tessler issj article

Democracy and the political cultureorientations of ordinary citizens:a typology for the Arab world andbeyond

Mark Tessler and Eleanor Gao

Political culture orientationand its relevance fordemocracy

Studies of democracy and democratic transitionsplace emphasis on the attitudes, values andbehaviour patterns of ordinary citizens. Thisresearch argues that successful democratisationrequires not only support for democracy among asignificant proportion of a country’s populationbut also that its citizens pos-sess norms and behaviourpatterns that are conducive todemocracy – in other words,that they possess a democraticpolitical culture orientation.Some analysts suggest that thisis a precondition for a demo-cratic transition (Huntington1993, p. 13). More common isthe view that democraticnorms and behaviour neednot precede, but rather canfollow, an elite-led transitioninvolving the reform of politi-cal institutions and procedures(Rose 1997, p. 98; Schmitterand Karl 1993, p. 47). Indeed,according to this argument,citizen orientations conducive to democracymay emerge in response to the experience of ademocratic transition. Debates about timingand sequence notwithstanding, there is generalagreement that sustainable democracy ultimatelydepends not only on the commitments and actionsof political elites but also on the normative andbehavioural predispositions of ordinary citizens.

These insights are derived primarily fromthe study of new democracies. Less commonlyexamined are the politically relevant attitudes,values and behaviour patterns of citizens innon-democracies, especially those in the Arabworld. Against this background, the presentanalysis uses recent survey data from Jordan, thePalestinian Territorires (West Bank and Gaza)and Algeria; three very different Arab polities,to investigate the nature and structure of

citizen orientations relatedto democracy and govern-ance. It also considers thedegree to which patternsand relationships observedin these three political com-munities may be generali-sable to other Arab coun-tries and perhaps beyond.

Almond and Verba’swork, The civic culture, wasthe first major attempt atunderstanding the relation-ship between citizen orien-tations and democracy(Almond and Verba 1963,1980). Among the parti-cular orientations theyexplore are obligation to

participate, sense of efficacy and level of inter-personal trust. Although Almond and Verba’sstudy was later criticised for a number oflimitations, such as its failure to examine sub-cultures, it was the first large-scale comparativesurvey of its kind and established the importanceof studying the attitudes, values and behaviourpatterns of ordinary men and women. Since that

Mark Tessler is Samuel J. ElversveldCollegiate Professor in the Departmentof Political Science at the University ofMichigan, where he is also Vice Provostfor International Affairs. His public opi-nion research in the Middle East has beenfunded by the National Science Founda-tion, the US Department of State, and theUS Institute of Peace. He is PrincipalInvestigator of the Arab DemocracyBarometer Project.Email: [email protected] Gao is a doctoral student in theDepartment of Political Science at theUniversity of Michigan. She specializes inMiddle East politics and has worked andstudied in the West Bank and Syria. She isthe co-author with Professor Tessler of arecent article in Journal of Democracy.

ISSJ 192rUNESCO2009. PublishedbyBlackwell PublishingLtd., 9600GarsingtonRoad,Oxford, OX4 2DK,UKand350Main Street,Malden,MA02148,USA.

time, especially during the last decade and a half,there have been many empirical investigations ofcitizen orientations and their relationship todemocratisation. The general conclusion, assummarised by Inglehart, is that ‘‘culture plays acrucial role in democracy . . . its survival dependson the values and beliefs of ordinary citizens’’(Inglehart 2000, p. 96).

These studies have examined a broad arrayof attitudes, values and behaviour patterns.Almond and Verba focused on political cogni-tion, feelings toward government and politics,levels of partisanship, sense of civic obligationand political efficacy. Using World Values Sur-vey data from 1990 and 1995, Inglehart inves-tigated the relationship between democraticachievement and adherence to self-expressionvalues, including trust, tolerance and politicalactivism. In another empirical study based ondata from Eastern Europe, the authors exam-ined support for freedom of expression, politicaltolerance, respect for competing ideas andpreferences, political interest and a willingnessto participate in the political process (Rose et al.1998, p. 98). Dimensions of political culture thathave received attention in other studies includepolitical interest, political tolerance, valuation ofliberty, rights consciousness, support for civildisobedience, support for media independenceand political participation (Booth and Richard1998; Dalton 2000; Garcia-Rivero et al. 2002;Gibson et al. 1992; Inglehart and Welzel 2003;Nathan and Shi 1993; Rice and Feldman 1997).

Although many analyses have focused onthe extent and distribution of these and otherdemocratic norms throughout a population, it ispossible that these dimensions of politicalculture do form a coherent syndrome. In otherwords, there may be no one-dimensional demo-cratic political culture orientation, meaning thata citizen who possesses one kind of democraticnorm is not necessarily likely to possess others.This seems particularly probable in countriessuch as those in the Arab world, where ordinarymen and women have had relatively little experi-ence of democratic governance. On the otherhand, there is no reason to assume that there areno interconnections at all among relevantattitudes, values and behaviour patterns. Inlight of these possibilities, a goal of the presentinvestigation is to understand the degree towhich normative and behavioural predispositions

relevant for democracy are associated with oneanother and, more specifically, to offer insightsabout the conceptual meaning of the patternsthat are observed.

Elements of democraticpolitical culture orientation

As noted, different authors have placed empha-sis on different attitudes, values and behaviourpatterns when discussing the elements of ademocratic political culture orientation. Amongthese are six that may be examined with the dataavailable for the present study: support forgender equality; tolerance; interpersonal trust;civic participation; political interest and politicalknowledge. The importance and relevance ofeach of these is briefly discussed.

The most recent Arab Human Develop-ment Report published by the United NationsDevelopment Programme (2006) discusses theimportance of gender equality and women’sempowerment both in general and with respectto the Arab world in particular. Democracy ismeaningless if half the citizens of a countrydo not have equal rights and equal access topolitical influence and power. But granting theserights is not sufficient to promote the involve-ment and inclusion of women in public life:rights can be granted without removing thesocial barriers that prevent women from becom-ing full citizens. For a polity to be truly demo-cratic there also needs to be broad publicsupport for the principle and practice of genderequality: ordinary citizens need to appreciatethat gender equality is desirable for ethicalreasons and is in the public interest. It is in thisconnection that a recent study by Inglehart andNorris (2003) documents the differencebetween western and Muslim societies in publicattitudes towards women’s rights and opportu-nities and suggests that a lower level of supportfor gender equality is among the reasons whydemocracy lags in Muslim countries. Similarfindings are presented by Fish (2002).

Not only should all citizens be accordedequal rights; their diverse ideas and preferencesshould be respected as well. Tolerance andrespect for diversity are necessary in order fordemocracy to function effectively. At the most

198 Mark Tessler and Eleanor Gao

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basic level, a tolerant citizenry can prevent civilstrife, since the abridgement of minority rightsby a dominant majority can lead to violence andconflict (Gibson 1995, 1996, 1998). Beyond this,however, tolerance is an indispensable feature ofdemocracy for two interrelated reasons. On theone hand, democracy requires the equality of allcitizens before the state and under the law andfor this to be accepted as legitimate it isnecessary that the right to hold and expressviews with which one disagrees be accepted aswell. On the other hand, tolerance for diverseand opposing viewpoints is necessary for thepolitical contestation and open exchange ofideas that are essential for democracy (Garcia-Rivera et al. 2002). Without respect for the rightto advocate, argue, dissent and debate, citizenswould be unable to hold their leaders accoun-table and government by the consent of thegoverned would not be possible.

Along with tolerance, citizens must trustone another in a functioning democracy; theymust believe that most men and women are fair-minded and reasonable and, accordingly, thatcitizens like themselves are the best judges ofhow a country should be governed. Otherwise,they are unlikely to distinguish respect for therule of law from uncritical deference to thosein authority (Rose et al. 1998). In addition,interpersonal trust is necessary for citizens tocoalesce and engage in collective political action,which is also essential for democracy to functioneffectively. Putnam (1992) is among those whomake this point, arguing that trust is a require-ment for strong civic organisations, which intheir turn improve the quality of governance intwo important ways. On the demand side,citizens in communities with high levels of trustcan insist upon better government. They canengage in collective action if the government isunresponsive to their needs. On the supply side,representative government benefits from areserve of citizens as potential lawmakers.Trustful citizens understand the necessity ofcooperation and compromise in a democraticregime.

Civic participation is another importantcomponent of a democratic political cultureorientation. First, a vibrant civil society is animportant check on the power of the govern-ment. Interest groups and other civic associa-tions allow citizens to monitor government

actions, articulate and aggregate interests andexert political influence. This is important in newdemocracies, as norms of governance have notbeen well established and power can be easilyabused (Diamond 1999).

Second, civic participation fosters thedevelopment of some of the skills that are usefulfor democratic citizens. Those who have learnedhow to organise activities, direct meetings andprioritise goals are more likely to be effective inorganising a demonstration, circulating a peti-tion or preparing a ballot initiative. Civicengagement can also increase feelings of efficacy,which, in turn, promotes political involvement(Verba et al. 1995).

On a cognitive level, political interest andpolitical knowledge are also very important foreffective democracy. Individuals who are inter-ested in politics are more likely to follow politicalaffairs and to participate in civic activities (Verbaet al. 1995). Engaged citizens are also likely tomake effective monitors of public policy andgovernment action. Political knowledge, which isassociated with political interest, is important forthe same reasons. Citizens aremore likely to learnabout politics and make informed assessmentswhen an issue is important to them and if theypossess relevant political knowledge (DelliCarpini 2000). Political interest and politicalknowledge can thus improve the quality as well asthe quantity of participation by allowing citizensto make enlightened choices and helping them toresist elite manipulation (Delli Carpini andKeeter 1996).

Cases and data

Data from representative national surveys car-ried out in Jordan, the Palestinian Territories(West Bank and Gaza), and Algeria in 2003–2004 are used to examine the political orienta-tions of ordinary citizens in these three Arabnon-democracies. Surveys were conductedin Jordan and the Palestinian Territories inDecember 2003 and in Algeria in summer 2004.These three countries were chosen for bothpractical and analytical reasons. The practicalreasons include the availability of local scholarsand institutions with substantial experience inthe conduct of rigorous survey research and,as reflected in their Freedom House ratings as

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partly free, a political climate that permits theconduct of public opinion research.

The analytical considerations included sys-tem-level differences that make cross-nationalcomparison instructive. Algeria, a republic, isone of the largest states in the Arab world, withconsiderable wealth from oil and natural gas andpossessing a tradition of state socialism andcentralised planning. For much of the timesince its independence in 1962 Algeria has beengoverned by a cohort of military and civilianleaders, with military officers having preponder-ant influence. Jordan, a monarchy, tends to besocially conservative, is organised to a consider-able extent along tribal lines and is amongthe less populous and also the poorer countriesof the Arab world. Jordanian society is alsomarked by an important cleavage between theJordanians of Palestinian origin and otherJordanians. The Palestinian Territories, whichare struggling for statehood, have a traditionof secular nationalism and strong relations withthe Palestinian diaspora. Until very recentlythe Palestinian national movement had beensymbolised and led for nearly four decades by asingle individual.

The three political communities also differwith regard to their history of foreign relations.Algeria has a legacy of intense French colonial-ism and continues to have very important tiesto France. The British were the dominantimperial power prior to Jordanian independenceand Jordan is today one of the most importantAmerican allies in the Arab world, while thePalestinian political experience is shaped by itshistoric and continuing relationship with Zion-ism and Israel.

In the context of the Arabworld, these threecountries constitute somethingof a ‘‘most differentsystem’’ research design. Although none resemblesthe small, oil-rich countries of the Arab Gulf, theyare otherwise at least somewhat representative ofthe region’s republics, monarchies and strongpresidential systems. Any pattern observed in allthree countries may thus be at least somewhatgeneralisable to other parts of the Arab world,since it will have been found to obtain underwidely differing conditions. For the same reason,patterns common to Jordan, the PalestinianTerritories and Algeria may also be applicable tonon-democracies in other world regions. Alterna-tively, the unique attributes and circumstances of

each country will help to define in conceptualterms the locus of applicability of patterns foundonly in that country. With only three cases, it willnot be possible to eliminate multicollinearity; sothat differences among the countries will remainover-determined. But Jordan, the PalestinianTerritories and Algeria are different enough tobe able to offer plausible propositions about thecountry-level attributes associated with particularwithin-system patterns and relationships.

The surveys in Jordan and the PalestinianTerritories were funded by a grant from theNational Science Foundation and the surveyin Algeria was funded by the American Institutefor Maghreb Studies. All are based onrepresentative national samples. The survey inJordan was conducted by the Centre forStrategic Studies at the University of Jordan,the survey in the Palestinian Territories by thePalestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Re-search in Ramallah and the survey in Algeria bya team at the University of Algiers. All threesurveys involved three-stage cluster samplingbased on the most recent national census; 1994in Jordan, 1997 in the West Bank and Gaza, and1998 in Algeria. In Jordan and the PalestinianTerritories, districts or clusters were first ran-domly selected from the list of all clusters in thenational census, followed by a random selectionof households within each of the selected clusters,and a Kish table was finally used to choose theperson in each household to be interviewed. InAlgeria, governorates and then communes wereselected randomly and quota sampling based onage, sex and education was employed at thecommune level. Census data were used toestablish the quotas.

The same interview schedule was adminis-tered in Jordan and the Palestinian Territories. Itwas used in Algeria as well, although here it wassupplemented by a number of items dealing withdomestic policy issues in that country.

The survey instrument contained itemsmeasuring the six normative and behaviouralorientations discussed above, including supportfor gender equality, tolerance, interpersonaltrust, civic participation, political interest andpolitical knowledge. Each of these orientationsis measured by an additive index constructed bycombining two or more highly inter-correlateditems from the interview schedule. Further, in allthree countries, each index was constructed


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using the same items, all of which are given in theappendix to this article. All the items possessface validity.

In addition, evidence of reliability, furtherconfidence in validity and an indication of cross-national conceptual and measurement equiva-lence are provided by the consistently significantinter-correlations among the items; the sameitems are related to each other to a statisticallysignificant degree for each one of the six indicesin each one of the three countries.

Analysis and findings

Dimensions and types of politicalculture orientation

Factor analysis was used to explore interrelation-ships among the six indices of normative andbehavioural orientations discussed above. Asstated, each index is composed of the samesignificantly inter-correlated items in Jordan, the

Palestinian Territories, and Algeria, thus max-imising conceptual and measurement equivalenceacross the three countries. Strikingly, the results ofthe factor analyses, shown inTable 1, are the samefor the three countries. In each case a two-factorsolution emerges. Both prior to and after rotation,political tolerance and support for gender equalityload highly on one factor; political interest,political knowledge, civic participation, andinterpersonal trust load highly on a second factor.All factor loadings are robust, with the partialexception of interpersonal trust, which loads moststrongly on the same factor but at a somewhatlower level in all three cases.

Table 1 shows that the elements of politicalculture explored in this investigation neitherform a one-dimensional political culture orien-tation nor are completely unrelated to oneanother. Rather, they consistently subdivideinto two identifiable clusters. One, composedof political tolerance and support for genderequality, might be characterised as a pluralismor diversity dimension. The other, composed of

Satellite dishes in Al Anaser, Algiers, Algeria, February 2006. AFP/Fayez Nureldine


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political interest, political knowledge, civicparticipation, and interpersonal trust, might becharacterised as an involvement dimension.The data not only permit the delineation of

these conceptually distinct dimensions; they alsodemonstrate their empirical independence.Whilesome citizens possess the orientations associatedwith both dimensions or neither dimension to asignificant degree, the political culture orienta-tion of other citizens is characterised by thenorms of one dimension but not the other.

Table 2 shows the four possible ways thesetwo normative and behavioural dimensions mightintersect: (a) a strong pluralism orientation and astrong involvement orientation; (b) a strongpluralism orientation and a weak involvementorientation; (c) a weak pluralism orientation and astrong involvement orientation; and (d) a weakpluralism orientation and a weak involvementorientation. For convenience, and also as a steptowards conceptual clarification, these combina-tions may be described, respectively, as (a) demo-cratic, (b) indifferent, (c) activist and (d) parochial.

Although they are to some extent ideal types,each represents a particular political cultureorientation that characterises a subset of ordinarycitizens in Jordan, the Palestinian Territories, andAlgeria and, quite possibly, in other non-demo-cratic societies in the Arab world and elsewhere.

An individual whose political cultural orien-tation may be described as democratic is tolerantof diverse political views, supports gender equal-ity, is interested in politics, is knowledgeableabout politics, participates in civic and associa-tional life, and is trusting of fellow citizens.

One whose orientation may be described asactivist is not tolerant of diverse political viewsand does not support gender equality but isinterested in politics, knowledgeable about politics,active in civic and associational life, and trusting of

Table 2: Political culture orientation based on pluralism and involvement dimensions taken together

Pluralism dimension

Strong Weak

Involvementdimension

Strong Democratic: A democratic citizen is tolerantof diverse political views, supports genderequality, is interested in and knowledgeableabout politics, participates in civic andassociational life and is trusting of fellowcitizens

Activist: An activist citizen is not tolerant ofdiverse political views and does not supportgender equality but is interested in andknowledgeable about politics, participatesin civic and associational life and trusting offellow citizens

Weak Indifferent: An indifferent citizen is tolerantof diverse political views and supportsgender equality but is not interested in andknowledgeable about politics, does notparticipate in civic and associational life,and is not trusting of fellow citizens

Parochial: A parochial citizen is not tolerantof diverse political views, does not supportgender equality, is not interested in orknowledgeable about politics, does notparticipate in civic and associational life andis not trusting of fellow citizens

Table 1: Factor loadings of indices measuring politicaltolerance, support for gender equality, political interest,political knowledge, civic participation and interpersonaltrust in Jordan, the Palestinian Territories and Algeria

Unrotatedsolution

Rotatedsolution

First Second First Second

Political toleranceJordan 0.132 0.728 0.149 0.725

Palestinian Territories 0.173 0.657 0.076 0.675

Algeria 0.176 0.578 0.093 0.597

Support for gender equalityJordan � 0.131 0.757 � 0.113 0.760

Palestinian Territories 0.050 0.730 � 0.057 0.729

Algeria � 0.323 0.677 0.003 0.750

Political interestJordan 0.674 0.025 0.675 0.009Palestinian Territories 0.698 � 0.145 0.712 � 0.042Algeria 0.676 0.379 0.773 0.047

Political knowledgeJordan 0.752 0.148 0.755 0.130Palestinian Territories 0.738 0.192 0.703 0.298Algeria 0.666 0.394 0.771 0.066

Civic participationJordan 0.722 � 0.216 0.717 � 0.233Palestinian Territories 0.674 � 0.094 0.680 0.005Algeria 0.697 � 0.150 0.562 � 0.438

Interpersonal trustJordan 0.217 0.144 0.220 0.139Palestinian Territories 0.383 � 0.334 0.427 � 0.274Algeria 0.434 � 0.216 0.297 0.383

Note: Figures are in bold for items that have a high factorloading and consequently help to show what the factormeasures.


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fellow citizens. Perhaps reflecting a more ideologi-cal perspective, this person engages with politicaland public life but does not accord legitimacy toalternative views, preferences and lifestyles.

An individual whose political cultural orien-tationmay be described as indifferent is tolerant ofdiverse political views and supports gender equal-ity but is not interested in politics, is not knowl-edgeable about politics, does not participate incivic and associational life, and is not trusting offellow citizens. This person is both disengaged andnon-judgemental, unconcerned with either politi-cal affairs or the behaviour of others.

Finally, an individual whose political cul-tural orientation may be described as parochialis not tolerant of diverse political views, does notsupport gender equality, is not interested inpolitics, is not knowledgeable about politics,does not participate in civic and associationallife, and is not trusting of fellow citizens.

Three possibilities were explored to com-bine, respectively, the two inter-correlatedindices associated with a pluralism dimensionand the four inter-correlated indices associatedwith an involvement dimension: first, factorscores were generated; then a scale was con-structed by adding indices, each of which wasfirst adjusted to a range between 1 and 10 toprovide measurement equivalence; and finallyan additive scale was constructed in the sameway with adjusted indices weighted in propor-tion to their factor loadings. These threepossibilities yield virtually identical results. Inno case was the correlation coefficient betweenany two of the three possible involvementdimension measures or any two of the threepossible pluralism dimension measures lowerthan 0.950.

In the additive measures as well as thefactor scores, and regardless of which measuresare used, the two political culture dimensions areindependent of one another. In no case was thecorrelation coefficient between any measure ofthe pluralism dimension and any measure of theinvolvement dimension greater than 0.050. It isthus the case that there are a significant numberof respondents in all four of the categoriesdescribed in Table 2. While some respondentsare either high or low on both the pluralism andinvolvement dimensions, there are many otherswho have dissimilar tendencies on the twodimensions.

Cross-national variation in politicalculture orientation

It is necessary to specify cutting points thatdistinguish between strength and weakness onthe pluralism and the involvement dimension inorder to juxtapose the two dichotomisedmeasuresand classify individuals with respect to the fourtypes of political culture orientation describedabove. For purposes of the present analysis, thecutting point selected was the midpoint betweenthe highest and lowest score of the unrotatedfactor scores for each dimension.

Table 3 shows the proportion of Jordanian,Palestinian and Algerian respondents with strongand weak ratings on the pluralism and theinvolvement dimension based on these cuttingpoints. Table 4 shows the distribution of politicalculture orientations among Jordanians, Palesti-nians and Algerians that results from a juxtaposi-tion of these dichotomised measures of thepluralism and involvement dimensions.

Table 4 shows both some similarities andsome differences in the distribution of politicalculture orientations across the three countries.The distributions are fairly similar in theJordanian and Palestinian cases. In both coun-tries only 11–12 per cent of the respondents have

Table 3: Pluralism and involvement dimensions of poli-tical culture of Jordanian, Palestinian and Algerianrespondents

Jordan(%)

PalestinianTerritories (%)

Algeria(%)

Pluralismdimension

Strong 26.4 31.5 70.1Weak 73.6 68.5 29.9

Involvementdimension

Strong 36.9 33.2 53.5Weak 63.1 66.8 46.5

Table 4: Types of political culture orientation of Jorda-nian, Palestinian and Algerian respondents

Jordan(%)

PalestinianTerritories

(%)Algeria(%)

Political cultureorientation

Democratic 11.2 11.9 37.0Activist 15.2 21.3 16.5Indifferent 25.7 19.6 33.1Parochial 47.9 47.2 13.3All 100 100 100


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a democratic orientation while 47–48 per centhave a parochial orientation. Among those whohave neither orientation, an activist pattern issomewhat more common among Palestiniansand an indifferent pattern is somewhat morecommon among Jordanians. This former findingmay be the result of the particular Palestiniansituation, with a heightened degree of politicalconsciousness and ideological militancy devel-oping in response to Israeli occupation.

More generally, however, the findingssuggest that comparatively few individuals ineither country possess a political culture orienta-tion that is democratic with respect to both ofthe dimensions examined, and that nearly half ofthe ordinary men and women in each country donot have a democratic orientation with respectto either dimension.

The Algerian case stands out from Jordanand the Palestinian Territories in that a strongrating is more common than a weak rating withrespect to both the pluralism and the involve-ment dimensions, and so there is also a higherproportion of citizens with a democratic poli-tical culture orientation. Specifically, 37 per centof the Algerian respondents possess a demo-cratic orientation. This may be partly explainedfor the pluralism dimension by some wordingdifferences introduced on one question by theAlgerian research team.1 But the differencebetween Algeria and the other two cases issimilar for the involvement dimension, for whichquestion wording and coding were identical inall three countries. Thus, even allowing for someminor measurement-related variation, it seemsreasonable to conclude that some of the historyand political experience that set Algeria apartfrom Jordan and the Palestinian Territories havecontributed to the greater emergence, in relativeterms, of a democratic political culture.

Among the factors that may help to explainthe difference between Algeria and the other twocountries are Algeria’s prolonged and intensecolonial experience, which introduced severesocial dislocation and undermined traditionalinstitutions and relationships, the mobilisationand modernisation resulting from Algeria’sextended experience with centralised planningand socialist development after independenceand, closer to the present, the country’s rela-tively deeper experience with partisan diversityand competitive elections.

The latter observation, if correct, suggeststhat experience with partisan competition helpsto foster a democratic political culture orienta-tion, which would be an important finding givendebates in the literature about whether such anorientation is a precondition for democratictransitions or can follow elite-led transitionsinvolving the reform of political institutions andprocedures.

Conclusion

The preceding comments are not intended to bean adequate explanation of the observed cross-national variation in political culture orientationpatterns. Such a discussion is beyond the scopeof the present inquiry. Nor should it be assumedthat the distributions reported in Table 4 areunchanging, since global, regional or country-specific events might alter the relative impor-tance of some political culture orientationcategories in one or more countries. But whilethese are subjects for future investigation, withboth longitudinal data and data from morecountries, the present analysis provides evidencefor several significant conclusions.

First, although the literature identifies anumber of attitudes, values and behaviourpatterns associated with a democratic politicalculture, in none of the three countries consideredin this study do these norms constitute a one-dimensional orientation. Instead, the six norma-tive and behavioural measures that have beenexamined consistently subdivide into two dis-tinct and independent dimensional clusters, andthese clusters are the same in Jordan, thePalestinian Territories and Algeria.

One dimension, which we have termedpluralism, is composed of political toleranceand support for gender equality. The other,which we have termed involvement, is composedof political knowledge, political interest,civic participation and interpersonal trust. Thatidentical patterns should be found in these threecountries with very different political, economicand social attributes suggests that this dimen-sional structure may be present in a broadarray of non-democratic countries, including,perhaps, some outside the Arab world.

Second, the analysis also suggests the utilityof juxtaposing the dimensions of pluralism and


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involvement in order to form a two-dimensionaltypology of political culture orientations asso-ciated with democracy. Individuals with strongratings on measures of both pluralism andinvolvement resemble the ideal democratic citizendescribed in the literature. Their political cultureorientation may be termed democratic. Otherindividuals, however, have strong ratings on themeasure of only one dimension, or onmeasures ofneither pluralism nor involvement. Their politicalculture orientations may be termed, respectively,activist, indifferent and parochial.

Although the proportion of citizens whopossess each political culture orientation to adegree depends on the way the two dimensionsare dichotomised and juxtaposed, it is significantthat there are substantial cross-national differ-ences in these proportions when the sameclassification procedures are employed. Thissuggests that while the typology may be usefulfor mapping political culture orientations, fu-ture research should undertake to identify thecountry-level attributes and experiences thataccount for variance in the distribution of theseorientations. Future research may also refine

this typology by incorporating dimensions thatgo beyond pluralism and involvement.

Finally, the analysis shows that there issignificant cross-national variation in the within-country distributions across the four politicalculture orientation categories. This, in turn, raisesimportant questions for future research, bothabout the causes and the consequences of varia-tion across andwithin countries. On the one hand,it will be instructive to investigate the reasons whya particular kind of political culture orientation ismore common in some countries and lesscommon in others. It will be similarly instructiveto ask why some citizens in a country exhibit onekind of political culture orientation while othersexhibit a different orientation – and to investigatethe factors that either promote or discourage ademocratic political culture orientation.

On the other hand, the consequences ofparticular distributions deserve attention as well.For example, are some distributions of politicalculture orientation more conducive to democracythan others, or to particular kinds of ideologicaltendencies or policy preferences? These questionsoffer a rich agenda for future research.

Note

1. As shown in the appendix, oneof the two items pertaining totolerance was different in Algeria

from that in Jordan and thePalestinian Territories. This item

pertains to the rights of non-Muslim citizens.

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Appendix: items used to measure dependent and independentvariables

Political tolerance People sometimes talk about the factors that make a person qualified fornational leadership. On this card are listed six of the qualifications to whichdifferent people would give priority. Please say which one of these youyourself consider the most important. Which would be the next mostimportant? And which would be third? Coded according to whether‘‘openness to diverse political ideas’’ ranks first or second.Jordan and the Palestinian Territories: Do you disagree or agree with thisstatement: Christian citizens of our country should have the same rights asMuslim citizens to hold any political office, including the president of the state.Algeria: People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should befor the next 10 years. On this card are listed four of the goals to which differentpeople would give priority. Would you please say which one of these youyourself consider themost important.Which is the secondmore important andwhich is the thirdmost important? Coded according towhether ‘‘assuring equalrights for all citizens, regardless of religion or gender’’ ranks first or second.

Support for genderequality

Do you disagree or agree with this statement: ‘‘On the whole men makebetter political leaders than women do’’?Do you disagree or agree with this statement: ‘‘A university education ismore important for a boy than a girl’’?Do you disagree or agree with this statement: ‘‘A woman may work outsidethe home if she wishes’’?

Political interest How important is politics in your life?When you get together with your friends, would you say that you discusspolitical matters frequently, occasionally or never?

Political knowledge Can you name the Foreign Minister?Can you name the Minister of Finance?Can you name the Speaker of Parliament?How often do you read the newspaper?

Civic participation How often do you interact with people at social, cultural or youth groups?How often do you interact with people at your mosque or church or atreligious associations?How often do you interact with people at political groups, clubs ordiscussion groups?How often do you interact with people at your professional associations?How often do you interact with people at sports or creation groups?

Political trust Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or thatmost people cannot be trusted?I will read some statements about social and political issues. Please indicateyour agreement or disagreement with each. ‘‘You can trust no one thesedays’’.


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