audit games jeremiah blocki, nicolas christin, anupam datta, ariel d. procaccia, arunesh sinha 1...

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Audit Games Jeremiah Blocki, Nicolas Christin, Anupam Datta, Ariel D. Procaccia, Arunesh Sinha 1 Carnegie Mellon University

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Auditing  Permissive real time access control policy  Inspect accesses after occurrence  Find and punish policy violators  How does it help?  Deter potential violators  Take remedial measures to prevent future losses 3

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Page 1: Audit Games Jeremiah Blocki, Nicolas Christin, Anupam Datta, Ariel D. Procaccia, Arunesh Sinha 1 Carnegie Mellon University

1

Audit Games

Jeremiah Blocki, Nicolas Christin, Anupam Datta, Ariel D. Procaccia, Arunesh Sinha

Carnegie Mellon University

Page 2: Audit Games Jeremiah Blocki, Nicolas Christin, Anupam Datta, Ariel D. Procaccia, Arunesh Sinha 1 Carnegie Mellon University

2

Motivation

Page 3: Audit Games Jeremiah Blocki, Nicolas Christin, Anupam Datta, Ariel D. Procaccia, Arunesh Sinha 1 Carnegie Mellon University

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Auditing Permissive real time access control policy Inspect accesses after occurrence Find and punish policy violators

How does it help? Deter potential violators Take remedial measures to prevent future losses

Page 4: Audit Games Jeremiah Blocki, Nicolas Christin, Anupam Datta, Ariel D. Procaccia, Arunesh Sinha 1 Carnegie Mellon University

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Auditing for Policy Enforcement

HIPAA

GLBA

EU Data Protection Directive

Page 5: Audit Games Jeremiah Blocki, Nicolas Christin, Anupam Datta, Ariel D. Procaccia, Arunesh Sinha 1 Carnegie Mellon University

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Auditing in Practice FairWarning Audit Tool for hospitals

Flags all celebrity record accesses as suspicious Place traffic police at strategic locations

Intelligent heuristics, but, no mathematical model or guarantees

Page 6: Audit Games Jeremiah Blocki, Nicolas Christin, Anupam Datta, Ariel D. Procaccia, Arunesh Sinha 1 Carnegie Mellon University

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Why study Audit Process? Optimize costs expended in auditing

Audits costs money

Prevent violations Decide appropriate punishment for deterrence

Efficiently computable audit strategies Enable cost-optimal prioritized inspections

Page 7: Audit Games Jeremiah Blocki, Nicolas Christin, Anupam Datta, Ariel D. Procaccia, Arunesh Sinha 1 Carnegie Mellon University

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Outline Simple rational game model

Example

Main Algorithm for computing equilibrium Example

Future Work

Page 8: Audit Games Jeremiah Blocki, Nicolas Christin, Anupam Datta, Ariel D. Procaccia, Arunesh Sinha 1 Carnegie Mellon University

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Simple Rational ModelSimple Rational Model

Adversary: violation, fined if detected Utility when target is attacked

targets

inspection𝑝1 𝑝2 𝑝3 𝑝4

Utility when auditedUtility when unaudited

Page 9: Audit Games Jeremiah Blocki, Nicolas Christin, Anupam Datta, Ariel D. Procaccia, Arunesh Sinha 1 Carnegie Mellon University

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Punishment as an Action

High Punishment: Hostile Work Environment

Low Punishment: No incentive to follow policy.

x

Simple Rational Model

Page 10: Audit Games Jeremiah Blocki, Nicolas Christin, Anupam Datta, Ariel D. Procaccia, Arunesh Sinha 1 Carnegie Mellon University

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Stackelberg Equilibrium Concept Defender commits to a randomized resource

allocation strategy (’s and ) Adversary plays best response to that

strategy

For defender Stackelberg better than Nash eq.

Goal Compute optimal defender strategy

Simple Rational Model

Page 11: Audit Games Jeremiah Blocki, Nicolas Christin, Anupam Datta, Ariel D. Procaccia, Arunesh Sinha 1 Carnegie Mellon University

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Small exampleExample

2 2 31 0.1 0.5

Utility audited ()Utility unaudited ()

0.25 0.5 0.251 1 1

Utility audited ()Utility unaudited ()

Defender’s utility

Adversary’s utility

𝑝𝑖𝑈𝑎 ,𝐷 ( 𝑡𝑖 )+ (1−𝑝𝑖)𝑈𝑢 ,𝐷 (𝑡𝑖 )−𝑎0𝑥

𝑝𝑖(𝑈𝑎 , 𝐴(𝑡 𝑖) – 𝑥 )+ (1−𝑝𝑖)𝑈𝑢 , 𝐴(𝑡 𝑖)

= 0.5

Page 12: Audit Games Jeremiah Blocki, Nicolas Christin, Anupam Datta, Ariel D. Procaccia, Arunesh Sinha 1 Carnegie Mellon University

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Example contd.Example

Defender’s Stackelberg strategy (utility )

Adversary’s strategy: Attack target

Fix , equivalent to security games (utility )

0.285 0.43 0.285

0.43 0.57 0 0.25

Page 13: Audit Games Jeremiah Blocki, Nicolas Christin, Anupam Datta, Ariel D. Procaccia, Arunesh Sinha 1 Carnegie Mellon University

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Computing Optimal Defender StrategySolve optimization problems for all and pick the best solution

subject to

and ’s lie on the probability simplexand

QuadraticNon-

convex

Simple Rational Model

Page 14: Audit Games Jeremiah Blocki, Nicolas Christin, Anupam Datta, Ariel D. Procaccia, Arunesh Sinha 1 Carnegie Mellon University

Properties of Optimal Point

14

Problem

𝑥

𝑝𝑖

TightConstraint

s

𝐶1

𝐶2𝐶3

𝐶41

1

Main Algorithm

Page 15: Audit Games Jeremiah Blocki, Nicolas Christin, Anupam Datta, Ariel D. Procaccia, Arunesh Sinha 1 Carnegie Mellon University

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Main Idea in Algorithm

Iterate over regions, solve sub-problems Set probabilities to zero for curves that lie above & make other

constraints tight Pick best solution of all

𝑥

𝛿=−3𝛿=−2𝛿=−1

𝛿=1− Δn 1

1

Main Algorithm

Page 16: Audit Games Jeremiah Blocki, Nicolas Christin, Anupam Datta, Ariel D. Procaccia, Arunesh Sinha 1 Carnegie Mellon University

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Solving Sub-problem 1.Objective can reduced to a polynomial function of

2. Find potential points of maxima by finding roots

3. Take the maximum over all values from steps 2

Splitting circle method: approximate real roots with precision in time polynomial in input size and

Main Algorithm

Page 17: Audit Games Jeremiah Blocki, Nicolas Christin, Anupam Datta, Ariel D. Procaccia, Arunesh Sinha 1 Carnegie Mellon University

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Main Theorem The problem can be approximated to an

additive ϵ factor in time using the splitting circle method, where K is the bit precision of inputs.

Main Algorithm

Page 18: Audit Games Jeremiah Blocki, Nicolas Christin, Anupam Datta, Ariel D. Procaccia, Arunesh Sinha 1 Carnegie Mellon University

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0.285 0.43 0.285 0

Varying cost of punishment , medium cost of punishment

, high cost of punishment

, low cost of punishment

0.43 0.57 0 0.25

0.46 0.54 0 0.99

Example

Page 19: Audit Games Jeremiah Blocki, Nicolas Christin, Anupam Datta, Ariel D. Procaccia, Arunesh Sinha 1 Carnegie Mellon University

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Future Work Studying security games variations in audit

games Budget-constrained defender Combinatorial constraints on use of defender

resources

Varying punishment with violation severity

Validation: Simulation: studying effect of various parameters Real world case study

Future Work

Page 20: Audit Games Jeremiah Blocki, Nicolas Christin, Anupam Datta, Ariel D. Procaccia, Arunesh Sinha 1 Carnegie Mellon University

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Conclusion

First model of auditing and first step toward a computationally

feasible solution of audit games.

Research at the intersection of AI and security & privacy holds lot of promise, given the encouraging precedent set by the deployment of security games

algorithms

Page 21: Audit Games Jeremiah Blocki, Nicolas Christin, Anupam Datta, Ariel D. Procaccia, Arunesh Sinha 1 Carnegie Mellon University

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Extensions inspections performed by single resource

Probability sum to : Each inspection’s probability distribution is Decompose using Birkhoff-von Neumann

decomposition

Zero violations by the adversary With no punishment Adds an additional non-convex constraint Handled in almost same way as the other

constraints

Extensions