the idea of nationalism intro

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THE IDEA O FNAT IO NALISMA STUDY IN ITS ORIGINS AND BACKGROUND

HANS KOHNWITH A NE W I NTRODUCT ION BY CRAIG CALHOUN

TRANSACT ION PUBLISHERSNE W BRUNSWKK (U.S.A.) AND L ONDON (U.K.)


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INTRODUCTION TOTHETRANSACTIONEDITION

I The contrast o f civic to e thn ic nationalism, l iberal to organic, Westernto Eastern is s o habitual today that it is hard to recall that itw as invented.Like nationalism itself, it s e e m s almost natural, a ref lection o f real i tyrather than a construction o f it. But wh i le the distinction does grasp impor tan t aspects of modern history an d contemporary polit ics, it does s o ina specif ic w a y , shaping evaluations an d perceptions, reinforcing some political projects and prejudicing thinkers against others. An d it w as invented.Hans Kohn w as th e most inf luent ial source o f both the opposi t ion o fcivic t o e thn ic nationalisms an d o f i ts associat ion w i t h a parallel oppos i4 tion between Western an d Eastern versions o f moderni ty. The Idea o fNationalism is th e mo st impor tant statement o f Kohns view, an d it occupies a central place amid his voluminous wri t ings a s the main generalstatement o f his mature perspective. It is o f interest no t only becauseKohn w as an impor tant scholar and pub li c intellectual, an d because hiscontrast o f civic and ethnic nationalisms has been deep l y inf luential, bu talso because his book is an enlightening w i ndow onto th e mo re generalrelationship between liberalism an d nationalism.The I d e a ofNationalism h a s , in on e s e n s e , an odd organizat ion After ageneral in troduct ion to the nature of nationalism, Kohn traces the developmen t of th e idea o f nationalism in Western history, from Israel an dHellas through Rome, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, a nd th e Reformation to the late eighteenth-century emergence of fu ll y developed m odern nat ionalismThe continental E u r o p e of t h e s e v e n te e n t h century a n d of the first half of thee i g h t e e n t h still l ived in th e prenat ional ist ic a g e Bu t in the g row th of central izedstates, in t he secu lar i za ti on of political life, in th e rise of individualismwith itsfaith in liberty an d its conf idence in mans powe r , with th e acceleration of ec o


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THE IDEA OF NATIONALISMnomic l i f e demanding the loosening of t h e s ta t i forms of traditional organizat io n t h e foundations w e r e laid for the r i s e of n a t i o n a l i s m . ( p . 2 0 4 )France took the lead on th e European cont inent, though K oh n a cknowledges that Englands seventeenth.century revolution w as no t j u st aprecursor bu t the first real f lower ing ofmodern nationalism~ Th e American And French revolutions were pivotal , crowning t he Age o f Enlighten.merit. Th e story o f nat ional ism is t hu s embedded in an account o f thedeve lopmen t o f Western civil ization. Th e account culminates with theproduct ion of a new k ind of l iberal universalism an d appropr ia te pol i ticalstructures fo r this by means o f revolut ion, t ransformation o f absolutistmonarchies, an d creation o f new countries in the new wor ld. Moderncivi l ization was molded into its definite form in t he e igh teen th century(p . 215) . Then there are tw o chapters on Stirrings in the O ld Wo r ld tracing developments inCentra l an d Eastern Europe. These start out p romising cultural revitalization bu t en d up ant i-modern or at least reactionary.Kohn init ial ly planned to wr i te a second volume. This wou ld have extended the discussion o f Europe further into the nineteenth century an dadded more on nationalisms wh ich developed elsewhere on into the t w e nt ieth century. He never did, though he pub l ished numerous studies o flater European nationalism an d nationalism in Asia, Africa, an d elsewhere?Bu t in a sense the very omission is tell ing. H is s to r y o f nationalism is astory o f l iberal achievement an d an i l l iberal challenge to it. It is a story inwhich the Westrepresented pr inc ipal ly by England, Franc; an d the UnitedStatesrepresents the universal an d th e rest o f the wor ld, frequently i dentified wi th the East, represents innumerable part icular isms. Bu t it is also astory that refuses to cede nationalism to mere backwardness, atavistic loyalties, or traditionalism.Th e idea o f nationalism, in Kohns v iew, developed specif ically in th eWest a s p a rt o f the pursui t o f a social order based on reason and un iversa ljustice. It w as centra l to l ibe ra l ism an d liberalism central t o i t un ti l itw asappropr iated and transformed, mainly in the East, by Romantics, traditionalists, mystical i rrational ists, an d those pursuing a different raison d & a tgoverned no t by universal ideals bu t by th e desire to c la im an equal oreven dominan t place in the wor ld remade by the Wes t Bu t th e good,l iberal version o f nationalism w as not irrevocably lost, Kohn suggested; itcould be recovered, c la imed by Western Europe an d th e U S , an d even

INTRODUCTIO~.J TO THE TRANSACTION EDITION xipotential ly spread throughout the wor l d a s pa r t o f the Wests gift to humank ind. Liberal nationalism could still serve a s a valuable step o n thepath to cosmopol i tan global integrat ion. As Kohn ended The I d e a ofNationalism, summing u p its message:

F r o m H e b r e w a n d G r e e k i d e a s th e a g e of nationalism drew m a n y of it s initial a n dfundamental inspirations, but f rom J e r u s a l e m a n d Athens s h i n e a l s o th e e t e r n a lguiding s t a r s which lift th e a g e of nationalism a b o v e itself, pointing forward o nth e r o a d to d e e p e r liberty a n d to higher forms of integration. ( p . 5 7 6 )Greece an d Israel are the crucial sources o f the Western inher i tance o funiversal ism, humanism, reason, an d liberty: It is s igni f icant that inantiquity only th e tw o nat ional ly conscious peoples deve loped a conscious cosmopol i tan ism and universal ism (p . 36) :Kohns story o f the idea of nationalism, in other words, is situated inthe heroic version o f the story of the rise of Western civi l ization an d its

gift to the wor ld o f Classical, Judeo.Christian, an d Enlightenment versions o f reasoned universalism. It is a s much an account o f the flourishin g an d impor tance of l iberalism a s a study of nationalism. Bu t it is no tsimply t r iumphal . Though Kohn seems to have been o f generally opt imistic character, an d found reasons fo r hope no t always apparent to his co ntemporar ies, The I d e a o fNationalism is informed by the rise o f Nazisman d Wor ld War II, an d indeed by Kohns fear fo r the future of l iberalism.Kohn had already been worr ied by i l l iberal nationalism, especially in newstates such a s Turkey, an d by Soviet Commun ism. He w as we l l aware o fthe potential for dominant groups to harness nationalist ideology to projectsthat oppressed minori ty nationalit ies an d indeed freedom more generally.3But the rise o f the Nazis prompted Kohn no t only to turn his attentionback to Europe bu t to try to wa r n his fellow Amer icans o f the threatNat ional Socialism posed.4t~cot~

The l94Os must have been an extraordinary t ime to wr i te about nat ionalism. They were perhaps a sti l l more extraord inary t ime to take up thechallenge o f showing that nationalism an d l iberal democracy were co mpatible, an d indeed that enlightened nationalism w as inseparable froml iberalism. The tendency tp equate nationalism wi th its wors t e x c e s s e s w a s


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THE IDEA OF NATIONALISM INTRODUCTION TO THE TRANSACTION EDITION xiiialready widespread (itcontinues to shape l iberal discussions). Th e othermost prominent early twentieth-century analyst of nationalism, Car l ton B .Hayes, por trayed ita s a kind o f religion, emphasizing th e i rrational ratherthan the rational.5 Much more extreme examples o f the effort to distinguish essentially bad nationalism from th e b roader and more benign co nsciousness of nat ional ident i ty abound. Frederick Her tz, fo r example, argued that th e term nat ional ism should be reserved for pol i t ica l movements characterized by a one-sided, intolerant, an d often fanatical accentuation o f ones ow n national i ty .. th e s t r iv i ng for powe r an d dominat ion,an d the subordinat ion of al l other values to these aims.6 Kohn by contraststressed at length ho w nationalism grew in close re la t ionsh ip to Enlightenment liberalism an d cosmop ol i tan ism, and should no t be equated wi ththe ethnic variants that grew in nineteenth-century response, inspired inpar t by Rousseau an d Romant ic ism. Both shared in th e common historyo f nationalism, though they revealed that it was Janus-faced. Th e latterwere no t merely late, however, bu t different in kind, an d representative o fa branching off o f intellectual l ineage.Though Kohn only presented his ful ly crystall ized view in The Idea ofNationalism, he ha d been developing it throughout his life, on the b a s i s o fpersonal experience an d publ ic commitment. a s we l l scholarship. Kohnw as born in Prague on September 15 , 1891, n ea r th e en d of th e lo ngnineteenh-century European peace an d just befo re the Cont inent s convulsive pol i tical crises. He g rew u p in a prosperous an d cosmopol i tanBohemia bu t IWed to s e e the collapse o f th e Austro-Hungar ian Empire,the struggles of.Czechoslovakian Repub l ic and its Ge rman invasion, an dthe. reconstruct ion of Czechoslovakia a s a communis t state after the ruin~qus Second Wor ld War. He d ie d in 1971 in Philadelphia.As f o rmat i ve fo r t he y oung Hans Kohn a s this cul tura l an d pol i t ica lcontext w as the project o f cultural or ethical Zionism.7 He studied atth e Ge rman Universi ty in Prague, eventually rece ivinga doctorate in l a w .Whi le there, he became act ive in Zionis t s tudent organizations. Fo r h im,asibr many others, a visi t from MartinBuber w as transformative. Indeed,,Bthers reception by the Prague students enthusiastic an d recruitecia numha df devoted fo llowe rs to cul tura l Zionism. If there was a single fundamenta l tene t to this alternative to Theodore Herzls statist version o f Jew~iifrbdonlism it w as the no ti on that Judaism i tself required an internal%newal . ft w as no t e no ug h to change th e external condit ions fa ce d by

J e w s , or even to create a new state to give Jews a secure place to live. Ifboth J e w s and Judaism were to f lourish t he re mus t be a t ransformat ion o fJewish culture an d indeed a spiri tual revitalization. Buber thus brought toKohn an d others his ow n version o f th e cul tura l Zionism associated w i t hAhad Haam, w ho clashed famously w i t h Herzl over just these i s s u e s .Herz l focused on saving J e w s , Ha am and Bube r on saving Judaism. Herzlp romoted a stra ightforwardly Western secular modernizat ion p rog ram,emphasizing th e state a s such an d no t focusing directly on dynamics ofidenti ty, social cohes ion , o r re li g ious values. By compar ison , Haam an dBuber were more interested in wha t made J e w s J e w s , an d wha t made Judaism valuable. Interestingly, t hey we r e also fa r more conciliatory towardsthe Arab populat ion o f Palestine.

F .. . In fact, Herzl ha d recruited Buber to edi t a Zionis t paper in Viemia, bu tt hey g rew apar t over the issue o f Jewish i d en t it y . The same happenedwi th others, inc luding Israel Zangwi l l , a Brit ish Zionis t w ho by his ow naccount worked slavishly fo r He rd before breaking w i t h h im on preciselythis issue. For Herz l, Jew was largely a biological, a racial category, an dJ e w s were peop le t o be protected by seek ing the powe r of a s t a t e . 8 But fo rBuber and Zangw i ll , J e w s were bound spi i j tual ly an d culturally. Moreover,the cultural Zionists s a w in Judaism a moral message wh ich should changethe outside wor l d ; an d faulted Jewish inwardness that blunted this m essagewhich amounted roughly to h um a n b ro t he r hood , o r th e essentialrelational i ty Buber wou ld evoke with th e language o f I an d thou ( a n ~t ic ipat ing in some ways Levinas s more phi losophical ly sophisticated account o f a1terity~).9 As Kohn w ou ld do a little later, Zangw i l l expl ici tlycalled fo r jo ining the Jewish message of justice an d sol idari ty to Greekuniversal cu l ture, though Zangw i llemphas ized Greek aesthetic ideals morethan Kohn.In t he ea rl y twen t ie th century, Haams cul tura l Zionists were oftenseen a s Jewish part icu lar ists in dpposi t ion to Herzls advocates fo r as e c u l a r , state.centered Jewish realpolit ik. As the c a s e o f Kohn reveals, though,th e part icu lar ist label ca n be misleading. The cu ltu ra l Zionists certainlycalled fo r a stronger sense of the special i den ti ty o f J e w s , not merely a s arace or descent group, bu t a s bearers o f a mora l an d cul tura l mission.Kohn would later emphasize Messianism a s a distinctive componen t o fJewish nationalism but also a s a contr ibut ion t o t he b roade r developmento f national ism. And he wou ld interpret this not only in terms o f the


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xiv THE IDEA OF NATIONALISMbelief iii the coming of a Redeemer, bu t a s an asp i ra t ion to make a betterw o rl d. H e thus l inked Messianism to liberal national ist faith in the poss ibility o f t ransforming the condit ions o f social l ife t o achieve universalends. The fut u re kingdom never w as expected ou ts ide this wor ld , inHeaven, bu t w as always regarded a s a phase o f human h isto ry , whose stageW a s t he earth , somet imes a t ransf igured earth, bu t still the earth wi th lifepurif ied an d c la r if ie d bu t sti l l human. .. It w as a stage of national o tuniversal history (p . 44 ) . Fo r Kohn , Z i oni sm must no t stand fo r b a ckward- looking historical claims, no r on ly fo r th e inward- looking self-concern o f the chosen peop le . It must contribute to wha t he wou ld lateranalyze a s l iberal nationalisms advance o f g loba l j ust ice and g loba l integration. Jewish nat idna l ism s tood a s a mora l nat ionalism duty and no tlaw; responsibi l ity for humani ty. 2 Of course, in th e en d Jewish particularism came to be associated l e s s with such ou tward looking reformersand more wi th the Orthodox an d wi th a range o f immigrants to Israel w hosought to defend received understandings o f Jewish ident i ty, part icu larinterpretat ions o f the law, an d even exclusive definitions o f w ho w as areal J e w . No t only d id I sr ael become more relig ious than early secularZionists imag ined, i ts r e li g ion was shaped l e s s by the spi r i tua l renewalBuber, Haam, Kohn, an d others advocated.In this context, it is curious that Zangw i l l should be remembered fo rtw o phrases that seem to embody contradictory messages. It w as his play,Tile Melting P o t , that popular ized that understanding o f America, toTheodore Roosevelt s great pleasure. Bu t it was th e same Zangw i l l w hoinf luential ly and misleading ly describedP alestine a s a land w i thou t peoplefo r a people w i t hou t land.3 It w as impor tant to many Zionists to co nceive o f Palestine a s al l bu t emptyas European sett le rs had earlier thoughtof North Amer ica, Austral ia, Southern Africa, an d other potent ial ly desi rable terr itories. B ut o f course Palestine w as already occupied an d when heapproached it l e s s abstractly, Zangw i l l recognized it was relatively denselyoccupied an d that this would be a problem fo r Zionism. Indeed, he brokewi th the dominan t currents of Zionism an d became a leader in the pursui to f a non-Zionist approach to a Jewish territory.4 He w a s among those temptedby the iffer of Ugandathough o f course it to o w a s hardly empty. Butcen tral to the transformation in his thought and the development of Kohnsw as th e notion that a terri torial solution fo r J e w s need no t be a r acia ll y o rethnical ly orderedstate , an d perhaps must be a mult icul tural state.

INTRODUCTION TO THE TRANSACTION EDITIONIn general, the cul tura l Zionists from Haam on were sympathet ic tothe Arab populat ion already in Palestine. Their preoccupat ion wi th Je wish ethics an d the relat ions o f Jews to the larger world w as a factor in this.When Buber, fo r example, wrote. that the Arabs are the test G od has given

Zionism he d idn t mean simply that Arabs were trouble fo r J e w s , thoughhe h a s been quoted a s though that we re t he s e n s e o f his remark. H e mean tthat t he p ro jec t o f Zionism wou ld have to be ju d ge d o n ho w we l l itaccommodated the interests o f Arabs a s we l l a s J e w s , an d h ow w e ll itme t th emoral standards o f Judaism. Such thoughts were w idesp read in the Bri tShalom (Covenant of P e a c e ) movement As Kohns fr iend Robert Weltschp u t it in 1918, Zionism is no t only a pol i t ica l movement; it is above al l aspir i tual and moral oppor tuni ty . 15 Cul tural or ethical Zionists felt that al lJewish immigrat ion to an d sett lement o f th e land must only be done inbrotherly conci l iation wi th the Palestinian people. Anything they wouldregard a s an immora l impos i t ion should no t be at tempted.Kohn in part icu lar was deeply troubled by the ways in wh ich Palestinia n settlement p u t Jews in the posi t ion o f dominat ing others by powe ralone, rather than cultural r enewa l and a dialogical exchange. He wasespecially unimpressed wi th arguments based on historic r ight ( jus t a she would be in his wri t ings on nat ional ism years later). With the termhistoric right, he suggested , one can rationalize every kind o f injustice.6 As he wrote to Buber in 1929: W e have been in Palestine fo r 1 2years no w an d have no t once seriously tried to secure th e acceptance oft he peop l e o r to negotiate with t he peop l e that live in the country. Wehave relied exclusively o n t he mil i tary powe r of Grea t Britain. We have setgoals that inevitably an d in themselves ha d to lead to conflicts wi th theArabs an d about wh ich w e should s a y that they are reason - an d just if iedreason . fo r a nat iona l upr ising against us,7Kohn was by this t ime l iving in Palestine. During Wor ld War I, he ha dbeen a pr isoner o f w ar an d was in terned inSoviet pr isons in Samarkandan d Khaborovsk; Krasnoyarsk an d Irkutsk until 1920. He learned R ussian an d later re turned to t he Soviet Union a s a journal ist fo r th e Frankfurter Zeitung H is wri t ings on Russian nationalism an d th e USSR aremuch inf luenced by personal observat ion an d are no t wi thout sympathy.He also spent a g reat deal o f t ime in Paris and London, working fo r Zionis torganizat ions an d combining an increasing commi tmen t to scholar ly writ

in g wi th both activism an d journal ism. H e had marr ied J ett y Wah l in

xv.


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xvi TH E IDEA OF NATIONALISM INTRODUCTION TO TH E TRANSACTION EDITION1921, an d then in 1925 moved to Palestine, where he worked until 1929.Q u i c J c i 3 ~ though, Kohn grew frustrated both with the l imited s u c c e s s o fcultural Zionism compared to more ethnonationalist variants, an d wi th thegrow ing tensions between J e w s an d Arabs. The dominant Zionist approach~ ~ o c e d him not just because of the conflicts itengendered wi th PalestinianAbs bu t because itat best ignored an d at wors t w a s directly contrary to thespiri tual an d cultural renaissance o f Judaism he sought. The A ra b r iots o f1929 shook h im, and he lped to precipitate his move to the United S t a t e s . Atthe same tim; Kohns grow ing frustration w i t h the dominant currents inZ ionism led h im to lo ok further at the nature o f nationalism.Kohn also g rew mo re an d more engaged w i t h historical research intoEuropean nat ional ism not least because European affairs seemed determinan t fo r g lobal af fa i rs. After the r iots o f 1929 he left Palestine an d in1934 started teaching modern history at Smith College in Northampton,Massachusetts. From 1949 until 1 961 , h e taught a t th e City College ofNew York, intermi t tent ly at the New School fo r Social Research, an d a s avisi ting professor at Harvard, Chicago, an d other universit ies. He was a l s oa member o f the Institute fo r Advanced Study in Princeton. B ut K oh nnever became s imply an academ ic historian. Fo r al l his academic appo i n tmen ts and his prominence among h isto rians, Kohn rema ined in important ways a s devoted to pub l ic intellectual life a s to scholarship . Or rather,his scholarship was a lw a ys in th e service o f a publ ic agenda. And wh i lethat agenda ha d a variety o f specif ic foci from Zionism to alerting theAmer ican public to the dangers o f Nazism to shaping Western response tothe ant i-co lonial nat ional isms o f the pos twar era, it had an endur ing theme.Th e theme w as rat ional enl ightenment l iberalism, a nd mo re specif icallythe possibi l i ty o f a grow ing unity o f humank ind in wh i c h na ti ona li smw a s no t the enemy o f cosmopol i tanism bu t a crucial if temporary media.to r between individuals an d global cit izenship. Until th e en d o f his life,Kohn w a s engaged both i n w r it ing the history o f nationalism an d i n t r y ingt o g u ide it.

Kohn w as steeped in Central European intellectual traditions an d exempl i f ied th e c ommand o f mul t ip le languages and b read th o f learningthat s o astonishes u s abou t many n ine teen than d twent ie th-century G er

xviiman thinkers)8 And a s was typical o f these thinkers, he saw the Greeks a sthe fundamenta l source o f Western civil ization. It was somewha t moredistinctive to give equal weight , a s he does in The I d e a of History, to theJ e w s . Certa in ly Judea an d Hellas were small countries an d the ancientwor ld w as a broad terrain, bu t they stand ou t against the background of al lthe rest of Ant iqui ty . Indeed, for the European consciousness, this background w a s no more than a distinct an d obscure sett ing wh ich by contrastserved to i l luminate even more brightly th e tw o great protagonists o f a n ~cient history, Israel an d Hellas (p . 27) . Iiigeneral, Kohn probably exaggera t e s the extent t o w h ic h appreciation an d appropr iat ion of the Old Testament heritage was basic to early European nationalism. Bu t it w as no twi thout impor tance.Th e Greeks an d the Jews shared tw o basic traits that set them apar t inthe ancient wor ld : individuals mattered, an d they achieved nat ional consciousness. The tw o are common ly opposedor at least they have been inrecent years, especially by liberals bu t also by more than a few conformi ty.minded ethnonationalists.Bu t Khn clearly wants from the outset to makethe po in t that they need not be. Among the Greeks an d J e w s , the naturalgroup-sentiment o f tr ibalism wh ich is common to a ll ethnic groups w a stransformed into something more. And the something more o f Greek an dJudaic nationalism makes no s e n s e wi thout the complement o f the moreactive engagement an d digni ty o f each member o f th e g roup . J e w s an dGreeks developed a new consciousness which g a v e every member of thegroup the knowledge of a special mission entrusted to itan d distinguishing itfrom all other peoples..This consciousness, shared b y every individual, raisedhim to a new personal dignity, an d prepared the spir itual foundations o fdemocracy (p . 27))~ Or again, the m a s s e s o f the other peoples appeared, toGreeks an d Hebrews alike, a s wi thout indiv idual digni ty, subject to thewi l l o f their despotic rulers, w i thou t participation in a national mission, andwi thout an active share in the cultural life reserved to the pr iestly c l a s s .With the other peoples of antiquity, only rulers and empires left their tracescm history. With the Greeks and the J e w , itw a s the national character and thespir itual creative energy of the people wh ich endured (p . 28) .Kohns theme f lows a s directly from his heritage in cultural Zionism a sfrom the crisis o f Europe that culminated in World War IL As Wo l fremarks, there was something nave about the cul tura l Zionis t hope fo r a

bi-national state in Palestine, since there was no t much suppor t fo r this


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xviii THE IDEA OP NATIONALISMidea among either J e w s or Arabs.2 This is an instance of the idealists, hopefo r th e abstract ought w i t hou t much regard fo r the concrete tendencies.And indeed, Kohn appeals to religion fo r an account o f ho w th e Greeksan d Jews achieved their distinctive m ix o f individuality an d nat ional ismin an appeal at once terribly tendent ious abou t the ac tua li ti es o f the tw or el ig io n s and yet no t wi thout its insight.

God is the reconciliation of mult ip l ic ity to unity . The G r e e k s arrived a t thisc o n c i l i a t i o n b y c o n t e m p l a t i o n a n d a w i s d o m fu ll o f m o d e r a t i o n ; t h e y n e v e r d o u b t e dthat a ll m e n would l o v e virtue if they could bu t c o n t e m p l a t e it. The J e w s foundconciliation no t in th e contemplation of knowledge but in th e exertion of thewil l . ( p . 34 )Greek ph i lo s ophy is here elided rather easily into an account o f reli.gion, an d the speci f ic i t ies of Greek rel igion seem to matter hardly a t a ll .Whether Kohn refers to the Homer ic pan theon o r neo-Platonism is nevermade clear.Kohn is clear, however, that there are impor tant differences amonggreat Greeks with regard to his key concerns o f i nd iv i dua l digni ty an dnational identity. He claims the Sophists a s inc ip ient humanitar ians againstthe absolute precedence o f the state over the ind iv idual urged by PlatosRepublic, wh i ch he saw a s simply a mil i tary despot ism ( p p . 56-7). Th eSophist enl ightenment started an emancipat ion o f the i nd i v idua l fromthe nar row t rad it ions o f family, clan, an d city an d prepared the w ay fo r abroader communi ty o f individuals held together by intellectual instead o ftr ibal or loca lbonds (p . 57) . This s e e m s to have been most realized in theHel len ism, fol lowing th e Alexandr ine transcendence of t he G r ee k city-

state. B ut w h ile th is makes clear Kohns emphasis on t he d i ffe rence between mere cul tura l commonal i tyethnic ityand mutual inte llec tual engagement that could be par t o f a transformative pro ject leading eventuallyto wor ld community , it raises deep questions. In wha t sense, fo r example,w as there a He l len is t ic communi t y ? Cer ta in l y there were far-f lungintel lectual connect ions among those w h o w r ote in Greek. And therewere some l inks by t ravel and trade. There w as arguably a Hel lenis t icoikoumene around th e Mediter ranean,2 but this w as not i n i ts e lf thebasis fo r an y polit ical commun i ty . On the contrary, th e Hellenist ic intellectuals surv ived par t l y by keeping their dis tance from polit ics andpar t l y by virtue o f th e protect ion o f an impe r ia l peace. Bu t they d id

INTRODUCTION TO THE TRANSACTION EDITION xixno t organize or fo r th e mos t p a r t run the empire. It is certainly true thatthe Stoics helped to promulgate a vision of wor ld community . Kohn quotesPlutarchs summary o f Zeno: that al l the inhabitants o f this wor ld o f oursshould not live differentiated by their respective rules o f justice into separate cities an d communit ies bu t that w e should consider al l men to be ofone commun i ty an d on e order common to all (p . 59) . He repor tsAlexanders refusal ofAristotles advice to think o f himsel f a s leader o fthe Greeksas it were, a nationalistand he avers that a s a result o fAlexanders atti tude the universalist ic phi losophy o f the Stoics had a p ract ical example set before it (p . 60). Bu t it is a little chi l l ing to think thatthe practical example is one o f conquest.It is e a s y to faul t Kohn fo r over-reaching a s he tries to sustain thepai r ing of Hellas an d the Hebrews. Bu t it would be a mistake to dismissentirely the importance o f the combinat ion o f universalism an d messianismto some nationalisms: Frances mission civilisatrice an d Americas s e n s e ofbeing a city on a hill perhaps mos t notably. And it would be a mistakealso to miss the impor tance of nat ional is t projects that founded on idea lso f transformative sel f - improvement Americans my a g e wi l l always remembe r the opposed slogans o f America: Love It or Leave It an d America:Change It o r Lose It Among other things, Kohn is grasping fo r ways toremind his readers of the potent ia l o f the latter approach to nationalisman d patr iot ism.Over t ime, Kohns outlook was shaped more an d more by Enlighten.ment rationalism an d the distinctively American version o f l iberalism.Both ge t pronounced emphasis in The Idea of Nationalism. Bu t amongEnlightenment rationalists an d American liberals, Kohn is unusual fo rhis sustained an d largely pos it ive attention to nationalism. Liberals havemore common ly sought to debunk nationalist claims a s mere histor icalerrors or invent ions of opportunist ic politicians.22 Many have rejectednationalism a s a fundamental ly i l l iberal impos it ion o f the col lectivi ty overthe ind iv idual , o f ethnic loyalty over human r ights, an d o f t radi t ion overreason. An d even more commonly , liberalism has swept its ow n tacit reliance on national ist th inking unde r the carpet , failing to analyze w hy thepopu la t ion o f an y one country belonged there an d w hy th e state w as entitled to keep others out Liberalism generally took up questions aboutho w to advance justice an d l iberty within societies, didnt much examine wha t made a society a society, an d (except when prodded by war ) w a s

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xx TH E IDEA OF NATIONALISMvague on the relationship between a wor l d o f such dist inct societies an dsovere ign states an d th e r ights o f ind iv iduals in th e wor ld a s a whole.These issues have come to th e fore recently in response to globalization,wi th many l iberals struggling wi th nat ional identit ies an d state boundariesan d proc laiming adherence to a more cosmopol i tan ideal. The same iss u e s came to the fore after World War II, a s liberals sought to organize theUnited Nations an d promote modernizat ion in l e s s developed countries. Kohns w a s an important voice informing the nation-building agendao f modernizat ion theory an d practice. Bu t he w as considerably ahead o fthe wave o f pos twa r modernizat ion projects, an d his synthesis o f valuesfrom cul tural Zionism wi th Enlightenment liberalism is a key reason. Inthis regard, Wol f is r ight that throughout his l i fe, Kohn remained a propheto f the cul tura l Zionis t ideals: wor l d uni ty, i nd i v idua l l iberty, an d a humane ethical nationalism.23At the same t ime, Kohn l ived through a fundamenta l crisis o f the traditions that formed him.

Rome an d Chris t iani ty l ike th e Middle Ages an d the Renaissance arefo r Kohn most ly conduits through wh ich th e essential ancient heritage o fGreece an d Israelis passed on to moderni ty , when once again intellectual,cultural, a nd mo ra l creativi ty begin to nurture improvements in the common inheritance?4 The conduits nonetheless shape the history o f nationalism.Rome, first o f all, prov ided an organizational context in wh ich th eStoic idea o f cosmopol i tan ism could become a reality. Kohn s e e s this a s an

essentially Greek idea taken up by the Romans, and together w i t h theGreek idea of philanthropeja or love o f mank ind , reworked to make th eideal o f humaniras, a compound o f the qualit ies o f th e human an d th ehumane, that quality wh ich makes a man a man. ..This ne w meaning o fhumaniras found its ou tward expressing in the Roman Empire wh ichCaesar founded by his revival o f the idea o f Alexander (p . 65 ). R omebequeathed to . the subsequent histoty o f nationalism, thus, mainly theuniversalism o f the Empi re (p . 7 O ) ? ~ Bu t Rome w a s only imperfectlyable to realize the ideal it embraced: there were Barbarians w i t hou t an dthere w as inadequate in tegrat ion wi th in : Only many centur ies later, inour ow n days, h a s the march o f technical progress made it objectively

INTRODUCTION TO TH E TRANSACTION EDITION xxipossible to unifymankind without l eav ing an y barbar ians at its frontiersor entirely outside its orbit (p . 69), Nonethe less, Kohn s u g g e s t s , the methoryof the Roman Empire offered hope to sustain Europeans through theensuing Dark Ages.

Chris t iani ty appropr iated the hope, but t ransformed it, par t ly by alsoappropr ia t ing the Jewish idea of a chosen people. At the same t ime,Chr is tendom was expl ici tly conceived a s mul t inat ional . Kohn notes thedifference between Eastern Orthodoxy, wi th its structure o f nat iona[churches, an d the Western overlay o f Catholic universalism an d a congeries o f more local polit ies. H e identif ies Byzant ium wi th a new spi r i t o fauthori tarian despotism in troduced into the Roman imper ia l heritage byConstantine, an d significantly l inks this to a transition from a this-worldlycivil ization o f l iberty wh ich he imagines to have obtained under Augustusto an otherwor ldly civi l ization o f authori ty (p . iS). Church w a s subord inated to state in the East26 In the West, at this t ime, the decentralizationan d differentiation within those bodies wh ich were later to form th e future nations in no way al lowed the grow th of that pol i tical an d emot ionalintegration wh ich is the basis o f modern nat ional ism (p . 78) . Moreover,the pol i t ical thought o f the Middle Ages w as character ized by the convktion that mank ind w a s one an d ha d to form on e community . ... The mainconfl ict o f the Middle Ages w as not between universalism an d th e desireo f separation o f indiv idual groups, bu t between tw o forms o f universalism, S a c e r d o d u m an d Imperium (p . 7 9 ) 2 7 Indeed, however much the powe ro f the Holy Roman Empire migh t fade after Charlemagne, the inheritednotion o f cont inuing Roman, Christ ian universalism remained strong.Even figures like Dante w ho expressed profound love o f country were no tnationalists. Wha t he wished w as no t the unity o f Italy, bu t the peace ofItaly and the peace o f humani ty in a unif ied wor l d (p . 92) . There werevery local solidarit ies, rooted no t only in terr i tory an d pol i ty bu t in autonomous occupat ional communit ies. But these are a s different from nat ionalism a s th e pan-nat ional Church. It is only from the thirteenth tosixteenth centuries that the formation o f nations got underway in Europe,an d it took form a s a struggle against the Church (and indeed, against theautonomy o f local g roups) .It w as the Renaissance an d Reformat ion that brought nationalism backonto the Western European s t a g e . The rise o f nationalism demanded anew atti tude of this-worldliness an d aff i rmat ion o f nature, the birth o f


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xxii THE IDEA OF NATIONALISM INTRODUCTION TO THE TRANSACTION EDITION xxiiiindividual ism, and a ne w in terpretat ion o f history (p . 104) . Th e Renaissance an d Reformat ion prov ided these. At the same t ime, they contributedto a break down o f the ostensible universal o r der t ha t ha rd overlain med ieval l oca l ism (Kohns account here centers especial ly on the Holy RomanEmpire) . Yet, neither actually w as typi f ied by or even directly producednationalism; they paved th e way. During both the Renaissance an d Reformation there were appeals to something l ike nations, no t least in literature, bu t the nascent nations were torn apar t from wi th in. Indeed, most o fthe humanist wr i ters of the Italian Renaissance, however much they migh tappeal t o l ar ger ideals, we re emp lo y ed in th e service of local pr inces orcities. Macchiavelli w as the first to transcend this, though even he wrotel e s s a s a nationalist p er s e than a s an advocate o f a secular s t a t e - And it w a sindeed the absolut ist states that succeeded i n un i fy ing t he d ispa rate loca lpowersexcept o f course in Germany. The moder n nationalism o f theWest, wha t Kohn wou ld later descr ibe a s th e good c iv i c va r ian t o f national ism, depended crucial ly o n th is precedence o f th e state overethnocul tura l appeals to sol idar i ty. And indeed t hecont ribu t ion of absolut ist monarchs w as n o t j us t to dom ina te feuda l l or ds a nd other loca lpowers, bu t to in tegrate and homogenize affairs throughout their r e a l m s . 2 8In England, thus, th e rise o f the Tudors exhausted t he f euda l b ar onsan d brought an integrated commerce. And then it w a s in Englands seventeenth-century c ivi l war, a rebellion against a t temp ted ex tens ion of thatvery absolutism that the first great surge o f nationalism . embraced awhole people (p . 125; s e e also 178) . Here w e find the first example o fmodern nat ional ism, relig ious, pol i tical, and social at the same t ime, although it was no t ye t the secularized nat iona l ism wh ich arose at the en do f the eighteenth century (p . 1 6 6 ) . 2 9 Milton an d Cromwe l l were bothdeeply relig ious ye t in impor tant w a y s , Kohn suggests, they emphasizedreason a s we l l a s faith.3 It w as no accident, moreover, that England g a v erise to science in the same era . Fo r science embodied, no t least fo r a utopian like Bacon, t he p r ospect no t j u st o f riches bu t o f t ransformation o fthe condit ions o f human life. It marked a n ew a nd forward- looking, progressive orientation wh ich Kohn wan ted to claim fo r l iberal nationalisman expectation o f society continual ly improved. This in turn in formed achanged or ientat ion to history, in which the history o f th e nation couldappea r largely a s ye t to be made. It w as no t un re la te d t o th e fa ct thatEnglish nationalism never, made the complete integration o f the mdi-

vidual into the nation t he a im o f nationalism; italways p ut a great emphas is on the i nd i v idua l an d upon the human communi ty beyond al l national divisions (p . 1 7 8 ) . 3 1 It was, in other words, just a s Kohn wantednationalism to b e -Wha t Kohn wrote about English nationalism he would have wishedfo r Zionism:A nation h a d c o m e into b e i n g , directing it s ow n d e s t i n y , f e e l i n g r e s p o n s i b l e for it,a n d a national spirit permeated all institutions. It sprang from a unique conscious.n e s s of th e identity of divine, natural, a n d national l a w , b a s e d upon th e dignitya n d liberty of e v e r y individual a s G o d s n o b l e s t c r e a t u r e , upon h is individualc o n s c i e n c e inspired b y th e inner light of G o d a n d r e a s o n a l i k e . ( p . 1 8 3 )English nationalism was , however, early on the European s c e n e . Onthe Continent, the more general trend w as fo r the consolidation an d secular ization o f states t o p roceed w i t hou t the level o f popu lar part ic ipat ions e e n in seventeenth century England. Etatism, not nationalism, emergedfrom the dis integrat ion o f medieval universalism. Politics became increasingly rat ional, bu t the masses cont inued t o l iv e in th e emot ionalforms o f religion. There were movements to rationalize religion a s we l la s polit ics, o f course, such a s pietism. But in general these sought to disassociate religion from polit icsand states returned th e favor, c laiming araison d e t a t grounded in instrumental rationalitynot relig ious values.Only in the late eighteenth century d id nationalism begin to rival religiona s a source o f emot ional warmth . This met a need o f the secular states,however, wh ich could no l onge r rely s o readily on religion fo r the i r legitimation. Nationalism made t he new State legitimate an d implanted it deep ly

in the hearts an d wil ls o f its cit izens (p . 188) .

Kohn is interested in tw o s e n s e s o f the idea o f nationalism. On theone hand his concern is fo r ho w nat ional ism, a s an idea, developed inhistory. On the other hand, he is concerned fo r ho w each nationalismthat is , each cultural movement o f nation formingformulated its dis t inctive nat ional idea and w hy these d i v e r g e . 3 2The former concern is evident when Kohn distinguishes nationalismfrom nationality. Nationalism is not a natural extension o f national i ty bu t


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xxiv TH E IDEA OF NATIONALISMi n vo l ves i ts transformation by ideas o f sovereignty, popu lar part ic ipat ion,an d ideals. Nationalism is a state ofmind, permeat ing th e large major i tyof a peop l e and c la im ing t o permeate a ll it s members; it recognizes th enation-stare a s th e ideal form o f pol i tical organization and t he national i tya s th e source o f al l creative cultural ene rg y and o f economic wel l -being .Th e supreme loyalty o f man is therefore du e to his nat ional i ty , a s his ow nlife is supposedly rooted in an d made possible by its welfare (p . 16).Whi le this is a plausib le account , it is a rather compound def ini t ion withshifting parts, not a singular idea. Indeed, par t o f wha t Kohn brings out isthat there is not a singular idea of nationalism, but rather multiple clashin g ideas that share a good deal o f vocabulary an d reference.33 This is infact one reason w hy heand after h im much of the literaturebecameincreasingly rel iant on t he va lue-laden dist inct ion between ethnic an dc ivic na tiona l ism.Th e latter concern comes out most clearly in Kohns discussion o f th eUnited States, though it is also basic to t he accoun t of the various l e s sl iberal nat iona lisms contras ted to it inthe latter pa r t o f th e book:34

Though (or r a t h e r , b e c a u s e ) the American nation w as to b e a universal n a t i o n not only in the s e n s e that the i d e a l which it pursued w a s u n i v e r s a l , valid, a n dappl icable to th e who l e of mank i nd , but also in th e sense that it w as a nationc o m p o s e d of a l l r a c ia l a n d linguistic s t r a in s i t w a s to b e s t r o n g l y i n t e g r a t e d a r o u n da l l e g i a n c e to th e American i d e a , a n i d e a to which e v e r y o n e c o u l d b e a s s i m i l a t e dfor th e very r e a s o n that it w a s a universal i d e a . ( p . 3 0 9 )We s e e in this impor tan t features of l iberal nationalism generally wh ichKohn ha d init ial ly expressed in his accounts o f cul tura l Zionism. Substitute the word Jewish fo r Amer ican in the passage just quoted. It then

evokes p recise ly the cul tura l Z ion ist c la im wh ich th e mo re ethno~racialZionists rejected.Liberal nationalisms center on universal ideas, especial ly freedom an djustice. These also prov ide l ibe ra l nations wi th universal missions: ThusAmerica became t he vangua rd of mankind, full o f a p roud an d blissfulfa it h in i ts mission . This fa it h o f th e American people in itself an d it smission made it a nation (p . 308) . Clearly the assimilationist, universaldimension o f American nationalism w as different fr om w h a t would develop in most o f Europealong with a more forward- looking, l e s s historica l orientation an d greater individual ism that deeply inflected, the versionof l iberty Amer icans wou ld c laim. These were no t merely coinc idental

INTRODUCTION TO TH E TRANSACTION EDITION xxvdifferences, however, they were dimensions o f self-understanding. Thenations idea o f i tself could repeatedly be clarif ied in th e contrast. Eachnat ional idea gains its emphasis by contrasting itself wi th an d differentiating itself from another concept; in th e c a s e o f America, this concept w asEurope (p . 292) . American nationalism was a cu l tura l nationalism bu tno t in th e sense o f c laiming ethnic culture. Rather, it w as cul tura l in thes e n s e that education and cultural product ion were to play a sorely neededrole in th e young nation to cement the loose ties binding the dis tantcommunit ies and colonies wi th their divergent tradit ions an d backgroundsinto a common who le (p . 301). In addit ion, o f course, freedom demandedknowledge. In Jeffersons words, If a nation expects to be ignorant an dfree, in a state o f civil ization, it expects wha t never w as an d never wi l l be (quoted on p . 313).Amer ica provided an exceptionally promis ing env i ronment fo r the. re ~alization o f the ideals o f the French Enlightenment. Indeed, Kohn beginshis discussion o f the U.S. by emphasizing this connection, not simply thedi rect lineage o f English ideals. He is just if ied in this both by the admi ration many French thinkers showed fo r English liberties an d by the importance o f the Amer ican example fo r the French, bu t he probably does underestimate the inf luence no t only o f English thinkers bu t o f th e Scott ishmoralists. In any event, wha t is impor tant to Kohn is that in the NorthAmer ican colonies, the struggle fo r civic l iberty could lead directly to thefoundation o f a new nation (p . 271 ) . Here too, the historical role o f themiddle c l a s s e s a s protagonists of l iberal nationalism w as renewed (after aslide towards greater, aristocratic dominance in Restoration England).Amer ican patr iot ism, on Kohns reading, w as typif ied by th e cosmopo l itanism o f Thomas Jefferson an d Tom P a i n e . Indi f ferent ways each emphasized that the freedoms o f Americans were not simply English historicalliberties bu t natural r ights o f al l m e n . 3 5 For by the en d o f the Revolut ionthe Amer ican colonies ha d emancipated themselves from the past s o c o m r npletely that they d id no t regard common descent or a common root a s thefoundation of their community (p . 275) . The common foundation w a s thecons t i tu t ion, a this-worldly human action, based on ideas an d ideals an dshowing their efficacy in the wor l d ( a s against mere realpol i tik). TheAmerican constitut ional l a w s of 1789 have lasted because the idea fo r wh ichthey stand w a s s o intimately welded withthe existence. of the Americannation that wi thout the idea there would have been no nation (p . 289) .

Fp

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xxvi THE IDEA OF NATIONALISMTh e U.S. is the setting fo r creation o f a new man a s we l l a s a newnat ion. Kohns emphasis o n th e newness o f American nat ional ism leadshim to s e e little common culture, ident i ty, or social in tegrat ion uni t ingthe thirteen colonies before the Revolut ion. This underwr i tes his view o fthe U.S. a s achieving an almost pure ly c iv ic nat ionalism. Likewise, he s a y sl ittle about the ethnocultural construction o f Amer ican identity that wou ldlater be termed WASP.Kohn emphasizes the mel t ing p o t character of the United States int e rms comparab le to ( an d inc luding quotes f rom) Zangw i l l. Crevecoeuremphasized that strange mixture o f blood, wh ich yo u will find in noo the r coun tr y and a long w i t h mixed descent the att i tude of leaving be.hind h im al l h is ancient prejudices, and manners , receives new ones fromth e n ew mo de o f life he has embraced (quoted pp . 275-6). Kohn quotesJohn Adams wi th approval : this radical change in t he p r inc ip les, opinions, sentiments, and affections of the people, w as t he rea l Amer ican Revo

lut ion (p . 276) . No t unlike Hannah Arend t , he f inds in the Revolut ionan d the founding o f th e United States a parad igmatic exempl i fi ca tion o ft he human capacity to create something new an d good in the wor ld , goingbeyond the exigencies of necessity an d nar row l y instrumental interest.36Unlike Arend t , he wou ld e xte nd much of the same enthusiasm to theFrench Revo lu tion , dw e l ling little on t he s li p per y slope towards totalitarianism s h e thought it r e v e a l e d . 3 7Kohns discussion o f American national ident i ty an d self-understandin g also reveals his ho w much his ideas about l iberal nat ional ism dependno t o n ly on th e themes o f universalism, active indiv idual part ic ipat ion,an d an ethical orientation bu t also on a notion o f creative self-fashioning.In Christ ian terms, it is not Christs suffe ring body a s por trayed in thecrucif ix, bu t t he redempt ionand perhaps the Pentecostthat l iberal national ism claims. This also suggests on e o f the reasons w hy Kohn s e e s animpl ic i t affinity w i t h Protestantism. Th e t ransfo rmat i on f rom an exte rna ll y imposed order to a cont inual sense o f the self a s a mora l projectwha t s o troubled Foucault about modern individualism is centra l to Khnsembrace of l iberal nationalism.38Whi le Kohn is adamant that nationalism is a state o f mind, he is clearthat this state o f mind is produced not just by inheritance o f an idea orthe labor o f intellectuals ( though The I d e a of Nationalism is mainly anintellectual h is to ry ) . Par tl y because nationalism is s o important ly about

INTRODUCTION TO THE TRANSACTION EDITION xxviiwha t ordinary people th ink and feel, Kohn is we l l aware that it has rootsnot just in the reading of high theory bu t in the experience o f everyday lifeand communicat ion. He anticipates the stress placed a generation later byKar l Deutsch on communicat ions media a s a b a s i s fo r nationalism, notingfo r example that French road building an d t ransportat ion w as very advanced (p . 225 ) an d more generally ho w impor tant communicat ions an dt ransport technology w as no t only to nationalism bu t to cosmopolitanism( p . 2 O f l . ~ ~

A deep prob lem fo r the ne w socio-polit ical order that arose wi th nat ionalism an d the centralized, secular state was recohciling the l iberty ofthe indiv idual w i t h the exigencies o f social in tegrat ion (p . 226). It is aprob lem famil iar to sociologists in Talcott Parsons classical evocation ofthe Hobbesian prob lem of order at th e beginning o f a treatise on ho wvoluntary social action could produce social structur&As stated, it isslightly l e s s famil iar to pol i tical theory, because questions of social integration have not f igured prominent ly in that tradition, though the oppos ition o f the i nd i v idua l to th e state has. This is no t quite th e same th ing,because the l iberty o f the indiv idual is counterposed here no t only tostate nor col lectivi ty bu t to social integrat ion. Above all, this is the p roblem taken up by Rousseau, whose solut ion is maddening , not least fo rtrying to bring together wha t pcilit ical theory general keeps asunder. AsKohn suggests, Rousseau w as seeking amid much confusion and cont radic t ion, a new communi ty starting f rom, an d based upon , the free individual (p . 226). Kohn t o o . 4 1Reconcil ing i nd i v idua l l iberty, a sense o f fe lt community , an d ethicaluniversalism is fo r Kohn at th e heart o f nationalism. And here the problems started, wh ich wou ld lead Kohn eventually to dis t inguish civic fromethnic nationalism. As a Zionist, Kohn ha d opposed cul tura l or ethicalnationalism to merely polit ical. Now, influenced both by deeper study o f!iberalism an d by th e rise o f Nazism, Kohn opposed tw o kinds o f pol i ticalnationalism. One retained indiv idual l iberty an d ethical universalism an dunde rwro te the nationalism o f th e Allies in World War II. Th e otherfocused more on culture, bu t in i rrat ional w a y s and wi thout t he i dea l of


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xxviii THE IDEA OF NATIONALISMself-transcendence Kohn valued. Embodied in fascism it transmuted ethica l universalism into mere imper ial ism.Rousseau appears a s th e las t g reat th inker cruc ial to the developmento f both civic an d ethnic nationalism. Claiming Rousseau, at least in par t ,fo r Enlightenment rat ional ism, an d fo r his version o f c ivic nat ionalism,Kohn insists that a nation that expressed i tself through the general wi l l ,could fo r Rousseau no t be a produc t o f nature (p . 249) . Indeed, Rousseaud id suggest inOf th e Social Contract that the mere prompt ings o f a p petite are slavery, whi le obedience to a law wh ich w e impose upon ourselvesis wha t constitutes l iberty (p . 246). This w as in accord wi th Kohns o p p osition (a l ready clear in his wri t ings on Zionism) o f mere self. interestedpowe r polit ics to the t ransformat ive, ethically h igher notion of the nat ion. Bu t Kohn wants to extend the distinction to dissociate his Rousseaufrom later Romant ic readings:

[The Romant icsj established a distinction b e t w e e n state a n d n a t i o n : t h e y r e g a r d e dthe state a s a mechanical an d juridical construction, the artificial produce ofhistorical accidents, white they believed the nation to be the work of nature, an dtherefore something sacred, eternal, organic, carry ing a deeper justification thanworks of m e n - Nothing could be further from Rousseaus thought ; fo r h im thenation and the nation-state were nothing natural or organ ic, bu t a produce ofthe wi l l of individuals. (p . 249 )Rousseau w as certainly no conserva t ive nosta lg ic for th e feudal o r de r,but Kohn s reading does not confront Rousseaus dist inct ion o f th e willof all from th e genera l will.Nor does Kohn dea l adequately with Rousseaus worry over what happens w he n th e normative ideals of th e sma l l community ar e t ransposedto th e large-scale society, though he notes th e rural an d isolationist biasimplicit in hi s p roposed constitution fo r Cors ica ( p p . 253.4 ) . It is true thatRousseau env is ioned a world federationof smal l i n dependen t a nd p e ac eful states a nd t he extens ion of th e rule of law from th e national ci ty-stateto th e city of man (p . 2 5 7 ) But Kohn without c ommen t treats this asi dent ica l to th e problem of national states in th e modern g l oba l o rde r. Theprob lem lies howe ve r not s imp l y in th e ques t ion ofwhether free peop l eswill at tack one another a nd th us perpetual peace is possible, but also inth e sociological shiftfrom th e local,largely face-to-face community to th emu c h la rg e r a n d mo r e a bst ra c t nat ion. Elsewhere ( p p . 8 -9) , i ndeed, Kohn

INTRODUCTION TO THE TRANSACTION EDITION xxixis at pains to make the distinction, precisely because he disagrees wi thRomant ic national ist assertions that the nation is simply an extension o fhome an d fami ly to a larger scale. He recognizes that nations must beassociat ions among strangers. But scale is an issue not only for ethnicnationalists w ho claim an i l lusory ident i ty between kinship an d nat iona li ty. It is also an issue fo r civic nationalists w ho propose that shared politica l forms shou ld be adequate to support th e mutual commitments ofcitizens to each otheran issue that h a s famously resurfaced recently wi thJurgen Habermass call fo r a consti tutional patriot ism.42Nonetheless, in Kohns e y e s , Rousseau prov ided the modern nationwi th its emot ional an d moral foundat ions (p . 251). And, though nat ionalism wi th Rousseau w as almost relig ious feeling o f an entirely new intensity an d o f an all-pervading intimate nature, it w as fundamental ly opposed to any intolerance or hosti l i ty t o o ther nations. Its basic aim was torender life more moral, more peaceful an d happy fo r al l men, to establishfirmly an d protect the digni ty an d l iberty o f every ind iv idual , an d ult i .mately to replace the state o f nature, in wh ich men are subject to passionsan d appetites, by the rat ional order of l aw (p . 259). It was an impor tantcatch that th e Romant ic reading of Rousseau wh ich Kohn disputes w aswidespread an d influentiaL43The absence o f a sustained chapter on the French Revolut ion an d itsaftermath is the signal lacuna o f The I d e a of Nationalism. After his approving account o f the Amer ican founding, Kohn turns to the stirrings o fnationalism in the Ol d Wor ld , by wh ich he means mainly Central , Eastern, an d Cathol ic Europe other than France. In the course o f this he

introduces the dist inct ion between civic an d ethnic nationalism that wi l lbecome s o inf luential, though he does s o no t b y taxonomic announcement bu t by the very organization o f the book. As I noted at the outset, thedistinction is framed in several more or l e s s homologous opposi t ions an dassociated strongly wi th geography.44 That it is represented in a who leseries of specific histor ies, rather than announced a s an analytic apparatus, makes it appear a ll t he more a s simply par t of th e empir ical re~ord.But th e miss ing French revolution is th e pivot on which this turns .Perhaps th e mo re deta i led treatment w as in tended for th e second volume, t hough that s e e m s anachronistic. In an y c a s e , it is not that Kohndoesn t think th e French Revolution important, for hi s open ing parag raph declares it the first great manifestat ion o f nationalism, wh ich in


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XXX THE ID EA OF NATIONALISMturn gave the ne w movement an increased dynamic force (p . 3). Onemigh t suggest that the reason the French Revolut ion doesnt ge t sustainedt reatment is that itd id no t contr ibute di rect ly to the idea o f nationalism.This is w hy Kohns Rousseau-centered chapter on the French Enl ightenment s e e m s to stand in fo r it Such an argument would depend on a sharpseparation between phi losophica l contr ibut ions to the idea of nationalismand t hose from pract ical pol i t ics , public discourse, and ever yday life. Indeed, Kohn does no t ma in ta in such a sharp distinction elsewhere, thoughh is b ias like that o f most intellectual historians is t owa r ds h igh cu lt ur e.Bu t su re ly the l e v e e e n masse , th e part ic ipatory polit ics o f the Paris clubs,fac t ions , commi ttees , and quartiers, an d t he nume rous r itualizations o frevolut ionary ci tizenship l ike the use o f cito y e n an d citoyenne a s termso f address, an d even th e family drama o f the t reatment o f th e royalfami ly al l contributed to t he i dea o f nationalism.45 Th e Revolut ion itslfa s event an d a s mythis clearly pivota l to the French nat ional idea, th enational self-understanding o f French pub l ic culture. In fact, of course,th is re lia nc e o n th e traditions and celebrations o f the Revolut ion introducs a significant element o f histor icism, traditionalism, an d culturalnational ism into Frances v a un te d c iv ic n at io na lism . Likewise, thephilosophes, whom Kohn rightly seeks to reclaim fo r the story o f nationalism, wre not simply rationalist enemies o f tradition. Voltaire g a v e Francean impor tant nat ional narrative in t he Henr iade , ex to ll ing Henry IV a s aman w ho p ut national unity ahead of par t y or religion.46 To t reat Francea s simply civic is to i ndu lge t oo much i ts ow n national self-understanding, reproduced in ritual an d a pedagog ica l nar ra t ive tha t is not quitesimple fact, an d also in a characteristic opposi t ion to Germany.47

Kohns thin t reatment o f France masks trouble at the core o f the concept o f c iv ic na tiona li sm- The prob lem is one that runs back into Zionisma s we ll . In deed , on e might think o f it a s the fundamental paradox o fl ibral nationalism: the need t o account fo r the part icular i ty o f belonging.That is , wh y s hou ld French nationalism a pp ly to th e French, or Zionism(cu l tura l or o therw ise ) to the J e w s ? W hy should Amer icans be pr iv i legedto live in one o f t he wor ld s r ichest and freest countries an d o the rs kep tout?The problem wi th the maximal ly universal construction, in other words,is that it makes poo r sense o f par t icu lar ism and ye t rel ies on it Oneresponse is simply to abandon part icu lar ism an d w i t h it an y defense o f

INTRODUCTION TO TH E TRANSACTION EDITION xxxinationalism. This is t he ro ut e take by some extreme cosmopolitans48Whatever its other merits, it suggests that any strong feelings o f membe rship in a more part icu lar communi ty are at best temporary expedients,probably suspect, an d to be tolerated moral ly only s o long a s they do notimp ly favorit ism fo r fellow members or otherwise ge t in the w ay o f moreuniversal e t h i c & 4 9 When Kohn wr i tes o f nationalism a s merely a w aystation on the path to a unif ied wor ld , he expresses ambivalence towardsit . And this ambivalence informs the int roduct ion o f the dist inct ion between civic an d ethnic nationse ffectively g ood and bad nationalisms.Th e French c a s e is central in a variety o f w a y s . On the one hand,France figures (alongside the U.S., bu t in the l i terature on nationalismeven outweigh ing th e U.S.) a s demonstrat ing the paradigmat ic civic nat ionalism. On the other hand, the main c a s e s of ethnic nationalism developed part ly in response t o F rench invasions an d imper ia l projects, especially in the Napoleonic Wars. And t he F rench Revolut ion i tself is adramatic bu t t roub li ng exemplification of extreme civic nationalism inaction. It does not appear unequivocally a s liberal.50Part o f the issue is tha t c iv ic France w as s o imper ial . It became expl icitly imper ia l w i t h the rise o f Napoleon, o f course, bu t it also retained oldcolonies an d conquered ne w dominions whi le it retained Republican form.Certa in ly Repub l ican France proved unable to accept a Repub l ican Hai t i .It w as the Directory that sent General Napoleon to Egypt, thus, an d itpresumably agreed w i t h his l iberal universal is t speech to his t roops on 9Ma y 1798, just a s they prepared to attack. The genius o f l iberty, wh ichhas since its birth rendered th e Republic the arbiter o f Europe, is no wheaded toward the most dis tant lands.5 Th e troops responded The Immorta l Republic forever! an d planted a Tree o f Liberty. Th e French R epub l ic o f Egypt w a s governed by its ow n Directory (the Diwan) on themode l o f that in Paris. Popular sovereignty w as announced, bu t it man ifestly d id not inc lude national self-determination. If the grow th o f nat ionalism is the process o f in tegrat ion of the masses o f the people into acgmmon pol i tical form (Kohn, p . 4) this wou ld seem to c oun t a s a varian t But itmigh t also simply be called imper ial ism, though an imper ial ismat leas t somewhat different from those that p ut only an umbrella o f common form over the retention o f local structures o f authority.52Arguably this imper ial ism was rooted in messianism.53 Kohn is r ightno t to shr ink f rom the direct cOnnections between nationalism an d i m pe

rI[


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xxxii THE IDEA OF NATIONALISM INTRODUCTION TO THE TRANSACTION EDITION xxxiiir ia lism; too often the tw o are simply opposed, a s though France were onlyimperial ist when formally an Empire ra the r than a Republic. But, in co mmon wi th nearl y a l l analysts o f nationalism, Kohn does no t think throughwha t imperial ism means fo r understanding Repub l ican France an d itsvaunted civic nationalism- French nationalism w as born, he wr i tes, (asEnglish an d American ha d Ibeeni before it) in a wave o f generous enthusiasm fo r the cause o f mank ind ; t he opposi ng nationalisms lacked thisinit ial inspirat ion o f a dis interested humanitar ian ism from the beginningthey were d i re c te d t o laudable bu t nar rower goals, self-centered an d antagonistic (p . 572-3). Yet th e dist inct ion between Francethe Hexagonand i ts dominions w as real, ifmasked by Repub l ican ideology , a s were theracial distinctions tha t i n fo rmed colonial pol icy an d helped to give rise tomode rn an th ropo log y in concern over mtissage. And su re ly the expor to f universalistic ideas by force carries problemat ic impl icat ions.

~ttflt

That Imper ia l France w as still France and no t simply the f lowering o funiversal reason w as also felt by many in t he European coun tr ies invadedby Napoleons armies. Ofcourse, this didnt bother everyone equally. Hegelan d a host o f other intellectuals we l comed t he F rench Revolut ion, an dsome even the Napoleonic invasion wh ich they hoped would usher an e raof progress and l iberty into German history-Goethe remained unimpressedby German nat ional is t appeals even after France w as defeated. Bu t at leastfrom 1813, German nationalism w as ascendant among intellectuals (thoughit is unclear ho w much t hi s ma t te re d t o t he res t o f the populat ion).54 Th estory belongs perhaps to the a g e o f nat ional ism the concern of Kohnsprojected second volumebut the w ay it played ou t w a s shaped by a dis t inctive version o f th e idea o f nationalism. This is the subject o f t he l as t tw ochapters of t he p resen t book.Germany is the overwhelming mode l fo r ethnic, Eastern nationalismfo r K o hn a s fo r most othersthough it is a mer i t o f Kohn s account thathe p a y s significant attention t o o ther European traditions, It is common tostress four factors which encouraged an e thnic nat ional ism in Ger .many . Because it was pol i t ical ly disuni ted, cultural an d l ingu is t ic commonalt ies mattered more. Because itdeveloped late, compared to Franceor England, it ha d l e s s chance to develop ra t iona l po l i t ica l ins t i tut ions

an d rel ied more on traditional loyalties. Because the p ow e r of ruralelites was entrenched an d the peasantry l e s s free part ic ipatory polit icsw a s impeded an d t op -down nationalism encouraged (a n argument appliedeven more in regard to Russia). And because th e Napoleonic invas ionin part icular an d th e threat of dominat ion by France an d Britain moregenerally stimulated Ge rman nationalism itw as essentially reactive.Kohn accepts each of these arguments, but doesnt think them ful lyadequate. Par t o f wha t he wants to show is ho w a different nat ional ideatook shape, sharing some phi losophical toots bu t taking a different intel.lectual course. Th e i d e a giving form to nationalism matters, Kohn su gg e s t s , no t just the circumstances in wh ich pol i t ic ians develop national iststrategies. If the Western national ist ideaat least in its idealized formstressed universalism, rational i ty, an d self-transcendence, t he Easternstressed particular nat ional identit ies, an emot ional connection to history,an d development rather than transcendence. Centra l an d Eastern European nationalists drew on myths o f the past, dreams o f the future, an ddistinctive intellectual traditions to imag ine an ideal fatherland, closelyl inked wi th the past, devoid o f any immediate connection w i t h the present,an d expected to become somet ime a pol i tical real i ty (p . 330). It is import ant t ha t in the eighteenth an d early nineteenth centuries this nationalismw a s no t informed by close relationships to actually exist ing states or socialinsti tutions. Where English o r F rench nationalism w as about t ransformin g an existing state, nationalism in Central an d Eastern Europe focusedon develop ing culture and t hus w as initially more remote from projects o fpractical reform. Th e deve lopmen t o f centralized state insti tutions preceded an d in formed English and French nat ional ism not least wi th co ncerns fo r i nd i v idua l l iberty in relation t o t ho se states. Though he is notexpl ici t about it, I suspect Kohn would argue the same w as true fo r theUnited States, albeit in more compl icated form because the existing ce ntralized state w a s British an d a new one ha d to be created in Amer ica. Bu tneither the ol d Hapsburg Empire nor t he sca tte red German dominionsoffered the same capacity to p ut th e project of rationalizing the re lat ionship between people an d government in the forefront. As Kohn write~:

National ism in th e W e s t w as based upon a nationality wh i ch w as th e product ofsocial an d pol i t ical factors; nat ional ism in Ge rman d id no t find its just i f ication ina rat ional societal concept ion, it found it in th e ~natural fact of a communi ty ,held together, not by th e wi l l bf its members nor by an y obl igat ions of contract,


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xxxiv TI-IS IDEA O F NATIONALISM INTRODUCTION TO THE TRANSACTION EDITION xxxvbu t by traditional t ies of kinship an d status. Ge rman na t iona l ism subs ti tu t e d fo rth e legal an d rat ional concep t of c i t izenship th e infinitely vaguer conce p t offo lk. . . (p.33l)Th e issue r ema ins current, as this quo ta ti on f rom Ju rgen Habermas,

informed by German history though formulated in genera l te rms, makesclear:

The n a t i o n - s t a t e o w e s its historical s u c c e s s to the f a c t that it s u b s t i t u t e d r e l a t i o n sof solidarity between the c i t i z e n s for the disintegrating corporative t i e s of e a r l ymodern s o c i e t y . But this r e p u b l i c a n a c h i e v e m e n t is e n d a n ge re d w h e n , c o n v e r s e l y ,the integrative force of the nation of citizens is traced back to the prepolit ical factof a quasi-natural people, that is , to something independent of and pr ior to t hepolitical opinion.and wi l l . formation of the citizens t h e m s e l v e s . 5 5Habermas wr i tes in exact ly the te rms ofKohn s a rgumen t, an d is concerned to achieve throughout Europe b ut n ot least in Germany and t he

E a s t a const itu t ional patr io t ism in wh ich the loyalty of citizens is basedon the reason, j ustice, and universal i ty o f the consti tution they have ch osen fo r themselves an d agreed to in democrat ic fashion. In other words,Habermass project is the realization o f the civic ideals Kohn describes.But Habermas is a lso awaremore than Kohn though it remains an unsolved prob lem fo r his theorythat the question a r i s e s o f whether thereexists a functional equivalent fo r the fusion o f the nation of citizens wi ththe ethnic nation.56Th e nat ion o f cit izens is a p roduc t o f polit ics an d collective wi l l , it isa creature o f choice an d contract. Th e ethnic nation is prepol i t ical , theproduc t of history (and perhaps nature), found in already-existing communi ty, though no t necessarily s ta t ic and poss ib ly amenab le to nurture an ddevelopment. The contrast o f the tw o ideas is dear enough, wi th Habermasraising to theory the h is to r ica l typo logy presented by Kohn. Bu t ratherthan oppos in g t he tw o types of nation, it migh t be better to ask h ow th etw o dimensions o f solidarity an d ident i ty, and t he tw o sorts o f claims tomembership and r ights f igure and relate to each other in specific nat ionalhistories. There cer tainly are differences o f emphasis. Some nationalismsth e Japanese and Chinese rely on ethnic ideas fused with racialtypologies.57 Some may be more matters o f rhe tor ic than actual behavioror pol icy. Rogers Brubaker, fo r example, shows ho w despite Frances longstanding rhetoric o f assimilationist c iv ic inc lus ion an d Germany s famousethnic nationalism, the tw o countries receive immigrants at abou t the same

rate an d grant them comparable benefits ( though Germany does make itharder fo r them to become citizens),58 Bu t even the most civic o f nat ionalisms demand an account o f the part icular i ty o f their relationship to thelarger wor ld .Fo r Herder, the national commun i ty was the necessary medium between mank ind an d the ind iv idual (p . 428 ) Kohn s e e m s to have thoughtmuch the same thing a s a cul tura l Zionist, bu t to have become unsure a she contemplated fascism. Or perhaps the necessity o f the mediat ion wastemporaryonly until the wor l d a s a who le could be ordered o n th e liberal, Enlightenment pr inc ip les he advocated. But in an y c a s e , wha t hedescribed a s the ethnic nationalism of the East w as different because o f adeep investment in the idea o f an essential diversi ty o f nations. Andal though Herder w as no nationalist in the modern s e n s e a n d his lovefo r national i ty embraced al l nationalit ies an d their nat ional life (p . 433)he w a s central to the development o f this line o f thought . Herder w as thefirst to insist that human civi l ization lives not in its general an d univers a l , bu t in its national an d pecul iar manifestations (p . 429 ) . Languagew a s paradigmatic.Kohn shows a considerable sympathy fo r Herder (despite his generalremarks o n Ge rman an d more generally ethnic nationalism). Indeed, mucho f Kohns discussion o f Old Wor ld nationalism is focused on wha t atleast its eighteenth-century forebears shared wi th Western Enlightenment,revealing the resources fo r a civic, cosmopol i tan nationalism even in G erm a n y . 5 9 Of course this makes on e wonder just when an d ho w Germanybecame Eastern.For most German intellectuals, at least, certainly not in the eighteenthcentury. Speaking o f Schlozer, Kohn suggests that like al l representativeGerman thinkers o f the a g e , he never thought o f himself a s a German;an d he never envisaged a common nationhood fo r Germany (p . 380).Schiller declared it a poor an d trifling ideal to wr i te fo r one nation; sucha l imitat ion is total ly unbearable fo r a phi losophical m ind. It cannot f indsatisfaction in such a changing, accidental, an d arbi t rary form o f m ankind, a mere fragmentJtcan have no warm feelings fo r itexcept in s o fa ra s a nation or a national event appears impor tant fo r the progress o fmank ind (quoted p . 409 ) . Kant concur red, visualizing a universal societ y o f free indiv iduals . W ri ti ng o f the French Revolut ion, he suggestedthat such a revolution ... arouses in the minds o f al l spectators ... a desire


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XXXVI TH E IDEA OF NATIONALISMto par t ic ipa te , on e wh ich almost verges on enthusiasm, an d which a s itsexpression was dangerous, could therefore have no other cause than amoral faculty inmank ind (quoted pp . 398-9).Wh i l some made reference t o na ti ona l cul tura l traditions, no eighteenth-century th inker regarded t he y o lk a s natural an d unchangeable (p .354). Appeals to the fatherland were ap t to be mo re o r l e s s ut i l i tarian a sthey sought to mobilize the loyalty o f subjects to their rulers (p . 362). Bu tif there w as on e cruc ial theme that foreshadowed the later divergent construction, itwas the proto-Romant ic reception o f Rousseaus emphasis onthe indigenous orig inal i ty ofeach nation. Even this, however, w as par t o fa broader European current Rousseau was, after al l a Genevois wri t ing inParis, an d a s Kohn notes th e vogue f o r na t iona l legends was also exemp l ified by the Ossian scam in Scotland an d a varie ty o f more honest Celticdiscoveries (p . 352). But the notion o f th e distinctiveness o f nationalcultures was taken up w i t h part icu lar enthusiasm an d intellectual dep thin Germany, an d l inked eventually to ideas o f national genius an d to thedist inct ion o f historical nations from those lacking the capac it y to survive.Early versions o f this th inking focused on the issue o f a national spi r i tthat shou ld connec t contemporar ies wi th each other a s we l l a s wi th thep a st In Mosers phrasing , w e do no t know ourselves any longe r, w e areestranged from one another, our spi r i t has depar ted from us... (quoted p .374 ). Indeed , the Rousseauian theme o f estrangement w as taken up in avariety o f projects fo r achieving new kinds o f communi ty a s inheritedones grew weaker; Marx w as a crucial inher i tor o f this tradition bu t itequally in formed nationalism. Kohn notes in passing bu t doesnt developth e po i n t that concern fo r new ties fo r the integration o f society (p .455 ) wen t we l l b ey ond pol i t ica l uni f icat ion into more sociological concerns.Where patr io t ism, cosmopol i tan ism, an d liberalism ha d been i nseparable, a s the century progressed the firstelement became dominant . Whi lethe Risorg imento revealed its roots inWestern thought by moving fromrat ional cosmopol i tanism to liberal nationalism (p . 509 ) , in Russia a s inGermany , there w as a turn from l iberal cosmopol i tanism to narrow nat ionalism (p . 569) . But it w as no t j u st the .narrowness o f nineteenth-century nationalisms that would distinguish these fo r Kohn, It was th e widespread embrace o f i rrational ism. The reasonableness of the eighteenth

INTRODUCTION TO TH E TRANSACTION EDITION xxxviicentury g a v e w ay to a fanatic enthusiasm from the depth (p . 474 ) . Kohnma y be looking forward to Wagner an d others beyond the precise t imeframeo f this book. In any c a s e , his formulat ion enables him to s e e ethnic nat ionalism a s an Eastern revolt against the Westand specif ically againstEnlightenment rather than a s a dimension o f al l nationalisms an d indeeda ref lection o f a crisis within Western thought an d politics.66Herder employed a ll t he t radi t ional claims that became typ ica l of G erman nationalism in th e nineteenth century. Yet, he remained insistentlyliberal an d cosmopol i tan, a humani tar ian an d a democrat. A proteanth inker ( l ike Rousseau), he could be claimed by opposing intellectual an dpol i t ical traditions. Kohn is left ambivalent, I t hi nk , part ly because Herders u g g e s t s three ingredients crucial to Kohns vision o f progress an d missingfrom much Enlightenment rational ist phi losophy . Th e first is the relat ionship o f being to t ime impl ic i t in his notion o f becoming. Humani t y isthe character o f ou r race, Herder wrote, w e receive itonly a s a potent ia li ty, an d w e must develop it (quoted p . 435)~6l Herders ideas o f potential.ity an d becoming resonate wi th Kohns notions o f self-transcendence. Likewise, Herders emphasis on language connects him to Haam an d an impor tant thread in cul tura l Zionism. Finally, Herde r is insistent on an active participation in national self-development: the happiness of one peoplecannot be forced upon any other. Th e roses fo r the wreath o f each nationsl iberty must be picked wi th its ow n hands, an d must grow happi ly out o fits ow n wants, joys, and l ove (quoted p . 431) .Bu t Herders strong s e n s e o f the uniqueness o f nations is troubling. Hearticulates a constitutive role fo r language an d culture that Kohn can onlys e e a s worryingly relativist, anticipating wha t in the twent ieth centurywou ld be called incommensurabil i ty.62 No indiv idual , no country, nopeople, no history o f a people, no state is like any other. Therefore, thetrue, the beautiful, and the good are no t the same fo r them (quoted p .433). As Kohn recognizes, Herde r s e e s each national i ty a s embody ing anoriginal version o f a common humanity , a humani ty wh ich because o fcultural an d creativi ty has a t remendous potent ial fo r variation. To eliminate this variety even in the name o f rational order or equality would beto lose much o f wha t is distinctively human. The prob lem is that eighteenth-century rationalism an d later l iberalism rely heavily on notions o fthe human ind iv idual that do not acknowledge this constitutive role fo rculture, that are often atomistic, an d that match w i t h universalism be


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xxxviii THE ID EA OF NATIONALISM INTRODUCTION TO TH E TRANSACTION EDITION xxxixpresuming equivalence. So there is a real difference, already in play w i t hHerder , even though he doesn t d r aw t he i l l iberal conclusions from it thatsome la ter nat ional ists w i ll . -A key, questionu nresolved t o t hi s d a y is whe the r grant ing culturethis consti tutive role ca n be reconciled with either indiv idual ism or universalism. Habermas, fo r example, reacted vehemently to Charles Taylorsadvocacy o f multicultural ism precisely because it seemed to h im to cha llenge universalism a nd th us a necessary foundat ion fo r l iberalism andto echo this t roubl ing Ge rman t radi t ion fo r doing s o . Th e const i tu t ionalstate can an d should tolerate cul tura l differences, Habermas suggests, bu tthese should no t be i nt ro duced i nto either the intellectual or the legalbasis for such a state.63Kohn recognizes both the innovat ive character o f Herders thought an dth e extent to wh ich it offers an answer to the question of why a nat ion?tha t o the r versions o f l iberal thought f ind more difficult. He s e e s in Herder,moreover, a strong echo of Moses an d much that he ha d praised in hisearlier discussion o f anc ient Hebrew nat iona l ism. Herders nationalism,an ethico-cultural nationalism, showed deep traces o f affinity wi th thenat ional idea o f t he Heb rew p r ophe ts and psal in ists (p.44l). Yet Kohn isambivalent because Herders culturalism (if I ma y use t ha t w o r d ) s e e m s tolead in wha t h is tor y proved were dangerous directions, an d because hecannot reconcile it wi th Enlightenment rationalism an d universalism.A cosmopol i tan global order must be buil t, Herde r suggests, in a w aythat provides fo r the f lour ish ing o f numerous nationalit ies, each mediat .in g th e relationship o f i ts members to humani ty at large, each contributin g to the fulfillment o f human potent ia l in diverse w a y s .

Has the wo r ld n ot enough s p a c e f or a ll of u s ? Do n ot the countr ies ex is t peacefully beside one another? Cabinets swindle one another, political machines manmaneuver unti l t hey des t roy one another. Bu t fatherlands do no t maneuver insuch a w a y , t hey ex is t peacefully beside one another, and like families, help oneanother. (quoted p,44l)Kohn an d others chas tened by th e late nineteenth and twentieth centuries common l y suggest th e wor l d ha s not space enough for al l of us . Thinkback to the cul tura l Zionists recognit ion, perhaps surpr is ing ly belated insome cases, that Palestine w as not a land without peop l e for a peop l ewithout l and . Think to o o f the tw o Wor ld Wars. Is this no t suppor t fo r a

different version of cosmopol i tan ism, one in wh ich nationality wou l dnotmedia te but be subordinated, valued only in s o fa r an d in s o long a s itpromoted i nd i v idua l r ights in a single, rational, universal order?

Kohn envisions a progressive extension simultaneously of the s c a l e o fpol i tical integration an d o f the use o f reason and justice t o o rd e r wor ldaffairs. Nationalism transcends localism an d kinsh ip; cosmopol i tanismt ranscends nat ional ism. His concern is to v ind icate liberal nationalism asp a rt o f this general progress, an d to keep it from being identified completely with th e fascist an d other aggressive ethnonat ional isms. But hedoesn t focus clear ly on why or when the claims o f country or communi tyrather than only humanity a s a whole should carry weight . As a result,when he begins to examine the c laims fo r more particularistic nat ionalidentit ies in the second par t o f The idea of Nationalism he sometimess e e m s to unravel the c a s e he made in the firstpa r t fo r the pos it ive potential o f a civic nationalism jo ining citizens in common commi tmen t to anethical project.Implicit ly, o f course, Kohn suggests that good nationalism deserves loyalty more than bad, and good nationalism i nheres in commitments toreason, justice, individualism, an d universality. It therefore is self.transcending. A centra l p rob lem with organic , histor ical , or ethnic nationalism thus is that it is not se l f - t ranscend ing. At bes t it is beni g n when it isnot coup led to pro jects ofexploiting minorities or conquer i ng ne ighbors.At wors t it lacks th e mo ra l orientation required (a ) to consider th e intere s t s o f other nations a s carrying comparable moral we igh t to those o f oneso w n , or ( b) to ask that ones nation become bet ter than it is , notmere ly bepreserved.The ke y is a concept ion of politics as rational, sel f-conscious crea t ion ,th e mak ing of social order b y m ea ns of mutual agreements an d coordinated act ions:MIn the West nat ions grew up a s unions of cit izens, by th e will of individuals w hoexpressed it in cont racts, covenants, or plebiscites. Thus they integrated around apol i t ical idea, looking t owa rds th e c ommon future wh ich wou l d spr ing from theircommon efforts. A nascent Ge rman nat ional ism, unable to find th e ral ly ing pointin soc iety or in a free an d ra t i ona l order, found it in nature or in th e past , not in


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xl THE IDEA OF NATIONALISM INTRODUCTION TO THE TRANSACTION EDITION xlia pol i t ical ac t bu t in a given natural fact, the folk commun ity , fo rmed by the tiesof a h o a r y p a s t , a n d l a t e r of prehistoric b i o l o g i c a l f a c t o r s . This natural foundationw a s no t simply a c c e p t e d a s a f a c t , but r a i s e d to the d ign it y o f a n i d e a l o r of am y s t e r y . The polit ical integration around a rational g o a l w a s r e p l a c e d b y a m y s t i c a lintegration around the irrational, p r e c i v i l i z e d folk c o n c e p t . ( p . 3 5 1 )In this respect, Kant is a decisive improvement on Rousseau. Bothshared the fundamental respect fo r the d i g n it y o f th e human ind iv idual ,bu t Kants ethics never knew any other hor izon than the universal ohe o fmank ind (p . 396). And on t hi s e ve n th e mo re romantic Goethe woulda g r e e : the fatherland of th e man who t hin k s wi thout prejudice, w ho ca nrise above his t ime, is nowhere an d everywhere (p . 414 ) .But then, just where is th e man w ho thinks wi thout prejudice? Justhow fa r ca n anyone rise above his t ime (and sti l l matter in it)? At i ts mos tex tr eme, the civic/ethnic opposi t ion impl ies the possibi l i ty o f a pure lypo l it ica l, pu re ly ra ti ona l order, escaping from any consti tution by cultureor preexist ing socia l re lat ions. Even in more moderate versions, though,

it suggests th e radical prior i t izat ion o f pol i t ica l commun i ty over a ll othersenses o f commun i ty or social solidarity. It suggests that belonging canplausibly be based entirely on adherence to an idea expressed in more o rl e s s abstract forms. A nd in doing s o itbegs the question o f whether suchcivic belong ing based on adherence to l iberal universal is t ideals couldunderw r i te the specif ic loyalty o f speci fic c i tizens to specif ic states, o r th eexclusion o f others from those states.It is no t that the distinction o f civic from ethnic makes no s e n s e . Theprob lem l i e s , rather, in using itto construct opposed types o f nationalism.This obscures the ex tent to wh ich civic an d ethnic d imensions are intertw ined in al l c a s e s , albeit in va ry i ng p r opo r ti ons . It also collapses intoethnic a variety o f notions about w hy some peop le belong together, fromlanguage and shared culture to attachments to place an d part ic ipat ion ina social structure~ And it suggests more homo logy w i t h the series of otheropp os it ions West/East, peaceful /aggress ive, liberal/illiberal, forward-look ing/backward- looking than is warranted. It is wor t h noting thatthough Car leton Hayes idea of in tegra l nat ional ism shares somethingw i t h Kohns e thn ic nat iona l ism it is by no means identical an d it is no tproposed a s distinctively Eastern. Hayes presents it a s typi f ied by Barresan d Maurras a s much a s Mussol in i an d H i tl erand i ndeed his label isd rawn from their integriste movement.65 And it w as a Frenchman w ho

wrote famously that historical enquiry brings to l ight deeds o f violencewh ich took place at the origin of al l pol i tical format ions, even thosewhose consequences have been altogether beneficial. Unity is always ef.fected by means o f brutality.66Ofcourse, Renan imag ined nationalism adaily plebiscite no t a binding inheritance. Bu t he recognized the impossibility o f a pure pol i ty, free from th e or iginal si n o f being part icu lar an dprobably the p roduc t o f power.Where does this leave the J e w s ? As a Zionist, Kohn sought a culturaltransformation that wou ld realize Jewish ethical ideals an d a nation thatwould s a v e Judaism not only J e w s . Both frustrated wi th the actual deve lopments o f Zionism, an d horr i f ied by wha t nationalism became in fas.cism, Kohn turned t o recover y o f a l iberal nationalism from a secularizedChristian tradition, the Enlightenment, an d its appropr iat ion of th e Sophi s t s , Stoics, an d other Greeks. This centered on indiv idual ism, the rights o fman, a rational an d universal concept o f pol i t ica l l iberty, an d a progres.sive orientation to the future. He contrasted this to a nationalism foundedon par t icular histories, on monuments an d graveyards, even harking backto the mysteries

the idea of nationalism intro

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