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2JAPCC Journal Edition 3, 2006

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Editorial

As the process of NATO Transformation moves forward, it is clear that anumber of key capability areas are now being tackled, including a widerange of air power related topics. However, perhaps one area that has yetto be addressed fully is that of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS).Undoubtedly, the technology in this area has made rapid advances inrecent years and, whilst individual NATO nations have developed arange of UAS related programmes, we have yet to develop any detailedNATO policy and doctrine to guide the future development of UASand fully integrate them into future combined operations. This needsearly resolution if NATO is to make best use of UAS within its forcestructure and also reap maximum operational benefit from this excitingnew technology.

To try and take this work forward, the JAPCC has made the UAStopic its top priority theme for 2006. Our intention is to engage withall UAS stakeholders, including NATO staff, industry and academiato identify what NATO needs to do to exploit the UAS potentialproperly. We plan to do this through a variety of different fora,including meetings and conferences. This JAPCC Journal is a furthermajor strand in this approach. Based upon all these different discussionsand feedback, our aim is to develop a NATO UAS “Flightplan”, settingout what topics need to be tackled in order to transform the NATOUAS capability.

Reflecting the growing importance of UAS, this issue of the JAPCCJournal offers a range of viewpoints, beginning with an article fromour new Director, General Tom Hobbins. Also included are inputsfrom a cross-section of NATO Chiefs of Air Staff summarizing theircurrent UAS operations and their future national plans in this area.Beyond that, articles are also provided on the UAS experience in currentoperations, including that from an Israeli perspective, together withacademic and industry views. Taken as a whole, I believe this providesa comprehensive insight into all aspects of UAS operation, which Ihope will serve to stimulate debate across the NATO air community.

Following on from the last edition, I am grateful to the new Chief of AirStaff, RAF, for his personal interview that gives us all a good insight intofuture RAF plans within the NATO context. I am also pleased to havereceived an unsolicited article from Dr Andrea Nativi, which I hope maybe the first of many from our elite readership.

I hope you enjoy this edition of the JAPCC Journal.

Hans-Joachim SchubertLieutenant General, DEU AExecutive Director,Joint Air Power Competence Centre

The Journal of the JAPCC welcomesunsolicited manuscripts of up to 1000words in length. Please e-mail yourmanuscript as an electronic file in MSWord to [email protected]

We encourage comments on thearticles in order to promotediscussion concerning Air and SpacePower inside NATO’s Joint Aircommunity. All comments should besent to [email protected]

The Journal of the JAPCC, Roemerstrasse 140, D-47546 Kalkar Germany


Transforming Joint Air Power:The Journal of the JAPCC

DirectorJoint Air Power Competence CentreGen Tom Hobbins

Executive DirectorJoint Air Power Competence CentreLt Gen Hans-Joachim Schubert

EditorAir Cdre Dai Williams

Deputy EditorWg Cdr Richard Duance

Editorial BoardCol Valentino SavoldiLt Col Terje FagerliLt Col Kenneth KerrWg Cdr Peter YorkMaj Gert-Jan WolkersMaj Panagiotis AkinosoglouMaj Patrick PianaMSgt Richard Bago

Sponsor ManagerMaj Frank Weißkirchen

Production ManagerMr Simon Ingram

Design and Art ProductionSSgt Duane White

DistributionSMSgt Edgar Hersemeyer

The Journal of the JAPCC is the professionalpublication of NATO’s Joint Air PowerCompetence Centre aiming to serve as a forum forthe presentation and stimulation of innovativethinking on NATO air power related issues such asdoctrine, strategy, force structure and readiness.The views and opinions expressed or implied inThe Journal of the JAPCC are those of the authorsand should not be construed as carrying the officialsanction of NATO.

All articles within this issue not bearing a copyrightnotice may be reproduced in whole or in partwithout further permission. Articles bearing acopyright notice may be reproduced for any NATOpurpose without permission. If any article is beingreproduced, The Journal of the JAPCC requests acourtesy line. To obtain permission for thereproduction of material bearing a copyright noticefor other than NATO purposes, contact the authorof the material rather than The Journal of the JAPCC.

6 Unmanned Aircraft Systems:

Refocusing the Integration ofAir & Space Power

10 The Evolving Capability of

UAV Systems

14 Integrating UAVs with Other

Airspace Users

18 Exploiting a New High

Ground

22 Beyond Technology:

Successful Unmanned AircraftSystem Employment

© Crown Copyright/MOD

Transformation & Capabilities

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Inside the JAPCC

Regulars

CONTENTS

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26 An Interview with Chief of

the Air Staff, Royal Air Force

34 Manned Unmanned Missions:

Chance or Challenge?

38 Manned Vs Unmanned:

Aerial Systems - False Expectations,Real Opportunities & Future Challenges

42 Lessons Learned from

Predator Operations

52 News

56 Bios

30 30 Years of Israeli UAV Experience:

Interoperability and Commonality

44 Unmanned Air Vehicles:

Some National Perspectives

48 Airbase Defence in

Expeditionary Operations

54 JAPCC Conference 2005

58 Book Review


Photo NATO

Out of the BoxView Points


Unmanned Aircraft Systems(UAS) of all types and sizesare proving their worth

everyday in operations around theworld. From hurricane relief inNew Orleans to combat operationsin Afghanistan and Iraq, they areextremely flexible. They can bedesigned and built for smallreconnaissance ground-teams, forstrategic level commanders and anylevel between. Besides beingflexible, they are also cost effective.Compared to other assets, UAS cancomplete their missions at relativelylower costs. The tremendousadvances in technology and theexploding numbers of UAS offereven greater opportunities foraerospace power. But, unless thesesystems are properly integrated intoa comprehensive command andcontrol system, UAS will not meettheir full potential.

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Joint air and space power is in themidst of a proliferation of UAS.As recently reported by the USDepartment of Defense, over 32nations are developing ormanufacturing more than 250different models, and 41 countriesare operating over 80 types ofUAS.1 By the latest count, the USalone is operating over 1,000unmanned systems. Added to thisexplosion in the number of systems,there has been a similar expansionin the diversity of UAS’ size andcapabilities. At the low-end of thespectrum there are micro unmannedsystems like the Wasp. This mico-UAV weighs less than 225 grams, isjust over 20 centimeters long with

Hawk and Euro Hawk that weighmore than 14,500 kilograms, areover 15 meters long and have awingspan of 40 meters.4 TheGlobal Hawk capabilities include aceiling of 65,000 feet, anintercontinental range of 5,400

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a wingspan of approximately 30centimeters.2 It has a ceiling of 1,200feet, a range of less than 5 nauticalmiles and an endurance that ismeasured in minutes.3 At the otherend of the spectrum, there are long-endurance systems like Global

By General Tom Hobbins, USA ADirector of the JAPCC

Northrop Grumman Copyright

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nautical miles and an endurance of32 hours.5 By 2015, the number ofUAS will increase by more than3,000.6 The introduction of newUAS will continue for many yearsto come. When unmanned balloonsand near-space systems with ceilingsof over 120,000 feet are added to themix, endurance can be measured inmonths and the diversity ofcapabilities and options available tocommanders are incalculable.7

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Currently, however, thisproliferation and diversity of UAShave led to developments that aresegregating airspace and aircraft andhampering the application ofaerospace power. Even moretroubling is that this is happeningcounter to the transformationalefforts of NATO nations tointegrate their forces better andmake them more interoperable forboth joint and combined operations.Two “pressures” are driving thesegregation. The first is the “bottom-up” tactical development of UASwithout an overall strategic visionor concept of operations and secondis the corresponding lack ofprocedures to integrate these diversesystems into a network of systems.It is not surprising that each nationand its independent services arefocused on fielding unmannedsystems to provide new capabilitiesto meet their own very specificneeds. For example, the US Armyhas acquired a small tactical UASknown as BUSTER (BackpackUnmanned Surveillance Targetingand Enhanced Reconnaissance), tomeet its requirement for a systemto provide warfighters with critical,real-time battlefield information inhigh-risk areas such as Iraq andAfghanistan. The purpose of thissystem is to increase the warfighters’situational awareness and providethem with force protection. Thesesystems weigh only 4.5 kilogramsand can be carried in a backpack,

launched by soldiers and reachaltitudes up to 10,000 feet. Thesystem provides soldiers withextraordinary capabilities. Thisexample can be repeated in manyother Services of the NATOnations. Each Service and theindustries that support them arescrambling to field UAS to tacklethe many difficult problems eachface.

However, little is being done toestablish the means to integrate theseunmanned systems with other forcesand systems, be it between mannedand unmanned, interservice, orinternational systems. The highdemand for current and plannedUAS, the diversity in theircapabilities and the lack of anintegrating concept of operations,across all these systems, is puttingpressure on command and controlmeasures to operate these systemssafely in crowded airspace.According to the USAF Joint Air-Ground Operations Center, therehave been three midair collisionsbetween small unmanned aircraftand helicopters during currentcombat operations making airspacecontrol and deconfliction seriousissues.8 Lt Gen Walter Buchanan,

Commander of US CentralCommand Air Forces, has stated“What I worry about is the daywhen I have a C-130 down low witha cargo-load full of soldiers and aUAV, it won’t have to be a big one,comes right through the cockpitwindshield”.9 These problems haveled to increased procedural airspacecontrol measures in an attempt todeconflict aircraft and increasesafety. Although proceduralairspace control measures providesome increased level of safety foraircraft over what is provided byuncontrolled airspace, it is far fromoptimal and does little to optimizesupport to the joint fight. Airmenfrom all Services and nations mustaddress this and other issuessegregating airpower and developsolutions to improve the integrationof all its assets. We must also ensureour army and navy forces areinvolved in the solution to this issue.

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Although current and futureunmanned systems may be quickto solve individual Service andtactical problems, more must bedone to develop the means tointegrate these systems beyond

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Mission Technologies Copyright


their stove-pipe functions into thejoint and combined force team.Optimization of UAS as part ofjoint/combined forces requires awider perspective. It is incumbentupon each nation and the Allianceto develop the doctrine, concept ofoperations, standards, and tactics,techniques and procedures (TTP)necessary to integrate UAS andother systems into our forcestructure. NATO should take thelead to standardize national effortsto the maximum extent possible.

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At the doctrinal level there are anumber of issues that must beaddressed. A major doctrinalchallenge centres on how to integratethese systems into the airspace that istypically above what is controlled bythe ground component commander.Some examples of this type ofprocedural control includesegregating airspace into restrictedareas and coordination zones as wellas providing altitude blocks fordifferent types of aircraft. Currently,procedural airspace control measuresare being employed to deconflict

aircraft and the components. Theproliferation of unmanned systemsonly highlights existing problems inattempting to apply existing linearbattlefield doctrine to non-linearsituations, like urban operations,which joint forces face today. In anattempt to employ various jointforces safely in the tight and difficultconfines of urban operations,commanders are forced to increaseprocedural deconfliction measures.When unmanned systems are addedto the dense concentration ofdifferent assets, the situation isfurther exacerbated, leading to morerestrictive procedural measures.Although this provides increasedsafety to those assets in the air, itonly further limits the applicationof aerospace power, handicappingits many strengths and ultimatelydecreasing the air support availableto those who need it most. Jointdoctrine must move away fromprocedures that only serve todeconflict joint forces. New jointdoctrine must allow and provide thepositive means necessary to allowairmen to integrate air assets inorder to meet the Joint ForceCommander’s priorities.

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It is time for airmen to take the leadand aggressively develop theconcepts of operation where UASare integrated into the joint force in“value-added” roles. UAS can addvalue by increasing militarycapability, decreasing cost, orreducing risk. If systems do not addvalue to a particular mission, nationsshould not pursue them until theywould add value. Generally, UASshow great promise as a tool formissions that are dull, dirty, ordangerous. Regardless of the rolesthey serve, and to the maximumextent possible, UAS must beinterconnected with other systemsand forces throughout thebattlespace to exchange informationand help correlate this informationmore quickly, precisely, andefficiently. The networking ofsystems will improve situationalawareness and battlespaceknowledge. The networking ofsystems and appropriate sharing ofknowledge must occur at all levelsfrom the tactical: for the companyfighting the 3-block urban war; tothe operational: for commanders

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who must allocate limited resourcesand monitor, adjust andcommunicate their operationalintent; to the strategic: for ourpolitical masters who must providepolitical guidance and civiliancontrol.

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High-level doctrine and conceptsof operations are simply notenough to bring UAS integratedcapabilities to the joint fight. Acadre of professionals must betrained to maintain and operatethese systems as part of aninterconnected joint/combinedteam. For each concept ofoperation, TTP must be developed.Currently, due to a lack ofresources and out of necessity,development of UAS TTP has beenleft primarily to the warfightersengaged in operations. Althoughthis has produced results, just as inother aerial platforms, it ispreferable to have the resourcesnecessary to develop, test and refineTTP, and train personnel prior totheir employment on thebattlefield. This will require nationsto not only purchase relativelyinexpensive unmanned systems butalso to secure the necessarymanpower and other resources toserve as the cadre that will nurture,develop and refine the applicationof airpower through UAS.

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The efficient and effectiveintegration and interoperability ofair and space forces into joint andcombined operations is thekeystone of aerospacetransformation. The integration ofunmanned aerial systems is amicrocosm of the effort that mustbe made to improve joint forcesinterconnectedness. Airmen mustcritically challenge the status quoand provide comprehensiverecommendations to improve air

and space power’s contribution tojoint and combined operations.They must judiciously reviewstanding air and joint doctrine inthe context of today’s strategicenvironment and push necessarychanges forward. Concepts ofOperations and the TTPs tosupport them must be establishedfor the missions where UAS canadd value. Finally, additionalresources, beyond merelyacquiring equipment, to includeinvestments in personnel,organizational structure, trainingand facilities, among others, arenecessary to develop UAS’contribution to joint/combinedforces. As airmen develop the roadforward for unmanned systems inparticular, and aerospace power asa whole, they must remember tothink jointly and work with theground and maritime components

to provide solutions to theproblems that have driven the rapiddevelopment of unmanned aircraftsystems of all shapes, sizes andcapabilities.

1 Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), -TheUnmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap: 2005-2030,20 July 2005, p. 38, http://www.acq.osd.mil/usd/Roadmap%20Final2.pdf.

2 Ibid., 29.3 Ibid.4 Ibid., 6.5 Ibid.6 Frost and Sullivan research study findings for the

European and Asian markets, combined withJAPCC research on US UAS acquisition programs.Frost and Sullivan data was presented at the Futureof Unmanned Vehicles conference held in Londonin November 2005.

7 OSD Roadmap, 35.8 Rebecca Grant, “The Clash of UAV Tribes”, Air

Force Magazine Online, Vol. 88, no. 9 (September2005): http://www.afa.org/magazine/sept2005/0905UAV.asp.

9 Lt Gen Walter Buchanan, presentation at DefenseNews Media Group’s Joint Warfare Conferenceon 26 Oct 2005, reported by Glenn W. GoodmanJr., “Congested Airspace: Hand launched UAVsCreate Hazards for Manned Aircraft”, C4ISR: TheJournal of Net-Centric Warfare, 9 January 2006,http://www.isrjournal.com/story.php?F=1379999

Mission Technologies Copyright

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The uninhabited air vehicle (UAV)is a concept whose origins can

be traced back over 100 years.Professor Samuel Langley, theSecretary of the SmithsonianInstitution in Washington DC, begana serious scientific study of the issuesrelating to heavier than air flyingmachines in 1886 and between 1890and 1896, he built a number ofexperimental, steam powered airvehicles, which he called“aerodromes”. The culmination ofhis work was Aerodrome Number5. This had two wings, each with aspan of 4.2 m, arranged in tandemand it had a mass of 11 kg, includingthe mass of the 0.75 kW steamengine. On the 6th of May 1896,following a catapult launch, Number5 covered a distance of over 1 km,at a height of 35 m and a speed ofover 20mph. The event waswitnessed, and photographed, byAlexander Graham Bell and it wasthe first sustained flight of an un-piloted, powered, stable, heavier-than-air machine of substantial size.

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Even before this ground breakingflight, visionaries (and cranks) were

proposing the use of radio signalsto guide vehicles and some withmilitary interests were proposing theconcept of aerial torpedoes. By thebeginning of WW1, Elmer Sperryhad demonstrated gyro-stabilizationin flight, paving the way for flight

By Professor Ian Poll OBE FREng FCGI FAIAA FRAeS

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However, these were unsuccessfullargely due to the primitive radiocontrol technology and were notpursued because the rapidlydeveloping manned aviation wascarrying all before it. Between thewars, the principal driver for UAVtechnology was the requirement forlow cost, but realistic, target practicefor anti-aircraf t gunners.Nevertheless, the key enablingtechnologies continued to bedeveloped for reasons that had verylittle to do with unmanned aviation.

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During WW2 the aerial torpedoconcept was used by Germany inthe form of the V1 “flying bomb”and many of the UAV enablingtechnologies received a terrificboost; notably propulsion,guidance, navigation, electronics andcomputation. Post WW2, in parallelwith the rapid development ofmanned aviation, it was recognizedthat the UAV could be used toextend military operationalcapability. UAVs began to beconsidered for reconnaissance,decoying, suppression of enemy airdefences (SEAD) and long range

control systems that did not rely onhuman senses, or skill, and whichcould be pre-programmed toeliminate the need for humanintervention. During WW1, therewere a number of experimentalaerial torpedo programmes.

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delivery of weapons (stand-offbombs). However, progress wasstill hampered by the lack ofmaturity of some of the keytechnologies. This was especially truein the areas of guidance andnavigation.

It is generally acknowledged thatthe UAV “came of age” during theVietnam conflict. This was the firsttime that UAVs were used in actionand a very large number of missionswere flown. UAVs were used togather images and electronic andcommunications intelligence. Theywere also used for SEAD. In the1980s, as a result of repeatedconflicts in the Middle East, Israel

and the internet have drivendevelopments in informationprocessing, imaging, simulation,encryption, and data management,analysis and compression. Arguably,the most significant development ofall has been the establishment of theglobal positioning system (GPS).

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From the beginning of aviation, thenavigation task has been performedby humans. The availability ofsecure GPS is revolutionizingnavigation and it allows thecomplete removal of the humanfrom the cockpit. Over the past onehundred years, there have been

became a major user and developerof UAV systems and theirassociated technologies.

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The past 20 years have seentremendous progress in theenabling technologies, largely thanksto growth in non-aerospacemarkets. The mobile phone boomhas driven communications, displayand energy storage technology. Thepersonal computer market hasdriven processing power and datastorage capacity to ever increasinglevels, whilst power consumption,size and cost have been dramaticallyreduced. The video games market

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tremendous developments inmilitary, manned aviation. However,in many ways, the potential ofaviation to deliver military benefitand advantage is severely limited bythe human in the cockpit. Airvehicles are subjected to very severebiological limitations. The humanputs clear limits on the size, speed,altitude, manoeuvrability, endurance,configuration, complexity andmethods of launch and recovery.When these limits are removed awhole new spectrum of operationalcapability is released. Added to thisis the fact that human life hasbecome a huge political issue.Military options can be constrainedby the potential cost in lives. In aworld where news travels in alldirections at the speed of light, eventhe loss of a single life can have amajor impact on public opinion.

With no humans in the cockpit, agreat many things change.

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After a century of manned militaryaviation, we have the opportunityto open a completely new line ofdevelopment for airborne systems.However, progress is beinginhibited by a number of pressingissues that need to be addressed andsolved quickly. Arguably, the mostserious problem is that ofairworthiness and certification.Military and civil regulations havebeen developed to cover mannedsystems and manned operations andthe regulators have not yet provideda framework that will allow UAVoperators to “file and fly” in alltypes of airspace. UAV systems thatcan only operate on ranges are of

no operational value. In technologyterms, there are serious gaps inpropulsion and actuationtechnology for small vehicles. UAVsin the Tactical Class offer thegreatest number of new operationalopportunities, but without robustand reliable sub-systems thepotential cannot be released.

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Beyond these teething problems,the principal challenge is thedevelopment of new concepts ofoperation. At this early evolutionarystage, the operational emphasis is onintelligence gathering, mirroringalmost perfectly the initial stages inthe development of mannedaircraft. However, as awareness ofthe potential grows so will thedemand for other capability. Atpresent, unmanned systems arebeing used to complement andaugment legacy manned systems,whose service lives are measured indecades and which are sometimesill-suited to the tasks that they arerequired to perform. UAVs offermore capability, less risk, lower cost,shorter service lives and faster andmore frequent upgrades. Thismeans that UAV equipment can bematched to the existing threats and,with greater flexibility than mannedsystems, be able to adapt morereadily to changes in the nature ofthe threats or to completely newthreats.

Whole military strategies can bebuilt around new UAV systemcapability, in much the same way ashappened with manned aircraft inthe last century and, although theremay be some reluctance to acceptthe view that UAV systems willrevolutionize military thinking in the21st century, it can be argued thatmanned aircraft systems are now inthe same position as battleshipswere in the early years of the 20th

century and we know whathappened to them! Singapore Technologies Aerospace Copyright*��+��,�(��

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By Wing Commander Mike Strong, RAF, EUROCONTROL Military Unit

Integrating UAVs WithOther Airspace Users

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The concept of an aircraft without a pilot in the cockpit mixing with other airspaceusers is an anathema to many people and a challenge to regulators. Nevertheless,this is exactly what EUROCONTROL is seeking to address with regard to UAVs.

EUROCONTROL is the European organization for the safety of air navigation.Although predominantly civil-staffed, it includes a Military Unit, is based in Brussels,comprises 35 member states and is responsible inter alia for developing a seamless,pan-European air traffic management (ATM) system.

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At present, most military UAVs inEurope are restricted to airspacethat is segregated for the purposefrom other aircraft or they areflown over the sea using specialarrangements. Where operations arepermitted outside segregatedairspace, numerous restrictions toensure the safety of other airspaceusers normally apply. This isextremely limiting. To exploit fullythe unique operational capabilitiesof current and future UAVplatforms and to undertake thetraining necessary for the safeconduct of UAV operations ,European military authoritiesrequire UAVs to be able to accessall classes of airspace and to be ableto operate across national borders.

This need was articulated duringthe autumn 2003 session of theEuropean Air Chief Conference,which suggested an investigationshould be made into the possibleharmonization of ATM proceduresfor the use of military UAVs outsidesegregated airspace in peacetime.EUROCONTROL was invited toundertake the work requiredbecause of its pre-eminence inATM in Europe and the task wasthen assigned to the Military Unitwithin the Agency. The work itself,

recognized this and were,accordingly, extremely supportive.

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The TF followed three basicprinciples. Firstly, UAV operationsshould not increase the risk to otherairspace users; secondly, ATMprocedures should mirror thoseapplicable to manned aircraft; andthirdly, the provision of air trafficser vices to UAVs should betransparent to ATC controllers. TheTF also sought to be innovative bynot accepting any constraintimposed by limitations in currentUAV capability. Instead, it took theview that technical issues weresomething for industry to address.Notwithstanding, the TF paidparticular attention to collisionavoidance, sense and avoid, andseparation minima, since these areareas of understandable concern toother airspace users.

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The TF initially identified 26 draftEUROCONTROL specifications,covering areas such as:

� Categorization of UAVoperations.

� Mode of operation.� Flight rules.

to develop EUROCONTROLspecifications for the use ofmilitary UAVs as Operational AirTraffic (OAT) outside segregatedairspace, was undertaken by aspecially formed task force (theUAV-OAT TF) comprising militaryand civilian members withexperience in the ATM practicalitiesof UAV operations. NATO alsoparticipated.

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Early on, the TF opted forSpecif ications as the mostappropriate category from theEUROCONTROL regulatory andadvisory framework, rather thanRules or Guidelines. Specifications hadvoluntary status; individual stateswould therefore be free to decidewhether or not to incorporate theEUROCONTROL specificationsinto their own national regulations.

The TF sought to avoidreinventing the wheel by identifyingbest practice and building uponexisting material. That said, inreality, there were no extant nationalprocedures just waiting to beadopted and adapted forimplementation throughoutEurope. Instead, the TF had to startwith something very close to aclean sheet of paper. Nations

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� Separation from otherairspace users.

� Sense and avoid.� Separation minima.� Airfield operations.� Emergency procedures.� Interface with ATC.� Equipment requirements.

These were then subjected to asafety assurance process by anexternal contractor, intended tosupport the argument that, byapplication of the draftspecif ications , military UAVOAT operations in non-segregated airspace will beacceptably safe. The approachtaken was to demonstrate thatthe risks to other airspace usersfrom UAV operations would beno greater than for mannedmilitary OAT in non-segregatedairspace and would be reducedas far as reasonably possible.Recommendations arising from thisprocess were then incorporatedinto the specification document,resulting in an increase in thenumber of specifications to 33.

The specifications are high-level,generic and standalone, so they canbe understood without supportingdetail and thereby be moreamenable to incorporation intonational regulations. For example,

they envisage a primary mode ofoperation that entails oversight bya pilot-in-command and a back-upmode that enables a UAV to revertto autonomous flight in the eventof loss of data-link. A similarhierarchy is followed with regard toseparation provision and collisionavoidance. Thus, where ATC is notavailable to separate a UAV from

service provided to UAVs shouldaccord with that provided tomanned aircraft, and UAVs shouldcarry similar equipment for flight,navigation and communication asrequired for manned aircraft whenflying VFR and IFR except for Anti-Collision Avoidance System, whichis currently predicated on having apilot in the cockpit.

In short, if UAVs requireintegration with other airspace users,they must fit in with those otherusers and with current procedures,rather than existing ATM having toadjust to accommodate UAVs.

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The draft specifications are presentlybeing progressed through theEUROCONTROL consultativeand approval process, with the aimof presenting them to theProvisional Council (aEUROCONTROL governingbody) by the end of 2006. The TFhas maintained links with otheragencies, helped by the fact that mostTF members were at the heart oftheir own nations’ policy-making onUAVs. In addition, the TFChairman participates in the NATOUAV FINAS (Flight in Non-Segregated Airspace) MilitaryWorking Group, which is likely toadopt the EUROCONTROLspecifications for the ATM aspectof its work.

There is no doubting the collectivewish for a successful outcome tothe work of the UAV-OAT TF.However, because this is focussedon ATM, it is just one part of thebigger jig-saw that must fit togetherbefore militar y UAVs will beallowed to fly routinely outsidesegregated airspace. Other agenciesworking on airworthiness, security,operator training and other suchaspects must all perforce play theirpart.

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other airspace users, the pilot-in-command will assume thisresponsibility using availablesurveillance information andtechnical assistance in the form ofa sense-and-avoid system. Thelatter will also initiate last-ditchautonomous collision avoidanceshould circumstances warrant.

Other specifications are even morepragmatic. Thus, the air traffic

SAAB Aerosystems Copyright


Exploiting a New High GroundExploiting a New High GroundUsing the Airspace Above Flight Level 650

By Colonel (S) Dan Lewandowski, USA A, JAPCC

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In some circles, it’s called ‘Near Space’. Others call it ‘Very High Altitude’.Whatever you call it, the airspace from 65,000 feet to 325,000 feetAMSL (20 to 100 km) is a part of the Earth’s atmosphere that almostno one uses. With technological advances, particularly in the area ofUnmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), exploitation of the Stratosphereand Mesosphere is now becoming affordable and a real possibility formilitary operations.

Why So High?

The desire to go above flight level 650 (above 20 km) is driven bysecurity, weather avoidance, cost, and persistence. Security at such highflight levels is increased because of the almost non-existence of threatweapons that can operate at such high altitudes. Security is furtherenhanced by the fact that from such a height, most adversaries won’teven know the collection platform is in the area. As for weather, oncethe UAS passes through the Troposphere, it is above all normal weatherconsiderations. Temperatures are, relatively speaking, rather constant.The new environmental consideration is that of exposure to the Sun’sradiation. This is not difficult or costly to deal with, especially when nohuman is in the vehicle. Very high altitude UAS are expected to havethe additional advantage of being much less expensive when comparedto satellites.

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Persistence is the single mostimportant benefit of operating inthe Stratosphere. A commanderdesires persistence so that he or shecan maximize situational awareness,collect information and increaseknowledge. As an example, imaginethe power of being able to trackevery moving ground vehicle in atheatre from a single very highaltitude UAS utilizing a groundmoving target indicator radar.Combine that radar with changedetection software and computercomputation capabilities that canprovide speed of vehicles,groupings of vehicles and trackingof individual high visibility vehicles,then a single asset can enableinformation dominance on thebattlefield.

Aircraft or satellites havenormally provided collectioncapabilities over the battlespace.The persistence of aircraft over alocation has been mostly limited bythe pilot. Due to long mean timesbetween mechanical failures, andthe development of air-to-airrefuelling, the ability of collection-type aircraft to stay on station has

greatly increased over time. Theseaircraft are now only limited by theendurance of the human in thecockpit. Satellites have the advantageof no over-flight restrictions whichenables collection over otherwisedenied airspace. And fromgeostationary orbit, satellites can‘stare’ at a location for years at atime. Satellites have their limitsthough. From geostationary orbitapproximately 22,240 statute miles

and flight path of the satellite overthe location being viewed. WithUAS advances, the limitation of thehuman is gone and the advantageof persistence remains for extendedperiods of time. The Euro Hawk,for example, is expected to have anendurance of 32 hours. Althoughnot at an altitude above 65,000 feet,this demonstrates the advancesalready made in high altitudepersistence. Going into theStratosphere is where Very HighAltitude platforms really couldearn their place in the militaryOrder of Battle. For example,Lockheed Martin is currentlydeveloping a test model HighAltitude Airship (HAA) that isscheduled for launch in 2011. Ifsuccessful, the HAA will remain inflight for 90 to 180 days, with a4,000 pound (1,800 kg) payload.

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The missions and capabilities ofUAS range from the smallest microsystems, weighing less than half ofone pound, to the large GlobalHawk that has a wingspan 1.3metres wider than an Airbus 320,and 6 feet wider than that of aBoeing 757. What this wide arrayof UAS lack though, is the abilityto go to the highest levels of flight.Only airships and vehicles equippedwith rocket-type engines can go toflight levels of 70,000 feet andhigher. The ‘explosion’ of UAScapabilities is fuelling efforts to goeven higher, to go regularly throughthe Tropopause and into theStratosphere. The hope is that VeryHigh Altitude UAS could one dayeven fly into the Mesosphere. Fromthese altitudes, the main missionsof UAS would be Intelligence,Surveillance & Reconnaissance(ISR) by an array of electro-optical,electronic emission, syntheticaperture, infra-red and weathersensors, and communication relayor broadcast.

Image courtesy of NASA

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(35,786 km) above the Earth’ssurface, it is difficult to see smallobjects, because the resolution ofvarious sensors is poor. Fromlower orbiting satellites, you getmuch better resolution, but the timeover target is reduced to 15 minutesor less, depending on the exact orbit

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Probably the most asked questionis why are we trying to use anAirship? Why not just make anaeroplane to fly that high, or asatellite to fly that low? The basicreason we can’t use aeroplanes isbecause we can’t get the lifting forceneeded. Given that below theTropopause, air density decreasesby half every 20,000 feet (6 km) andabove the Tropopause it decreasesby half every 15,000 feet (4.5 km),it is easy to see that over 90% ofthe Earth’s air mass is below 10 kmin altitude. When you reach analtitude of 75,000 feet, the surfacearea of the wing needs to be 16times larger than at sea level. At analtitude of 150,000 feet, the surfacearea would need to be over 500times greater, in order to achieve thesame lifting force. These numbersare just not possible for an aircraft.

Spacecraft have a minimumaltitude requirement or they areforced to re-enter the Earth’satmosphere. Once a satellite fallsbelow an altitude of 100 km(325,000 feet), the drag of theatmosphere is so great that thesatellite will return to Earth in amatter of a few days. Thus, puttingsatellites into this part of the

atmosphere is just not possible.Airships are the only viable optionwith today’s technology, but eventhey have their limitations. In theStratosphere and beyond, there aregenerally increasing temperatures asthe altitude increases and this causesproblems for electronics as well asthe expansion of gases. A lack ofair cooling capability due to thereduced air density is anotherlimitation. Finally, the problem offlying through weather and the jetstream, in order to get to the desiredaltitude, must be dealt with. Thereare challenges for the very highaltitude ‘High Ground’ but theyare not so great that they shouldprevent us from addressing them.

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The High Altitude Airship is oneglimpse into the future. With aninterior volume of about 5.2 millioncubic feet, it will be about 16 timeslarger than the Goodyear blimpand seems huge by today’sstandards. Mankind has built suchlarge airships in the past though;the Hindenburg was an amazing 7.1million cubic feet in volume. Ifsuccessful, this UAS could carrytraditional payloads such as sensorsand communications equipment.With a bit of innovation,exploitation of this new highground could also include the useof small directional mirrors, whichwould redirect lasers from groundstations onto targets at very greatdistances. Armed with solar panelson such an Airship, energy couldbe produced for years providingthe operational commander arobust persistent ISR andcommunication relay platform thatwould most likely reduce hisdemand for satellite and aircraftassets. Flight level 650 and beyondis ready for us to exploit.

Are we ready to make it happen?

Image courtesy of NASA

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Frequently, there are storiespublished that advocateunmanned aircraft systems

(UAS) as the way of the future.These stories espouse how muchcheaper and safer these unpiloteddrones are for conducting militarymissions over their mannedcounterparts. Most visionary andconceptional work focuses ontechnology. However, based onmy two-year experience as aPredator squadron commander,the success of these “unmanned”systems depends more on the menand women that provide theleadership, testing, training,operation, and maintenance ofthese systems, than the technologyitself.

The major focus on technologyand cost comes at the expense ofthese other factors that are at leastas important. The current emphasison issues such as computerprocessing speed, levels of UASautonomy, sensor technology, andcommunications architectures candiminish the importance of othercritical issues including the manningand organizational structurerequired to support and advance“unmanned” systems.

Technological innovation is onlyone part of the transformationprocess. Transformation involvesimprovements in the areas ofdoctrine, organization, training,materiel, logistics, personnel,

facilities and integration(DOTMLPFI). Some level oftransformation is necessary acrossall these areas to maximize themilitary advantage UAS represent.The focus of this article is ontransformation supported bypersonnel and organizationalchange.

In his work, Innovation and the Modern

Military: Winning the Next War,Stephen Rosen, backs the positionthat there are many importantdrivers and aspects to militaryinnovation. One of his manyconclusions is that it is not moneythat is the key to innovation buttalented military personnel.1 Moreimportantly, he concludes that a

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�� By Colonel Stephen P. Luxion, USA A, JAPCC


“failure to redirect human resourcesresulted in the abortion of severalpromising innovations”.2 Historyshows talented manpower is criticalto innovation. Our currentexperience with UAS demonstratessimilar results.

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Clearly, the integration of varioustechnologies is important to thedevelopment of UAS. Advances incomputing power, communicationsbandwidth, composite materialmanufacturing, sensor technologiesas well as numerous othertechnological developments allcombined to provide a militaryapplication in the Predator aircraft.

But, the Predator UAS was acomponent of the US Air Force foryears, with minimal operationalsuccess, until senior leadership sawthe potential and provided thevision and a way ahead.

Predator, from the beginning, hadthe endurance and sensor capabilitynecessary to provide commanderspersistent near real-time full-motion video of the battlespace.What was lacking was the abilityto do something quickly with theinformation Predator provided ontime sensitive and high-value targets.The vision was to have in one UAS,the means to find, fix, target, track,engage and assess targets.However, the implementation of

this vision met resistance until theUSAF made the decision to employmore aggressive fighter, attack,bomber and special operations’pilots with experience in weapons’employment. It was these officerstrained in the employment of air-to-ground weapons and large forcepackages that were able to fulfill thevision of senior officers.

Most military professionals haveheard the stories of how a laser wasadded to the reconnaissance pod to“buddy-guide” laser-guided bombsdelivered from other fighter aircraftonto targets. Also well known isthe fact that the Hellfire missile wasmodified for employment from thePredator and how radios were

General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Copyright

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added to provide communicationsbetween the Predator and otheraircraft in its vicinity. The integrationof all these new technologies intothe UAS was truly remarkable andtends to be the focus of many roadahead and visionary documentspushing the virtues of unmannedsystems. However, it was theefforts of experienced aircrews,maintainers, and weapons expertsthat were at least as important tothe successful integration oftechnology into the Predator andthe development of the concepts ofoperation and tactics, techniques,and procedures (TTP) that made itall work on the battlefield.

The new breed of Predator pilot,with their air-to-ground expertise,worked with engineers to developthe procedures, displays, andchecklists necessary for thesuccessful employment of weaponsfrom the aircraft. This was noeasy task. Developing reliableprocedures and displays that wouldwork, despite the distance betweenaircraft and pilot and the time delaycaused by satellite communications,was fraught with challenge.

Concurrently, Predator pilotswith forward air controller (FAC)expertise, advanced current close airsupport (CAS) TTP to integratethe Predator with other weapons’

systems. The Predator had provenits worth at finding targets, butmore was needed to effectivelyengage the targets. These pilotsdeveloped the procedures to safelyoperate UAS in the same airspaceas manned aircraft, in order toeffectively identify and engagetargets as a Hunter-Killer team.

Developing these procedures andtechnical solutions was simply not

enough; training and the fullintegration with manned aircraftwere also necessary. These Predatorexperts acquired the assetsnecessary to train manned aircraftpilots and Predator crews togetheron the procedures. They builtleadership confidence through thedevelopment and enforcement oftraining and performance standardsand convinced senior staff toallocate valuable resources such asrange airspace and manned tacticalassets for training and furtherdevelopment. Following the eventsof September 11, this initial cadreof innovative Predator aircrewsplayed an important role inconvincing wartime commandersto employ and to continue toimprove these new capabilities incombat when lives were at stake.

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Although the Predator capabilityhas been validated throughoperations in Afghanistan and Iraq,more must be done. Predator andGlobal Hawk assignments,historically, have been two to three-year assignments for pilots away

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1 Stephen Peter Rosen, Innovation and theModern Military: Winning the Next War,(Ithaca: Cornell Press, 1991), 252.

2 Ibid., 252-253.3 Ibid., 20.4 Ibid., 20-21.

from their primary weapon system.Following their UAS assignment,these experienced aircrew return totheir previous aircraft. The USAFhas now determined that this is notsufficient for the long-termdevelopment of unmannedsystems. It is now in the process ofimplementing the organizationalchanges that Rosen documented asnecessary for successful innovation.The USAF has committed to thedevelopment of a career path foryoung officers to learn and practisethe new ways of unmanned aerialwarfare.3 Rosen states that suchchanges are “necessary to ensurethat the new skills are not relegatedto professional oblivion”.4 Byproviding a UAS career path, theUSAF will ensure a pool ofunmanned aircraft experts to workall levels and aspects of UASdevelopment are maintained.

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The ability of pilots to conductoperations remotely from halfwayaround the world is truly atechnological marvel. Still, thesesystems and the TTP to employthem are being developed, tested,and flown by skilled airmen.Discussions of drones operatingautonomously throughout theworld, without a man-in-the-loop,

are premature. Even if this becomestechnically feasible, it is unlikelythat it will be politically acceptableto remove the human from thecommand and control of themission. Although it is likely thattechnology will make pilots’ stickand rudder skills less important,their skills as professional aviators,accompanied by their situation

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awareness, will remain critical.UAS, even those with anautonomous capability, will stillrequire a pilot to be responsible forthe aircraft or flight of multipleaircraft, the implementation of rulesof engagement and overall missionmanagement. More importantly,UAS operations and the continuedinnovation required needs more

than technological solutions.Doctrine, organization, the trainingof highly proficient aircrew/operators, materiel, logistics and theintegration with other jointsystems will all play an importantrole. Some may ask what thenmakes UAS so different thanmanned systems.

Very little and that is the point!

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Sir, Congratulations on your recentappointment as Chief of the AirStaff, Royal Air Force. On takingup this post, what do you see asthe key challenges facing theService and what are your keypriorities?

I see myself building on thefoundations set by Sir Jock Stirrupand his predecessors. We’ve madeexcellent progress towardsgenerating an agile and adaptable

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force structure, more suited totoday’s security environment. Theshift from a Cold War orientatedMain Operating Base culture hasnot been easy but I genuinelybelieve that we now have a balancedAir Force, which is structured andorientated towards expeditionaryoperations. Agility is at the heartof our capability. Our aim is toachieve rapid effect across thebattlespace, but we also need to beable to adapt swiftly to changes in

the overall security environment.We need to keep pace with thatchange, intellectually anddoctrinally, and our equipmentneeds to have the embeddedflexibility to be capable of adaptingto new demands. As aconsequence, single role platformswill, I believe, become increasinglysomething of the past; from both afinancial and operationalperspective, multi-role must be theway forward. We must also makesure that we have the right peopleto support the frontline and ensurethat they are just as agile andadaptable as our equipment.

In terms of priorities, furtherdevelopment of our expeditionarycapability must lie at the top of thelist, especially in the areas ofCommand and Control (C2) andexpeditionary logistics. Secondly,I want to reduce operating costs.HQs need to be smaller and moreagile and fit more closely with thereduced size of our frontline; thisis already underway with thecollocation of HQ StrikeCommand and HQ Personnel andTraining Command. But we alsohave to streamline our processes.Here I believe we can draw on thelessons from operations where wehave small, relatively flat, HQstructures in which responsibilityis genuinely delegated; we need totranslate that experience into ourpeacetime HQs, rigorouslyshedding tasks that are no longerrelevant. On the equipment front,Typhoon has to be our mainequipment priority; it will be thebackbone of our fast jet force forthe future. We also need to developour UAV and UCAV capability,both of which offer significantcapabilities for the future. That said,


Conducted by Wing Commander Richard Duance, GBR A,and Wing Commander Pete York, GBR A, of the JAPCC.

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we need to gain a betterunderstanding of how theseplatforms can contribute mosteffectively, and the associated costs.I also believe greater priorityshould be given to integrated air-land operations. Op DESERTSTORM and Op ALLIEDFORCE involved distinct aircampaigns followed by discreteland campaigns. On the otherhand, Op ENDURINGFREEDOM and Op IRAQIFREEDOM (OIF) demonstratedthe need for, and value of, trulyintegrated operations, with the AirComponent providing significantsupport to the Land Component.This must continue in the future.To support that, more realistictraining is required, particularlythrough the use of synthetics anddistributed mission training. Thiswill help to reduce costs but, moreimportantly, as we move into anincreasingly networkedenvironment, it will be the onlyway to deliver effective, joined-uptraining.

Would you care to comment at thisstage on the Lessons Learnt fromIraq and Afghanistan?

Yes, I think one of the main lessonswe have learnt is the need to be ableto respond quickly tounpredictable events, often overstrategic distances. Balanced forces,held at high readiness, with robuststrategic mobility and appropriateC2, are essential for today’s securityenvironment. As an example,during Op TELIC we established8 Forward Operating Bases andassociated C2 – in 7 differentcountries – in just 6 weeks; this wasa significant achievement.Additionally, Iraq and Afghanistanhave both emphasised the complex,ambiguous and non-linear natureof the modern battlespace, in whichasymmetric threats feature heavilyand engagement opportunities maybe brief and unpredictable. Speed,

therefore, will be of the essence.The other thing we have seen veryclearly in Iraq and Afghanistan isthat the military - during manyphases of an operation – will beplaying a supporting role.Although there may be periods ofhigh intensity warfare, OtherGovernment Departments andNon-Governmental Organisationswill have a vital role to play fromthe very start, not least in deliveringhumanitarian relief andreconstruction. This makes lifemore complex and increases theneed for a fully integratedcampaign plan, which drawstogether all the levers ofgovernment. The task is made allthe more challenging when theefforts of other Coalition partnershave to be integrated into the plan.

In that respect, do you see a needto shift away from combat aircraftlike Typhoon more towardssupport platforms like SupportHelicopters (SH) and StrategicAir Transport (AT)?

No, I don’t. I see maintaining acoherent force structure, which

places appropriate emphasis onenabling capabilities – such as ATand SH - as the most importanttask. Both of these capabilities arebeing fully utilised in currentoperations, but C2 and ISTAR arealso absolutely fundamental to theway we conduct business. It wouldbe too easy – and convenient – toreshape our force structure to suitthe environments we are dealingwith today in Iraq and Afghanistan,to the detriment of being able tocope with the unpredictable. Moreto the point, our fast-jets – likeTornado GR4 and Harrier GR7 –are playing a vital role in deliveringCAS and ISR to Coalition groundforces. It’s worth noting thatduring OIF, 80% of the air effortwent to the Land Component andI see this trend continuing in thefuture. The other significant lessonto come out of operations in Iraqand Afghanistan is the need for AirDominance. The Coalition’scomplete control of the airprovided freedom of manoeuvreand action to each of theComponents; this allowed theCoalition to use relatively lightground forces – because firepower


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was available from the air – andmeant that key enabling capabilities,such as tankers, ISTAR and C2platforms, could operate wellforward in order to maximize theireffectiveness. Another area thatrequires further investment is ourability to generate and maintain ashared picture of the battlespace;without that we will not be able toeffectively conduct collaborativeplanning and deliver truly jointeffects. At the moment, we still relytoo much on the proceduralseparation of activities and forces –in time and space – in order toprevent fratricide.

Recent operations haveconfirmed the need for precision.But what we lack is persistence overthe battlespace – both in terms ofISTAR and a striking capability.This is where UAV and UCAV arelikely to play a crucial role,particularly as more sophisticatedweapons - like directed energyweapons - become available. Thiswill allow platforms to remain

airborne for many hours or evendays without rearming. Having apersistent ISTAR and strikingcapability offers significantopportunities for increasing thespeed and tempo of operations and,of course, our ability to engagesmall, fleeting targets. But goingback to your original question, Ifirmly believe that we must remainpostured for the unexpected, whichmeans maintaining a coherent and

balanced force structure, includinghigh-end capabilities like Typhoon.

Surely a challenge for today is howwe get the right capabilities to thefront-line, on time and withinbudget. What is the RAF doingto make sure this occurs?

You are absolutely correct. Centralto achieving this objective is thedevelopment of an agile



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procurement process, which is ableto keep pace with changes in theoperational environment and,importantly, exploit the rapidadvances in technology that we seetoday. The recent announcementof the UK’s Defence IndustrialStrategy, which proposes a closerpartnership between the MOD andIndustry, will, I hope, be one ofthe mechanisms for delivering thisagility. If you look back over thepast 15 years, the UK’s ArmedForces have been committed almostcontinuously on operations, andwe owe it to our servicemen andwomen to provide them with thebest possible capability from theresources of the Defence Budget.A better partnership will allowindustry to focus their resources,especially in areas such as Researchand Development, and create anenvironment where industry ismuch more involved in thethrough-life support of platforms.Incorporating the potential forgrowth and incremental capabilityenhancements need to be keyfeatures of this strategy.

On the military front, we needto be a lot more rigorous in settingrequirements – we need to saywhat we need, rather than what wewould like. Regrettably,technology is seductive, and we areall prone to asking for the moon!!We also need to make more use ofexperimentation and, where

appropriate, the early introductionof possibly immature technologywhich, in the hands of the warfighter, can be incrementallydeveloped. The introduction ofPredator by the USAF is a classicexample of how this can work andthe enormous benefits that result,both in delivering an earlyoperational capability and steeringfuture development.

The NATO Response Force(NRF) is one of the drivers forNATO’s military transformation.In the last edition of the JAPCCJournal, Lt Gen Gaviard, Chief ofAir Defence and Air Operations,French Air Force suggested thatnational air components shouldincreasingly take responsibility forproviding the complete ACC, airforces and support. What is yourview?

I can understand why Gen Gaviardtakes that view. From both atraining and execution perspective,drawing from one nation is thesimplest solution. That said, I thinkit’s probably a bit of a tall order toexpect a single nation to take on thecomplete task, especially with thenumber of other commitments weface. At the moment, the US, UKand France are probably the onlynations that have the completerange of capabilities required tofulfil this role singly. I believe,therefore, that a more likely optioncould be, perhaps, 2 or 3 nationsin conjunction with NATO,getting together to fill a particularNRF period – or back-to-backperiods - with one leading as theframework nation. This workedwell for NRF 5 and 6, and providesa useful framework to improveinteroperability and burden share.

And f inally, a very importantquestion. If they meet in thecompetition, do you thinkEngland will beat Germany in theWorld Cup?

I’m sure it will be a highlycompetitive match!

Sir, thank you for your time.



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By Yair Dubester – Israel Aircraft Industries(IAI)/MALAT General ManagerIdo Pickel (IAF Capt. Res.) – IAI/MALAT UAV Operator

This article presents a brief overview of the Israeli experience in thedomain of Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV) based on numerous operationalchallenges from 1973 to the present day. The various UAV solutions,which were conceived over the years, are presented below detailing theoperational requirements, technologies and design principles used.

Over these 33 years, we have seen an evolution from simple, proof-of-concept Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) to a multiplicity of advanced,fully operational UAV systems responding to the demands of practicallyall military forces and echelons. The 1973 Yom Kippur War was theimpetus for raising the operational level of the UAV by incorporatingreal-time video assets capable of tracking mobile SAM batteries inthreatened areas. The R&D matured even further resulting in the “Scout”UAV system which first saw operational use with the Israeli forces duringthe “Peace for Galilee” campaign in the early 1980’s. Since then, theoperational mission use of UAV has only intensified with a continuousand significant increase in flight hours around the world.

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The Scout UAV were used with unparalleled success during the 1982 “Peace for Galilee”campaign. The strikes against Syrian missile batteries in the Bekaa Valley are excellentexamples of effective UAV use in combat, both in a SEAD scenario and as closesupport to ground forces. The UAVs were used to detect, identify, and performtarget acquisition for strike aircraft followed by immediate real-time BDA.

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The results were impressive. Mostof the SAM batteries in the BekaaValley were destroyed, and a largenumber of fighters defending theSAMs shot down. Israel hadachieved air supremacy of theregion in but a single afternoon.

The Scout UAV was removedfrom service in 2004 after almost25 years of successful operations.During that period this tacticalUAV system saw numerousupgrades, improvements andadaptations, in order to respondto continuously sophisticatedoperational requirements.

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A direct consequence of thesuccessful UAV operation in the1982 campaign supporting SEADoperations was the US Navy’sinterest in adapting the Israeli UAVto their requirements. The result ofthis effort was the highly successfuland still operational (with the USMarines) Pioneer UAV, a directderivative of the Scout. ThePioneer UAV was originally adaptedfor Navy operations byimplementing point rocket launchand point recovery by means of anet set up on the ship’s deck. SeveralPioneer systems saw extensive useduring the 1991 “Desert Storm”campaign in Iraq, once againproving its capabilities and reliability

and dedicated capabilities forspecific missions on the edge ofthat envelope. To state just a fewexamples: the ability to operate

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Now that the tactical UAVs hadproven themselves worthy at thedivision level and higher, the needarose towards providing the UAVasset to all forces. Independent real-time ISR capability was now tocome to the lower echelons such asthe brigade, company or SpecialForces. This was especially neededfor missions such as urban warfareand homeland security whichbecame ever more common.

This requirement generated thedevelopment of two new“families” of UAVs , the smallTactical UAV (TUAV) and the miniUAV. In fact, this family approachwas chosen in order to provide each

with great success. In accordancewith the US UAV Roadmap,operation of the Pioneer with theUS Marines is planned to extend upto 2015.

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After proving itself operationally inSEAD, Targeting and general ISRmissions, the evolving requirementsled to the gradual fielding of UAVsystems with enlarged operationalenvelopes. That meant growing notonly from a mission perspective,from which also evolved newpayloads and concepts ofoperation, but also from otherperspectives, such as flightperformance, around-the-clock/all-weather operational availability

around-the-clock without landingand with combined Colour ElectroOptical/Infra Red payloads, in

adverse weather conditions withSynthetic Aperture Radar/GroundMoving Target Indicator payloads,

and to perform SIGINT missions,such as ELINT and COMINT. Theincrease in requirements andmissions led to the fielding of theeven larger systems, e.g. Hunter,Searcher and Ranger UAV systems.

UAV level with its own optimalsolution while maintainingmaximum commonality andinteroperability within the varioussystems with a minimum logisticseffort. The most important lessonlearned over the years regardingTUAV was the importance ofpinpoint landing in any terrain anda parafoil for controlled landing.The parafoil was tested along withthe parachute and was selected dueto its ability to allow the TUAV toland safely at a predefined point.The I-View Small TUAV wasdesigned according to that lesson.The small TUAV offers tacticalintelligence at the battalion andbrigade levels. The focus here is tooffer a low-footprint, all weather/all terrain operating capability with

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dedicated functions, such aspinpoint automatic recovery.

When analyzing the requirementsfor optimized over-the-hillobser vation and all terrainoperation, the most importantrequirement is a 360° day or nightunder the belly payload installation,in order to have a steady, with nolimits, real time ISR image at alltimes. The other requirement is toprotect the payload in rough terrainby allowing the Mini UAV to landon its back. The Bird-Eye MiniUAV offers a modular solution fortactical intelligence gathering at thebattalion, company and SpecialForces levels. It enables offsetobservation patterns for maximumoperating force flexibility.

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Alternatively, the demand arose forUAV capable of longer flightscapable of carrying multiple sensorsat extended range. For example,Maritime Patrol missions requireheavier payloads, greater electricalpower capacity, higher flightaltitude, longer endurance andgreater system reliability. Therequired system should include aplatform, which will be the best“Truck” to carry several sensorssimultaneously, that are not sensitiveto electromagnetic interference(EMI) and have full interoperability.

This concept was implemented inthe Eagle/Heron UAV that wasconceived as a multi-payload, multi-mission UAV. The classical twin-boom design enabled the re-positioning of multiple andseparately placed antennas awayfrom the engine for minimal or noEMI. The retractable landing gearswere put inside the booms freeingup considerable space for variouspayloads in or under the fuselage.Accordingly, the Navy requirementfor offshore maritime ISR gatheringresulted in the Advanced Ship

Control Station that enables directsystem operation from the ship firecontrol centre. Once a de-icingsystem was integrated on the“Eagle/Heron” the operationalenvelope was enlarged even furtherto include flights in icing conditions.

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The use and application of UAV isspreading throughout the world,mainly on military missions. Basedon IAI’s experience this includes 27different customers and over270,000 flight hours. The generaldirection of development has beenbased on integrating maturingtechnologies with continuouslyevolving user requirements.

operational outcome for eachUAV operator. Nevertheless, anAir Traffic qualification isrequired.

� A “UAV Family” approachshould be adopted in order tooffer each level of operationwith its optimal solution, at thesame time maintainingmaximum commonality andinteroperability.

� For short-term operationalrequirements or when a fastresponse is needed, UAV serviceslike System Lease or Power bythe Hour should be offered forall UAV platform sizes andpayloads.

� The basics of effective ISRcollection are similar for large,as well as small, UAV platforms.

� The Safety level of UAV shouldmeet and even exceed GeneralAviation safety levels.

� Automatic Taxi, Take-Off andLanding, mission planning andexecution capabilities are criticalto enhance safety.

� Human Machine Interface andsystem operations tailored to thelevel of the enlisted soldier areessential. Simple training and aqualification process is achieved(not requiring certified aircraftpilots) with significant gains incost and with an optimized

� Integration of the UAVcapability into the C4I system isessential in order to link the“Sensor to the shooter” (oruser) in real time.

� All systems regardless of theirsize must meet all airworthinesscriteria in order to operate notonly in military airspace but alsoin civil airspace.

There should be two principles forAirspace management. Flying to andfrom the mission area should bemonitored on general aviation flightpaths after all means of ensuringsafety, such as IFF, have been taken.Flying in the mission area should bein a defined flight segment in aclosed military airspace.

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When thinking of the co-existenceof humans and unmanned combatrobots furnished with technologiessuch as artificial intelligence,machine learning and emergentbehaviours, our Hollywood-movie-conditioned minds are likelyto dwell on visions ofuncontrollable, super-intelligentkilling machines, turning againsttheir human creators. With thismental picture in mind, thefollowing questions might be worthconsidering: What are currenttechnologies truly capable of ? Canhuman/machine co-agency be achieved?Would it be a concept to benefitNATO war fighters? While tryingto answer these questions, I wish tofocus on the airborne application,one of the most developingdomains in this field as thebattlefield deployment of so calledUninhabited Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)is commonplace today.

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The required automationtechnology for UAV flightmanagement, guidance, navigationand control has been rapidlydeveloped in the last decade. Thegeneral principle of integrating man

selection and demand value settingas the observable outcome ofplanning, decision-making, humandeliberation and anticipation of thelevel of mission management.Thereby, a hierarchically organised work

system is established, which may faildue to human or machine error, butit can be assumed that theautomation will never intentionallyact against the human operator’sgoals. No one would seriouslyspeak of such an automated UAVbeing smart or intelligent. The“intelligence” as a result of mental,i.e. cognitive performance, is solelythat provided by the humanoperator.

The inadequacy of this approachbecomes obvious when thesupervision of multiple vehicles bya single operator is required. Suchideas are currently being discussedin various NATO fora under the

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and such machinery is known assupervisory control. While the on-board automation typicallyperforms fast inner control loops(e.g. stabilization and trajectoryguidance), the ground-based humanoperator is responsible for mode

By Prof. Dr. Axel SchulteFlight Mechanics, Guidance & Control

Institute of System Dynamics and Flight Mechanics, Munich University of the German Armed Forces.

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term Manned-unmanned Teaming

(MUM-T). This is an approach tocontrol multiple UAVs and theirpayloads simultaneously from amanned aircraft, in order to increasethe effectiveness of the mannedsystem in performing its mission.However, while this conceptappears clever, there is a likelihoodof the human operator reachingcognitive overload whilst controllingmultiple platforms. Inevitably, thiswould lead to errors andperformance decline.

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How then do we bring in sufficientcognitive capacity to cope with thetask of supervising and steeringmore than one unmanned remoteplatform in a co-ordinated mannerwhile maintaining control of theparent (manned) aircraft? Theobvious answer is to increasemanpower by providing at least 1operator per UAV and placing himsomewhere central, e.g. in anAWACS. Task each operatorcentrally and make the output resultsattainable via “Internet” fordownload. This aspect of Network

Centric Warfare (NCW) is currentlybeing investigated in conjunctionwith multiple decentralized options,MUM-T being one of them,(Figure 1). The advancedtechnology involved in the NCWsolution is mainly in the field ofinformation technology whereasMUM-T highlights human factorsresearch and autonomous flightguidance issues, the latter being thefocus of this article.

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The question remains how to buildenough cognition into a MUM-Tsetup. From a purely technology-driven stance, the simple answercould probably be to make theUAVs autonomous! So, what arethe requirements of an appropriateautonomous system and what are itsdifferences to the aforementionedautomated system? Commonly, anautonomous system would beexpected to pursue the overall goalsof the considered mission, bereactive to perceived externalsituational dynamics, generate

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environment of a MUM scenario,incorporating teamwork iscompulsory, the basis of which isthe appreciation of the behaviourof teammates, humans andmachines alike. Establishing thecapability of teaming betweenhumans and machines will bereferred to as co-operative control, asopposed to the classical paradigmof supervisory control. Interactionshall no longer occur at the level ofmode selection and demand valuesettings but through the negotiationof requests and commitments at thetask level. This will be based upona common current situationalunderstanding by both humans andmachines. Although the finaldecision authority (e.g. for weapondeployment) stays with the humanoperating element, there will beestablished a peer team of thehuman and several artificial cognitive

units on-board each UAV and anintelligent operator assistant system on-board the manned aircraft (seeFigure 2 for the architecture).Therefore, various machinecapabilities have to beimplemented, for instance:

� Mission accomplishment toautonomously comply with themission objective.

� Operator assistance to direct thehuman’s attention, by technicalmeans, to the most urgent taskand to balance his workloadwhenever demanded by thesituation.

� Human-machine and machine-machine co-operation in order to

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solutions by means of anticipation,deliberation and planning andexecute them without humanintervention; in short to be anartificial cognitive system. But, what usemight such a system be, performingcompletely detached from humaninput? Imagine a member of apurely human team who isunapproachable to his teammatesand you have the answer!Obviously, making the UAVsautonomous in this limited sense isnot the solution!

In order to embed the UAVs intothe highly interactive work


achieve common top-levelgoals, such as team building andthe co-ordinated pursuit of acommon mission objective.

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In order to implement suchfunctionalities there are severalapproaches available. Artificialintelligence, expert systems, softcomputing, machine learning andgenetic algorithms are just a few up-to-date keywords, predominantlydenoting methodological approachesto process knowledge. Most arepoor from an architecturalviewpoint. The theory of agentsoffers such a conceptualperspective, though mostly leavingout the method aspect. Onepromising approach combiningboth has been developed at theBundeswehr University located inMunich, the so-called Cognitive

Process (CP). The CP comprises alayered architecture of capabilities,all of which are structuredaccording to the CP blueprint ofthe sub-processes, namely, situationgathering and interpretation, goaldetermination and planning andplan execution (see Figure 3). It isstrictly structured along the line of aknowledge-based architecture, separatingan application-independent inference(i.e. processing) engine from the

explicit, central representation ofstatic a-priori knowledge anddynamic situational knowledge.The a-priori knowledge will beimplemented by a knowledgeengineer on the abstract level of socalled mental notions, whereby themodelling of e.g. goals to bepursued or action alternatives andtheir related behaviour will bepossible.

On the basis of the CP, anengineering framework forimplementing artificial cognitiveunits in an efficient manner has beendeveloped, the so-called Cognitive

System Architecture (COSA). On thebasis of the rule-based architecture

Soar (State Operator and Result), anobject-oriented layer has beendesigned with Cognitive Programming

Language (CPL). Currently, furtherwork is planned to advance thesystem for future operation onembedded real-time computingplatforms.

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Researchers at the BundeswehrUniversity have been working onco-operative automationtechnology in the field of aircraftguidance for almost 20 years. Earlyapproaches were on knowledge-based systems assisting airline pilotsin IFR flight. The Cockpit Assistant

System (CASSY) was successfullyflight tested in 1994; it was the firstprototype of its kind. The Crew

Assistant Military Aircraft (CAMA)

followed in the late 1990s,incorporating technology capableof autonomously performingmission tasks (e.g. tactical situationanalysis, tactical re-planning) on thebasis of goal-oriented behaviours,while keeping up a situation adapteddialogue with the pilot, in order tobalance his workload. More recentwork focuses on the co-agency ofautonomously co-operatingUnmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles(UCAVs) in a Suppression of

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Enemy Air Defence (SEAD)scenario. The scope of this researchis on the co-ordination of machineagents, i.e. the UCAVs, on the basisof goal-driven dialoguesnegotiating for task allocation.Upcoming activities will coveradaptive automation, to provideintelligent crew assistance in militaryhelicopter guidance and manned-

unmanned teaming for airborne armymissions, both of which involvetechnologies of cognitive automationand human-machine as well asmachine-machine co-operation andco-agency. The technologies will befield tested on the BundeswehrUniversity UAV demonstratorplatforms, currently underconstruction.

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The United States currentlyhas around 250 UnmannedAerial Vehicles (UAVs)/

Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles(UCAVs) in service. By 2015, thatnumber will rise to 1,400 excludingthe smaller types. Before 2011, theUS also plans to spend US$13Billion1 developing unmanned aerialsystem technology. From thesefigures alone, we could concludethat the days of the manned aircraft,both fixed and rotary wing, arenumbered. However, we shouldnot forget the number and varietyof manned aircraft currently in use,which yet have extensive flying livesremaining. Neither should weignore the fact that much moremoney than that stated above isbeing invested in a variety of majormanned aircraft programmes,some of which will be in servicefor the next 25-35 years. Thedemise of the pilot, therefore, maynot be such an imminent issue. Inthis article I will investigate thisdiscussion by examining some of

the pros and cons of unmannedaerial systems in the militarycontext with a view to predictingthe likely future development ofthis technology.

systems. While a pilot may need tofly his aircraft for a minimum of150 hours per year to remain current,an unmanned aerial system (UAS)can remain stored in its hangar formost of that time, with the vastmajority of UAS controller trainingconducted on flight simulators.Furthermore, UAS can be designedto operate in extreme conditions;flight envelopes can be stretchedwithout risk to human life and UAScan be sent to places where it wouldbe too dangerous to send a live crew.This is particularly advantageous incombat zones and for intelligencegathering. Yet, although UAS havebeen widely used since the VietnamWar, they have all too often beenquickly put aside. Why is this?

Firstly, many UAS currently inservice are little more thanconventional aircraft without apilot. Although some UAS aremaking possible missions that werenever considered before1 e.g. verylong and dangerous Intelligence,

There are, of course, numerousadvantages in operating without thepilot. Flight endurance is no longerlimited by the capabilities of thehuman being and weight andvolume savings accrue from theomission of crew related support

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Surveillance and Reconnaissance(ISR) flights over unfriendlyterrain, or attack missions againstheavily defended enemy assets intowhich it would be too dangerousto risk a manned aircraft, noUCAV currently in developmentor design is offering capabilitiesthat a conventional aircraft or anti-aircraft SAM or air-to-air missilecannot match. In short, UAS haveyet to bring any new capabilitiesto the Air Commander.

Secondly, UAS were touted as amuch cheaper alternative topiloted aircraft. Instead, R&Dcosts, IT development limitationsand technical advances havebrought with them costs, whichare as high, if not higher, than thecosts of operating conventionalaircraft.

Thirdly, experience with UAShas shown an unwelcometendency of increased levels ofoperational failure, much of itassociated to technical andcontroller error mishaps2. Suchsortie loss, failure and UASattrition rates may be acceptablefor small and inexpensive tacticalsystems but this is not so for thebigger, more complex and costlymodels. Training controllers tooperate UAS, including missioncontrol systems, is more complexand expensive than envisioned. Inaddition, parallel advances in flightsimulator technology and theirresultant economies in pilottraining plus a very real needregularly to integrate UAS sortieswith manned aircraft missions inbusy airspace, have soaked upmuch of the expected financialsavings from omitting pilots fromthe cockpit. Finally, there arepolitical difficulties. Less wealthycountries cannot afford the R &D costs associated with developingUAS, nor can they afford to buythe tested technology. However,a wealthy nation may be able to

absorb the cost of an UAV crashbut other countries could perhapsmore readily face the political costof the loss of a pilot than theperceived waste of money incrashing a valuable unmannedvehicle.

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We must not forget that UAS arestill in their infancy and theirgrowth rate is much faster than isthe case for manned aircraft, so afar brighter future is probablywithin reach. However, usersshould not sit and wait for trulyreliable UAS that can simplyduplicate what manned aircraft cando now. Already, accumulatedexperience with UAS has shownthat there is no magical economicadvantage in retiring currentaircraft just because an UAS canperform the same mission with thesame results. UAS need to becomemuch better in every singlerespect.

Engineers have long complainedthat the human body is limitingthe performance of aircraft. UAVdevelopment presents anopportunity to explore newmaterials and much strongerstructures that can withstand

1 US Dept. of Defence, Office of the Secretary ofDefense, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap2005 – 2030, July 2005, Washington DC.

2 US DAB Study, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles andUninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicles, February2004, Washington DC.

3 As demonstrated by many research programs, suchas HIMAT, X-29, X-31.

higher loads or extremetemperatures. New engines can bedeveloped that are conceived tooperate for days in the mostdemanding ambient conditions, ascan more advanced aircraft systemsand new sets of control laws thatallow UAVs to operate in a muchdifferent way to conventionalaircraft3. It is conceivable thatfuture UAVs will be able tooutperform every “traditional”aircraft or missile in combat,facing perhaps a threat only fromdirected energy weapons.

In summary, promoting the UASrevolution to achieve economiessimply by eliminating humancockpits does not seem a soundapproach. In order to achieve orat least to explore the limits andthe viability of a realistic futureUAS concept, there is a need forvision, a willingness to take riskand to invest.

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The Italian Air Force (IAF)currently has 4 RQ-1A

Predator UAVs in service. Theywere bought from GeneralAtomics Aeronautical Systems (GA-ASI) and assembled by METEOR(Italy). The system was deployedin Tallil (Iraq) in January 2005, insupport of the Italian Joint TaskForce in the Dhi Qar province. Afew days after deployment, thesystem was ready to fly its firstmission. Just 1 year later, the aircrafthave accumulated over 1000 flyinghours, achieving Initial OperationalCapability in a very short time. Theaim of this article is to highlightsome of the lessons the IAF haslearned from its early experiencewith the Predator.

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The word “system” has beenintentionally used to underline that,unlike “manned” aircraft, UAVsneed an integrated combination of

a Ground Control Station (GCS),a datalink system, Line Of Sight(LOS) or Beyond LOS (BLOS)antennas, an exploitation cell and theaircraft themselves. If any one ofthese components fails, the entireasset would be useless. This simple

By AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER – UAV “PREDATOR”Colonel Ludovico Chianese, ITAF

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on the flow of information, howyou use that flow of informationand how quickly you are able tomake decisions based upon it. Theachievement of this different systemcould well be considered the firststep towards a net centric system,

consisting of a decision maker,sensors and shooters net, includingthe various sub-systems. This is oneof the goals being pursued by theItalian Defence Strategic Concept.This is not an easy process and it isstill undergoing strategic analysis byour Headquarters.

The staff ’s job is made the moredifficult by the UAVs’ relatively newconcept of operations and becausefew countries have UAV experienceon which we can rely. Similarly, thejointness of the programme is achallenge in itself since all users, AirForce, Navy, Army and policeforces, have different needs andexpectations. State of the Arttechnological requirements, such as

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statement can be considered oneof the most important “lessonslearned” that implied a change ofmentality. There was a need toswitch from a traditional system,where the aircraft is the core business,

to a different system, which focuses

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Ku Band Satellites, sophisticatedOptic, IR and radar sensors, allrequire highly trained andspecialized operating and servicingpersonnel. Last but not least,universal reductions in nationaldefence budgets will really challengeMilitary HQs to find the best wayto allow these programmes tosurvive.

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Programme development must alsointegrate civilian companies workingwithin the Defence environment andtake into consideration theircapabilities, interests, know-howand so on. L3 COM, GA-ASIsubcontractor for satellite aspects,is working to provide fine-tuningto the chosen satellite for BLOScapability, which will be needed toreach Full Operational Capability(FOC). TELESPAZIO, the Italiancontractor with the Armed Forcesfor satellite services, is providing theappropriate channels andbandwidth on the satelliteconstellation. SELEX, anotherItalian company, is the actualprovider for the aircraft spare parts.

If we now look to the future, thesituation is even more complicated.The Predator will receive a systemupgrade to improve itsperformance. All these upgradesare intended to support the interestsof the Italian Armed Forces toexploit the full potential of UAVs.That is to improve our ability to useUAVs to replace high value assetsin routine or even dangerous jobsand to save human lives.

From an operational point ofview, LOS only enables less thanoptimum utilization of the UAVsystem. When BLOS isimplemented, there will bevirtually no range limitations dueto high endurance (about 30flying hours) and wide satellitearea coverage. However,

limitations are arising frommanning, due to high trainingcosts and the small numbers ofqualified personnel. Moreover,very intense operationalworkloads during on-shiftperiods limit duty times for thosepersonnel who are qualified. Thespare part logistic cycle also needsto be improved to reduceEstimate Time ReplaceableOperatives.

Weather limitations are also asignificant factor. Moderate tosevere precipitation, crosswindsover 14 kts, surface winds over 29kts, ceilings below 800 ft, visibilitybelow 3200 m, moderate to severeicing or turbulence, lightning closerthan 18 km or ground temperaturesover 40°C are all limitations, someof which will be overcome by thesystem upgrade.

Moreover, the pre-take-offprocedures for each flight take upto 90 minutes. In tacticalsituations, where UAVs may beneeded for short notice tasking, itis necessary to fly the UAVs eitheron Combat Air Patrol or holdthem on the ground on QuickReadiness Alert, either of whichis expensive in terms of flyinghours and/or personnel effort.

The Unit that operates ItalianPredators is the 28th UAV Sqn,based in Amendola. A former

recce Sqn operating the F-104,then the AMX, the Sqn has beenconverted to UAVs throughpilot and payloader training inthe US. Mission Monitors arerecruited from officers with anIntel background after a systemsoftware course. Exploitation cellpersonnel are recruited fromphoto interpreter and intelligencecourses. Personnel are drawnfrom Army, Navy and Air ForceBranches. Pilots keep their flyingcurrency on the aircraft they usedto fly before joining UAVs inorder to retain their currency andmotivation.

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In conclusion, UAVs are a complexnew world and their operation hasbrought considerable success butalso some unexpected challenges.Technological developments and theneed to work closely with industryhave been unfamiliar areas. Trainedmanpower requirements and theintense workload on operators havealso been higher than expected.Surprisingly restrictive weatherlimitations have also hamperedoperations, as have the respectivetimes taken for planning andpreparing the UAVs for flight.The Italian Air Force has madeconsiderable progress with theRQ-1A Predator during theirearly operation and we continue tomove forward towards FOC.

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The JAPCC is promoting 2006 as the year of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). The UAV is recognized asa major contributor to transformation in our nations’ Services and NATO as a whole. In March 2006, theJAPCC hosted a UAV Forum at CC-Air Ramstein; the theme of this edition of the JAPCC Journal is butanother example of the importance of this fast developing area of joint air power. NATO has much work todo to properly exploit this capability. Therefore, Lt Gen Schubert, Executive Director of the JAPCC, invitedthe Air Chiefs of the JAPCC sponsoring nations to provide an insight into their nation’s experience with UAVs,both now and for the future.

The extracts here illustrate the broad nature of UAV experience.

Canada has found UAVs to be highly significant in reorienting our ideasand the architecture of a truly joint C4ISR system. Instead of consideringthese machines as individual aviation assets with unique functions, theyare more critically viewed as specialized components of a largerinformation grid. This simple observation suggests that our lessonslearned in this new capability area will rapidly accumulate; our emergingUAV doctrine will undergo significant modification as a result.

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For its future UAV development programme, the French Air Forcefavours a step-by-step approach based on the lessons learned operatingthe HUNTER and the commissioning of the Medium Altitude LongEndurance (MALE) system. Today, the EUROMALE programme isunderway through a European cooperation programme, which shouldpermit France to reach its fundamental capability by 2015. For offensivemissions, the NEURON European Demonstrator Programme will allowthe French Air Force to evaluate the UCAV concept within the scope ofthe renewal of its combat fleet by 2025.

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By 2009, Germany plans to introduce MALE UAV to provide all-weather reconnaissance; by 2010, we will add EUROHAWK toprovide SIGINT and, by 2013, we intend to procure the GLOBALHAWK IMINT UAV within NATO’s AGS concept. We are alsomonitoring closely R&D into UCAVs.

The Hungarian Air Force NATO/EU contribution is modular andthere is no UAV planned in their Table of Establishment, althoughin some cases small platforms could be useful for force protection. Ifthe ongoing development projects of the MoD Technology Agencyand the National Defence University produce available assets, wewill consider their operational use.

The Hellenic Air Force (HAF) is currently in the development-productionphase of a MALE UAV “PEGASUS”, destined for tactical and operationalneeds. Even though the programme started for Tactical Reconnaissance,other possible applications are being examined including area andinstallation surveillance, communications relay, IMINT-SIGINT intelligencecollection and support of special operations. In parallel, the Hellenic AirIndustry has declared participation in the French “NEURON” UCAVinitiative. The main problem concerning the use of the above systems liesin the absence of air traffic regulations, both nationally and internationally,making flight trials and missions, such as sea surveillance and border control,difficult. In the medium term, the HAF is planning the acquisition ofmore MALE UAVs, MINI UAVs and UCAV, while, at the same time,monitoring international trends.

The Italian experience gathered in Iraq confirmed that UAV havegreat potential. Predator’s surveillance capabilities have been used toenhance Force Protection and to increase precision engagement, bothon the ground and from the air, while improving overall awareness.The full implementation of Beyond Line of Sight Operations isexpanding the field of view. Glancing into future operations, multi-role UAV will provide the best combination of effectiveness andflexibility to unravel the uncertainty of modern scenarios.

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The Royal Netherlands Armed Forces aim for a nationally ownedair-ground surveillance capability with the procurement of MALEUAV systems. Initial operational capability is expected in 2011. Withthis AGS capability, the Netherlands Armed Forces can offer ameaningful contribution both within NATO or coalition alliances.The MALE UAV missions can vary from homeland defence, disasterrelief to ISR data-gathering in warfighting mission types.

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By 2012, Poland plans to equip her Air Force with at least two MALEUAV. In the intervening years, we will work on the safe exploitation ofnon-segregated airspace, a national communication system to distributedata collected and compatibility with the NATO Alliance GroundSurveillance programme.

Norway is acquiring a tactical UAV capability. The Royal NorwegianAir Force (RNoAF) will declare their UAV squadron operational in2009. The UAV capability is designated for the support of groundoperations, primarily as an ISTAR-asset. UAVs establish a capacityenabling a true situational awareness for ground forces manoeuvringin future areas of operations. The upcoming Defence Study willconsider increased utilization of UAV in the full spectrum of futuretasks for the Norwegian Defence Organisation.

The Portugese Air Force aims to operate, in the future, one UAV MALESystem, composed of three to four air platforms, associated set of sensors,one Ground Control Station and support personnel. The main objectiveis to obtain the capability to provide long-range strategic Reconnaissance,Surveillance and Target Acquisition for the full range of NATO missions,using UAV’s.

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Romania started to operate UAVs 8 years ago. Presently, there are 2Shadow 600 systems in use by the Romanian Armed Forces. One ofthem is used for domestic purposes and training, the other is deployedwith Coalition Forces in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. During theseyears of operation, the UAV systems have proved their capabilities in theservice of the Romanian Army, so that we plan to enlarge the Romanianmilitary UAV family, in order to have a good response to the new kind ofthreats against democratic values.

The RAF’s operation of Predator A has offered a unique insightinto the complexities of operating a persistent, armed UAV, therebyelevating the RAF to the forefront of high-tech UAV operations.This is exemplified further by our UAV experimentation programme- integrating the wide-area surveillance capability of the RAPTORsensor with the impressive performance of the Predator B. We nowaim to set the conditions for UAV operations outside of UK segregatedairspace. From simple beginnings, the UAV is fast carving a core rolein the future force and sensor mix, which will ensure Air Power’scontinued relevance across the whole spectrum of future offensiveand support operations.

The Spanish Air Force is involved in several programmes related tothe development of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) with theobjective of improving some already existing ISTAR capabilities. Theprocurement of MALE type UAS is the fourth phase of a programmethat will cater for all national requirements. In addition to the valuesupport to the traditional warfare areas, UAS are considered toimprove the ability to adequately face new challenges in many otherfields, like deployments and peacekeeping, control of illegalimmigration and drug traffic, anti-terrorism, environmental activities,SAR/CSAR and ISTAR.

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Attributes such as persistence and versatility contribute to highly capablesystems improving the way we currently operate and allow us to dothings previously impossible or impractical. The Air Force will integrateunmanned aviation with existing and future air and space systems toprovide a more capable force, implement Human Systems Integration,and continue to lead and innovate Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) andUAV development and employment. As RPAs and UAVs prove theirworth, lessons learned will be applied to enhancing the next generation ofunmanned systems.


The vulnerability of air powerwhen on the ground has beenrecognized as long as combat airoperations have been conductedand is encapsulated by GeneralDouhet’s observation in 1921 that‘it is easier and more effective todestroy the enemy’s aerial powerby destroying his nests and eggs onthe ground than to hunt his flyingbirds in the air’1. In current NATOoperations, the reality of facing theasymmetric threat in a non-linearbattlespace is that there is no frontline. Airbases supporting NATOstability and security operations,such as ISAF in Afghanistan, maybe in the midst of the land

component’s AO. Their size andrelative concentration of personnel,aircraft and other materiel, makethem attractive targets for ouradversaries, particularly throughstand-off indirect fire or the use ofMANPADs against aircraft takingoff or landing.

In principle, the key to providingeffective air base defence against theasymmetric threat, both currentand emerging, is to include elementsof defence in depth and a layereddefence, together with the closedefence of our vital assets.Additionally, we need to mount anumber of patrols (both foot and

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vehicle), provide a Quick ResponseForce (QRF) and ideally have amobile reserve on-call. Moreover,when the need arises, we need topossess the ability to fight back,projecting our force into ourGround Defence Area (GDA)using a variety of support weapons.

Whilst many European nationsand the US possess dedicated andwell trained personnel to carry outair base defence, recent experiencehas shown that when deployed, weare particularly vulnerable to thestand-off weapon attack and, morerecently, the use of MANPADS.We tend to be very good atproviding the close defence of ourassets, control of entry andmaintaining a highly visiblepatrolling profile within the base,or within the base perimeterdefences. However, where we tendto let ourselves down is in thedomination of the immediate areaof tactical importance just outsidethe base, where stand-off weapons

(and MANPADS) are most likelyto be launched or fired from. Toeffectively dominate this area wewould need to be able to projectour FP forces up to 10 km out fromthe base perimeter. To successfullyachieve this, we require a dedicated,well-trained, lightly equipped andhighly mobile force. Additionally,national caveats often restrict thedeployment of FP forces off-base,

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contributes to a delay in an effectiveresponse to incidents.

Of course, as part of his riskassessment, the commander maydecide that this sort of attack isunlikely and therefore allocate hisFP resources to other, higherpriority tasks. Historically however,the statistics show us that the riskof a stand-off weapon attack againstan air base has never been higher.In the mid 1980s, on behalf of theUSAF, the Rand Corporationundertook a study to examine thevulnerabilities of air bases. Whenpublished the study concluded thatsince WWII, over 75% of all groundattacks against air bases were in theform of a stand-off attack. Mostrecently, in late 2005, the Royal AirForce suffered damage to two GR7Harriers at Kandahar in Afghanistan.Open news sources reported thatthese losses were directly attributedto ground fire; clearly some formof mortar or artillery shell was usedagainst the Harriers.

relying on other coalition forces or,in some cases, the host nation (HN)forces to carry out this essentialtask. Inevitably, co-ordination andcommand and control can thenbecome very difficult, lines ofcommunication tenuous and abreakdown in language often


So, stand-off weapons pose amajor threat to deployed air bases.Why then do they? Because theyare simple to use and are widelyavailable at relatively low cost onthe international armaments blackmarket. Furthermore, they are idealweapons of choice for insurgentsand terrorists who, apart from thesuicide bombers, prefer not to becaught. They can blend in with thelocal population and probably havevery good knowledge of the localarea. Furthermore, they can pickthe time and place of the attack,most likely using the “shoot andscoot” technique. Stand-offweapons characteristics include:

� Ease of use. Personnel can bequickly trained on these systems– most are low tech, some arefire and forget. Systems cancome pre-loaded or can be easilyassembled.

� Small size. These weapons canbe easily stored and moved

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covertly into position. Ifrequired they can be cachedclose to the firing point for easeof use at a later date. In mostcases, a two-man team is all thatis required to operate them.

� Readiness. During a window ofopportunity, only a few minutesare required to make theseweapons combat ready.

� Ease of Employment. Often,unlimited firing points areavailable, such as the roof of abuilding, a clearing in a woodor even from a pre-positionedstatic vehicle; the IRA achieveda huge propaganda success whenthey targeted Downing Street inLondon in 1991 with this typeof device.

� Availability. Unclassified sourcesestimate that there are thousandsof stand-off weapons andMANPADS around the worldwith a considerable number

available on the black market,if the price is right.

So what can the defender do tocombat this threat? Firstly, thecommander must conduct his riskassessment based on the mostaccurate and up-to-date intelligence,

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and if the threat from stand-offweapons exists, allocate sufficientpriority to provide forces to counterthe threat. The FP Commandermust be in tactical command of all

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forces allocated to Active Defence,and in cases where this is notpossible, due to HN or Nationalconstraints, establish effectiveLiaison Officers with the othersupporting forces. Moreover, theActive Defence forces need toproject their presence out into thestand-off weapon footprint byadopting a proactive patrollingposture throughout the GDA.Furthermore, modern technicalresources such as infantry groundradars and sensors, need to beprocured to provide the FPCommander with timely warnings,so that a counter-attack withsupport weapons (if local ROEpermit their use) or thedeployment of the QRF, asappropriate, to follow up theattack. Local intelligence sourcesshould not be overlooked.

In conclusion, duringexpeditionary operations, air assetsand in particular aircraft, providea target rich environment for anyopposing force. The provision ofsufficient Force Protection assets

needs to be assessed at the outsetand the threat from stand-offweapons should not be overlooked.This threat needs to be counteredby the provision of robust forces,familiar with air operations andcapable of dominating the GDA.

1 Guilio Douhet, The Command of the Air,Washington DC, Office of Air Force History 1983(orginally published in 1921, pp 53-54).

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In 2006, the priority for the JAPCCis to deliver a range of importantprojects that will aid thetransformation of NATO air andspace power. These projects , insupport of HQ SACT, have beenformalized into an agreedProgramme of Work (POW),which sets out the JAPCCdeliverables and timescales. Inaddition, JAPCC is developingprojects for a number of otherNATO customers that includesNATO HQ, SHAPE, CC-Air HQIzmir and CC-Air HQ Ramstein.We believe the overall 2006 POWwill make a major contribution toNATO’s transformation agenda.

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The JAPCC has made the UAV/UAS its top priority theme for 2006.The subject of UAS will featureprominently in our JAPCCsponsored workshops and forathroughout the year, including the2006 JAPCC Conference. Ourintention is to bring together all UASstakeholders such as NATO staff,nations, industry and academia toidentify what NATO needs to doto fully exploit the airpowercapabilities of fered by UAStechnologies. Issues relating toairspace management, commandand control, integration andinteroperability are challenges facedby all NATO nations.

To meet these challenges, theJAPCC aims to develop a“flightplan” that identifies whatNATO needs to do, as an Alliance,to exploit the UAS potential.

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The JAPCC has been asked byNATO HQ to lead a study groupto examine future NATO AirDefence (AD) requirements andcapabilities. This project, lookingto the year 2020, will analyze thefuture capability requirements forNATO AD in a holistic mannerto identify any capability gaps andto develop a roadmap to addressthem. This project should becompleted by Autumn 2006.

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The JAPCC is supporting HQSACT to develop a Joint ISR(JISR) concept, a transformationalproject that will ensure NATO isable to meet its aspirations acrossthe full range of effects basedoperations. The JAPCC is alsoplaying a significant role on behalfof ACO in the NATO AllianceGround Surveillance project.Working closely with the NAEWcommunity, including ForceCommand and NAPMA, JAPCChas helped to develop a CONOPand to provide specialist assessmentfor the Main Operating Basedecision process. The JAPCC is

also contributing to thedevelopment of the ‘Concept forFuture E-3A NATO Mid-TermEmployment’ that incorporates anassessment of the likely expandedroles and missions such as TimeSensitive Targeting, AirborneCommand Element, UASoperations and overall Air BattleManagement.

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The JAPCC supports thetransformation of the AARcapability, by developinginteroperability and promoting amore coherent management, by theAlliance, of AAR assets. TheJAPCC is also leading to develop along term NATO vision for thiscritical capability.

The JAPCC is enhancinginteroperability through thedevelopment of AAR doctrine,procedures, STANAGs andplanning methodologies. Thisproject has resulted in 2 significantimprovements:

� The production of a newAlliance Joint AAR manual thatharmonizes and standardizes


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procedures currently found inmore than 20 different manuals.

� The drafting of an updatedNATO AAR concept thatprovides a coherent structurefor planning and directingAlliance AAR.

Looking longer term, the JAPCCis developing a future NATO AARconcept. This work, with a 15-yeartime horizon, seeks to identifyfuture AAR requirements,resources and technologies and toestablish future operating andemployment concepts for AAR.This project incorporates theintegration of AAR into networkcentric operations and newconcepts, such as unmanned airrefuellers. This work should becomplete by the end of 2006.

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NATO SMART is a distributedsimulation project involving JAPCCin collaboration with HQ SACT.The JAPCC chairs both the

SMART Steering Group and theOperations and Training Group.

With the initial scoping effortcomplete, the JAPCC is nowworking with HQ SACT toprovide a Phase 1 report to the HQSACT Management Board. Thenext steps involve gaining formalcommitment of national and NCSassets for a SMART exercise event,which has been scheduled for 2008.

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The JAPCC is currentlydeveloping a project to identify afuture NRF Air training andexercise concept. The aim of theproject will be to examine the valueand relevance of current air trainingprogrammes to support the broadrange of missions and threats thatthe NRF faces.

The detailed objectives andmilestones of this study are currentlybeing identified. The JAPCC aimsto complete the project by the endof 2006, working closely with themain stakeholders in the JFC’s andACC’s.

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The JAPCC continues to providestrong support to the SACTIntegrated Capability Teams onlogistics transformation issues. Thiswork includes the furtherdevelopment of the DeployableAirfield Activation Wing (DAAW)concept described in JAPCCJournal Edition 1. The JAPCC hasbeen asked to develop a NATOforce proposal to cover the DAAWcapability and to lead on theassessment of the DAAW conceptas part of the DefenceRequirements Review 07 process.HQ SACT has also been requestedto support an exercise in 2007 to testthe DAAW concept.

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Recent SHAPE TACEVALS havehighlighted nations are increasinglyadopting different approaches todeployed operations in a chemical,biological, radiological and nuclear(CBRN) environment. With theadvent of the NRF, and the focuson multinational operations withinthe same deployed airbase, currentNATO policy and doctrine in thisarea needs to be reviewed.

The JAPCC is leading with thiswork in consultation with SHAPE,the ACC’s and the NATOAEW&C Force Command. Theaim is to develop a new Concept ofOperations for NRF air operationsin a CBRN environment to becomplete by June 2006.

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If you want to know more aboutany of the JAPCC’s projects, pleasevisit our new website atwww.japcc.de The website givesyou the opportunity to add yourown comments and suggestions,including any ideas on newprojects that could be undertakenby the JAPCC.www.japcc.de

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The JAPCC held its first airpower conference in Kleve,Germany in November 2005.The theme of the Conference wasto question, “How do we ensurethat NATO joint air and spacepower remains relevant?”. Over180 delegates including high-ranking NATO military officers,academics and DefenceIndustrialists attended. TheConference was opened byGeneral Henault, Chairman ofthe Military Committee, whoaddressed the issue of air powerwithin the context of NATO’stransformation process and thepart played by Centres ofExcellence like the JAPCC.

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Gen Henault emphasized the vitalrole of airpower in today’s militaryoperations, particularly thedetermining contribution it can playin the early part of a campaign. Hehighlighted the great changes in theway air power is now applied withthe focus on Joint and Combinedoperations and the differing scaleand types of interventions. TheGeneral stressed the importance ofthe NATO Transformation initiativeand the value of the NRF conceptas the catalyst for delivering thenecessary changes. Although NATOfaces many challenges in making thebest possible use of air power,Gen Henault believes the Alliance

will continue to require asubstantial and diverse set of airand space power capabilities. Heargued that efforts needed to befocused, emphasizing that thechallenge to the air communitywas to go on improving airpower capabilities with continueddevelopment of new ideas andconcepts.

Gen Henault concluded by payingtribute to the work done by SACTin leading the Transformationprocess, but he also emphasised themajor role to be played by the newCentres of Excellence, which hesaw as vital for the development ofnew ideas and concepts. He saidthat the work done by the

JAPCC was vital to the Alliance’soverall capabilities, not leastbecause air power would remaina key element for the futuresuccess of NATO.

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The remainder of the Conferenceconsisted of a series ofpresentations and panel discussionswith full involvement of thedelegates. These discussionsconcluded that air and space powerhas much to offer in tacklingterrorist and insurgent threats, wherethere are no front lines and whereground units cannot control theground with any degree ofpermanence. Air platforms have

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the perspectives of height andendurance and, due to their speed,they also have the necessaryflexibility for dynamic re-tasking.New technology now also offersthe potential for air power tooperate with an increased degreeof “sensitivity” when interactingwith the ground environment.Developing new technologies willfurther enable air power byassuming an increasingly prominentrole in missions that require non-kinetic and non-lethal effects.

The panels, looking at the future,identified a range of areas whereNATO air power needs to continueto evolve and to transform. Theseinclude:

� Avoiding a dual class militaryAlliance in which specific nationscan only operate with the onesthat have similar capabilities.

� Introducing new platforms andcommand and control systemsnot based on system centric ora Service centric approach, butwith a holistic capability basedapproach.

� Recognizing a harmonizedevolution versus a revolutionaryapproach as a pragmatic wayforward – focusing on rolespecialization and national nichecapabilities.

� Improving interoperabilitythrough broader NATOcommon funding, which shouldbe viewed as an important toolfor Transformation.

� NATO working to developgreater capability within space ornear-space and to be less relianton purely national sensors.

� Exploiting the potential ofUAVs. There is a pressing needfor policy and doctrine relatingto airspace control, theintegration of UAVs and theassociated command andcontrol issues.

� Introducing a new concept forfuture exercises, by movingaway from the old legacy styleof counting missions andairframes towards evaluatingthe operational and tactical

requirements for the NRF.This must include a strongerjoint approach, less focused atthe Component level, and withmore priority to enablingactivities such as airlift, logisticsand CIS.

� Releasing the potential ofmodelling and simulation toallow NATO to conduct realisticand cost effective training.

� Promoting an effects-basedmindset with the formulation ofNATO policy on EBAO.

� Development of air landintegration procedures to meetthe operational challenges.

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The first JAPCC Conferenceidentified the continued need topersuade others, especially nationaldecision-makers, about theimportance and utility of air andspace power. Despite prominenceof late, air power is not generallywell understood outside the aircommunity; therefore we must beready and able to demonstrate itsvalue if air power is to remainrelevant and properly resourced.

In closing the 2005 Conference,Lt Gen Schubert, the JAPCCExecutive Director, expressed hisgratitude for the open exchange ofinformation and knowledge thathad stimulated all the discussions.The Conference had beeninvaluable in helping determine theJAPCC 2006 programme ofwork, where the JAPCC couldaddress the most pressing issuesidentified by the NATO aircommunity, together with tasksthat would contribute most to thetransformation of joint air andspace power.

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General TomHobbins,USA A, is DirectorJAPCC KalkarG e r m a n y ,Commander, U.S.Air Forces inE u r o p e ;C o m m a n d e r ,

Allied Component Command - AirRamstein; and Air ComponentCommander, U.S. EuropeanCommand, Ramstein Air Base,Germany. Gen Hobbins entered theAir Force in Dec 1969 as a graduate ofOfficer Training School. He hascommanded two tactical fighter wingsand a composite air group. He hasserved as the Director of Plans andOperations for U.S. Forces Japan,Director of Plans and Policy for U.S.Atlantic Command, and Director ofOperations for U.S. Air Forces inEurope. As the USAFE Director ofOperations, Gen Hobbins wasresponsible for the planning, beddownand execution of combat forces inEurope for Operation ALLIEDFORCE. As 12th Air ForceCommander, Gen Hobbins deployedthe 12th Air Force’s AOC to SouthwestAsia as Operations ENDURINGFREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM’salternate AOC. A command pilot, GenHobbins has flown more than 4,275flying hrs, primarily in fighter aircraft.

WingC o m m a n d e rMike Strong,RAF, joined theRAF in 1966 as amilitary air trafficcontroller. Hehas served at RAFand RN airfields

worldwide and at joint civil/militaryATC centres. He has broad experiencein a variety of air traffic managementposts in military and civilian HQs.Since 2003, he has been on secondmentto EUROCONTROL as a militaryexpert, specializing in airspace and airtraffic management matters.

Colonel StephenP. Luxion, USA A,is the Director ofStaff at theJAPCC. A 1984USAF Academygraduate, ColLuxion spent 10yrs flying the F-

111 and 2 yrs flying the F-14A and EA-6B . He flew the MQ-1B Predator for 3yrs and commanded the 17th

Reconnaissance Sqn. He has 2,500 hrsflying time with 700 hrs combat time.Col Luxion is a distinguished graduateof the USAF Fighter Weapons Schooland Air Command and Staff College.He is also a graduate of the School ofAdvanced Airpower Studies and theNational War College.

Air ChiefMarshal Sir GlennTorpy, KCB, CBE,DSO, BSc(Eng),FRAeS, RAF, hasflown the Jaguarand TornadoGR1A aircraft inthe reconnaissance

role. He commanded No 13 Sqn duringthe 1991 Gulf War where he wasawarded the Distinguished ServiceOrder. He has served as the StationCommander RAF Bruggen, Germany,and has attended both Royal College ofDefence Studies and the HigherCommand and Staff Course. He has helda number of senior national staffpositions including Director AirOperations in the MOD and AssistantChief of the Defence Staff (Operations).In 2001 he became Air OfficerCommanding No 1 Gp and during thisperiod, he was the UK Air ContingentCommander for Operation IRAQIFREEDOM, for which he was awardedthe US Legion of Merit. Following atour as Deputy Commander in ChiefStrike Command, he was posted asChief of Joint Operations in thePermanent Joint Headquarters. In Jan2005, he was made a Knight Commanderand on 13 Apr 2006 took up his currentappointment as Chief of the Air Staff.

Colonel(S) DanLewandowski ,USA A, is theJAPCC CombatAir Branch Head.He was one of thefirst career spaceoperations officersin the USAF. He

was the Branch Chief for space andC4ISR programs for the Deputy UnderSecretary of the Air Force forInternational Affairs. In 2002, he tookcommand of the 50th OperationsSupport Squadron, responsible for 130personnel and the combat readinesstraining of over 530 crew personnel,operating over 140 satellites. He has fourmasters degrees in Strategic Studies,Military Operational Art and Science,Space Systems and BusinessAdministration.

Professor IanPoll, OBEFREng, FCGIFAIAA , FRAeS,is Professor ofA e r o s p a c eEngineering andB u s i n e s sDevelopment and

Technical Director of CranfieldAerospace Limited. A graduate ofImperial College, London, he has 30yrs experience in aerospace andaviation gained in both the academicand commercial domains. A Fellowof the Royal Academy of Engineering,The City and Guilds Institute, theAmerican Institute of Aeronautics andAstronautics and the RoyalAeronautical Society, he was awardedthe OBE in 2002 in recognition of hiscontribution to the Cranfield Collegeof Aeronautics.

WingC o m m a n d e rRichard Duance,GBR A, joined theRAF in 1982 as aFighter Controller.Within 3 yrs, hetransferred to theNavigator Branch

and qualified on the Tornado F3 in 1987.He has flown over 2000 flying hrs,primarily in the Tornado F3, and is agraduate of the Advanced Commandand Staff Course at JSCSC Shrivenham.In 2005, he joined JAPCC from a touras Commanding Officer FalklandIslands Air Wing. He works in thePolicy, Concepts & Co-ordinationbranch responsible for Interoperability,Doctrine and Integration.


WingCommander PeteYork, OBE,GBR A, is a VIPT r a n s p o r tnavigator whoarrived at JAPCCin 2005 from CC-Air Izmir, Turkey

where he was the Director of Staff. Priorto that, he was CC-Air Izmir’s CJFACCPlanning Chief and responsible for theimplementation of NATO’s CJFACCand NRF Concepts. He has experiencein planning and execution of the flyingschedules for RAF AT, AAR and VIPTransport fleets during peacetimeroutine and crisis operations. Pete hasalso been a tutor in the Muharraq Al-Abdullah Command and Staff Collegein Kuwait.

ProfessorDr.-Ing. AxelSchulte, isProfessor ofFlight Mechanicsand FlightGuidance at theInstitute of SystemDynamics and

Flight Mechanics, Munich Universityof the German Armed Forces,Aerospace Engineering Department.His research focus is on automation invehicle guidance, human-automationinteraction in aviation and intelligentsystems based on cognitive models ofhuman operators. In teaching, he coversthe aeronautical disciplines of flightmechanics, guidance and control.

WingC o m m a n d e rAndy Ingham,GBR A, transferredto the CombatService SupportBranch at JAPCCfrom the ReactionForce Air Staff. He

is an RAF Regiment officer with abackground in Survive-to-Operate andForce Protection. He has commanded aUK SHORAD sqn in Germany, servedas a GBAD/SHORAD staff officer andas the air force member of a joint servicecommunications project team. He hasalso served as an Exchange Officer withthe USAF at the USAF Security ForcesAcademy as an airbase defence instructor.

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Mr. YairDubester, is theGeneral Managerof MALAT, theUAV division ofIsrael AircraftIndustries (IAI).He completed hisBSc. in Electrical

Engineering at the Technion, IsraelInstitute of Technology, Israel in 1975.In that year he joined IAI as a designengineer on Israel’s first UAV, the“Scout”.

Mr. Ido Pickel, isthe marketingmanager in theMALAT divisionof Israel AircraftIndustries Ltd forSouthern Europe.He is a seniorqualified UAV

operator and mission commander withservice in the Israel Air Force UAV Sqn.He holds a Bachelor Degree in BusinessAdministration (B.A.) specializing inInformation Technology from theInterdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Israel.

Dr AndreaNativi, acquired adegree inFinancial Law,Summa cumlauda, in GenoaUniversity in 1984and served as aR e s e r v e

Lieutenant in the Guardia Di Finanzafrom 1985-86. He became a professionaljournalist in 1985 and joined the RivistaItaliana Difesa in 1987; he became theirEditor in Chief in 2000. He is a memberof the Italian MoD sponsored StrategicStudies Centre and Military ResearchCentre and a respected Air PowerLecturer at the Italian MoD Joint andAir Force War Colleges.

Air CommodoreDai Williams,GBR A, joined theRAF as a SupplyOfficer in 1980. Hehas an MA inDefence Studiesand was awardedan OBE in 1996.

He has been a Military Assistant to AirOfficer Maintenance and COS in theTri-service HQ Defence Supply Chain.In 2002 he commanded the UK’s largestsupply depot where he merged theformer air depot at Stafford with theArmy depot at Donnington to create aunified tri-Service depot. He was postedto the JAPCC in Jan 2005 as BranchHead, Combat Service Support.Promoted to Air Commodore inJanuary 2006, he assumed the role ofAssistant Director Transformation. Heleft JAPCC in Apr 2006 to be Director(Supply Chain) within the UK DefenceLogistics Organisation.

Colonel LudovicoChianese, ITAF, isthe AirC o m p o n e n tCommander ofthe “Predator”UAV in Tallil,Iraq. He isresponsible for the

Air Task Order of the Italian UAVSquadron as Tactical Commander. TheSquadron conducts ISR missions insupport of the Italian Joint Task Forcein the Dhi-Qar area. Col Chianeseentered the Air Force in 1984, graduatingfrom the Academy in 1988. He hasserved as a helicopter pilot in the SARand CSAR role and is a flight instructorand examiner.

Lt Col Jens CFehler, DEU L,joined the GermanArmy Artillerybranch in 1978. Heis a qualified UAVoperations officerand graduatedfrom Hamburg

Military University and German ForcesStaff Academy. In the beginning of 2006,he joined JAPCC from a post as the UAVflight safety advisor at the GermanArtillery School. Working in the C4ISTARBranch, he is responsible for UAS.


Soviet/Russian Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

by Yefim Gordon, original translation by Dmitriy KommissarovMidland Publishing, Hinckley, England, 2005, 127 pagesAvailable as ISBN 1-85780-193-8

In the past, Soviet Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) were barelyrecognized by the West. However, a great number of flying target decoysand reconnaissance drone systems have been produced, and today Russianindustry develops many Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) includingUnmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAV).

The author provides an extensive overview of research and developmentas well as operations from the beginning to the present. Starting with anassessment of the Soviet Airspace Industry after World War II, individualchapters deal with the UAS of the four development bureaus. The chapterscontain detailed descriptions and construction plans augmented by technicaldata sheets and photographs of the systems. The concluding chapterpresents the current status of Russian UAS Technology and gives a detailedforecast of planned projects.

Reviewer: Jens Fehler, Lt Col, DEU L

Attack of the Drones – A History of Unmanned Aerial Combat

by Bill YenneZenith Press, MBI Publishing Company, St. Paul MN USA, 2004, 127pagesAvailable as ISBN 0-7603-1825-5

Research and development of UAV in the USA started at the beginningof the 20th century. The first tangible steps towards the new technologywere “aircraft models”, unmanned target aircraft and reconnaissancedrones. The progress in technology fields like wireless communication,miniaturization and materiel, facilitated control systems for precisenavigation and secure recovery. Meanwhile, many applications for UASoperations could be identified and the significance of air based sensorplatforms increased. The use of satellites to enable beyond line of sightcommunication between a ground control station and the UAV facilitatedthe development of the new concept of an UCAV. Air to surface attackhas been revolutionized, and this technology has led to USA superiorityin the field.

The author gives a description of development, performance andspecialities of the different techniques as well as future developmentprogrammes accompanied by many impressive photographs.

Reviewer: Jens Fehler, Lt Col, DEU L

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Courtesy of Midland Counties Publications

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