The Ambiguity of Ugandas Hybrid State According to scholarly accounts such as Barbara Geddes, political regimes are categorized as personalist/dictatorship, single party, and military regimes. However, although these regime types are important to learn, and are prevalent in the world; there is another type of regime that is not as eminent, and hence understudied. That is the hybrid regime (from this point on I use the terms hybrid regime and partly free interchangeably). The hybrid regime, according to Aili Marie Tripp, is a regime type that is filled with many contradictions that promote civil rights and political liberties and yet these same rights are curtailed when it benefits the elite actors need to maintain power. After 19 years of a strong single party system, Uganda went to a multi-party system in 2005. This was set into motion by the acceptance of this type of system from the National Resistant Movement (NRM) in 2004, which was engendered by the pressure from within the NRM. It was triggered by the interest of the party for Museveni to maintain his power. This was a quid pro quo so to speak in that by Musevenis government (NRM) swiftly legalizing a multiparty system, simultaneously removed the term limits for the presidency, leaving Museveni to remain in power as long as he succeeded. This illustrates the common practice of a partially free regime in using democratic institutions to achieve undemocratic objectives. Another example of the misuse of the democratic institutions, and one that exists in Uganda, is a political environment that has constitutional supported rights for freedom of speech or press; yet still has journalist who are critical of the government being imposed with critical limitations such as an inability to cover opposition related events, being attacked during the process of covering those events, or being verbally threatened or summoned for questioning. With this being said, I think it is safe to say that hybrid regimes possess the trappings of democracy at the same time pervert democracy through patronage and largess or violence and coercion for the sole purpose of centralizing authority. (Tripp 2010) This also describes the political environment governing Uganda. Some scholars label this a stagnant state, and other scholars such as David Epstein, Robert Bates, Jack Goldstone, Ida Kristensen and Sharyn OHalloran (2006) view this transition into democracy as a process and not a finalization or end-state. Therefore, their studies of democratization are trichotomous and include the hybrid regime as its focus. They state, The behavior of these hybrid systems largely determines the level, rate and properties of democratization (Epstein et.al 2006). Nonetheless, like the comparative analyses entailing the hybrid regimes, the literature available, in comparison to the literature on personalist, military, and single-party regime, is scarce. For example, modernization theory addresses countries such as Burma, Singapore, East Germany, Taiwan, USSR, Belgium, France and Germany just to name a few, which are classified as either democracies or dictatorships. So, there are still very few accounts that extend modernization theory to the hybrid regime. What makes the case of Uganda so unique is that it has been a hybrid regime since 1986, a state of hybridity for 27 years. Hybrid regimes were initially viewed as being in transition to democracy, however this view has changed according to scholars Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way (2005). Reviewing the post cold war era, they conclude that some hybrid regimes democratized such as Indonesia, while others remained stable such as Uganda. According to Leonardo Morlino (2007), a regime can be assumed to be stabilized if its succession last between 8-10 years. Molino also states that this stabilization is caused by either a permanent transition that is set in motion which is usually a stalemate or stagnation as a result of a long stand-off between veto players and democratic elites; or, because a dominant power keeps the regime in a sort of limbo; or finally the cause of the lack of a central governing institution. Therefore, the hybrid regime is an amalgamation of democratic and totalitarian components.What is interesting about Ugandas longevity as a hybrid regime is that its president, Yoweri Museveni, appeared to be inclined on democratizing his country at the beginning of his term. So, why did Museveni not democratize Uganda? Why have some hybrid regimes democratized and others have not? Was Museveni falsely claiming democratization to gain the confidence of his people? If so, is 27 years not enough time for his people to detect his disingenuousness, and revolt to free their political process? Or, is it that he co-opted them? On the flipside of this, it is a hybrid regime. In retrospect, the democratization process is not a linear one, and ought to be examined from different angles for the purposes of extracting a consistent generalization. This is why I take an integrative approach when explaining the outcome in Uganda.I extend the structural, cultural, institutional and the rational approach to encompass the case of Ugandas hybrid regime. By comparing Uganda with three other countries, the once hybrid and now democratized country Indonesia, a once autocratic but now a stabilized democratized country, South Korea, and a stabilized autocratized country, North Korea. I will show that Ugandas structural conditions economic, social and institutional are quintessential to the type of regime and it stability, therefore; arguing Ugandas partly free status is the result of the absence of the structural forces to democratize. It is absolutely necessary that I do not deny the deterministic element in the democratization process, even though I am not taking an exclusively structural approach. In fact, I am taking an integrative approach, as I stated above, that combines structural, rational, cultural and institutional perspectives. Indeed, the case of Uganda requires all these perspectives to explain both the conception and endurance of its hybrid regime.

Authoritarianism and Democracy Defined It is important to understand what democracy and authoritarianism means to fully envelope the idea of democratization and the role that a hybrid regime plays in that process. First, I will define authoritarianism; and second, I will define democracy.First, authoritarianism according to Timothy Lim (2010) is a nondemocratic political regime in which decision-making authority is highly centralized and exclusionary. Typically, authoritarian regimes are ruled by a single dictator, or by a small elite, who make decisions in top-down fashion. Authoritarian regimes are also characterized by limited individual freedoms, minimal civil liberties and rights, excessive reliance on violence and coercion (including imprisonment, torture, and murder) against political opponents, and limited accountability on the part of the government officials. Second, to define democracy I will use Larry Diamonds (2008) definition of democracy labeled thick democracy. Thick democracy has free and fair elections plus such familiar attributes as freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of ethnic and religious groups to pursue their beliefs, clear rules of law, an independent judiciary that enacts checks and balances on elected officials, a vibrant civil society, and civilian control over the military.

Placing Uganda within the Literary ContextThe democratization process has been ripe with contradictions and unforeseeable developments. For example, the Third Wave of Democratization that swept across the developing world in Latin America during the 1980s-1990s contradicted, and rightly so, scholars that argued that Catholicism is anti-democratic. These scholars were proven wrong. Similarly, scholars who argued that democracy is incompatible with Islam were also proven wrong. The democratization of Indonesia, a country with the most Islamic population in the world, proved the latter set of scholarly accounts of incompatibility between Islam and democracy specious. Conversely there are few incidences of democratization that give certain theories predictability. South Korea is one country that is a prime example in giving Modernization theory predictive power. It states that there must be a certain level of income in order to throw off dictatorship. It threw off dictatorship when income levels were increasing and they were becoming wealthy. However, there are very few cases where democratization occurs this way.Some scholars such as Adam Przeworkis (1991) contend that democracy is an institutionalized uncertainty, and that as a consequence the only outcomes will be predetermined within the framework of democratic rules. This framework is composed of two elements, the social actors, and the institutions. The former includes the elites political and capitalists/lobbyists and the mass public, i.e. the people. The latter includes the military and the paramilitary. He argues that the social actors are forced to democratize because they stand on the cusp of political chaos where liberalization is the only game in town. That is to say, their very survivability is dependent on abandoning authoritarianism, or on sharing power. Therefore, there is a strong element of determinism to Przeworskis approach, hence the structural approach.Conversely, if democratization is not the only game in town, then the framework of democratic preconditions is absent, or at least partly absent, which brings us to Uganda. Given the weakness of the effectuation of the structural conditions, and hence the inadequacy of the structural perspective, the other two perspectives, the institutional and the rational, are at play. When it comes to Uganda, the aforementioned conditions are not in place, hence, its stagnation as a hybrid regime. This is why I argue that Ugandas partly free status as being the result of the absence of the structural forces to democratize.Through the rational choice perspective, Geddes (2004) reveals a simple game theory argument that portrays the incentives of facing officers in military regimes as contrasted with those of cadres, in single-party regimes, and clique members in personalist regimes. She maintains that most personalist and single-party regimes maintain their grip on power as long as possible and consequently the data shows that they also last longer. Uganda, being in a stabilized hybrid state since 1986 has demonstrated the single party regime grip on power and is holding on to it as long as possible. It is through the manipulations of the institutions and the elite actors involved with those institutions that keep President Yaweri Museveni in power. The role of choice should not be discounted. Museveni crafts the democratic institutions of Uganda preventing its forward movement. This would mean that for Uganda, democracy depends on the interests, values and actions of the political leader Museveni. However, to claim this would be too voluntaristic and atheoretical because the structural factors demand responses and influences Musevenis or other elite actors preferences and ability to act upon these preferences. The structural factors set up from the prior regime and its characteristics plays an important role and can also determine the strategies and resources available during transition. The following challenges that face Uganda into being led towards democracy are what has kept Uganda in the stabilized hybrid state: institutionalizing democracy, participation, corruption, limited civil and political rights, misuse of decentralization, the role military plays, security, boundaries, economic influences, the preferences available during transition, and donors roles. To understand the entirety of the comparatives a brief background of Uganda is provided.

BACKGROUNDSince 1962, when Uganda was granted Independence, and before the ousting of authoritarian leaders Milton Obote and Idi Amin, the people of Uganda suffered from mass genocidal massacres against particular ethnic groups leading to weak security and a very unstable political system with a mismanaged economic system. Uganda was greatly divided along national, religious and ethnic lines. The East Indian immigrants under the British undertook Ugandas economic activity. Indian immigrants constituted a large amount of the colonies merchants. Furthermore, there was a divide between the Bantu of the south and Nilotic of the north of the country. Moreover, the activities of the government and guerilla armies in Luwero triangle caused the deaths of 3,000 people. More than 80,000 were forced to leave Uganda, due to the regime using exile and expulsion. Ethnic and social groups were expelled from Uganda with Obote expelling approximately 20,000 Kenyan workers in 1969. In 1971, Amin expelled 75,000 Asian of Indo-Pakistan origins; by 1984, about a quarter of a million Ugandans were living in exile as refugees.The surrounding regions did not add to the security and the political stabilization of Uganda. Uganda struggled bordering Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and its Lords Resistant Army (LRA) led by Joseph Kony. This caused distrust and instability with neighboring Sudan until Uganda and Sudan later joined forces against the LRA. The LRA military campaigns and the governments armed responses caused the displacement of 1.6 million people. Sudan, another bordering country of Uganda, allowed for LRA bases to reside on the Southern area of Sudan because they fought against the Sudan rebel army, Sudans People Liberation Army (SPLA). Uganda supported the SPLA because of its hopes to drive the LRA out of Sudan. Concurrently, because of the D.R. Congos rich resources- including diamonds, timber, copper, cobaltand gold, the militias backed by mining multinationals, Uganda, Rwanda and Zimbabwe got supplies for food, money and military hardware in exchange for smuggled rich resources. Thiscorruption waslateraddressed in 2003 by a panel of UN experts reporting that Uganda, Rwanda and Zimbabwe were exploiting Congolese resources. They recommended the Security Council to impose sanctions. However from the time of independence to the end of Amins leadership, Uganda did not get international recognition of its civil war and humanitarian crisis through the media.From 1962 to 1971 Uganda, under Obotes (UPC) party leadership was deeply fractionalized due to the lack of urban organization before independence. The constituencies were ethnically unique, and each party functionary represented a local constituency. What lacked was no common ideology to unite the UPC having to maintain the task of UPCs external alliances. Due to British policy favoring Buganda through patronage, Obote granted Bugandas monarch special treatment as they requested. The other kingdoms requested the same type of treatment, but their requests were not granted. However Obotes long-term goal was to gain a strong centralized government at the expense of local interest, particularly those of Buganda. Dealing with challenges such as the Ugandan Army requesting higher pay and more rapid promotions, Obote sent the Minister of defense Onema to speak with the Mutineers. He was taken hostage, only to cause Obote to get the British military to seize the military, which became a blow to the new regime. Obote soon after met the needs of the military where they then assumed a more prominent role in Uganda life. Idi Amin was selected and rapidly promoted to become Milton Obotes protg. The expanding army became a source of political power until the breakup of the coalition in 1964.Addressing the critical issues of the lost countries that British postponed until after independence, several members of the Democratic Party (DP) parliament joined the Obote side of the government because Obote promised to undertake a popular referendum to restore the lost countries to Bunyoro. However, the Kabaka opposed andsent 300 soldiers from Buganda to intimidate the Bunyoros, and as a result a civil war started, and the referendum was held. Buganda loosing this war strengthened Obotes government and sent Buganda in disarray. By 1966, the Obote regime parliament was made up of 74 UPC, 9 DP, 8 KY and 1independent military. Obotes rule continued and became associated with food shortage, corruption and terrorizing, harassing and torturing opposing Ugandans, especially Indian traders.After Museveni became President in 1986, Northern Uganda was still terrorized by DR Cong 2003. More than 100,000 people were killed, and 20,000 children were abducted, in an effort to destabilize politics in Uganda.When Yoweri Museveni came into power by ousting Amin through a military coup, he came in with great ideas and promises for the transformation to a democracy. In the violent transfer of power, he succeeded two prior authoritarian regimes that openly violated human rights, ignored the rule of law, with the only goal of keeping their power.

Theory and MethodThe comparative method used for this paper is Mills Most Similar Systems MSS, and the Most Different Systems, MDS, for the comparison of Uganda with three other countries. I did this because there is a wide variation between the dependent and the independent variables.The current research will also apply the structural approach. However, the structural approach will be integrated with the institutional , cultural and rational approaches to explain the missing pieces to thoroughly define the ambiguous political system that makes Uganda what it is. And furthermore, it will illustrate why Uganda is in a stable hybrid state. Uganda is the central focus because of its long-term hybridity; Uganda is compared with South Korea, a stabilized democracy; North Korea, a stabilized dictatorship, and Indonesia, which recently democratized from a hybrid state. I will be reviewing each country from their time of independence until 2013, though some information was available on Freedom House from 1998. This will reveal the missing structures in Uganda. It will also identify the different resources available for the actors to make decisions as well as how the institutional system is used as a tool due to the structural set-up needed to reach the goal of democratization, authoritarian or a stabilized hybrid state. Because Uganda has both democratic traits and authoritarian traits, its essential to compare Uganda with the above countries. This will demonstrate the structural factors present in each political environment and its origins as they relate to Ugandas structural factors. It is essential to review the impact of the prior regime to review the structural status and the way it impacted and shaped both the preferences of the actors and their ability to act upon these preferences. It also makes sense that the characteristics of the prior regime e.g. totalitarian, pseudo-democratic, etc. would shape the strategies and resources available to actors during the transition. In fact, the impact of prior regime type is quite evident. Democratic design may be challenged by problems of unconsolidated borders and national identities, by deep social divisions, as well as by acute underdevelopment. (Judith Large and Timothy D. Sisk 2006)The following is a comparison of Uganda and the three countries of Indonesia, South Korea and North Korea. The comparison will be on the basis of structural, Institutional rational and cultural factors.

Comparing Bordering Countries Border WarsThe bordering countries of Indonesia are Papua New Guinea, Malaysia and East Timor. Bordering countries are an important factor for the long-term stabilization of whatever regime type exists. According to Freedom House (2013) Papua New Guinea (PNG) transferred from free to not free in 2004, Malaysia has been partly free from the time the information was available in 1998 to 2013 and East Timor changed from not free to partially free in 2002. The bordering countries of Uganda as stated earlier are Sudan, DRC, Somalia, Rwanda, Tanzania and Kenya. All countries but Kenya are living under authoritarian rule. Kenya is partially free. This structural set up of bordering countries can allow bordering countries to emulate or acclimate easier to democratic change the more this ideology in valued, practiced and needed. PNG who just turned from free to not free has been a continuous and contagious cause of instability in the SW pacific region. Their conflicts consisted of PNG complaining of Indonesia flying over their airspace, refugees flooding into PNG, Indonesias acquisition of Irian Jaya after WWII of which an Iranian Guerilla group called Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) sought to dismember Irian Jaya from Indonesia. This was resolved through a Peace Treaty in 1987 when PNG and Indonesia agreed to reduce or contain disputes or conflicts between their nations and settle their disputes by peaceful means. Indonesias territorial disputes with Malaysia occur in the Celebes Sea where both countries both claimed sovereignty over Sipadan and Ligitan islands because the Celeb Sea over the Ambalat block is believed to be rich in mineral resources and still continues however part of this dispute is being handled and was settled by the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Sipadan and Ligitan Case in 2002 and is now awaiting restrictions between the two countries. Compared to Uganda these border disputes, in Indonesia show more democratic characteristics and ideology in how they resolve their disputes.. Uganda and DRC continue to have border wars with each other. There are many dynamics to this war. For instance since 1990 Uganda has been robbing the DRC of their minerals, and according to a United Nations Report, Ugandans politicians and the Congos military have enriched themselves. In 2005 the International Court of Justice ordered Uganda to compensate Kinshasa, finding Uganda guilty of plundering minerals during its five-year occupation in the DRC. Museveni has many interests in the borders. Since Musevenis presidency he has struggled against the DRC due to the LRA invading Uganda in 1986 and murdering, raping and abducting children to use in the military. This war caused tensions between Sudan and Uganda briefly with Sudan believing that they were supporting the rebels. This was short lived however and the two countries joined forces to fight the LRA together. Starting in 2006, Juba talks occurred in Uganda between the government of Uganda and the Lords Resistant Army with the goal of a cease fire and a peace treaty, unfortunately; Joseph Kony, the leader of the LRA, refused to sign the Peace treaty in 2008. This was followed by an attack on Sudanese grounds two months later. Musevenis motives for his interest in bordering countries was to maintain his political position of power and his interest in having a bargaining chip when negotiating with the West. Musevenis interest in Somalia, Rwanda, South Sudan and even Central African Republic is not just about wanting to influence the region. Ugandas political development is reliant on the opinion of the Western Countries as the US alone accounts for almost half of Ugandas National income. By 2001 International agencies such as UNHCR and HRW have become more involved in monitoring Human Rights. These bordering wars, particularly the one with the Congo, effected the economic stability which was reduced from paying wages to the military, as well as taking care of refugees in an already poverty stricken area. In addition, infrastructures that were established to help with import/export were being prevented from being built or ruined. This was also instrumental in causing insecurity of safety, powerlessness and suppression. International forces supported South Korean Border and ideological wars. The US and UN both supporting South Korea and encouraging democratization. North Korea was supported by China and USSR, both Communist countries, therefore supporting communism. North and South Korea were influenced by the International forces ideologies and foreign aid unlike Uganda. The border wars in Korea were initiated by international involvement, as well as by the end to Japans rule after its defeat in WWII. The United Nation forced its demarcation of the North and South with no input from the Koreans. U.S. forces remain in South Korea though the reason for being there at this point are claimed to be to protect South Korea from North Koreas continual attacks and nuclear threats on South Korea. These border wars involve international interest as well as international donors, which help with the unsure peace between the two countries. Ugandas war with LRA and other bordering areas did not receive International Recognition until mid 2000s as NGO and ICJ got involved. However, regardless of the continual war against the LRA, corruption still continues while greed asks to benefit regardless of the situation of death and blocks to democracy. It can however, also be analyzed in a way that might reveal that Ugandas involvement in the Peacekeeping missions for the UN are a move towards democratization. Some Western countries have already froze their budget support to Uganda. Whether more radical sanctions will follow is yet to be seen. Museveni manipulates this system with International Agencies to keep the funds coming in, although donor funds are not being dispersed properly. So though international agencies may have the intent of moving Uganda towards democratization their attempts become fatal. In dealing with Uganda and Musevenis first goal of staying in power, its obvious that the political strategy is different by the way in which it is applied compared to that of Indonesia, South Korea and North Korea. Revealing the balance being nurtured and maintained of both authoritarian and democratic rules. This reveals the borders as being one of the main structural factors missing in Uganda, including Musevenis manipulation and use of these bordering countries to remain in power. This however is one of many factors that make Uganda what it is. Mobilization Regime Legitimacy, Emancipated Values and ModernizationMass mobilization is a major factor in undermining authoritarian regimes in order to transition to democracy. People have to view the authoritarian regime as illegitimate in order to do this. This requires the ideology of the freedom that comes with democracy. Modernization and an emancipated belief in the values of democracy are factors that create mobilization. According to Inglehart and Wetzel, (2003) once socioeconomic modernization enables a society to move out of poverty and subsistence economy, the latent desire for freedom, expression, and rights in every human being will be emancipated. The development as freedom argument (Amartya Sen 1999) can be understood that material resources accumulated by socioeconomic development will create economic means, then individuals will make demands for more and then securing civil and political rights (Inglehart, Wetzel, and Klingamann, 2003). Human development can be described as an integration of socioeconomic, modernization and changes in values that support the desire and motivations for democracy. These emerging values motivate mass mobilization and collective action. In evaluating mass mobilization as one of the primary factors for the cause of democratization, I will apply this analysis by reviewing the structural and institutional rational factors in Uganda that have prevented mass mobilization to occur, in turn keeping it at its hybrid status. I will evaluate legitimization of regimes and what that entails, and then I will recognize how these factors emancipate or repress the values of the civil society in Uganda.Illegitimating an authoritarian regime is not easy if a country is benefitting in some way from the regime in power, particularly if its power is less authoritarian than the prior regime as is the case with Museveni and Uganda. Legitimizing Musevenis semi-democratic regime was not difficult because of the difficulties the people of Uganda faced from the prior regimes. Moreover, the fact that Uganda has made substantial economic gains since Museveni took over, has helped legitimize the regime and its autocratic tendencies. Since 1990 the poverty rates in Uganda have decreased, with an annual growth rate of 5% between 2005-2007. Despite the global financial crisis, it continued to grow. During the following decade, Museveni donor transfers multiplied more than eightfold reaching $819.5 million annually by 2000. This represented growing confidence in Ugandas economy as well as promoting the legitimacy of the National Resistant Movement. The discovery of large oil deposits in 2006, caused speculation that Uganda would become a major producer of oil in Africa. With the amount of oil amounting to US $2 billion a year. Legitimization of Museveni was furthered. by donors supplying aid to an undemocratic system. The Donors involved, like the people of Uganda, were more lenient on Museveni by not following through on the punishments for Musevenis refusal to met the strict policies of political reform. This was allowed because the horror caused from the prior regimes were much more violent and destructive on Ugandans than Musevenis regime. Ugandas constitution promoted civil liberties and political rights, however, Museveni manipulated them to maintain power. He found these manipulations necessary in order to avoid the punishment that comes with stepping down from the presidency, (losing power in these regime types can mean prosecution, torture, being ousted or all of these.) He claims his action will prevent an authoritarian regime from taking over, causing Uganda to return to its pre Museveni state. In this way Ugandas hybridity is being intentionally maintained. Museveni and the NRM seem much less threatening to the Peace and Security of the people of Ugandas long-term and short-term growth. This makes fairness, equality and freedom less discernable. South Korea is a textbook example of socioeconomic modernization leading to erosion of support for authoritarian regimes and demand for democratic openings. This allowed for the mobilization of massive student uprising combined with U.S. and U.N Support. South Korea democratized in 1987. The previous regime provided a better economy, leaving the democratic regime to inherit a better economic state that supported democracy. The changes in government until democratization have varied from democratic to autocratic. Syung-Man Ree 1948-60 was the president of the first regime in South Korea, however Rees regime ended by student revolt in 1960. From 1961 to 1963 Major General Park Chung-Hee eliminated the second republic, that was ruled by the military, with a coup. Park developed a five-year economic development plan, which was a policy that relied on an export orientated industrial policy. Economic and technological growth improved the standard of living as well as the expansion of the opportunity for education. Park maintained ties with the U.S. and continued to receive large amounts of aid. At the time of Parks presidency the term limits were only for two terms. Park tried to amend the constitution through the National Assembly to seek a third term. Though protest against this amendment tried to prevent this from happening it failed and park was re-elected for a third term. Park declared Martial law in 1972, which dissolved the National Assembly and suspended the constitution. The Yusin Constitution was initiated, allowing Park effective control over the parliament and providing the possibility of a permanent presidency. By indirect elections Park was re-elected for another term. The director of Korea Central Intelligence Agency had Park assassinated. Following the assassination, a republic was established by the election of Chun Doo-Hwan as president by indirect elections. He had unmet promises for democratic justice, hence he lost his legitimacy. An outcry from the public occurred in 1987, when a Seoul University student died under police interrogation. Roh-Tae Woo presented a declaration of political reforms calling for direct presidential elections and the restoration of civil rights. In 1987 the National Referendum passed the revised constitution. Roh-Tae Woo began the 6th Republic as president. This demonstratged a clear assertion for democracy. This accumulation of the institutionalization of democracy, the expanding economy (through donor roles and support of International Institutions) that caused modernization, and the emancipation of values to fight for democracy influenced the formation of the democracy in South Korea.The financial crisis during the Suharto regime in Indonesia between 1997-1998 is another example of the loss of legitimacy according to socioeconomic factors. When the Indonesian economy was trapped in a long period of serious crisis the regime lost its favor of the public and/or its legitimacy. Though Suharto originally helped the economy grow by an average of 7% through the decades, he arranged it so that his children and cronies were the beneficiaries of privatization schemes; causing inflation to rise high and fast and unemployment to expand following the Asian financial crisis. This provoked mass mobilization through urban riots, which caused Suharto to resign in 1998. Vice President B.J. Habibie succeeded Suharto. He then removed legal constraints on the press, labor unions and political parties earning legitimization. In 1999 Indonesia held its first free and fair elections since 1955. (Freedom House 2013) The Peoples Consultative Assembly made of elected lawmakers and appointed official chose a Muslim leader Abdurrhman Wahid as President and Megawati Sukarnoputri as vice president. Due to charges of corruption Wahid was impeached and Magawati became president in 2001. In 2004 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and Jusuf Kalla won the presidency and vice presidency of the countries first elections. In North Korea the transfer of power is inherited, therefore, only one family has governed North Korea for its entire existence. Soviet leaders first installed Kim Il Sung in 1948 and they remained there until his death in 1994. He equipped every elementary school with a special training room where the children were indoctrinated with the regime teaching. In 1998 the constitution was amended claiming him the eternal president. His son Kim Jung Il took over power and continued his legacy until his death in 2011. A North Korea remains isolated from the international community, with governmental, economic and other operations veiled in secrecy and is referred to as the Hermit Kingdom. In 1979 North Korea renegotiated an international debt then defaulted on them in 1980 except for the debt with Japan. A large portion of North Koreas GDP goes to its military. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union North Koreas economy stagnated. North Korea was known as the worlds first and only industrialized country to lose the capacity to feed itself (Christopher Trautvetter 2010). Presently North Koreas GDP is 5% of the Souths GDP and they continue to make threats on South Korea as well as defies Nuclear Proliferation treaty obligations that isolate them internationally. North Koreas dictatorship continues to rule through, suppression, violence, neglect, greed, intolerance and coercion, that continues to be passed down from generation to generation.CONCLUSIONIn conclusion, based on the aforementioned information, Uganda has been in its hybrid status for as long as it has due to the various structural factors missing that promote and maintain democratization. These structural factors include bordering countries lack of security (and its economic effects), what regime type control the bordering countries, the involvement of international roles and cultural roles, the institutional set-up for the purpose of legitimacy as opposed to democracy (manipulated by Museveni), the lack of modernization (that imposes the value and awareness for democracy from citizens), the lack of the masses illegitimating Museveni (leading to suppression of the emancipation of values), and finally motivation to promote mass mobilization to undermine authoritarian regime creating the demise of authoritarianism and rise towards democracy

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