte ou le change-ment fondamental de circonstances, sans entrer dans l'analyse de la pro-portionnalit6 des prestations assumes par les parties.

III. - << LAcuris) tVENTUELLES DES QUESTIONS TRAITEES PAR LES CON.

VENTIONS

A. - En matiare de riserves

On connait le d6bat i propos de l'existence d'un rdgime spcial enmatire de reserves aux trait~s relatifs i la protection des droits de la per-sonne 127. On pretend 6galement qu'il existe un traitement diff~renci6 encas de succession d'Etats pour ces m~mes traitds' 2 8. On ne saurait niercertaines particularit~s propres i ce genre de trait6s, d'ailleurs d6ji misesen exergue par la Cour en 1951 29. Cela ne veut cependant pas dire que les

126 Voir A ce sujet l'6tude de L. Caflisch; "Unequal Treaties". German Yearbook ofInternational Law, 1992, vol. 35, p. 52-80. Les rbserves A la CV 1969 formul6es parI'Afghanistan et le Maroc font r6f6rence aux trait6s o in6gaux n.

127 Voir le deuxieme rapport sur les r6serves aux trait6s 6labor6 par le rapporteur sp-cial A. Pellet, 13 juin 1996, A/CN.4/477/Add.1, ainsi que le rapport de la Commission dudroit international A I'Assemble g n~rale sur les travaux de sa quarante-neuvi~me session(A/52/10), p. 98-108.

128 La question reste ouverte dans I'affaire sur ]'Application de la Convention pour laprevention et la rdpression du crime de genocide. La Bosnie-Herzhgovine a invoqu6 lath~orie de la succession automatique aux trait6s de protection des droits de la personne.Cf. les plaidoiries de M. Erik Suy (Yougoslavie) et de Mine Brigitte Stern (Bosnie-Herzdgovine) du 29 avril et du I er mai 1996 respectivement (CR 96/6, p. 8-18 et CR 96/9,p. 20-41), ainsi que I'arret du 13 juillet 1996 relatif Ala competence de la Cour et la receva-bilit6 de la requite (C..J. Recueil 1996, p. 611-612, par. 21-23). En doctrine, voir M. Ka-minga, "State Succession in Respect of Human Rights Treaties". European Journal ofInternational Law/Journal europden de droit international, 1996, vol. 7, p. 469-484.

129 Riserves it la Convention pour la prevention et la repression du crime de gino-cide, avis consultatif C.LJ. Recueil 1951, p. 23-24.

trait~s ayant un tel contenu soient soumis ' un regime particulier enmatire de conclusion (y compris la possibilit6 de formuler des r~ser-

yes), interpretation, application, extinction et succession. Les partisans

d'un regime particulier confondent souvent le contenu des r~gles et leurssources. Du moment oiu certaines rigles conventionnelles et coutumires

ont un contenu identique, on pretend qu'aucune reserve i la dispositionconventionnelle ne serait permise, ou que la d~nonciation ou le retrait autrait6 ne serait pas possible. S'agissant de la r~gle conventionnelle, toutd6pendra en r~alit de ce que le trait6, ou les r~gles du droit des traites si

celui reste muet, pr~voit en mati~re de reserves et de denonciation ou re-trait. Si la reserve, la d~nonciation ou le retrait sont permis, alors l'Etatqui procede de la sorte ne sera pas li du point de vue conventionnel,mime s'il reste sounis aux m~mes obligations du point de vue coutu-mier 30 . Lorsque les obligations coutumires et conventionnelles sont

identiques dans un domaine donn6, le complement apport6 par les trait6sest constitu6 par les regimes institutionnels ou de mise en ceuvre, de con-

tr6le et de r~glement des diff~rends qu'ils instaurent. La qualit6 de partie,

la possibilit6 de formuler des reserves et l'extinction du lien convention-nel sont d~termin~es par le droit des trait~s et non par la mati6re consi-dire. Le rapporteur special Alain Pellet a mis en lumijre que le syst6medes r~serves des CV 1969 et 1986, qui suit I'avis de la Cour intemationalede Justice de 1951 (donc celui consacr6 auparavant par les pays d'Am6-rique latine), o par sa souplesse et sa flexibilit6 (...) est adapt& aux exi-

gences de l'ensemble des trait~s, quel que soit leur objet ou leur nature .

En effet, son caractere suppl~tif et le fait d'itre axe autour de la notion del'objet et but du traite comme crit&e fondamental pour la datermination

de la licdit6 des reserves justifient cette position' .

Rien ne justifie non plus l'6tablissement (prdtendument existant ousouhait6) d'un regime spdcial de succession pour les traitds relatifs aux

droits de la personne, car le contenu des traitds ne peut pas modifier ou

diterminer les procdds en vertu desquels les Etats y deviennent parties.

I1 convient donc de distinguer, ici aussi, le contenu et la source des regles.

130 Le pr~tendu retrait de la R-publique drnocratique et populaire de Coree au Pacte

international relatif aux droits civils et politiques, j ustifi6 i titre de Igitime defense (sic), a

td consid&r6 i juste titre comme n'6tant pas perius par celui-ci, A la lurnire des disposi-

tions de Particle 56 de la CV 1969, reflet du droit coutumier. Cf I'aide-rmeoire des Na-

tions Unies concemant la lettre de retrait de ]a Corde du Nord du 23 septembre 1997.

Doc. C. 1997. TREA TIES 10 du 12 novembre 1997.131 Deuxi&re rapport, toc. ci. (supra. note 90), p. 89. La Cormmission du droit inter-

national a enterin6 cette prise de position dans ses conclusions prrliminaires concernant

e les reserves aux traites multilatTaux normatifs, y cornpris les traites relatifs aux droits de

r'hornme , (voir le Rapport de /a Commission du droit international citk supra, note 20,

p. 107). Sur la proposition du Rapporteur special A. Pellet, la Commission du droit interna-

tional consid~e en efTet que les conmpetences des organes de contr6le cr66s par les traitds re-

latifs aux droits de la personne pour faire des observations sur )a liceit6 des r6serves Cnises

par les Etats n'est pas en contradiction avec I systrne des CV 1969 et 1986 (ibid).

Qui plus est, les tentatives de justification d'un r6gime sp6cial de succes-sion automatique pour les conventions relatives aux droits de la personneignorent que c'est pr~cis~ment la r~gle de la succession automatique quiest pr~vue par la Convention de 1978, A I'exception deji mentionn~e desEtats nouvellement ind~pendants. Telle serait l'interpr~tation correcte dela CV 1978, sur laquelle nous reviendrons ultdrieurement.

Ayant djiA signak 1'existence d'un regime unique de reserves, deuxprobl~mes importants restent ouverts. Le premier d~passe en r~alit6 lecadre des reserves, mais dans une certaine manire se confond avec ce-lui-ci. II s'agit de la question des daclarations interprdtatives'32 . L'ab-sence de toute r~f~rence i ces daclarations dans les CV a certainement in-citi certains Etats i diguiser leurs rdserves sous la dinomination de<( d&clarations interprdtatives )). L'article 310 de la Convention des Na-tions Unies sur le droit de la mer de 1982, qui precise clairement ce qu'estune declaration, en la distinguant nettement des r6serves, constitue unbon exemple de ce que l'on aurait souhait6 voir mcorpor6 aux CV 1969 et1986.

Un autre probl~me insuffisamment r6solu par les CV 1969 et 1986est celui de l'effet juridique de l'objection i la reserve. Un exempleest celui de l'Etat qui formule une objection sans s'opposer A 1'entreen vigueur du trait6 entre lui-m~me et l'Etat rdservataire. De la lecture del'article 21, paragraphe 3, des CV 1969 et 1986 ne ressort en effet au-cune difference entre la situation pr&cddemment dacrite et celle de 'Etatqui accepte la r6serve, lorsque celle-ci vise i exclure les effets juridiquesde certaines dispositions du trait 33 . Comme on le sait, le ddbat reste6galement ouvert quant A la distinction entre l'objection et la validitides reserves 134

. A notre avis, l'objection comporte un choix pour lesEtats contractants ou parties autres que 'Etat rdservataire, qui n'obditpas forcdment A la validit6 de la rdserve. L'objection n'a pas besoind'8tre justifide : elle peut s'expliquer simplement par la volont6 de'Etat contractant qui 6tablit, moyennant l'objection, l'6tendue de son

consentement. Au bout de compte, les reserves ne constituent qu'un as-pect (un <( accident o) pourrait-on dire) de la conclusion des traitds. Rdser-yes et objections ddlimitent ainsi la portde de l'accord des volontds.En outre, s'il faut s'attendre que les Etats contractants qui consid6-rent une reserve comme ktant mvalide formulent une objection, ne se-rait-ce que sous peine d'Etre r~put~s 'avoir acceptde, un organe juridic-

132 Voir sur la question le troisitme rapport sur les rdserves aux trait~s pr~sentd parAlain Pellet le 19juin 1998 (A/CN. 4/491).

133 L'article 21, paragraphe 3, affirme que v les dispositions sur lesquelles porte la r6-serve ne s'appliquent pas entre les deux Etats dans la mesure privue par la rdserve ).

134 Cf. le rapport prtliminaire sur les reserves aux traitts du Rapporteur special AlainPellet, A/CN.4/470, 30 mai 1995, p. 47-58.

tionnel resterait toujours libre d'apprcier lui-meme la validit6 decelle-ci'35 .

D'autres probl~mes pr~tendument laiss6s sans r~ponse en matierede reserves ont pourtant it r~gls par le droit de Vienne. L'un est celuides < r~serves > aux trait~s bilat~raux. Le fait que ia Conference deVienne de 1968-1969 ait modifi6 le titre originaire de la section perti-nente de la CV 1969, se bornant i l'intituler ( r6serves > au lieu de < r6-serves aux trait&s multilatiraux)> est sans effet A cet 6gard. Lessoi-disant 4 reserves o aux traitis bilateraux constituent en r~alit6 soitune nouvelle proposition de trait6, soit une interpretation du traits parl'une des parties ou l'un de ses organes 36.

Un autre faux probleme est celui de reserves aux dispositions codi-fiant des regles coutuniures. Une fois encore, on confond le contenu de laregle et sa source en prtendant qu'aucune reserve n'est permise si ellevise une disposition qui codifie la coutume. Les CV ont retenu avec beau-coup de discemement le crit~re de I'objet et but du trait6 pour 6tablir lapossibilit6 d'6mettre une r6serve, A d~faut de dispositions conventionnel-les r~gissant la mati~re. Si la r~serve n'est pas contraire A l'objet et but dutraitl et a trait a une disposition codificatrice d'une r~gle coutunire,I'Etat r~servataire continuera simplement, et seulement, A 8tre li par lar~gle coutumi&e. I1 peut etre 1gitime pour un Etat de ne pas vouloir ap-pliquer A cette r~gle les dispositions conventionnelles en mati&re de con-tr6le ou de r glement des diff~rends. Cela relve en effet de son choixsouverain. 11 n'&chappera pas pour autant A l'application A son 6gard de larigle coutumrire.

135 Notons en passant que ce probl&ne peut se poser d'une mani&re analogue i 1'egard

de certaines causes de nullit6 ou d'extinction des trait~s invoqudes par 'une des parties.136 Un exemple de cette dernire situation est )a r6solution commnune des paris du

Budestag du 17 rnai 1972 relative aux traitas dits de l'Ostpolitik conclus par l'Allernagnef&.rale avec la Pologne et 'Union sovidtique [texte dans D. Rauschning ( d ); RechLsstel-lung Deutscilands. V6lkerrechtliche Vertrdge und andere rechisgestaltende Ale 2e 6d-,Nerdlingen, DTV, 1989, p. 139-1]. Roberto Ago, en tant que prisident de la Conference de

Vienne, a dit que, quand ii faisait ses 6tudes de droit, on lui a enseigMt que parler de rTserves

aux traits bilataraux constituait une contradiction dans les terrnes (Conference des NationsUnies sur le droit des traitds. Deuxiime session, Vienne 9 avril-22 mai 1969 AJCONF .39/

1 1/Add. 1, p. 39). Voir sur la question : E. De La Guardia, Derecho de los tratados inferno-cionales. Buenos Aires, Abaco, 1997, p. 170-172, et les auteurs qui y sont cites. La question

a pourtant dtd mentionn~e comme l'une des lacunes des dispositions relatives aux reserves

dars les CV 1969 et 1986 (voir le rapport pr6liminaire du professeur A. Pellet, AJCN.4470,

30 nai 1995, p. 59, par. 127) et certains Etats souhaitent que la Comirrussion du droit inter-

national se penche sur cette question qui thioriquement enentrait pas dans le regime de

Vienne >) (cf Rapport de la Commission du droit international sur les travaux de so qua-

rante-neuvieme session. Resume thematique des dibats tenus h la Sixinme Commission de

I 'Assemblee ginlrale A/CN 41483, 20 janvier 1998, p. 13, par. 93).

B. - Les effets de la d~claration de nulliti, de suspension ou d'extinc.tion d'un traitd en 1 'absence d'accord entre les parties

Lorsqu'une partie consid6re un trait6 comme nul, 6teint ou suspenduet se heurte i la contestation de l'autre ou des autres parties, les CV 1969et 1986 se bornent i 6tablir une proc~dure de rglement du diff6rend. Lacodification a en effet laiss6 sans r~ponse la question de savoir quels sontles droits et obligations des parties i l'6gard du traitS, tant que le diff~rendA son 6gard n'est pas r6glP'37 .

C. - Les ddclarations de succession aux traitds multilatdrauxfaites endehors de la ddcolonisation

Comme on sait, la pratique r~cente en mati~re de succession d'Etatsva dans le sens de la formulation de d6clarations de succession dans lescas de d~membrement et de dissolution. Autrement dit, ce qui 6tait pr6vucomme une hypoth~se exceptionnelle en faveur des Etats nouvelle-ment ind~pendants (ceux issus de la ddcolonisation) s'est g~nralis pourles autres cas de succession dans lesquels un nouvel Etat voit le jour.Cette pratique, outre l'incertitude qu'elle comporte pour la diterminationdes parties aux trait~s, entraine d'autres difficult6s suppl~mentaires:est-ce la dclaration qui permet A 'Etat successeur de devenir partie autrait6 ? Si oui, a-t-elle un effet r6troactif, comme pr~vu par l'article 17 dela CV 1978 pour les Etats nouvellement ind~pendants ? A-t-elle un effetdclaratif d'une situation d~ji existante ? I1 ne s'agit pas, bien 6videm-ment, d'un pur d~bat doctrinal et la question reste ouverte dans l'affairede l'Application de la Convention pour la prdvention et la repression ducrime de g~nocide (Bosnie-Herz~govine c. Yougoslavie). A notre avis, lathese qui s'adapte au mieux A la solution retenue par l'article 34 de la CV1978 est celle du pur effet confirmatif de la daclaration de succession 138.

CONCLUSION

Il ressort de l'analyse pr~c~dente que les questions rest~es v~ritable-ment ouvertes apr~s la codification sont bien moindres que celles que ladoctrine a l'habitude de mentionner. Nous avons constat6 que certainespropositions n'ont pas 6t retenues car elles ne correspondent ni i l'Etatdu droit en la mati~re considar~e ni aux finalit~s du systfme du droit destrait~s, qui sont de faciliter l'6tablissement des liens conventionnels et fa-voriser leur maintien.

137 Cf. A cet 6gard, P. Reuter; op. cit., supra, note 73, p. 151-153 et 177-178.138 Dans ce sens: V. Mikulka "The Dissolution of Czechoslovakia and the Succession

in Respect of Treaties". Development and International Cooperation. Ljubljana, 1996, vol.XII, n* 23, p. 45-63, en part. p. 47.

Ainsi, la plupart des questions relatives i la mati~re ont t6 couver-tes par les trois Conventions. fl serait en outre demesur6 de parler de lacu-nes Ua oi il existe un point non spocifiquement abord6 par les Conven-tions dans un domaine n~anmoins trait6 par celles-ci. Davantage encores'il s'agit de vues opposes dans la pratique relative a tel aspect ou telautre de l'ceuvre de codification. Dans ce sens, nous serions tent6s d'af-firmer que dans certains domaines, comme celui de la succession auxtrait~s en cas de separation ou dissolution, il nous faut regretter que la pra-tique se soit 6cart~e des dispositions de la CV 1978.

Par leur coherence et leur flexibilit6, le trois CV permettent d'unemaniire g~n~rale de faire face aux probl~mes nouveaux qui surgissentdans la pratique. Elles servent egalement de source d'inspiration pour re-gler dans leur esprit les rares questions qui n'ont pas k6 couvertes parl'ceuvre de codification.

Presentation by Ms. Lori Fisler Dam rosch139

It is an honour and a pleasure to present remarks on this controver-sial topic at a moment when the Commission is preparing to move to thenext stage in its consideration of this issue. When I received the invitationa few weeks ago, I was encouraged to elaborate perspectives that mightnot otherwise be emphasized before the Commission, specifically fromthe perspective of human rights bodies or from the non-State point ofview. I assume that the perspectives of Governments are already fullyavailable to you through their comments on the Preliminary Conclusions,which you adopted last summer, on the basis of the excellent reports pre-pared by your able Special Rapporteur and President, Mr. Alain Pellet.And you also had the benefit of governmental comments from the SixthCommittee session in autumn 1997 where, I understand, the tenor of thediscussion was generally supportive of the Preliminary Conclusions. I,therefore, have the moderately daunting task of endeavouring to bring toyour attention alternative points of view, not only differing from thoseexpounded in the several years of work carried out by Mr. Pellet but alsodiffering from the dominant sentiments of Governments, including myown. This task is all the more difficult in view of the fact that my own ini-tial attitude towards questions of treaty law was shaped during a period ofgovernment service, which has somewhat been tempered through subse-quent experiences in academic and non-governmental circles.

I would like to address three aspects of the topic, three issues fromthe many surveyed in Mr. Pellet's reports, emphasizing aspects of thePreliminary Conclusions that might warrant further consideration in thedeliberations. The three topics are:

-The application of the object and purpose test, derived from gen-eral international law, embodied in the 1969 Vienna Conventionon the Law of Treaties, 40 as a standard for determining the ac-ceptability of reservations;

-The competence of the human rights treaty monitoring bodies toevaluate reservations that are alleged to be incompatible with theobject and purpose of the treaty;

-The possibilities of severing, or withdrawing, an impermissiblereservation or of withdrawing from the treaty as a whole.

Let me begin with the object and purpose test. I think that everyoneagrees on the starting point, regardless of the differences on other aspectsof the topic, and this starting point is that the object and purpose test, em-bodied in article 19 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, is sound-that is to

139 Professor at Columbia Law School.140 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331.

say, a reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of a treaty is,in principle, impermissible. The differences begin to arise over questionsof who is to make the evaluation of the object and purpose: Is it each Statefor itself at the moment of acceptance of the treaty obligation? Is it otherStates in formulating their objections? Is it a treaty body? Is it a disputesettlement organ or some other authority? But no one disagrees, in princi-ple, that a reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of a treatyis impermissible, prohibited, unacceptable, inadmissible, invalid or, per-haps, void. Now, the question is can the Commission do more than it al-ready has done in explicating the concept of object and purpose in gen-eral--that is, not as regards particular treaties but as a matter of generalmethodology? I think that this is a very valuable area of inquiry. It wouldprovide guidance to all those who engage in the evaluation of object andpurpose and in the compatibility of reservations that are alleged to be in-consistent with the object and purpose. Therefore, I agree with Mr. Pellet,who wrote in his first report that because the concept of object and pur-pose, as used in the 1969 Vienna Convention, is uncertain, it would be ap-propriate for the Commission to undertake a study of the very notion ofobject and purpose. Some headway in this regard was made in Mr. Pel-let's second report, where such issues are explored as reservations thatare alleged to conflict withjus cogens norms, i.e., reservations that are al-leged to conflict with peremptory norms of international law or reserva-tions that are alleged to conflict with customary international law norms.You may well wish to return to these issues. I will not elaborate on themhere because I have in mind two other points bearing on object and pur-pose that I would like to stress. These points do not relate to the content ofreservations, but rather to certain features of reservations that may bearon how to evaluate the consistency of reservations with the object andpurpose of the treaty.

First, I think that it is fundamental that any reservation should beclear and specific enough so that all relevant audiences will understandthe content of what is being reserved against In other words, you could

formulate a presumption that an excessively vague or general reservationwould be presumptively incompatible with object and purpose. This ideawas raised by the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment

No. 24, in which that Committee stressed that reservations must be

specific and transparent so that all concerned may be clear as to what ob-

ligations of human rights compliance have or have not been undertaken.

A similar point of view has been expressed by the Committee on the

Rights of the Child, as well as other human rights treaty bodies which

have criticized reservations that are broad and imprecise. And your work,

I think, could profitably elaborate these criteria of precision and of trans-

parency, regardless of your disagreements with the human rights treaty

bodies on other aspects of their standards for evaluating compatibility.

Second, I would encourage you to look into reservations that meas-ure the entire scope of obligations in terms of a State's own domestic law.In my view, there should be a presumption of the unacceptability of suchreservations. Or at least, a State could have a very heavy burden in justi.fying such a reservation in terms of compatibility of object and purpose.And again, General Comment No. 24 has expressed this point of view,pointing out that it might be necessary to reserve against some specificobligations, in the light of an overriding element of domestic law, but thatit should be impermissible to subordinate the entirety of the internationaltreaty to domestic policy. In my view, this criterion should hold even if aState's domestic law is, in fact, consistent with the treaty at the time of ac-cession.

There would be broad support for such criteria among States. In-deed, one can find broad support for such criteria in such instrumentsadopted by consensus as the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Ac-tion growing out of the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993, inwhich it was stressed that any reservations to human rights treaties shouldbe formulated as precisely and narrowly as possible.

I now turn to my second topic, perhaps a more sensitive one, and thatis the competence of treaty-monitoring bodies to evaluate reservations interms of their consistency with object and purpose. I chose the term"evaluate" because it is a broad term, broad enough to encompass all thedifferent verbs that you used in your Preliminary Conclusions, as well asmany other verbs that could have been used. For example, when I use theword "evaluate", I will be referring not only to the terms that you used inPreliminary Conclusions No. 5, of "commenting upon" and "expressingrecommendations concerning reservations", but also to such terms as"monitoring", "considering", "deciding", "assessing", "giving an opin-ion", "pronouncing upon", "expressing an opinion" and "verifying thepermissibility". As a first step, your Preliminary Conclusions have cor-rectly acknowledged that the monitoring bodies are to comment upon andexpress recommendations concerning reservations in order to carry outthe functions assigned to them. This acceptance of the treaty bodies rec-ommendatory competence is fully consistent with their own terms of ref-erence and should not raise any difficulties.

The controversies arise with the more cautious, circumspect or pos-sibly conservative stance of the following paragraphs of the PreliminaryConclusions, where it is suggested that, perhaps, some new law-making,new treaty clauses or protocols might be needed "if States seek to confercompetence on the monitoring body to appreciate or determine the ad-missibility of a reservation". Similarly, in paragraph 9 of the PreliminaryConclusions, it is mentioned that bodies could be granted competence tothat effect in the future. This choice of language conveys an impression ofdoubt about the current competence of treaty bodies with regard to theevaluation of treaty reservations. The choice of words in the Preliminary

Conclusions, no doubt, reflects great care and possibly compromise be-

tween positions that are difficult to reconcile in principle. And, indeed, it

is quite possible that this choice of words is more deferential to the treaty

bodies than some in the Commission may have preferred. Nonetheless,

one may wonder whether the Commission, by venturing views however

carefully expressed, tending to cast doubt on the competence of the

treaty-monitoring bodies to carry out the functions in question, has, per-

haps, assumed the Commission's own competence in a sphere where it

does not necessarily enjoy a comparative advantage and where it may not

have the benefit of the fullest possible information. In other words, as re-

gards issues relevant to the law of treaties, the Commission has a clear

mandate and considerable expertise but, on the issue of institutional com-

petence of other bodies, an entirely different method of analysis would be

required. Even assuming that your own terms of reference allowed you to

inquire into the scope of authority of other United Nations bodies-and I

am not sure that they do, any more than a treaty body could inquire into

the International Law Commission's authority or endeavour to circum-

scribe or constrain the authority of the International Law Commission-

the methodology was not made clear in the Preliminary Conclusions.

And I would like to stress a point of view that the Preliminary Conclu-

sions may underestimate the valuable functions performed by the treaty

bodies.

I would like to start with the proposition that the monitoring bodies

are, presumptively, the proper bodies to know what the object and pur-

pose of their particular treaty is; they will be intimately familiar with that

treaty, with its relations to the overall corpus of the international human

rights law, with practice under that treaty, including the treaty body juris-

prudence itself, with other points bearing on the object and purpose of the

treaty, as well as with scholarly writings on aspects of human rights law.

There is no other body with comparable expertise on the object and pur-

pose of the treaty. When treaty bodies do evaluate reservations for their

compatibility with object and purpose, the views of these treaty bodies

can have a very great influence in helping to inform and influence the po-

sitions of States concerning reservations, and those views can help shape

the positions of States in a constructive direction so that the test of com-

patibility of a reservation with the treaty's object and purpose is more

likely to be satisfied, if not immediately, then over time. By this, I mean

that public opinion in Member States can be, and often is, receptive to the

treaty bodies' views and can, in turn, help to shape the position of Gov-

ernments so that States are encouraged to come into fuller compliance

with international standards. For example, if a reservation has been en-

tered because of a good faith question about how the treaty body might

eventually interpret substantive obligations under the treaty, the treaty

body is competent to flesh out the content of ambiguous norms and to an-

swer any questions that have been left in doubt, thereby helping to elimi-

nate the gap between the content of the reservation and the content of sub.stantive obligations under the treaty. This dialogue between treaty-bodymembers and State representatives concerning the meaning and scope ofa reservation may help narrow the reservation, as where a State represen-tative gives a clarification of the State's intentions in response to thequestions and observations of the treaty body. This dialogue can be veryimportant from the point of view of the people in the reserving State whobenefit from a narrowing of the reservation.

Finally, a treaty body's views concerning incompatibility of a reser-vation with the object and purpose may be useful to other States Parties asthey seek to engage the reserving State in a dialogue aimed at narrowingor withdrawing the reservation. The position of objecting States or poten-tial objectors can be fortified by the knowledge that the objection is notmerely one of policy or politics but, rather, an authoritative objectivepoint of view on the object and purpose of the treaty.

My final topic concerns the possibilities of withdrawing, modifyingor severing a reservation, or, perhaps, withdrawing from the treaty in itsentirety. According to the Preliminary Conclusions, it would be up to thereserving State to decide what action to take in the event of inadmissibil-ity of a reservation. According to paragraph 10 of the Preliminary Con-clusions, such action could consist, for example, of a State either modify-ing its reservation so as to eliminate the inadmissibility, or withdrawingits reservation, or forgoing becoming a party to the treaty. From thechoice of the verb "to forgo", I assume that you meant to include the pos-sibility that the State would decide to withdraw from the treaty entirely.This is the course of action that some representatives of States assume tobe inevitable if the reservation in question is a sine qua non of the State'sconsent to be bound as, for example, if the reservation is a conditionof parliamentary approval. I do agree with the position implicit in thisparagraph that there can be no automatic, all-or-nothing, in-all-circum-stances, answers to such questions as whether the State party remainsparty to the treaty in general or how the scope of its obligations is affectedby the inadmissibility of the reservation. But there are two points to beemphasized in this connection.

The first point is that "the State", using that term in quotes, may welltake a new decision concerning the scope of its commitment, and theviews of the treaty body may well be relevant to reformulating the termsof consent, especially if public opinion is attentive to these views. Thus, Irestate the point I had made earlier concerning the very positive impact ofthe views of treaty bodies on public opinion within a reserving State.

The second and final point concerns the question of withdrawalfrom the whole treaty as a consequence of invalidity of a reservation. Thisoption has been called into question by the Human Rights Committee inits General Comment No. 26, which was adopted last autumn, in responseto a purported withdrawal from the 1966 International Covenant on Civil

and Political Rights, 14 1 on the part of the Democratic People's Republicof Korea. This general comment treats the 1966 Civil and Political Cove-nant as the kind of treaty which, under the 1969 Vienna Convention onthe Law of Treaties, is not subject to denunciation or withdrawal. Youmay wish to address this matter in your ongoing work on the law of treat-ies, especially in connection with the option of ceasing to be a party to atreaty in lieu of altering an inadmissible reservation.

The impulse underlying the Human Rights Commission's positionis consonant with a growing trend toward acceptance of the universalityand inalienability of international human rights and their assimilationinto the corpus of customary international law. A State may not be able todiscard the normative obligations of a treaty reflecting the general inter-national law of human rights, even if that State has second thoughts aboutits ratification or has come to understand that conditions of its consentare unacceptable. But that is a very different question from thedenounceability of a particular institutional framework for implementa-tion of the rights in question. All human institutions are fallible and oneway that participants in any institution can register their view of errors isthrough the exit option. Your ongoing study must clarify that the exit op-tion remains fully available to a State, the original consent of which wassubject to a reservation later found to be unacceptable.

141 Ibid., vol. 999, p. 171.

Presentation by Mr. Ian Brownlie'4 2

I think the problem we are facing is not one of whether I, or anyoneelse, agrees with Mr. Marcelo Kohen or Ms. Lori Damrosch. I think theproblem is one of balance and of perspective. What I want to do is to tryand discuss perspective. The perspective in a way was outlined by Mr.Kohen: What are the tasks remaining in relation to the law of treaties sofar as the Commission is concerned? And if I may translate that questioninto another one: What is codification? In his work in the Commission,during the period from 1956 to 1960, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice 143 adoptedthe mode of the expository code which gives a detailed exposition ofpractically every thinkable permutation in the law of treaties. It is still aremarkable piece of work which has a sort of Hohfeldian touch about itand is terribly complete. But the Commission, quite rightly, decided thatit was not the way forward and what we have, especially in the 1969 Vi-enna Convention itself, is a very useful piece of work, which is not com-plete and, of course, does not purport to be complete. I think it is impor-tant to remind ourselves that the preambles to all three ViennaConventions 44 related to treaties preserve the right of States to invokecustomary law. The preamble of each one of them says: "Affirming thatthe rules of customary international law will continue to govern questionsnot regulated by the provisions of the present convention". Therefore, theconventions are all modest in that way: they are useful texts; they are nottoo detailed. It is important to bear in mind the users, even non-lawyerswho use the texts that this Commission produces, and also to keep inmind the user when we are offered lists of possible improvements andfill-outs of existing instruments. Now, what are the policy dictates so faras comprehensive coverage is concerned? If we are discussing the 1969Vienna Convention, is it a policy dictate that we aim for total coverage?In my view, it is unrealistic to expect to have total coverage; it is not nec-essary in most cases, especially this morning, in the discussion of someother subject matters. I detected a feeling, in the context of State responsi-bility, for example, that somehow by anticipatory drafting you can actu-ally avoid the awful problems of fact which decision makers always haveto face. That, I think, is delusive; you cannot avoid the ultimate problemof weighing facts and applying the law to difficult sets of facts. I do notsee why the Commission should try to achieve the impossible. Having

142 Member of the International Law Commission, 1997-.t43 Former member of the International Law Commission, 1955-1960.144 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969): United Nations, Treaty Series,

vol. 1155, p. 331; Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties (1978):United Nations Conference on the Succession of States in respect of Treaties, Official docu-ment, vol. III (Conference documents) (United Nations publication, Sales No. F.79.V.10);and Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organiza-tions or between International Organizations (1986): document A/CONF.129/15.

said that, of course, there are some omissions which can be pointed out inthe context of the 1969 Vienna Convention and I will mention three ofthem.

The first is the modification of treaties by subsequent conduct of theparties, which appeared in an article in the final draft of the Commission,but was rejected at the Vienna Conference as it was thought that it mightbe a source of instability. At the same time, in State practice, clearly suchmodification does take place and, I would think, is in principle acceptableif the subsequent conduct involves the common consent of the parties.

The second gap is the importance of supervening custom as aground of treaty termination or revision. This is not provided for m the1969 Vienna Convention. The closest one comes to this is in article 64where there is the reference to the emergence of a new peremptory normof general international law. There is a very helpful thesis of Dr. Kontou,prepared at Cambridge, exactly on the relevant State practice and the im-pact of developments in the law of the sea on prior fisheries agreements,and there are other examples which she adduces.

The two omissions to which I have referred thus far do not require,as far as I am concerned, further attention. The practice of States dealswith these problems m a perfectly sensible way. They are omissionswhich, I think, are completely benign, and I am not for a minute suggest-ing that the Commission should rush about fixing these omissions.

The third omission is, of course, the question of reservations. In thisrespect, the Commission has committed itself to further examination ofthe problems and I think that there is room, in the context of reservations,for further clarification and development of what is already in the 1969Vienna Convention. I would say this: I think there are limits on what theCommission can do. There are occasional signs, very slight signs, of lackof security from my colleagues in some of their statements. We are ingreat danger of wanting to be relevant, which is a very dangerous state ofmind. If relevance takes the form of handling any hot potato which theSixth Committee cares to give us, we should think very carefully beforeaccepting some of these propositions.

I think that there is going to be a continuing problem in the monitor-ing bodies because they vary greatly. They have various institutionalframeworks and there will be continuing problems over reservations. Iam not sure that the Commission should be set up as the rescuer, becausewe are bound to fail. If we accept this challenge, we are setting ourselvesup for a guaranteed, relative failure. I said there are limits on what theCommission can do, because I do not see how you can readily generalizein relation to the work of the monitoring bodies. In the Loizidou Case, 145

145 Case ofLoizdou v. Turkey (18 December 1996) to be published in the EuropeanCourt of Human Rights Reports

the European Court of Human Rights, which is a court and not a monitor-ing body, had to apply the applicable law, which was the convention but,because there were incidental problems and because a convention itself isgoverned by general international law, in some respects, the Court had toapply the Convention as part of its applicable law in relation to other as-pects of general international law. The Court had to act in this manner,and I do not see how the Commission or any other outside body can law-fully tell the European Court how to deal with the question of reserva-tions. So I think that there are considerable problems in producing gen-eral formulae.

Although I listened with interest to what Ms. Damrosch had to say, Idid not really agree on what she had said concerning the expertise of themonitoring bodies. She calls them treaty bodies and she says that thesebodies are the real experts on the question of the law of treaties and espe-cially on the question of reservations to the particular treaty which theyare monitoring. I wonder if this is really true. Of course, they are authori-tative within some sphere, but you cannot suddenly say that they alonehave a view and the partner States parties have no view. It is the usualproblem of balance. One cannot suddenly cut out one set of actors and, inmeetings like this, we are all experts; we are all trying to be dreadfully lib-eral and it is the State actors who end up, paradoxically, under-represented.And then one is in danger of producing something that looks tremendous,that will bring slaps on the back by liberal friends but will simply not getvery far forward in the Sixth Committee. Are these bodies experts on thelaw of treaties? The European Court of Human Rights, which does have ahigh status, has at the moment, I think, 40 members and, as far as I can tellfrom its new composition, I think that only about five of these membersare experts in public international law. We have to be really careful whenwe generalize about bodies, even bodies which are courts and notlighter-weight monitoring bodies. Therefore, I do not think that the Com-mission should go too far in trying to resolve this particular problem by aset of formulae.

Presentation by Mr. Peter C. R Kabatsil'

The law of treaties, as codified in the Vienna Conventions of 1969,1978 and 1986, 17 has, generally speaking, worked well.

The codification exercises which culminated in the adoption ofthese three Conventions were intense and well prepared. It was the hopethat, as a result of the painstaking work that was put into these instru-ments, few questions, if any, would remain unanswered. For States, thisclearly was a welcomed effort. After all, there are always advantages insetting down rules of international law in a treaty. The most obvious ofthese advantages are:

(a) The clarity and preciseness of the obligations. States know ex-actly-as much as may ever be possible-what are their obligations andthose of other State parties.

(b) Treaties in many cases also provide mechanisms for the settle-ment of disputes by means of clearer and simplified procedures.

The Vienna instruments, to a very large extent, respond to theseconcerns. However, even when adopted they do not answer all the ques-tions. Indeed, that much was conceded, as can be seen from the last para-graph of the preamble to the 1969 Vienna Convention which explicitlydisclaims completeness for the Convention. It is clearly stated there thatrules of general customary international law will remain applicable out-side the coverage of codified rules embodied in the conventions.

Ambiguities and lacunae remain. Whether these ambiguities can beresolved and these lacunae filled by resort to rules of customary interna-tional law and State practice must remain a debatable question. Somemay be, whereas others must remain a matter of contention.

The following are some of the questions to which no adequate an-swers have been found:

(1) The doctrinal quarrel between the opposability andpermissibility schools concerning reservations is not settled. Questionsrelating to acceptance of reservations, objections and the definition ofreservations have found no clear answers within the existing law of treat-ies, largely because the 1969 Vienna Convention does not adequately ad-dress these questions.

(2) Questions still remain as to the distinction between reserva-tions and interpretative declarations.

(3) Are reservations permitted to treaties codifying norms ofjuscogens or to human rights instruments?

(4) Questions remain when State successions occur.

146 Member of the International Law Commission, 1992-.147 See footnote 144.

(5) Does the law of treaties address the concerns and obligationsof newly independent States?

(6) What is the position regarding the emergence of new rules ofcustomary international law?

As time passes and almost 30 years after the Vienna Conference of1968-1969, more and more questions inevitably surface. For those towhich answers are not provided by customary international law or Statepractice, the answer must be the adoption of new conventions or amend-ments to the existing ones. The International Law Commission's currentwork on the topics of reservations to treaties and nationality in relation tosuccession of States are an effort to answer some of the questions that re-main. There are, no doubt, other efforts which are being made elsewhere,for instance, by specialized bodies, such as those concerned with humanrights and the environment. These efforts will have to continue.

Presentation by Mr. Bernardo Sepulveda 148, 149

I should like to refer to the question of admissibility of reservationsand the way that such admissibility of a reservation formulated by a Statecan be determined. I recall the origin of the proposal enshrined in the1969 Vienna Convention and I recall what Sir Humphrey Waldock15°

said in his 1965 report, prior to the initial phase of the Vienna Conferencein 1968. Sir Humphrey Waldock said that to reach the proposals includedin his text the opinion which prevailed in the Commission, with respect toreservations, was that in the case of multilateral general treaties and othertreaties entered into by a relatively large number of States, it was advis-able to adopt a more flexible procedure, whereby each State would decideindependently on acceptance of the reservations, and the State formulat-ing it would be considered a party to the treaty with respect to reserva-tions between the two States. Hence, this element of flexibility is a pri-mary criterion for the establishment of reservations and acceptance ofsuch reservations. However, in 1997, in its Preliminary Conclusions, theCommission begins by confirming the regime established by the ViennaConvention, the antecedent of which is the 1951 advisory opinion of theInternational Court of Justice on Reservations to the Convention on thePrevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.15 1 In its Prelimi-nary Conclusions, the Commission states that the object and purpose cri-terion of the Vienna regime is the most important of the criteria for as-sessing the admissibility of a reservation. In its 1997 conclusions, theCommission mentions the two major qualities of the Vienna regime, i.e.,its flexibility, which makes it well suited for all treaties, whatever theirobject and purpose, and the fact that it strikes a satisfactory balance be-tween the objective of maintaining the integrity of the treaty text and theuniversality of participation.

The first three Preliminary Conclusions reached by the Commissionconcern acceptance and praise the validity of the Vienna regime, but thefollowing nine conclusions are intended to establish a system of excep-tions to the Vienna regime which departs from the intended criteria ofcompatibility and congruence, since they bridge the unity of the regime inrespect to international treaties. Supposedly, the monitoring bodies estab-lished under human rights treaties will have competence to make com-ments and issue recommendations with respect to, inter alia, the admissi-bility of reservations made by States. The consequences of themonitoring bodies' conclusions are not unimportant. The State which ini-tially formulated the reservation may amend its reservation to eliminate

148 International Law Commission member, 1997-.149 Translated from Spanish.150 Former member of the International Law Commission, 1961-1972.151 ICJ. Reports 1951, p. 15.

its inadmissibility, withdraw its reservation or withdraw from the treaty.The opinions of monitoring bodies may be issued even in absence of ex-plicit competence in the constitutional treaty and the Vienna regimecould, by granting implicit faculties resulting from broad interpretations,give inadequately defined powers to a monitoring body.

The last Preliminary Conclusion, Conclusion No. 12, implies cer-tain risks that cannot be ignored. It seems to encourage practices ofmonitoring bodies operating within a regional context. It refers to thetrend observed within the European context. Such criteria should not au-tomatically be applied to other regional contexts. There are severalsystems associated with the admissibility of reservations to multilateraltreaties. First of all, there is the Vienna regime, based on the will of States,according to which it is up to States and States alone to proceed to assesspermissibility of reservations, their consent being the key factor in re-spect to treaties and the basis of the principle pacta sunt servanda. Sec-ond, the regime of the International Convention on the Elimination of AllForms of Racial Discrimination"5 2 institutes a collegial system among theMember States to regulate admissibility of reservations which provides,in article 20, that "no reservation shall be accepted which is incompatiblewith the purpose of the present Convention, nor shall any reservation bepermitted which might restrict the functioning of any of the organs estab-lished pursuant to the present Convention". It should be considered that areservation is inadmissible if two thirds of States parties to the conven-tion formulate objections to that reservation. The third regime is the juris-dictional regime, based on the request of an advisory opinion from the In-ternational Court of Justice, or settlement of a dispute through theEuropean Court of Human Rights or the Inter-American Court of HumanRights, for instance. The fourth approach is established within the re-gional context. The European Commission for Human Rights, for in-stance, addressed the question of the admissibility of the reservation for-mulated by a State. It seems advisable to consider the desirability ofextending, as part of universal or regional practice, a sole decision by asingle regional monitoring body. The fifth regime would be the one pro-posed by the Commission in its final nine Preliminary Conclusions, a re-gime which would imply a sizeable change to the conventional regimewhich was instituted in Vienna based on the advisory opinion of the In-ternational Court of Justice, in the context of the 1948 Genocide Conven-tion.'

5 3

In the context of a heterogeneous community of States, it is neces-sary to determine which are the best instruments for strengthening thecontent and scope of international law. In the case of general multilateral

152 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, p. 195.153 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: ibid.,

vol. 78, p. 277.

treaties, it is advisable to recall what was said by the Court in 1951: "Ex-tensive participation in conventions of this type has already given rise togreater flexibility in the international practice concerning multilateralconventions. More general resort to reservations, very great allowancemade for tacit assent to reservations, the existence of practices which goso far as to admit that the author of reservations which have been rejectedby certain contracting parties, is nevertheless to be regarded as a party tothe convention in relation to those contracting parties that have acceptedthe reservations-all these factors are manifestations of a new need forflexibility in the operations of multilateral conventions."''

In the light of these and other considerations and in response to theneed for caution and prudence which Mr. Ian Brownlie mentioned in hispresentation, I think that we should not be unduly hasty with respect tothe Preliminary Conclusions established in the 1997 text.

154 I.C.J Reports 1951, pp. 21-2.


Dibat

Mile Andrea Bossard. Je suis 6tudiante i l'Institut universitairede hautes 6tudes internationales, i Gen~ve. Fai une question concemantla Convention de Vienne de 1978 sur la succession d'Etats en mati~re detraitds. Est-ce que la Commission ne s'est pas trop concentr&c sur la p -riode de la d~colonisation en 61aborant cette convention ? J'ai l'im-pression qu'il y a une certaine confusion dans la pratique, a l'heure ac-tuelle, qui rdsulte, me semble-t-il, de la distinction dans la Conventionentre les cas concernant les Etats nouvellement indapendants, pour les-quels les r~gles sont plus nombreuses et plus ddtailles, et les autres cas.Un exemple, qui montre cette confusion, est que les Etats successeurscontinuent de faire des notifications de successions aux dapositaires destrait~s multilat~raux. Un autre exemple est l'insicuritd concernant laquestion des reserves dans le contexte de la succession d'Etats en mati~rede trait~s.

Mr. Mochtar Kusuma-Atmadja. Before asking other membersof the Commission to reply on this point, I would like to say that, to myknowledge, the situation of newly independent States came later. In fact,the emphasis was not on that but on the situations of Central and EasternEurope after the end of the cold war. At the insistence of some members,especially from Africa, both north and south of the Sahara, this newly in-dependent State practice was emphasized. At least, that is my recollec-tion.

M. Alain Pellet'". J'ai quelques rernarques, non pas sur ce quivient d'etre dit, ni sur ce qu'a dit M. Marcelo Kohen que j'tais frustr6 dene pas entendre davantage, mais sur les expos6s de Mme Lori Damroschet M. Ian Brownlie. Je pense que, en ce qui conceme Mne Lori Dam-rosch, elle a contract6 cette maladie, qui est, i mes yeux, une maladiegrave, que j'appelle < le droit-de-l'honnisme o. C'est une maladie graveparce qu'elle a, pour ceux qui la contractent, une grande vertu : elle leurdonne bonne conscience, et ils essayent de donner mauvaise conscienceaux autres. Je ne suis pas << droit-de-l'hommiste >> etje n'ai pas mauvaiseconscience de ne pas l'6tre, je m'explique mal cet acharnement des(< droit-de-l'hommistes )> de consid6rer, d'abord, qu'ils sont le centre dumonde et qu'ils 6chappent i toute r~gle de droit international g~n~ral et


de penser que ceci a des vertus. Je crois que, au contraire, ceci est ungrave inconvinient et j'aimerais que les gens qui sont sp~cialistes desdroits de l'homme, comme ceux qui sont spcialistes du droit de l'en-vironnement ou du droit humanitaire, se disent que tout cela se fait dans lecadre gdndral du droit international et que le probleme est de partir de cecadre gdn~ral et de se demander si, compte tenu des r~gles gdndrales exis-tantes, il convient ou non de les adapter A une mati~re particuli~re. Mais,quand on part du principe que, de toute faqon, les problmes de droits de1'homme sont tellement spdcifiques que les r~gles de droit internationalg6ndral ne leur sont pas applicables, A mon avis, on fait fausse route.Donc, je conteste fondamentalement deux points sur ce qu'a ditMme Damrosch. D'abord, je suis absolument convaincu que la Comns-sion du droit international se trouve dans son r61e lorsqu'elle s'intdresseaux mdthodes et aux moyens d'6valuation, et je vais revenir sur ce mot6valuation, de la validit& des rdserves. Je crois qu'on ne peut pas 6tudierle sjet des reserves sans se demander qui peut procdder A leur 6valuation,comment et sur la base de quels crit~res ? Je ne vois pas au nom de quoion nous interdirait de le faire, sauf au nor de cette maladie qui s'appellele ( droit-de-l'hommisme >> et, deuxi~mement, je conteste aussi le mali-mlo et la grande confusion introduite par Mine Damrosch lorsqu'elleparle d'(( &valuation )>, «( to evaluate >); li dedans elle nous a donn6 uneliste impressionnante de mots qui recouvrent tout et n'importe quoi. Jus-tement,je crois qu'une des vertus des conclusions prdliminaires adoptdesl'an dernier par la Commission c'est d'avoir 6vit6 cela et d'avoir essay6de distmguer divers stades. Fondamentalement, et c'est une incompr6-hension A laquelle la Commission s'est daja heurtde i la Sixi~me Com-mission l'automne dernier, la Commission a considare qu'il y avaitdeux probl~mes diffdrents qu'il fallait distmguer. Le premier 6tait de sa-voir si les organes des droits de l'homme pouvaient apprdcier la validit6d'une reserve, et sur cela nous avons kt6 presque unanimes pour dire oui.Ces organes peuvent daterminer si, A leurs yeux, une r6serve est ou n'estpas compatible avec l'objet et le but du trait6 et aussi avec le traitd dansson ensemble parce que, A mon avis, le probl~me ne se pose gu~re diff6-remment si le traitd interdit certaines rdserves ou en autorise expresse-ment certaines autres. C'est la premibre 6tape. La deuxi~me 6tape est desavoir quelles consequences tirer de cette 6valuation, et, lA, la Commis-sion, avec d'ailleurs des divergences en son sein, a considdr6 que les or-ganes des droits de l'homme s'arrogeaient des pouvoirs excessifs en d6-terminant quelles consequences les Etats devaient en titer, en disant quec'est aux Etats et i eux seuls qu'il appartient, conformdment au principedu consensualisme en mati~re de traitds, de dacider si oui ou non ils veu-lent rester lids, malgrd la constatation de l'invalidit6 de leur r6serve.

En ce qui conceme M. Brownlie, il est atteint, A mes yeux, d'unemaladie un peu moins grave mais assez rpandue, qui est «( le particula-risme >). Si je l'ai bien compris, la Commission devrait prendre garde,

lorsqu'elle ilabore des r~gles g~n~rales, parce qu'il existe des r~gles par-ticuli~res. Li-dessus je dirais i M. Brownlie que, bien sibr, il est tout i fait6vident qu'il existe des r~gles particuliires. Bien stAr, la Cour europ6ennedes droits de l'homme doit d'abord mettre en ceuvre le trait* qui la r~git,qui est la Convention europ~enne des droits de l'homme et maintenant leProtocole n' 11. Mais, si on dit que, sous pr~texte qu'il existe des r~glesparticuli~res, il ne faut pas 61aborer des r~gles g~n~rales, on tombe dansun travers grave qui est de dire que tout ce qui est limit6, particularis6 doltpasser avant les r~gles g~n~rales. Je pense que c'est une erreur de pers-pective. La Commission du droit international doit 6laborer des r~gles g-n~rales, ces r~gles g~n~rales ne sont qu'un filet de s~curit: qui intervientlorsque des r~gles particulires n'existent pas. Mais il est 6vident quedans tous nos projets, et non pas seulement en ce qui concerne les r6ser-yes, les r~gles particuli~res passent d'abord simplement parce que spe-cialia generalibus derogant, parce que les r~gles particuli~res l'empor-tent sur les r~gles gdn~rales. Sur ce point je suis d'accord avecM. Brownlie. La oit je ne suis pas d'accord c'est sur le fait que ceci doltavoir un impact sur le travail de la Commission. La Commission doltcontinuer son travail qui consiste i 6laborer des r~gles g~n~rales qui s'ap-pliqueront en cas d'absence de r~gles particuli~res. Je crois simplementqu'il faut avoir bien en tate cette distinction.

Un dernier point sur l'intervention de Mme Damrosch. Elle s'est in-terrog~e sur la possibilit: pour un Etat de se retirer du trait6 et elle a invo-qu6 l'observation g~n~rale n' 26 du Comit: des droits de l'honme i pro-pos de la Cor~e. Je suis d~solk, ce n'est pas, i mes yeux, une questionsubjective, c'est une question presque objective. Cela n'a aucun rap-port parce que, 6vidermment, la Cor~e 6tait li~e par sa ratification du Pactede 1966 et que, lorsqu'un Etat est l6, il ne peut pas se retirer comme 9ad'un traitS. L'expression du consentement i 8tre li est, je crois, un pi~gei volont6, et, lorsqu'on a accept6 le pi~ge, il s'est referm6, on ne peutpas se retirer d'un trait6. Mais notre probl~me, li aux reserves, est touti fait different. I1 est de savoir si un Etat s'est validement li et la r~ponse,i mon avis, est non, un Etat ne s'est pas validement li s'il a fait une r6-serve qui est, soit incompatible avec le but et l'objet du trait6, soit incom-patible avec les termes m~mes du trait&. Dam ce cas on arrive i cette si-tuaion dans laquelle l'Etat ne s'est pas valablement li6, que cela plaise ounon aux o droit-de-l'homnistes ,, que cela plaise ou non aux organes desdroits de l'homme. Ce n'est pas du tout le cas de la Corie et je pense quec'est une erreur totale de milanger ce probl~me des riserves et le pro-blame de l'Observation g6n6rale n' 26, contre laquelle ma hargne est infi-niment moins grande que contre l'Observation g6n6rale n" 24.

Mr. Hans Corel.156 This is a very interesting discussion for me,since, as Legal Counsel of the United Nations, I exercise the Secre-tawy-General's functions as depositary. I have a comment on Mr. MarceloKohen's observations. He said that the depositary has created a situationwhich is not all that clear. I can understand this critique. When I took upoffice in 1994, I was confronted with the situation that led to exercisingthe Secretary-General's functions as depositary, and I must admit that Iwas a little surprised because I had in recent memory the discussionsamong the legal advisers on public international law under the auspicesof the Council of Europe. I was Chairman of the Committee at that timeand when we were confronted with the situation, particularly the situationwith the former Soviet Union, but also with the former Yugoslavia, wetook a very pragmatic view. Basically, we thought that multilateral treat-ies would simply apply because we could not have a lawless State. Wedistinguished between three cases. The first case, when there is only atreaty and we thought the treaty would apply; the second case, in whichthere is a treaty, but at the same time a national entity, a body at the na-tional level, entrusted with a function under the treaty. We thought that inthis case notification from the new State was needed to indicate which au-thority, at the new national level, would be in charge of that particularfunction. Lastly, we identified the third category, namely, treaties whichestablish an organization to which States parties have to be members. Inthis case, we thought that the new State would have to apply for mem-bership, which in most cases would be granted. But the way in which thedepositary dealt with the situation in the United Nations was slightly dif-ferent and I think that this has created some of the problems that we haveseen emerging at least in one of the regions.

My second set of comments relates to Ms. Lori Damrosch's presen-tation. She talked first about sweeping reservations, and, of course, I wit-ness these reservations all the time, although the depositary can do verylittle about them. We circulate them and then we wait to see what Statesparties do. What I have said in the United Nations Congress on Public In-ternational Law, in 1995, 17 is that some of these reservations are held insuch general terms that they are actually bringing treaty law into disre-pute. It is obvious from some reservations that whatever would be discov-ered at the national level would prevail, whether in the national religionor in the national Constitution. I do not think that this is the right approachto treaty law. Concerning the Republic of Korea, I agree with Mr. AlainPellet that this is a completely different matter-that case concernedwhether a State can withdraw from a treaty, in this particular instance, the

156 The Legal Counsel of the United Nations.157 See international Law ar a Language for Internaional Relations. Proceedings of

the United Nations Congress on Public International Law, New York, 13-17 March 1995,Kluwer Law International (The Hague) (United Nations publication, Sales No. T.96.V.4).

1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As depositary,I took, in this case, the very unusual step to circulate not only the commu-nication from the Member State party but also a legal analysis paper thatwe had elaborated in the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs. I amhoping that this matter shall find a positive solution. I have had a verylow-key dialogue with the Member State in question and I think that wecan continue that dialogue.

Lastly, Ms. Damrosch mentioned the human rights treaty bodies.Again, I agree with Mr. Pellet, based on my 11 years' experience as mycountry's agent before the Human Rights Court in Strasbourg. When anindividual brings a matter before these organs, the question of the validityand the scope of the reservation can definitely be part of the case and theorgan, be it the Court or the Committee, would have to rule on this ques-tion in order to estallish whether it has jurisdiction in the case or not.

M. Viclav Mikulka158. Merci, Monsieur le President. A l'6poquede l'adoption des deux Conventions de Vienne sur la succession d'Etats,j'tais encore trop jeune pour 8tre membre de la Commission, mais j'ai,tout de m~me, particip6 i la Conference et j'ai encore en mdmoire ce quis'est passe. J'avais suivi cette question depuis 1972, quand je l'avaischoisie comme sujet pour ma these de dipl6me. Je connais, donc, encorepar cceur les formules utilistes dans la premiere lecture du projet d'arti-cles et les changements opiras par la Commission pour la deuxi~me lec-ture. Je dois avouer que, vraiment, A l'6poque l'accent a 6t6 mis sur le casde dacolonisation parce que tout le monde pr~voyait que ce serait le der-nier 6vnement de notre 6poque en mati~re de grands changements ter-ritoriaux. Naturellement, cette pr~somption s'est r6v~l~e compl~tementfausse. Je ne pense pas que la convention, telle qu'elle a t6 adopt6e AVienne, ne soit pas 6quilibr~e, bien sir le nombre d'articles consacris A ladacolonisation est plus grand, mais cela est dict6 par la nature de la riglequi a 6t6 adopt~e. La r~gle de la table rase, A certains 6gards modifie, aforc6 la Commission et ensuite la Conference diplomatique A distinguerentre le regime des trait~s multilat~raux et des trait~s bilat~raux. L'ap-plication de la r~gle de la table rase a rendu n~cessaire que la question desreserves soit r~gl~e aussi, parce qu'une fois la notification de successionexigee - mais une notification de succession qui pratiquement corres-pondait i ce que l'on connait comme l'accession a une convention multi-lat~rale - il a fallu riglementer aussi la question des riserves, des objec-tions et tout le reste. Pour les cas d'unification ou de separation d'unepartie du territoire la situation etait diff~rente, car, une fois la r~gle decontinuit: approuv~e, adopte, quel aurait 6t6 le motif pour la r~glemen-tation des questions de reserves ? Si on presume qu'il y a une continuit6

158 Ancien membre de la Commission du droit international, 1992-1998; directeur de

la Division de la codification du Bureau des affaires juridiques des Nations Unies, 1999-.

des relations conventionnelles, alors les relations doivent continuer tellesqu'eUes ont eti formulkes par l'Etat pr&i cesseur. Cela veut dire que, s'ily avait dji des r6serves, le rapport continue inchang6 y compris sur la r6-serve. Naturellement, 'Etat successeur a toujours le droit de retirer cettereserve, mais il n'y avait aucun motif de le riglementer dans la Conven-tion sur la succession parce que la Convention de Vienne de 1969 s'ap-plique d~ji a cet aspect. Les seuls ajouts qui ont 6 faits, si ma m&noirene me trompe pas, i la Conference de Vienne, sur une proposition de lad~l~gation hell6nique, ont W les articles 32, 33, 36 et 37 qui r~glent lesquestions de participation i des trait~s qui n'6taient pas en vigueur i ladate de succession et la participation i des trait&s sign~s par I'Etat pr~d&cesseur sons reserve de ratification. On s'est bas6 sur l'exemple de riglesque la Commission a formukes pour les Etats nouvellement indpen-dants et on a trouv6 utile de transposer cela au contexte d'unification et deseparation. La s6paration couvre deux situations compl6tement difflren-tes, c'est-i-dire la dissolution oii 1'Etat predecesseur disparait et le cas deskession d'une partie ou de plusieurs parties du territoire. Le second cas6tait assimik originellement par la Commission i la situation des Etatsnouvellement ind6pendants, et ce sont les Etats qui, apr~s la premiere lec-ture, ont demande a la Commission d'assimiler ce regime au regime dedissolution. Si aujourd'hui il y a des critiques au sujet des cas des Etatsn~s par separation, comme dans le cas de desintdgration de l'Union sovi&tique, que la r~gle de continuit6 n'est pas suivie, alors c'est precisimentque dans cette partie l'article 34 ne reflte pas la codification de r~glescoutumi~res mais repr~sente, plut6t, le developpement progressif dudroit international, consacr6 par la Conference de Vienne mais pas n~ces-sairement encore devenu r~gle coutumi~re internationale. Compte tenude rheure tr~s tardive je m'arr~terai M, sur ce sujet.

M. Jose Miago. Je reprdsente ici le Conseil de l'Europe; je suis lechef de la Division du droit public international et comme vous le savezpeut-Etre le Conseil de ]'Europe s'occupe aussi des problimes du droit in-ternational au see du Comit6 du droit international public, qui regroupe40 Etats membres et certains observateurs de diffirents pays 6trangers etdes organismes internationaux. Je serai trs bref, j'ai pris la parole justepour informer les honorables membres de la Commission ainsi quel'audience pr6sente ici sur les activitds du Conseil de l'Europe concernantles reserves et la succession d'Etats. L'ann~e dernire, nous avons pris ladkision de crder un groupe de travail qui s'occupe des problmes de r6-serves aux trait~s internationaux, en particulier ceux qui relkvent du res-sort du Conseil de l'Europe. Evidemment, ce groupe de travail, qui n'atenu qu'une r6union au mois de mars demier, tient compte des activit6sde la Commission du droit international des Nations Unies, et le rapportfait par M. Alain Pellet au cours de cette reunion au mois de mars en t -moigne. La prochaine r6union de ce groupe de travail aura lieu au mois de

septembre et son mandat est prolong6 jusqu'A la fim de cette annte. Je neveux pas anticiper les rtsultats de ce groupe de travail, mais je vous ap-pelle A tenir compte de ses activit~s.

En deuxinme lieu, je voudrais 6voquer la pratique des Etats dans ledomaine de la succession. Selon la dacision du Comit6 des Ministres duConseil de l'Europe, nous sommes charges d'6laborer un projet pilote surla succession, qui portera sur la pratique europ~enne de 1989 i 1993. IIs'agit, principalement de l'ex-Union sov~tique et l'ex-Yougoslavie. Leprojet pilote est en cours, nous esp~rons aboutir i la fm de cette annie oupeut ftre l'annte prochaine. Ce projet sera aussi la contribution duConseil de l'Europe i la dacennie des Nations Unies du droit internatio-nal public.

M. Ahmed Mahiou' 59 . Merci, Monsieur le President. Vousm'aviez interpellk etje n'ai pas os6 intervenir mais, apr~s l'interventionde M. Viclav Mikulka qui connait la question de succession mieux quemoi, je voudrais ajouter une remarque. C'est vrai que les deux Conven-tions sur la succession portent l'empreinte de l'6poque i laquelle elles ontW 6labor~es, i savoir la p~riode de la dacolonisation, et l'on peut doncse demander si les r~gles 6nonces A cette p~riode n'6taient pas tropconjoncturelles, et si elles allaient s'appliquer i l'avenir. U1 6tait difficilede rtpondre. On pouvait se dire peut-8tre que la phase de la dacolonisa-tion 6tant pass~e, que pour 1'avenir on n'6tait pas sir de l'application deces r~gles. Et puis, dans les anntes 90, il y a eu l'6clatement d'un certainnombre d'Etats comme la Yougoslavie mais surtout l'Union sovi~tiquequi a entrain6, effectivement, l'interrogation suivante : est-ce que les r6-gles posses par les Conventions ont k6 respect~es dans cette successiond'Etats ? Une douzaine d'Etats nouveaux sont n6s de l'6clatement deI'URSS. Je ne suis pas un sp~cialiste de la succession d'Etats, je n'ai passuivi particuli~rement l'6volution des probl~mes, mais j'ai constat6 que,dans un cas, un Etat a mvoqu6 implicitement la r~gle de la table rase enmati~re de succession de trait6s, c'est l'Arm~nie, et pour les autres Etatsles conduites ont W beaucoup plus complexes, s'attachant parfois auprincipe de la table rase et dans d'autres cas, au contraire, i la r~gle de lacontinuit6. II existe des 6tudes, actuellement, sur la position des Etatsvis-i-vis de la succession en mati~re de trait~s et dans d'autres domaines.I1 serait mttressant d'en voir les r~sultats mais je crois que les r~gles po-sees i Vienne, tout en portant cette empreinte de la dcolonisation, mon-trent qu'elle peuvent aussi s'appliquer i d'autres situations.

159 Professeur de droit, ancien doyen de la Facultd de droit d'Alger, ancien membre de

la Commission du droit international, 1982-1996.

FUTURE TOPICS AND PROBLEMS OF THE INTERNATIONALLEGISLATIVE PROCESS

LES SUJETS A VENIR ET LES PROBLILMES DU PROCESSUSLtGISLATIF INTERNATIONAL

Introduction par l'animateur,M. Guillaume Pambou-Tchivounda'60

Monsieur le President, Messieurs les conseillers, Mesdames et Mes-sieurs, cette cmqui~me session s'articulera autour d'une th~matique rela-tive aux sujets i venir et aux problemes du processus legislatif internatio-nal. A ce stade, deux 6vidences peuvent etre rappeles.

La premiere 6vidence peut s'6noncer en deux temps. Je diraisd'abord, de fagon p~remptoire, les sujets i venir permettront-ils d'iden-tifier des problbmes d'un type nouveau relatifs i leur r6glementation parle droit international ? Dans un deuxi me temps, les sujets i venir confir-meront-ils l'identit6 de probl~matiques posies par leur r~glementation auniveau international ? Voili les deux temps qui me paraissent figurer auregistre du paradoxe, mais je voudrais faire 6galement ici le rappel d'uneautre 6vidence qu'il y aurait lieu d'inscrire sur le mode du registre opera-tionnel. Est-ce que l'identification d'un sujet i venir releve directementde l'Assembl~e g~nerale ou plut6t de la Commission du droit internatio-nal elle-m~me ? Est-ce que la qualite de sujet i venir constitue un criterede son inscription au programme de travail de la Commission du droit in-ternational ? Enfin, est-ce que la qualit6 de sujet i venir pr6d6termne oupr&destine son traitement de codification ou de d6veloppement progres-sif ? Il y a peut-8tre la des points d'mterrogation dont l'6clairage pourraitetre donn6 par MM. Yves Daudet et Vaughan Lowe.

M. Daudet est actuellement professeur a Paris I, vice-pr6sident del'Universit& Paris I. II fut pendant longtemps une des chevilles ouvri~resde la facult6 de droit d'Aix-en-Provence, dans le midi de la France et lacheville ouvri~re de l'Institut d'6tudes politiques d'Aix-en-Provence. Il afait une thise que les francophones, je dirais la communaut6 mtematio-


nale ou la communaut6 universitaire internationale connait puisqu'elle aport6 sur les conferences de codification. A Aix-en-Provence, M. Daudeta coordonn6 plusieurs ouvrages, resultant des colloques organis6s i Aixet touchant pr6cis6ment i l'action des Nations Unies. Ces ouvrages sontpublis par les 6ditions Pedone et portent sur l'Organisation des NationsUnies et I'Afrique, I'Organisation des Nations Unies et les problmeshumanitaires, l'Organisation des Nations Unies et l'ex-Yougoslavie,'Organisation des Nations Unies et Haiti. Enfm, M. Daudet s'intresse

actuellement aux probl~mes du droit international et au r6le de l'Or-ganisation des Nations Unies en pleine mutation.

M. Vaughan Lowe est membre du barreau anglais. I1 est lecteur endroit international i l'Universit6 de Cambridge, l'une des places fortes,j'allais dire, de la science en g6neral et du droit international en particu-lier.

Us vont donc nous entretenir aujourd'hui de la question de savoir siles sujets i venir se situent dans le droit fil des preoccupations de la Com-mission du droit international. M. Daudet, je vous donne la parole.

Exposk par N. Yves Daudet161

Sujets futurs et problimes du processus 16ilatif international

Lors de sa session de 1997, la Sixi~me Commission a rendu un hom-mage appuy6 a la Commission du droit international en considerantqu'elle avait su ritablir le dialogue avec les Etats, sans lequel i n'est pasde resultat f&ond de la codification et du developpement progressif dudroit international 62 . Un a W observ6 que la Commission semblait avoirretrouvi un regain de vitalit6 et du m~ne coup une confiance parfoismouss&e, voire perdue, des gouvernements. Certes, une partie de l'ex-

plication tient au fait que des projets depuis longtemps en discussion sontarrives i leur terme ou ont franchi des tapes marquees. Cet aspect de bi-lan ne sera pas 6voqu6 ici puisqu'il s'agit de s'interroger sur les sujets fu-turs. Et precis~nent, ce regain de vitalit de la Commission et cetteconfiance reconquise soulign6es par la Sixi~me Commission tiennentaussi i la mani&e dont eUe envisage son avenir. Une initiative telle quecelle qui a t prise A sa 49c session en 1997 d'6tablir un calendrier pr~vi-sionnel tres dtaillk des travaux pour le temps restant de son quinquen-nat'" est i cet 6gard excellente pour au moins deux raisons. D'une part, etsurtout, ce calendrier permet aux gouvernements d'avoir une vision pr6-cise de la progression escompt~e du travail de codification et donc demieux en percevoir l'utilit6 et I'efficacit6. 1 faut bien reconnaitre que,dans ces derni&es ann6es, la situation n'6tait i cet 6gard pas tr s claire,on pouvait 6prouver le sentiment d'un certain pi6tinement dans les activi-tes de la Commission. Cet aspect de la question ne sera pas davantageexamin6 ici car il touche aux sujets en cours (qui continueront simple-ment A 8tre examin6s dans l'avenir) et non les sujets v~fitablement " fu-airs )).

Sur les sujets futurs, d'importantes analyses ont diji k6 conduites idiverses reprises par la Commission elle-m~me. Pour s'en tenir A la pe-riode r6cente, en 1993, un sch~ma sur divers sujets de droit international a6 tabli'". Ce document n'est pas une simple liste; il s'agit de r6-

flexions portant sur tne douzaine de sujets et 6manant de membres de laCommission qui ont ainsi pr6sent6 sur chacun d'eux de v6ritables ((pr6-rapports, de grand int&6rt au terme desquels une vision plus claire despossibilit6s ou des obstacles A leur codification a pu 8tre d~gag~e. Cer-tains de ces sujets sont d'ailleurs ddsormais A l'examen : la nationalit6 enrelation avec la succession d'Etats et les reserves aux traites en font

161 Professeur A I'Universitd de Paris I (Panthdon-Sorbonne).162 Document A/CN.4/483, par. 155,159.

163 Documents officiels de I Assemblde gnrale cinquante-deuxibme session, Sup-pbment n 10 (A/52/10) par. 220, p. 127.

164 Document A/CN.4/454 du 9 novembre 1993.

partie. On signalera aussi la liste tr6s d~taill6e des 13 grands th6mes duprogramme de travail i long terme figurant dans le rapport de 1996'65. Ala derni6re session, le groupe de travail du groupe de planification a remisun rapport 6 6 d~finissant un certain nombre de crit6res de choix de sujetsqui sera arr~t6 i la pr~sente session de la Commission. D'autres listes en-core circulent ou ont 06 pr~sent~es, soit par le Secretariat de l'Or-ganisation des Nations Unies, soit i certaines occasions comme parexemple le Colloque de New York en octobre 1997, et on peut donc secontenter d'y renvoyer.

En effet, il est certainement utile d'examiner l'opportuniti d'aouteraux listes existantes tel ou tel sujet qu'il est naturellement toujours pos-sible de d~couvrir dans tel ou tel domaine que le jeu de l'actualit6 met enrelief. On pourrait alors songer i des sujets aussi diff~rents que les rela-tions entre les operations de maintien de la paix et l'exercice de la justicepinale intemationale, les accidents automobiles dont les diplomates sontles auteurs, la corruption et bien d'autres questions encore susceptibles defigurer dans une liste qu'il est loisible i chacun de compl6ter.

Une autre dimarche, i laquelle on se tiendra ici, consiste i s'inter-roger moins sur le choix de tel ou tel sujet i codifier que sur les types desujets et d'activit~s susceptibles de retenir l'attention de la Commissiondu droit international ou de lui 8tre confi~s.

I1 a souvent W dit que 1'( age d'or , de la Commission fut le tempsdes ( grandes codifications )> aboutissant A des conventions portant sur de( grands sujets >> : le droit de la mer, le droit des trait6s et les relations di-plomatiques et consulaires, largement ratifi~es et combinant heureuse-ment les aspects de codification et de d~veloppement progressif du droitinternational. Ces grands sujets ont W trait~s et ce filon est aujourd'hui6puis6.

Mais naturellement le monde change et de nouveaux grands sujetssont susceptibles de surgir, tandis que d'autres peuvent revenir i l'6tude.Ce fit le cas du droit de la mer, m~me si la question a 6chapp6 i la Com-mission du droit international. A certains 6gards, les reserves aux trait~saujourd'hui en cours d'examen par la Commission permettent de dscelerles lacunes et les imperfections des Conventions de Vienne et le caractirehistoriquement dat6 de certaines de leurs dispositions. J'ai personnelle-ment le pressentiment que, au fur et i mesure que ce sujet va etre creus6 et6tudi6, surviendront des interrogations plus profondes qu'on ne s'y atten-dait peut-8tre au moment de son inscription. Par exemple, s'il n'est sansdoute pas question de remettre en cause les crit6res de non contrari~t6avec l'objet et le but du trait6 pour determiner la validit6 d'une reserve, il

165 Documents officiels de I'Assemblie ginirale, cinquante et unidme session, Sup-

pliment n' 10 (A/51/10), p. 366-372.166 Document ILC (XLIX) IWG/LTPW/4.

demeure que les ricentes reflexions du Rapporteur special sur le sujet desriserves aux traits 16' montrent bien les incertitudes de crit6re et les inter-rogations qu'il soulive, alors que pourtant il a 6t6 jusqu'i present utilis6comme un acquis faisant presque figure de dogme. Enfin, nul ne peut diresi des transformations politiques majeures n'obligeront pas i reconsid6-rer des sujets perqus comme durablement 6tablis.

Pour demeurer dans une perspective assez concrete et maitrisable, ilpourrait etre suggiri que la Commission s'engage de mani~re simultanedans deux vojes, i vrai dire tr~s diff~rentes : 1'examen de projets de carac-tare precis, r~pondant i des besoins presents des Etats et susceptibles deles satisfaire dans le court terme, d'une part, et, d'autre part, une activitde caractre reflexifet d'effet i long terme. L'une comme l'autre se heur-tent a certaines difficult6s et prdsentent des sp~cificit~s concemant le pro-cessus l6gislatif international qu'elles mettent en cuvre.

A. - L'EXAMEN DE QUESTIONS PRtCISES RPONDANT A DES BESOINSPR.ESENTS

Dans un pass6 assez r6cent, de nombreux gouvernements ont ma-nifest leur scepticisme, voire leur opposition, i l'6gard de certains tra-vaux de la Commission. Disons-le franchement: vingt-cinq aris, ou cm-quante ans selon le dies a quo choisi, pour aboutir i l'adoption enpremiere lecture d'un texte sur la responsabilit6 des Etats dont certainesdispositions suscitent encore de vives discussions est 6videmmentbeaucoup tiop long. Dix ans ou quinze ans pass6s sur des sujets mineursconduisent in6vitablement i jeter un certain discr6dit sur le travail de laCommission.

C'est pourquoi aujourd'hui il est indispensable que la Commission,dans la mesure du possible, aborde des sujets pr6cis et actuels aboutissanta des r6sultats rapides en sorte qu'elle remplisse ainsi une mission dontles Etats ont besoin. Un ou deux exemples sont i cet 6gard significatifs.L'avancement remarquable du sujet sur la nationalit6 en relation avec lasuccession d'Etats168 est un 6lment tr~s positif qui r6pond aux attentesdes Etats. Voila une question qui se pose aujourd'hui i des gouverne-ments d'Europe centrale et orientale qui doivent r~gler un certain nombrede questions dans ce domaine et qui ont donc besoin de guides en ce mo-ment mfme et pas dans vingt ans. Autre exemple a contrario et toujoursdans le domaine de la succession d'Etats : les Conventions de 1978 et de1983, meme si elles s'attachent aux divers cas possibles de successiond'Etats, ont 6t6 cependant, comme il est naturel, compte tenu de l'6poqueou elles ont &t6 pr6par es, tr~s marquies par le contexte de la decolomsa-

167 Document A/CN.4/477 et Add. I.16 Documents offcies de I'AssembMe ginrale, ciquae-deibme session. Sup-

plement n* 10 (A/52/10), p. 19-77.

tion. La deuxi~me n'est toujours pas en vigueur et semble loin de l'tre, lapremiere est entree en vigueur le 6 novembre 1996 alors que la d~coloni-sation est pratiquement achev~e et que les cas de succession d'Etats sepr~sentent aujourd'hui dans un contexte different. Cette entree en vi-gueur a &6 rendue possible par la ratification 6manant d'Etats directe-ment concerns par les questions de succession d'Etats, ceux de l'ex-Yougoslavie mais dont, ironie, elle ne r~gira pas la succession puisqu'ilest pr~cisi rarticle 7 que la convention ne s'applique qu'aux cas de suc-cession post~rieurs A son entree en vigueur (sauf intention contraire ex-prim~e par les parties, ce qui a 6t6 par exemple dcid. en Europe centralepar la Slovaquie).

Ces deux exemples dans un m~me domaine montrent, par contrastel'un par rapport i l'autre, que les Etats ont besoin que la Commission dudroit international fasse une ceuvre concrete et rapide sur des sujets pr6cisou techniques. La rapidit6 est 6videnment souvent une question de mi.thode. Le fond n'y est pas 6tranger et on peut dire du caract~re techniqueet pr6cis des r~gles qu'il est un facteur d'acc616ration des travaux. I1 n'estpas utile d'insister sur cette v6rit6 d'6vidence que l'on fait plus vite le tourd'un sujet pr6cis que de celui qui requiert des synthnses complexes. Pourautant, il ne faut pas confondre la Commission avec un conseiller juri-dique charg6 de donner des r6ponses pr6cises et techniques i des ques-tions au fur et i mesure qu'elles se posent.

Cela signifie seulement que, s'agissant de la s6lection des sujets,ceux-ci doivent r6pondre i l'attente des Etats et la pratique des Etatseux-memes doit r6v6ler une maturit6 du sujet telle qu'il puisse 8tre effec-tivement codifi6 dans un d6lai raisonnable. Cela veut dire encore que las6lection des sujets doit r6sulter d'une proc6dure de dialogue entre laCommission et les Etats eux-memes, principalement par l'interm6diairede la Sixieme Commission mais aussi par des consultations 61argies au-pres d'autres acteurs des relations internationales. Ainsi, on observeraavec int6ret que, i la demiere session de la Commission, l'id6e avait &lanc6e, i propos de I'examen des r6serves aux trait6s, que les organes decontr6le des droits de l'homme pourraient ftre consult6s et que cette pro-c6dure 6tait apparue au Rapporteur sp6cial (< tout i fait dans l'esprit del'alin6a b du paragraphe 2 de l'article 17 et de l'article 25 du statut de laCommission' 69 . 11 parait en effet important, si l'on veut que les posi-tions adopt6es par la Commission du droit international soient dot~esd'efficacit6, qu'elles refletent les vues des Etats au premier chef, et celan'est pas nouveau, mais aussi les vues des autres acteurs de la vie mterna-tionale qui ont pris aujourd'hui une place importante et parfois d6cisivedans les relations intemationales. En d'autres termes, peut-on codifiertelle branche du droit international sans avoir des consultations avec telle

169 Documents officiels de I 'Assemblie ginirale, cinquante-deuxime session, Sup-

pldment n' 10 (A/52/10) par. 147, p. 105.

organisation nternationale, telle organisation non gouvernementale,voire mme sans s'entretenir avec tels dirigeants du monde des affairesou de grandes societds multmationales ou sans recueillir les reactions decertains acteurs sociaux ? Le monde change et, si les Etats et les organisa-tions internationales restent les seuls sujets de droit international, ils sontloin d'etre les seuls acteurs des relations internationales. Les r6alitds de lavie internationale qu'aucune codification ne saurait n6gliger passentdonc aussi par ces aspects.

Pour autant, la Commission est-elle en mesure de prendre en chargetons les sujets, mEme techniques ? Certainement pas ni pratiquement nipolitiquement. Pratiquement, certains sujets requirent des connaissan-ces scientifiques ou techniques qui font difaut i la Commission. I1 a k6dit que le droit de la mer de Montego Bay comportait des aspects techni-ques et politiques que la Commission ne pouvait assumer. On peutd'ailleurs tris certainement discuter ce point de vue, au moins s'agissantdes aspects politiques, ne serait-ce qu'en raison du fait que la Commis-sion n'a jamais pr~tendu proposer des textes d~finitifs. Ce sont des pro-jets qui constituent la base de travail des ndgociateurs a la Conferenceauxquels il appartient de passer les compromis politiques convenables enmodifiant le texte de la Commission autant que de besoin. S'agissant desaspects techniques et i supposer que la Commission rencontre de r~eUesdifficult~s sur ce point, qu'i cela ne tienne, dira-t-on, que 'on fasse appelA des experts qui viendront l'6clairer ! Cela n'est pas i rejeter i priori eton peut en effet imaginer que la Commission ait recours i cette proc&dure. Celle-ci rencontrera cependant tr&s rapidement ses limites qui se-ront tout simplement des limites budgitaires et des limites de temps. Lesmoyens financiers feront 6videmment defaut pour inviter les experts, g6-n6ralement fort cofiteux, autant qu'il le faudrait, et par ailleurs on voitmal comment pratiquement dans les 10 semaines de riunions de la Com-mission on pourrait encore loger les auditions d'experts et le dialogueavec eux. Et il est vrai qu'en toute hypoth~se la Commission dispose depeu de temps et qu'il faut donc savoir limiter les ambitions de son pro-gramme de travail. I reste qu'on ne devrait pas considrer ces obsta-cles comme totalement insurmontables et peut-etre toutes les voiesn'ont-elles pas k6 explorees dans ce domaine, m8me si leur efficacit6 esti priori assez douteuse.

Politiquement, par ailleurs, il sera dans certains cas difficile i laCommission d'intervenir dans des domaines qui sont confi6s i d'autresorganes, qu'il s'agisse de ceux de la famille des Nations Unies ou d'insti-tutions de caract~re interktatique. Les Etats eux-m mes peuvent souhai-ter que certaines questions soient trait~es dans des enceintes ad hoc.

Ainsi, la Commission ne peut-elle compltement 6viter la concur-rence et il est certainement souhaitable que certains sujets soient exami-nes par des organes ad hoc si leur competence est justifi~e, si la mati~res'y prate et si, i l'6vidence, la Commission du droit international n'est

pas outille pour les examiner. A cet 6gard, il ne faut pas perdre de vueque la Commission est un organe d'itude du droit international g6n~ral etnon pas de toutes ses branches particuli~res qui se d~veloppent de ma-ninre anarchique et dans lesquelles elle n'a ni les comptences ni la voca-tion i s'engager. Elle doit au contraire conserver la vision d'ensemble dudroit international, y compris et surtout i travers les sujets pointus qu'ellene doit pas refuser d'examiner en les inscrivant dans l'harmonie d'en-semble du droit international g~n~ral. Ainsi les conditions de cette con-currence seront-elles pr~cis~es, comme on l'a dit, car il est clair que laCommission a ici un r6le i jouer si on veut 6viter que, i l'issue d'uneconcurrence < sauvage o entre divers organes proc~dant, chacun de sonc6ti, i des codifications, le droit international se trouve 6parpillk et sonunit6 affect~e. C'est pourquoi la Commission du droit international doitaussi et en m~me temps (cette simultan~it6 est essentielle) conserver unevue d'ensemble du droit international et conduire une activit6 de r6-flexion sur celui-ci.

B. - UNE REFLEXION D'ENSEMBLE ET D'EFFET A LONG TERME

Le risque existe qu'i ne s'occuper que de sujets precis, voire techni-ques, on perde de vue les grands axes et l'ossature fondamentale degrands principes du droit international qui doivent assurer la solidit6 del'difice d'ensemble et qu'on se trouve en presence d'un droit internatio-nal devenant, i force de sp~cialisation ou de r~gionalisation, morcelk ou6miett6. C'est li un danger souvent 6voqu6 i propos de lajustice interna-tionale et de la multiplication des juridictions spcialis6es mettant en p6-il l'unit6 du droit international. Un risque comparable existe en mati~red'6laboration de la codification et la Commission du droit internationaldevrait pouvoirjouer un r6le en vue de r6duire ce risque.

Mais, pas plus qu'il ne s'agissait il y a un instant de limiter son r6le icelui d'un conseiller juridique, il ne s'agit maintenant de l'riger en gar-dien du droit international, fonction qu'elle ne peut ni ne doit assumer.

En revanche, il est possible d'envisager pour la Commission une ac-tivit6 de r~flexion d'ensemble sur le droit international, ses tendances, saplace et son r6le dans une socit% en 6volution. Or, seul un organe comniela Commission, dont la composition reflfte les principaux syst~mes ju-ridiques et les grandes formes de civilisation et dont les membres sontcompitents en matinre de droit international, a la capaciti d' avoir une vueglobale et assez distanci6e du droit international. A cela on objectera sansdoute que cette mission incombe davantage i l'Institut de droit interna-tional ou i des socint~s savantes d'6tude et de r~flexion sur le droit inter-national. Leur autorit6 scientifique est en effet incontestable mais ellesn'ont pas la l6gitimit6 de la Commission du droit international ni, surtout,la m~me relation avec les Etats, gage du succ~s et de l'efficacit6 d'une r6-flexion tendant i dagager les tendances 6volutives du droit international.

Cette activit6 pourrait prendre la forme d'un examen systimatiquedes grands principes du droit international a Ia lumi6re des changementsactuels. On rpte inlassablement que la soci&t intemationale a profon-dement changi, que la mondialisation (ou la globalisation) bouleverse lescomportements et habitudes, ce qui est vrai. II est alors certainement n6-cessaire de faire une relecture du droit international i la lumi~re de cestransformations (un peu au sens oi l'infortuni droit du developpementpouvait se comprendre comme une relecture du droit international i la lu-mitre des besoins des pays en d6veloppement).

Une telle relecture est en r~aliti du restatement, au sens oil lesEtats-Ums le pratiquent rdgulierement, auquel la Commission devraitetre invitde A proc~der afin de d6gager les tendances nouvelles du droitinternational. f1 convient n~anmoins de s'interroger sur le point de savoirsi la Commission peut utilement se lancer dans une entreprise aussi vasteavant que les Etats eux-memes s'y soient engages et que l'exemple desEtats-Unis ait t suivi par un nombre significatif d'Etats appartenant auxdifferents systemes juridiques et aux principales formes de civilisations,faute de quoi l'exercice de la Commission risque d'etre tris theorique etabstrait.

Naturellement, i la difference des sujets plus pr6cis ou pointus dontl'examen peut Etre rapidement terminal, il s'agirait ici d'un travail de treslongue haleine dont il faut admettre que, paradoxalement, il serait destin6A ne jamais vritablement finir. Le but de l'exercice ainsi conqu seraitmons d'arriver i un texte dont le statut resterait A dterminer qu'A une re-flexion permanente sur l'6tat du droit international, ses evolutions et sestransformations. La Commission aurait ainsi une fonction d'observationdes grandes tendances du droit international, la conduisant par exemple i6laborer des textes qui pourraient 8tre des sortes de recommandationssusceptibles d'orienter les comportements des Etats.

II semble en tout cas que le restatement constitue une perspectiveplus envisageable aujourd'hui qu'elle ne 'a t dans les periodes prece-dentes. En effet, pendant longtemps, la (< voie royale de la codificationa t& la convention signe et ratifile, les autres formes (modeles de reglespar exemple) 6tant signdes d'6checs. L'exemple de la procedure arbitraleest revelateur. Le projet de Georges Scelle et de la Commission en 1958tait inacceptable par les Etats et le projet a 6t6 enterr6. Enterrement de

premiCre classe il est vrai puisqu'on en a fait un < modile > de r~gles < re-commandE >) aux Etats qui, justement, n'en voulaient pas.

Les vues sont aujourd'hui beaucoup plus nuancees et la Conventionn'est plus n6cessairement perque comme une panacee. Peut-8tre memene 'est-elle plus assez, si l'on ose dire. Force de souligner les merites,r6els, de la soft law, on laisse le balancier aller aux extremes en oubliantque la regle de droit positifrsulte de la convention et non de la declara-tion. Sans doute faut-il se garder des exc~s qui apres le (( tout convention-nel ) tendent vers le ( tout ddclaratoire o. L'important est de mettre ici de

la mesure et de profiter de ce que, les voies de la codification itant diver-sifides, elles sont susceptibles d'8tre fmalement mieux adaptdes aux dif-fdrents sujets traitos par la Commission. La convention conserve sesavantages de r~gle de droit positif et ses inconvnients et ses insuffisan-ces cons6cutives notamment aux aldas des ratifications. La situation de lad6claration est inverse. I faut donc penser i utiliser I'une ou lautre,peut-8tre m~me l'une puis l'autre, une declaration pouvant prdceder laconvention en traqant le chemin qui y conduit.

En effet, il convient d'avoir du droit international des visions plusaudacieuses et novatrices. Certes, la tendance naturelle est d'en appr~cierl'autorit6 i la mesure de celle du droit interne et de rechercher la r~gle dedroit positifet la contrainte qui ressemble au plus pr6s i la loi. Pourtant, ledroit international ne pourrait-il avoir une autre nature et la societ6 inter-nationale ne pourrait-elle 8tre appr6ci6e autrement qu'en comparaisonavec la soci6t6 interne ? Le Rapporteur sp6cial sur les r6serves aux trait6slors de ]a discussion sur la forme i donner i l'instrument a pr6cis6 < qu'iln'envisageait pas le droit international comme une succession d'obli-gations et d'interdictions; des directives, des orientations, pour autantqu'elles fussent bien conques, pouvaient, selon lui, avoir un effet sur laconduite des Etats. Si, par cons6quent, les membres de la Commission semettaient d'accord, dans le cadre d'un consensus ou d'un quasi consen-sus, sur des pr6cisions importantes, celles-ci pourraient avoir une grandeautorit6 aupris des Etats170 . )

Lorsque l'6tude de la responsabilit6 des Etats a 6t6 lanc6e, la pers-pective 6tait de deboucher un jour sur une convention de codification.Pourtant, en 1997, i la Sixi~me Commission, plusieurs d616gations sesont exprim6es pour considdrer << qu'il fallait demeurer souple quant i laforme que pourrait prendre un futur instrument sur la responsabilit6 desEtats, comme toutes les r6gles relatives i la responsabilit6 des Etats tou-chaient au fondement m~me du droit international et devaient donc leconsolider. Les r6gles relatives i la responsabilit6 des Etats devaient donc8tre 6nonc6es dans un document exposant l'6tat du droit internationalplut6t que sous la forme d'un instrument n6cessitant une ratification parles Etats. > De mEme, en ce qui concerne la nationalit6 en relation avec lasuccession d'Etats, de nombreuses d616gations se sont prononc~es en fa-veur d'une d6claration, plus souple qu'une convention, pouvant com-prendre un plus large 6ventail de questions et, si elle 6tait adopt6e parconsensus, avoir plus d'autorit6 qu'une convention ratifi6e par un petitnombre d'Etats.

Ainsi, les proc6d6s sont-ils nombreux et vari6s, As s'entrecroisentet se combinent et contribuent grandement i cet 6gard i faire la richesse

170 Documents officiels de IAssemblde gdnrale, cinquante-deuxi~me session. Sup-plment n* 10 (A/52/10), par. 123, p. 98.

et l'originalitd du droit international. lls nourrissent aussi la possibi-litd pour la Commission de jouer dans Pavenir un r61e accru etd'tre vWritablement un centre de gravitd pour I'dlaboration du droit inter-national.

Presentation by Mr. Vaughan Lowe' 7 '

My contribution to the International Law Commission's fiftieth an-niversary Seminar falls into three parts. In the first, I make some brief re-marks on the strengths and achievements of the Commission. In the sec-ond part, I consider the question of the topics that might be added to theCommission's agenda, to be dealt with in much the same way that theCommission has dealt with topics in the past; and, in the third part, I sug-gest the possibility of a rather different role, aligned much more closelywith the task of the progressive development of international law thanwith its codification, that the Commission might adopt in the future. Myremarks owe a great deal to a series of discussions held by a United King-dom study group formed at the initiative of Sir Franklin Berman, the Le-gal Adviser to the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office,and organized under the auspices of the British Institute of Internationaland Comparative Law as part of the British celebration of the Commis-sion's fiftieth anniversary. The group considered the question of theCommission's future agenda and produced a rewort, about to be pub-lished, which identified several promising topics.' 2 Much of this paper isderived from this report, although responsibility for the views in this pa-per is mine alone.

A. - STRENGTHS AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMtS-

SION

The International Law Commission has been rightly praised for thecontribution that it has made to the development of international law. Butfrom one perspective, its record has been only a partial success. Fiftyyears ago, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, in his Survey of International Law inRelation to the Work of Codification of the International Law Commis-sion,173 envisaged the Commission completing the codification of publicinternational law in the space of two decades. The International LawCommission has, indeed, completed a good deal of the groundwork forsuch a comprehensive codification of the elements of international law.Its work led to the adoption of some of the most important legal instru-ments in modem international law. The 1961 and 1963 Vienna Conven-tions on Diplomatic Relations 174 and on Consular Relations, 7

1 the 1958

171 Reader in International Law, University of Cambridge and Fellow of CorpusChristi College, Cambridge; Barrister, Essex Court Chambers, London.

172 The Role and Future of the International Law Commission (British Institute of In-

ternational and Comparative Law, 1998).173 Document A/CN.4/1/Rev.I of 10 February 1949.174 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 500, p. 95.

175 Ibid., vol. 596, p. 261.

Geneva Conventions on the Continental Shelf,17 6 Territorial Sea 177 andHigh Seas,17S and the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 7 9

are, without doubt, all fundamental to the structure and content of inter-national law as we understand it today. But when the Commission's con-tribution is considered more closely, a number of features stand out.

First, all of these Conventions date from the first 25 years of theCommission's existence, having been identified at the beginning of theCommission's life as "fundamental" elements of the international legalorder. Second, there was a substantial, if sometimes divergent, body ofexisting law and practice on each of these topics, which tended to meanthat the Commission's work was more concerned with codification thanwith the progressive development or formulation of new law. Third, eachof the topics undertaken by the Commission could be relatively easily de-fined and circumscribed and was "manageable" in scale. Fourth, it was inthe interests of at least a significant part of the international community tosecure the rules on each of the topics in an international agreement. Notall topics share these features.

The Commission appears to have avoided topics with a heavy mu-nicipal law or private international law content. It also has avoided topicswith a heavy political content-both these topics, such as recognition,where States have traditionally maintained a high level of discretion, andthose topics, such as trade law, where there are sharp conflicts of interestsbetween States that demand political compromises. The InternationalLaw Commission seems to have been influenced, too, by the need to finda satisfactory relationship with other bodies, such as the International In-stitute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), and with otherprocesses for the elaboration ofnorms, such as the General Agreement onTariffs and Trade (GAT) and multilateral diplomacy in general. It hasavoided fields that have effectively been occupied by others. Indeed,sometimes such accommodations have been forced upon the Commis-sion. It was, for example, effectively cut out of the wholesale revision ofthe 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea'9s that began only half adozen years after the entry into force of the first of the 1958 Geneva Con-ventions on the Law of the Sea, whose drafts the Commission had pre-pared.

There is another factor that appears to have influenced the choice oftopics to be addressed by the Commission. This is the tacit assumptionthat the normal final result of the Commission's work should be a con-vention. Article 23 of the Commission's statute envisages a variety of

176 Ibid., vol 499, p. 311177 Ibid-, vol. 516, p- 205.179 Ibid., vol. 450, p. 1I.179 Ibid., vol. 1155, p. 331.190 Document A/CONF. 62/122 and Corr. I to II.

possible forms which the final products of the Commission's work mighttake, but cases in which the Commission has merely adopted a report orrequested the adoption of a resolution are rare.'"' This may well havedrawn the Commission's attention towards topics on which a conventionmight eventually be adopted and away from those where a convention ap-peared at best a remote possibility.

Plainly, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht's vision of comprehensive codifica-tion within two decades has not been realized. There is not yet a compre-hensive code of international law. The Commission has concentrated onmending some seams, such as diplomatic law, State succession and Stateresponsibility, and it has given little or no attention to other global issuesthat were identifiable in the 1950s, such as armed conflict, intervention,neutrality and recognition. Moreover, the Commission has not taken thelead in the development of newer, emerging areas of international law,such as environmental law and economic law.

The Commission is more suited to some tasks than to others and itsfuture must lie in playing to its strengths. What, then, is the main strengthof the International Law Commission? This plainly lies in the expertise ofits members, and not merely their expertise as public international law-yers, but also as a body of lawyers throughly grounded in the principlesand techniques of all of the major legal systems of the world. The value ofthe International Law Commission as a repository of expertise in com-parative law should not be overlooked. The Commissioners are, more-over, generalists rather than lawyers with a narrow technical expertise inparticular areas of the law. Furthermore, they are independent, in thesense that they represent no one and are able to offer a disinterested anal-ysis of legal problems and of the current state of international law. TheCommission remains the only international body whose responsibilitiesare relevant to the task of consolidating and developing the corpus of gen-eral international law on a coherent basis-coherent as between subjectareas and coherent as between geographical areas. It can maintain awatch over the coherence of the entire international legal system at a timewhen that system faces the threat of fragmentation, as legal principles andtechniques begin to develop divergently in different areas of the world(the distinctive legal order of the European Union is a good example) andin different areas of international life (the handling of questions of treatylaw by tribunals in the fields of international economic law and humanrights furnish many instances).

Can the Commission's approach to its role continue to be that whichit has adopted in the past? I do not think that it can. There are two mainreasons why this might be so.

181 See, for example, the Report on ways and means for making the evidence of customary international law more readily available (1950) and the Draft Declaration on theRights and Duties of States (1951).

The first is that a relatively large part of the foundations of whatmight be called the "transactional" international legal system (that is tosay, the principles that are applicable m the dynamic area of routineday-to-day dealings between States, as opposed to the principles on mat-ters such as territorial title, which are heavily case-specific, and highlypoliticized matters such as the use of force) has already been addressedby the Commission. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that it is by nomeans always the case that areas of international life benefit from beingmade the subject of rules or, if rules are desirable, that these are best es-tablished at the international rather than the national or regional level.Those parts of the foundations of international law that remainuncodified may not benefit from codification at all, and, even if codifica-tion is thought desirable, a premature attempt to codify them may have apositively deleterious effect, reducing the flexibility available to States intheir practice and impeding the development of a satisfactory legal re-gime through the pragmatic testing processes of customary internationallaw.

There is, it is true, some purpose in revisiting areas already tackledby the International Law Commission-as is being done with treaty res-ervations-to see if any modification to the existing rules is necessary ordesirable. Many areas of international law have been developed by inter-national organizations, such as the International Maritime Organization(IMO) or the World Trade Organization (WTO), which maintain a con-tinuing watch over the application of the instruments that they have spon-sored, in order to determine when modifications become necessary. In theabsence of a "responsible" international organization, there is no betterbody than the International Law Commission to perform this role in rela-tion to most of the great conventions based upon Commission drafts.112 Itis, however, hard to see that such reviews could ever satisfactorily be-come the primary focus of the Commission's work.

The second reason follows from the latter point. The existence of in-ternational organizations with responsibility for particular areas of inter-national law and the informal rolling processes, such as the meetings ofStates parties to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, together with theincreasing use of "framework" conventions supplemented by detailedprotocols made from time to time, have taken much ground away fromthe International Law Commission in the most important of the nelyemerging areas of international law.

This development is by no means to be regretted. Other bodies maybe better equipped than the International Law Commission to deal with

182 There are exceptions. Responsibility for the law of the sea has in practice nowmoved to the States parties to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seaand to specialized agencies, such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and theFood and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), for example.

some aspects of the codification and progressive development of interna-tional law. The development of the law goes through various stages: dis-cussion of the practical problems which call for legal solutions; explora-tion of the principles that might be applied to these problems, perhapsinvolving technical experts, non-governmental organizations and othernon-State groups representing particular interests; selection of and be-tween alternative approaches; the harmonization of the chosen ap-proaches with existing legal rules and principles; the precise formulationof texts, in a range of different languages; and the "selling" of the text toStates, tribunals and other users. Some, at least, of these stages may moreeasily be conducted outside the Commission. Participation in the ongoingdevelopment of a legal "regime" where concessions in one "round" maybe made in the expectation of gains in another separate round, for in-stance, may facilitate moves towards a consensus between States. Otherbodies may have greater knowledge of the practical and technical issuesinvolved. And where compromises between different interests are neces-sary, bodies composed of representatives of States, rather than the inde-pendent experts of the International Law Commission, will inevitablycarry greater political authority.

That is not to say that the International Law Commission becomesredundant in these contexts. One might be forgiven for thinking that theCommission has tended to read article I of its statute as if its task were"the progressive development of international law and its codification".That is not what the statute says. The Commission's task is "the promo-tion of the progressive development of international law and its codifica-tion". It is by no means necessary that the Commission should itself un-dertake every stage of that process, and it is certainly not the case that theCommission must be judged to have failed if its work on any specifictopic does not result in the adoption of a convention. The criterion of theCommission's success must be the utility of its work, first to the GeneralAssembly, which may be regarded as its immediate "employer", but alsoto the broad international community, the invisible college of interna-tional lawyers. That community does not consist merely of "States" (asrepresented by foreign ministries). It includes other lawyers in govern-mental service and private practice, and negotiators of international ar-rangements, those acting on behalf of Governments and those acting forcorporations; it extends to those sitting on and pleading before municipaland international tribunals, and to many others who have a need to callupon the techniques and 23 structures of international law. For all of theseparties, the analysis of legal problems, the collection of State practice andthe discussion of legal principles in the International Law Commissionreports are of immense value.

The International Law Commission is, perhaps accidentally, alreadyfunctioning in this way, making a particular and limited contribution to awider exercise in the codification and development of international law.

For example, although the responsibility for the law of the sea shiftedfrom the Commission, which had prepared the drafts of what became the1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, to the Third United Na-tions Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS Ill), the influence ofthe Commission on the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law ofthe Sea is great and quite clearly apparent. Large parts of the 1982 Con-vention were taken verbatim from the earlier Commission texts, and thewhole approach of UNCLOS Ill to delimitation and to ascriptions ofcompetence was plainly moulded by the approach that had been adoptedby the Commission in the 1950s.

The emerging division of responsibility between the InternationalLaw Commission and other international bodies and processes is, at leastin part, a reflection of the fact that the Commission's strength lies in itsexpertise in public international law, and incidentally, in comparativelaw. The further the Conmmssion moves away from codification towardsinnovation and the progressive development of international law, the lessrelevant that technical legal expertise becomes. And not being represen-tative of States and lacking political authority, the diminished relevanceof the Commission's legal skill inevitably diminishes its potential as abody which can attempt to prescribe the legal framework within whichinternational relations in new and technically complex and politicallycontroversial fields should be conducted.

It follows, in my view, that the work of the International Law Com-mission must begin to change direction. The question is, how? That is thesubject of the second and third parts of my paper.

B. - ToPiCS FOR THE AGENDA

There is, of course, room for a continuation of the Commission'scurrent approach to its work. There remain topics in need of the attentionof the Commission, working according to its traditional methods. The re-port of the United Kingdom study group on the Commission's futureagenda identified several promising topics. The topics illustrate not onlymerely subjects to which the Commission might turn, but also a numberof modifications to its working procedures or shifts of emphasis in its ap-proach to its work that might usefully be adopted.

The modifications and shifts of emphasis fall under six broad head-ings. First, the Commission might begin to deal more directly with ques-tions of private international law, not in order to codify private interna-tional law as such, but rather in order to address the question of theimplementation of rules of public international law in what one might callthe "real world", in those contexts where this is either necessary or desir-able-that is, the world that is largely made up of transactions betweenindividuals and corporations, and in some cases Governments, ratherthan the theoretical world of relations exclusively between States on the

plane of international law."8 3 Second, the Commission might directlyconsult or involve technical experts in other fields, such as scientific, mil-itary or economic matters, and indeed, practising lawyers with particularexpertise in relevant fields, in order to increase the utility of internation-ally agreed rules by addressing the question of the manner in which theymay be implemented in practice. Third, the Commission might cooperatewith other international organizations in making its distinctive contribu-tion to the codification and progressive development of international law.

A fourth modification to the Commission's practice illustrated bythese suggestions for future topics is the assumption by the Commissionof a responsibility for maintaining a continuing surveillance of those ar-eas of the law in which it has drafted legal instruments, rather than remov-ing subjects from its agenda when it has "finished" work on them. In-creased use of instruments, other than draft treaty texts as the "product"of the Commission's work, is the fifth shift that might be desirable. And,sixth, the Commission might conduct exploratory studies in some areasin order to determine whether it can make a useful contribution on a topicand, if so, how that contribution can best be made. Those studies maywell indicate that there is no useful contribution that the InternationalLaw Commission can make at that time, but the exploratory exercisewould be no less useful were that to be the result.

Topics ripe for the attention of the International Law Commission

The United Kingdom study group identified several topics ripe forconsideration by the International Law Commission which would benefitfrom the modifications in Commission working practices just described.The most important were the following:

(1) Aspects of the law of treaties. There are aspects of the exist-ing law of treaties that might usefully be addressed by the InternationalLaw Commission: for example, the interrelationship between the inter-pretation, modification and amendment of, and the making of reserva-tions to, treaties, and the legal effect of resolutions by treaty bodies re-garding treaty implementation. There are also gaps in the ViennaConventions, such as the effect of armed conflict on treaties, which couldusefully be filled. Furthermore, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Lawof Treaties is an area where there is a clear need to provide some counter-balance to the evident danger of the fragmentation within internationallaw that would result if different treaty regimes were to reach differentsolutions to the same problem-the danger exemplified by, for example,the "reservations" issue in human rights treaties and the rampant teleol-

183 This development is, indeed, envisaged by article 1 (2) of the statute of the Interna-

tional Law Commission.

ogy of the approach of the Court of Justice of the European Communitiesto treaty interpretation.

There are other problems, too. Treaties are dynamic instruments,which are modified during the course of their application (ornon-application) between the parties and, particularly in the case of mul-tilateral treaties, by organs established under them. These modificationsare not well accommodated within the Vienna Conventions, and thedrafting of rules governing them is another matter that might be under-taken by the Commission.

Such is the range of treaty issues, and the variety in the contexts inwhich these issues arise, that the Commission could usefully maintain asa permanent fixture on its agenda the question of aspects of treaty law. Itcould address both novel questions as they arise and also the impact ofState practice upon existing rules. Such work might result in simple re-ports of the Commission clarifying the issues involved and the relevantlegal principles, or in resolutions of the Commission or the General As-sembly, giving guidance on the application of the Vienna Conventions,or in a protocol (the approach in respect of reservations). Any of these ap-proaches is easier and more likely to be effective than a wholesale recon-sideration of the Vienna Conventions. The possibilities also might be ex-plored of encouraging use of the procedure envisaged in article 17 of thestatute of the International Law Commission, under which drafts of mul-tilateral treaties may be referred by the parties to the Commission forstudy.

(2) The responsibility of international organizations. Thoughsome of the Commission's draft articles touch on the subject, the inten-tion seems to have been to keep the question of the responsibility of inter-national organizations out of the scope of the Commission draft articleson State responsibility. This question has received little attention, despiteits current relevance in a wide range of contexts. For example, if mem-bers of international peacekeeping forces operating under organizationalcontrol breach international humanitarian law, where should responsibil-ity for the breach lie? Does it matter if the international organization inquestion is not a party to the relevant humanitarian law instruments?Again, who is responsible if, for instance, the European Commissionfines an extraterritorial cartel for operating in a Member State in circum-stances where the fine violates international law? Who is responsible ifagents of a frontier river commission from State A injure a third-party na-tional while they are exercising powers in State B given to them under thefrontier river treaty? Is the approach to such questions to be the same forall international organizations? If not, what should the differences be andwhat principles should dictate the differences? This is an area of consid-erable complexity, of exactly that kind which the Commission excels inreducing to a set of coherent principles.

(3) Economic sanctions. There is a widespread view that eco-nomic sanctions are preferable to the use of armed force. I doubt whetherthat is altogether correct. Economic sanctions, whether multilateral orunilateral, are blunt weapons. A large part of the burden that they imposeis borne by the weaker members of the civilian population, and they oftenhave relatively little effect upon ruling elites whose behaviour they at-tempt to influence. The International Law Commission could make a ma-jor contribution to the refinement of the tools available for inducing com-pliance with international law, if it studied the manner in which economicsanctions should be framed and implemented, in order that they achievetheir intended purpose as fully as possible and with as few unintendedside effects as possible.

A detailed study of this topic, in order to have practical value, wouldcertainly have to extend beyond questions of public international law intoprivate international law and other relevant branches of the municipallaws of the States most directly concerned. It also would necessitate thestudy, with the assistance of appropriate experts, of the practical opera-tion of banking and commercial systems.

(4) Remedies. The practice of the Iran-United States Claims Tri-bunal and, more recently, of the United Nations Compensation Commis-sion (UNCC), has made clear both the importance of questions concern-ing remedies in international law and the paucity of international practicebearing directly upon these questions. Some aspects of remedies are con-sidered in the draft articles on State responsibility, and it is plainlynot sensible to propose that the same issues be studied under the differentrubric of "Remedies". There are, however, other aspects of current con-cern to international tribunals where principles can be inferred from thewealth of practice in international and municipal tribunals: questions ofcausation and remoteness, the mitigation of loss, the quantification ofdamages and heads of recovery, for example. The International LawCommission, with its representation of the principal legal systems of theworld, is admirably equipped to study this important area of internationallaw.

(5) Evidence. A related area in need of careful study is the law ofevidence before international tribunals. This subject, which has rarelybeen systematically addressed by scholars, is of growing importance,particularly in bodies such as the Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunalswhose procedures partake as much of criminal as of civil law processes,and in the UNCC, whose technically administrative, rather than judicial,status gives rise to difficult questions concerning the way in which princi-ples of the law of evidence and of due process should be applied in its pro-ceedings.

(6) Corrupt practices. The corruption of State officials is recog-nized, in the work of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-velopment (OECD) and other bodies, as a major and persistent problem

that corrodes the basis of civil society and undermines the rule of law.There is agreement on the need to repress corrupt practices, and a wide-spread acknowledgement of the fact that there are real difficulties in find-ing an agreed definition of what is to count as corrupt conduct. There ismuch less agreement on the approach to be taken in the consequences ofcorrupt practices, for instance, the effect of corruption on State contractsand on unilateral acts, such as the issuance of passports and customsclearances and the delivery of judicial decisions. The analysis of theseand related issues, and the articulation of a clear conceptual frameworkby the Commission for the handling of the legal effects of corruption,would itself be an important contribution of considerable practical valueto the international community, whether or not it led to the adoption ofany international instrument on the subject.

(7) Parent/Subsidiary relations. The United Kingdom studygroup considered whether to recommend that the International Law Com-mission should undertake a general study of legal aspects of transnationalcorporations, but thought that, on balance, this was not desirable. The in-volvement over the years of other international bodies, such as the OECDand the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations, withparticular aspects of the activities of transnational corporations, coupledwith the lack of coherence of the topic, suggests that it is not suitable forinclusion in the Commission's agenda. There is, however, one central le-gal issue that is of general importance to all aspects of the regulation oftransnational corporations and that is suitable for consideration by theCommission. This is the question of the relationship between parent andsubsidiary corporations, which bears upon issues of agency and responsi-bility of the transferability of rights and obligations (for example, underdispute settlement clauses in concession agreements) and of nationality.There is much practice on this question, international and municipal. It isan essentially legal question which would benefit greatly from carefulconsideration and precise analysis; it is of pressing concern and the Com-mission could produce useful general rules on the subject, particularly inthe context of issues of jurisdiction and responsibility.

(8) The intersection ofpublic international law and private inter-national law: the case ofjurisdiction. It is a paradox of contemporaryinternational law that the exercise of a State's criminal jurisdiction evenin trivial circumstances is regarded as a matter of public internationallaw, engaging State interests and the rights and duties of States because ofits "public" character, whereas the exercise of civil jurisdiction over aparticular dispute is determined in principle, unilaterally, by a State'sown rules of private international law. Yet, States frequently have a verygreat and direct interest in the operation of private international law rulesin civil proceedings of a foreign State, for example, in cases where the cit-izens of one State may be denied access to the courts of another State (asin the Bhopal disaster), or where private civil actions are used as instru-

ments for compelling compliance with public policies (as in the UnitedStates antitrust laws). Inconsistencies and uncertainty in the operation ofprivate international law systems may lead to confusion and costly delayfor regulatory agencies, individuals and businesses, as well as to denial ofaccess to legal remedies.

Without interfering with the important work of The Hague Confer-ence and similar bodies, the Commission could usefully bring its exper-tise to bear upon selected problems of private international law which in-volve questions of systematizing State practice and which lie at theinterface with principles of public international law. A study of Statepractice and applicable principles of law in this area would allow theCommission to codify existing law where certainty exists, and to contri-bute to the progressive development of law where inconsistent practiceprevails. It also may indicate principles that might be applied to deter-mine the allocation of priorities between overlapping criminal jurisdic-tions (a problem epitomized by the Lockerbie case).

Topics meriting exploratory studiesby the International Law Commission

There is a distinct category of possible agenda items identified bythe United Kingdom study group. This consists of areas in which it ispractically certain that there is useful work to be done by the InternationalLaw Commission, but the exact nature of that work cannot be identifiedwithout some preliminary exploratory work. The last three topics to bementioned here fall into this category.

(9) Multiple jurisdictions in international law. The proliferationof international dispute settlement bodies and the increasing propensityof States (and other international actors) to have recourse to these bodiesis now regularly giving rise to situations where an international legal is-sue may be challenged in two or more forums. The problem would be-come more severe if, as I suspect, some litigants begin to break downtheir complaints against the respondent into a series of distinct parcels inorder to benefit from the widening range of near-compulsory dispute set-tlement procedures under widely ratified treaties, such as the WorldTrade Organization and the International Centre for Settlement of Invest-ment Disputes conventions.' Difficulties may arise where the applicantand the respondent choose different forums, or where one tribunal thinksthat some other tribunal should or should not deal with the matter. Theremay be questions of conflicting treaty obligations, either on matters ofsubstance (for example, where trade and environmental treaties apply tothe same activities), or on matters of procedure (for example, where there

184 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1867, p. 3, and vol. 575, p. 159, respectively.

appear to be treaty-based rights or duties to refer disputes to more thanone forum). There also are important procedural questions involved, suchas the scope of resjudicata in international law.

There is as yet little international practice on the topic, but there is awealth of practice in municipal tribunals upon which the Commissionmight draw, on issues such as forum non conveniens, res judicata, fispendens and, in the field of administrative law, the availability ofjudicialreview of administrative actions. Nonetheless, it is doubtful whether theCommission could at this stage devise a satisfactory set of generalizablerules which would be applicable (at least in principle) to all internationaltribunals. It may be that, on closer examination, it appears that the prob-lems cannot satisfactorily be addressed in isolation from the problems ofconflicts between specific substantive rules or between treaty obliga-tions. It is, therefore, unclear whether the International Law Commissionshould or should not take up this important topic, and the best approachwould be for the Commission to conduct an exploratory study, preciselyin order to determine whether or not there is a useful contribution that itcould make, and what that contribution might be.

(10) Extraterritorial jurisdiction. There is, in my view%, no sin-gle "problem" of extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction, but rather a bun-die of issues, closely related but distinct and requiring different ap-proaches to regulation. The legal and policy issues arising in the contextof taxation, for example, are not at all the same as those arising in the con-text of export controls or competition laws. There seems to be no practi-cal possibility of finding sufficient international consensus for a generaloverarching codification of the whole range of issues of extraterritoriallegislative jurisdiction. On the other hand, the Commission might use-fully look to see if in any specific substantive areas (for example, compe-tition laws) there is sufficient convergence for the International LawCommission to be able to make useful contributions to the developmentof the law.

(11) State contracts. The changing international scene and thedramatic increase in the number of bilateral investment protection treat-ies evidences a notable, and perhaps temporary, convergence of views ona range of issues concerning State contracts: for example, the perform-ance of contractual obligations in good faith; the principles on which acontract may be renegotiated or substantially changed; the validity andoperation of stabilization clauses; the application of the notion of ac-quired rights; the principle of non-discrimination; the areas in which pub-lic powers of regulation might appropriately be exercised, and the typesor degree of measures which may be taken in pursuance thereof. Theremay now be a window of opportunity in which the International LawCommission could attempt to codify aspects of this area of the law. Tothe aspects already mentioned might be added the more controversial is-

sue of takings of foreign property, and particularly the questions underly-ing the controversy over the Helms-Burton law:18 5 What are the conse-quences of an unlawful taking? Can good title ever be obtained to thegoods taken? What are the proper valuation methodologies? Here again,the Commission could examine the area and consider how it could mosteffectively contribute to the clarification and development of the law.

(12) International cooperation in criminal jurisdiction. Muchwork is being done in the area of extradition by the United Nations CrimePrevention and Criminal Justice Programme and by regional bodies, butthere are still areas where difficulties remain: the question of the transferof offenders is one example. Moreover, the International Law Commis-sion's current work on international crimes and on the internationalcriminal court"s6 might suggest that extradition, as an important compo-nent of arrangements for establishing an effective regime for the repres-sion of international criminality, also be examined, if only in order tojudge the adequacy of present instruments and arrangements.

Topics to avoid

It is perhaps worth noting in passing that there were several itemsthat the United Kingdom study group considered definitely should not beinscribed on the agenda of the International Law Commission, for va-rious reasons. These included the question of the sources of intemationallaw, excluded because of its exceptional degree of dependence upontheoretical perspectives and its lack of immediate practical significance.The nature and significance ofjus cogens was excluded for similar rea-sons and, in addition, because of the risk that any report on the subject bythe Commission might freeze the development of this part of interna-tional law-and, indeed, in so far as the role ofjus cogens under the 1969Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is concerned, because work bythe Commission might give rise to awkward questions of the proper rela-tionship between the Commission and the International Court of Justice,to which the Vienna Convention gives competence in questions relatingtojus cogens.

Three other areas of major importance should be avoided by the In-ternational Law Commission for rather different reasons. Internationalenvironmental, economic and human rights law have all become the par-ticular concern of other international bodies and processes, which havebuilt up a very considerable expertise concerning the practical applica-

185 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996: 22 U.S.C.sect. 6021 et seq. (1997).

186 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishmentof an International Criminal Court adopted the Rome Statute of the International CriminalCourt on 17 July 1998.

tion of international norms. Moreover, the drafting of legal instruments inthese areas often involves the framing of political accommodations and,sometimes, the handling of complex technical issues. The InternationalLaw Commission is, therefore, less well suited than other internationalbodies to handle the codification and progressive development of thesebranches of international law. Nonetheless, environmental, econormcand human rights concerns permeate almost the whole of internationallaw. In the context of State responsibility, for example, considerationneeds to be given to situations, common in the field of environmentallaw, where damage has multiple perpetrators and multiple victums. Anyset of general principles on State responsibility needs to be able to accom-modate this fact, if the foundations of international law are not to becomefragmented. One of the most important contributions that the Interna-tional Law Commission can make is to take a broad overview of thewhole of international law when developing its reports and proposals,and to help avoid precisely that fragmentation and incoherence in the in-ternational legal system. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance thatthe Commission should keep a close watch on these areas of interna-tional law, primary responsibility for which it wisely leaves to other bod-ies.

C. -A MORE PROGRESSIVE ROLE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL LAW

COMMISSION?

In this final part of my paper, I turn to the possibility of the Commis-sion adopting an altogether more progressive role, far removed from itspast concentration on codification. There are areas of international lifewhere State practice may be very far from settled. It may be sparse, oreven non-existent. Yet there may be a very clear need for there to be somerules and for these rules to be agreed upon at the international level. Oneobvious current example is the Internet, where issues over the regulationand taxation of commercial transaction on the "Net", for instance, raisedifficult questions concerning jurisdiction and the practicality of enforc-ing any agreed rules. Other examples might include genetic engineeringand the important question of the setting and harmonization of interna-tional technical standards.

Again, there are other looming issues, more characteristic of the tra-ditional concerns of the international legal system. The increase in the

number of States in recent years has been accompanied by the prolifera-

tion of international and regional bodies. It is a matter of mathematical in-evitability that many small States will not be able fully to maintain their

own representation in every international body in which they wish to

have their voices heard. How best can we conduct international multilat-

eral diplomacy in these circumstances? How should we handle the inevi-

table overlaps and lacunae between the competences of international or-

ganizations? Are controls necessary upon the taking of quasi-judicialdecisions in circumstances where the opportunities to hear interested par-ties may be limited? These and other accidents of governance, which leadin municipal systems to the development of principles of constitutionaland administrative law, are bound to arise in the international system. Isthere a need for an international constitutional order? And if so, whatshould it look like? Or are such questions fanciful? Is there, perhaps, noreal problem here?

In this context, the International Law Commission could play a cru-cial role. It could be asked to go away and think about these new issuesconfronting the international community. It could be asked to report onthe basic questions: What exactly is the problem, if any? What ap-proaches to it might be adopted and what advantages and disadvantagesdo they have? How should the international community react? What rolescould and should international law play? The Commission could identifythe legal issues, explore the principles that might be applied and the alter-native approaches to regulation, perhaps (but not necessarily) suggestingwhich approach it considers best. In some cases, its work might yield acore of coherent principles around which State practice could crystallize.In other cases, the Commission might initiate international considerationof the issue, but then let the matter go to some other forum for further dis-cussion, perhaps being brought back to the Commission at a later stagewhen, for example, a broad international consensus has emerged and ithas become worthwhile to explore the possibility of fixing that consensusin a treaty text.

Such a role would place very much greater emphasis on law reformand the progressive development of the law than the Commission hasdone in the past. In that sense, it would mark a break with the establishedtradition of the International Law Commission's work. There is, how-ever, no reason why this more progressive role should not be undertakenin some areas, even now, while the Commission still has "traditional"topics on its agenda. The "traditional" and "progressive" roles are in nosense incompatible with one another.

What topics would benefit from this treatment? Some possible ex-amples have been given above. But, whereas the identification of topics"ripe for codification" is a task that can be approached as a technicalproblem within the skills of an international lawyer, the choice of topicsfor this kind of speculative exploration is not. It is a matter of political pri-ority, where the lead should be taken by a political body-the GeneralAssembly of the United Nations, to which the International Law Com-mission reports. This conclusion is dictated not only by the nature of thequestion. There is also an organizational consideration. The time of theCommission is a scarce resource. It is a small part-time body, with verymodest (and to outsiders woefully inadequate) resources, and while in-creases in resources, such as research assistance, would no doubt clearly

be very helpful, an increase in the size of the Commission might destroyits valuable collegiality. And for all of the members"V to move on to afull-time basis would, in my view, be regrettable: The fact that the Inter-national Law Commission members have other professional roles and ex-perience is one of the most important factors enriching and refreshing thecontributions that they can make. As a scarce United Nations resource,therefore, it should be for the United Nations to lay down the priorities forits use.

I close by emphasizing again a point made earlier. Much has beensaid of the successes of the International Law Commission. They are im-portant, but it is more important that an obsession with particular forms ofsuccess should not come to cripple the Commission. It must not bethought a sign of failure if a particular Commission project does not leadto the conclusion of a treaty, or leads to a treaty that attracts fewratifications. The stringent, dispassionate examination and analysis ofproblems to whose solution international law may be able to make a sig-nificant solution is worthwhile in its own right. The clarification of issuesin the closely reasoned Commission reports is immediately available toinform the taking of decisions in States, international organizations andin municipal and international tribunals. Neither the influence nor thevalue of the work of the International Law Commission is dependentupon the translation of that work into treaty form or, indeed, into anyother particular form. Similarly, it is no failure if the Commission beginsto examine a topic and then concludes that the time is not ripe for furtherwork on it. Such conclusions give a clearer focus on the issue and cansave a great deal of time and effort not only in the Commission but alsoelsewhere in the international community. It is the simple capacity forstringent, dispassionate analysis of legal topics that is both the mainstrength of the Commission and its enduring raison d'itre.

187 There may be a case for having a small number of full-time Commissioners in or-

der to maintain the momentum in handling particular projects and to develop the time-

consuming practice of exchanging views with Governments and other interested bodies.

Presentation by Mr. Gerhard Hafner"88

There is little doubt that the International Law Commissioncurrently is undergoing a fundamental challenge concerning its veryexistence. I would like to confine my comments to the following twoquestions: (a) the possible subjects of future work of the Commission and(b) the current problems of legislation.

(a) Possible subjects of its future work

In my view, the programme of work of the current quinquennium ofthe International Law Commission leaves no room and time for addi-tional subjects; the issues inherited from the former quinquennium, suchas State responsibility, reservations, prevention and State succession, to-gether with the new items, such as diplomatic protection and unilateralacts, present sufficient work to the Commission to keep it busy for the re-maining four years. It would be of little use to add still other issues; onemust only give a closer look to State responsibility and the large numberof problems which it arouses to repudiate any idea of additional itemsfrom the outset. Hence, if we are discussing future items we are doing sofor the next quinquennium.

If we, nevertheless, try to figure out possible new items, we have tokeep in mind that we obviously approach the end of the list of possibleitems which are considered appropriate for codification. From the origi-nal programme of the work of the International Law Commission, onlyrecognition of States and Governments, extraterritorial jurisdiction,rights of foreigners and territorial asylum are not yet codified. Of course,the law on the status of foreigners seems already covered by humanrights, so there is no need for further codification except perhaps the lawof investments; in this regard, we experience the problems of codificationin the attempts concerning the Multilateral Agreement on Investment. Asto territorial asylum, some fruitless attempts already have been made.Hence, it would perhaps be worthwhile to try extraterritorial jurisdiction.I know quite well the political difficulties such an item would encounter.However, the Commission should not be horrified by its political naturesince, in essence, any legal rule is politics. The Commission should notwork in an esoteric manner, remote from any realism, devoted only tosome abstract ideas of an extremely general nature. In order to be takenseriously by States, it must tackle serious problems or at least show that itis prepared to do so. Reluctance and hesitation should not be the rule. Italso is quite clear that the codification or legislation under today's cir-cumstances is quite more difficult in view of the highly increased cor-


plexities and complex ramifications of modern life. But the Commissionshould consider these complexities a challenge and not a pretext for nottaking these issues aboard. In order to facilitate the matter, this item couldperhaps be split into separate sub-items according to the different legalbranches ofjurisdiction.

A further item which seems worthy of being dealt with is the secondpart of the law of international organizations. The first was completed bythe 1975 Vienna Convention;8 9 the fact that this convention has not yetcome into force was in my view not the fault of the Commission but ofcertain States which did not care about realities. Of course, it is wellknown that several years ago the States did not appreciate this secondhalf. Nevertheless, it seems just timely to make a new attempt since ques-tions are now discussed worldwide, such as the legal status of interna-tional organizations, their immunities, the effects of ultra vires acts, etc.It is not the lack of urgency which precluded any legislation, but the lackof appropriate arguments to convince the States of the necessity of suchan undertaking.

The third item which in my view deserves further study by the Com-mission is hitherto what was called liability. One should not deal with thismatter as it was done, so far, proceeding from a very general approach,but the Commission should have a closer look at the practice which is re-flected in more than 40 conventions on what is called more correctly"civil liability". These conventions follow a relatively similar structure;the Commission should try to figure out these similarities and draw con-clusions therefrom.

As to recognition of States, it has to be seen how far the unilateral actof recognition is already attacked by the new item of unilateral act beforeanything could be said.

There is, however, still another task the International Law Commis-sion could assume. A substantial part of the codifications produced by theCommission stems from a situation which no longer exists, so that thescope of applicability of the codification would be reduced. Or the codifi-cation could no longer cope with the actual situation since new questionshave arisen which the original codification did not address. It is fre-quently stated that one of the drawbacks of a codification is its rigidityand lack of adaptability to a new situation. It could perhaps be wise tokeep existing codification under review in order to assess the need of anychanges or additions. An existing example is certainly the Vienna regimefor reservations. Another example is the 1961 Vienna Convention onDiplomatic Relations, 9° which has served its purpose very well. How-

189 Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with Interna-tional Organizations of a Universal Character: United Nations document A/CONF.67/16.

190 See footnote 174.

ever, new circumstances have arisen such as economic integration andnew forms of taxation for which this Convention does not provide a clearanswer. Another item which is already under scrutiny by the Committeeon Legal Advisers on Public International Law is that of the insolvency ofembassies and their personnel. Of course, the danger of such an undertak-ing consists in the possibility of opening a Pandora's box; nevertheless, itseems useful to discuss this need in a more general perspective.

(b) The present problems of legislation

In any case, we have to keep in mind that such a selection dependson certain circumstances which inevitably influence this selection.Hence, the items which were the most conducive for codification were,undoubtedly, those where an established pattern of the practice of Statesalready existed (e.g., in the form of general customary law) and whichwere of a synallagmatic nature. It is the classical situation ofState-to-State relations, based on reciprocity. In this regard, hardly any-thing is left. Current international law has to deal with the emancipationof the individuals from the States, the obligations incumbent upon Statestowards individuals or the international community in its entirety. In thisregard, we find ourselves still in some form of transition.

Hence, the International Law Commission can place on its agendaonly items which are marked by a divergent if not conflicting practice andwhich reflect one-sided obligations, i.e., obligations which are not mu-tual. The best example is the question concerning the establishment of aninternational criminal court. In such a situation, the Commission has toperform a totally different role: it no longer only formulates rules reflect-ing the general practice of States; it acts as a mediator between States andbecomes part of a real negotiation process. Such a role requires a muchcloser link with the States in order to reflect accurately their divergent in-terests. On the other hand, in such a situation the Commission suffersfrom a drawback which other bodies do not have: as it is not composed ofState representatives who depend on instructions from Governments,States do not entrust the Commission with the representation of their in-terests. Hence, it cannot be expected that the outcome of the deliberationsof the Commission would already constitute the compromise, sinceStates would make their most expensive concessions only towards theend of any procedure in which they are directly involved.

In such a situation, the Commission finds itself in a certain dilemma,since when formulating the draft rules it has to choose between what itconsiders just and legally correct and what is acceptable to States. TheCommission is required to strike a balance between both approaches.Both solutions correspond to different approaches of law and justice anddo not necessarily coincide. But in order to achieve the second result,

namely, the acceptable solution, the Commission needs the feedbackfrom States which it does not always receive as is required.

In this regard, there is a fundamental difference between theepistemic communities and the Commission: Whereas the former arecommitted only to their own view on what is desired and required, the In-ternational Law Commission is responsible to the General Assembly andthe States which are its clients. Hence, it must necessarily take into ac-count the wishes of the States when elaborating drafts. For these reasons,it cannot be as progressive as the epistemic communities. However, thisdifference must not exclude exchanges of views between them. On thecontrary, both can profit from such an exchange.

In view of this situation, it is no surprise that States establish or usebodies consisting of State representatives in order to elaborate treatieseven of a more general nature, such as the Sixth Committee of the Gen-eral Assembly, the United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of OuterSpace, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law andthe Human Rights Commission. This situation not only prompts an ero-sion of the field of activity of the International Law Commission, but alsois the origin of one of the current problems of international law-its frag-mentation. It is sometimes difficult to be aware of all the legal standardsset in the different treaties; it would be a noble task of the InternationalLaw Commission to monitor these different tendencies reflected in thedifferent treaties and to try to draw generally applicable conclusions.

Presentation by Mr. Zdzislaw Galicki 9'

As I have already mentioned, the first topic of our session yesterday,namely, "An overview of the work of the International Law Commissionfor the years 1948-1998", is closely connected and interrelated to our cur-rent subject concerning future topics and problems of the internationallegislative process. It is virtually impossible to make plans for the short-or long-term future without taking into account positive or negative expe-rience from the past.

One can find interesting that from its very beginning the Interna-tional Law Commission paid a lot of attention to its programme of workfor the future. At its first session in 1949, the Commission drew up a pro-visional list of 14 topics selected for codification, from the list of 25 top-ics proposed earlier in the memorandum prepared by the Secretariat ofthe United Nations.

Ten topics from those above-mentioned, some of them divided intosub-topics, have already been studied by the Commission, and with oneexception (which is "State responsibility"), the Commission has submit-ted final drafts or reports with respect to them.

There are, however, four topics from the 1949 list which, until now,have not been properly treated by the Commission (there is no final draftor report) and which could be considered by the Commission as the itemsfor the future. These are the following topics:

-Recognition of States and Governments;

-Jurisdiction with regard to crimes committed outside nationalterritory;

-Treatment of aliens; and

-Right of asylum.

It seems that at least some of these subjects are still viable and wor-thy of consideration by the Commission with the view to undertakingin-depth studies on them.

If we are looking back for future topics, it would not be unwise to re-visit some topics with which the Commission was not fully successful inthe past. Meanwhile, maybe some of them have become more ripe forcodification or progressive development. Perhaps these topics are worthyof a second look. And even where the Commission was successful, as isgenerally recognized, for instance, in the sphere of the law of treaties,such a second look is sometimes very useful. The example of the currenttopic on reservations to treaties seems to support this view.


In addition to the topics included in the 1949 list, the Commissionhas studied, or is studying now, other items referred to it by the GeneralAssembly, in some cases following an earlier initiative of the Commis-sion itself.

Some of these more than 20 topics already have been finalized in theform of draft conventions, articles or declarations; some of them are un-der current study by the Commission. But, once again, there is a largegroup of items which remains in a form of passive suspension. It seemsthat the Commission, in selecting the topics for its future work, shouldcarefully analyse the possibility of revisiting these subjects which werealready selected but not acted upon in an appropriate way. Looking for-ward, we should not forget about what we are leaving behind us.

After 1949, the Commission's programme of work has been re-viewed many times by the Commission with a view to bringing theprogramme of work up to date, taking into account General Assemblyrecommendations and the international community's current needs.Some overall reviews took place, for instance, in 1962, in 1973 and in1993. Numerous inclusions of particular topics into the Commission'scurrent programme of work also took place.

The process of selection of future topics by the Commission is be-coming more and more affected by the phenomenon of proliferation ofbodies engaged in the elaboration of juridical instruments within theUnited Nations, as well as outside this Organization. This proliferation,as Mr. Alain Pellet once said, is a healthy one and reflective of the vitalityof international juridical activity and the need for law in the internationalcommunity. But it also shows that the Commission does not have a mo-nopoly on the elaboration of the law within the United Nations. Quite theopposite; in this elaboration, the Commission has to compete and cooper-ate with other bodies.

The position of the Commission in the said process has to be ratherflexible, since, as it was correctly noticed by Mr. Pellet: "The Comnuis-sion, being made up of independent experts, could not impose on Statesdrafts relating to politically charged topics over which the internationalcommunity was deeply divided".

However, it does not mean that the Commission should not under-take difficult and controversial subjects or those which, in general, wereleft until now outside its scope of interests. For instance, I am deeply con-vinced that the Commission should be engaged in the development of theinternational law of human rights. Another sphere of the Commission'sfuture engagement, which seems to be a promising one, is the develop-ment of international legal norms concerning the suppression of variousforms of international or transnational organized crime.

Mr. Alexander Yankov, a former member of the Commission, in hisspeech delivered at the United Nations Congress on Public InternationalLaw in 1995,92 in New York, noticed that the:

"Selection of appropriate topics to be included in the long-term andcurrent programme for work of the International Law Commissionis an essential part of the whole process of law-making. The maincriteria for selection should be the assessment of the pressing needsof the international community, identifying topics designed to pro-vide practical responses to key issues of legal policy in various areasof international life and selection of topics fairly manageable withregard to their requirement."Such were the guidelines adopted by the Commission at its

forty-second session in 1990. Similarly, at the last session in 1997, theCommission agreed to the application of the following criteria to the se-lection of topics for the long-term programme:

-The topic should reflect the needs of States in respect of the pro-gressive development and codification of international law.

-The topic should be sufficiently advanced in terms of State prac-tice to permit progressive development and codification; and

-The topic is concrete and feasible for progressive developmentand codification. Besides, the Commission should not only res-trict itself to traditional topics, but also would consider those thatreflect new developments in international law and pressingconcerns of the international community as a whole.

And we, the members of the Commission, cannot forget that this isone of its primary tasks during the current session.

192 See International Law as a Language for International Relations, Proceedings ofthe United Nations Congress on Public International Law, New York, 13-17 March 1995,Kluwer Law International (The Hague) (United Nations publication, Sales No. T.96.VA).


Mbat

Mr. Hans Corell.'" First, I would like to congratulate the panel;it was a very comprehensive and elegant presentation of the subject. Ihave asked to take the floor to approach the topic from a completely dif-ferent angle. I would like to stress that I speak in my personal capacity,but you must admit that the platform on which I stand gives me the oppor-tunity to view matters from a different angle. I intend to raise five points,the first of which is very down-to-earth.

The United Nations is, currently, from the financial point of view, indire straits. We have a capped budget and we have several members whosimply do not pay their dues. This means that for a programme managerlike myself, with a budget of about $32 million for two years, and 160staff members, this is a constant struggle, a daily struggle to make endsmeet and to produce the results that we are asked to produce. Every sec-ond year, I have to present a budget to the Administration, and then to theFifth Committee and to the Advisory Committee on Budget and Finance.This year, Mr. Kofi Annan has presented a proposal to the General As-sembly for results-based budgeting. I do not know what the implicationsof this are for the next budget submission for the International Law Com-mission, but I can tell you, frankly, that already the last time I presentedthe budget I was asked questions by the Administration: What does thisCommission do? What are the results produced by this Commission?What is the use of this Commission to the Organization? I try to explain,to the best of my ability, that this is a very important organ that has beenin the Organization since its inception and that its results may not be tan-gible on a day-to-day basis but that, over the long term, the contribution isnoteworthy. I intend to discuss this matter again later as part of one of theother points, but I simply would like to bring to your attention that one ofthe issues that I will have to take up in November and December this year,when presenting the new budget, is to defend the existence of the Com-mission and the financial needs of it. If I am not successful, the financeswill be cut and allocated to other entities. I already have difficulties in theOffice of Legal Affairs because there are six subprogrammes, a fact ofwhich many are not aware. The Office of Legal Affairs covers a broadspectrum and I have to defend the budget for it all.

19 The Legal Counsel of the United Nations.

Secondly, it comes to me rather naturally to make comparisons withthe national level and this is how I looked at the United Nations when Icame in 1985 as a delegate to the Sixth Committee. I considered the Com-mission and I asked myself: Is the Commission a product of the nationalpatterns of 50 years ago? I know that in many countries there were lawcommissions which basically produced all the legislation to be consid-ered by parliaments. I know that in many countries law commissions stillexist, for example, in Australia, if I am not mistaken, but in many othercountries law commissions have been abolished and ad hoc commissionsare appointed for particular tasks. The ad hoc commissions are given pre-cise terms of reference from the political echelon. When I learned aboutthe interrelationship between the International Law Commission and theSixth Committee, I wondered whether the Commission received politicalguidance from the Sixth Committee, which is basically a political bodyeven though it is concerned with legal affairs. The Sixth Committee is po-litical because legislating is a political exercise. It has been said here thatthere must be a dialogue between the Sixth Committee and the Interna-tional Law Commission and I think that this is right, but we must under-stand that, in the meantime, other bodies have actually taken charge of thelegislative work of the Organization. Mr. Gerhard Hafrier mentioned hu-man rights; maybe the International Law Commission should engage thattopic. I do not know, but I think that across the corridor they would have afit if they heard that some other bodies intend to deal with the subject, be-cause they think that it is within their competence, and the Third Commit-tee and the General Assembly also think so. If Mr. Roy Lee 93 had therules of procedure of the General Assembly in front of him, he wouldconfirm that there is a resolution of 1952 that requires all Commissions inthe General Assembly to refer any legislative matter to the Sixth Com-mittee before decisions are taken. However, that is never done, and I donot think that any other committee would accept the Sixth Committee'shaving a supervisory role on legislative matters in the General Assembly.Therefore, the situation has crystallized into the present one, whichleaves the Sixth Committee competent only for certain legal matters re-flected in the work of the International Law Commission.

My third point concerns the interrelation between the Sixth Com-mittee and the International Law Commission. When I first came to theUnited Nations and I realized how the debate between the Commissionand the Sixth Committee was carried out I was very surprised. The SixthCommittee was basically debating the report of the International LawCommission, but most of the participants in the debate were actuallymembers of the Commission itself. They made rather long statements,actually continuing the discussion from the Commission, whereas in the

193 Director of the Codification Division, United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, untilDecember 1998, when he retired from the Organization.

Sixth Committee the discussion should be more political, focusing onmajor issues on which the Commission needs some guidance. The situa-tion has changed now. I tried to get colleagues from capitals to come tothe United Nations because I realized that some of the issues that are dis-cussed here are simply not foreign ministry matters. At the national level,they are dealt with by ministries ofjustice, of health and of social affairs.This is why it seemed important to me to have somebody from the capi-tals participate in the discussion of issues in the Sixth Committee and tobecome the link between the concerned ministries and the foreign minis-try. To a certain extent this has happened: participants from capitals cometo attend the debate of the International Law Commission, but there stillare some limitations. In particular, many developing countries and newlyindependent States do not have the resources to send several persons.Therefore, they are represented in the Sixth Committee at the relativelyjunior level. It is difficult to have a really sound political discussion basedon instructions from capitals. I do not know exactly how the decisions ofthe Sixth Committee are arrived at. It is sometimes difficult to find out,basically because States have different opinions. This is the differencewith the terms of reference given to ad hoc commissions at the nationallevel, which I mentioned earlier. At the national level, there is only oneGovernment which can give clear political guidance to a commission,whereas here it is very difficult to give terms of reference. The SixthCommittee just gives the subject matter to the International Law Com-mission to see what they ultimately can do in the Sixth Committee. TheCommission is used as a tool to identify a possible stand to be taken laterin the Sixth Committee.

Fourthly, the assessment that I made as a delegate to the Sixth Com-mittee is that it has been able to change its working methods, but the addi-tional participation of legal advisers from capitals did not bring to theSixth Committee the political guidance and the political impetus that Ihad hoped it would contribute. The reason may be that all these people arevery busy and concerned with a number of other issues and in the thirdworld resources do not exist to send participants. This is why I amconvinced that after 50 years the International Law Commission is still avery relevant factor in the legislative work of the Organization. But whatis unacceptable is that members of the Commission are the dominant par-ticipants in the debate in the Sixth Committee. It is very important that theSixth Committee sends to the Commission a guiding signal from theMember States for the work of the International Law Commission.

This brings me to the fifth point. I am sorry to take the floor for solong but it is important for me to convey this message to you. What is thecontribution that the International Law Commission can make? Well, itdepends largely on how the dialogue between the Sixth Committee andthe Commission develops, and I think that there is a limit to this dialoguebecause the Sixth Committee is in many instances not able to give clear

political guidance on many issues. This is the case because decisions arenot taken in capitals; the reason may be that the political corpus in thecapitals does not have enough knowledge of the substance being dis-cussed. On the other hand, the International Law Commission must takecare not to sever itself from the Sixth Committee and produce drafts thatno one wants, because ultimately legislative work is a political exercisethe result of which has to be accepted in capitals by Member States. In myview, clearer terms of reference will allow the Commission to producegood results, such as, for example, the Draft Statute for an InternationalCriminal Court.' 94 In this instance, there was clear guidance from theSixth Committee and, admirably, the Commission produced a draftwhich is already recognized as a major achievement. It often has beensaid that given guidance the Commission can very quickly produce re-sults. However, this kind of guidance is not always going to be available.Therefore, the question remains focused on what the Commission shoulddo in the absence of guidance. To what extent should it take initiatives?This morning several ideas were tabled and they are worth exploring. Ithink that the Commission has an independent role.

Let me return now to the first point I made. For me as programmemanager, it is not easy to justify to those above me the need for financinga Commission that does not produce concrete results almost every day. Ineed to have some idea of what you are contemplating, what is going onin order to explain to those who ultimately make the decisions on the bud-get that the work of the Commission is of high relevance for thelong-term development of international law. I see that in a very long-termperspective because we are engaged in an exercise that will span not onlydecades, but even centuries. Unless people at large understand thatmaybe these are the only bridges that we can build across borders be-tween countries spread all over the globe, and that the general legal in-struments to which the Commission contributes life are necessary, wewill come to a standstill. What I really need, therefore, as an input fromyou is not so much focusing on issues where there are clear terms of refer-ence or requests from the Sixth Committee, but an idea of how you viewyour work in the other echelon, the more long-term, general one, so that Ican use it in the budget process to convince those that are simply takingout a red pen to draw a line across an item that I have put into the budgetproposal. I am sorry for taking so long but I hope that you understand myconcern.

194 See footnote 186.

M. Constantin Economides'96. Monsieur le President, je vou-drais vous remercier, amsi que les rapporteurs et les intervenants de ladiscussion tris interessante que nous avons eue jusqu'ici. Je voudraisfaire quelques remarques.

Tout d'abord concernant l'ceuvre de codification d'une manire ge-n&rale. Je crois que nous sommes quelque peu s~v~res vis-i-vis desconferences de codification et des trait~s qui en resultent. C'est vraiqu'une conference de codification ne peut pas tout r~gler, par definition,parce que, lorsqu'on essaye de trouver les couturnes, on en trouve un cer-tain nombre mais il y en a d'autres qui sont introuvables, pas encore cris-tallisees, incertames et donc on opte pour la solution de ne pas les incluredans. un projet. Et en mime temps, on ne peut pas remplacer tine normecoutumi~re par une norme relevant du developpement progressif dudroit, parce que le sujet ne serait pas mr, il serait donc prematured'imposer de manire artificielle ou 6ventuellement mime arbitraire unerigle nouvelle. Donc, que fait-on ? On attend, souvent on dit que la cou-tume continue de r~gir ces questions, si des r~gles coutumires existenten la matire, mais on attend aussi la formation de nouvelles r6gles coutu-mitres. Ceci a eu lieu avec la question des reserves, un exemple tout i faittypique. Dans notre convention de 1969 nous avons des r~gles concer-nant les reserves illicites mais nous n'avons pas de r~gles concernant lessanctions contre ces reserves illicites. La partie o sanction )) fait d6faut.On n'a pas voulu le faire en 1969 parce qu'il n'y avait pas de regle coutu-miere sfire et parce qu'on n'a pas voulu imposer tine regle par vole de de-veloppement progressif. Mais ensuite il y a eu une 6volution avec les or-ganes de contr6le des conventions des droits de l'homme, et par voied'application de ces conventions, il y a eu des arrets de la Cour euro-peenne des droits de l'homme, d~ji cites i plusieurs reprises, de la Com-mission europeenne des droits de l'homme qui ont combl& ce vide en cequi concerne les sanctions des r6serves illicites. Nous avons actuellementun pr~cident qui est, i mon avis, tout i fait pertinent, et m~me contrai-gnant pour tout le monde. Je crois que nous avons de nouvelles r~glescoutumires 6dictes par des juridictions internationales et acceptees parles Etats, ce qui est dcisif et concluant. Maintenant, pour nous, la ques-tion est de savoir si cette nouvelle regle peut ftre transposie i tous les au-tres trait6s, mais c'est lia une question que nous allons examiner dans lecadre du sujet ( Les reserves aux traites )).

Ma seconde remarque porte sur la forme des documents que nousRIaborons. Nous avons dit depuis hier, pourquoi faire une convention,une directive serait mieux, ce serait plus facilement acceptable et cela au-rait tout de meme des effets positifs. Tout ceci donne l'impression quenous avons diji pris position, notamment concernant le projet sur la res-

1% Membre de )a Commission du droit international, 1997-.

ponsabilit6 des Etats, en faveur d'une directive plut6t que d'une conven-tion. Personnellement je crois qu'il faut r~fl~chir 6norm~ment avant deprendre une telle decision et, d'abord, si nous optons pour une telle d6ci-sion il est 6vident que nous rttrogradons. C'est-i-dire que nous baissonsla barre de mani~re tr~s significative et je me demande s'il est dansl'inttret de la Commission du droit international et des rapports interna-tionaux que la barre soit baiss6e de maninre aussi forte. II ne faut pas ou-blier que la convention intemationale est une source formelle, principalede droit international, c'est la forme la plus contraignante, alors qu'unedirective est une source auxiliaire. Nous baissons la barre au niveau d'unouvrage de doctrine. Ceci est-il souhaitable ? Pour ma part j'en doutefort, d'autant plus qu'en ce qui concerne le projet sur la responsabiit6 in-ternationale ce projet est la suite logique de la convention sur les trait~s.Le traitS, par ces dispositions, donne naissance aux obligations interna-tionales, la responsabilit6 internationale est la consequence de la viola-tion de l'engagement international, l'un complete l'autre. Puisque nousavons d~ji fait une convention internationale pour les trait6s, personnel-lement j'aurais bien vu une nouvelle convention internationale pour laresponsabilit6 internationale. Ceci est peut-8tre pr~matur6 i ce stade,mais je tenais tout simplement i r~agir i ce qui a 06 dit i plusieurs repri-ses, aussi bien hier qu'aujourd'hui, en faveur d'un texte de soft law, dedroit plus souple.

Une troisinme remarque au sujet de nouvelles questions. II fautd'abord 6viter les questions trop sptciaises qui rel~vent le plus souventde la compitence d'organes mieux armis pour les affronter que nous;donc, toutes ces questions que nous n'avons pas trait6es, pour de bonnesraisons, jusqu'i present, il vaut mieux les laisser i l'6cart. A moins que lademande nous soit express~ment faite de nous charger de telle ou tellequestion, je crois qu'il faut 6viter tout ce qui est sptcialis6. Je ne sais sinous-memes, de par nos connaissances, nous serions capables de traiterde questions hautement techniques. En second lieu, avant de choisir unsujet, il faut examiner les crit~res i appliquer au choix de nouvelles ques-tions. Cela a t6 dit hier i maintes reprises, le premier crit~re est la matu-rit. II faut que le sujet soit aussi mfir que possible pour la codification, ilfaut aussi consid~rer le caractre de n~cessit6 de la question. II peut yavoir des questions mdres mais qui n'int~ressent pas actuellement lasocit6 internationale, dorc ces deux crit~res sont, i mon avis, indis-pensables au choix des questions. Une des propositions faites au sujetde nouvelles questions m'inttresse beaucoup, elle a &6 proposie parM. Vaughan Lowe, c'est la question de l'ordre public international. Onparle d~ji depuis plusieurs annes d'un ordre public international, et sapremiere consecration a 6t6 le Chapitre VII de la Charte des NationsUnies, ce chapitre relive de l'ordre public international, il en est de m~medes r~gles dejus cogens et d'autres regles pourraient 6tre ins~r~es danscette question. Je pense souvent i une question qui n'a pas encore W

6tudiie et qui concerne la politique itrang~re. Quels sont les fondementsjuridiques de la politique itrang~re ? On a souvent tendance i croire dansnos Etats que la politique 6trangire relive du politique et que le droitjoueun r61e tout i fait accessoire. Cette conception erronde est souvent celled'individus ignorant le droit international. En effet, la politique 6trang~reconnait des limites, des freins 6dict6s par le droit interne, certainement, etsurtout par le droit international. Je crois que le fondementjuridique de lapolitique 6trangre en liaison avec l'ordre public international serait unequestion fort intdressante bien que tr~s politique. II s'agit de determinerles limites en ce qui concerne la politique 6trang~re des Etats. Voili donc,par ces propos, je me permets d'appuyer une des questions qui vientd'8tre proposde.

Mr. Abdulai Sayed. I am a doctoral candidate at the Graduate In-stitute of International Studies in Geneva. I would like to thank the organ-izers of the Seminar for the opportunity given to us students to hear andinteract with the honourable members of the International Law Commis-sion. My comment is in fact addressed to them. When talking about thefuture topics to be tackled by the Commission I cannot help but thinkabout the limits, past and present, of your work. Considering the work ofthe Commission and the present discussion, it seems to me that the Com-mission is suffering from a puzzling duality. On the one hand, you sithere, in your individual capacity as independent members of the Com-mission, determined to promote international law. Yet, on the other hand,many of the honourable members are representatives of their Govern-ments or advisers and other agents. In other words, you advise Govern-ments and you are well aware of their reticence concerning the differentprojects you are working on. In addition, State comments also limit yoursupposed enthusiasm for aggressive international law. You consequentlystruggle with language, and you settle for general formulations, for theambiguous ones which are supposed to accommodate your various con-tradictory understandings, in the quest for a handful of ratifications. Theenthusiasm of States appears to be increasingly slim; ratifications are be-coming increasingly rare or hesitant and are often associated withwide-scope reservations. You seem in a certain way resigned not to aimfor the progressive development of international law and, thus, not to aimfor conventions because this may appear prejudicial to your work in thelong run. Declarations of principles or General Assembly resolutions dotake note of or adopt your work, or so you console yourselves. Thiswould, in fact, in my personal view, allow you to do two things. It wouldgive you the possibility to venerate your role of promoting more incisiveinternational law by specifically arguing that the effort exerted in yourwork was one of codification whenever the national interest you are de-fending is not offended or is served by the declaration. You will, on theother hand, have the necessary safety valve that will permit you to cast

doubt as to the crystallized nature of the declaration under considerationwhenever the content of this declaration is not in harmony with the na-tional interest you are defending. To my mind, the dilemmas of yourCommission are those of all international lawyers. Such an account maybe dismissed on grounds of inaccurateness, incompleteness, perhapsnaivety or simplicity. Yet, you would agree that it expresses some of thepreoccupations of the younger generation of international lawyers whoalways wonder about the role of their discipline and their role in this dis-cipline of disciplines, international law, in a fragile society characterizedby multiple centres of power.

M. Constantin Economides. Je dois dire que la question qui vientd'8tre poste est une question vraiment classique, car elle s'est toujoursposte et on n'a jamais trouv6 de r ponse satisfaisante. Cependant, ilexiste un moyen pour renforcer le droit international, un moyen relative-ment pratique. Il faut avant tout renforcer tous les services juridiques desEtats, tous les services qui s'occupent des questions de droit internatio-nal. Un Etat qui poss~de un service juridique de droit international tr~sfort est un Etat qui donne beaucoup d'importance et fait attention au droitinternational. Or, certains Etats negligent cet aspect. M. Hans Corell s'estd'ailleurs occup6 de cette question l'ann~e pass~e. Je crois que ce seraittr~s utile pour l'ceuvre des Nations Unies de faire une recommandation itous les Etats en faveur du renforcement de leur service juridique de droitinternational et ceci pour pouvoir suivre l'ceuvre des Nations Unies d'unemani~re satisfaisante. Ce serait dans l'int6r& des Nations Unies, maisaussi dans l'intr& de tous les Etats et dans l'int~ret du droit international.Je ne pense pas que ce soit la Commission du droit international qui pour-rait faire une telle recommandation, mais un autre organe des NationsUnies pourrait le faire avec une certaine facilit6, et ce serait vraiment untexte de daclaration tout i fait pertinent et utile.

M. Alain Pellet9 1 . Un petit point de dMtail d'abord stir ce qu'a ditM. Yves Daudet en ce qui concerne l'objet et le but du trait6. Quandje disqu'il faut examiner ce problkme, il faut bien s'entendre. Dans mon esprit,il n'est pas question de remettre en cause la notion, mais simplementd'essayer de comprendre ce qu'elle veut dire et ce qu'elle cache, et aprtson pourra se demander si, par hasard, mais ce serait extraordinaire, il fau-drait la remettre en cause.

J'ai trouv6 intiressant tout ce qui s'est dit ce matin, j'ai eu un choc,le choc d'une r~v~lation extraordinaire, lorsque M. Vaughan Lowe a ex-pliqu6 que la damarche anglaise 6tait proche de la damarche frangaise. Jedois dire que c'est quelque chose d'extremement nouveau pour moi et les


dibats de ce matin n'en donnent pas I'exemple. Je voudrais dire quelquesmots sur trois problmes de la codification: I'objet, la m~thode et le pro-duit.

En ce qui conceme l'objet, je crois que I'on devrait essayer d'etre unpeu modeste etj'ai toujours kti tres choqu6, quelque fois exasp~r6, par lamanie de certains coll~gues de vouloir a tout prix suivre des modes. Jepense fondamentalement qu'on devrait partir du principe de subsidiarit6.C'est-i-dire que la Commission ne devrait faire que ce pour quoi elle estmieux equip~e que d'autres organes. Mais l'id~e que nous nous occu-pions de tout et de n'importe quoi, parce que c'est dans l'air, comme onI'a dit plusieurs fois, est une idie tout i fait critiquable. Je fais partie deceux qui, par exemple, consid~rent que nous ne sommes pas equips pournous occuper directement du droit de 1'environnement. Nous demanderde faire un texte sur le droit de 1'environnement me parait absurde.Comme l'a dit il y a un instant M. Constantin Economides, nous ne som-mes pas intellectuellement 6quip&s pour cela, m~me si certains d'entrenous connaissent le droit de 1'environnement, l'arrire-plan 6conomiqueet technique est trop scientifique, trop important pour qu'un groupe de34 personnes, aussi 6minentes soient-elles, puisse s'en occuper. Nous nesommes pas 6quip6s pour cela et ce n'est pas raisonnable de soutenir cegenre de thise ind~finiment. J'ai un peu le meme sentiment i l'6gard desdroits de l'homme. Je ne crois pas que nous puissions faire mieux darscette matiere que d'autres organes qui sont 1U pour 9a. Je pense queM. Lowe sous-estime gravement un certain nombre de problmes damles propositions qu'il a faites. II sous-estime notre manque de moyens in-tellectuels, ce n'est pas de l'autocritique, c'est sinplement une consta-tation. Comme l'a dit le mod6rateur, on ne peut pas tout savoir et si noussavons quelque chose c'est du droit international public g~n6ral. C'estautour de cela que doivent toumer nos projets futurs. Je pense queM. Lowe sous-estime aussi l'absence d'6quipement technique, notre sta-tut pr~voit que nous pouvons consulter des experts, mais, M. Corell I'atr~s bien dit, il n'y a pas d'argent, et les experts ce sont les gem les pluschers du monde et je pense que des experts au rabais, par des conversa-tions de couloirs comme cela a 6t6 propose, ne nous permettront pas demettre au point s!rieusement un projet entier sur des sujets qui sont en de-hors de notre 6quipement intellectuel.

Un troisi~me 616ment sur lequel je pense que M. Lowe sous-estimele probleme c'est le tres grand conservatisme de la Commission. Noussommes des juristes et les juristes sont des conservateurs, presque par es-sence. J'tais un peu abasourdi F'an demier de voir i quel point le petitpas, que je croyais un pas en avant, que j'avais propos6, en recomman-dant i la Commission d'adopter un projet de r6solution, s'est heurt6 i uneopposition presque unanime de la part de gens que je considere commeextr~mement conservateurs et qui sont mes collgues. On ne peut pasdam ces conditions nous demander de faire trop de choses extravagantes

ou des tours d'6quilibre. Partant de la reaction presque unanimement n6-gative et extr~mement conservatrice de la Commission i ma propositiond'adopter une r~solution, il faut comprendre que cet organe n'est pas pr~ti aller tr~s en avant dans l'originalit6 et la recherche de solutions novatri-ces. Est-ce une raison pour 6liminer tout une sr~ie de sujets tr~s impor-tants, comme les droits de I'homme et le droit de 1'environnement, de te-nir la Commission i lI'cart de cela ? Je ne crois pas, mais je crois qu'ilfaudrait les introduire par la petite porte. I faudrait que la Commissionsoit modeste en admettant qu'elle ne peut pas prendre l'initiative de r6-gler ces questions. Mais, par contre, elle peut proposer son expertise, sonsavoir-faire en droit international g~n~ral, par exemple en acceptant quelui soient soumis, pour expertise au point de vue du droit international,des textes 61aborts par des organes sptcialists comme la Commissiondes droits de l'homme ou le Programme des Nations Unies pour l'en-vironnement ou m~me la Banque mondiale. Peut-etre que nous pourrionsdonner un avis autoris6 en ce qui concerne la technique juridique et celame parait beaucoup plus astucieux, beaucoup plus conforme A notre vo-cation que de nous lancer dans des sujets qui me semblent en dehors denos compktences.

Par ailleurs, je considre que le sujet cher i M. Lowe n'est pas un su-jet trs appropri6 en ce qui concerne la Commission parce que ce qui im-porte dans les sanctions 6conomiques c'est d'essayer de voir comment onpeut limiter les retomb~es antihumanitaires de sanctions 6conomiques,tout en sanctionnant l'Etat responsable d'une violation grave du droit in-ternational et j'ose dire responsable d'un crime international. Ce sont desprobl~mes tr~s concrets qui, encore une fois, ne me paraissent pas 8tre di-rectement de notre competence. Par contre, on pourrait envisager queI'Assemblee generale ou le Conseil de sdcurit6 crde un organe intergou-vememental et que cet organe nous consulte sur certains aspects propre-ment juridiques et techniques du sujet, mais traiter le sujet lui mime neme parait pas appropri6.

De meme, et pour d'autres raisons, j'ai des doutes sur la propositionde M. Gerhard Hafher concernant la juridiction extraterritoriale. C'est unsujet qui, A mon avis, correspond A notre 6quipement intellectuel. Cecidit, on le sait, les oppositions entre les Etats, la position trs rigide et, imon avis, parfaitement inacceptable, prise par la seule superpuissance, enclair les Etats-Unis, dans ce domaine, font qu'on soul6vera de telles va-gues et de telles oppositions et passions politiques que, personnellement,tout en 6tant intellectuellement convaincu que nous pouvons traiter ce su-jet, je pense, pour les raisons que je viens d'exposer, que ce ne serait pasun bon choix. Alors, par contre je pense que la proposition de M. Daudet,qui consiste A dire que nous pourrions nous lancer dans une restatementdu droit international public, est une proposition assez intrressante quenous pourrions peut-8tre mettre en ceuvre trs lentement, en pr~venantque cela ne pourra 8tre qu'une ceuvre i trs long terme, un peu comme le

dictionnaire de l'Acad6mie franqaise, qui fait que si on adopte quelquesarticles chaque ann6e c'est bien. 11 y a d'ailleurs d~ji une base, ce sont lesgrands trait~s comme ]a Convention de Vienne sur le droit des trait~s oules grands projets comme celui sur la responsabilit6. On pourrait develop-per tout ceci d'une faqon qui, au fond, n'engagerait que la Commission,mais ce serait une oeuvre doctrinale int~ressante.

Ie ne suis pas d'accord avec M. Lowe lorsqu'il dit que le syst~mejuridique international, comme tout systeme juridique, comporte peu deprincipes g~ndraux, qui sont d6ja largement trait6s. La Commission ad'ailleurs fait un recensement en 1996, il est vrai un peu bicl6, un peu ra-pide, mais malgr6 tout un recensement de tous les grands sujets qui res-tent i traiter et on s'est aperqu qu'il y en a encore beaucoup.

Deuxi~me point, la m6thode. I1 a 6 dit qu'il fallait que nous nousconcertions avec d'autres organes. M. Daudet nous a flicit6 pour 'ini-tiative de 1'an demier. Je serais, 6videmment, le dernier i le contester etjerappelle que noire statut le pr6voit : l'article 25 § 1 et I'article 26 § 1 nousinvitent a consulter des organes etje crois qu'il faut que nous le fassions.Ce qui est int6ressant c'est que les autres organes ont l'air de s'affoler dece qu'on leur demande et, apparemment, ont l'air encore plus onusiensque nous le sommes, c'est-i-dire encore plus prudents et suspicieux. Lesquelques r6actions que j'ai reques pour l'instant sont, honntement, par-faitement inint6ressantes. J'esp~re que les organes en question vont sedcider i discuter vraiment sur les questions qu'on leur a pos6es. Pourl'instant, ils ont les manies des Nations Unies qui consistent i en dire lemoins possible, ce qui n'est pas tr~s satisfaisant I1 faudrait aussi faire lad6marche contraire, c'est-i-dire que nous soyons consult6s par d' autres.Je crois que M. Abdulai Sayed nous a dit que la Commission du droit in-ternational souffrait de dualit6, il a W poh, il n'a pas dit de schizophr~nie.Je defendrais assez cette schizophrnie ou dualit&, dans le sens d'unecomposition duale de la Commission, avec, d'une part, des universitaireset, d'autre part, des conseillers de gouvemement, nous ne sommes d'ail-leurs pas tous des conseillers de gouvemernent actifs, et, si on l'est, c'esti titre de consultants. Je crois donc que cette dualit6 est utile. C'est int6-ressant d'avoir, au sein m~me de la Commission, un point de vue univer-sitaire et acadimique, dontje suis un des exemples, et puis des personnesqui connaissent le syst~me et qui peuvent mettre en garde sur des envo-lies lyriques de professeurs qui peuvent conduire quelques fois a des ca-tastrophes. Ce que je regrette, par contre, c'est que cette dualit6 soit d6s6-quih'br~e, il y a 9 professeurs pour 25 conseillers, ministres, anciensministres, etje dois dire que c'est un peu dommage, d'autant plus que, iquelques rares exceptions pros, les professeurs sont essentiellement occi-dentaux, ceci d6s~quilibre un peu la Commission. Par contre, M. Sayedsemble oublier que la Commission est un organe au service de la commu-naut6 intemationale des Etats, nous sommes une cr6ation d'un organe in-tergouvememental, de 'Assembl6e g6n6rale, nous sommes au service

des Etats et je crois que nous servons les Etats en 6tant effectivement in-dtpendants mais en faisant attention i ce qu'ils racontent. Je fais partie deceux qui consid~rent que nous devons i la fois rester indtpendants, main-tenir notre indtpendance intellectuelle, mais en m8me temps pr~ter laplus grande attention i ce qui se dit au sein des autres organes. Par contre,je ne suis pas content lorsque je trouve que les autres organes, en particu-iier la Sixibme Commission, ne sont pas strieux et ceci arrive extrtme-ment souvent. Je pense qu'A la Sixi~me Commission on manie la languede bois, qu'on ne rtfltchit pas etje dois dire que je rtagis tr~s violemmenten disant d'accord, demandez-nous de faire attention ce que nous di-sons, de faire attention i ce qui se dit dans les organes intergouvememen-taux, cela me parait tout i fait normal, mais i condition que cela soit ditstrieusement, et je n'en ai pas toujours le sentiment.

Dernier point en ce qui concerne le produit du travail de la Conmmis-sion. J'ai relev6 un assez large accord sur le fait qu'il n'est pas ntcessaireque le travail de la Commission se traduise par des traitts. Saufnotre col-lgue, M. Economides, qui dit que nous baisserions la barre au niveaud'un ouvrage de doctrine. Avec tout le respect dfi, je suis en disaccordavec lui. Je crois qu'on ne baisse pas la barre. D'abord, il vaut mieux quece soit nous qui la baissions plut6t que de laisser l'Assemblde gtn~rale labaisser. Par exemple, s'il arrivait , la responsabilit6 ce qui est arriv6 i laclause de la nation la plus favoriste, ce serait beaucoup plus ennuyeuxque si nous prenons l'initiative de dire que nous considrons qu'il n'estpas utile que ce soit un trait6. Mais peut-8tre que c'est une ceuvre doctri-nale, mais une ceuvre doctrinale trs particulire du fait justement de cequi donne i la Commission son caract~re irremplagable, c'est-i-dire cetaller-retour avec les organes intergouvemementaux, avec les Etats. Etceci, je crois, est absolument irremplagable, comme l'a dit M. Daudet,c'est notre lkgitimit6, et c'est quelque chose que nous devons cultiver etgarder i l'esprit. Alors, ce large accord qui est en train d'6merger sur lefait qu'au fond on n'a pas besoin, i tout prix, de rdiger des conventionsest int~ressant, meme si M. Daudet nous a mis en garde contre un effet debalancier excessif. Mais, je crois que de nombreuses solutions sont possi-bles. Par exemple, on a parlk de guides de la pratique, de directives, de d&clarations, vers lesquels nous nous acheminons dji, mais par exempleaussi la mixit6. Personnellement, je suis partisan des ( z~bres juridi-ques >, c'est-i-dire de l'idde qu'on peut trs bien avoir sur certains sujetsdes parties qui se pretent i une conventionnalisation et des parties qui nes'y pr~tent pas. Au fond avec les reserves aux trait~s, c'est ce que l'on vaavoir, puisqu'il est acquis que nous faisons un guide de la pratique et quoce guide de la pratique va s'appuyer sur quatre articles d'une convention.Donc, on aura un r6gime juridique mixte, qui sera i la fois conventionnel,s'appuyant sur les articles 19 et suivants de la Convention sur le droit destrait~s, et en meme temps un r6gime recommandatoire, soft meme si celadaplait i certains, etje pense que c'est satisfaisant. Sur la responsabilit6,

je crois que c'est le Gouvernement autrichien qui a propose quelquechose de ce genre en disant qu'on pourrait peut-8tre avoir, d'une part, soitune diclaration de principe, soit meme un trait& avec les principes clks etpuis, un guide de la pratique qui serait un projet d'articles comment6.

Voil, j'en ai termin6. J'ai lanc6 quelques ides qu'on aura l'oc-casion d'approfondir au sein de la Commission, la semaine prochaineavec le Groupe de planification.

M. Mohamed Bennouna'". M. Alam Pellet vient de dire qu'il ya une proportion de 9 professeurs seulement par rapport aux 34 membresde la Commission. Peut- tre que ces professeurs compensent en parlanttrois fois plus que les autres, alorsje ne vais pas parler trop longtemps. Jedirais d'abord que je suis d'accord, si itonnant que cela puisse paraitre,avec beaucoup des choses mentionnes par M. Pellet et notamment le faitque nous sommes des ginraIstes. Pour faire la comparaison avec lemonde m&Iical, il y a les internistes, c'est-i-dire ceux qui font la syn-thise, qui ont une vue g6nrale; nous sommes g~n~ralistes, je suis enti6-rement d'accord li-dessus, nous devons nous tenir i cette vue globale dudroit international public g6ndral. Nous sommes des conservateurs, pro-bablement, mais nous le sommes parce qu'il faut du temps, il faut une d-cantation pour pouvoir se prononcer sur des questions aussi complexes etaussi difficiles qui mettent en cause le monde entier. Nous ne sommes pasen train de traiter de problfmes notariaux, pour l'achat d'un immeuble oud'une 6picerie, il est donc tout a fait normal, i mon avis, de se donner letemps. Si on doit dicider de la responsabilit6 des Etats, de problkmesconcemant les accords entre pays, il faut se donner le temps, le temps estun iliment essentiel. C'est justement pour cela que je n'ai pas compnsl'intervention de M. Hans Corell, je m'en excuse. II est venu nous direqu'il est manager, qu'il y a des problimes d'argent aux Nations Unies, ons'en serait dout6, et que nous cofitons trop cher. Alors, en tout cas en tantqu'experts, je peux rassurer M. Corell, nous ne cofitons pas tris cher, pasassez cher au gofit de beaucoup d'entre nous, 6tant donn6 le rapporttemps-qualit:, entre la qualite des personnes qui sont ici et la remuntra-tion qui est la n6tre, certains ont d'ailleurs voulu y renoncer. Et je peuxrassurer M. Corell que, personnellement, je suis prt i y renoncer, avecd'autres ici presents, si cela peut aider les Nations Unies. Mais en r~alite,ce qui cofite cher, semble-t-il, dans cette reunion ce sont les traducteurs,c'est l'interpr~tariat, avec tout le respect que j'ai pour leur travail. Cen'est quand meme pas la faute de la Commission s'iI y a cinq ou six lan-gues officielles. Alors, M. Corell ne doit pas s'adresser i la Commissionpour 9a, il doit s'adresser i d'autres organes des Nations Unies qui sontdisposes i rduire ces langues. Apr~s tout, la Cour internationale de Jus-tice fonctionne sur deux langues. Maintenant, je ne comprends pas non

I" Ancien rnernbre de a Commission du droit international, 1987-1998.

plus M. Corell quand il nous dit qu'ii faudrait travailler comme on tra-vaille dans des entreprises. Alors, je regrette, il s'est tromp6 d'endroit, determes de r~f~rences, de dtlais, d'6valuations du travail avec un tempsd~termini pour le rendre. Et bien, ce n'est pas 9a, autrement il faut nouspayer beaucoup plus cher et i temps plein. Nous ne sommes pas iIlaCommission i temps plein, nous venons ici en tant que volontaires etnous faisons un travail dans lequel nous considirons qu'il y a une part demorale et d'6thique, c'est-i-dire un engagement 6thique de notre part.Nous sommes ici en tant qu'orgarnsme travaillant sur le long terme, ef-fectivement, un organisme que l'Organisation se paye, et heureusementqu'elle se le paye, parce qu'il y a beaucoup d'organes au sein des NationsUnies qui ne servent vraiment i rien, qui cofitent beaucoup plus cher quela Commission du droit international et qui passent leur temps i des 6lu-cubrations de nature politique. Que l'Organisation se paye cet organepour faire la jonction entre l'thique et le pouvoir, comme dirait GeorgesScelle, pour essayer de dagager des grandes lignes dans le droit et dans lelong terme, je pense que c'est une excellente chose. Il y a eu un inspecteurdes Nations Unies, M. Bertrand, qui dans son 6valuation des NationsUnies avait estim6 que, s'il y avait un organe incontestable dans l'Or-ganisation, ce serait la Commission du droit international. I faut arr~terde revenir vers la Commission avec ces critiques daplaces.

11 y a peut-8tre une chose dans ce qu'a dit M. Ahmed Mahiou, quireprend une remarque faite, en son temps, par Roberto Ago, qui consiste idire que les temps changent et la Commission a fonctionn6 en une p&riode de guerre froide, de division Nord-Sud, d'affrontement, elle fonc-tionne aujourd'hui dans un contexte different. Cela est vrai etje crois quedepuis les annes 90 la Commission va avoir aussi, comme la plupart desorganes des Nations Unies, i prendre en compte le fait que nous sommesdas un autre monde et que nous devons probablement fonctionner diff6-remment et probablement que le besoin en conventions n'est plus lem~me et qu'une adaptation de notre travail aux temps nouveaux est n6-cessaire.

Sur un plan pratique, quand aux sujets proposes, je crois qu'il fautque la Commission se situe i un juste milieu entre ]a doctrine qu'ellen'est pas et le lgislateur qu'elle n'est pas non plus. C'est pour cela quejene suis pas tellement favorable i une relecture, parce que ce n'est pas lelieu, il ne faut pas nous ramener i un organe doctrinal, il y a pour celal'lnstitut de droit international. Je ne suis pas, non plus, favorable au faitde prendre la place des Etats, il faut qu'on soit ce lien entre la doctrine etles Etats. Pour ma part, sur ce qui a 6t propose, explorer des sujets entrele droit international public et priv6, c'est-i-dire entre droit interne etdroit international, serait une excellente chose pour la Commission il'avenir. Je crois que, avec la mondialisation et toutes ses consequences,nous sommes dans un monde oii les choses vont, de plus en plus, 8tre en-trem~les. II faut que nous allions voir ce qui se passe dans les relations

entre le droit international public et le droit interne, je crois que Von at-tend cela de nous. Peut-8tre que la corruption, qui est un sujet qui est re-venu tellement souvent, ou la multiplicit6 des juridictions sont des sujetsqui sont interessants de ce point de vue. I1 ne faut pas oublier, parexemple, que des sujets sont trait~s au sein de diffirents organes sansqu'il y ait viritablement de coordination. Par exemple, l'organe de rigle-ment des diff~rends de l'Organisation mondiale du commerce traite decontre-mesures au moment of, nous aussi, nous traitons de contre-mesures. Une prise en compte de cela est n~cessaire. De meme la relationentre la future cour p~nale intemationale et la Cour internationale de Jus-tice est un sujet qui devrait donner lieu i r~flexion pour l'avemr.

Mr. Igor Ivanovich Lukashuk" (translated from Russian). Iasked for the floor simply to react to what I deemed a very interesting re-mark by Mr. Abdulai Sayed. As you know, he touched on the most im-portant area of our work. We are not idealists or professors, we are not cutoff from real life, we study the practice of States most attentively. How-ever, at the same time the Governments do not always understand us.Why? Well, I think that it is perfectly simple. Our basic approach is abouthow international law ought to be, in terms of real life, what Govern-ments do. They are basically guided by their own narrowly viewed na-tional interest and look at what would be good in a convention or not. Ev-ery year, the General Assembly adopts a resolution saying that thereneeds to be closer coordination between the Sixth Committee and theCommission. What does this mean? That we have to take greater accountof the views of Governments, and so it seems to me that this question issomething that deserves discussion at our meetings, and maybe we couldeven set up a special group for that.

M. Yves Daudet. Je me suis souci6 de la question du morcelle-ment, de l'parpillement du droit international et par consequent du r6leque la Commission pourrait jouer en mati&e de promotion et de develop-pement du droit international gdndral. Je dirais que la Commission pour-rait Etre un peu comme un ciment. Je rejoins ce qu'a dit tout i l'heureM. Alain Pellet, c'est une question que je m'6tais moi-m~me posse. Com-ment la Commission pourrait-elle se situer par rapport aux autres organestechniques qui travaillent sur des questions plus particulinres ? C'est unequestion qui n'est pas sans rappeler la situation de la Cour intemationalede Justice par rapport i d'autres juridictions et certains juges se sont 6musde cette situation de risque d'6parpillement du droit international etavaient mene imagini qu'on pourrait avoir un syst&ne qui rappelerait unpetit peu, toutes choses 6gales par ailleurs, 'article 177 du Traiti deRome et le recours prijudiciel, adapt6 bien entendu. C'est un peu la


meme ide qu'exprime M. Alain Pellet en disant que les organes techni-ques pourraient nous consulter sur les aspects de droit international g~n6-ral. C'est probablement une bonne id6e qui pose tout de mime, i monavis, une question que je pose respectueusement aux membres de la Com-mission :

Est-ce que vous ne craignez pas qu'on vous reproche de vous placerdans une situation hi~rarchique, qui serait peut-Etre mal v6cue par tel outel organe, qui n'accepterait pas tr~s volontiers de voir sa copie corrig6e il'encre rouge des professeurs de la Commission ?

Mr. Vaughan Lowe. My point is basically the same. I think thatthe key to it and the point that unites practically everyone is that if theCommission can adopt a more limited conception of its role and see thatin terms of cooperation with other bodies. The Commission does not nec-essarily have to consult experts in order to enter itself into the codifica-tion of a particular field, but rather work along with experts to make itsown contribution in the areas where it can best make such contributions.And I agree with Mr. Yves Daudet that the crucial contribution that it canmake is holding together the cohesion of the international legal system asbetween divergent tendencies in different regions of the world and in dif-ferent subject-matter regimes. This, I think, is where the future of theCommission lies.

Mr. Hans Corell. I would like to say that, obviously, I must haveexpressed myself in such a way that Mr. Mohamed Bennouna misunder-stood me. I certainly have not said that the Commission costs too much orthat the Commission should work like a company. I simply wanted tobring into this discussion the realism of the Secretariat of the United Na-tions. These are questions that I am being asked by those who manage theAdministration. When we have a capped budget, and I have had the expe-rience of making the last two budgets for the legal department, the Ad-ministration caps the budget and then you are left on your own to fend foryourself within that cap. This means that I have to go around, within myown department, to see where the cuts are to be made. We are luckier thisyear because of the exchange rate between the Swiss franc and the UnitedStates dollar. If that rate changes we will have dramatic changes in thebudget of the Organization. I can assure you that I am really very con-cerned about that development. I can assure Mr. Bennouna that I am notat all suggesting that the Commission costs too much. I know that the re-muneration of the members of the Commission, by international stand-ards and by company standards, is very, very low, but do understand thatthere is a realistic exercise behind all this when we come to the prepara-tion of the budget.

M. Guillaume Pambou-Tchivounda. C'est le moment de con-clure cette cinqui me seance du s~minaire qui a port6 sur un th~me mobi-lisateur, nous en avons parlk toute la matinee, nous serions mime sur lepoint de commencer une cinqui~me seance bis, si cela 6tait possible.C'est donc dire tout l'int~ret qu'a pr~sent6 cette problmatique. Une pro-blmatique qui a men6 les uns et les autres i s'interroger sur les m~tho-des, j s'interroger sur l'ceuvre, sur les perspectives, car au fond c'est decela qu'il s'agit. Je crois que ces perspectives ne sont pas celles de laCommission mais bien celles du droit international. Je crains fort quecette question ne soit pas qu'une question de doctrine, qu'elle ne soit pasqu'une question de politiciens ou une question politique, mais une ques-tion qui intiresse tous ceux qui sont partie prenante i l'ouvrage que cons-titue le droit international. Je dirais que cet ouvrage est a la crois~e deschemins et c'est ce qui aura justifi6, prcis~ment, cette cinqui6me seancedans 'esprit de ceux qui ont conqu 'architecture de ce s~minaire. Je vou-drais saluer l'int~ret que les d6bats de ce matin ont pu susciter par rapport, cette question. I appartient d~sormais i la Commission du droit interna-tional de s'ajuster par rapport i cette probl~matique et ainsi certainementde donner espoir i tous les Etats et i tous les acteurs internationaux. Vousm'avez confi6 une tfche delicate quej'ai essay& de mener i terme de monmieux. Je voudrais remercier les conf~renciers qui ont fait apparaitredans leurs visions, certainement diff~rentes, des lignes de convergence.Je voudrais remercier les deux membres de la Commission qui ont ajoute,dans le meme sens de l'kluih bre, des convergences de vues. Je voudraisremercier toute la Commission et les d(lHgu6s qui ont bien voulu partici-per et apporter i la Commission leur vision, leur contribution par rapportA ce sujet. M. le Prsident, Messieurs les Conseillers, Mesdames, Mes-sieurs, je consid6re que la seance de ce matin est levee.

USES AND PERILS OF CODIFICATION

LES USAGES ET LES DANGERS DE LA CODIFICATION

Introduction by the Chairman,Mr. Igor Ivanovich Lukashuk 20o

Thank you all for coming to this session. I do not think I need tointroduce the members of this forum. You all know Mr. AwnAI-Khasawneh, our old friend, and one very experienced in the practiceand theory of international law. As for Mr. Georges Abi-Saab, it is diffi-cult to find a law book without quotations from his work; we all knowhim well. And our colleague, Mr. Didier Opertti-Badan, is not only atheoretician but a man of practice and experience. I am very thankful toyou for your participation.

I would, especially, like to invite the younger generation, not to sitquietly along the wall, but to participate in our discussion. We are very in-terested in your opinion, and, especially, I would be delighted to listen toour young ladies. The reason for this is that I believe that one of the rea-sons for the setbacks of our Commission is that the best part of human-kind is not represented. It is not our fault; we are ready to accept ladies inour Commission. It is the Governments. There are not many women whoare Heads of State, Prime Ministers, or Ministers of Foreign Affairs. OnlyMr. Robert Rosenstock works under the guidance of a female Secretaryof State. So, please do not be shy. If you have any opinion, we'll be gladto hear you and we will always be very attentive to you.

I now give the floor to Mr. Abi-Saab.


Presentation by Mr. Georges Abi-Saab 20

Thank you Mr. Chairman. It is a signal honour for me to be here to-day and to participate in this celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of theInternational Law Commission. It is a very nice anniversary because itstretches over three years. The resolution establishing the Commissionwas passed in 1947, the statute was adopted in 1948 and the first sessiontook place in 1949. So I already look forward to the next celebration.While acknowledging the honour, I am also a little diffident, as I amabout to speak under double or even triple jeopardy, as common-law law-yers say. First, because I was one of the rapporteurs at the earlier celebra-tion in the General Assembly last October,20 2 and it is very difficult to saysomething new on the same subject within six months. Secondly, I wassupposed to be the second speaker today, so I had hoped that my col-league, Mr. Hugh Thirlway, would say so much that I would only have topick one or two of his points and comment on them but, unfortunately, hefell ill. Thirdly, I was initially asked to draw some general conclusions,but when I received the programme I discovered that I am to speak aboutuses and perils of codification, a subject which should logically havecome at the beginning rather than at the end, after discussing the work ofthe Commission. Anyway, as a result, I propose to combine the two: Iwill start with a very brief flashback on the uses and perils of codifica-tion,21 3 which I will follow with a zoom forward, trying, in the light of therich debates we have had during these two days, to draw some conclu-sions as to the way forward for the Commission which would maximizethe uses and minimize the perils.

The uses and perils of codification

I would like to start with a few words about the meaning of codifica-tion. Do we define it by its origin or by its destination? By the input or bythe output? This is a very important question which was put forward veryearly in the history of the Commission by no lesser authority than my ownteacher, Sir Robert Jennings, in his famous article in the British Yearbook

201 Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva; Global Professor, New York

University Law School.202 Georges Abi-Saab, la Commission du droit international, la codification et le pro-

cessus de formation du droit international, Making Better International Law: The Interna-tional Law Commission at 50, Proceedings of the United Nations Colloquium on Progres-sive Development and Codification of International Law (1998) (United Nationspublication, Sales No. E/F.98.V.5), p. 181-200.

203 I have treated this subject at some length at the New York Colloquium, ibid.

of International Law of 1947.2" For him, codification is the production ofa code, which means a complete system of rules covenng an importantsubject or an important field of law. For Sir Robert Jennings, therefore, itis really the output that defines codification. It is the architectural activitydefined by the ensuing edifice rather than the building blocks used to con-struct it. This is not a moot question. If we go by input, codification wouldbe limited to working with pre-existing legal material, though the distinc-tion which appears in article 15 of the statute of the Commission betweencodification and progressive development has proved very early on in thework of the Commission to be impracticable. In fact, as soon as itbroached its first important endeavour, the law of the sea, it declared thatit would not even try to distinguish one from the other. The difference be-tween them is a question of degree, for once one intervenes on unwrittenlaw to transform it into written law, there is a "value added", which is anelement of legislation. It is a question of degree, of how far the interven-tion goes.

If we look at codification as output, it is very important in evaluatingthe work of the Commission to note that it has concentrated-as codifica-tion in this sense should-on large edifices of law, on architectural effortsrather than acting like a mechanic who deals with one specific problem oranother. The difference is important because it distinguishes a body likethe Commission from, for example, a unit of advisory legal services towhich specific questions are submitted with the expectation of receivingspecific answers (including draft legal instruments).

What are the advantages of codification? As we all know, codifica-tion makes law more visible and more clear--more visible, not only as toits content, but also as to its very existence. If it is visible, clear and acces-sible, it will be more widely used. Someone, in a small country, in a dis-tant place, would not easily find the applicable law if he has to look intotreaties, precedent and State practice and so on. But if he has the Interna-tional Law Commission's handbook, The Work of the International LawCommission, 20 5 with all the different conventions and drafts, he will beable to find the legal answers to his query. In a way, codification bringslaw more closely into the daily life of the legal community. Moreover, byassociating the representatives of new States in the elaboration of thesecodes, it makes the product more acceptable to them even if its originspredate their creation, and may even overcome their reluctance to acceptthird-party judicial or arbitral settlement. If the codification is done bytreaty, there may be another advantage, which is, in fact, a mixed bless-ing, namely, that the basis of obligation of the rules changes. The instru-

204 R, Y. Jennings, "The Progressive Development of International Law and its Codi-fication", British Yearbook oflnternational Law, vol. 24 (1947), p. 302.

205 See the most recent The Work of the International Low Commission, fifth edition(1996) (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.95.V.6).

ment itself provides the basis of obligation of the rules, defines the partiesbound by them and may even contain dispute settlement procedures.However, as we know, this is a double-edged sword.

Interestingly enough, these advantages, as summarily as I have pre-sented them, all relate, not so much to the substance of the rules, as to theworking of the international legal system itself. They perfect the legalsystem by making it more visible, more predictable and, to this extent,more efficient (or workable). As early as 1911, Mr. Elihu Root wrote in theAmerican Journal of International Law the following about codification:

"To codify municipal law is to state in systematic form, the re-sult of the law-making process already carried on by a nationthrough its established institutional fora. To codify international lawis primarily to set in motion and promote the law-making process it-self, in the community of nations, in which the institutional fora, ap-propriate for the carrying on of such a process, have been so vague,indistinct and irregular that they could hardly be said to exist ataU,,206

What are the disadvantages of codification? The first is the dangerdepicted by the famous "strangling theory": law is a living phenomenonand a direct social emanation. The fact of capturing it in written form ar-rests its development and strangles it by immobilizing its movement.This is true if codification is badly done, but, if it is done at a certain levelof generality and flexibility allowing for adjustment and adaptation, thenthere is no reason for such a fear. More serious is the very widespread ar-gument about the potentially destructive effect of codification on custom(always illustrated by the famous example of the three-miles limit in the1930 Conference): we enter the Conference with the impression thatthere is a rule and we come out of it with the impression that there hasnever been, or at least there is no longer, a rule, that is, if no agreement isreached. If partial agreement is reached, then what is left out may be indanger. And, even if there is total agreement, it may have been reached atthe price of diluting the rule itself. These are real dangers, but they are notinsuperable; with good preparation, there is no reason why conferencesshould fail to adopt the conventions. As for partial agreement, the anti-dote is the inclusion of safeguard clauses, the most famous amongst thembeing the Martens clause in humanitarian law, which states that what has

206 Elihu Root, "The Function of Private Codification in International Law", Ameri-can Journal of International Law, vol. 5 (1911), p. 579. Fifty years later, Hart said almostthe same thing, when he wrote that international law has no secondary rules, but is a merecollection of primary rules. (H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford, the ClarendonPress (1961), p. 226). This is obviously wrong, but it reflects his representation of the struc-ture of international law which evokes Root's last remark. For a criticism of Hart's position,see G. Abi-Saab, cours g6niral de droit international public, 207 Recueil des cours(Academie de droit international) [1987 Vill, p. 122.

not been agreed upon in the adopted legal instrument remains subject tocustomary law, etc. As for the danger of dilution of the rule, it is a ques-tion of vigilance.

There is another current criticism of codification contending that itpoliticizes the law: rather than law developing through tribunals and law-yers, codification brings in, be it at the last stage, political representa-tives, which politicizes the process. However, this criticism reflects a ba-sic misunderstanding of the nature of legislation or law-making, which isessentially a political activity, from which States cannot be totally ex-cluded. Even if codification is to be undertaken by some neutral "legalpriests", in the end, the result has to be accepted by States, which cannotbe circumvented, while a good codification may convince States thattheir well-considered interest is in adopting it.

The great problem with codification, which is a real one, if the treatyroute is chosen, is that we end up with a dual regime. Sir HerschLauterpacht addressed this problem by saying that it all depends: if wewant spontaneous legislation (as in municipal law), then, of course, codi-fication is not the right way, but if we have a good codification, which isadhered to progressively, then, in reasonable time, it ends up command-ing general acceptance. A good example is that of the Geneva Conven-tions of 1949." 7 We have understood since then that the mere stayingpower of a good traiti-loi, purporting to express the law, structures the le-gal environment by creating legitimate expectations and ends up produc-ing what has been called by Mr. Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga2t ° the"generating effect of codification treaties",' meaning that it passes intocustom, becoming a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy, which projects itselfbeyond the conventional community.

The same reasoning applies mutatis mutandis to a codificationwhich would not take the form of a treaty, but of a declaratory resolution.However, the great difference is that, while avoiding the double regime,the basis of obligation remains elusive, having to be rooted in generalinternational law rather stopping at the instrument or the vehicle thatexpresses it.

The way forward

How does this very brief overview of the uses and perils of codifica-tion relate to the work of the Commission and its future prospects in thelight of the discussions we have had during these two days? This morn-

207 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, pp. 31, 85, 135 and 287.208 Former member of the International Law Commission, 1960-69.209 Eduardo Jinmnez de Arechaga, "International Law in the Past Third of a Century:

General Course of Public International Law", ibid. (1978), pp. 14-22.

ing, Mr. Gerhard Hafier ° said that the programme of work laid downfor the Commission at its inception has been covered, with the exceptionof three or four items. I think we all feel that the Commission has reacheda crucial juncture, where it has to take its bearings and perhaps try somenew directions. I am not speaking of a crisis. Not that I am afraid of Mr.Alain Pellet 2 '-in spite of the pervading syndrome I sense in this roomof "who is afraid of Alain Pellet"--but because I do believe that there isno real crisis, although we all have, or have had, a middle-age crisis ataround fifty. The Commission has done extremely well, even unexpect-edly so. Mr. Hafner also has mentioned epistemic communities and Iwould like to emphasize the epistemological effect of the Commission. Ithas contributed to a fundamental change in our perception and in our wayof handling international law. We now deal with international law aswritten law. We proceed from texts enunciating general rules, whilewhen I was a student we proceeded either from the doctrines of professorA, B or C or, if we were in an Anglo-Saxon university, from the SchoonerExchange,212 the Caroline2 .3 and a few other such cases. We now dealwith international law in a very different way and to a great extent that isthanks to the Commission and its achievements.

These achievements are the result of choices made by the Commis-sion as to the subject matter, the method of work and the type of finalproduct best suited for its endeavours. From the outset, it had to positionitself along several schedules, and managed progressively to achieve adelicate balance between their opposing poles, particularly between clar-ity and complexity; generality and specificity; the technical and the polit-ical (or extra-legal); and substantial progress and wider acceptance.

The Commission has, thus, chosen to work on subjects which arerelatively technical (without necessarily avoiding their politically contro-versial aspects), and it addressed them by formulating general normativepropositions at the level-along the schedule generality/specificity-ofoperational rules of general international law. It paid little (or less) atten-tion to general principles with wider political implications, but which arenot operational by themselves (i.e., without further specification), al-though it drew the consequences of such principles in the operationalrules it formulated in the more technical fields, such as the law of treatiesand State responsibility. On the other hand, the Commission also has suc-cessfully avoided the extreme level of specificity and redundant detailthat frequently besets Anglo-American drafting (and which correspondsto and sometimes even goes beyond the level of internal regulations-rdglements d'exicution-in municipal law).

210 Member ofthe International Law Commission, 1997-.211 Member ofthe International Law Commission, 1989-.212 The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, I I U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).213 The Caroline Case, Moore's Digest and International Law, vol. II, p. 412 (1906).

There is a limit, however, to the type of normative substance theCommission has been handling. It has processed a good part of it. In eco-nomic terms, we could say that it may be approaching the stage of dimin-ishing returns if it continues concentrating on the same type of normativematerial (which I will shortly define). Put differently, it runs the risk ofdecreasing relevance, considering that different types of legal issues aredrawing more attention and given greater importance. This takes usback to the question raised by Mr. Hans Corell" 4 this morning of the po-litical visibility and saleability of the product as an enabling conditionfor undertaking its production. What should the Commission do? Andhow?

The progressive development of international law and its codifica-tion is part of the global strategy of the United Nations Charter to promotethe rule of law in the international society (Article 13). It can be doneeither by making explicit the structure and thickening the texture of theinternational legal system--working through existing material--or byextending law's empire to uncharted areas, which is ex nihilo legisla-tion. Where does the International Law Commission stand in this generalstrategy?

Contemporary international law can be classified into three relevantcategories. The first encompasses the constitutive principles, which oc-cupy, to some extent, the place of the fundamental rules in any legal sys-tem, similar to that of the constitution of a State. Beyond or, rather, belowthem, there are two different categories of law: one is the law of currentinternational transactions and relations. Mr. Vaughan Lowe21 5 called ittransactional law and Mr. Hafner synallagmatic law. This is law based onreciprocity, exchange of considerations, etc. The other category of lawcan be called the law of cooperation, in other words, the law based oncommonalities, law proceeding from common interests and common val-ues. The difference betweeii transactional law and the law of cooperationis that the former tries to regulate situations where the parties are in a"zero sum game" type of relations, whilst the law of cooperation regu-lates "non-zero sum game" situations.

The Commission has concentrated on the second layer oftransactional law, which occupied the bulk of every book of internationallaw up to the 1950s. The general principles are covered (if at all) in a fewpages, including in the eighth edition of Oppenheim, published in 1955.The general principles are included because they are important for thelogical coherence of the system. They are not treated, however, as opera-tive rules. In fact, the great contribution of the United Nations has been totry to make explicit these rules and render them more constraining as le-

214 The Legal Counsel of the United Nations.215 Reader in International Law, University of Cambridge, and Fellow of Corpus

Christi College, Cambridge; Barrister, Essex Court Chambers. London.

gal reality. Unfortunately, although this process had started in the Com-mission, with its early work on the rights and duties of States and the firstversion of the Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind,the final product came from special commissions, as graphically illus-trated by the Friendly Relations Declaration.. 6 and the definition of ag-gression. These escaped the Commission, which concentrated on the sec-ond layer, as I have already said, and there we are reaching the point ofdiminishing returns because most of it has already been processed.

As to the third layer, it covers such subjects as human rights, the en-vironment, even international criminal law, which is also based on com-mon values through sanctioning their violations, as well as the perceivedgrowing needs for devising the structures of common management ofnew technologies that cannot be treated only on a commercial basis. TheCommission has not worked much in these fields, with the notable excep-tion of the Draft Statute of the International Criminal Court.2 ' The rea-son may be that the legal regulation of these fields cannot be purely nor-mative, but has to be institutional as well because of the crucial role ofmonitoring procedures therein, and the fact that methods of preventionand avoidance are much more appropriate than the traditional ones ofpeaceful settlement of disputes.

At this juncture, the Commission should try to position itself againin relation to these three categories and consider what best can be done ineach of them. Mr. Lowe reminded us that, contrary to the general impres-sion, the task of the Commission, as stated in article 1/1 of its statute, isnot "the progressive development of international law and its codifica-tion", but "the promotion" of these activities, which do not have to be car-ried out exclusively by the Commission, particularly where the subjectmatter calls for specialized non-legal expertise or for greater political in-put?

Clearly, the Commission has no monopoly over these activities(which can be loosely called the "legislative" or "quasi-legislative" func-tion of the United Nations), nor is it capable of undertaking all of them,even if it wanted to. Where should it then concentrate its efforts and whatkind of division of labour should it promote, with a view to producing thebest total effect?

Coming back to the tripartite classification of contemporary interna-tional law, I do not think that what I have just said necessarily implies, in

216 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and

Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations: GeneralAssembly resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970.

217 See the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the UnitedNations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an Interna-tional Criminal Court on 17 July 1998; for text of the Rome Statute, see documentA/CONF.183/9.

answer to these queries, that the Commission should relinquish the con-stitutive principles and the law of cooperation and continue to confine it-self to the law of international transactions and relations. Nor does itmean that it has to labour over them in the same manner or to the same de-gree as it does in its choice field of transactional law. The role of theCommission can be different, but, in my submission, should not benon-existent.

Indeed, it would be a pity for the Commission to shy away com-pletely from the constitutive principles, which are the backbone of the in-ternational legal system, while having in any case to deal with their con-sequences in any subject it has to handle. To me, the argument that theyare too political is not convincing. Political here simply means that theyare controversial. But we have seen in the course of our debates that evenostensibly technical subjects, such as State immunities, can be highlycontroversial. I agree with what Mr. Pellet said in this regard, that it is thematurity of the subject for being formulated in normative terms ratherthan the controversialism of its subject matter that should command thechoice. The changes taking place in the world compel us to reconsider theconstitutive principles and reinterpret them against this rapidly changingbackground, as the Friendly Relations Declaration did a quarter of a cen-tury after the adoption of the United Nations Charter.

I realize that this may be a delicate political exercise, but the Com-mission can undertake it in collaboration with a political (or representa-tive) organ designated for that purpose, producing, for an example, a firsttechnical rendering (possibly with alternative formulations) that wouldbe examined later by the political organ, as it can examine the output ofthe political organ before its final adoption, with a view to ensuring legalcoherence and workability.

I also think that the Commission should not stay completely out ofthe third category, the law of cooperation which is the largest field of ex-pansion of international law (unlike the constitutive principles which areby their very nature limited and infrequently revisited), even though it re-quires a different approach to legal regulation. It calls for exercises inwhat can be called "virtual legality", like virtual reality, in the sense thatthe Commission has to devise, almost from scratch, complete new re-gimes, including important institutional designs for new phenomena.This may call for extra-legal know-how, owing to the subject matter, forwhich the Commission can solicit external individual or institutional ex-pertise, while concentrating on the legal architecture. Of course, such anexercise partakes more of legislation than of codification and progressivedevelopment But if the Commission is solicited (as it was for the DraftStatute of the International Criminal Court), or an opportunity arises for itto offer its services, and if there is a widely perceived need for such a re-gime, there is every reason to expect the offer as well as the final product

to be well received, and even for the Commission to obtain the materialsupport needed for this purpose.

The International Law Commission should not be absent from anyof the three categories, though the degree of its implication in each ofthem may vary widely. This also is dictated by the unique position it oc-cupies within the United Nations structure. For while it is true that, ac-cording to Article 13 of the United Nations Charter, the function of "en-couraging the progressive development of international law and itscodification" is the responsibility of the General Assembly, it also is truethat the General Assembly has entrusted this task principally to, or ratherdischarges it principally through, the instrumentality of the InternationalLaw Commission. The Commission is, thus, the only United Nations per-manent organ that is exclusively devoted to this task, be it a subsidiary or-gan working under the authority of the General Assembly (the Economicand Social Council is materially in the same position, in spite of its formalstatus as a "principal" organ of the Organization). Thus, substantially,though not formally, it is the principal specialized organ in charge of thistask within the United Nations.

As such, in addition to undertaking whatever it is best able to handleon the substantive level, the Commission is the only organ within the sys-tem which is in a position to play the pivotal role of attending to the nor-mative unity and coherence of the international legal order at the legisla-tive or quasi-legislative level, similarly to the International Court ofJustice on the adjudicative or interpretative level. But here, as with theCourt, the Commission has to be conscious of the necessity of filling thisrole (which is in search of an actor) and to aim at filling itby seizing on allthe opportunities to do so and by exercising leadership in this regardamong the diverse organs working in this field within and even beyondthe United Nations, not because of any formal hierarchy, which does notexist, but as a primus inter pares, deriving its authority from the qualityand the sagacity of its work and judgement.

In sum, in a fast-moving world, the Commission has to look for op-portunities and take the initiative. If the Commission always must have avery wide consensus over what already exists before even starting tomove, it will not keep up with the pace of changes in the world and willprogressively lose ground. This may be one of the perils of codificationthat it will encounter: the peril not of going too quickly but rather of beingtoo slow and, thus, losing in terms of credibility and significance.

Presentation by Mr. Didier Opertti-Badan 2i1, 219

Since the beginning of this morning's meeting, I have listened atten-tively and with some concern to the expression of doubt that has arisen inthe minds of certain members of the Commission, not so much with re-gard to its method of work or its aims, but with regard to its actual nature.I would like to underline a number of points relating to the uses and perilsof codification. I shall do this in the most Cartesian way possible: goingfrom the major to the minor, from the largest to the smallest. I would saythat it is a good idea for the Commission to ask itself in good faith, whatrole it has to play, what it is, what its nature is.

In my view, the Commission is a body which works within theUnited Nations system. It is not an isolated body; it is independent; it istechnical. Its members do not act within the Commission as representa-tives of their Governments, although obviously, depending on the levelof intellectual or diplomatic commitment they may have to their States,the members have to reflect their origins within the Commission. I thinkthat the fact that the Commission is composed of people from differentregions of the world is positive. Without looking at it in mathematicalterms of proportionality, I think that what is essential is whether the"cocktail" is a good one. I believe it is a good one, even if, at times, theexercise in isolation of an individual political will may tend to lead to re-sults not in tune with our times.

With regard to the scope of codification, someone said this morning,I think it was Mr. Alain Pellet-and I am among those who are not afraidof him or his ideas, because they are thought-provoking-who said thatthe concern of this Commission should be the codification of general in-ternational law. I agree with him on that and on the fact that we shouldkeep to a triad that looks at the object, the method and the product or re-sult.

With regard to the object, I agree with Mr. Pellet that the object ofcodification must be general international law. I agree with this because itenables us to visualize the work of the Commission as being compatiblewith regional codification. Today, reference was made to an example ofthis. Mr. Viclav Mikulka22° mentioned, among the many topics thatcould be dealt with, the topic of corruption. In March 1996, m theinter-American region we studied the adoption of a convention on cor-ruption which treats certain kinds of corruption as crimes. This field is notjust regional; corruption has a vocation to be universal. What happened in

218 Member of the International Law Cornrrission, 1997-.219 Translated from Spanish.220 Former member of the International Law Commission, 1992-1998, and now Di-

rector of the Codification Division, United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, effective Janu-ary 1999.

this case is perhaps that the time for development in our region was ripe.There are some matters that can be dealt with both regionally and univer-sally, and others that must be dealt with universally. Codification of top-ics, such as State responsibility, reservations, lawful and unlawful activi-ties and unilateral acts, for example, is common to international interests.Someone here today said that it would be a good idea to look at some con-cepts of international private law. Is it really alienjuris for the Commis-sion, something outside what constitutes the normal ambit of our work?Why should the Commission not look at it? It is not an academic's whim,it is, simply, that the world has changed. International economic agentstoday, whether public or private, work mostly in the area of private inter-national law, in fields like investments, commercial transactions, interna-tional loans. The State also is acting in the industrial and commercialsphere. Therefore, international law, unless it wishes to avoid that area,should at some point decide to deal with rules of the game that are not tra-ditional topics but have now come onto the international stage.

Mr. Pellet spoke about method. I have to say something about it, too.Frankly, I do not agree with the methods of the Commission. Some maythink that, perhaps, I am not in the best position to bring forward this criti-cism, as I am not often present, but that is because I live 11,000 kilo-metres away. However, I think that methodology influences the timeneeded by the Commission to carry out its work. This Commission takestoo much time. It is very slow in its work, extremely slow; it does notkeep up with the pace of the present times. I think that the young peoplelistening to us here must see us as tortoises in a world that is progressingat a much quicker pace. Time is absolutely fundamental for some mattersof international law. Time has gone by, the wheel has already been in-vented, and gunpowder was invented a long time ago. We take too muchtime and that influences the budget and the final result, the product.

Mr. Pellet spoke about the product. The product is a bit like medi-cine, and sometimes medicine comes too late to save the patient. I amconcerned that if we are not careful the remedies of the Commission willcome too late. There is a malfunction between the time the Commissiontakes to reach a result and the pace at which the world is developing andthat too has to do with methodology.

Finally, the dangers, the perils-I see them first of all from the pointof view of expansion. This Commission cannot be expansionist, meaningthat it should not intervene in matters that belong to regional law per se. Ihave my doubts as to whether the Commission should deal with humanrights or reservations. I have expressed these doubts, rather discreetly, atthe last session. I believe that regional matters should be looked into withgreat care and respect.

The other peril is lack of coordination. It is difficult to coordinateand the development of regional conventional law does not make the taskof determining legal rules any easier. It seems that the Commission does

not have the background for it. Lack of coordination is a peril. It can beovercome, of course, and it is not an absolute danger, but it is a latent perilwhich is very present for the time being.

Codification is always difficult, in both domestic and internationallaw. Codification means setting down certain criteria in a permanentfashion, not just for the moment. This contributes to a certain stabilityHowever, stability does not seem to be the main feature of the times inwhich we live. Stability is one of the factors that show the most erosionand that is clearly the influence of politics on international law. Politicsshow situations in a completely different light than that envisaged in in-ternational law. Today, we cannot say that legislation meets the needs ofthe new international society. I admit the difficulty in setting down crite-ria in codification. I recognize this, but at the same time it should be rec-ognized that we have to have some cooperation with diplomatic bodies. Iunderstand the Secretary-General's letter of 6 October 1997 to Mr. Pellet,I understand it perfectly. This letter implies the need to reflect on the roleof this Commission and that is what we are doing. It seems to me that per-haps we could think of some kind of relationship or link that would bemore stable between the Sixth Committee and our Commission. It couldbe a rapporteur from the Sixth Committee working within the Commis-sion and linking it with the Sixth Committee. I introduce this as a sugges-tion for the moderator, not as a categorical proposal. We also should bearin mind the fact that some important codifications are being tackled by re-gional organizations which carry out work that is similar to ours. It couldbe useful to invite them to one of our sessions, to meet with them so asto work together in better harmony. That is all I want to say for the timebeing.

Presentation by Mr. Awn AI-Khasawneh 221

Our Commission is the body primarily mandated with the codifica-tion and progressive development of international law within the UnitedNations system. I would like to state, immediately, that I agree with mydistinguished colleague, Mr. Georges Abi-Saab, on the fact that fromvery early on the distinction between progressive development and codi-fication was bound to be illusory. So referring to codification, which is inthe title of the topic of today's session, I also mean progressive develop-ment.

Yet, as everyone knows, the concept of codification is much olderthan the Commission and the United Nations. One thinks of the laws ofHammurabi, of Justinian, the Visigothic Codes, the laws of Suleiman theMagnificent and the Napoleonic Code, which are known to students oflaw. Their existence testifies to what I would call an urge, in different so-cieties and at different times, to produce a set of rules in written formwhich constitutes a yardstick against which the rights and duties of thesubjects of the law can be measured and regulated objectively. Hence, itcan be said that the first use of codification is that it should provide, in theinterest ofjustice, certainty of applicable law. I found it interesting, in lis-tening to Mr. Lucius Caflisch's 2 2 2 presentation on State immunity yester-day, that a comment was made to the effect that the draft on State inmu-nity should be revisited, because in some national societies industrial andbusiness interests wish to know the applicable law and hope to find it in aconvention. Yet, while the main use of codification is that it provides, orat least should provide, greater certainty of the law and easier accessibil-ity, it is by definition a process of standardization and uniformity ratherthan a process of creativity and of fine tuning. There is something regi-mental and monolithic about codification, and it is perhaps no accidentthat the great conquerors of the world also have tended to be the greatcodifiers.

This, of course, does not suggest that codification is the only answerto providing greater certainty of the law. The development of Islamiclaw, in the classical age, with which I am slightly familiar, tended to relyon the writings ofjurists and a subtle system ofprecedents, not unlike thedoctrine of stare decisis in the common law, which was used to distin-guish precedents. The system depended for its efficacy on the existenceof a body of jurists and doctors of law, highly erudite and sharing thesame educational grounding in the law. It is interesting that the systemworked fairly well, and it was only in the later part of the nineteenth cen-tury when the Ottoman Empire was increasingly coming under theinfluence of European, especially French, ideas and concepts that the

221 Member of the International Law Commission, 1987-.222 Legal Adviser to the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

first attempts of codification of Islamic laws took place in the form ofwhat came to be known as the Ottoman Magella or Ottoman Gazette. It isnoteworthy that in the introduction to the Magella its authors lament thepassing away of the illustrious doctors of the past, on whose work reli-ance could be made to ascertain rights and duties, and conclude, there-fore, that a need arises in the interest ofjustice to provide a compendiumof legal rules.

This is a brief background introduction to the idea of codification,necessary in my opinion, so that things could be kept in context. What,for our present purpose, are the uses and perils of codification? Perhapsone should add, what are the perils to codification? The uses are obvious.Mr. Abi-Saab has dwelt on them at length and there is no need to repeatthem. I will, therefore, move on to the perils of codification. In addition tothe three perils of the theory of strangulation of Mr. Roberto Ago,2" ac-cording to which codification tends to destroy custom, although in myview the destruction is temporary, lasting only until contractual lawpasses into custom once again, and the existence of a double regime, theperils I was thinking of are of a different nature. There is no doubt that theworld in which we live is marked by a huge cultural heterogeneity. This,to my mind, constitutes the greatest obstacle to codification. The con-querors of the past could impose their codes, but in our world, given thedemocratic nature of international law, this is not the case. We should re-member that international law is an essentially democratic process, be-cause States are free to accept or reject international conventions, and theprocess of law-making becomes an increasingly slow, time-consumingprocess, with compromise taking precedence over logical consistency.To illustrate the problem, let us take two examples and contrast them. Thefirst is from the law of human rights. You are well aware of the debate onthe universality of human rights, with some maintaining that an objectivestandard, applicable to all societies, exists, and that Governments, regard-less of the degree of economic development and of national priorities,should be held accountable for infringements of human rights obliga-tions, while others argue that this is a form of cultural imperialism- I thinkthat this debate is inconclusive and is likely to remain so. The other exam-ple is from the law of non-navigational uses of international water-courses. The whole process was predicated on the observation, made inthe late 1970s, that watercourses have specific geographical and geologi-cal characteristics and serve different human needs but, at the same time,common watercourse characteristics exist. The solution devised was anumbrella agreement approach, consisting of general residual rules,applicable in the absence of agreement, while the specificity of individ-ual watercourses would be addressed by watercourse agreements. Is itnot possible that the umbrella agreement solution would have suited the

22 3 Former member of the International Law Commission, 1957-1978.

field of human rights more than the imposition of obligations of certainspecificity, which do not take enough into account the cultural heteroge-neity and different degree of development and hence of national prioritiesin different societies?

The second peril of codification emanates from the fact that thereare huge differences in power among States. History teaches us that con-ditions most conducive to the development of legal rules are those wherethe subjects of the law are equal or at least similar. When we speak of thegolden decade of codification, we should remember that it was not undersuch a heterogeneous world. It is not difficult to see why powerful Stateswould want their freedom of action to be curtailed by legal regulations. Ifind it disconcerting that even within the Commission some of my distin-guished colleagues have argued that a convention on State responsibilityis not desirable and that we should opt for a declaration or guidelines, orother instruments of the kind. If this is said about a topic that has beencalled the backbone of international law, there can be little wonder thatelsewhere government officials would be reluctant to accept the legal ob-ligations that curtail their freedom of action.

The third peril stems from the first two and can be described as theabsence of agreement on the fundamentals. For an agreement to reachfruitful conclusions, there should be agreement on the basic premises andthere should be shared reasoning. The fundamental question in interna-tional law is whether we see it as a living and developing system that aimsat the establishment of the rule of law on the international plane, just aseach of us has agreed that this is a worthy aim at the national level. If, aswe have heard yesterday and this morning, some think that certain areasof international relations should be left unregulated, presumably thosethat touch on questions of international peace and security and those thatare termed political, then the unity of purpose of our exercise of codifica-tion may collapse. I am not, of course, advocating a compendium of com-pendia to solve all problems with one stroke, but I think that we shouldagree that the function of law is not to legitimize power relations but toact as a rock against the abuse of power. And hence, without wild flightsof fancy, there should be agreement that the codification of internationallaw is part of a process that aims at the establishment of the rule of law inall international relations.

Another peril to codification stems from an entirely different source.Our drafts tend to take a relatively long period of time to reach fruition.Special Rapporteurs change, they impart to the drafts their personal pref-erences and, sometimes, their idiosyncrasies, to use the words Mr. BrunoSimma224 used yesterday when he contrasted articles 20, 21, 23 and 24 to26 with articles I and 35 of the State responsibility draft. When we look at


these drafts, later on, with the passage of time, they do not sound as asymphony should but rather, sometimes, as uncoordinated noises. In myopinion, the problem is that the degree of specificity versus generality isnever subject to verifiable criteria and is more a question of art than aquestion of science. Much of what we think of as legal technique is actu-ally legal taste and only the passage of time can be the judge of taste.Luckily, problems arising under this point can be ameliorated by second-ary and subsequent debates, but we should also be humbled by the recog-nition that fallibility rules the affairs of man.

The last problem to which I would like to allude stems from whathas been called this morning "our dual function". In its earlier days, theCommission, which was, of course, smaller in number, tended to attractmore academics than diplomats and practitioners. Lest academics em-bark on wild flights of fancies, to which some of them are prone, monitor-ing was provided for in the Sixth Committee, and, ultimately, in the Con-ference of Plenipotentiaries. Thus, in a real sense, a satisfactory divisionof labour and an equilibrium was established. The system became in-creasingly srained, as days went by, especially when it came to the repre-sentation of smaller States that could not afford academics and diplomatsto represent them in the Sixth Committee and in the Commission. Conse-quently, the equilibrium was upset. Again, I find it disconcerting that theprospects of the acceptability of a draft by States is so frequently invoked,in the Commission, as an argument against codification of certain areasof international law. I think this argument is abused. A few years ago, Mr.Karl Zemaneck camed out an empirical study in which he established,beyond doubt, that there is no correlation between the inferences thatcould be drawn from the debates of the Sixth Committee, regarding theacceptability or not of certain drafts and the number of subsequentratifications of the same convention. I am not arguing that we should beoblivious to political realities, but that the uppermost consideration in ourminds should be to provide to Governments drafts of quality and logicalconsistency and then leave it to them to trim the failed of those drafts, ifthey so wish. It seems to me that to retreat before the battle starts carriestoo far the argument of realism at the expense of idealism-

In sum, as the Commission celebrates its fiftieth anniversary, it isfair to say that it can be rightly proud of its past achievements. Its soldiersare under adverse political conditions, stemming from the fact that, de-spite the move from bilateralism to community interest, the world is still ahighly heterogeneous place with different ideas, shared moralities, na-tional priorities and an increasing gap between rich and poor, strong andweak, both within national societies and among States. These are not themost ideal conditions for codification and our work, out of necessity, hasto be a compromise between political realism and the ideal of justice,without which the whole concept of codification becomes meaningless.


Dbat

M. Mohamed Bennouna 225 . Merci, M. le President. II me sembleque, dans ce qui vient d'8tre dit par M. Georges Abi-Saab, qui nous a per-mis, i travers une catdgorisation, de retrouver ]a belle dialectique intel-lectuelle i laquelle il nous a habituds, et aussi dans ce qui vient d'6tre ditpar MM. Awn AI-Khasawneh et Didier Opertti Badan, on retrouve un61dment r6current, le facteur temps. Ce facteur temps est ici permanent. Jeme demande s'il n'y a pas une certaine contradiction dans le discours,puisque, d'un c6t6 on nous dit : attention au temps, il faut aller vite, car, sivous n'allez pas assez vite, vous risquez de perdre votre crdibilit6, ce surquoi je suis personnellement trs sceptique, et, d'un autre c6t6, on nousdit que les choses importantes en mati~re de codification supposent unecertaine stabiliti dans la r~gle de droit, une certaine flexibiliti, une gdn6-ralit6 qui fait que la r~gle ne colle pas i l'6vdnement; ele n'est pasquelque chose de conjoncturel. Il faut faire trs attention aux chosesconjoncturelles, je crois que ce n'est pas ici le lieu. Apr~s tout, la Com-mission du droit international n'est pas faite pour cela. M. Abi-Saab arappelk le fameux article de M. Roberto Ago dans lequel il est dit que lacouturne peut souffrir d'une codification. Mais la coutume n'a pas besoinde la Commission pour souffrir; clle souffre assez i l'Assemblde gdn6-rale, tous les ans et meme tous les jours, parce qu'aujourd'hui les encein-tes de discussion des rgles juridiques sont permanentes. Donc, le fait quela coutume souffre n'est pas dii La codification, cela est dfi aux types dcrelations internationales, qui, d'ailleurs, font que la coutume se dave-loppe de fagon plus rapide de nos jours. Nous avons ce facteur temps, quiest au centre de cette question de l'int&rt et des dangers de la codifica-tion. M. Hans Corell nous a cit6 un exemple, comme dtant le bonexemple, celui de la Cour pnale internationale. Je ne sais pas si c'est lebon exemple. M. Corell oublie peut-8tre que la question de la Cour pdnaleinternationale date de 1950, elle a dtd relancde rdcemment, on a donc ac-cdldrd le mouvement, mais les discussions sur la Cour pdnale intematio-nale durent depuis cinquante ans. C'est vrai, il y a eu une acc6lration dumouvement avec les tribunaux ad hoc, mais une accdl~ration relative.Effectivement, la priorit6 a &6 donne i ]a Cour pdnale intemationalepour des raisons que l'on sait. I1 faut attendre de voir ce que va donner laConf&rence des plinipotentiaires du 15 juin prochain. M. Gerhard Haf-ner, qui est beaucoup mieux inform6 que moi, puisqu'il arrive de New

225 Ancien membre de la Commission du droit international, 1997-1998.

York, me confirmait ce que j'ai lu dans la presse, notamment, qu'il y a,dans ce projet, 1 500 morceaux de phrases entre parenthases, c'est-i-dire,sur lesquels il n'y a pas d'accord. C'est impressionnant. Sur le plan tech-nique c'est une codification inachev~e et avec M. Hafner, si je peuxriveler son sentiment exprime dans notre conversation privde, on sedemandait s'il ne faudrait pas revenir i ]a Commission, sur le plan tech-nique, avant que la Conference ne puisse v~ritablement damarrer. Face iautant de problmes techniques on voit, li aussi, l'effet de la rapidit6.Peut- tre la deuxi~me lecture ne s'est pas faite comme il fallait et certainsproblimes de gain de temps se sont retrouves ici. Peut-etre que la Confe-rence des plinipotentiaires ne finira pas cet et6 et sera oblig~e de prolon-ger les travaux. Donc, je suis personnellement assez sceptique. Je conqoisqu'il faut aller vite, mais je me dis que ce n'est peut-etre pas ici le lieu dela vitesse, de la rapiditi. L'Assembl6e g~n~rale adopte, parfois, desconventions trs vite, comme celle sur le personnel diplomatique, qui ont6ti adoptdes sur le champ. Je pense que la Commission du droit interna-tional a une autre mission, erie est faite pour une r~flexion approfondiesur le droit international public general.

Mr. Gerhard Hafner 3. 6 First of all, I would like to thank thissession's speakers for the elaboration of their ideas, particularlyMr. Mohamed Bennouna for his intervention on the duration of the Inter-national Law Commission work. I do not think that the argument raisedagainst the Commission on the long duration of its work is correct. If wecompare several negotiation processes in the General Assembly or inconferences in certain matters with the work of the Commission we mustcome to the contrary view and to the opposite result. The law of the sea isthe best example. As for the International Criminal Court project, if wecompare the time the Commission really devoted to the elaboration of theDraft Statute, which was submitted to the General Assembly, with thetime taken by the Ad Hoc Committee and the Preparatory Committee, wesee that the Ad Hoc and the Preparatory Committees together used 15weeks, morning and afternoon sessions only, for this work, which is stillfar from completed at this stage. 2 7 The International Law Commissiondevoted less time to it and came up with a final text and commentaries.The elaboration, in the General Assembly, of the United Nations Con-vention on the Safety of the United Nations and Associated Personnel"was done relatively quickly, but, with due respect, it is not a masterpieceof international legislation. As for the United Nations International Con-

226 Member of the International Law Comrmssion, 1997-.227 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted by the United

Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentianes on the Establishment of an Interna-tional Criminal Court on 17 July 1998; for text of Statute, see document A/CONF. 183/9.

22s Document A/491/742 of 2 December 1994.

vention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing,22 9 we shall see how itfares, but it was easier to elaborate because it followed traditional pat-terns and did not require breaking new ground in international relationsand international law. I really do not think that the argument of long dura-tion of work is a valid argument against the International Law Commis-sion.

I would like to raise a second point, in relation to Mr. GeorgesAbi-Saab's intervention. He referred to the maturity of matters forcodification, already mentioned yesterday by Mr. Alain Pellet. Ofcourse, everybody agrees that only matters which are ripe for codifica-tion should be taken up. But, in my view, the problem lies in how to de-cide whether a matter is ripe for codification. What are the criteria to beapplied in taking the decision? I have no answer to this and I would bevery happy if an answer could be provided.

M. Marcelo Kohen23 °. Merci, M. le Pr6sident. Je voudrais aussidire un mot sur la question de la lenteur des travaux de la Commission. Jesuis tout i fait d'accord avec ce qui vient d'8tre dit. Je pense que, dans denombreux domaines, la lenteur de la Commission est pr6f~rable i la rapi-dit6 de l'Assembl6e g6nrale. I1 n'est pas n6cessaire de r6p6ter l'exemplede la Convention sur le personnel onusien et du personnel associ6. A monavis, le problme de la lenteur des travaux de la Commission doit 8tre i6au choix des techniques de la Commission. I1 faut distinguer les projetsqui ont vocation i devenir des textes conventionnels d'autres projets, quin'aboutiront qu'i une d6claration ou i un modale de r~gles. Les sujets quine se pretent pas i l'61aboration de textes conventionnels sont ceux qui,peut-8tre, se pretent le mieux A un d6bat permanent. Cela peut 8tre ainsiparce que le sujet n'est pas encore mfir ou parce qu'il s'agit d'une ques-tion qui doit etre en analyse permanente. Je pense notamment au projetsur la responsabilit6 des Etats. I1 a 6t6 dit, hier, qu'il est d6ji un succ~s.Cela fait d6ji un bon nombre d'ann6es qu'il est A l'6tude de la Commis-sion du droit international, mais le projet propos6 par M. Roberto Agoconstitue d6ji une r6f~rence. C'est le point de dapart de toute analyse enmatire de responsabilit6, notanment en ce qui concerne l'attribution etles circonstances excluant l'illic6it.

Une autre question que je voudrais 6voquer est celle du danger des'61oigner de la technique 16gislative des travaux de la Commission dudroit international. Je pense que, m~me si cette technique lgislativen'aboutit, en somme, qu'i des projets de loi, pour reprendre une compa-raison avec le syst~me juridique interne, ce serait dangereux pour la

229 Document A/RES/52/164 of 15 December 1997.230 Chargd de cours A la Facult6 de droit de I'Universit6 de Geneve. Charg6 d'en-

seignement et de recherches i I'Institut universitaire de hautes 6tudes intemationales deGenve.

Commission de substituer cette technique 16gislative et de devenir Pin-terpr~te de sa propre codification. Je pense que cette tiche d'inter-pritation est une tiche plus appropri6e pour les Etats eux-mmes ou, lecas 6ch6ant, pour les organes juridictionnels.

Enfin, je comprends bien, M. le President, que la Commission, ar-riv6e a 50 ans, se pose des questions existentielles. Mais, pour reprendreune expression de Luigi Condorelli, lors du cinquanti~me anniversaire dela Cour internationale de Justice, vous avez dji 50 ars mais vous n'avezpas encore une ride, ou si vous en avez quelques unes, cela ne se voit pas.

Mr. Robert Rosenstock." I think that in the last year of the pre-vious quinquennium, the planning group came up with a number of sug-gested reforms to expedite the work of the Commission, and so far, in thisquinquennium, there are some signs of progress towards honouring thosesuggestions. There has been increased expeditiousness to the work, aswell as a recognition that we should plan our work for five-year periods.There is no denying the fact that the number of years the material on Stateresponsibility has been before the Commission is a disgrace. And if youare stuck, as Mr. Hans Corel] is, with results-based budgeting, it is noteasy to explain. Also, it is not easy for me to conclude that there are fewerhowlers in the existing work on State responsibility than there were in thedraft on protection of United Nations personnel. The question, however,is not whether the International Law Commission has made a mess of it orwhether it has taken too much time, but rather are we working towardsbeing as efficient as we can be given the nature of the work we are doing?I think that the steps that were taken last year and the year before are stepsin that direction. But there is no excuse for what has happened with Stateresponsiility. There is little excuse, if any, for what has happened withwatercourses, which took over 15 years. And there are lots of other exam-ples. I think that we do well to face up to the fact that there is no need torepeat that sort of thing and that we now have working methods and or-ganization. If everybody accepts the responsibility they volunteered forand the Commission sets about using working groups and using varioustechniques, as appropriate, we can produce results with the expeditious-ness with which we produced results on succession with respect to na-tionalities, for example. It took a Special Rapporteur who stuck to hiscommitment; it took working methods which were a departure from whathad been standard; and it took a general seriousness of purpose whichproduced a fine result in rapid time. I think that we can ensure to hold our-selves to that. Make haste slowly, but make haste.


Mr. Bruno Simma.232 I would like to comment on the three cate-gories of international law that Mr. Georges Abi-Saab put before us andthe respective potential tasks and possibility for the International LawCommission in dealing with them. In the first category, he mentioned thefundamental principles of international law, like the ones contained in theCharter of the United Nations and concretized in the Friendly RelationsDeclaration. He said that he sees no reason why international law shouldabstain from entering these fields. I remember reading, as an outsider atthe time, the debates that took place in the Commission, in the context ofState responsibility, the relationship between Chapter VII, the SecurityCouncil and general international law, if there is any, on crimes and othersimilar issues, and I have to confess that I am not very optimistic aboutthe Commission spending time on that first category of international le-gal rules.

Mr. Abi-Saab mentioned that the Commission has concentrated itswork mainly in the second category, which he calls in his general lawcourse the international law of coexistence, the transactional interna-tional law as Mr. Vaughan Lowe has called it. The problem in this sectoris that we are running out of "sexy", nice, tangible subjects. State respon-sibility is probably the last "sexy" subject; whether Mr. JamesCrawford, 33 after one year of working on it as Special Rapporteur, agreesis another matter. I think that the Commission should pick up the role,which may not be very attractive, of "plumber". By that I mean, the Com-mission should engage in reviews. There is nothing wrong with it. I havea good friend in Munich who, as a car dealer, makes most of his moneyrepairing cars rather than selling new ones. The Commission could keepup its reputation, not in "selling" new drafts but "repairing" existing ones.The exercise we are engaged in, with regard to reservations to treaties, isa splendid example of the work that can be done. Of course, I havetouched on all sorts of taboos. We are not repairing the Vienna Conven-tion-the Vienna Convention is "the greatest thing since sliced bread".Yet, de facto, I see it as "repairing" some of the deficiencies of the 1969Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 234 That kind of task has agreat future and Mr. Mohamed Bennouna's subject is related to it. I con-sider diplomatic protection, with all due regard, as an annex to State re-sponsibility proper.

This brings me to the third category: the international law of cooper-ation. There we find all sorts of institutions, international organizations,already engaging in everything from genetic manipulations to combatingcorruption. What can the role of the Commission be? This is the puzzlingquestion. All the answers so far, whether here during the last two days or

232 Member of the International Law Commission, 1997-.233 Member of the International Law Commission, 1992-.234 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331.

m New York last October, are uniform in saying that the Commission canno longer avoid entering this field. We are certainly not a body having ex-pertise in any of these fields, but we have solid general knowledge andpractical experience in general international law. As was stressed by Mr.Igor Lukashuk, our role is to bring together the fragmented parts in orderto maintain unity of the system. The challenge will be to bring togetherour general expertise and the specific expertise of others. That can bedone in two ways. One way is that we offer our general expertise to theoutside world. Mr. Alain Pellet, for example, could offer his good officesto the Human Rights Commission. However, as Mr. Hans Corell said, thehuman rights specialist will probably have a "fit". The presentation Ms.Lori Damrosch 2" gave yesterday is an example of what expression such a"fit" can take. What I fear is that if we offer our expertise to human rightsspecialists, to environmental specialists or to the World Trade Organiza-tion, we will wait forever because the doors w-ill be locked. Therefore, ifwe want to venture into the law of cooperation, first of all we would haveto take the initiative to look into some of these subjects, and then wewould have to revise our working methods to allow for outside expertknowledge to participate in our deliberations. And here I touch on a sub-ject, dear to my heart, which has hardly played a role in the life of theCommission during its first 50 years, that is, tapping the resources of ex-isting academic, scientific and international institutions, with the help ofoutside funding. I think that there is a great untapped potential there. Ihave mentioned this briefly in a conversation with Mr. Corell. Of course,mentioning the possibility of financing the work of the International LawCommission through non-Organization budget carries the danger thatGovernments will then cut our budget proportionately. Nevertheless, thecolloquium we had in New York, last October,2 3

6 is reflective of that po-tential, as some people made the effort of tapping outside sources to en-rich the debate on codification and progressive development of interna-tional law. I believe that it should be further explored.

M. Ahmed Mahiou "1

7 . Merci. Je voudrais faire quelques remar-ques. Premierement, pour repondre i M. Alain Pellet, puisque, hier, al'issue de mon intervention je n'ai pas eu le temps de repondre a un cer-tain nombre de questions, dont une, sur laquelle tout le monde s'est re-joint pour dire que la forme conventionnelle n'est pas le seul critre per-mettant de juger du produit et des r6sultats. Cela est vrai, et d'ailleurs

235 Professor at Columbia Law School.236 See the proceedings of the United Nations Colloquium on Progressive Develop-

menit and Codification of International Law in Making Better International Law: The Inter-nationalLaw Commission at 50(1998) (United Nations publicaton, Sales No. EF.98 V.5).

23 7 Professeur de droit, ancien doyen de la FacuMt de droit d'Alger, ancien membre dela Commission du droit international, 1982-1996.

dans mon intervention je l'avais dit au conditionnel : osi 'on prenaitcomme crit~re la forme conventionnelle". Cela ne veut pas dire que je re-nonce, pour autant, i la forme conventionnelle. C'est vrai que, mmed'apr~s ie statut de la Commission, la voie conventionnelle n'est pas laseule qui lui est offerte, mais elle reste la tendance principale. On attendd'abord de la Commission qu'elle 6labore des conventions et c'est fautede mieux qu'elle envisage d'autres types d'instruments. Peut-8tre que lestemps ont chang6 et que la priorit6 accord~e A la forme conventionnelleapparait moindre. Personnellement j'ai des doutes sur ce point.

Deuxi~mement, il y a un aspect qui n'a pas encore tA 6voqu6 aucours de cette discussion. 11 y aurait peut-8tre une activit6 pour la Com-mission qui consisterait i revoir les textes qu'elle a 61abor6s et, dans cer-tains cas, i entreprendre tne v6ritable revision. Apr~s tout, un texte 6la-bor6 depuis 20, 30, 40 ans, i la lumi~re de la pratique, peut r6v6ler lan~cessit6 d'une remise i jour. Je ne dis pas que cela est valable pour tou-tes les conventions, mais il peut l'8tre pour certaines. La preuve en estque, pour la convention que l'on considbre comme 6tant la meilleurecuvre de la Commission, la Convention de 1969 sur le droit des trait~s,on a entrepris, non pas une r6vision, mais tout de mme un examen en re-lation avec le probl~me des rdserves. Bien que le rapporteur sp6cialM. Pellet ait fix6 un objectifmodeste, qui est celui d'un code de conduite,je me demande si cela n'est pas une application de ce queje viens de dire:la voie conventionnelle n'6tant pas possible, la Commission choisit uneautre solution. Dans ce cas particulier, il est vrai que l'objectif a 6t6 an-nonc6 ds le d~part, comme 6tant tn code de conduite; mais, A la lurniiredes rapports du Rapporteur sp6cial, et aussi de certains d~bats i la Com-mission, on peut se demander si, A terme, on ne parviendra pas A la con-clusion qu'un code de conduite est insuffisant et qu'il faudra changer unpeu les conventions et, donc, les r~viser. Le d~bat est-il vraiment clos surce point ? II est possible que, A la lumi~re des discussions que ]a Comnis-sion aura eu pendant plusieurs annies, on aboutisse, tout de m~me, A uneadjonction A ces conventions, concemant le probleme des rserves. Pourpousser cet argument un peu plus loin, le moment n'est il pas venu pour laCommission, notamment dans le cadre du Comit6 de planification, de r6-flchir A cette ide ? D'envisager la mise jour de certaines conventions ?Dans cette approche, il faudra donner la priorit6 aux conventions quin'ont actuellement pas beaucoup de succ~s aupr~s des Etats. Par exem-ple, pour les conventions qui n'ont pas obtenu le nombre de ratificationsncessaires, les Etats pourraient 8tre consult~s sur les raisons de leur refusde ratifier, et ces textes pourraient revenir devant la Commission. Cecis'applique aussi aux conventions qui sont entr6es en vigueur, mais A unesi petite 6chelle, que l'on peut difficilement parler de conventions uni-verselles.

Je vous ai livr6 ces quelques pens~es comme mati~re i r~flexion surle possible r6le de r6vision de la Commission. Ce r6le n'est pas pr~vu di-

rectement au statut, puisque l'article 15 mentionne uniquement la codifi-cation et le diveloppement progressif, mais ne serait-il pas souhaitableque la Commission ait aussi une mission de revision ? Il s'agit presqued'une fonction legislative, en droit interne ce sont les parlements qui revi-sent les lois; c'est peut-tre donner une fonction trop large i la Commis-sion, mais cette possibilit6 de r~flexion m~ritait d'8tre 6voqu~e pour vousfaire r6agir.

Troisiemement, je voudrais ivoquer le lien entre la coutume et la co-dification. Comme je l'ai dit bier, il y a eu une pdriode pendant laquelleon a privil~gi6 la codification, parce qu'il y avait des tensions dans l'ordreinternational, le conflit Est-Ouest, le conflit Nord-Sud. A propos du r6lede la coutume, les nouveaux pays, n'ayant pas particip& i son 6laboration,prfffraient les rigles codifi6es. Cette pdriode est peut-6tre depass e, cequi ne vent pas dire, pour autant, que ce serait la mort de la codification etle retour tout simplement i la coutume. Je crois que ces deux phanom~nesentretiennent une relation dialectique et s'encouragent mutuellement. Lacodification consacre la coutume, mais, loin de la tuer, i mon avis, ellecr&e de nouveaux espaces de developpement pour d'autres rigles coutu-mi'res, pour d'autres pratiques et comportements des Etats. Au bout d'uncertain temps cette pratique mrite de nouveau une prise en considera-tion, d'oi la logique des revisions des conventions. Lorsque la pratiquedes Etats atteste du diveloppement de nouvelles coutumes, il n'y a pas deraison de considerer que ces conventions sont dji fixes dans le marbreet que l'on ne peut plus y retoucher. EI faut, peut-6tre, pour certaines con-ventions, s'interroger sur l'apport de la coutune et sur la faqon de proc&der i une revision. Cela s'est produit pour le droit de la mer; cela peut sefaire pour d'autres domaines du droit international.

Enfin, ma dernire remarque porte sur les relations entre la Com-mission et les autres organismes. J'ai 6t6 membre de la Commission etj'aifait l'expoence de la pratique, au demeurant sympathique, de recevoir lesrepr~sentants des commissions de codification r~gionales, pour &changerdes informations sur l'Etat de nos travaux mutuels. Je peux dire que cettepratique est positive mais, en mime temps, peut- tre, trop formelle et so-lennelle. I1 faudrait rflchir i une simplification de ces relations et aussise demander comment permettre i la Commission d'entrer plus facile-ment en contact avec les institutions scientifiques reconnues et 6tabliessur le plan international et comment avoir des relations plus simples dansles 6changes afin de faciliter cette consultation qui est pr6vue par le statutde la Commission mais qui n'a pas 6t6 suffisamment developpe.

Mr. Raul Goco.238 Congratulations to the speakers and to theChairman for the fruitful session we have had this afternoon. I would like

239 Member of the Intemational Law Commission, 1997-.

to articulate my thoughts on the matter. The issue of international legisla.tion is related to that of uses and perils of codification. I am intrigued withthe international legislative process. In 1945, in San Francisco, when theCharter of the United Nations was being elaborated, there was a proposalto empower the General Assembly with the authority to legislate. Thisproposal was rejected for a valid reason: State parties do not want to besubjected to a supranational legislative body. It was, therefore, decidedthat the United Nations should focus more on peacekeeping efforts ratherthan legislation. Article 13 of the Charter of the United Nations, in appli-cation of which the General Assembly has the task of promoting interna-tional law and codification, was, in my view, a compromise. The GeneralAssembly was not given the power to legislate but, at the same time, itwas authorized to craft and to draft what may become international law.The International Law Commission was created and vested with the spe-cific authority mentioned in Article 13 of the Charter. Would it not havebeen better if the power to legislate had been given to the General Assem-bly? If we compare the Assembly with a national legislative body, a par-liament, we see that there the laws are drafted for the purpose of address-ing an "evil" or a "mischief' in order to prevent it from happening.

I suppose that there is a parallelism with the International Law Com-mission whose work in the field of the development of international lawis done for the purpose of addressing certain concerns, like determiningthe status of migrant workers or addressing environmental issues, asneeded. The problem is the time it takes. The process is long: drafts haveto be submitted to the Sixth Committee. Then, they have to be acceptedby State parties. Unlike domestic law, which can be passed rather quicklyand which can immediately address the issue for which it was elaborated,codification of international law takes a long time and sometimes, whenconventions enter into force, the issues they were to address have alreadychanged. The Commission should try to remedy this situation. We needinnovation in our method of work. It was suggested that the Commissionshould take up the role of giving advisory opinions. For the time being,that is the role of the International Court of Justice. However, the Com-mission could be vested with the authority to issue advisory opinions.Our drafts, even before they are finalized, are invoked as internationallaw. The Commission is well geared for giving advisory opinions, and Ithink that it should be part of our work.

Commentaire d'une personne dans I'audience (l'intervenant n 'apas donna son nom). Merci, M. le Pr6sident, de m'accorder la parole.J'aimerais me r6f6rer aux points qui ont 6t6 soulev6s plus t6t. Au-jourd'hui, la soci6t6 civile s'apergoit que toute l'action internationales'engage au nom du droit international. Et toutes les r6solutions, surl'embargo, le blocus 6conomique, sont prises au nom du droit internatio-nal. Souvent, l'homme de la rue ne comprend pas ce qu'est le droit inter-

national, si puissant et au nom duquel on peut declencher une guerre ouimposer un embargo contre un pays. L'ancien droit international autori-sait lgalement la guerre entre les Etats pour risoudre les conflits intema-tionaux. Mais je me demande, aujourd'hui, alors que la Commission dudroit international iete ses 50 ans, 50 ans apres la D~claration universelledes droits de l'homme, et alors que le droit international contemporam in-terdit l'usage de la force, je me demande pourquoi, malgr6 tout cela, ledroit international peut encore 8tre invoqu6 pour faire la guerre contrecertains pays. Cela est contradictoire.

Je voudrais faire remarquer qu'avec la chute du mur de Berlin leprincipe essentiel du droit international contemporain, notamment lacoexistence pacifique, n'existe plus. La coexistence pacifique entre deuxEtats, avec des conceptions, des systrnes 6conomiques et sociaux diff&rents, n'existe plus parce qu'il n'y a plus de camp socialiste. Comment laCommission pourrait-elle ripondre i cette question ? Car ce sont desprincipes automatiquement invalidds.

J'aimerais aussi me r~f&er i l'intervention de M. Didier Opertti Ba-dan qui nous a parl. de la corruption, du transfert illicite des richessesd'un pays i l'autre. Ce transfert des ressources s'op~e,justement, sous lemanteau de la globalisation ou de la politique n6o-librale. M. OperttiBadan a remarqu6, i juste titre, que les agents 6conomiques font partie dudroit international, en tant que sujets non conventionnels et donc qu'ilsdoivent porter la responsabilit6 dans la mise en ceuvre de la politique 6co-nomique mondiale. La corruption aujourd'hui se pratique, plus que ja-mais, tant dam les pays developps que dans les pays sous-d~veloppes,tant au Nord qu'au Sud. Ne devrait-elle pas faire l'objet d'un examen parle droit international ?

Finalement, est-ce que le droit international public ne devrait pas r6-pondre i l'exigence du developpement 6conomique, aux conditions del'ivolution de l'6conomie et refl~ter cette 6volution rapide ?

Ms. Barberis. I speak in my capacity as a former rapporteur of theSixth Committee. I would like to thank the Codification Division for in-viting me to attend this Seminar. I have a comment relating to the issue ofthe dialogue between the International Law Commission and the SixthCommittee, and beyond the Sixth Committee, the Governments.

It is true that the International Law Commission is an independentbody, with eminent representation and authoritative input in the field ofinternational law, but it also is an organ of the General Assembly. Severalmembers have raised this crucial point yesterday. The Commission re-ports constitute a sizeable share of the work of the Sixth Committee,which gives these reports their due share of time during the normal ses-sion of the General Assembly. However, the format of the debate in theSixth Committee needs to be periodically appraised and adapted. I re-

member that when I was rapporteur, the Sixth Committee consideredchanging the format of the debate on the report of the International LawCommission. It was proposed that instead of dealing with the report asone unit, a topical approach could be envisaged, that is, grouping the top-ics so that they would all receive equal attention.

The question of feedback from the Sixth Committee to the Interna-tional Law Commission is problematic. Many Commission membershave mentioned the fact that political guidance is not forthcoming or isnot specific enough. The problematic aspect of the dialogue between theCommission and the Sixth Committee has to do with the dialogue be-tween the Commission and the Governments. For some of the topics theCommission has worked on, in its wisdom, the Commission has seen to itthat the opinion of Governments is sought as regards the conclusion of itswork. Maybe this approach should be changed so as to have the work re-ported to Governments as work progresses. That may sound superfluous,as the Sixth Committee is composed of government representatives. I re-fer to specific issues on which the Commission would like to obtain reac-tions from Governments. This would allow the appraisal of the work ofthe Commission as it progresses.

Another question I would like to address is that of coordination andintegration of the work of the different competent bodies in the field of in-ternational law. The Legal Counsel, Mr. Hans Corell, referred earlier toother bodies of the General Assembly having carved for themselves, intheir own fields, a place in the codification and progressive developmentof international law. I refer to bodies like the Human Rights Commissionand the Third Committee. Maybe it is time for the International LawCommission to consider how to coordinate the range of different exer-cises in the field of international law. Coordination can start "in house",with all competent bodies of the General Assembly engaging in codifica-tion, and then proceed to regional and subregional coordination, to in-clude other relevant institutions outside the United Nations system. Coor-dination and integration could also include the activity of academia.

I also would like to talk about the reference to the representative andreflective character of the International Law Commission, its composi-tion, in terms of culture, tradition and legal systems. From time to time,the question of the representative and reflective character of the work ofthe Commission is posed. Considering the members present in this roomand the official membership, the composition is fair and in line with therequirements of the Charter of the United Nations. However, if the dia-logue is kept closely monitored and closely associated with the SixthCommittee and the Governments, the aspect of the representative charac-ter of the Commission would be more appreciated.

Finally, there is the issue of the role of the International Law Com-mission in the promotion, dissemination and general appreciation of in-temational law. I would be interested in hearing more from the members

on this. Would it not be more in line with the mandate of the Commissionto move beyond Geneva, maybe to the regions and to the subregions?fis may be difficult, especially in the light of the observations regardingfinances available for carrying out the mandate of the Commission. Butcertain things need to be done for the International Law Commission toconform to its mandate.

Mr. Raul Goco. I forgot to say something regarding future topics.In addition to corruption, there is also plunder of wealth. Corruption canbe a matter of internal law, but plunder of wealth means that wealth is be-ing tossed away, particularly in economically deprived countries. That ismy own empirical experience. When I was the Solicitor-General of myGovernment in the Philippines, I took part in the proceedings that led tothe decision by the Swiss Government to return the money that had beendeposited in Swiss bank accounts. From that experience, I can say thatplunder of wealth could be a very good subject and future topic for theCommission because it has many ramifications. It involves dealings be-tween the victim State and the one where the money is known to be kept.It involves mutual assistance programmes, even in the absence of extradi-tion.

Mr. Hans Corell.239 I was glad to hear Mr. Georges Abi-Saab talkabout codification and make reference to Sir Robert Jennings. Personally,I never understood the distinction between progressive development andcodification or, rather, the need for it. For me, codification is to put intowriting what can be derived from sources that exist, or ideas, or emergingtopics like space law and other topics. I agree with you that the problem isnot so much whether it is progressive. The problem is whether the issuesare difficult from a political point of view because that is where it is put tothe test of the political constituency. This applies equally at the nationallevel. There are many legal issues with which lawyers can deal withoutinput from the political field because those issues are not deemed as sen-sitive. Seen from this perspective, to me codification is how difficult theissue is in substance and how difficult it is to deal with at the politicallevel.

I would like to recall the observation that Mr. Alain Pellet made be-fore the Sixth Committee last year, namely, on the response from Mem-ber States. He said that the Commission had done its duty. Questionswere asked but there was a very poor response from Member States. Thereason for this is difficult to determine-perhaps foreign affairs minis-tries are too busy. It is clear that this is one of the problems for which theCommission bears no responsibility. On the contrary, the Commission is

239 The Lcgal Cowisel of the United Nations.

focusing on this problem. States also have to live up to their part of the"deal", and when they do, then the Commission can produce. I disagreewith Mr. Mohamed Bennouna; I think that the Draft Statute of the Inter-national Criminal Court is a very, very good example of this. The issuewas completely dead for many years when it was raised in the Sixth Com-mittee, not so much because of what happened in other parts of the world,but because Trinidad and Tobago wanted this issue addressed, becausethey had problems in the Caribbean. That is what triggered the issue. Af-terwards came the tragic events in other parts of the world, and the re-quest from the Sixth Committee. What did the Commission do? Irrespec-tive of what other members of the Commission may think, I and many ofmy colleagues, members of the Sixth Committee, were impressed by theway in which the Commission dealt with this item.

Another item raised in the discussion by Mr. Bnmo Simma wasunity in the system of coordination. This is perhaps where I feel a certainlack of attention. You may say, well, that is your duty as Legal Counsel,but I do not think it is really. To see where things are dealt with and see ifthere are lacunae or overlaps, or if the different actors could assist eachother. So the coordination in the legislative work of the United Nations,in my view, is an important issue. This issue was discussed in the ambit ofthe Decade of International Law, and the Secretariat of the United Na-tions has been asked to produce a document where different entities of thesystem present their work. This is to be examined in the Sixth Committee.However, there is a little problem of coordination. I am not suggestingthat the Commission should assume this role, but perhaps it would be in-teresting if, with the knowledge that is represented in this Commission,there could be some kind of feeling about the kind of work that has beendone in the different agencies and by the different actors and on whetherthere are lacunae. Or, to look at it in the way Mr. Simma approached it:Are there some general legal issues needing to be addressed where theCommission could make a contribution? I mention this because, when Ifollow the debate in the United Nations, I often realize that people talkabout issues without realizing that they are already being dealt with or inwhat way they are being dealt with. Take human rights, for example.Sometimes when I speak about international law, I realize that in my con-stituency they do not understand that human rights belongs to interna-tional law. Some would like to make a distinction. International law is forthe lawyers and the Commission, and that it is not so interesting, but hu-man rights, that is a big issue, that is politically interesting. So they haveto be educated and told that human rights is actually one of the most im-portant parts of international law. You have been talking about corrup-tion. Of course, there are already legal instruments to address this. Wehave the drug issues, the transnational crimes and the corruption, whichare dealt with by the Centre for International Crime Prevention in Vienna.They are the ones who make contributions in this field. To sum up, I sim-

ply think that it could be interesting to see whether the International LawCommission can do better than the Sixth Committee in having a generalidea of what kind of legislative work is being done throughout the system.

Finally, concerning the economic realities of which I talked thismorning, I did it, of course, in order to provoke the debate. I will refer tothem on Friday morning during the planning group meeting becausemaybe these concerns are better discussed there. But I think that it is im-portant that the members of the Commission get a feeling of the direstraits in which the Organization is from the financial point of view. Thatis where I am in the crossfire, and you must admit that this Seminar givesme a good opportunity for raising my concerns.

Mr. Bruno Simma. In our profession, we have to rely on tacitconsent in order to overcome all sorts of lacunae. I foresee the danger oftacitly consenting to topics suggested, namely, the topic of corruption,which comes up time and again. It came up last year and again today. Forthe record, I would like to state that I personally consider the topic of cor-ruption as particularly unfit for the International Law Commission'swork. If I may be allowed to allude to my own country, deduction ofbribes from income tax is not because the Commission has not taken upthe issue of corruption. I hope that we all live up to the standard of inno-cence the Chairman of this afternoon's session decreed, namely, that weare simply too unimportant to be bribed or corrupted. I think that the In-ternational Law Commission is not the right body to deal with this issue.Besides, as Mr. Hans Corell pointed out, in his tactful way, there are otherbodies within the United Nations already dealing with this issue which isalso dealt with by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and De-velopment (OECD) and other regional bodies. What more can we, in theCommission, do about corruption?

Mr. Didier Opertti-Badan (translated from Spanish). It seems tome that the topic of corruption is being raised in inadequate terms. Cor-ruption is a topic that is a matter of concern to people, Governments andinternational organizations. There is a lot of concern, obviously. Manyprofessors are also concerned with this topic. To answer the very directquestion of what international law can do in the face of corruption, wemust bear in mind that the Commission is a body that deals with interna-tional law but is not international law itself. So what can the Commissiondo? One of the categories mentioned by Mr. Georges Abi-Saab, the lawof cooperation, is a subject for international law: the prevention of moneylaundering, fraudulent accounts and transfers to escape taxes. All theseforms that exist in the international financial world today make it possiblefor some people to escape from the control of local and international au-thorities. I do not know whether this is a topic for the Commission, but

there is a group of States, in Latin America, which has dealt with this sub-ject because it was believed that the assistance of these States could help.If the Commission does not think that it can help the world to solve thisproblem, then too bad. But international cooperation is an area of law thatcould be one of the most important to be dealt with by the internationalcommunity.

Mr. Mauricio Herdocia Sacasa" ° (translated from Spanish). Iwould like to come back on what was said by Mr. Hans Corell and therepresentative of the Sixth Committee. It is very important to understandthat we are confronted with a problem linked to integration between thedifferent bodies working on international law. The question has to belooked at from this angle. I would like to shatter a myth. Codification isnot exclusively the work of the International Law Commission; it is notan isolated process. On the contrary, it is a dynamic, open process, whichtakes into account opinions and interests of members and Governments.It is essential to bear in mind that the Commission is part of a legal systemin which Governments, the Sixth Committee, organizations and courtsparticipate. It is a network of relations that has not yet been fully ex-plored. The International Law Commission is part of a legal systemwhich, in a world where organizations and institutions proliferate, theneed is being felt for a leading centre, for guidance on standards, so as toachieve harmony, order, unity and coherence within the international le-gal system. This can be achieved only through interaction between thevarious bodies. Thus, the final product will be strengthened. The key is-sue is coordination, and I believe that there is a lot left to be done in thisfield. Coordination and closer cooperation between the International LawCommission and other institutions, particularly the Sixth Committee,will contribute to lift many of the doubts raised. It would enable the Com-mission to expand its technical ability.

Many regional laws have become universal through a process of in-tensive and open dialogue. Thus, international law, regionally and glob-ally, has benefited. In these times, marked by change and a trend to glob-alization, the political and legal components of the international systemtend to be increasingly universal. There is tendency to expand the norma-tive power of institutions. The capacity to cooperate is extremely impor-tant in such a context, for instance, to overcome such problems as the lackof sufficient response from Governments to questions raised by the Inter-national Law Commission. Perhaps there is a communication problem.Information on the role of the Commission and its work should perhapsbe better disseminated. There is a need for coordination between all theactors involved in the international law-making process. I believe that itis of the utmost importance to work on the issue of coordination and co-


operation and to view the Commission as part of a legal system with greatpotential for interaction.

Mr. Georges Abi-Saab. I just want to reply to some of the com-ments addressed to me. There has been a misunderstanding. I do not con-sider that the work of the Commission is too slow. What I said was thatthe Commission should not be out of step with the perception of the prob-lems, the new problems. Mr. Mohamed Bennouna said that we should not"coller i l'iv~nement". That is not what I am saying. We are living in anincreasingly complex world and we have to deal with increasingly com-plex issues and problems calling for legal regulation. Many of these prob-lems cannot simply be addressed (not to say adequately solved) by theformulation of a normative proposition starting from a basis in custom. Adifferent approach is needed, and that is the creation of special regimeswhich can have an effective legal handle on the complex phenomena theyare supposed to deal with. This is what I meant when I said that oneshould not continue to follow the same road when other roads are openingup, in areas of increasing importance. I am against all modes, particularlythe post-modem mode, which says that general propositions are neces-sarily false and that formulating them is the wrong approach as every caseis a special case. I do not mean that at all. All I am saying is that, as legalscholars and practitioners, we cannot avoid taking into account thecomplexification of social phenomena. We, therefore, have to adapt ourway of thinking so as to find a way of dealing with them significantly, onthe legal plane.

This brings me to the third category of international law, which Imentioned earlier, the law of cooperation. The complex regimes calledfor in this area frankly require a legislative process. Some indicationsabout the needed solutions may already exist in practice, but huge gapspersist and have to be filled and new regimes have to be developed, in-cluding very important institutional components. The Draft Statute of theInternational Criminal Court is a good example.

The fact that the construction of such regimes may need special ex-pertise from outside international law (which can be obtained by collabo-rating with other bodies or calling on outside experts) should not deter theCommission from handling the legal architecture of these regimes. Thisis the type of activity that the Commission should welcome rather thanavoid. If not, other bodies will take over this task, marginalizing the roleof the Commission in the process. But, like the International Court of Jus-tice in relation to the international adjudicative function, the Commissionshould remain the pivot of the international "legislative function", a roleno other organ can play within the United Nations structure.

Mr. Igor Ivanovich Lukashuk. The time has come to close thissession. I will just add a few words before ceding my place to the Chair-man of the International Law Commission, Mr. Joao Clemente BaenaSoares, for the closing of our Seminar.

CLOSING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE FIFTIETHSESSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMIS-SION, MR. JOAO CLEMENTE BAENA SOARES241

REMARQUES DE CLOTURE DU PRlSIDENT DE LA CINQUAN-TIEME SESSION DE LA COMMISSION DU DROIT INTER-NATIONAL, M. JOAO CLEMENTE BAENA SOARES

We are now at the end of our work. I would like to express thanks toall those who have made this Seminar possible. It was an opportunity fordiscussion and reflection on the work of our Commission and on interna-tional law. I would like to congratulate the professors and experts, and theparticipants, who have offered excellent contributions, new ideas, com-ments, criticism and analysis, which have been very competent and broadin scope. I must confess that I would have liked to hear more from theyoung people present. However, there will be other opportunities. As weall know, this anniversary is being celebrated over three years, which willprovide other opportunities to encourage the ideas of young people andthe expression of their opinions and comments, because they will have totake over in the future. During the next 50 years, they will probably havedirect responsibilities in international affairs, as representatives of theirGovernments or in the international institutions. In this Commission, wehave very precise tasks, very clearly defined responsibilities, as well asan agenda and guidelines from the General Assembly. But our work is notcarried out only in this room. The aim is to draw practical conclusions forour people, for individuals. Public opinion must be made aware that theCommission does not work in the abstract, but that what we discuss herewill have an impact on the daily lives of everyone.

It has been said that this Commission is going through a crisis. It ismy opinion, and I would like to share it with you, that present times aredifficult, not only for the Commission but also for international law as awhole. We are all aware of this. However, it is necessary to react, to vig-orously reaffirm the prevalence of law in international relations. TheUnited Nations and, therefore, our Commission are the result of idealism.We must not be discouraged and give up under the pressure of adverse re-alities. This may be a bit daring, but I think that Utopia is the motor of his-tory. We have to take every effort to ensure that international law, whichfor many is Utopian, will continue to drive history.

241 Translated from Spanish.

ANNEX A

ANNEXE A

Current membership of the International Law Commission

Membres de Ia Commission du droit international

Mr. Emmanuel Akwei Addo (Ghana)

Mr. Husain AI-Bahama (Bahrain)

Mr. Awn Al-Khasawneh (Jordan)

Mr. Joao Clemente Baena Soares (Brazil)

Mr. Ian Brownlie (United Kingdom)

Mr. Enrique J. A. Candioti (Argentina)

Mr. James Richard Crawford (Australia)

Mr. Christopher John Robert Dugard (South Africa)

Mr. Constantin P. Economides (Greece)

Mr. Nabil Elaraby (Egypt)Mr. Giorgio Gaja (Italy)

Mr. Zdzislaw Galicki (Poland)Mr. Raul Ilustre Goco (Philippines)

Mr. Gerhard Hafner (Austria)

Mr. Qizhi He (China)

Mr. Mauricio Herdocia Sacasa (Nicaragua)

Mr. Jorge E. Illueca (Panama)

Mr. Peter C. R. Kabatsi (Uganda)

Mr. Maurice Kamto (Cameroon)

Mr. James Lutabanzibwa Kateka (United Republic of Tanzania)

Mr. Mochtar Kusuma-Atmadja (Indonesia)

Mr. Igor Ivanovich Lukashuk (Russian Federation)

Mr. Teodor Viorel Melescanu (Romania)

Mr. Didier Opertti-Badan (Uruguay)

Mr. Guillaume Pambou-Tchivounda (Gabon)

Mr. Alain Pellet (France)

Mr. Pemrnaraju Sreenivasa Rao (India)

Mr. Victor Rodriguez-Cedefto (Venezuela)Mr. Robert Rosenstock (United States)Mr. Bernardo Sepfilveda (Mexico)Mr. Bruno Simma (Germany)Mr. Doudou Thiam (Senegal)Mr. Peter Tomka (Slovakia)Mr. Chusei Yamada (Japan)

ANNEX B

Statute of the International Law Commission

Article 1

I. The International Law Commission shall have for its object thepromotion of the progressive development of international law and itscodification.

2. The Commission shall concern itself primarily with public in-ternational law, but is not precluded from entering the field of private in-ternational law.

CHAPTER I. ORGANIZATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAWCOMMISSION

Article 2'

1. The Commission shall consist of thirty-four members who shallbe persons of recognized competence in international law.

2. No two members of the Commission shall be nationals of thesame State.

3. In case of dual nationality a candidate shall be deemed to be anational of the State in which he ordinarily exercises civil and politicalrights.

Article 3

The members of the Commission shall be elected by the General As-sembly from a list of candidates nominated by the Governments of StatesMembers of the United Nations.

Article 4

Each Member may nominate for election not more than four candi-dates, of whom two may be nationals of the nominating State and two na-tionals of other States.

Text amended by the General Assembly resolution 36/39 of 18 November 1981.

,inn

Article 5

The names of the candidates shall be submitted in writing by theGovernments to the Secretary-General by the first of June of the year inwhich an election is held, provided that a Government may in exceptionalcircumstances substitute for a candidate whom it has nominated beforethe first of June another candidate whom it shall name not later than thirtydays before the opening of the General Assembly.

Article 6

The Secretary-General shall as soon as possible communicate to theGovernments of States Members the names submitted, as well as anystatements of qualifications of candidates that may have been submittedby the nominating Governments.

Article 7

The Secretary-General shall prepare the list referred to in article 3above, comprising in alphabetical order the names of all the candidatesduly nominated, and shall submit this list to the General Assembly for thepurposes of the election.

Article 8

At the election the electors shall bear in mind that the persons to beelected to the Commission should individually possess the qualificationsrequired and that in the Commission as a whole representation of themain forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the worldshould be assured.

Article 9 b

1. Those candidates, up to the maximum number prescribed foreach regional group, who obtain the greatest number of votes and not lessthan a majority of the votes of the Members present and voting shall beelected.

2. In the event of more than one national of the same State obtain-ing a sufficient number of votes for election the one who obtains thegreatest number of votes shall be elected and if the votes are equally di-vided the elder or eldest candidate shall be elected.

bTeXt amended by the General Assembly resolution 36/39 of 18 November 1981.

Article 10

The members of the Commission shall be elected for five years.They shall be eligible for re-election.

Article 11

In the case of a casual vacancy, the Commission itself shall fill thevacancy having due regard to the provisions contained in articles 2 and 8of this Statute.

Article 12d

The Commission shall sit at the European Office of the United Na-tions at Geneva. The Commission shall, however, have the right to holdmeetings at other places after consultation with the Secretary-General.

Article 13c

Members of the Commission shall be paid travel expenses, and shallalso receive a special allowance, the amount of which shall be determinedby the General Assembly.

Article 14

The Secretary-General shall, so far as he is able, make availablestaff and facilities required by the Commission to fulfil its task.

CHAPTER II. FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAWCOMMISSION

Article 15

In the following articles the expression "progressive development ofinternational law" is used for convenience as meaning the preparation ofdraft conventions on subjects which have not yet been regulated by inter-national law or in regard to which the law has not yet been sufficiently de-veloped in the practice of States. Similarly, the expression "codificationof international law" is used for convenience as meaning the more preciseformulation and systematization of rules of international law in fieldswhere there already has been extensive State practice, precedent and doc-trine.

I Text amended by General Assembly resolution 985 (X) of 3 December 1955.dText amended by General Assembly resolution 984 (X) of 3 December 1955.

1 Text amended by General Assembly resolution 485 (V) of 12 December 1950.

A. PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Article 16

When the General Assembly refers to the Commission a proposalfor the progressive development of international law, the Commissionshall follow in general a procedure on the following lines:

(a) It shall appoint one of its members to be Rapporteur,

(b) It shall formulate a plan of work;

(c) It shall circulate a questionnaire to the Governments, and shallinvite them to supply within a fixed period of time data and informationrelevant to items included in the plan of work;

(d) It may appoint some of its members to work with the Rappor-teur on the preparation of drafts pending receipt of replies to this ques-tionnaire;

(e) It may consult with scientific institutions and individual ex-perts; these experts need not necessarily be nationals of Members of theUnited Nations. The Secretary-General will provide, when necessary andwithin the limits of the budget, for the expenses of these consultations ofexperts;

(1) It shall consider the drafts proposed by the Rapporteur;

(g) When the Commission considers a draft to be satisfactory, itshall request the Secretary-General to issue it as a Commission docu-ment. The Secretariat shall give all necessary publicity to this documentwhich shall be accompanied by such explanations and supporting mate-rial as the Commission considers appropriate. The publication shall in-clude any information supplied to the Commission in reply to the ques-tionnaire referred to in subparagraph (c) above;

(h) The Commission shall invite the Governments to submit theircomments on this document within a reasonable time;

(i) The Rapporteur and the members appointed for that purposeshall reconsider the draft taking into consideration these comments andshall prepare a final draft and explanatory report which they shall submitfor consideration and adoption by the Commission;

(j) The Commission shall submit the draft so adopted with its rec-ommendations through the Secretary-General to the General Assembly.

Article 17

1. The Commission shall also consider proposals and draft multi-lateral conventions submitted by Members of the United Nations, theprincipal organs of the United Nations other than the General Assembly,specialized agencies, or official bodies established by intergovernmentalagreement to encourage the progressive development of international

law and its codification, and transmitted to it for that purpose by theSecretary-General.

2. If in such cases the Commission deems it appropriate to proceedwith the study of such proposals or drafts, it shall follow in general a pro-cedure on the following lines:

(a) The Commission shall formulate a plan of work, and studysuch proposals or drafts, and compare them with any other proposals anddrafts on the same subjects;

(b) The Commission shall circulate a questionnaire to all Mem-bers of the United Nations and to the organs, specialized agencies and of-ficial bodies mentioned above which are concerned with the question,and shall invite them to transmit their comments within a reasonabletime;

(c) The Commission shall submit a report and its recommenda-tions to the General Assembly. Before doing so, it may also, if it deems itdesirable, make an interim report to the organ or agency which has sub-mitted the proposal or draft;

(d) If the General Assembly should invite the Commission to pro-ceed with its work in accordance with a suggested plan, the procedureoutlined in article 16 above shall apply. The questionnaire referred to inparagraph (e) that article may not, however, be necessary.

B. CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Article 18

1. The Commission shall survey the whole field of internationallaw with a view to selecting topics for codification, having in mind exist-ing drafts whether governmental or not.

2. When the Commission considers that the codification of a par-ticular topic is necessary or desirable, it shall submit its recommendationsto the General Assembly.

3. The Commission shall give priority to requests of the GeneralAssembly to deal with any question.

Article 19

1. The Commission shall adopt a plan of work appropriate to eachcase.

2. The Commission shall, through the Secretary-General, addressto Governments a detailed request to furnish the texts of laws, decrees,judicial decisions, treaties, diplomatic correspondence and other docu-ments relevant to the topic being studied and which the Commissiondeems necessary.

Article 20

The Commission shall prepare its drafts in the form of articles andshall submit them to the General Assembly together with a commentarycontaining:

(a) Adequate presentation of precedents and other relevant data,including treaties, judicial decisions and doctrine;

(b) Conclusions relevant to:(i) The extent of agreement on each point in the practice of States

and in doctrine;(ii) Divergences and disagreements which exist, as well as argu-

ments invoked in favour of one or another solution.

Article 21

1. When the Commission considers a draft to be satisfactory, itshall request the Secretary-General to issue it as a Commission docu-ment. The Secretariat shall give all necessary publicity to the documentincluding such explanations and supporting material as the Commissionmay consider appropriate. The publication shall include any informationsupplied to the Commission by Governments in accordance with article19. The Commission shall decide whether the opinions of any scientificinstitution or individual experts consulted by the Commission shall be in-cluded in the publication.

2. The Commission shall request Governments to submit com-ments on this document within a reasonable time.

Article 22

Taking such comments into consideration, the Commission shallprepare a final draft and explanatory report which it shall submit with itsrecommendations through the Secretary-General to the General Assem-bly.

Article 23

1. The Commission may recommend to the General Assembly:

(a) To take no action, the report having already been published;

(b) To take note of or adopt the report by resolution;

(c) To recommend the draft to Members with a view to the conclu-sion of a convention;

(d) To convoke a conference to conclude a convention.

2. Whenever it deems it desirable, the General Assembly may re-fer drafts back to the Commission for reconsideration or redrafting.

Article 24

The Commission shall consider ways and means for making the evi-dence of customary international law more readily available, such as thecollection and publication of documents concerning State practice andof the decisions of national and international courts on questions of inter-national law, and shall make a report to the General Assembly on thismatter.

CHAPTER III. COOPERATION WITH OTHER BODIES

Article 25

1. The Commission may consult, if it considers it necessary, withany of the organs of the United Nations on any subject which is within thecompetence of that organ.

2. All documents of the Commission which are circulated to Gov-ernments by the Secretary-General shall also be circulated to such organsof the United Nations as are concerned. Such organs may furnish any in-formation or make any suggestions to the Commission.

Article 26

1. The Commission may consult with any international or nationalorganizations, official or non-official, on any subject entrusted to it if itbelieves that such a procedure might aid it in the performance of its func-tions.

2. For the purpose of distribution of documents of the Commis-sion, the Secretary-General, after consultation, with the Commission,shall draw up a list of national and international organizations concernedwith questions of international law. The Secretary-General shallendeavour to include on this list at least one national organization of eachMember of the United Nations.

3. In the application of the provisions of this article, the Commis-sion and the Secretary-General shall comply with the resolutions of theGeneral Assembly and the other principal organs of the United Nationsconcerning relations with Franco Spain and shall exclude, both from con-sultations and from the list, organizations which have collaborated withthe nazis and fascists.

4. The advisability of consultation by the Commission with inter-governmental organizations whose task is the codification of interna-tional law, such as those of the Pan American Union, is recognized.

ANNEXE B

Statut de [a Commission du droit international

Article premier

1. La Commission du droit international a pour but de promouvoirle d6veloppement progressif du droit international et sa codification.

2. Elle s'occupera au premier chef du droit international public,sans qu'il lui soit interdit de pintrer dans le domaine du droit internatio-nal priv6.

CHAPITRE PREMIER- - ORGANISATION DE LA COMMISSIONDU DROIT INTERNATIONAL

Article 2'

1. La Commission se compose de trente-quatre membres, poss6-dant une competence reconnue en matiere de droit international.

2. Elle ne peut comprendre plus d'un ressortissant d'un m~meEtat.

3. En cas de double nationat , un candidat sera considr6 commeayant la nationalit6 du pays dans lequel il exerce ordinairement ses droitscivils et politiques.

Article 3

Les membres de la Commission sont 6lus par l'Assembl6e g6n6ralesur une liste de candidats pr6sent6s par les gouvernements des EtatsMembres de l'Organisation des Nations Unies.

Article 4

Chaque Membre peut pr6senter quatre candidats au plus, dont deuxpeuvent etre ressortissants de l'Etat qui les prisente et deux peuvent Etredes ressortissants d'autres Etats.

' Texte amendd par la rdsolution 36/39 de I'Assembl6e gen6rale en date du 18 no-vembre 1981.

Article 5

Les noms des candidats doivent etre communiqu6s par icrit par lesgouvemements au Secr6taire g6n6ral avant le I-juin de l'ann6e au coursde laquelle l'61ection a lieu; toutefois, un gouvemement peut, dans descas exceptionnels, substituer A un candidat qu'il avait pr6sent6 avant lelerjuin un autre candidat d6sign6 au plus tard trente jours avant l'ouver-ture de l'Assembl6e g6n6rale.

Article 6

Le Secr6taire g6n6ral transmet aussit6t que possible aux gouverne-ments des Etats Membres les noms qui lui sont ainsi communiqu6s, demime que les curriculum vitae des candidats envoy~s par le gouveme-ment qui les pr~sente.

Article 7

Le Secr6taire g6n6ral dresse, par ordre alphab6tique, la liste, pr~vuei l'article 3 ci-dessus, de tous les candidats dfiment pr~sent~s et la soumeti l'Assemblke g~n~rale aux fins de l'M1ection.

Article 8

A l'6lection, les 6lecteurs auront en vue que les personnes appel~esi faire partie de la Commission r~unissent individuellement les condi-tions requises et que, dans l'ensemble, la representation des grandes for-mes de civilisation et des principaux syst~mes juridiques du monde soitassuree.

Article 9 b

1. Sont 6lus, i concurrence du nombre maximal de membres pres-crit pour chaque groupe regional, les candidats qui obtiennent le plusgrand nombre de voix et au moins la majorit6 des voix des Membres pr6-sents et votants.

2. Au cas ofi plus d'un ressortissant d'un meme Etat obtiendraitsuffisamment de voix pour etre 6lu, celui qui aura obtenu le plus de voixsera 6lu et, au cas ofi il y aurait partage 6gal des voix, le candidat le plusig6 sera 61u.

b Texte amendd par la r~solution 36/39 de I'Assembl6e gn6rale en date du 18 no-vembre 1955.

Article 16F

Les membres de la Commission sont 6lus pour cinq ans; ils sont r6-ligibles.

Article 11

En cas de vacance survenant apres 6lection, la Commission pourvoitelle-meme au si~ge vacant, en tenant compte des dispositions contenuesdans les articles 2 et 8 ci-dessus.

Article 12'

La Commission se r~unit i l'Office europeen des Nations Unies iGeneve. Elle a toutefois le droit de se r~unir en d'autres endroits, apr~sconsultation avec le Secritaire gin~ral.

Article 13e

Les membres de la Commission reqoivent leurs frais de voyage et,de plus, une indemnit6 spciale dont le montant est fix6 par l'Assemblkegen~rale.

Article 14

Le Secr~taire g~naral mettra, autant qu'il lui est possible, i la dispo-sition de la Commission le personnel et les facilitis dont la Commissionaura besoin pour accomplir sa tiche.

CHAPITRE II. - TACHE DE LA COMMISSIONDU DROIT INTERNATIONAL

Article 15

Dans les articles qui suivent, l'expression diveloppement progressifdu droit international est employ6e, pour la commodit6, pour viser les casoil l s'agit de r&liger des conventions sur des sujets qui ne sont pas en-core r~gls par le droit international ou relativement auxquels le droitn'est pas encore sutfisamment developp6 dans la pratique des Etats. Dememe, l'expression (< codification du droit international , est employee,pour la commodite, pour viser les cas oii il s'agit de formuler avec plus de

, Texte amendt par la rsolution 985 (X) de I'Assembl6e g&nale en date du 3 dd-cembre 1955.

d Texte arnend par la resolution 984 (X) de I'Assemble g&&ale en date du 3 dd-cembre 1955.

Texte amende par la resolution 485 (V) de I'Assembl&e g6n6rale en date du 12 di-cembre 1950.

precision et de syst~matiser les r~gles du droit international dana desdomaines dans lesquels il existe d6ji une pratique Etatique considarable,des precedents et des opinions doctrinales.

A. - DVELOPPEMENT PROGRESSIF DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL

Article 16

Lorsque l'Assembl~e g~n~rale renvoie A la Commission une propo-sition concernant le daveloppement progressif du droit international, laCommission suit, dans les grandes lignes, la procedure suivante:

a) Dtsigne un rapporteur parmi ses membres;

b) Elle 6tablit un plan de travail;

c) Elie adresse un questionnaire aux gouvemements et invite cesderniers i lui foumir, dans un dtlai d~termin6, des informations et desrenseignements se rapportant aux sujets figurant dans le plan de travail;

d) Elle d~signe, s'il y a lieu, dana son sein les membres chargts detravailler avec le Rapporteur i la prtparation d'avant-projets, en atten-dant les r~ponses i son questionnaire;

e) Elle peut consulter des institutions scientifiques et des expertsindividuels; ces experts ne devront pas ncessairement 8tre des res-sortissants de Membres de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Le Secr-taire g~ntral pourvoit, lorsque c'est ntcessaire et dans les limites du bud-get, aux frais de consultations d'experts;

J) Elle 6tudie les avant-projets du Rapporteur;

g) Lorsqu'elle estime qu'un projet est satisfaisant, elle prie le Se-crttaire g6ntral de le publier en tant que document de la Commission. LeSecretariat donnera i ce document la publicit6 ndcessaire et y joindratelles explications et pi~ces i l'appui que la Commission jugera appro-pri~es. La publication doit comprendre les informations fournies i laCommission en r~ponse au questionnaire mentionn6 A l'alinta c ci-dessus;

h) Elle invite les gouvemements i pr6senter, dana un d6lai raison-nable, leurs observations sur ce document;

i) Le Rapporteur et les membres d6sign6s i cet effet r6examinentle projet i la lunire de ces observations et 6laborent le texte final de ceprojet avec rapport explicatif, qu'ils soumettent pour adoption i l'exa-men de la Commission;

j) Elle soumet, par l'entremise du Secr6taire g6n6ral, le texteadopt6 ainsi que ses recommandations A l'Assembl6e g6n6rale.

Article 17

1. La Commission examine 6galement les plans et projets deconventions multilat~rales imanant de Membres de l'Organisation desNations Unies, d'organes prmcipaux des Nations Unies autres que l'As-sembl6e g nirale, d'institutions spcialis6es ou d'organisations officiel-les 6tablies par accords inter-gouvernementaux en vue d'encourager led6veloppement progressifdu droit international et sa codification, que luitransmet i cet effet le Secretaire g6n6ral.

2. Si, en de tels cas, elle juge utile de poursuivre l'6tude desditsplans ou projets, elle suit, dans les grandes lignes, la proc6dure ci-dessous:

a) Elle 6tablit un plan de travail, itudie lesdits plans ou projets etles compare avec d'autres plans ou projets se rapportant aux memessujets;

b) Elle adresse un questionnaire i tous les Membres de l'Orga-nisation des Nations Unies et aux organes, institutions sp6cialis6es etorganisations officielles spcifis ci-dessus qui sont int6ress6s i la ques-tion et les invite i faire connaitre leurs observations dans un d6lairaisonnable;

c) Elle soumet un rapport et des recommandations i l'Assembl6egen6rale. Elle peut aussi, si elle lejuge desirable, faire, avant cela, un rap-port int~rimaire a l'organe ou institution dont 6nane le plan ou le projet;

d) Si 'Assembl6e g6n"rale invite la Commission i poursuivre sestravaux selon un plan propose, la procedure d6crite i 1'article 16 est appli-cable. Il se peut toutefois que le questionnaire mentionn6 i l'alin6a cdudit article soit inutile.

B. - CODIFICATION DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL

Article 18

1. La Commission recherche, dans l'ensemble du droit internatio-nal, les sujets appropriis de codification, en tenant compte des projetsexistants, qu'ils soient d'origine gouvernementale ou non.

2. Lorsqu'elle juge la codification d'un sujet n6cessaire ou d6si-rable, elle soumet ses recommandations a l'Assemblke g6n6rale.

3. Elle donne priorit6 i toute demande de l'Assemblke generale detraiter une question.

Article 19

1. La Commission adopte, pour chaque cas, le plan de travail quilui parait appropri6.

211

2. Elle s'adresse, par l'entremise du Secr6taire g6n6ral, aux gou-vemements pour leur demander, avec toute la pr6cision n6cessaire, de luifournir les textes de lois, d6crets, d6cisions judiciaires, trait6s, correspon-dance diplomatique et autres documents relatifs aux sujets i l'6tude etdont elle croit avoir besoin.

Article 20

La Commission r6dige ses projets en articles et les soumnet a l'As-sembl~e g~n~rale avec un commentaire comprenant :

a) Une pr6sentation adaquate des precedents et autres donn6espertinentes, y compris les trait6s, les dcisions judiciaires et la doctrine;

b) Des conclusions pr6cisant:i) L'6tendue de l'accord r6alis6 sur chaque point dans la pra-

tique des Etats et dans la doctrine;ii) Les divergences et dasaccords qui subsistent, ainsi que les

arguments invoqu~s en faveur de chacune des thises.

Article 21

1. Lorsque la Commission estime qu'unprojet est satisfaisant, elleprie le Secr6taire g6n6ral de le publier en tant que document de la Com-mission. Le Secr6tariat donnera i ce document la publicit6 n6cessaire et yjoindra telles explications et pi&ces i l'appui que la Commission jugeraappropri6es. La publication doit comprendre les informations foumies ila Commission par les gouvemements en vertu de l'article 19. La Com-mission d6cide si des opinions 6mises par des institutions scientifiques oudes experts individuels consult6s par la Commission doivent etre compri-ses dans la publication.

2. La Commission demande aux gouvernements de lui faire con-naitre, dans un d6lai raisonnable, leurs observations sur ce document.

Article 22

La Commission pr6pare, i la lumi~re de ces observations, le texte fi-nal du projet et un rapport explicatif qu'elle soumet avec ses recomman-dations i l'Assembl6e g6n6rale par l'entremise du Secr6taire g6n6ral.

Article 23

1. La Commission peut recommander i l'Assembl6e g6nirale:

a) De n'entreprendre aucune action, le rapport ayant W publi6;

b) De prendre acte du rapport, ou de l'adopter dans une r6solution;

c) De recommander le projet aux Membres en vue de la conclu-sion d'une convention;

d) De convoquer une confdrence pour conclure une convention.

2. Chaque fois qu'elle le juge utile, l'Assemble g~n~rale renvoiei la Commission les projets aux fins de riexamen ou de nouvelle r&lac-tion.

Article 24

La Commission examine les moyens susceptibles de rendre plus ac-cessible la documentation relative au droit international coutumier, parexemple la compilation et la publication de documents 6tablissant la pra-tique des Etats et des decisions de juridictions nationales et internationa-les sur des questions de droit international, et elle fait rapport i l'As-semblke g~n~rale sur ce sujet.

CHAPITRE m. - COOPERATION

AVEC D'AUTRES ORGANISMES

Article 25

1. La Commission peut consulter, lorsqu'elle le juge utile, tout or-gane des Nations Unies sur tout sujet entrant dans la compltence de cetorgane.

2. Tous les documents de la Commission transmis aux gouverne-ments par le Secr~taire g~nelra seront 6galement transmis aux organes del'Organisation des Nations Umes qui y sont nt~ress~s. Ces organes pe-vent fournir des renseignements et presenter des suggestions i la Com-mission.

Article 26

1. La Commission peut consulter toute organisation, nationale ouinternationale, officielle ou non, sur tout sujet qui lui a t6 confi6, si elle lejuge utile i l'accomplissement de sa tiche.

2. Aux fins de la distribution des documents de la Commission, leSecrtaire g~n~ral 6tablira, apr~s avoir consult6 la Commission, une liste

d'organisations nationales ou internationales s'occupant du droit interna-tional. I1 s'efforcera d'inclure dans cette liste au moins une orgamsationnationale de chaque Membre de l'Organisation des Nations Umes.

3. En appliquant les dispositions du prsent article, la Commissionet le Secr~taire g~n&al se conformeront aux rsolutions de l'Assembl~eg~n~rale et des autres organes prncipaux de l'Organisation des Nations

Unies concernant les relations avec l'Espagne franquiste et excluront desconsultations et de la liste les organisations qui ont collabor6 avec les na-

zis et les fascistes.

4. L'utilit6 de consultations entre la Commission et les organes in-tergouvernementaux, tels que ceux de l'Union panam~ricaine, dont latiche est la codification du droit international, est reconnue.