the communication complexity of coalition formation among autonomous agents a. d. procaccia & j....
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The Communication Complexity of Coalition Formation Among Autonomous AgentsA. D. Procaccia & J. S. Rosenschein
Lecture Outline• Coalition formation
• Cooperative games• Solution concepts
• Communication Complexity• Model• Fooling Set
• Motivation
• Results
• Conclusions
Cooperative Games
• Cooperative n-person game =def (N;v). N={1,…,n} is the set of players, v:2N→R.
• v(S) is the value of coalition S.
• Payoffs to players are x=(x1,…,xn).
• Coalition structure =(S1,…, Sr) =def partition of N.
• Payoff configuration (x; ), s.t. j=1,…,r:)()( j
Siij SvxSx
j
Coalitions
Solution Concepts• Given coalition structure, wish to find payoff
division which is stable: agents are not motivated to deviate.
• Different notions of stability:• The core.• Shapley value.• The nucleolus.• Equal excess theory. • A horde of others.
In paper
In talk
Solution Concepts: The Core
• The core: C=def{(x; ): S, x(S) ≥ v(S)}
• No coalition can improve its payoff.• The core is sometimes empty.
Communication Complexity
• Player i holds private input zi.
• Goal: compute binary-valued function f(z1,…,zn).
• Players broadcast bits according to a protocol; in the end, all players know the value of f.
• Communication complexity: worst-case number of bits sent in best protocol.
• Ignore computations.
Communication Complexity: Example
• 2 players, each player holds 2 bits. Wish to determine whether all bits are 1.
a(00)=0
a(01)=0
a(10)=0
a(11)=1
a(00)=0
a(01)=0
a(10)=0
a(11)=1
b(00)=0
b(01)=0
b(10)=0
b(11)=1
b(00)=0
b(01)=0
b(10)=0
b(11)=1
0
0 1
I
II
Fooling Set• A set H of input vectors is a fooling set
for f iff:1. (z1,…,zn) in H, f(z1,…,zn) = f0.2. For every two distinct vectors z,z’ mix of
coordinates s.t. image is 1-f0; e.g. f(z1,z2’,z3’,…)=1-f0.
• Lemma: fooling set of size m lower bound of log(m) on communication complexity.
Motivation• Significant body of work on the
computational complexity of coalition formation.
• Virtually none on the communication complexity.
• Analysis of communication complexity particularly appropriate in this case.
Bounds• Each agent has constant info O(n) upper
bound.
• Lower bounds of (n) using fooling set: what is the function f?• The core: is nonempty?• Singleton solution concepts (Shapley, nucleolus,
equal excess): is the value of player 1 greater than 0?
Lower Bound for the Core• Lemma:
Sufficient to produce fooling set of this size.• Weighted majority: [q;w1,...,wn]. Values are
0/1, v(S)=1 iff sum of weights in S is at least q.• n’=n/2+1. H = all weighted majority games
with q=n’-1 and binary weights s.t. exactly n’ are 1.
• i0=argmax{xi}, S = all players with wi=1 and ii0.
)(
12/log n
n
n
Assume grand coalition forms
n=4,n’=3,q=2
Lower Bound for the Core II
i0 S
Lower Bound for the Core III
n=7, n’=4, q=3
z1 z2 z3 z4 z5 z6 z7
z1 z2 z3 z4 z5 z6 z7
Closing remarks• Results: tight bound of (n) on communication
complexity of four solution concepts. • May be a problem when communication is
severely restricted. • Future:
• Other lower bound methods for other solution concepts.
• Perhaps lower bound can be breached with respect to specific nontrivial games or environments.