the embassy of the future recommendations for the design of future u.s. embassy buildings
TRANSCRIPT
The Embassy of the Future:Recommendations for the Design of Future
U.S. Embassy Buildings
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The Embassy of theFuture:
Recommendations forthe Design of Future
U.S. Embassy Buildings
Final ReportNOTICE TO ACCOMPANY UNCLASSIFIED REPORT
September 1986
This is an unclassified version of the original report submitted in January1986 to the U.S. Department of State by the Committee on Research for theSecurity of Future U.S. Embassy Buildings, of the Building Research Board
(BRB), Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National ResearchCouncil. This summary report does not include certain passages and materialsthat appeared in the original report transmitted to the State Department, which
contained information and recommendations that were deemed by the StateDepartment to be classified. Also, the original committee report transmitted to
the State Department was accompanied by eight technical appendixes thataddress areas of particular interest and concern. All of these appendixes weredeemed by the State Department to contain information of a classified nature,
not suitable for publication in an unclassified document.
Readers of this report are urged to take into account the fact that thiscommittee's work spanned a period of nearly 18 months, during a time of
substantial and rapid change within the State Department's Office of ForeignBuildings Operations (FBO). This
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report, therefore, reflects conditions and practices that were in a state oftransition. By the time of the report's transmittal, many of the situations
identified by the committee had been addressed by FBO. At the time thisunclassified report was released, many of the committee's recommendations had
been implemented; others were under active consideration.
Committee on Research for the Security ofFuture U.S. Embassy BuildingsBuilding Research BoardCommission on Engineering and Technical SystemsNational Research Council
NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESSWashington, D.C. 1986
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NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board ofthe National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the NationalAcademy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. Themembers of the committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competences andwith regard for appropriate balance.
The original report has been reviewed by a group other than the authors according to proce-dures approved by a Report Review Committee consisting of members of the National Academy ofSciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine.
The National Research Council was established by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy's purposes of further-ing knowledge and of advising the federal government. The Council operates in accordance withgeneral policies determined by the Academy under the authority of its congressional charter of1863, which establishes the Academy as a private, nonprofit, self-governing membership corpora-tion. The Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy ofSciences and the National Academy of Engineering in the conduct of their services to the govern-ment, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. It is administered jointly by bothAcademies and the Institute of Medicine. The National Academy of Engineering and the Institute ofMedicine were established in 1964 and 1970, respectively, under the charter of the NationalAcademy of Sciences.
The original report was prepared through the Building Research Board, which is a unit of theCommission on Engineering and Technical Systems of the National Research Council. It was pre-pared under Contract No. 1030-562112 between the National Academy of Sciences and the StateDepartment.
For information regarding this document, write to the Director, Building Research Board,National Research Council, 2101 Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20418.Printed in the United States of America
National Academy PressThe National Academy Press was created by the National Academy of Sciences to publish thereports issued by the Academy and by the National Academy of Engineering, the Institute ofMedicine, and the National Research Council, all operating under the charter granted to the NationalAcademy of Sciences by the Congress of the United States.
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BUILDING RESEARCH BOARD
1985-1986
Chairman
GEORGE S. JENKINS, President, Consultation Networks, Inc., Washington, D.C.
Members
ROSS B. COROTIS, Chairman, Department of Civil Engineering, Johns HopkinsUniversity, Baltimore, Maryland
RAY F. DeBRUHL, Director, State Construction, North Carolina Department ofAdministration, Raleigh, North Carolina
RICHARD B. DeMARS, Chairman, Geupel-DeMars, Inc., Indianapolis, IndianaDAVID R. DIBNER, Senior Vice-President, Bernard Johnson, Inc., Bethesda,
MarylandROBERT C. DOBAN, Senior Vice-President, Science and Technology, Owens-
Corning Fiberglas Corporation, Toledo, OhioEZRA D. EHRENKRANTZ, President, The Ehrenkrantz Group, New York, New YorkDENOS C. GAZIS, Assistant Director, Semiconductor Science and Technology, IBM
Research Center, Yorktown Heights, New YorkJOHN T. JOYCE, President, International Union of Bricklayers and Allied
Craftsmen, Washington, D.C.RICHARD H. JUDY, Director, Dade County Aviation Department, Miami, FloridaFREDERICK KRIMGOLD, Associate Dean for Research and Extension, Virginia
Tech, Alexandria, VirginiaROBERT P. MARSHALL, Turner Construction Company (Retired), Vero Beach, FloridaRICHARD L. TUCKER, Director, Construction Industry Institute, The University of
Texas, AustinRALPH WIDNER, Executive Director, Greater Philadelphia First, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania
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setti
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COMMITTEE ON RESEARCH FOR THE SECURITY OFFUTURE U.S. EMBASSY BUILDINGS
Chairman
DAVID R. DIBNER, Bernard Johnson, Inc., Bethesda, Maryland
Members
RICHARD T. BAUM, Jaros, Baum and Bolles, New York, New YorkSEYMOUR A. BORTZ, IITResearch Institute, Chicago, IllinoisROBERT C. BREWSTER, U.S. Ambassador (Retired), Washington, D.C.RICHARD A. DAY, Severna Park, MarylandCHRISTOPHER DEGENHARDT, EDAW, Inc., San Francisco, CaliforniaBRIAN M. JENKINS, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CaliforniaSTUART L. KNOOP, Oudens + Knoop, Architects, Washington, D.C.MICHAEL R. MORRIS, Hanscomb Associates, Inc., Chicago, IllinoisJOHN C. PIGNATO, Stone and Webster Engineering Corp., Boston, MassachusettsLESLIE E. ROBERTSON, Leslie E. Robertson Associates, New York, New York
Liaison Representatives
ROBERT BURKE, The Smithsonian InstitutionDONALD B. BALDWIN, U.S. Army Corps of EngineersCHARLES CULVER, National Bureau of StandardsSAMUEL E. DUNCAN, Veterans AdministrationROBERT FURLONG, U.S. Air ForceRALPH JUSELL, U.S. Postal ServiceJOHN MOYER, General Services AdministrationBART RINEHART, The Smithsonian InstitutionMICHAEL YACHNIS, Naval Facilities Engineering Command
State Department Representatives
WILLIAM E. BISCHOFF, Acting Chief, Communication Security Division
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DONALD J. BOUCHARD, Assistant Secretary for AdministrationHARVEY A. BUFFALO, JR., Office of the Inspector GeneralGREGORIE W. BUJAC, Chief, Physical Security DivisionRICHARD N. DERTADIAN, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Foreign Buildings
OperationsDAVID C. FIELDS, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security and
Director, Diplomatic Security ServicePETER E. GURVIN, Civil Structural Engineer, Office of Foreign Buildings OperationsKENNETH C. KIDWELL, Chief, Communications Security DivisionROBERT LAMB, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Diplomatic SecurityDENNIS LUNDSTEDT, Chief of Fire Protection, Office of Foreign Buildings
OperationsWILLIAM Mc COLLOUGH, Assistant Director for Building Design, Office of Foreign
Buildings OperationsDAY MOUNT, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Information SystemsROBERT C. RIBERA, Deputy Assistant Secretary for CommunicationsRICHARD ROBERTS, Deputy Chief, Standards and Design, Physical Security DivisionJOHN WOLF, Physical Security Division
Consultants and Contractors
KATHLEEN ALMAND, Cabin John, MarylandJEANETTE A. BEHRENDS, Daytona Beach, FloridaROLAND M. BINKER, Metcalf and Associates, Washington, D.C.MICHAEL W. DAVIS, The Perimeter Enhancement Group, Alexandria, VirginiaWILMOT ELMES and JOHN MAGLIANO, Syska and Hennessy, New York, New YorkDAVID B. HATTIS, Building Technology, Inc., Silver Spring, MarylandWILLIAM A. KEENAN, P.E., Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory, Port Hueneme,
CaliforniaEARLE W. KENNETT, JR., Kensington, MarylandJAMES R. RILEY, Fort Lauderdale, FloridaHEINZ R. TRECHSEL, H. R. Trechsel Associates, Germantown, Maryland
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JAMES D. WILLIAMS and DAVID SHEBY, The WLS Group, Albuquerque, New Mexico
Building Research Board Staff
JOHN P. EBERHARD, DirectorTHOMAS V. VONIER, Project DirectorPETER H. SMEALLIE, Senior Program OfficerPATRICIA M. WHOLEY, Administrative AssistantDONNA F. ALLEN, Senior SecretarySHEILA A. DAVIS, Senior SecretaryDELPHINE D. GLAZE, Administrative Secretary
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PREFACE
In late 1984, the U.S. Congress, responding to growing concerns over thesecurity of U.S. Foreign Service personnel and facilities abroad, authorized theState Department to carry out advanced research on the development andapplication of state-of-the-art security measures. The State Department soughtthe advice of the National Research Council's Building Research Board (BRB).
The BRB established for this purpose in early 1985 the Committee onResearch for the Security of Future U.S. Embassy Buildings. Its membersinclude distinguished persons from a variety of fields, including building designand construction, landscape planning and design, physical and communicationssecurity, cost estimation and control, architecture, structural engineering, andmechanical and electrical engineering. The committee also includes anambassador of the United States (retired), a leading expert on terrorism andterrorist incidents, and liaison representatives from other agencies of the U.S.government that have active foreign and domestic construction programs.
The committee and staff, aided by consultants and contractors expert infields related to building design and security, have conducted detailed inquiriesinto a broad range of subjects that are concerned with the security of personneland vital information in U.S. embassy buildings. The committee has maintainedactive contact with many offices within the State Department, as well as withthe Secretary of State's Advisory Panel on Overseas Security. Members of thecommittee and staff traveled to a number of foreign posts and receivednumerous briefings from the State
PREFACE ix
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Department and from other U.S. government agencies with related interests.This report summarizes the committee's recommendations after more than
a year of work. The recommendations are concerned with security-relatedissues in virtually every aspect of the planning, design, construction, andmanagement of the State Department's overseas buildings. In view of the plansnow being implemented by the State Department to build anew, relocate, orsubstantially modify a large number of foreign posts, and in the face of ever-increasing concern over acts of terrorism and espionage directed against U.S.citizens and facilities abroad, the committee's work has taken on added urgencyand significance.
PREFACE x
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CONTENTS
1 SUMMARY 1
2 THE COMMITTEE'S CHARGE 11
3 THE COMMITTEE'S WORK APPROACH 14 Committee Structure 14 Federal Agency Liaison Representatives 16 The Study Process 17
4 FORCES THAT WILL SHAPE EMBASSIES OF THE FUTURE 21 The Concentration and Colocation of User Agencies Within the
Embassy and Compound 23
The Proliferation of Electronic Information Management Systems 24 The Growth in Incidents of Terrorism, Espionage, and Sabotage 25 Appropriate Architectural Expressions of the U.S. Government
Presence Abroad 27
5 COMMITTEE FINDINGS: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES IN THEDESIGN, CONSTRUCTION, AND MANAGEMENT OFFUTURE U.S. EMBASSY BUILDINGS
29
Changes in Current FBO Processes and Practices 29 The Prime Importance of Building Sites 30
CONTENTS xi
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Clear Physical Separation of Sensitive and Less SensitiveChancery Building Areas
31
The Need for Building Flexibility and Ease of Expansion 32 Building Control and Management Systems 33
6 DESIGN CRITERIA FOR A NEW GENERATION OF U.S.EMBASSY BUILDINGS
35
Definition of the Design Threat 37 Performance-Based Criteria and Recommendations 38
7 IMPROVING SECURITY IN THE PLANNING, DESIGN, CON-STRUCTION, AND MANAGEMENT OF FUTURE U.S.EMBASSY BUILDINGS
56
Background on Improvements to FBO Procedures 56 Committee Recommendations on Program Implementation, Man-
agement, and Administration 57
8 FUTURE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 69 The Need for a Sustained Building Research and Development Pro-
gram Within the State Department 69
Techniques and Methods for Security Impact Assessments 72 Site Design Elements 74
9 CONCLUSION 76
CONTENTS xii
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nd s
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typo
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Ple
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the
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sion
of t
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publ
icat
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as th
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1
Summary
During the course of its deliberations from January 1985 until the present,the Committee on Research for the Security of Future U.S. Embassy Buildingsidentified a number of factors, in addition to growing threats from terrorism andespionage, that will affect the design of embassies of the future. These factorsinclude the increased use by the Foreign Service of computer-aided officesystems and telecommunications capabilities, and increased pressure from otheragencies of the U.S. government to be located in or on the same compound asembassy buildings.
The delineation by the committee of these key areas of concern gave riseto a series of recommendations for the State Department's overseas constructionprograms. The committee urges that the State Department integrate theserecommendations with a new set of comprehensive design guidance documentsto be used by the architects, engineers, and others who will design new embassybuildings.
Table 1-1, which appears on page 3, summarizes the recommendationsdeveloped by the committee during its deliberations.
Briefly, the committee recommends that the State Department adopt aprocess of thorough and regular security impact assessments. Such a processwould begin at the earliest stages of project conception and run throughout thelife cycle of the embassy building, serving as the basis for designed responses toactual and perceived security threats. The committee also recommends:
• rigorous new procedures, guidelines, and criteria for the identificationand evaluation of sites for future embassy buildings,
SUMMARY 1
Abou
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DF
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Thi
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w d
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rese
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ion
of t
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the
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s, w
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Ple
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of t
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as th
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taking into account a full range of security considerations andintegrating them with other aspects of site development;
• security-conscious site planning and design guidelines to ensure thatmaximum advantage is taken of the protection that can be afforded bysite size, perimeter access controls, and landscape planning;
• revised guidelines for the location and arrangement of functional areaswithin embassy buildings to ensure that the most vital and sensitiveaspects of foreign operations are afforded maximum protection fromthreats of takeover and espionage;
• new guidelines and criteria for the protection of electrical, mechanical,and communications systems within buildings and for the use of state-of-the-art security and access-control systems as complements tosecurity-conscious building design;
• changes in current State Department practices and procedures in suchareas as capital construction program management, the selection andmanagement of architects, engineers, and construction contractors, andthe management of information about foreign buildings; and
• an ongoing building research and development program within the StateDepartment, directed in part toward the improvement of physical andtechnical security in embassy buildings.
The committee has continued its efforts on behalf of the State Departmentthrough the middle of September 1986, focusing on aspects of theimplementation of its recommendations and on research into several areas ofspecial technical concern.
SUMMARY 2
Abou
t th
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file:
Thi
s ne
w d
igita
l rep
rese
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ion
of t
he o
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as th
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TABLE 1-1 Summary of Committee Recommendations
No. Subject Page
Site Evaluation and Selection
1 Site selection criteria and proceduresA comprehensive, systematic approach should be developed toidentify and synthesize the factors important to embassy sitings,including site developability, security, communications, and costcriteria. The approach should entail three phases: project definition,site generation, and site evaluation. The committee's site selectionprocess and methodology should be used as the basis fordevelopment of a site selection field manual for the Office ofForeign Buildings Operations (FBO) siting teams.
38
2 Site size and perimeter standoff distancesThe State Department should use the full extent of its negotiatingabilities (including the authorities of the Foreign Missions Act) tosecure sites large enough to implement a mandatory setback distancefor all embassy buildings. For those few sites on which thisrequirement cannot be achieved but that are otherwise desirable, awritten waiver of the requirement can be issued by the UnderSecretary for Management.
39
3 Prescreening of sitesBefore formal site selection begins, FBO should work with the poststaff—if necessary, by temporarily assigning personnel there—toensure that sufficient information on potential sites has beenassembled for the site selection team.
40
4 Advance preparation for site selectionAfter final candidate sites have been identified, the post (under thedirection of the FBO professional temporarily assigned to it) shouldassemble detailed information on each site. This information shouldbe available to and should be reviewed by the site selection teamprior to its visit.
41
SUMMARY 3
Abou
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is P
DF
file:
Thi
s ne
w d
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l rep
rese
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ion
of t
he o
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of t
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as th
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5 Site selection teamOne or more permanent site selection teams should be formed withexpertise in architecture, landscape planning and engineering, physicaland technical security, communications, cost engineering, local foreignlanguage negotiations, and political and diplomatic relations.
41
6 Adjacent land purchaseThe State Department should consider purchasing the land adjacent to aproposed U.S. embassy site when the type of future developmentplanned for that land cannot currently be determined but mightpotentially be unsatisfactory.
42
Site Planning and Design
7 Site security analysis guidelinesFBO should immediately adopt and implement a site security analysis,to be conducted directly after site selection, as the basis for site planningand design decisions.
43
8 Site security planning guidelinesFBO should immediately adopt and implement a site planning processthat emphasizes security and that is conducted concurrently with thefunctional analysis of the building program.
43
9 Site security design guidelinesFBO should immediately adopt and implement security designguidelines for all major site elements on the perimeter or within theembassy grounds.
44
10 Site perimeterThe site perimeter should be designed to protect embassy facilities fromstandoff or drive-by attacks and from thrown explosives; it should alsodetect (through the use of detection devices) and delay intruders and/orvehicles attempting forcible entry.
44
SUMMARY 4
Abou
t th
is P
DF
file:
Thi
s ne
w d
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l rep
rese
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ion
of t
he o
rigin
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tain
ed, a
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prin
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of t
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as th
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11 Site access pointsAn embassy site should have only two vehicular access points:ceremonial and service. Vehicular and pedestrian, as well as employeeand visitor, access points should be separate. Site access points alsoshould be designed to provide inspection capabilities.
44
12 Onsite circulation and parkingOnsite vehicular circulation and parking should be restricted to thegreatest degree possible. Any vehicle that does enter the site should bethoroughly searched.
45
Architectural Programming and Planning
13 Chancery building program modificationsFBO should revise the existing chancery building program guidance inaccordance with the committee's detailed recommendations and withaccepted principles of functional zoning, adjacencies, and separation.
46
14 Designation of blast and arson risk areas and containment of effectsThose embassy areas designated as areas of risk with respect tobombings and deliberately set fires should be designed to resist andcontain the effects of such incidents.
49
15 Secure areas and safe havensTwo separate, distinct protective areas should be designated in differentlocations of future embassy buildings.
49
16 Separation of hazardous occupanciesAll hazardous occupancies or materials, such as heavy buildingmaintenance activities, furniture storage, automobile repair facilities,fuel storage, and paint shops and storage, should be housed in separatefire-rated compartments.
49
SUMMARY 5
Abou
t th
is P
DF
file:
Thi
s ne
w d
igita
l rep
rese
ntat
ion
of t
he o
rigin
al w
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er b
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ed, a
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Ple
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prin
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of t
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as th
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Architectural and Structural System
17 Protection of exterior walls and openings 50
18 Protection of exterior walls and openings 50
Building Service and Security Systems
19 Protection of systems and equipmentAll building service equipment and distribution networks should becontained in areas that are secured from unauthorized access and thatprovide clear separations between those elements to be accessed only bycleared U.S. citizens and those that can be accessible to foreignnationals or others without clearances.
51
20 Protection of power, waste, water supply, and communications lines 52
21 Site self-sufficiencySites should be self-sufficient with respect to essential building servicessuch as emergency power and water, including that for fire suppression.
53
22 Monitoring and controlEmbassy services and security control and monitoring systems shouldbe integrated and simplified, with particular consideration given to theirhuman resources requirements (including ergonomic design ofcommand and control stations).
53
Program Implementation, Management, and Administration
23 Design criteria formatFBO should develop a more cohesive, fully integrated set of designmanuals and guidelines that are stated in performance terms wheneverpossible and that convey clearly the specific requirements of FBO.Mandatory training in these guidelines and security briefings should also be developed and provided to all professionalsrendering design services to FBO.
57
SUMMARY 6
Abou
t th
is P
DF
file:
Thi
s ne
w d
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l rep
rese
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ion
of t
he o
rigin
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ed, a
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of t
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as th
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24 Integrated data baseTo manage its major program of new embassy construction aseffectively as possible, FBO should establish an integrated data base(that is, one that collects information during the entire life cycle of anembassy building).
58
25 Space programmingFBO should institute a structured procedure for space programming thatwill accurately reflect current and anticipated embassy needs and thatwill incorporate the security and personnel considerations and thefunctional requirements unique to this building type.
58
26 Standardized components and large-scale procurementFBO should explore the opportunities that may result from thestandardized design and large-scale procurement of selected embassybuilding components and systems, which are made possible by thescope of the Inman Panel recommendations.
60
27 Procurement of architectural and engineering servicesFBO should institute changes in its procedures for the procurement ofarchitectural and engineering services to incorporate an expandedArchitectural Advisory Panel and modifications to the preselectioncriteria to recognize security design capability and previous StateDepartment experience.
61
28 Program managementThe State Department, to ensure uniform, effective, and efficientmanagement of the total new embassy construction programrecommended by the InmanPanel, should implement a project management program centralized inWashington, D.C., that will direct a building project from inceptionthrough occupancy of all facilities.
62
SUMMARY 7
Abou
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DF
file:
Thi
s ne
w d
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l rep
rese
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ion
of t
he o
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sion
of t
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ion
as th
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29 Project administrationWithin the overall program management structure, the State Departmentshould develop a centralized project administration procedure thatassigns responsibility and control for the duration of each project to oneWashington-based individual.
63
30 Security aspects of procurementDrawings and documentation related to the bidding, award, andconstruction processes should be circulated on a restricted basis, andconsideration should be given to using, whenever possible, U.S.contractors and subcontractors who hold appropriate security clearances.
64
31 Cost considerationsSteps should be taken immediately to gather raw cost data for review,refinement, and assembly into a format suitable for budgeting andsubsequent financial management. Also, cost models should bedeveloped for various embassy types, value management studies shouldbe an integral part of the overall design process, and value incentiveclauses should be included in embassy construction contracts.
65
32 Building operation and maintenanceOperating and maintenance manuals for building and security systemsshould be required project deliverables, as should manuals detailing theintended use of the building under emergency conditions. Service forbuilding and security systems should be provided by regionalmaintenance staffs (consisting of U.S. cleared personnel) that have beenestablished for that purpose.
66
SUMMARY 8
Abou
t th
is P
DF
file:
Thi
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w d
igita
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rese
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ion
of t
he o
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33 Postoccupancy evaluationAll new embassies, after at least one year of occupancy, should beevaluated for a series of factors that are designed to measure aspects of abuilding's performance. Feedback from these evaluations should be usedto improve design criteria.
67
34 Building information management systemsFBO should develop a building information system that tracks the flowof important construction data throughout the design and constructionprocess. After construction is completed, record drawings of theembassy should be prepared and updated as changes occur during thelife of the building.
68
Future Research and Development
35 Ongoing research programFBO should fund and administer ongoing research and developmentactivities directed toward the improvement of existing security-relateddesign methods and criteria. An outgrowth of such activities should beintegrated technical design requirements, translated into performancecriteria that can be implemented in practical terms by designprofessionals.
70
36 Security impact assessment developmentThe State Department's research and development activities shouldconcentrate in part on the development and implementation of formaltechniques and methods for evaluating and reporting on the security-related aspects of future embassy buildings throughout the facility lifecycle.
72
37 Physical elements for site securityFBO should sponsor or conduct an ongoing research and developmentprogram specifically directed toward testing the effectiveness of sitedesign elements against the security threats of greatest concern toembassies.
74
SUMMARY 9
Abou
t th
is P
DF
file:
Thi
s ne
w d
igita
l rep
rese
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ion
of t
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rigin
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as th
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38 Development of new enclosure systems 75
39 Development of door and window systems 75
SUMMARY 10
Abou
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DF
file:
Thi
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rese
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ion
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2
The Committee's Charge
Over the past decade, U.S. embassy buildings throughout the world haveincreasingly become the target of terrorist acts, raising concerns about the safetyof U.S. personnel and information abroad. In response to recent acts ofviolence, the U.S. Congress, by means of a supplemental appropriation,supported efforts launched by the State Department's Office of ForeignBuildings Operations (FBO) to carry out an advanced physical and technicalresearch program. The appropriation measure stated:
The goal of this program is to design the model embassy that will meetsecurity, operational and program requirements and will serve as the prototypefor worldwide application. The emphasis will be on research and developmentthat will establish a benchmark of minimum requirements which all futureembassy designs will follow as well as setting forth criteria for site identification.
To carry out this charge, the Assistant Secretary of State forAdministration turned to the National Research Council's Building ResearchBoard (BRB). In an early planning meeting, he elaborated on the StateDepartment's need for a program that would involve a fundamentalreconsideration of embassy design and construction, incorporating securityrequirements into all aspects of building design. Agreement was reached on thenature of this program, and FBO then requested, and subsequently contractedfor, the advice and assistance of a BRB advisory committee.
The BRB committee was to develop “a research and development programintended to . . . enable FBO to find the most effective ways to assure that anembassy building and its immediate
THE COMMITTEE'S CHARGE 11
Abou
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as th
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environment can support the performance of the post's representational,operational and program functions in a secure manner.” The contract that wasdrawn between the State Department and the National Research Councilformalizes this charge and reads, in part: “The BRB committee will develop aresearch agenda to provide the knowledge base needed for design criteria,methods of testing, and prototype design for facilities that enable the Office ofForeign Buildings Operations to obtain an environment that will support theperformance of program functions in a secure manner abroad.”
Although the original impetus for the committee's activities was terrorismand threats to the safety of Foreign Service personnel, recent events havedemonstrated that potential threats exist also to the vital information produced,handled, and stored within embassies. Consequently, the committee hasincluded a wide range of potential security threats within its scope of concerns.
Early in the course of its work, the committee concluded that it could bestrender advice and assistance to the State Department by providingrecommendations for a new set of design guidelines, requirements, and criteria.The security implications of the following elements of the building processwere considered by the committee:
• selection of design professionals;• building programming and space planning;• site selection and site design;• architectural and structural design;• building service systems and fire safety design; and• building operation and maintenance.
The design guidelines and criteria contained in this report and itsappendixes are based on clearly defined performance objectives and oncurrently available scientific and technical knowledge. When adopted by FBOand integrated with its design criteria manuals, the committee believes thesecriteria and guidelines will, as requested by Congress, provide a basis for thedevelopment and evaluation of new embassy building prototypes. Suchguidelines and criteria should also help to ensure that the prototypes willperform as intended but will remain open to the potential for design innovation.
THE COMMITTEE'S CHARGE 12
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The committee interpreted its charge to include nearly all aspects of thesecurity of future U.S. embassy buildings.* It did not interpret its charge asincluding recommendations on the present or future composition of a U.S.Foreign Service mission; that is, which agencies of what size and functionshould or should not be housed in FBO-constructed facilities. The committeeassumes that such determinations are a product of U.S. government policy andthat all functions and personnel under the chief of mission will be consideredequally from a security standpoint.
Cost implications of the committee's recommendations have beenaddressed only in general terms, in part because accurate, reliable costestimation data for building security are limited. In addition, some of therecommendations that have been developed represent new and innovativeapproaches for which costs may be difficult to estimate. The committee believesthat the State Department is in the best position to make cost determinations andthat methods can be devised to resolve the estimation problems noted above.
Midway in the committee's works in June 1985, the report of the Secretaryof State's Advisory Panel on Overseas Security was issued. (The panel waschaired by Admiral Bobby R. Inman, USN [Ret.], and is hereinafter referred toas the Inman Panel.) The Inman Panel recommended that a substantial buildingprogram be undertaken to “correct the security deficiencies of office buildingsof the Department of State and the other foreign affairs agencies abroad.” It alsoidentified a total of 126 buildings that it considered to be in need of majorsecurity upgrading or total replacement. The urgency of these recommendationshas moved the scope of the committee's work from the embassy of the distautfuture to the embassy of the immediate future. In addition, the size of thebuilding program proposed by the Inman Panel has led the committee, at therequest of the State Department, to make organizational and proceduralrecommendations to help ensure that its other recommendations can beimplemented in a large-scale special program, as well as in FBO's annualcapital programs.
*For the purposes of its work and for this report, the committee's definition ofembassy building includes chanceries, consulates, and all other buildings(excluding residences) constructed by FBO or for which the State Department isresponsible, regardless of the affiliation of the tenant. The term also includes theland on which these facilities are located and any factors or features external tothe land or property that bear on the secure performance of the embassy'sbusiness.
THE COMMITTEE'S CHARGE 13
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3
The Committee's Work Approach
COMMITTEE STRUCTURE
Much of the committee's work was carried out through subcommitteesassigned to areas of special concern, a structure that was adopted to use to themaximum extent possible the variety of skills of the committee's members.Each subcommittee is described below; the information provided includes itsmembership, its areas of responsibility, and the affiliations of the federal agencyliaison representatives to the committee. (The role of the federal representativesis described later in this chapter.)
Subcommittee 1: Overview and Integration
Charge: To review and oversee the work of all other subcommittees; toundertake study of such special matters as may from time to time arise out ofsubcommittee work and from the deliberations of the committee as a whole; tostudy the administration of design and construction programs of the Office ofForeign Buildings Operations (FBO) and to recommend improvements; and toexamine the cost and procurement aspects of the committee's recommendations.
Members: David R. Dibner (committee and subcommittee chair), RobertC. Brewster, Brian M. Jenkins, Michael R. Morris (cost control andprocurement aspects)
Federal agency liaison representatives: None
THE COMMITTEE'S WORK APPROACH 14
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Subcommittee 2: Site Security Considerations
Charge: To assess current methods and criteria for the selection of newembassy sites; to recommend improvements in the site selection process thatenhance security and other considerations; to identify areas where research isneeded to improve the security of embassy sites; to monitor the conduct ofcommittee-sponsored research work in these areas; and to develop security-related planning and design criteria for new embassy sites.
Members: Christopher Degenhardt (subcommittee chair), Michael MorrisFederal agency liaison representatives: Robert Burke and Bart Rinehart
(Smithsonian Institution), Robert Furlong (U.S. Air Force), WilliamMcCollough (State Department)
Subcommittee 3: Building Structure, Envelope, Fenestration,and Internal Functional Relationships
Charge: To review existing criteria and guidelines related to buildingstructural, envelope, and fenestration systems and to recommend modificationswhere appropriate, initiating and overseeing research as necessary; to reviewexisting building programming guidance with respect to internal functionalrelationships and adjacencies, recommending changes where appropriate; and toconsider the potential implications of security considerations for architecturalform and building planning.
Members: Stuart L. Knoop (subcommittee chair), Leslie E. Robertson,Seymour A. Bortz
Federal agency liaison representatives: Michael Yachnis (NavalFacilities Engineering Command), Donald B. Baldwin (U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers), Samuel E. Duncan (Veterans Administration), Peter E. Gurvin(State Department)
Subcommittee 4: Criteria for the Design of Service andSecurity Systems for Future U.S. Embassy Buildings
Charge: To review all existing FBO design criteria related to accesscontrol, security monitoring, and building service systems;
THE COMMITTEE'S WORK APPROACH 15
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to identify security considerations related to building service systems; and todevelop needed additional security-related design criteria related to the above.
Members: Richard T. Baum (subcommittee chair), Richard A. Day, JohnC. Pignato
Federal agency liaison representative: John Moyer (General ServicesAdministration)
Subcommittee 5: Potential Threats to the Security of FutureU.S. Embassy Buildings
Charge: To develop for use by the committee as a whole, and as anelement in the final report, a characterization of potential threats to the securityof future U.S. embassy buildings, based to the extent possible on knowledgegained from past experience and available general intelligence; to recommend acommittee position, to be communicated to the State Department, on futuresecurity threats; and to respond to and challenge design criteriarecommendations emerging from the other subcommittees.
Members: Brian M. Jenkins (subcommittee chair), Richard A. Day, JohnC. Pignato
Federal agency liaison representatives: John Moyer (General ServicesAdministration), Donald B. Baldwin (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers)
FEDERAL AGENCY LIAISON REPRESENTATIVES
One of the committee's most valuable resources was the activeparticipation of its federal agency liaison representatives. Many governmentagencies must address security concerns in the design of their buildings; andalthough such concerns are not identical to those of the State Department,nevertheless shed light on the potential of the federal building process torespond to unique building needs. The federal agency liaison representatives tothe committee contributed knowledge from other areas of the governmentcommunity and reported on research that is directly applicable to thecommittee's work, including the following:
• Naval Facilities Engineering Command and Naval Civil EngineeringLaboratory—structural design;
THE COMMITTEE'S WORK APPROACH 16
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• U.S. Army Corps of Engineers—security and survivability planning forsensitive installations and facilities;
• U.S. Air Force—physical security planning and design;• Veterans Administration—contract administration and security design
criteria development;• National Bureau of Standards—structural design and life safety;• Smithsonian Institution—security planning and management for public
buildings;• U.S. Postal Service—contraband detection and parcel management; and• General Services Administration—security planning, criteria
development, and design and management for public buildings.
THE STUDY PROCESS
Each subcommittee began its work with an extensive review of existingFBO design criteria and other State Department publications, including thefollowing: Chancery Building Program; Planning Procedures and EngineeringCriteria; Fire Protection Design Criteria; Lock Hardware and BarrierStandards;* and various addenda provided by the State Department's Office ofSecurity and Office of Communications, among others. During the course of thecommittee's work, the State Department also made available various reports thatwere applicable to the current effort but that had been prepared under separatecontracts.
To provide a centralized technical reference collection, the staff of theBuilding Research Board assembled the materials noted above and otherrelevant reference matter: reports, criteria, and documents from other federalagencies, and security directories, manuals, handbooks, and pertinentdocuments available in the general literature. This collection gave thecommittee some perspective on the current state of the art with regard tobuilding design for security and enabled it to identify: (a) those provisions
* U.S. Department of State, Office of Foreign Buildings Operations, ChanceryBuilding Program (January 1982); U.S. Department of State, Office of ForeignBuildings Operations, Planning Procedures and Engineering Criteria (October1983); U.S. Department of State, Office of Foreign Buildings Operations, FireProtection Design Criteria (March 1981); U.S. Department of State, Office ofSecurity, Lock Hardware and Barrier Standards (December 1983).
THE COMMITTEE'S WORK APPROACH 17
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within existing FBO design criteria that are in need of modification to meetsecurity requirements; and (b) needed provisions not presently contained inthese design criteria.
The full committee met eight times during the course of the study tofurther define and meet its objectives and to integrate the work of the varioussubcommittees, leading to the drafting of this report. The subcommittees metapproximately twice as often as the full committee. The following is achronology of committee meetings and a brief summary of the work that wasaccomplished:
• On November 15, 1984, the BRB invited interested guests to be briefedby senior State Department officials on the department's buildingprogram and their security concerns regarding building design. Theadvisory committee composition and study plan were discussed.
• On December 12, 1984, the first full committee meeting was held. TheNational Research Council policy for the selection of committeemembers—that is, seeking a proper balance of interests and biases—was discussed. The committee received an update on the StateDepartment's building program and was briefed by committee memberexperts on world terrorism trends and the blast resistance of structures.
• On January 16-17, 1985, the full committee and subcommittees met todiscuss the possible classification of the final report and to receivefurther background on the State Department's Chancery BuildingProgram and Fire Protection Criteria documents. At this meeting theconcept of performance criteria was adopted by the committee as theapproach for developing guidelines and criteria.
• At the March 15, 1985, meeting, the major subject of discussion wasthe preliminary report of the Inman Panel, in particular theimplications of its recommendation for a large building program.Subcommittees reported on their progress, and a series of issues wasidentified as being of common interest to all members.
• In its meeting of May 8, 1985, the committee outlined the tasksrequired of various consultants and contractors and discussed theoverall structure and scope of planned project documents. An updateon threat characterizations was presented. At this meeting thecommittee focused its efforts on security-related aspects of designcriteria.
THE COMMITTEE'S WORK APPROACH 18
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• On July 18, 1985, the committee heard detailed briefings from one ofits major consultants, the Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory. TheDeputy Assistant Secretary of Foreign Buildings Operations describedto the committee the implications of the Inman Panel recommendationson FBO operations.
• On September 18, 1985, the committee reviewed the draft outline of thefinal report and heard reports on the progress of the varioussubcommittees. The committee received a detailed briefing on vehiclebomb incidents worldwide and moved toward definition of bomb-related threats.
• In October 1985, a steering group was formed to oversee developmentof the committee's draft final report. The steering group included allmembers of subcommittee 1 and the chairmen of all othersubcommittees. The draft final report was reviewed first by thesteering group, acting on behalf of the committee as a whole; it wasthen circulated for additional review and comment by the entirecommittee.
• On November 21, 1985, the last full committee meeting was held toreview and approve the draft report, to assess the status of otherdocuments in preparation by the various subcommittees, and to discussfuture activities.
The members of the Committee on Research for the Security of FutureU.S. Embassy Buildings brought to their efforts a broad base of experience andfamiliarity with embassy design. Prior to the formation of the committee, manyembassies had been visited, on a professional basis, by a number of committeemembers acting in other capacities and by BRB staff. In addition, after theformation of the committee, the committee members and staff made officialvisits abroad to the following U.S. posts:
• Cairo, Athens, and Lisbon (March 1985);• Vienna (August 1985);• Ankara, Izmir, and Istanbul (August 1985); and• Bonn and Paris (August 1985).
On the visit to Turkey, which was made at the request of the StateDepartment, committee members and BRB staff joined a site selection team thatwas charged with evaluating sites for a replacement embassy in Ankara andreplacement consulates in Izmir and Istanbul. This visit yielded findingsspecific to the site selection process and was especially valuable in thepreparation of the report of the subcommittee on site security considerations.
THE COMMITTEE'S WORK APPROACH 19
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The committee also had the benefit of extensive briefings by StateDepartment personnel and by personnel from other agencies with experience insecurity and building design. In addition, these briefings included the following:
• interviews with State Department staff from the Office ofCommunications, the Office of Security, and the Fire Protection,Interior Design, and Architecture divisions of FBO;
• briefing on site design measures by the Mobil Oil Corporation;• guidance on fire protection by staff from the National Bureau of
Standards, Center for Fire Research;• briefings from the Naval Facilities Engineering Command Research
Laboratory;• briefing from a State Department contractor regarding work on
designing windows; and• briefing from the Los Alamos National Laboratory on advanced
technical research and development counterterrorism programs.
These briefings were invaluable to the committee in enhancing itsunderstanding of certain technical issues and in ensuring that it had been madeaware of the most up-to-date information available through public and privatechannels.
THE COMMITTEE'S WORK APPROACH 20
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4
Forces that Will Shape Embassies of theFuture
During its studies, the committee identified several distinct factors that itbelieves will increasingly influence the physical settings within which thediplomatic, consular, and other public business of the United States abroad isconducted. All of the influences noted below (and discussed in more detail laterin this chapter) are already being felt at State Department posts throughout theworld:
• the concentration and colocation of user agencies within embassybuildings and compounds;
• the changing nature of the Foreign Service and the proliferation ofclassified and unclassified electronic information management systems;
• the growth in the scope and seriousness of terrorism, espionage, andsabotage; and
• the need for appropriate architectural expressions of the U.S.government presence abroad.
Despite an awareness of these factors, currently there is no unified view ofor statement about the broader embassy design and construction context, ofwhich the need for enhanced security forms only a part. Future embassybuildings must fit into this context, but although periodic updates andmemoranda have been issued over the past year, the committee found littleevidence of a formal reconsideration of design and construction context issues.In fact, the basic design guidelines and criteria now used by the Office ofForeign Buildings Operations (FBO) to instruct architects and engineers remainessentially unchanged from those
FORCES THAT WILL SHAPE EMBASSIES OF THE FUTURE 21
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in use eight years ago.* And these criteria and guidelines are often deficient andunresponsive to technical developments in many areas of building design andconstructions, whether directly related to security or not.
The State Department lacks—and needs—a clear, integrated, and well-coordinated sense of direction in response to the range of factors that will shapeits facilities in the future. There is not, to the committee's knowledge, a generalstatement about the requirements that future embassy buildings must satisfy.The need for a clear sense of direction in this area is particularly urgent in lightof the large construction program that was recommended by the Inman Paneland that is now being implemented by the department.†
The conclusion that a clear sense of direction is lacking in the StateDepartment's building efforts is further reinforced by an examination of theprograms currently under way to upgrade various physical facilities withinexisting embassies, incorporate new equipment, and afford enhanced physicalsecurity. For example, there is a vigorous program within the State Departmentthat is directed toward the implementation of new generations of automatedoffice equipment and electronic information handling systems; this effort istaking place, however, without sufficient regard for the ways in which buildingsthemselves could be altered to accommodate and ease the transition to suchsystems. Similarly, intensive efforts are being made to upgrade physical andelectronic security but, understandably, without sufficient consideration of theways in which such improvements might relate to, support, or impede futurebuilding functional needs.
There can be no doubt that conscientious efforts are being made by theState Department in these and other areas. It is important and fair to state,however, that such efforts to date are largely ad hoc responses to the urgency ofcurrent situations and as such lack the coordinated guidance recommendedabove.†
* Note added by the committee in September 1986: should read “four years ago.”† Note added by the committee to report in September 1986: In its final meeting of
September 18, 1986, the committee recognized that substantial progress had been madein this area by the State Department.
FORCES THAT WILL SHAPE EMBASSIES OF THE FUTURE 22
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The work of this committee, although directed principally towardquestions of security, has afforded it an opportunity to consider the broadercontext within which security must be provided and to develop a description ofthose factors that will combine to influence the shape of embassies of the future.These descriptions are presented in the sections that follow. Articulating thenature of these influences and considering how they relate to one anothershould, in turn, help to establish more coherent attitudes about the nature of theState Department's future buildings. By serving as the basis for a new set ofsecurity-conscious building design criteria, an understanding of these forcesshould help to ensure that future embassy buildings are responsive to newinfluences by design, rather than by coincidence or by change.
THE CONCENTRATION AND COLOCATION OF USERAGENCIES WITHIN THE EMBASSY AND COMPOUND
For a variety of reasons—and not least because of increasing threatsworldwide to the security of official Americans abroad—there is increasinginterest among government agencies that operate overseas in being physically apart of the embassy chancery or compound. There is a general sense that U.S.citizens working abroad on behalf of the federal government will be safer fromthe consequences of mob violence, terrorist attack, and other potentiallyharmful events by being within the protective umbrella of the embassycompound.
Some of these agencies have traditionally sought to be in locations andfacilities that were distinct from consular and diplomatic buildings and sites, inpart because they saw such separations as beneficial to the accomplishment oftheir missions. Today, however, and for the foreseeable future, it is likely thatpressures will mount on foreign sites and buildings operated by the StateDepartment to house an ever greater number of diverse official U.S. functions,both sensitive and nonsensitive. As one consequence of these circumstances,there is likely to be a general increase in the size of the overseas facilities thatfall under the State Department's stewardship. In Chapter 7, this reportaddresses changes that are needed in the means by which space requirementsfor new construction are developed and kept current.
FORCES THAT WILL SHAPE EMBASSIES OF THE FUTURE 23
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Moreover, because of the increase in the number of agencies housed on theembassy compound, it is likely that there will also be an increase in the numberof casual and scheduled visitors to embassy buildings. Many of these visitorswill simply be requesting information or participating in recreational or publicevents and will not be conducting official business. (This is, in fact, already thecase at many posts; a wide variety of informational and other essentiallynondiplomatic functions are found at both large and small facilities.) Theseadded burdens will continue to complicate and intensify the security challengesfacing the State Department, especially if it assumes widened responsibility forthe security of other official and nonofficial U.S. citizens overseas.
Although some committee members have expressed concern over thepossible negative security consequences of the apparent growth of the U.S.government presence abroad, this committee does not believe itself in a positionto do more than note that the trend of such growth over the past decade seemsdestined to continue for the foreseeable future and that it will place ever greaterdemands on State Department buildings and grounds. Future facility plansshould be developed with the expectation that they will need to accommodatemore non-State Department user agencies and personnel, many of which willbring increased unofficial traffic into the area if only by increasing the size ofthe mission community.
In Chapter 6, this report recommends changes in the approaches taken inplanning the physical relationships among the various activities and functionsthat are likely to be a part of future embassy compounds. Although thiscommittee did not consider in depth the possibility of including housing forForeign Service personnel and dependents on future compounds, circumstancesmay dictate serious consideration by the State Department of including suchhousing wherever possible. The same is likely to be true with respect to housingprovided for Marine Security Guard detachments.
THE PROLIFERATION OF ELECTRONIC INFORMATIONMANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
Consistent with developments in practically all aspects of government,business, academic, and professional life, the Foreign Service and the wholeforeign policy apparatus of the United States
FORCES THAT WILL SHAPE EMBASSIES OF THE FUTURE 24
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is relying increasingly on electronic systems for storage, analysis, andcommunication of all sorts of information and data.
Analysts for economic, political, commercial, agricultural, military, andother affairs who operate within the embassy environment already arebeginning to rely on these systems and will continue to do so at a rapidlyincreasing pace. And the curricula being followed in universities by personsentering these fields are increasingly concerned with computer-based dataprocessing. Aggressive programs are already in place within the StateDepartment to provide suitable field opportunities for these individuals, and theDepartment is rapidly coming to depend on its telecommunications capabilitiesto reach into the remotest regions of the world. In addition, the clerical andadministrative aspects of the Foreign Service and overseas State Departmentoperations, from personnel and budget management to consular affairs andword processing, involve the use of electronic equipment and systems that placenew demands on—and pose new security challenges for—embassy buildings.
Embassy buildings, then, share a common requirement with other types ofbuildings being constructed today: They are expected to provide aninfrastructure suitable for the support of currently available and rapidlychanging automated office and telecommunications systems (as well as somethat are on the near horizon). Thus, embassy buildings must be designed toaccommodate complicated and frequently changing networks of wires andcables to service work stations and other data processing facilities. In short,embassies must follow the already established pattern for what have been called“intelligent” or “smart” buildings, which provide the means to accommodateexpanding electronic requirements.
THE GROWTH IN INCIDENTS OF TERRORISM,ESPIONAGE, AND SABOTAGE
A significant portion of the committee's efforts has been directed towardidentifying and understanding the dimensions of threats from terrorism,espionage, sabotage, and other sources of hostility in terms of their effects onbuildings. The committee has not sought, nor have others tried on its behalf, toidentify specific locations, times, or types of threats, or to engage the committeein activities that are properly within the domains of
FORCES THAT WILL SHAPE EMBASSIES OF THE FUTURE 25
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the intelligence community and law enforcement agencies. Yet the committeehas had access to such information, both classified and unclassified, and toanalytical material related to past incidents directed against the United Statesand allied interests. Its findings and recommendations, therefore, have beenbased on and reflect the seriousness of these data.
Threats to the security of official U.S. personnel and information haveincreased. In no area of the world are the interests of the United States and thesafety of its citizens immune from the threats of terrorism, espionage, and otherhostile acts. Every indication suggests that these threats will continue andprobably increase and intensify in the years ahead.
It is certain also that official U.S. government policy, developed at thehighest levels, is committed to reducing as much as possible the threat of harmfrom terrorism and mob action to U.S. citizens abroad, and to minimizing theconsequences of such attacks that do happen. Indeed, the charge to thiscommittee grows directly out of this commitment. There is no question that thedesign of future U.S. embassy buildings will be affected by both perceived andactual terrorist threats.
Yet, granting and even underscoring the importance of taking such steps asare possible to prevent a recurrence of the tragic events at State Departmentposts in the 1970s and 1980s, three statements of fundamental importance mustbe made:
1. Diplomatic relations rest on the premise that the ultimateresponsibility for the safety and well-being of Foreign Servicepersonnel lies with the host country and its military and lawenforcement agencies. In the event of a breakdown of the hostcountry's willingness or ability to afford such protection, the mostthat can be expected of a building and of the security personnelassigned to protect it is some delay in the capture of occupants and,therefore, more time to effect a resolution of the hostilities or, inthe extreme case, rescue or evacuation.
2. Buildings that are designed for the conduct of official business andfor the representation and support of the United States abroad arenot and cannot be perceived as fortresses. Although they shouldafford as much protection from hostile attack as is reasonablypossible, they must still fulfill the basic functional and symbolicpurposes for which they are intended. This entails architecturalexcellence and a measure of openness that cannot be
FORCES THAT WILL SHAPE EMBASSIES OF THE FUTURE 26
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compromised without a consequent loss in character and theprojection of an undesirable image.
3. Terrorism is a dynamic phenomenon, and the means employed bydetermined adversaries will continue to shift and escalate inresponse to obstacles, resources, opportunities, and motives. Nosecurity provisions or systems and, especially as related to thisreport, no building can be expected to thwart every kind of attack.The most that can be expected is that all reasonable steps will betaken to provide measures to counter and delay known andreasonably anticipated threats.
Using historical records and other resources placed at its disposal, thiscommittee has identified and detailed the characteristics of a broad spectrum ofboth known and potential security threats. Because embassies and the personnelcharged with their protection must respond to these threats (and probably tomany that have yet to be identified), these characterizations have served as thebasis for the committee's recommendations on security-related design criteriafor future U.S. embassy buildings.
APPROPRIATE ARCHITECTURAL EXPRESSIONS OF THEU.S. GOVERNMENT PRESENCE ABROAD
It is and will remain imperative that embassy buildings play a major role inconveying to others an appropriate impression and image of the United States.The embassy assumes this importance because it is the first and at times theonly official contact that foreign nationals have with the United States.
In the past, U.S. architects and engineers have produced severalgenerations of distinguished architecture in the nation's official buildingsabroad. In the main these buildings have been consistent with the principles thatthe United States, as a leading democracy and global power, should express inthe world. Reflecting these concerns, the FBO has had, since 1954, a writtenstatement of its design philosophy, which reads in its entirety as follows:
Facilities shall be provided in an architectural form representative of theUnited States, expressing such qualities as dignity, strength, and neighborlysympathy. These facilities should create good will because of their excellentarchitectural design, and their appropriateness to the site and country. Designsmust adhere to established construction practice and require maximumutilization of United States materials, methods and equipment of provendependability. Designs should also describe buildings economical to
FORCES THAT WILL SHAPE EMBASSIES OF THE FUTURE 27
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construct, operate and maintain. Maximum consideration must be given toincluding in the buildings features providing for the greatest possible protectionand safety for the people using the buildings.
As evidenced by this statement, FBO places strong emphasis on theaesthetic aspects of embassy buildings. And in the past, such a design emphasiswas reasonable. Aesthetic considerations in many instances were permitted topreempt security concerns in a world in which the U.S. presence abroad wasseldom threatened or challenged. But the recent growth of anti-U.S. terrorismmust cause the State Department to reevaluate its position. To its commitmentto produce buildings of aesthetic excellence and appropriate design must beadded a recognition of the need for increased security requirements for new andexisting embassy buildings. The committee supports the State Department'sbroadened areas of emphasis and concurs with its expressed determination tobalance aesthetic excellence with increased security for embassy personnel,facilities, and information.
FORCES THAT WILL SHAPE EMBASSIES OF THE FUTURE 28
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5
Committee Findings: Issues andChallenges in the Design, Construction,
and Management of Future U.S. EmbassyBuildings
The broad trends and general influences identified in Chapter 4 indicatethat future U.S. embassy buildings must be designed to satisfy a variety ofrequirements and fulfill a number of objectives. These requirements andobjectives are presented below in the form of committee findings. A briefdiscussion of each finding follows, in which the reader may be directed formore detail to other chapters in this report.
CHANGES IN CURRENT FBO PROCESSES AND PRACTICES
Finding: Enhancing the security of U.S. embassy buildings overseas willrequire changes in certain practices within the State Department that relate tothe planning of new buildings and to the management of building design,construction, and maintenance.
Discussion: The committee has concluded that a number of securityconcerns and opportunities for improvement relate directly to State Departmentpractices in managing and administering the planning, design, construction, andmaintenance of its buildings. The subjects encompassed by this finding includethe following:
• the manner in which space needs are identified and recorded;
COMMITTEE FINDINGS: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES IN THE DESIGN,CONSTRUCTION, AND MANAGEMENT OF FUTURE U.S. EMBASSY BUILDINGS
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• identification and evaluation of the qualifications of professional designfirms to render embassy design and construction services;
• formulation and implementation of security-related design criteria;• evaluation of contractors and procurement procedures; and• inspection and evaluation of buildings during construction and after
occupancy.
Existing State Department concerns in these areas were intensified by therelease of the Inman Panel report and the prospect of a greatly increasedconstruction program within FBO. A subsequent letter to the committeechairman from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Foreign Buildings Operationsencouraged the committee to consider and recommend organizational changes.The committee took up this challenge and developed detailed and specificrecommendations concerning changes that should be implemented in currentand planned FBO procedures.
THE PRIME IMPORTANCE OF BUILDING SITES
Finding: The committee recognizes that building site size and site designmeasures alone cannot provide all the security necessary for an embassy andshould not be treated in isolation of building design; nevertheless, siteconsiderations represent the single most important physical design aspect ofprotecting an embassy from security threats. Sites for future U.S. embassybuildings should be identified, evaluated, selected, and designed with adequateand systematic consideration of security implications. In addition, the StateDepartment must seek larger sites for the several reasons discussed in this report.
Discussion: The importance to security of sites for U.S. embassy buildingsthat are correctly chosen, planned, and designed cannot be overstated. Theconsequences of choosing a particular site for a future embassy building will befar-reaching and long-lasting; where buildings can be and usually are changedover time—and can even be replaced or relocated on a site if necessary—thesite itself is not easily changed, and its security shortcomings, if severe and/orextensive, may be difficult to overcome. In nearly every respect, then, againstvirtually every security threat, proper selection and treatment of the site are thefirst,
COMMITTEE FINDINGS: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES IN THE DESIGN,CONSTRUCTION, AND MANAGEMENT OF FUTURE U.S. EMBASSY BUILDINGS
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the most effective, and often the least expensive of the steps that can be taken toenhance security and to counter a wide range of threats. This suggests that thesite selection process should be carried out with the greatest of care.
Current State Department guidelines indicate that the benefits of increasedsite size and greater “setback” or “standoff” distances between embassybuildings and surrounding areas are recognized but are not fully exploited.Some discussions with the State Department have centered on the presentrequirement, which has been imposed by the Office of Security. Therequirement calls for a minimum standoff distance between occupied buildingsand a secure site perimeter (that is, a continuous line beyond whichunauthorized vehicles, even when set on a course of destructive ramming,cannot progress without being arrested or disabled). The committee considersthis setback requirement to be an acceptable minimum for a number of reasons.Greater setback distances offer clear advantages in enhancing aspects ofsecurity, improving opportunities for desirable functional zoning, andmaximizing surveillance and control of visitors and intruders. However, thecommittee also recognizes that the minimum setback will not be achievable insome cases, and it has recommended a waiver procedure.
The primary importance of site characteristics to the security of anembassy building led this committee to identify substantial and systematicimprovements that are needed in the means and methods by which candidatesites for future embassy buildings are identified, evaluated, and selected. Thecommitttee has also recommended much closer links among the processes ofbuilding programming, site selection, and site design. Chapter 6 recommendsnew criteria for site selection and design and outlines procedures that should beintroduced to improve the State Department's site acquisition efforts.
CLEAR PHYSICAL SEPARATION OF SENSITIVE AND LESSSENSITIVE CHANCERY BUILDING AREAS
Finding: Future embassy buildings will be required to provide distinct,highly secure, and easily respected physical separations between the followingwork areas: those that are used for the conduct of classified and sensitivefunctions and, therefore, the
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handling and storage of sensitive and classified information, accessible only toU.S. citizens with appropriate security clearances; and those areas in which thepublic business of the embassy is conducted and that therefore are accessible toforeign national employees and the public.
Discussion: The information handled by U.S. government officialsworking abroad within the State Department is often sensitive and frequentlybears security classifications. The amount of information that is designated assensitive is growing and is likely to continue to grow.
For this reason, and because such treatment will both ease and reduce theexpense of implementing other security-related measures, the committeeconsiders it necessary for future U.S. embassy buildings to provide clear andinviolable lines of physical demarcation between areas accessible only tocleared U.S. citizens (and, on occasion, to others under appropriate escort) andthose areas accessible to other personnel and visitors.
For the same reason, the committee has concluded that stronger effortsmust be made to zone and create dedicated physical compartments for distinctfunctions within embassy buildings and compounds. Such efforts may includefunctional zoning and physical compartmentalization of building areas (and, insome cases, separate buildings on a single compound or even at a separatelocation). Whatever method is used, the objective remains the same: to separatethe functions that generate large amounts of visitor traffic from those thatrequire the greatest security and generate the least visitor traffic. This security-conscious zoning should also be extended to all building services andcirculation systems. (For specific recommendations on the functionaladjacencies and zoning relationships that should guide basic planning anddesign efforts, see Chapter 6 of this report.)
THE NEED FOR BUILDING FLEXIBILITY AND EASE OFEXPANSION
Finding: Future U.S. embassy building design must take intoconsideration the fact that the functions performed within them will becontinually required to grow, shrink, and change in ways and at times that arenot and cannot be anticipated during the original design and construction period.
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Discussion: World affairs and the corresponding shifts that must occur inU.S. foreign policy can be and often are volatile and unpredictable. These shiftsplace great pressure on basic State Department post missions and on theembassy buildings that must accommodate them. There are many cases, someof them recent, in which the U.S. diplomatic posture toward a given country, orvice versa, has changed almost overnight. Such changes often mandate a greatlyincreased (or, in some cases, greatly decreased) official U.S. presence abroadand dramatic alternations in the size and character of the building(s) required tocarry out a revised foreign policy mission.
Even in those instances in which shifts in foreign relations and the U.S.foreign policy mission abroad are not dramatic or abrupt, there is a pervasivetendency within U.S. embassies toward almost continuous change, generally inthe direction of expansion. This basic volatility directly affects building designand usually has an effect on security; the need for greater amounts of workspace than originally anticipated leads to additions, expansions, extensions,remodelings, and other modifications whose security implications may not havebeen anticipated in the original design.
Apart from asking necessary improvements in the processes of obtaining,communicating, and updating programmatic information for design, the StateDepartment must also design facilities that are as flexible as possible and helpensure that designs and construction techniques are as amenable as is practicalto possible future changes.
BUILDING CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
Finding: Future U.S. embassy buildings will rely increasingly on a widevariety of complex control, monitoring, annunciation, and management systemsfor such diverse purposes as security, communications, surveillance, personnelaccess control, environmental conditioning, equipment status monitoring andmaintenance, fire safety, and other functions. These systems have potentialsecurity advantages, but they also carry some risks.
Discussion: In most cases these systems will involve electronic computer-based devices and componentry. Although such complex systems make a clearcontribution to security by extending human
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capabilities, building designers should seek to avoid overreliance on suchsystems and should limit the use of complicated, delicate equipment.
The committee's advice in this matter is based on the body of knowledgeand experience accumulated by the professional disciplines that are concernedwith the design of facilities involving continual surveillance and high security.The literature suggests that line-of-sight and direct visual and auditorysurveillance are nearly always more effective than, and are generally preferableto, indirect or highly mediated forms of observation and status monitoring. Tothe extent that indirect systems are used, efforts should be made to integrate andsimplify the apparatus required for their effective use.
The committee recognizes the dedication of Marines who volunteer forembassy security duty and perform their duties even at the risk of danger totheir lives. Without question, they constitute a valued and important element inthe provision of security for U.S. embassies.
The committee believes that the State Department should address thoseissues that are related to the roles of all security personnel, including the MarineSecurity Guards. A reconsideration or redefinition of the Marine Guard's roleand responsibilities may be warranted.
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6
Design Criteria for a New Generation ofU.S. Embassy Buildings
In response to the challenge to implement the massive building programrecommended by the Inman Panel, the U.S. State Department is poised toembark on the most ambitious and significant embassy construction program inits history. To carry out this program, the Office of Foreign BuildingsOperations (FBO) faces the prospect, over a seven-year period, of building and/or reconstructing more embassy facilities than have been constructed abroad bythe United States since the founding of the nation. The consequences of thisbuilding program will be profound and lasting for the Foreign Service, for U.S.foreign relations activities, and for the image of the United States in the worldat large. And it is unlikely that the opportunities for improving embassy securitythat are inherent in such a program will again present themselves.
Well-founded concerns about embassy vulnerability to terrorism and toespionage have created the support for a program of this expense andmagnitude. Yet, apart from the clear and current need to make extraordinaryefforts to protect U.S. embassies from threats to safety and security, there arereasons why careful scrutiny and thorough reconsideration should be given toquestions of how the United States constructs its embassies abroad.
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 of this report identify the broad influences andchallenges, encompassing considerations that extend well beyond security, thatthis committee believes will shape the requirements for embassies of the future.Despite this delineation, however, the committee does not call for or condonethe construction of standardized or prototype embassy buildings in order to
DESIGN CRITERIA FOR A NEW GENERATION OF U.S. EMBASSY BUILDINGS 35
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satisfy such requirements as may evolve. Rather, embassy buildings mustrespond to the richness and diversity of the climates and geographical settingsin which such buildings will exist. The design challenges posed by eachembassy building are unique and formidable: An embassy is a building whosedesign must respect its context, wherever and whatever that may be; and yet itmust also, in the best sense possible, represent the character and strengths of theUnited States. In addition, embassy buildings must satisfy a great number ofcomplicated, technically challenging functional requirements, to which nowmust be added many that serve to enhance security.
Early in its deliberations, the committee recognized that there can be nosingle or uniform set of architectural and engineering design responses to themyriad factors and requirements that are often unique in application toindividual embassy projects. For this reason, the committee adopted twoguiding principles for its work and for its recommendations to the StateDepartment:
• The overall approach to future embassy building design, construction,and management should be governed by a continuing process ofsecurity impact analysis, in which the factors unique to each particularsetting and mission are clearly identified and thereby determine thebasis of design. Although this committee has considered only security-related influences and factors, it is clear that other factors must also beconsidered and should be used, in conjunction with securityconsiderations, to determine the final design of the facility.*
• Design guidelines, criteria, and requirements imposed by the StateDepartment should be formulated and evaluated in terms of desiredperformance attributes and not in terms of fixed, rigid, standardized, oruniform design solutions.
This chapter and the two that follow present the recommendations thathave evolved from the committee's work. This chapter details specificperformance-based criteria and recommendations for security as related to thefollowing:
• evaluation and selection of sites for future embassy buildings;
* Among these other factors are a wide range of functional, cultural, andaesthetic considerations that are already routinely investigated and identified aspart of the design professional's efforts.
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• planning and design of sites;• desired functional layouts and adjacencies that should serve as the basis
for the design of future embassy buildings;• properties that should be required of structural, envelope, and
fenestration systems; and• properties and characteristics that should be required of building service
and control systems.
Chapter 7, which is concerned with the implementation of the committee'srecommendations, elaborates on performance-based design criteria andrecommends a generic format to be followed as FBO develops new guidancedocumentation for design professionals in meeting security and otherrequirements in future buildings. And in Chapter 8, the committee details itsviews on how a process for security impact assessment could be developed andcarried out.
It is important to note that the committee considers its proposedrecommendations and design criteria to be minimum responses. For eachspecific embassy building, a security impact assessment can determine whetherthe nature of the potential threats facing a given facility may warrant theimplementation of stronger security design measures.
DEFINITION OF THE DESIGN THREAT
The definition of the security threats confronting an embassy building inturn establishes the level of performance and protection that must be affordedby the building and the site in order to withstand such threats. The committeebelieves it is essential that the design professionals retained by FBO have aclear and unequivocal definition of the range of potential security threatsagainst which embassy buildings are to be designed. Although formulating sucha definition is a difficult and inexact undertaking at best, nevertheless, thecommittee is convinced that a base level can be determined. For this purpose, ithas used historical records to characterize potential threats.
Although threats to the security of embassy buildings are constantlychanging and can, in some cases, be extraordinary, a standard, minimum baselevel of security must be provided at all posts.
The committee recognizes that, by establishing a particular level ofresistance in future embassy buildings, the State Department is also accepting acertain level of risk. These minimum
DESIGN CRITERIA FOR A NEW GENERATION OF U.S. EMBASSY BUILDINGS 37
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standards cannot defeat or deter all possible threats, and in some cases thegravity of the known or potential threats may warrant security measures that aremore stringent than the minimum standards. The committee further recognizesthat there is a distinction between the “maximum potential event” (as threats aresometimes defined in design criteria for military facilities) and practical designassumptions. The committee believes that, in making its recommendations anddeveloping design criteria, it has made practical design assumptions that arebased on an analysis of past incidents. It has not, however, attempted to predictor determine the greatest or most severe threat that could be posed for anembassy building.
PERFORMANCE-BASED CRITERIA ANDRECOMMENDATIONS
Site Evaluation and Selection
The proper location and design of sites is crucial not only to ensuring thesecurity of future U.S. embassies but to virtually all aspects of the effectiveperformance of embassy activities. In addition, as increasing urbanizationthroughout the world brings concomitant increases in the cost and scarcity ofland, locational and site decisions will assume increasing budgetary andpolitical importance.
Current State Department site selection procedures cannot respondadequately to the demands of any program, let alone those that will be imposedby implementation of the large construction effort recommended by the InmanPanel. The committee's recommendations call for improvements in theseprocedures; and although such improvements are directed primarily towardenhanced embassy security, they should also produce returns in overall embassyeffectiveness.
Recommendation 1: Site selection criteria and procedures. The StateDepartment should adopt a comprehensive and systematic approach toidentifying and synthesizing the various factors that are important to the sitingof future embassy buildings, including criteria related to site developability,security, communications, and costs. The procedures in such an approachshould constitute three sequential phases:
DESIGN CRITERIA FOR A NEW GENERATION OF U.S. EMBASSY BUILDINGS 38
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• project definition, in which the proposed new building's locational andprogrammatic requirements—with consideration also given to futureneeds—are accurately established;
• site generation, in which candidate sites are identified, based onprogrammatic requirements; and
• site evaluation, in which a team of professionals, assigned permanentlyto this responsibility and representing a balance of disciplines, appliesthe criteria and procedures to select the preferred site.
The committee has developed a structured site selection process andmethodology for the evaluation of site suitability, a process that takes intoaccount a full range of security and other considerations. For the present, thisdocument should be used to instruct State Department personnel who are or willbe involved in site selection; but because the document in its present form is notsuitable for field use, it should be used as the basis for developing a fieldmanual for site selection. In fact, the committee urges FBO to beginimmediately to develop such a manual.
Discussion: Existing site selection guidelines and procedures, to thedegree that they exist, are not formalized and do not integrate the full range ofconcerns that must enter into this important and sensitive process. And althoughsecurity-related site evaluation criteria do exist, they are not complete and areunevenly administered in practice. Moreover, existing security-related siteevaluation criteria are not in balance with other important considerations: costs;appropriateness of the site to the building program; special and often overridingrequirements related to the communications system's access and security; andsuitability of the site with respect to representational and other goals.
In response to these issues, the committee has recommended a siteselection process and site evaluation criteria that are flexible and that allow theintegration of the special or unique requirements that invariably arise in eachembassy building case. As is appropriate, however, the committee'srecommendations provide a framework for, but do not and should not supplant,the professional judgment of the members of the site selection team.
Recommendation 2: Site size and perimeter standoff distances. For siteselection purposes, area requirements should assume a minimum setbackdistance (from the site perimeter) for all
DESIGN CRITERIA FOR A NEW GENERATION OF U.S. EMBASSY BUILDINGS 39
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embassy buildings, and such a requirement should be mandatory for all newembassy sites. Given the clear importance of site characteristics to the securityof an embassy and its occupants, the committee believes that the StateDepartment should use the full extent of its negotiating abilities, including theauthorities of the Foreign Missions Act, to secure sites that meet thisrequirement. In those few instances of sites on which the minimum setbackcannot be achieved, the department should require that a formal, written waiverof the requirement be issued by the Under Secretary for Management before siteacquisition can proceed.
Recommendation 3: Prescreening of sites. As the State Departmentoffice responsible for site selection, FBO should work with assigned membersof the post staff before beginning formal site selection procedures to ensure thatsufficient information on potential sites has been assembled for use by the siteselection team in advance of its visits. Wherever necessary, FBO shouldtemporarily assign personnel to the post for this purpose.
Discussion: Under the current site selection process, the post identifiespossible sites based on program information (which is sometimes scanty) thathas been provided by FBO. In some cases, a site prescreening team is sent tothe host country by FBO, followed by a final site selection team; in other cases,only one visit is made, during which site prescreening and final selection arecombined. With this type of system, post personnel report on one hand that theydo not have sufficient time or resources to identify sites and to gather neededinformation; on the other hand, members of the site selection teams oftenremark that their efforts are hampered by the lack of such basic backgroundmaterials as plot plans, surveys, aerial photographs, and maps.
The temporary assignment to the post of an FBO professional wouldalleviate such problems. This individual should hold the appropriate securityclearances, possess a general knowledge of the building program, andunderstand site developability issues. He or she could then proceed to assemblethe information and background materials required for prescreening of the sitesthat had been identified as possible candidates for development. Ideally,between 10 and 15 possible sites should be identified, depending on localconditions; following the prescreening process, between 5 and 7 sites should bepresented for consideration by the selection team.
DESIGN CRITERIA FOR A NEW GENERATION OF U.S. EMBASSY BUILDINGS 40
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Recommendation 4: Advance preparation for site selection. Afterprescreening has been carried out and final candidate sites have been identified,detailed information on each site should be assembled by the post under thedirection of the FBO professional temporarily assigned for that purpose. Thisinformation should be made available to the site selection team prior to its visit.Also, the team should hold at least one meeting before the visit to becomefamiliar with the information.
Discussion: The arrival of the site selection team in the host countrywithout adequate preparation seriously jeopardizes its chances of selecting themost suitable site. Admittedly, it is difficult to assemble in advance all of theinformation needed to make an informed decision; yet, certain basicinformation requirements must be met:
• the proposed building program must be defined clearly;• plot plans, photographs, and site maps with topographical contours
should be available;• green field lots should be staked or otherwise clearly demarcated;• locally available utility information should be developed;• information should be assembled on local zoning and building
regulations;• the cost of the site, its present ownership, and the condition of any
existing facilities should be known;• documented city and area maps should be available to show the
relationship of the site to government offices and other points of likelyfrequent contact, to major transportation facilities, and to surroundingpatterns of development; and,
• in cases in which future adjacent development may occur, researchshould be conducted to determine likely future uses.*
Recommendation 5: Site selection team. The State Department, underFBO, should form one or more permanent site selection teams that wouldinclude professionals with expertise in architecture, landscape planning andengineering, physical and technical security, communications, cost engineering,local foreign language negotiations, and political and diplomatic relations.
* This research should prevent the kind of situation that occurred recently inLisbon, Portugal; there, a mid-rise hotel was later constructed that overlookedthe newly completed U.S. embassy complex.
DESIGN CRITERIA FOR A NEW GENERATION OF U.S. EMBASSY BUILDINGS 41
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Discussion: Currently, State Department site selection teams areessentially formed on the basis of which personnel are available at the time.They generally include an FBO area operations officer, an FBO architect, andspecialists in communications and security. There may also be other membersof the team, including representatives of tenant agencies. Because these teamsare often formed with little advance notice, they are rarely able to prepare fortheir task prior to the trip. Even in instances in which some advance notice isgiven, team members may have little extra time or incentive for preparation.(Indeed, such assignments are often seen as an intrusion on a governmentemployee's normal work responsibilities and as offering no potential for careerenhancement.)
The formation of permanent site selection teams would overcome theseproblems and focus appropriate attention on the importance of a careful sitingdecision. To produce such a decision, the site selection team would review thecandidate site information assembled by the assigned FBO professional at thepost and administer the procedures and evaluation criteria developed by thiscommittee.
Recommendation 6: Adjacent land purchase. In certain cases, the typeof future development planned for land adjacent to a U.S. embassy site cannotbe determined. In those instances in which the land potentially could be used forpurposes that would be unsatisfactory, the State Department should considerpurchasing the parcel. The land can be leased or sold later for uses that, fromthe standpoint of security, are deemed appropriate or acceptable.
Discussion: The larger sites that will be required to implement increasedembassy setback criteria suggest that many embassy buildings will be locatedoutside of denser, central urban areas; in many cities of the world, this willmean siting embassies in areas in which relatively little development has yetoccurred. On the basis of past experience, the presence of the embassy itselfwill attract adjacent new development, which can be cause for considerableconcern. Inappropriate or unacceptable development can threaten the security ofthe embassy and damage its image. To prevent such circumstances, thecommittee has formulated the above recommendation.
DESIGN CRITERIA FOR A NEW GENERATION OF U.S. EMBASSY BUILDINGS 42
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Site Planning and Design
Currently, there are very few guidelines in FBO literature relating to siteplanning, landscape design, and perimeter protection of embassy buildings.Because aspects of site design and perimeter protection frequently constitute thefirst line of defense against most threats, the committee believes that guidelinesin these areas are an absolute necessity; consequently, it has developed therecommendations that follow.
The committee has addressed these issues only from the standpoint ofsecurity, although site planning and design for embassies in general isinadequately dealt with by current FBO procedures and guidelines. Moreover,with the promulgation of a setback requirement for all embassy buildings, sitedesign and protection take on added significance. The committee recommendsthat FBO undertake the preparation of a comprehensive set of guidelines for siteplanning and design, integrating the security recommendations made by thiscommittee. Recognizing, however, that additional research is necessary in manytechnical areas of site security, the committee further recommends that studiesbe conducted in these areas. Some of the possible directions for fruitful researchare identified in Chapter 8.
Recommendation 7: Site security analysis guidelines. FBO shouldimmediately adopt and implement a site security analysis, which should beconducted immediately after site selection and subsequently used as the basisfor site planning and design decisions.
Discussion: The careful collection and analysis of site-related data areessential to informed design decision making concerning security issues.Therefore, the committee presents procedures for conducting a site securityanalysis. The analysis deals with topography, vegetation, adjacent land use,circulation, visual access, lighting, utilities, and fire, police, and medicalservices. It should be undertaken in conjunction with a security threat analysisor impact statement.
Recommendation 8: Site security planning guidelines. FBO shouldimmediately adopt and implement a site planning process that emphasizessecurity and that is conducted concurrently with the functional analysis of thebuilding program.
DESIGN CRITERIA FOR A NEW GENERATION OF U.S. EMBASSY BUILDINGS 43
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Discussion: Site planning for effective security establishes therelationships between the site and the accompanying offsite and onsite uses.Often, such careful attention can minimize any problems that may arise beforethe site design process begins. The committee recommends site securityplanning guidelines that address circulation, access points, parking, the siteperimeter, site-to-building and support facility relationships, and offsiterelationships.
Recommendation 9: Site security design guidelines. FBO shouldimmediately adopt and implement security design guidelines for all major siteelements on the perimeter or within the embassy grounds.
Discussion: The committee recognizes that many site security designdecisions will vary from site to site and will depend on such factors as thephysical characteristics of the site, the prevalent offsite conditions, the designintent, and the nature and level of security threats. However, certain siteelements or combinations of elements have performance characteristics thatshould be the basis for a minimum standard, including barriers, walls andfences, guardhouses, sally ports, lighting, plantings, and earth berms.
Recommendation 10: Site perimeter. The site perimeter should bedesigned to protect onsite facilities from ground-level standoff or drive-byattacks, and from thrown explosives. In addition, it should be designed to delayintruders attempting to enter the facility by climb-over or penetration methodsand to stop vehicles that are intent on forcible entry. Furthermore, through theuse of detection devices, the perimeter should be designed to detect andpromote the identification of intruders, whether vehicular or pedestrian.
Discussion: The perimeter may be composed of walls, fences, earth berms,natural topographic separations, or any combination thereof that is capable offulfilling security objectives and that will enhance the architectural image andstyle of the embassy buildings.
Recommendation 11: Site access points. An embassy site should haveonly two vehicular access points (ceremonial and service), and pedestrianaccess points should always be separated from vehicular access points. On thosesites where chanceries and
DESIGN CRITERIA FOR A NEW GENERATION OF U.S. EMBASSY BUILDINGS 44
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consular sections are colocated, visitor and employee entrances should beseparate. Site access points should be designed to provide inspectioncapabilities, through the use of a sally port arrangement, and the same level ofprotection (or greater) as that of the adjoining perimeter barrier treatment.
Discussion: Site access points can be the weak link in the perimeterdefense system if they are not properly located, designed, and protected. Undercertain circumstances, vehicular approach routes to the site may make siteentrances the points most vulnerable to attack. For these reasons, and because ofthe problems inherent in entry control, the number of site entrances should bekept to an absolute minimum. Additionally, vehicular and pedestrian siteaccesses, as well as employee and visitor entrances, should be separated tominimize the potential threat to each from a breach of the other.
Sally port arrangements are necessary at all site entrances to control accessand ensure that each entrant is individually inspected. Both vehicular andpedestrian sally ports should be designed so that no two sides may be opened atthe same time except in an emergency. Sally ports should also be so designedand located that in the event of a vehicular forced entry attempt, the deflectionof the vehicle by any gate or barrier will not allow such a vehicle to approachany occupied building.
The location of site access points should be analyzed carefully to ensurethat vehicular approach speeds are or can be controlled. Such control is crucialto providing enough response time for the deployment of necessary securitymeasures. Appropriate site access points can be provided using gates, barriers,fences, walls, or other devices, or a combination of these methods.
Recommendation 12: Onsite circulation and parking. Onsite vehicularcirculation and parking should be restricted to the greatest degree possible.Although vehicular access may be granted to high-ranking U.S. and foreignofficials and dignitaries, any onsite parking for these vehicles should be placedat the greatest practical distance from any building within the perimeter. Novehicular site access should be granted to other employees and visitors. Instead,offsite parking in controlled and protected areas may be provided. Vehicularsite access should be granted to service and emergency vehicles only whenabsolutely necessary.
DESIGN CRITERIA FOR A NEW GENERATION OF U.S. EMBASSY BUILDINGS 45
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In addition, all vehicles accessing the site should be thoroughly searched.Discussion: Onsite vehicular access drives should be limited and
controlled to reduce potential threats from vehicles that have penetrated the siteentry or gone undetected and that may pose a danger to the facility. Interioraccess roads should be equipped with a secondary system of barriers that,depending on the nature of the entering vehicle, can selectively permit or denyaccess to a given area of the site. (For example, barriers preventing access to aparticular area may be left deployed until such time as access is warranted.)
Architectural Programming and Planning
Currently, FBO guidelines instruct design professionals on the size of andpreferred relationships among the functional areas normally found withinchancery (embassy office) buildings. This documentation serves as the basis forthe earliest embassy planning and design efforts in which basic functional areaswith assigned space allocations are arrayed in relation to one another and inrelation to major circulation and building service facilities. This process isknown as functional zoning, and using it to provide the first and mostfundamental levels of physical security is an established, time-tested, andproven design approach. Current FBO chancery building programdocumentation embodies this principle, but it is in need of extensivemodifications.
Recommendation 13: Chancery building program modifications. FBOshould revise the existing chancery building program guidance in accordancewith the committee's detailed recommendations and the principles of functionalzoning, adjacencies, and separation that are represented in Figure 6-1.
Discussion: The committee recommends comprehensive changes in thebasic planning and design guidance given to professionals engaged in chancerybuilding design. The approach is encapsulated in Figure 6-1 and embodies thefollowing concepts:
• completely separating secure areas, which are accessible only to clearedU.S. citizens (and others under appropriate escort), from areas that areaccessible to foreign nationals and others without necessary clearanceswho are employed by the embassy;
DESIGN CRITERIA FOR A NEW GENERATION OF U.S. EMBASSY BUILDINGS 46
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FIG
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-1 S
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DESIGN CRITERIA FOR A NEW GENERATION OF U.S. EMBASSY BUILDINGS 47
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• in all embassy building work areas, providing staff circulation that isseparate from public circulation and that is behind the so-calledhardline (a line of protection separating secure areas from more publicones and providing resistance to forced entry attempts and ballisticweapons);
• limiting access points to buildings, with provisions for personnel andvehicle access controls and inspection at all points of entry;
• providing interior and exterior controlled circulation routes that withoutproper access protocols cannot be deviated from without alerting guardforces;
• clustering and removing functional areas that generate the greatestpublic traffic from proximity to the more sensitive portions of theembassy compound (public traffic is greatest for immigrant andnonimmigrant visa services, other aspects of consular operations, U.S.Information Service and commercial libraries, nonsecure conferenceareas and meeting rooms, post community service operations, andassociated informational and representational functions);
• separating service or industrial-type functional areas from sensitiveareas and areas requiring special protective treatments (servicefunctional areas include those that require the use or storage ofhazardous materials and equipment, that otherwise represent risks ofaccidental fires, or that make it extremely difficult to prevent theintroduction and concealment of incendiary or explosive, electronic, orother dangerous devices);
• using concentric rings of circulation barriers and control points toprovide ever more secure areas, moving from the outside toward theinnermost reaches of the compound;
• separating building service equipment and distribution areas into areasauthorized for unescorted access only by cleared U.S. citizens andthose allowing limited access to foreign national personnel underescort; and
• designating and designing an area for the placement of suspiciousarticles and explosive devices until they can be examined by experts.
Acquiring larger sites for future U.S. embassy buildings, which is desirablefor the reasons previously discussed, will also facilitate the segregation of themost sensitive facilities and work areas from those requiring less extensivetreatment. Thus, the larger
DESIGN CRITERIA FOR A NEW GENERATION OF U.S. EMBASSY BUILDINGS 48
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building sites that were recommended earlier in this report will alsoaccommodate the functional zoning principles and separations discussed above.
Recommendation 14: Designation of blast and arson risk areas andcontainment of effects. Certain embassy areas should be designated as areas ofrisk with respect to bombings and deliberately set fires and should be designedto resist and contain the effects of such incidents. Also, a temporary disposalarea should be provided for known or suspected explosive devices.
Discussion: A majority of all attacks against U.S. embassy buildings since1968 have involved either bombings or arson—and often both, because firegenerally accompanies bomb blasts. Although the records available to thecommittee provide only limited detail with respect to where bombs orincendiary devices were placed in these incidents, it is clear that the more publicareas of the embassy—essentially, those outside the hardline—are mostvulnerable.
The committee believes that all reasonable steps must be taken to preventinjury from explosions and/or fires and that compartmentalization of risk areasoffers the most promising approach. To achieve these objectives, embassysecurity system design should minimize the possibility (absolute assurance cannever be provided) that bombs or incendiary devices will be brought into thebuilding. In addition, the building should be compartmentalized to prevent thespread or spillover of arson fires or bomb blasts from these more accessibleareas to those areas with more restricted access. This can be accomplished boththrough more careful functional zoning and by the proper design of walls andother separations.
Recommendation 15: Secure areas and safe havens. Two separate anddistinct protective areas should be designated in different locations of futureembassy buildings.
Recommendation 16: Separation of hazardous occupancies. Allhazardous occupancies, such as heavy building maintenance activities, furniturestorage, automobile repair facilities, fuel storage, and paint shops and storage,should be housed in separate fire-rated compartments. Any hazardous materialsor occupancies in classified or sensitive building areas should be similarlytreated.
DESIGN CRITERIA FOR A NEW GENERATION OF U.S. EMBASSY BUILDINGS 49
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Discussion: In current embassy designs, multiple occupancy types areoften housed in one structure (for example, one building may contain all of thefollowing: office space, building maintenance activities, storage, kitchens,cafeterias, libraries, Marine Guard residences, automobile repair facilities, fuelstorage, paint shops and storage, and warehouses). These areas may or may notbe separated into fire-rated compartments by fire-rated construction and exits.To increase embassy security and protect structures and occupants, programplanning should group functions according to their relative security risk ratherthan their relative fire hazard.
Architectural and Structural Systems
The committee recognizes that treatment of the embassy building's exteriorenvelope represents one of the most challenging aspects of security designbecause so many factors and potential threats are involved. FBO and the StateDepartment's Office of Security have been working in this area for at least fiveyears, beginning with the development of measures designed to thwart mobactions and unauthorized entry and more recently moving to otherconsiderations.
Recommendations 17 and 18: Protection of exterior walls and openings.
Building Service and Security Systems
As part of its scope of interest, the committee examined in detail a range ofthreats posed to building service systems, which it has defined to include allelectrical, mechanical, and communications networks and equipment. Thecommittee believes that, in general, insufficient attention has been paid in thepast by the State Department to security protection for these systems. With theincrease in terrorist attacks at U.S. embassies, it would appear that areconsideration of security measures for these systems is in order. Indeed, thecommittee's studies indicate that substantial threats would be posed to thesecurity of personnel and information by the compromise of these systems andequipment, all of which provide embassy buildings with vital services.
Consequently, the committee recommends that these systems be protectedfrom deliberate or accidental damage that would
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result in the interruption of vital services. Emergency backup systems andequipment to be used when such events do occur are also needed. In essence,embassy buildings should be designed to function as self-sufficiently aspossible, using self-contained, U.S.-controlled systems and equipment whereverpractical and relying on locally available utilities only insofar as they aresatisfactory. Furthermore, networks and equipment for plumbing, heating,ventilating, electrical, and communications functions should be designed insuch a way that they cannot be used by hostile interests to gain intelligence or tootherwise compromise embassy security.
Turning to security systems (including status-monitoring devices, publicaccess controls, fire annunciation systems, and others), the committee's studiesindicate that they should be as simple as possible and designed to functionreliably and appropriately in the specific environmental conditions they willface. Due to the wide variety of local conditions at embassies in which thesesystems will be used, no single set of systems and equipment will beappropriate for all locations. The committee has examined a large number of thesecurity systems and equipment that are presently available and, presentsdetailed design and installation considerations that should guide theirapplication for embassy buildings. The recommendations below summarizethese criteria and describe the principles that guided their development.
Recommendation 19: Protection of systems and equipment. Futureembassy buildings should be so designed and constructed that all buildingservice equipment and distribution networks are contained in areas that aresecure and that provide clear separations between those elements that are to beaccessed and serviced only by cleared U.S. citizens and those that can beaccessible to foreign nationals or others without suitable clearances. All suchsystems should be secured from unauthorized access and provided with alarmsto indicate intrusion or tampering.
Discussion: The type of building service equipment and distribution areareferred to above can be achieved by a wide variety of technical solutions, manyof which would not necessarily employ a central service core. There are certainbenefits to that solution, however. A physically distinct service equipment anddistribution area would ease problems related to maintenance, repair, andservicing. In addition, this type of solution could provide a degree of uniformityin the design and layout of these systems in embassies
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around the world, once again enabling easier maintenance and repair.The issue of servicing these systems is an important factor in maintaining
their security. Because the nonsensitive portions of building service systems arelikely at some point to require servicing by foreign nationals and others withoutsecurity clearances, every effort should be made in building design to ensure thefollowing:
• Those building service system components that are likely to needroutine servicing and maintenance should be placed outside classifiedand sensitive work areas and well away from classified and essentialequipment that should be handled only by cleared U.S. citizens(essential equipment includes that equipment used to provide basicbuilding services).
• Those components that cannot be physically separated should beinstalled in such a way that they can be easily inspected, removed (forservicing off the premises), and replaced without interruption tocritical services within the building.
• Distribution networks and equipment areas should be readily securedfrom vandalism or tampering, yet they should be easy to inspect andshould allow relatively simple modification.
To ensure the installation of only those raceways, conduits, and otherelements that are part of the building design, future embassy design andconstruction should permit easy and positive inspection during the buildingprocess. The connections between the building service equipment anddistribution network areas, which are described above, and the embassy'sgeneral office areas are most critical. Construction drawings and specificationsshould clearly indicate the intended and permitted connections; constructiontechniques and procedures should afford easy verification in the field that onlythose connections are installed.
Any drawings and specifications that are needed for routine servicing ofthese systems should be controlled; they should not be removed from embassypremises. Any changes that are made to these systems should be fullydocumented and thoroughly reviewed to ensure that security objectives are notcompromised.
Recommendation 20: Protection of power, waste, water supply, andcommunications lines.
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Recommendation 21: Site self-sufficiency. Embassy sites should be self-sufficient with respect to essential building services such as emergency powerand water, including that for fire suppression. Embassy buildings and sitesshould be designed to function effectively without exclusive reliance on utilitiesand services supplied from offsite so that, in the event such services areinterrupted or become so eroded in quality or availability as to render themunsatisfactory, the embassy may continue operations.
Discussion: Local utility supply sources for embassies are not alwaysreliable or of satisfactory quality; they are also vulnerable to sabotage. Becausethe disruption of these sources may coincide with terrorist attacks, embassiesrequire reliable onsite emergency backups for these systems. The committee isnot suggesting that embassies should not use locally available utilities andservices, such as electrical power and water, where such services are availablein satisfactory quality and form; but it is recommending that steps be taken toreduce the extent of the embassy's reliance on these local resources.
Of particular concern in the event of utility service disruptions areelectronic information handling systems, computers, and other such devices.Given their requirements for an uninterruptible supply of high-quality electricalpower, special efforts must be made to protect embassy buildings from voltagespikes and other spurious signals that are characteristic of power systems inmany areas of the world.
Because of the considerable variation in the availability and quality oflocal services throughout the world (there can be variations in service betweendifferent sites in the same country or locale), an evaluation of these aspects oflocal utility services should be a part of initial and ongoing security analysesundertaken for each project. The committee has incorporated suchconsiderations in its recommendations on site evaluation and selection.
Recommendation 22: Monitoring and control. Embassy services andsecurity control and monitoring systems should be integrated and simplified,with particular consideration given to their human resources requirements.Also, the State Department should undertake special efforts to upgrade theergonomic design of command and control stations for both routine andemergency or crisis uses.
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Discussion: Increasingly, future U.S. embassy buildings will rely on awide variety of complex control, monitoring, annunciation, and managementsystems for such diverse purposes as security, communications, access control,environmental conditioning, and equipment status monitoring. A wide range ofautomated systems is now commercially available for management andmonitoring of building service systems and equipment; and these systems canbe integrated with others that are used for monitoring and control of securityequipment and networks. It is especially likely that these automated monitoringand control systems will be required for large embassy buildings, in whichmechanical and electrical systems are larger and more complex. But they haveapplication to and should be used for smaller buildings as well.
As discussed in Chapter 5, these control and management systems will, ifthey are integrated with the existing command and control facilities associatedwith Marine Security Guard Post 1, impose additional burdens andresponsibilities on persons whose capabilities are already taxed.
Regardless of where they are located and who operates and monitors them,these systems should, to the maximum degree possible:
• rely mainly on principles of alarm and annunciation, rather than onregular or continuous monitoring by a guard or attendant;
• be provided with redundant features throughout, so that, for example, aclosed-circuit television camera and monitor could be used to assessconditions in an area where a door alarm has been triggered; similarly,light alarms showing on a console or screen should be coupled with asound alarm;
• be designed, as fully as possible, for integration with other systems inorder to eliminate multiple panels and screens and to ensure that onlythose items requiring attention are given prominence (for example,rather than crowding a console with devices for continuous monitoringof central equipment, it should be possible to display information onlywhen and where conditions warrant attention); and
• be designed to indicate the recommended or required courses of actionto be taken in the event of an emergency, including information aboutthe nature and sequence of steps to be taken and persons to be alerted.
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Finally, the committee believes that the State Department must undertakespecial efforts to upgrade the ergonomics and basic human factors engineeringand design of these control and command workstations. Such efforts would takeinto account the full range of tasks, functions, and routine difficulties that areencountered in the monitoring of these systems. Consideration should be givenalso to the development of a facility for Marine Security Guard training in thetasks and functions noted above.
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7
Improving Security in the Planning,Design, Construction, and Management of
Future U.S. Embassy Buildings
BACKGROUND ON IMPROVEMENTS TO FBO PROCEDURES
During its development of guidelines and criteria for increased security inU.S. embassies, the committee came to realize that unless the Office of ForeignBuildings Operations (FBO) used a well-managed process for obtaining theservices of architects, engineers, and construction companies, there would bedifficulties in integrating the committee's security recommendations with theprocedures of the State Department. It also was apparent that certain aspects ofthese procedures, as described later in this chapter, would in themselves affectthe security of the buildings that were to be constructed. Therefore, thecommittee directed its attention toward developing recommendations thatwould improve FBO's procedures for planning, designing, constructing, andmanaging future U.S. embassy buildings.
The organization of this chapter is based on the steps normally followed inthe design and building process. Most of these steps are currently incorporatedin the State Department's procedures, which the committee has explored indetail. However, as discussed in previous chapters of this report, the committeein its efforts also has taken into consideration the potential impact of the InmanPanel's recommendations for a greatly expanded building program. Thecommittee's recommendations reflect its awareness of these issues, as well as itscollective judgment and experience with the building process within both theprivate and government sectors.
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COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS ON PROGRAMIMPLEMENTATION, MANAGEMENT, AND
ADMINISTRATION
Performance-Based Design Criteria
Recommendation 23: Design criteria format. FBO should manage thedevelopment of a more cohesive, fully integrated set of design manuals andguidelines to be communicated to design teams. Where practical, these criteriashould be issued with the concurrence of other embassy tenants to avoid overlapor confusion in the design process. In accordance with the concepts and formatdeveloped by the committee, the design guidelines and criteria should be statedin performance terms whenever possible. All such materials should conveyclearly the specific requirements of FBO. A comprehensive course of trainingand briefing on security design matters should be developed and provided to allprofessionals as a mandatory requirement for rendering design services to FBO.
Discussion: During its deliberations, the committee conductedcomprehensive reviews of the existing design criteria and guidelines currentlyin use by FBO. In addition to lacking necessary emphasis on security-relatedmatters, these materials are, in general, uneven in quality, superfluous oroutdated in parts, and wholly lacking an integrative framework. New designguidance, generated principally by the Office of Security, is contained inprovisional memoranda that at times conflict with the guidelines contained inthe bound FBO design manuals. As a result, design professionals can beoverwhelmed and confused by the volume of these materials and their lack ofclear organization. Moreover, FBO's current design criteria and guidelinesrepresent a mixture of prescriptive statements and performance statements. Theprescriptive statements instruct the design professionals on the precise methodsand materials that must be used; the performance statements present the desiredperformance attributes clearly and in terms against which solutions can beevaluated, leaving the choice of methods, design approaches, and materials tothe design professional. The committee believes that FBO design criteria,including those that do not pertain strictly to security issues, should, whereverpossible, be stated in performance terms.
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An Integrated Computer Data Base
Recommendation 24: Integrated data base. A critical element inmanaging the major program of new embassy construction planned by FBO isan integrated data base (that is, one that begins to collect information about eachbuilding project from its first stages of planning and programming andcontinues to accumulate needed data in a computer file during the entire lifecycle of the embassy). It is important that FBO establish such a data base, anexample of which is shown in Figure 7-1.
Discussion: Although FBO currently employs some computerapplications, the committee recommends that an extensive effort be made tobuild on the work of the Building Research Board's Committee on AdvancedTechnology for Building Design and Engineering. Over the past three years,this committee has developed in some detail the conceptual framework for anintegrated data base for building clients. FBO can create such a tool bycapturing the data currently generated by architects, engineers, estimators,suppliers, construction firms, and others—data that are essentially by-productsof their activities. The progress that has been made in computer technology, theincreased use of and experience in employing computers by professionals of allsorts, and the lower costs of computer technology and software all contribute tomaking the concept of such an integrated data base feasible.
The development of an integrated data base will enhance all aspects ofFBO project management, record keeping, and facility maintenance. Ifundertaken in an evolutionary manner, FBO's implementation of suchtechnology should cause minimal disruption and provide a valuablemanagement tool.
Space Programming and Facility Needs Identification
Recommendation 25: Space programming. FBO should institute astructured procedure for space programming that will accurately reflect currentand anticipated embassy needs and incorporate the following considerationsunique to this building type:
• Security. Functional adjacencies and circulation patterns that resultfrom the required separation of secure areas from those accessible toforeign service nationals (FSNs) and the public may influence spaceprogramming. In addition, special security systems
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FIG
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-1 I
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• Functional requirements. A recognition of the functions associated withFSNs and contract personnel (such as extra cafeterias and recreationalassociations) should be part of the space programming process.
Discussion: The existing space programming methods prescribed by FBOdate from 1964 and consist solely of a required listing of full-time StateDepartment personnel. As such, they provide little guidance on how to dealwith the multiplicity of current embassy users in terms of current securityprogramming requirements. The committee's collective experience with StateDepartment embassy design, coupled with its visits to embassies during thecourse of its work, illuminated the results of an inadequate space programmingprocedure: overcrowding and inappropriate postconstruction modifications tostructures to incorporate security considerations or unaccounted-for staff andothers.
Recommendation 26: Standardized components and large-scaleprocurement. FBO should explore the opportunities that may result from thestandardized design and large-scale procurement of selected embassycomponents and systems that would be made possible under the Inman Panelrecommendations. These components and systems could be produced in theUnited States under secure conditions and then shipped and stored in a securefashion on foreign sites.
Discussion: The fabrication of standardized components and systems forfuture embassies could offer an opportunity for the development of a buildingsystem that would provide security improvements at controlled costs. Thesespecialized systems could be custom designed for embassies and would includesuch items as the following:
• window units that are designed against a special set of securityrequirements—if well conceived and designed, such windows
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and equipment have unique space and service system requirements thatshould be identified concurrently with other building requirements.
• Personnel. An accurate assessment of State Department and other useragency personnel (both part-time, full-time, and contract), includingFSNs, should be carried out as a first step in the programming processto determine space requirements.
would represent an improvement in performance at a reasonable costand still allow a diversity of design alternatives; and
• components for other security purposes, which might include a range ofproducts from doors to Marine Security Guard enclosures and thatwould lend themselves to standardized design for large-volumeproduction.
Architect and Engineer Selection Process
Recommendation 27: Procurement of architectural and engineeringservices. FBO should institute changes in its procedures for the procurement ofarchitectural and engineering services to incorporate the following features:
• The Architectural Advisory Panel should be expanded to includemembers with expertise in such areas as structural engineering,building services design, and security. Strictures on their terms ofservice and ability to secure work from FBO should be modified.
• Preselection criteria, to be applied by FBO staff prior to the panel'sreview of qualifications submittals, should give recognition to thosedesign teams that have a capability in security design and should notexclude teams that have previous State Department experience.
Discussion: The Architectural Advisory Panel has played, and shouldcontinue to play, a valuable role within the State Department's constructionprograms by emphasizing excellence in design and by helping to ensure thatrepresentation of an appropriate U.S. image abroad is incorporated in embassybuildings of architectural distinction. There are shortcomings in the currentadvisory panel process, however, and four issues have influenced thisrecommendation:
• Three panel members, whose service is voluntary, are too few innumber for the major program anticipated.
• Aesthetic and architectural design sensibilities must be balanced with aserious and pervasive concern for security at all levels, beginning withthe selection of properly qualified design professionals.
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• To limit any proliferation of contract documents through theirdistribution to a wider base of noncleared persons, it is recommendedthat architects be U.S. citizens who hold an appropriate securityclearance.
• The complexity of security design requirements in future embassiesdictates that experience in this field is a desirable prerequisite ofembassy design teams.
Program Management
Recommendation 28: Program management. The State Departmentshould implement a project management program to ensure uniform, effective,and efficient management of the total program of new embassy constructionthat would result from the implementation of the Inman Panel report. Theprogram management effort should be centralized in Washington, D.C., andshould be performed by, or under, the direction and control of the StateDepartment. The program should encompass the total building effort frominception through occupancy of all facilities throughout the world.
Discussion: The program management function for the embassyconstruction planned by the State Department should include the following:
• establishment of uniform guidelines and procedures related toprogramming, site selection, site development, design, procurement ofconstruction, and occupancy of all facilities;
• development of prototypical architect/engineer and other consultant feeagreements with appropriate prequalification and selection procedures;
• development of prototypical contract forms between contractors and theState Department to reflect various project requirements—for example,fast-track construction, lump sum bids, turnkey, and the like;
• establishment of centralized accounting functions to ensure a properaudit trail and uniform accounting procedures;
• establishment by the State Department of permanent review andmanagement teams to oversee the program (the teams should includerepresentation by all sections of the State Department involved in thereview and approval process);
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• development and implementation of the integrated data base discussedin recommendation 24;
• development of a procedure for the establishment of realistic budgetsand time schedules for each project and of monitoring procedures toensure that each project is developed on time and within budget.Budgets should include both hard costs (e.g., construction) and softcosts (e.g., land acquisition, design fees, furniture);
• development of a quality assurance program to ensure that facilities aredesigned and constructed to the prescribed quality levels;
• application of value engineering/life-cycle costing techniques to ensurethat the State Department obtains maximum value for its money overthe life cycle of the buildings; and
• incorporation of guidelines to enhance the secure distribution of designand construction documents and to improve security during theconstruction process.
Project Administration
Recommendation 29: Project administration. Within the overall programmanagement structure, the State Department should also develop a centralizedproject administration procedure that assigns responsibility and control for eachproject to one Washington-based individual for the project's duration. Thefunction should include the following:
• oversight of the development of a comprehensive space managementprogram;
• development and maintenance of the project data base;• development and review of the project timetable;• dissemination to the design team of new guidance and change orders;• revision and updating of the design program;• coordination and review with tenant agencies (if any);• coordination and administration of design review and project progress
meetings;• liaison and coordination with the post; and• identification and resolution of conflicts and issues that may from time
to time arise among parties to the project.
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Discussion: FBO currently has no consistent system for the administrationof embassy design projects from the predesign stage through postoccupancyevaluation. Yet, because of the wide geographical distribution of FBO projectsand the variety of tenants or potential users of each planned facility, crucialproject decisions are often difficult to make and may be delayed or changedduring (or even after) the building process. The resulting delays and reductionsin building quality point to the need for more centralized control of the processand more feedback regarding past design decisions. Such centralized controlcan be achieved by assigning project administration responsibility to oneindividual for the duration of the project.
The project administrator should be based in Washington and should bethe point of contact and the central manager for all aspects of a given project,receiving whatever support is necessary to carry out these duties. Supporttechnical staff should also be based in Washington and should communicatewith the architect/engineer and post primarily through the project administrator.In addition to these individuals, each project should have a team of FBOtechnical advisers/reviewers that consists of an architect, mechanical engineer,electrical engineer, civil/structural engineer, interiors specialist, and physicalsecurity specialist.
Other technical specialists should also be part of the Washington staff, tobe called upon as needed by the project administrator. These include specialistsin communications, information management, cost control, agency technicalliaison, fire protection, and construction management.
One administrator could handle several projects on a staggered basis butshould not be burdened with duties related to ongoing improvement programs ata number of existing posts (and the associated requirements for frequent travel).Support technical personnel probably can handle more than one project at atime, as long as key review events do not occur simultaneously.
Recommendation 30: Security aspects of procurement. To enhance thesecurity of future embassy facilities to the maximum extent possible, thecirculation of drawings and related documentation during the bidding, award,and construction processes should be restricted, and consideration should begiven to using, whenever possible, U.S. contractors and subcontractors whohold appropriate security clearances.
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Discussion: Documents on U.S. embassy facilities currently are availableto any contractor who wishes to bid, as well as to subcontractors and suppliers.Often, these categories will include firms from countries that are not friendly tothe United States. It may be possible, by judicious prequalification ofcontractors and by the use of controlled bidding and procurement procedures, toreduce significantly the circulation of construction documents. Given thevolume of construction being contemplated by the State Department, it shouldbe possible to obtain successful competitive bids from cleared U.S. constructionfirms.
Recommendation 31: Cost considerations. Steps should be takenimmediately to gather raw cost data for review, refinement, and assembly into aformat suitable for budgeting and subsequent financial management. The datashould be drawn from known bid results for similar work or from estimates ofcosts computed from preliminary designs for new embassy facilities. Fromthese cost data, cost models should be developed for various embassy types thatcan be used for budgeting and financial management purposes. To ensuremaximum value for its expenditures, the State Department should make valuemanagement studies an integral part of the overall design process. Additionally,value incentive clauses should be included in contracts between the contractorand the State Department.
Discussion: The cost/benefit implications of designing embassies to meetnew criteria for enhanced security will be significantly different than for earlierFBO projects. Therefore, direct cost comparisons with previous work will notalways be appropriate. For example, the requirement for minimum setbacksimmediately increases the size and cost of new sites. And the mandate forincreased security that dictates a “hardened” building, physical securitymeasures around and within the building, and increased security for informationand communications devices will contribute to increased costs as well asimproved performance. Standby power generation, increased fire protection,and a self-sufficient water supply also bring higher costs. In addition, if biddingon projects is restricted to U.S. firms (as opposed to bids from foreign firms),this may result in further expenditures. As research continues, improved andprobably more costly security-related guidelines will be introduced to combatboth terrorist attacks and electronic surveillance. The successful implementation
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of the proposed Inman Panel construction program will depend in part onreliable cost models coupled with an understanding of the security benefitsthese increases in costs are likely to produce.
Operation and Maintenance Procedures
Recommendation 32: Building operation and maintenance. Operatingand maintenance manuals for building and security systems should be projectdeliverables that are required of embassy system and building designers,contractors, and suppliers. Regional maintenance staffs consisting of U.S.personnel holding appropriate security clearances should be established tomaintain security and emergency systems and ensure that building systems donot need to be serviced by FSNs. In addition, manuals should be provided bythe architects/engineers or other appropriate design professionals detailing theintended use of the building under emergency conditions. These manuals shouldalso address routine building servicing, operating, and maintenancerequirements.
Discussion: The operating and maintenance manuals provided withbuildings should be explicit with regard to the intended use of the buildingunder emergency conditions, including plans for evacuation, hiding, and otheractions that are likely to take place in times of attack or other threateningcontingencies. These manuals should also address routine building servicing,operating, and maintenance requirements. Currently, FBO has no standardoperating or maintenance procedures for embassy buildings. In most cases,maintenance is performed by local nationals, a circumstance that necessarilylimits the technical complexities of the various systems in the building. Becauseof such limitations, the FBO building inventory cannot take advantage ofemerging systems that, although performing more efficiently and with a longerlife, may require maintenance beyond the technical capabilities of local nationals.
This committee is not in a position to evaluate the costs and potentialadministrative difficulties that might be associated with the establishment of atechnical maintenance staff of U.S.-cleared citizens, but it believes this proposalwarrants careful and serious consideration. In addition, the committee hasattempted in its design criteria development efforts to call for design approaches
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that will minimize the need for access to secure work areas for routine buildingmaintenance functions.
Postoccupancy Evaluation Procedures
Recommendation 33: Postoccupancy evaluation. All new embassies,after at least one year of occupancy, should be evaluated for a series of factorsthat are designed to measure aspects of the building's performance. In addition,there should be a system for obtaining feedback from these evaluations in amanner that will allow the knowledge gained to be used in improving designcriteria. The committee believes that such evaluations will lead to the improvedquality of both the building that is thus evaluated and subsequent buildingprojects.
Discussion: Postoccupancy evaluation should take place at least one yearafter occupancy and should examine the following:
• functional factors, comparing the building's initial functional and spaceprogramming to actual facility use and evaluating the overallsuitability of the site;
• technical factors, measuring the operational effectiveness of installedmaterials and systems;
• economic factors, measuring the efficiency of the design andconstruction process, staff operating costs, maintenance costs, andactual versus intended life-cycle costs;
• behavioral factors, measuring the occupants' use of building spaces andequipment as they are affected by the performance of the completedbuilding; and
• cost-time factors, comparing the building's initial construction budgetand schedule with the final construction costs and completion time.
This information serves several purposes. An evaluation can be madeabout how well the building design decisions have fulfilled program objectives(such as operational needs, user needs, occupant satisfaction, systemperformance, and security requirements). It can also provide important feedbackto new embassy designs on the successes and failures of previous buildingperformance. And an evaluation of this type can aid as well in the identificationof new assumptions and relationships between certain design decisions andbuilding or occupant performance and behavior.
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Postoccupancy evaluation holds great promise for improving the designprocess and its outcome as long as an effective feedback procedure isimplemented. As a larger evaluation data base on embassy performance iscompiled, designers can begin to find some answers to questions regardingoptimum space allocations, traffic patterns, adjacencies, security performance,and other important design and building considerations for which the onlypresent guidelines are experience, tradition, and the use of outdated standards.
Facilities Management
Recommendation 34: Building information management systems. FBOshould develop a building information system that tracks the flow of importantconstruction data throughout the design and construction process. All proposedconstruction or alterations should be examined thoroughly with respect to theirpossible effects on the security of the building in question. After construction iscompleted, record drawings of the embassy should be prepared and updated aschanges occur during the life of the building.
Discussion: An adequate record must be maintained at all times of the “asbuilt” condition of the embassy. Such a record is needed both in the interest ofgood facilities management practices and in the event the embassy is taken overby hostile persons. Under ideal conditions, this information will be in theintegrated project data base (see recommendation 24) and would be available torescue forces, if necessary, at any location in the world. Wherever suchinformation resides, however, it is important that any changes made to theembassy building and systems are fully documented and assessed from asecurity standpoint.
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8
Future Research and Development
As part of its charge, the committee agreed to consider and provide adviceto the State Department on security-related research questions and areas thatwarrant further investigation and development. The recommendations thatappear later in this chapter were developed because these questions and issuesextend beyond the scope of what could be accomplished using the resourcesavailable to the committee.
It should be noted that these are the first of the committee'srecommendations in this area. A subsequent report to be issued in April 1986*will elaborate on the points presented here and will raise new issues to beconfronted as part of continuing research and development activities within andfor the State Department.
THE NEED FOR A SUSTAINED BUILDING RESEARCH ANDDEVELOPMENT PROGRAM WITHIN THE STATE
DEPARTMENT
The committee believes that the State Department needs to establish andmaintain a strong, carefully directed building research and developmentactivity, a substantial part of which should be related to design for security. Thischapter provides the rationale for this view, describes especially challenging orpromising areas on which such studies could initially be concentrated, and
* Note added by the committee to report in September 1986: This subsequentreport was actually transmitted in September 1986.
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defines the subjects that the Building Research Board will continue to pursuethrough the term of its present efforts on behalf of the State Department.
Recommendation 35: Ongoing research program. The Office ofForeign Buildings Operations (FBO) should fund and administer ongoingresearch and development activities directed toward the improvement ofexisting security-related design methods and criteria. These research anddevelopment activities should be planned and carried out in cooperation with,but independently of, related programs and activities within the StateDepartment's Office of Security and Office of Communications. An outgrowthof the FBO research and development programs should be integrated technicaldesign requirements, translated into performance criteria that can beimplemented in practical terms by design professionals.
Discussion: There are at least three reasons why an ongoing research anddevelopment program is a necessary and appropriate aspect of FBO's activities:
1. There remain significant technical challenges that must be met ifsecurity is to be enhanced in future U.S. embassy buildings to thefullest extent of current abilities.
2. The security-related research and development activities carried outby other federal agencies, although capable of providing valuableinformation to FBO, are not directed toward the unique needs andcircumstances of foreign embassy buildings.
3. FBO, in the State Department's current organizational context, hasthe encompassing responsibilities and concerns that will allowsecurity considerations to be factored in with the full range of otherconsiderations and issues that are invariably a part of buildingdiplomatic facilities abroad.
The challenge of designing secure facilities can hardly be called new;much of architecture and building through the ages have been at least in part fordefensive purposes. In many cases throughout history, security considerationswere primary. Certain well-established principles of security-conscious designand planning that remain in use today (for example, concentric rings offormidable barriers to control access and define physical zones of security) havetheir origins in historic town planning and building patterns used the world over.
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Ancient principles of defensive building design and planning, and much ofthe technical knowledge that has since accumulated in this field, are concernedwith how to build defensively against what at any given time is considered anassault by conventional military means. To the significant degree that terrorismand terrorist attacks depart from these military “conventions” (becauseterrorism is characterized by the element of surprise and the use ofunconventional, generally unanticipated means of assault), they representdesign challenges of a different order.
These factors are recognized today by many of the organizations, includingthe State Department, that must protect people, information, and buildings fromthreats of terrorism, espionage, and sabotage. The design requirements forcontemporary defense installations, water treatment stations, pipelines,refineries, power plants, and a wide range of other sensitive public and privateindustrial facilities all address problems of security and access control. Andthey explicitly identify measures that are intended to counteract threats ofterrorism and industrial or national security espionage. Yet there remainsubstantial technical problems and challenges that are unique to the StateDepartment and that require sustained attention and technical endeavor toovercome.
Although several agencies of the federal government now have activeresearch programs related to physical security and even to counterterroristdesign, these programs are concerned with a range of facilities andcircumstances that are quite different from those of interest to the StateDepartment. These other federally sponsored research and developmentprograms have provided and will continue to provide valuable information toFBO. However, they are directed toward the design of facilities whose purposesare essentially military or industrial in nature and not toward the design ofbuildings that have public use purposes. Even within the State Departmentitself, the vigorous and productive programs of research and technicaldevelopment being carried out through the Office of Security and Office ofCommunications do not—and probably cannot—take into account the fullrange of engineering and architectural design issues that confront actualprojects. Rather, it is FBO, as the agency that oversees and carries out buildingprograms, that is responsible for ensuring that the narrower concerns of theseother offices are integrated and applied.
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The committee believes that a number of the national laboratories andother research facilities operated at federal government expense offer apotentially excellent research resource to the State Department. This has beenan area of interest and concern to the committee but one that lay outside thescope of its charge. The committee believes, however, that in implementing thisrecommendation the State Department could profitably seek additional directadvice from the National Research Council as to the capabilities andappropriateness of particular laboratories for the performance of specificresearch activities. In addition, FBO should continue close consultation with theOffices of Security and Communication in regard to future research anddevelopment initiatives. Currently, these offices remain informed of eachother's activities, and there is some consultation among them in the planning ofresearch projects, but their efforts lack the overall sense of direction andguidance that would come from a more formal and rigorous approach. TheBureau of Administration should consider the formalization of a researchplanning structure and procedure within the State Department, headed by FBO,that would ensure a coordinated, comprehensive, and well-integrated approachto these initiatives.
TECHNIQUES AND METHODS FOR SECURITY IMPACTASSESSMENTS
Recommendation 36: Security impact assessment development. TheState Department's research and development activities should concentrate inpart on the development and implementation of formal techniques and methodsfor evaluating and reporting on the security-related aspects of future embassybuildings throughout the facility life cycle.
Discussion: Elsewhere, this report recommends that the State Departmentconduct detailed and highly tailored security assessments on a project-by-project basis, beginning at the earliest stages of project planning and design andcarrying through the entire facility life cycle. However, the department's currenttechnical capability to carry out this task is rudimentary. A properly conceivedand fully developed security impact assessment capability would encompass atleast the following stages and concerns:
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• Site acquisition and funding. This earliest stage of programming andplanning includes an analysis of the host country context in securityterms, taking into account military and intelligence forecasts; anidentification of the post mission and the associated agencies likely tobe on the embassy building compound and the resulting securityimpacts; and a delineation of the security contingencies that may arise,including options for response.
• Preliminary programming and planning. Explicit site conditions andappropriate general design responses are identified, in addition tospecific requirements for power, emergency backups, basic functionalrelationships, and vehicle access.
• Architectural and engineering design review. Schematic and designdevelopment documents are reviewed and evaluated in light ofapplicable performance criteria and any subsequent host countrydevelopments.
• Bidding and construction document security. In this stage, assessmentsare carried out to identify specific security requirements for handlingand distributing project documents. Also, portions of the design areidentified for construction and/or inspection only by U.S. citizens.
• Pre- and postoccupancy security evaluations. As-built facilities, bothprior to and after initial occupancy, are evaluated by a variety ofmeans, including unobtrusive observation and interviews, to determinethe effectiveness of design measures and the validity of designassumptions. Findings from these efforts are used to correct anydeficiencies that are noted and to revise future planning and designcriteria.
• Operation and maintenance security evaluations. Vulnerabilityassessments are carried out as an element of routine facility caretakingactivities to identify the readiness and adequacy of basic emergencyand backup systems and to assess the facility's ability to perform inlight of recent suspected or known security threats.
• Postevent evaluations. Assessments of the performance of the physicalfacility are made following any event in which security was actuallythreatened or breached. The results of these assessments are integratedwith design criteria and are used to guide facility modifications andadjustments.
• Decommissioning security evaluation. In the event of the abandonmentof an embassy building, a security assessment is made to determinewhat items must be removed and/or destroyed,
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and to identify parts of the building that should be disguised orotherwise treated so as not to reveal vital information about buildingpatterns that could be used to compromise the security of otherfacilities.
These descriptions are illustrative and are only intended to suggest therange of considerations and steps that should be addressed by the StateDepartment as part of a comprehensive approach to building security impactassessments. Some elements of this approach currently exist in various formswithin the Offices of Security and Communications. In addition, as noted by theInman Panel, the State Department now has a successful program of postemergency action drills. The results of these drills could become even morebeneficial if the drills are integrated with more formalized, comprehensive, andcontinuous building security impact assessments.
SITE DESIGN ELEMENTS
Recommendation 37: Physical elements for site security. FBO shouldsponsor or conduct an ongoing research and development program specificallydirected toward testing the effectiveness of site design elements against thesecurity threats of greatest concern to embassies.
Discussion: The committee is aware of and has reviewed the results ofresearch and testing programs sponsored by the government, its laboratories,private industry, and universities, programs that are concerned with the designand operation of security-related site elements. Although there is a great deal ofactivity in this area, particularly with regard to vehicle barriers and antirammingdevices, the appropriateness of this work to embassy site planning and design isquestionable. Much of it has focused on military or industrial applications thatare not suitable for embassy buildings. And, although many of the principlesand some of the techniques are applicable to embassy sites, more research isneeded on the following:
• the effectiveness of combining fences, walls, earth berms, and otherlandscape and site elements as perimeter barriers;
• the use of new materials and techniques, or the refinement of existingones, for the construction of perimeter walls;
FUTURE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 74
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• innovative techniques for arresting vehicles without the use of physicalbarriers such as walls (a number of these techniques are now beingproposed for investigation at Los Alamos National Laboratory; suchstudies should be supported);
• efficient, restrikeable security lighting systems that are capable offunctioning after being fired upon; and
• new site elements that will respond to technical security threats andattack scenarios and that may not have been considered by thecommittee.
A research program that encompasses these topics could be undertaken incooperation with other federal agencies facing similar challenges in new publicbuildings. Such a program, however, must emphasize requirements for technicalsimplicity and ease of maintenance, and its results must be suited to locationswhere skilled labor and relatively sophisticated equipment or materials areunavailable.
Recommendation 38: Development of new enclosure systems.Recommendation 39: Development of door and window systems.
FUTURE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 75
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9
Conclusion
Consistent with events of the past decade, terrorism—and particularlyterrorist actions directed against U.S. citizens and facilities abroad—showssigns of continuing to increase, both in the intensity and severity of attacks andin the number of incidents. One of the main targets of such actions has been andwill probably continue to be the United States presence abroad, as embodied inits embassy buildings and in the persons of its citizens, both official and private.
With the increasing awareness by the State Department of the scope ofthese threats has come a growing determination to provide protection, to thefullest extent possible, for U.S. embassy buildings and their occupants andcontents. It is toward this challenge that the efforts of the Committee for theSecurity of Future U.S. Embassy Buildings have been directed for the past year.*
That the U.S. Department of State should seek the advice of a committeeof this nature is significant and encouraging. It demonstrates, in a most concretemanner, the degree of recognition and concern that has developed around theissue of security for embassy buildings and the advantage the department seesin seeking outside advice and recommendations against which to assess itsefforts.
* Note added by the committee to report in September 1986: The committee'swork was extended for an additional nine months in January 1986.
CONCLUSION 76
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It would be unwise, however, to suppose that the efforts needed to guardagainst a repetition of past outrages and tragedies at U.S. Foreign Servicemissions will be complete with the implementation of measures andrecommendations conceived at one point in time against threats that appear forthe moment to be the most likely. This is a quite natural but unfortunatelymistaken response.
It is clear to this committee, and should be clear also to the StateDepartment, that only constant vigilance and repeated, continuing assessment ofpotential threats and countermeasures can provide reasonable assurance thatappropriate safeguards are in place. The committee is hopeful that the findingsand recommendations contained in this document will provide an important anduseful contribution to this critical endeavor.
CONCLUSION 77
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