the german werewolf and the iraqi guerrilla

8/11/2019 The German Werewolf and the Iraqi Guerrilla

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The German WerewolfAnd the Iraqi Guerrillaby Captain Brian K. Glasshof

A country exercised from the tyranny ofa madman. Members of the national andlocal leadership at virtually every leveloutlawed members of an ousted crim-inal regime. Intelligentsia that resistedthe movement, ruthlessly eliminated by aparanoid dictator, leaving a nation with-

out a vital personnel infrastructure. Fis-cal infrastructure decimated by the ef-fects of war. American troops and mili-tary leaders forced to grapple with a fa-natical resistance using guerrilla tacticsto frustrate operations and influence thelocal population. An indifferent local pop-ulace that changes disposition from oneblock to another.

Although the scenario is familiar, thetime and place was 1945 Germany con-cluding five years of world war. The sim-ilarities are much deeper than the socio-political landscape and the operationalmilitary decisionmaking that accompany

it. The small-unit tactics that are current-ly used against coalition forces in Iraqare similar to those used by German re-sistance in 1945 against allied forces. Wecan draw from these experiences and les-sons learned to better equip our forces forthe current mission.

As German leaders grappled with a fail-ing military campaign, some resurrectedthe centuries-old concept of guerrilla tac-tics. General Heinrich Himmler, leaderof the Schutzstaffel (SS) and command-er in chief of the home army, undertook

the responsibility to develop an organiza-tion, later named Werewolf, to fightbehind the front as a diversionary force,and subsequently lead a paramilitary re-sistance, once the regular military capit-ulated.1Himmler placed SS Police Gen-eral Pruetzmann in charge of this new se-

cret organization, which successfully ex-ecuted missions both behind enemy linesin the west, and in Berlin to counter theRussian advance. These Werewolf mis-sions are similar in purpose and endstateto current Iraqi resistance and provide his-torical, as well as tactical perspective, toguerrilla resistance.

Initially, Werewolf activity focused onlocal leaders that cooperated with occu-pational forces. The most famous and suc-cessful of these attacks was in the city ofAachen against the American appointedChief Burgomaster (mayor), Franz Op-penhoff. Aachen is a small town in the

southwestern region of Germany that al-lied troops conquered.

Mayor Oppenhoffs crime resulted fromhis cooperation with American occupa-tional forces, which included discussionsof how best to structure a defeated post-war Germany.2Himmler issued the deathsentence for these actions and namedthe mission Operation Carnival. To exe-cute the sentence, Himmler selected aWerewolf group of five, which includedone woman. The group was tasked to par-achute behind enemy lines, infiltrate into

the town, reconnoiter the objective, se-lect the place to kill the mayor, and thenexecute actions on the objective. The lonefemale of the group, Isle Hirsch, conduct-ed the night reconnaissance to ascertainMayor Oppenhoffs location and the com-position/disposition of his security forc-

es. Hirsch found the mayors home easi-ly and discovered the extremely lax se-curity, despite Oppenhoffs fear of sucha strike. After disseminating the intelli-gence to the remainder of her group, athree-man detail executed the killing.Once the objective was accomplished, theWerewolf team quickly broke contact andinitiated exfiltration.

Although Operation Carnival was suc-cessful, it was not the norm for the dura-tion of the war. More often, the successof the Werewolves depended on the Hitleryouth during the defense of Berlin. Dur-ing these operations, the Werewolf-trained

soldiers executed guerrilla close combattactics with great success. In one case,Adolf Hitler awarded the Iron Cross to a12-year-old soldier who recorded 20 Rus-sian tank kills.3The SS Werewolf CombatInstruction Manual provided the tacticsfor the exploits during the battle for Ber-lin, and best illustrates how the Werewolffought at the small-unit level.4

The Werewolf organization, at its small-est level, consisted of four guerrillas anda leader. This five-man group was em-ployed when operating in areas of tight

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observation and was employed during thefirst phases of guerrilla warfare.5The firststage was the beginning of resistance, orguerrilla warfare, in which the situation

was unclear or observation was very tight.During phase one, the objective was highpayoff targets and harassment actions.These missions were quick strike andavoided decisive engagement.

Phase two included multiple groups orplatoons with combat missions or the de-struction of large objectives. Phase-twomissions were only used when the situa-tion was clear and in favorable terrain. Ineither type of mission, phase two involveddecisive contact.

Phase three involved using task force-sized guerrilla organizations, composed

of several platoons or companies, and wassupported by the regular army. OperationCarnival was a phase-one mission. Thegoal of guerrilla warfare is the involve-ment of the general population in an up-rising that overwhelms the enemy andallows for future offensive operations ofthe regular army.6

The two most advantageous tactics areinterdiction and ambush.7Interdiction op-erations are surprise operations in the en-emys rear that result in the destruction ofhigh payoff targets such as supply, com-munications, transportation, or civil en-gineering soft targets. Interdiction is best

used when implemented during phaseone of guerrilla warfare and, as such,seeks to avoid decisive contact. On the

other hand, the ambush is used through-out operations and is based on surprise.It is best used when integrated with minesand light automatic or antitank weapons.

Ambush sites are more effective if theenemy cannot identify them as potentialambush sites, thus maintaining the nec-essary surprise component. Operation Car-nival illustrates the use of interdiction,and the battle of Berlin is an example ofsuccessfully using ambushes.8

Superior reconnaissance, which provid-ed superior intelligence, was essential toall Werewolf action.9An intelligence net-work gathered the necessary information/intelligence and was made up of individ-ual scouts who worked independently.10Charismatic people, whom the local pop-

ulation considered helpful, often filledthese scout positions.11Lightly equipped,small units then used the intelligence tomaintain superior maneuverability.12BothOperation Carnival and the heroics of 12-year-old boys during the battle of Berlinrelied on these basic principles. Theseprinciples continue today on the battle-field in Iraq.

The current environment in Iraq is sim-ilar to that of Germany in 1945. Iraqi fight-ers planned guerrilla tactics before thewar began and implemented these tacticsbefore the war concluded. Iraqi fightersand subsequent resistance groups incor-

porated essential elements of the Were-wolf instruction manual, which producedtheir most successful engagements.13Un-

like the Werewolves, Operation Iraqi Free-dom (OIF) elevated guerrilla tactics fromphase one to phase two, and arguablyphase three during the attack of the 507th

Maintenance Company.

OIF resistance is based on the tactics ofinterdiction and ambushes. Interdiction isdemonstrated daily with attacks on battal-ion supply lines and on operational tar-gets such as aircraft approaching and de-parting Baghdad International Airport.Both are high payoff targets, specificallyenumerated as interdiction targets in theWerewolf instruction manual.14In mostcases, these attacks are conducted as partof phase one of guerrilla warfare as de-fined by the Werewolf instruction manu-al.15Small groups, ranging from three to

five personnel, execute these operationsand avoid decisive contact by attemptingto destroy their targets and then break con-tact by using covered and concealed routesor withdrawing into friendly crowds. Flex-ibility and maneuverability are essentialto the success and survivability of theseattacks and the attackers.

Armament is usually light, only enoughto destroy targets and rarely surpass rock-et-propelled grenades (RPGs), antitankguided missiles (for aircraft), and lightautomatic weapons for local security. Mor-tars are also employed, but are done sofrom a truck platform, or if dismounted,

are dismounted quickly and only longenough to drop rounds and then remountthe truck and exfiltrate. If heavier dis-mounted armament or additional ammu-nition is needed, caches seem favoredover carrying additional weight or usingadditional forces. This was particularlytrue in the beginning of OIF when in-numerable caches were regularly foundthroughout the entire region. When im-plementing interdiction, the biggest dif-ference between OIF and Germany is theincreased mobility and maneuverabilityof the attackers due to the availability ofautomobiles, which provide easy exfil-

tration.

The ambush is the most successful tac-tic used throughout the region. The am-bush techniques used in OIF are usuallyexecuted with an improvised explosivedevice (IED) and sometimes in conjunc-tion with small arms and RPG fire. If theambush is executed with a small force ofless than three to five personnel, then anIED is the method of choice. In this case,the Werewolf fundamental of avoidingdecisive contact is achieved. The IED isdetonated remotely from a safe distance

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As German leaders grappled with a

failing military campaign, some res-urrected the centuries-old conceptof guerrilla tactics. General HeinrichHimmler, leader of the Schutzstaffel(SS) and commander in chief of thehome army, undertook the respon-sibility to develop an organization,later named Werewolf to fight be-hind the front as a diversionary force,and subsequently lead a paramili-tary resistance, once the regular mil-itary capitulated.


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that minimizes the opportunity for coali-tion forces to conduct action drills due tothe inability to easily or quickly identifythe enemy. If the enemy uses direct fire

contact, it is not decisive in nature.Resistance fighters might use direct fire

in conjunction with IEDs, but only whenthe terrain strongly favors the guerrillafighter. Initiating a near ambush with anIED, followed by subsequent small-armsfire and RPGs is a good example of directfire. Guerrilla fighters use direct fire whenattacking smaller groups, or when theyare in position to withdraw into crowds,buildings, or canals. Supremacy is not infirepower (AK47 versus M2 or M240) butin the number of weapons systems andfighting positions. Direct fire is used frommultiple locations and from different an-

gles, which allows massing guerrilla fire-power and simultaneous dispersement ofcoalition fire in multiple directions. Oncedirect fire is used, guerrilla forces con-tinue using direct fires until coalition forc-es execute successful actions on contact.Successful actions on contact usually in-volve suppression to allow forces to breakcontact and execute medical evacuation.

Guerrilla forces also used the fundamen-tals of flexibility, maneuverability, andreconnaissance to execute the hasty am-bush on the 507th Maintenance Compa-

ny. With the situation unclear, guerrillaforces minimized contact and collectedinformation while repositioning forces.When the 507th, believing their previous

route to be clear, backtracked through thetown, the guerrillas attacked, achievingsurprise. The guerrilla forces massed in adecisive engagement once they realizedthey had sufficient firepower to destroythe entire coalition force that remained inthe engagement area.

Coalition forces can use three principlesof war against guerrilla tactics; they canbetter use mass, security, and economyof force to defeat the current threat. Im-proving mass will allow the coalition tomaintain firepower superiority in eachengagement. The ability of guerrilla tac-

tics to use a much smaller force and gainfirepower superiority with that smallerforce can be mitigated. Particularly againstthe ambush, coalition forces can massforces against any enemy that uses directfire systems. Currently, enemy guerrillaforces identify soft targets or small com-bat patrols as ambush targets. Combat pa-trols are usually no more than three vehi-cles and can be as few as two vehicles. Ifone vehicle is hit with an IED and ren-dered combat ineffective, this leaves oneor two vehicles to react to contact andsimultaneously conduct medical evacua-

tion. The remaining vehicles are not ca-pable of returning fire in multiple direc-tions and mass fires. In this case, all firesare dispersed and not massed. To mass

fires, a second three-vehicle section is man-datory. The second section can conductthe patrol behind the lead section. If thelead section gains contact in an ambush,the second section maintains the free-dom of maneuver and can action to a fa-vorable position to mass fires on a specif-ic target.

One section massing fires can quicklydefeat or destroy one fighting positionthat is no longer concealed. Destroying aflank firing position can quickly allowfriendly forces to reorient fires on the re-maining two or three fighting positions.Initial suppression by the second section

will allow the lead section in contact tomore easily coordinate its degraded firesto suppress the two fighting positions thatremain. Once the initial fighting positionis destroyed, the orientation of the secondsection can shift to the next fighting po-sition. Once friendly forces demonstratethe ability to mass fires, enemy forces willbreak contact.

Using a second section as a follow-onforce for all combat patrols provides se-curity. Increasing the patrols depth pro-hibits the enemy from effectively flank-

The two most advantageous tactics are interdiction and ambush. Interdiction operations are surprise operations in the enemys rear that result in the destruction of high payoff targets such asupply, communications, transportation, or civil engineering soft targets. Interdiction is best usewhen implemented during phase one of guerrilla warfare and, as such, seeks to avoid decisive contact. On the other hand, the ambush is used throughout operations and is based on surprise.


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ing friendly forces. Additionally, duringmilitary operations in urban terrain, a sec-

tion in depth enables the patrol to ade-quately scan building tops located imme-diately next to the first patrol. It is mucheasier to scan rooftops from a distance.Snipers and other rooftop forces wait forthe signal that friendly forces are in theengagement area before revealing them-selves, and then doing so in a favorablecondition. With a section in depth, friend-ly forces will more quickly identify am-bush forces on rooftops or upper floors,and subsequently, more easily suppressthose ambush forces.

If an ambush is conducted with an IEDonly, without direct fire, the section indepth provides the needed personnel tobegin cordon operations. It is nearly im-possible for one section with casualties toconduct cordon operations. Guerrilla forc-es will immediately attempt to break con-tact, and if possible, exfiltrate the ambushsite. The second patrol is more capableof cordoning the area and eliminating thefreedom of maneuver necessary for theguerrilla to expedite the withdrawal. Oncean area is cordoned, additional forcesmight be capable of conducting sweepsand searches to identify enemy forces.

Mandating patrols consisting of twothree-vehicle sections is an appropriate

application of economy of force. The en-emy is force oriented; they must attackfriendly forces to obtain any success. Byconcentrating forces in fewer patrols, thetotal area affected by patrols is reduced.However, since the enemy must attackfriendly forces, the amount of vehicles incontact at any given time increases. There-fore, fewer patrols are out of position togain contact or support friendly forces incontact. Otherwise, patrols that are not incontact when other friendly forces makecontact with an ambush are patrols with-out relevant purpose.

Guerrilla tactics used today in OIF arebased on the same fundamentals of theGerman Werewolf of World War II. Un-derstanding the similarities and adaptingthese fundamentals to the contemporaryoperating environment provides the his-torical perspective needed to counterat-tack successfully. Rather than patrol alarger percentage of assigned areas, con-centrate forces in fewer patrols to gainmass and security, and gratuitously im-prove economy of force.

Notes

1Charles Whiting,Hitlers Werewolves, New York, Stein andDay, pp. 66 and 164.

2Ibid., p. 56.

3Ibid., xxx.

4Michael C. Fagnon, SS Werewolf Combat Instruction Man-ual, Boulder, CO, Paladin Press, 1982, p. 13.

5Ibid.

6Ibid., p. 7.

7Ibid., pp. 45, 47.

8Ibid., pp. 45-47.

9Ibid., p. 8.

10Ibid., p. 41.

11Ibid., p. 40.

12Ibid., p. 8.

13Ibid..

14Ibid., p. 47.

15Ibid.

Captain Brian K. Glasshof is assistant G3 PlansOfficer, 3d Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, GA.He received a B.A. from Centre College and aJ.D. from University of Memphis. His militaryeducation includes Combined Arms and Ser-vices Staff School, Armor Officer Basic Course,and Armor Captains Career Course. He hasserved in various command and staff positions,to include S3 and XO, Headquarters and Head-quarters Troop, 2d Squadron, 2d Armored Cav-alry Regiment (2ACR), and scout platoon lead-er, E Troop, 2d Squadron, 2ACR, Fort Polk.

The current environment in Iraq is similar to that of Germany in 1945. Iraqi fighters plannedguerrilla tactics before the war began and implemented these tactics before the war concluded.Iraqi fighters and subsequent resistance groups incorporated essential elements of the Were-wolf instruction manual, which produced their most successful engagements.

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the german werewolf and the iraqi guerrilla

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