television, individualism, and social capital

Television, Individualism, and Social CapitalAuthor(s): Allan McBrideSource: PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Sep., 1998), pp. 542-552Published by: American Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/420614 .Accessed: 16/06/2014 09:08

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

American Political Science Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toPS: Political Science and Politics.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.89 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 09:08:10 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=apsahttp://www.jstor.org/stable/420614?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

Television, Individualism, and Social Capital Allan McBride, University of Southern Mississippi

Students of political culture and

political theory (Pool 1990; Post- man 1985; Merelman 1984, 1989, 1991; Habermas 1975) hypothesize that values associated with individualism have become increasingly prevalent in recent years, with distressing consequences for politics and gover- nance. Putnam (1995), in an article that appeared in these pages, ob- serves that there has been a decline of "social capital"' in the United States since 1972 as well, as measured by the number of visits Ameri- cans make to family and friends, the number of organizations to which they belong, the amount of trust they report having in other people, and the amount of involvement they report in politics. Ehrenhalt, in his discussion of the tenure of the late Mayor Daley of Chicago, notes that the United States has changed from a society that reveres obedience, authority, order, and a closed political system, to one that reveres freedom, choice, and an open political system.

To Americans of the baby-boom generation, authority will always be a word with sinister connotations, calling forth a rush of uncomfort- able memories about the schools, churches, and families in which baby-boomers grew up. (1997, 85)

It is not only the case that social capital has declined, but political capital, as measured by partisanship and confidence in the institutions of government, has also declined over the past several decades (Luttbeg and Gant 1995). If individualism is a causal factor in the decline of social and political capital, the relationship can be explained by the fact that

individualism is by nature loose- bounded (Thompson, Ellis, and Wil- davsky 1990); self-seeking behavior is the norm, as are self-negotiated relationships. Organizations that make undue demands upon their members, without providing clearly demonstrable benefits, are unlikely to be successful in gaining or retain- ing members.

The waxing of the individualist moon over America and the declin- ing stock of capital that supports community development share a common cause according to Putnam (1995) and Postman (1985): television. Their arguments are arresting and find support in the work of John Robinson (1981, 1990a, 1990b), who has noted that television viewing is crowding out alternative leisure activities and has been doing so since 1965. If these scholars are correct, television is tearing the social fabric while destroying social capital because there are only so many hours in the day. As people spend more time with television, they have less time available for other activities.

Whether television, as a technology, is personally liberating, as argued by Pool (1990), or a technology of isolation and separation, is a matter for debate, as is the issue of its contribution to the governability of contemporary America. However, entertainment programs, aside from the apparent effects of the technology and production techniques, may contain content that has the effect of either supporting the prevailing tech- nological imperative or subverting it. Put another way, the entertainment programming that represents the bulk of the fare available on broadcast television (which is still the primary object of viewers' interest) may have a discernible, long-term, and ubiquitous cultural bias, that is af- fecting a change in the cultural concerns of Americans.

The central hypothesis under con- sideration here is that what people see when they watch television is

contributing to the observed changes in the social and political lives of citizens of the United States. Specifi- cally, television programs erode social and political capital by concen- trating on characters and stories that portray a way of life that weakens group attachments and social/political commitment. The work I present here is, of course, only the first step in the process of isolating television as a causal agent.

In this article, two independent content analyses of televised cultural messages are reported. The first is an analysis of top twenty television entertainment programs and the second is an analysis of television crime-drama programming. In both analyses, television programs have been investigated for evidence of important political culture values, which are relevant to issues raised by Putnam.

Evidence of political values is ob- servable in many television programs. For example, in an episode of Law and Order, the following events transpired. A young woman was posthumously accused of planting a car bomb in a large parking garage situated at the bottom of an office building in a large American city. The young woman was killed in the blast and eventually linked, through police investigation, to a religious sect that performs a street ministry. The sect and its members are described in terms reminiscent of religious sects organized and dominated by Charles Manson, David Koresh, and Jimmie Jones. The group's characteristics include isolation from the rest of society; equal treatment of group members within the confines of the group; freedom to leave the group at any time, that few exercise given the strong bonds that exist between the members; and a charis- matic leader who advocates with- drawal from the perils of modern urban society. The central issue unit- ing the group is not, as one might suspect, spiritual redemption, but

Allan McBride is an assistant professor of political science at the Univeristy of Southern Mississippi, where he teaches popular politics, methods and statistics, and electoral behavior. His research focuses on media, popular culture, and political participation. He has published in the Southeastern Political Review, the Political Communication Review, and the Journal of Popular Culture.

542 PS September 1998


http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

TABLE I Cultural Bias

Culture Basis for Authority Object of Blame Pattern of Conflict Conflict Resolution

Egalitarian Charisma Society and its institutions Group against society Cooperatively by group Individualistic Achievement Personal responsibility Individual v. individual Independently by individuals

Hierarchical Ascriptive Shed blame or blame Institution v. institution Imposed by authority dissidents

Fatalistic Not important Fate Any of above Serendipity or deus ex machina

criticism and fear of the greed and secularism of modern society.

Cultural Theory The events depicted in the episode

of Law and Order represent a pot- pourri of recent American history, but what is more interesting is that they depict a "deep structure" (Merelman 1989) vision of religious sects. The characteristics attributed to the religious sect on Law and Or- der (equality orientation, strength of group boundaries, type of leader- ship, and attitude toward the dominant culture) are sufficient for cate- gorizing it among the the four primary political cultural types pos- ited by "cultural theory" (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990). Accord- ing to cultural theory, religious sects of the type described above display the cultural bias of "egalitarianism." Cultural theory tells us that egalitarian groups, as their name denotes, worship at the altar of equality, a pattern of belief that has deep roots in American culture. Equality can be interpreted in a number of ways, but egalitarians adopt the most encom- passing definition, equality of condition or outcomes (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990). Because of their insistence that all members of society are equal, egalitarians are resistant and antagonistic to authority. Because they seek equality and reject authority, egalitarians are likely to blame society and its institutions when things go wrong. A commitment to equality makes for a closed community, in which members share work as well as outcomes. When such a community is faced with conflict, egalitarians might be

expected to resolve the conflict through cooperative action. Egalitar- ianism is joined in the theory by three other cultural types: individualism, hierarchy, and fatalism.

Space restrictions prohibit a de- tailed discussion of the values associated with each culture,2 but in this article, television program content will be coded using three specific values useful in distinguishing between these cultural types: blame," authority, and conflict. Cultures can be expected to differ in terms of how they approach these values, as indi- cated in Table 1.

Data Collection The sampled population consists

of television programs which were broadcast in North Louisiana at two different times: the top twenty programs were videotaped from network television in the summer of 1992, and the crime shows were videotaped in the latter half of Febru- ary and the early part of March 1995. Only those programs that were broadcast during the evening hours (7-10 pm) were included. (A list of the coded programs can be found in the Appendix.)

Programs were coded using a six- page standardized coding protocol. The authority issue was measured by the following criteria: Is an authority figure present in a program seg- ment? If so, what type of authority figure is it (boss, parent, teacher, police officer, etc.)? Does the authority figure attempt to wield his or her authority? Additional items address the response of subordinates to the authority, the authority figure's success in wielding his or her author-

ity, and, finally, whether the authority figure is challenged.

The issue of conflict is measured using the following items: Is conflict present? If present, which sorts of characters (individuals, groups, institutions, or society) are involved? Upon what is the conflict centered? What is the nature of the contended benefit? Is the conflict resolved? If so, how is the conflict resolved? The final two items in the protocol address the issue of blame: Is any- one blamed for the conflict, and, if so, who or what is blamed? (Blame is only measured in the 1995 study.)

Since even the most simplistic of television programs contains copious amounts of codeable information, the number of coding units was re- duced to one scene between each commercial break for each coded program. The coded scene is the first scene of substance after each commercial (in one instance, this meant that a very short scene with no relevance to the plot development of the program is left un- coded). Finally, issues related to conflict and blame are coded once, at the end of each program.

In the 1992 study, the coders were two female graduate students in the MPA program at Grambling State University. In the 1995 study, I con- ducted the coding personally.

Findings Authority

Authority figures are found in most of the scenes in both situation comedies (51%) and crime programming (86%). In crime shows, they tended to be police officers (52%),

PSOnline www.apsanet.org 543



Figure 1 Authority

1-'

. 75 0

0

S.5 O

S.25

0

Crime Shows Top 20 Shows

SAuthority Present [ Authority Used SAuthority Successful E Authority Challenged

Figure 2 Attitudes towards Authority

.3

(D

o .2

10

.1- CD

0

0


Supportive D Intimidated I Antagonistic D Aggressive I Indifferent

bosses (20%), and professionals (doctors, lawyers, and writers) (20%), all of whom gain their status by personal achievement as might be expected in individualistic cultures. In sitcoms, parents, who are given authority ascriptively, are the most common form of authority. Further, in both crime shows and situation comedies, as the program progresses, parents tend to become less-prominent characters. For example, in the first two scenes of each coded episode parents are very likely to be present as authority figures (50% of those scenes in which an authority was present), but as characters, parents disappear in the final two scenes of each of the coded programs.

Furthermore, in situation comedies, authority is used more often (72%) than it is in the crime programs (57%), but it is less likely to be used successfully (66% versus 96%). Authorities are generally successful in both genres, and they are also relatively unlikely to be challenged (challenges to authority occur only 30% of the time in crime shows and 40% of the time for shows in the top twenty). As will be shown later, however, authorities are less often employed when it comes to resolving the major conflicts around which the plot revolves. This is particularly true of the situation comedies.

In most of the scenes, the authorities are supported by (crime-20%; top twenty-29%), or successfully in- timidate (crime-21%; top twenty -25%) their subordinates. In a significant proportion of the scenes, though, authority figures are treated less positively, as they evoke re- sponses of antagonism (crime-24%; top twenty-13%), aggression (crime -10%; top twenty-24%), or indifference (crime-10%; top twenty- 9%) from those around them. In both categories there are roughly equal percentages of support or intimidation. In crime shows, greater amounts of antagonism are apparent, usually at the program's de- nouement, while more aggressive- ness is found in top twenty programs. Indifference towards authority is nearly equal between program types. Antagonism and aggression towards authorities are expected




in egalitarian cultures, while support for and intimidation by authority are indicative of hierarchical cultures. On the other hand, individualists might display behavior that is either supportive, antagonistic, or indifferent, though individualists are unlikely to be intimidated.

Conflict The beneficiaries of conflict in the

majority of the episodes are individuals (crime shows-84%; top twenty -58%) with little support for the notion that society benefitted from the conflict (crime-O%; top twenty -12%), and only modest evidence of institutional benefits (crime-8%; top twenty- 12%).4 Conflict involving individuals, as opposed to groups or societies, has been a common theme in American television programs for a number of decades. Children getting in trouble with their parents, crimes committed for individual gain, even crimes of pas- sion are portrayed as conflicts in which an individual seeks to gain an advan- tage. While greed may be discouraged as part of the television morality play, the characterization of the beneficiaries as individuals argues for an individualistic cultural bias.

Not only are the beneficiaries individuals, but the conflicts more often involve differences between individuals (crime-46%; top twenty-65%) rather than groups, organizations, or institutions (crime-9%; top twenty- 2%). In- ternal conflict, another form of individual conflict, was coded as being present only on top twenty programs (15% of the conflicts were of this type) when a single character suffered from some personal torment. While one might expect to see conflicts between, for example, the PTA and a local school board, or between a church and the media, or between a labor union and corporation, or between two political parties, these sorts of conflicts are rare on television entertainment programming. In only one crime show episode was an institutional conflict, involving a local police department, the Mafia, and the FBI, depicted.

Finally, each program was coded for the manner in which the conflict was resolved. Codeable categories include: resolved by the independent action of

Figure 3 Conflict Beneficiaries

.8

0 CO

a,

00 .4

0

I . 4)

I-


Individual L Institutional I Society

Figure 4 Types of Conflicting Parties

.6

0 C)

0

C 0

Crime Shows Top 20 Shows Internal Conflict L Indiv. v. Indiv. M Indiv. v. Insti. Insti. v. Insti. I Indiv. v. Society




Figure 5 Type of Conflict Resolution

.6 4.4 C

I-

0 (0

Cn 4

0

) 2 - a, ?

0.


SImposed ] Independent I Cooperative 1 Deus ex Machina

individuals (individualism), cooperative group resolution (egalitarianism), imposed authoritative resolution (hierarchy), or by serendipity or deus ex machina (a device of the Greek theater in which a deity de- scends from the heavens to resolve human conflict) (fatalism). Conflicts found in situation comedies are most often resolved as the result of individual or independent action (63%), despite the pervasive presence of authority figures in these programs. In crime shows, resolution is often imposed (67%), but independent action was common (33%). When independent action resolves the conflict in crime shows, it occurs most often in detective programs, such as Diagnosis Murder and Murder She Wrote. The fact that many of the conflicts are based upon differences between individuals, and are resolved largely, though not exclu- sively, by independent action, provide significant support for the individualist hypothesis.

Blame The assignment of blame was not

assessed for the top twenty pro-

grams, but it was for the crime programs. In the crime shows, individuals (92%), as opposed to deviants (8%), are most likely to be blamed. Blame is assigned most often by ad- mission of guilt or by the apprehension of the criminal. Guilt and the assignment of responsibility are im- plicitly presumed through the act of apprehension. It is also clear that egalitarianism plays little role in the laying of blame since there is a lack of any reference to society or its institutions as the cause of crime and social unrest. Personal responsibility remains the most prominent value.

Consistent with the individualist pattern of blame, several other indi- cators of individualism were noted within the category of crime programs. Though it might be expected that the police represent a hierarchy, most of the police officers in these programs are not dressed in uni- forms with clear insignia marking their rank; it is not uncommon for police subordinates to refer to their superiors by first name; meetings are held informally; and officers are often left to their own devices, with broad directives from their superiors,

to solve the crimes. Walker: Texas Ranger represents the extreme form of this pattern, as the title character wears cowboy-style clothing (a sym- bol of the rugged, individualistic Old West), meets with his boss in infor- mal settings where he most often controls the agenda. By comparison, the program Picket Fences represents a more hierarchic vision, as police officers are frequently portrayed in uniform, including the police chief.

While the evidence presented thus far provides a glimpse into the nature of the value system prevalent on television programs in the early part of the 1990s, something is miss- ing. If contemporary America has become more individualistic, and if television is a causative agent in that change, then, at minimum, there must be evidence that television programming has itself become more individualistic in tone. It is difficult, though perhaps not impossible, to return to the programs of earlier decades for the purposes of content analysis, but a sense of the change may be gleaned from a subjective overview of television's most popular crime programs between 1950 and 1990. This is made possible by an examination of the titles of the ten most popular programs, by year, between those years (Brooks and March 1988). In the 1950s the only crime show that penetrated the top ten list of programs, Dragnet, was very conventional in its approach to law enforcement, emphasizing a very orderly and routinized vision of police activity. While crime shows were noticeably less popular in the 1960s, the 1970s saw their resurgence with one of the more popular police programs (Ironsides) emphasizing independent action on the part of police officials, though relatively hierarchic portrayals of the police were still common (The FBI, Kojak, Hawaii Five-O, and Adam-12). In the late 1970s, hierarchic and bureaucratized police shows were replaced among the most popular programs with detective programs in which the pro- tagonists operated outside of the bounds of bureaucratic police routines, (Charlie's Angels and Baretta), where the police hierarchy is seldom in evidence. The 1980s saw an in-




crease in the number of popular programs featuring private investigators (Magnum P.I., Simon and Si- mon, and Murder She Wrote). Only two police programs, Cagney and Lacey and Miami Vice, were in the top ten. Cagney and Lacey featured two women police officers who, while working within the police hierarchy, challenge the male-dominated culture of police work. Miami Vice featured police officers careening in Ferraris, sockless and in tee-shirts. Both of these programs stretched the notion of the bounded, hierarchic police organization to its limits. Over the past forty years, television viewers have witnessed a decline in the number of hierarchic, disci- plined, routinized portrayals of police activities, and an increase in crime shows featuring non-conventional, independent police and private investigators.5

Summary In sum, situation comedies, which

are also the most popular programs on television, extol the virtues of individualism by focusing on conflicts that predominantly involve individuals and by showing them to be resolved through individual effort, even though authorities are depicted as respectable (though humorous) and effective parents. The crime shows examined here are relatively serious dramas (Diagnosis Murder is the ex- ception) that most often present a conflict between individuals and society that is resolved by authoritative and imposed action. Another way of characterizing the crime shows is to say that in those programs it is the responsibility of the system (the police) to curb the excesses of individualism. Even so, detective programs, which have become more popular in recent decades, feature the individual private investigator solving crime, sometimes in cooperation with the police, sometimes not, but always out- witting them. Whether the program is a police program or "stars" a detective, personal responsibility abounds. Thus, values associated with individualism are abundant even here. Fur- thermore, the characterizations of the police have also changed over the de-

Figure 6 Assignment of Blame in Crime Shows

1 -

Q) C

E

._ .75

. i

a- ? .25

Crime Shows

* Individual Blamed O Deviant Blamed * Society Blamed i Fate Blamed

cades, becoming less conventional, less dependent upon authority within the police hierarchy, and more likely to exude personal freedom as they solve crimes.

While individualism is not the sole cultural bias of the programs reported in this paper, it is the most prominent value system among several different types of programs, sharing the limelight with authority and hierarchy, as anticipated by the "requisite variety" condition of cultural theory. It is also the value system associated with the most popular programs on television-situation comedies and detective programs. Television individualism, as portrayed in situation comedies, is a leisure-oriented, prosperous lifestyle with few expectations of its members, other than to live relatively moral lives and to be responsible for their actions. Even in the more hierarchic police dramas there is clear evidence of individualism. The evidence seems to lie more heavily on the side of low boundaries (police are seen more often outside the confines of the office and in many pro-

grams are depicted operating undercover) and low prescriptions.

Discussion Ehrenhalt's (1997) comments con-

cerning the decline of hierarchy in the United States bear recalling. Ehrenhalt's argument, summarized briefly, is that Americans have re- jected authority in nearly all of its guises, from cronyism to command economies. There is a certain virtue in hyperbole, but it is not clear that Americans have given up authority entirely, though they may have relin- quished some of their traditional adherence to hierarchy. While Ro- nald Reagan advocated a more anar- chic vision of society than did Lyn- don Johnson, government has not whithered away, nor is it likely to do so in the near future. There are two ways of thinking about the baby boom generation's attitudes towards authority. The first is to presume that, in the United States, hierarchy has been supplanted by individualism as our contemporary cultural bias. This view is not consistent with




the "requisite variety" postulate of cultural theory, which states that each culture needs the others to per- form certain sorts of tasks for it (for example, individualists use the hierarchy of government to protect con- tracts and private property). Nor is it consistent with the view that the United Stated has historically been thought of as an individualistic nation. It seems clear that, as a society, Americans have not done away with hierarchy and bureaucracy, though they may well have changed their perceptions of them. The second explanation is that hierarchy has come to play more of a supporting role in a culture dominated by individualism. Observers of the political culture of the United States have long noted the importance of individualism to this culture (Tocqueville 1990; Hofstadter 1955) so changes in our culture that are the result of television are changes in emphasis, rather than changes in types of culture. This is consistent with the findings of this research that suggest that authorities are still around, though with circumscribed powers and di- minished status.

Most observers of contemporary political and social culture in the United States agree that cultural changes have occurred. The weaken- ing of social ties may be a hallmark of the baby boom generation, but it need not be concluded that any generation has given up on authority. Instead, it may be that the manner in which authority is achieved and maintained, and its place in the system has been altered and dimin- ished. Furthermore, while Ehrenhalt has provided evidence of a significant cultural change, he does not explain why this change has occurred. By emphasizing individualism, even within social structures that are normally expected to be hierarchic, like the police force, television programming contributes to a rethinking of Americans' cultural bias. Whether media executives consciously try to influence contemporary culture in a direction they find desirable, or merely allow programs to reflect their own cultural bias, is a question which cannot be answered here.

Several questions remain to be

addressed, in response to which mostly speculative answers may be given. Does televised culture matter? Is there a theoretical explanation of how television may influence an American value system? Is there evidence from other researchers supporting the notion that when people are being entertained, either by television or motion pictures, that what they view affects them politically? Finally, how may researchers establish a linkage between what people see on television, on the one hand, and their political attitudes, beliefs, values, and behaviors, on the other? Each of these fundamental questions will be addressed below.

Does it matter? Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky (1990), Merelman (1989), Postman (1985), and Gerb- ner and his research associates (1986) all argue that culture, televised or otherwise, is important.

Culture is not people's most popular set of cognitive classifications, narratives, or images of collectivi- ties.... Rather culture is the par- ticular one which people feel bound to respect, and are generally prone to obey.... Culture in its regulative guise is relentless; it never lets people escape. (Merel- man 1989, 480)

Does television programming let viewers escape? It has been argued (Mander 1978) that American television programming, in order to remain economically viable, is de- signed to maintain "audience flow." As noted, John Robinson (1981, 1990a, 1990b) has reported evidence that since 1965, television programmers have been increasingly successful in keeping the attention of American viewers, as viewers devote larger and larger amounts of leisure time to television viewing at the ex- pense of other leisure activities. While viewers view, they are sub- jected to the cultural messages con- tained in the programs they watch. The images and messages people receive from television programs are part of their daily experience and have potential impacts upon affective, behavioral, and cognitive aspects of their lives. The televised images are tempered to the extent that their personal experiences pro-

vide an alternative to them. How- ever, for the inexperienced or for those who lack direct exposure to an issue or event, the influence of the media broadcast images can become almost wholly determinate of how they understand and react to the information received.

The programs that appear on television, either as entertainment or as public affairs, are the stories people tell about themselves and have been referred to as "collective representa- tions" (Merelman 1989). While they originate with media, governmental, and economic elite, members of society absorb them and they become part of society's consciousness, memories, and collective history. Ameri- cans recall the programs, they adopt the language and the behaviors of the media, and their attention is drawn to the issues that are the subject of programming.

That people absorb the content of television programs has been dem- onstrated by Bandura (1977), who calls the type of learning that occurs via television "observational learning" or "modeling." Bandura's work provides a theoretical underpinning for communication effects research. Bandura's research focuses especially upon the learning of children and treats television as an agent of (political) socialization. In Bandura's model, observational learning is more likely to occur when behavior is rewarded (or punished), when the rewards are administered by some- one of high status, or when the observer can identify with the model. However, the most easily identifiable effects reported by Bandura are behavioral, not attitudinal, in nature.

Can Bandura's findings be used to explain the transmission of cultural values as opposed to behaviors? There is good reason to believe so. A value system is a guide to behavior. Media portrayals of relationships between parent and child, between police officer and citizen, between politician and voter, provide patterns of behavior that viewers may use as guides to behavior in their personal lives. While the behaviors Bandura presented to his youthful subjects were relatively simple, each child observed the behavior only once and




was still able to replicate them at a later time. Even children who did not replicate the behaviors, were able to dem- onstrate verbally that they had "learned"them, when presented with an opportunity to do so. If a pattern of behavior is viewed repeatedly in a variety of settings, the observer is in a position to generalize the behavior to a broad range of situations, where it be- comes part of the reper- toire of personal behaviors.

Television, as an agent of socialization, socializes simultaneously with other agents, such as families, peers, schools, and churches. Americans' exposure to television is high, there is political content present, and many viewers have positive feelings about the programs and characters they regularly view. If behaviors, and thus values, are reinforced through other experiences, they can become enduring aspects of people's behavior. Structural anthro- pologists hold the view that patterns of behavior, such as those being discussed here, are replayed throughout the culture in a variety of circum- stances and ven- ues (Merelman 1989). The patterns visible on television are but one manifestation of common cultural stories or themes. Television viewing is like a cultural stream. "The angle and direction of the 'pull' depends on where groups of viewers ... are

Ie 11: . . . ...... . .. ... .. .

imi ..... ..

... ........ . ..... ... .

Law & Order, NBC

Since 1965, television programmers have been increasingly successful in keeping the attention of American viewers, as viewers devote larger and larger amounts of leisure time to television viewing at the ex- pense of other lesiure activities.

in reference to the center of gravity .... Each group may strain in differ-

ent directions, but all groups are af- fected by the same central current" (Gerbner et al. 1986, 24).

Furthermore, experimental evidence indicates that even a single viewing of value-laden programming can influence our thoughts and behaviors as much as six weeks later.6 When presented in an entertainment context, during which the critical faculties of viewers are likely to be lowered, over

long periods of time, changes in patterns of thinking, belief, and behavior become more likely. Carlson (1985) has observed, for example, that crime show viewing by 6th through 12th graders results in more positive images of police effective-

ness and negative images of police- community relations. More impor- tantly, he found evidence of a "spillover" effect. Not only were heavy viewers of crime programs more likely to have the views men- tioned above, they were likely to be influenced in their attitudes towards the larger political system. Thus, at least among youthful viewers, there are relatively significant implications for the political system from viewing one type of entertainment program.

That raises a troublesome issue. Few researchers have addressed the question of whether television entertainment programming affects adults.7 As a result, no credible evidence exists to support or negate a claim that watching such shows strongly affects how adults live their lives. However, political scientists have investigated and reported media effects resulting from exposure to other types of programs, most nota- bly public affairs programming- effects that are cognitive, affective, and behavioral in their consequences (see Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1996; Ball-Rokeach, Rokeach, and Grube




1984; Hofstetter and Buss 1980; M. Robinson 1976; Stauffer, Frost, and Rybolt 1983; Volgy and Schwartz 1980). The parsing of entertainment media for political content has focused primarily on movies and television specials such as Roots and The Day After (Adams et al. 1985; Ball- Rokeach, Grube, and Rokeach 1981; Feldman and Sigelman 1985; Lenart and McGraw 1989; Sigelman and Sigelman 1974). The evidence from these studies is mixed and differs according to the nature of the programs. The mini-series Amerika, which portrayed life in the United States following a Soviet military takeover, has a "dominant message: namely that Americans need to be increasingly vig- ilant against Soviet threats" (Lenart and McGraw 1989, 710). According to the researchers, this message has the effect of producing a conservative swing among even liberal viewers. Roots: The Next Generation and The Day After both avoid clear political references, and researchers could find little evidence of attitude or value change as a result of viewing these programs (Feldman and Sigelman 1985; Ball-Rokeach, Grube, and Rokeach 1981). Movies such as The Candidate and The Right Stuff have mixed effects on audiences, though viewers of The Candidate were more aware of the importance of candidate image to elections after viewing it, while viewers of The Right Stuff were reinforced in the positive image of the candidacy of Senator John Glenn for president after viewing that film.

Many of the programs, the most popular of which are situation comedies, that Americans view in their homes symbolize personal-level experience. Kinder and Kiewiet (1979) report that the fragments and pieces of personal experience that comprise a person's life are not generally viewed by the individual as part of the larger political, social, or economic context (see also Brody and Sniderman 1977). For example, when a person is unem- ployed or finds that her paycheck is shrinking, she does not immediately blame Congress, the president, or the national debt. On the other hand, she is likely to blame the system (i.e., Con- gress, the president, or government) if there is evidence that broad-ranging

changes have occurred in the econ- omy, society, or the polity. Several issues relevant to television viewing and the transmission of values are raised by the research of Kinder and Kiewiet. First, is television, as a transmitter of entertainment programming, part of our private or public experience, or are some programs more public while others are more private? Second, if, as seems apparent, television has a "cultural bias," are the values that are part of that bias transmittable in the same manner that political, social, and political issues and problems are? Third, if television is transmitting personal values via situation comedies, are those values transferable from the personal/ private side of experience to the public and political side of experience? Fourth, and finally, are the situations portrayed in television programming similar enough to the personal lives of Americans to encourage them to generalize their television experience to their personal and public experiences?

Whether television is "causing" greater individualism, merely reflecting trends in society, or reinforcing chang- ing value perceptions remains to be shown. A first step in such an en- deavor, which has been partially un- dertaken here, is to establish the exis- tence of a cultural bias in the medium. Gerbner and his research associates (1986) have also taken this step, though they cast their net far more broadly than I do, examining television content without regard to its popular- ity. They also fail to examine programming from the perspective of a coher- ent cultural theory. They correctly recognize, however, that, in order to determine the nature of the putative relationship between television viewing and attitudes, the researcher must know what the content of television programming is. What remains is to establish a linkage between what viewers see and what they say their values are. This can be done, with some de- gree of success, through survey research efforts. Researchers should survey public attitudes towards political objects using the same set of values that have been observed as compo- nents of television content (for example, attitudes towards authority, conflict, and blame). Broadcast values

Appendix Coded Programs 1992* freq. Roseanne 2 Murphy Brown 1 Cheers 2 Home Improvement 2 Fresh Prince of Bel-Air 1 Coach 1 Full House 2 Murder, She Wrote 1 Major Dad 1 Evening Shade 1 Northem Exposure 2 A Different World 2 The Cosby Show 1 1995 freq. Diagnosis Murder 3 Highlander 1 Law and Order 1 Murder, She Wrote 1 New York Undercover 2 Picket Fence 1 Sweet Justice 1 Walker, Texas Ranger 1 Under Suspicion 2

*The program list for 1992 contains only top twenty programs that had a continuing story line, which means that programs such as America's Fun- niest Home Videos and 60 Minutes were excluded.

should be specifically linked to viewers' values by the use of measures of viewing that are sensitive not only to the total amount of time viewed, but also to the types of programs viewed (Norris 1996; Potter and Chang 1990). Correlations between viewing patterns and respondents' political attitudes will provide preliminary, though not conclusive, evidence of a causal relationship between viewing and attitudes. Researchers should also be sensitive to the situations, problems, and solutions that are typically found in television entertainment programming. Television programs that feature grisly ax murders or invasions by space aliens, for example, are not likely to be contexts from which viewers can generalize to their personal experience.

Finally, the effects of television viewing should be evaluated in a series of experimental research projects in which subjects are exposed to pro-




gramming that has been coded in terms of cultural values. Using a pretest/post-test design with multiple experimental conditions (i.e., different types of program content), attitudes and values can be compared between experimental and control groups as

well as between the pretest and post- test. Experimental effects resulting from a single or even several expo- sures to a stimulus can be expected to be minimal in strength. It would be surprising were they otherwise. How-

ever, in combination with survey research of the type described above, experimental research can provide evidence of a pattern of effects, or in the language of Gerbner, evidence of cul- tivation.

Notes

1. Putnam defines "social capital" as "features of social life-networks, norms, and trust-that enable participants to act together more effec- tively to pursue shared objectives" (1995, 664- 65).

2. See the work of Thompson, Ellis, and Wil- davsky (1990), Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), and Schwarz and Thompson (1990) for a more complete discussion of the values associated with each way of life.

3. I am indebted to the late Aaron Wildavsky, who suggested the use of "blame" as a cultural indicator.

4. In approximately 10% of the episodes, coders were unable to identify the type of benefi- ciary.

5. While it may seem odd to describe hierar- chies with values associated with individualism, Cockburn provides an account of Israeli military training routines that illustrates how the military instills the habits of initiative and independence into its field commanders. By contrast, the Sovi- ets trained tank commanders to literally follow a script. Initiative and independence were discouraged (1984, 261-64).

6. For evidence that television programming is successful in transmitting values, as well as in influencing the behavior and emotions of adults, see Ball-Rokeach, Rokeach, and Grube (1984) and Loye, Gorney, and Steele (1977).

7. Gerbner et al. (1986) is a notable excep- tion. See also Surette (1992). For examples of research on the effects of crime show viewing on children's political beliefs see Carlson (1985) and Potter and Chang (1990).

References

Adams, William C., Allison Salzman, William Vantine, Leslie Suelter, Anne Baker, Lucille Bonvouloir, Barbara Brenner, Margaret Ely, Jean Feldman, and Ron Ziegel. 1985. "The Power of 'The Right Stuff': A Quasi-Experi- mental Field Test of the Docudrama Hy- pothesis." Public Opinion Quarterly 49(3): 330-39.

Ansolabehere, Stephen, Shanto Iyengar, and Nicholas Valentino. 1994. "Does Attack Ad- vertising Demobilize the Electorate?" Ameri- can Political Science Review 88(4): 829-38.

Ball-Rokeach, Sandra J., Joel Grube and Milton Rokeach. 1981. "'Roots: The Next Genera- tion'-Who Watched and With What Ef- fect?" Public Opinion Quarterly 45(1): 58-68.

Bandura, Albert. 1977. Social Learning Theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Brody, Richard A., and Paul M. Sniderman. 1977. "From Life Space to Polling Place: The Relevance of Personal Concerns for Voting Behavior." British Journal of Political Science 7(3): 337-60.

Brooks, Tim, and Earle Marsh. 1984. The Com- plete Directory to Prime Time Network TV Shows: 1946-Present. 2nd rev. ed. New York: Ballantine Books.

Carlson, James M. 1985. Prime Time Law En- forcement: Crime Show Viewing and Attitudes Towards the Criminal Justice System. New York: Praeger Special Studies.

Cockburn, Andrew. 1984. The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine. New York: Vintage Books.

Douglas, Mary, and Aaron Wildavsky. 1982. Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technical and Environmental Dangers. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Ehrenhalt, Alan. 1997. "Mayor Daley and Mod-

ern Democracy: What We Should Have Learned from Chicago in the 1950s." In Present Discontents: American Politics in the Very Late 20th Century, ed. Byron Shafer. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publisher.

Feldman, Stanley, and Lee Sigelman. 1985. "The Political Impact of Prime Time Television: 'The Day After."' Journal of Politics 47(2): 556-78.

Gerbner, George, Larry Gross, Michael Mor- gan, and Nancy Signorelli. 1986. "Living with Television: The Dynamics of the Cul- tivation Process." In Perspectives on Media Effects, ed. Jennings Bryant and Dolf Zill- man. Hillsdale, NJ: Laurence Erlbaum As- soc.

Habermas, Jurgen. 1976. "Problems of Legitima- tion of Late Capitalism." In Critical Sociol- ogy, ed. Paul Connerton. New York: Penguin Books.

Hofstadter, Richard. 1955. The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. New York: Vintage Books.

-, and Terry Buss. 1980. "Politics and Last- Minute Political Television." Western Political Quarterly 33(1): 24-37.

Kinder, Donald R., and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1979. "Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Judgements in Congressional Voting." American Journal of Political Science 23(3): 495-527.

Lenart, Silvo, and Kathleen McGraw. 1989. "America Watches 'Amerika': Television Do- cudrama and Political Attitudes." Journal of Politics 51(3): 697-712.

Loye, David, Roderic Gorney, and Gary Steele. 1977. "An Experimental Field Study." Jour- nal of Communication 27(3): 206-16.

Luttbeg, Norman R., and Michael M. Gant. 1995. American Electoral Behavior, 1952- 1992. 2nd ed. Itasca, IL: F.E. Peacock Pub- lishers.

Mander, Jerry. 1978. Four Arguments for the Elimination of Television. New York: Quill.

Merelman, Richard. 1984. Making Something of Ourselves: On Culture and Politics in the United States. Berkeley: University of Cali- fornia Press. . 1989. "On Culture and Politics in America: A Perspective from Structural Anthropolo- gy." British Journal of Political Science 19(4): 465-93. . 1991. Partial Visions: Culture and Politics in Britain, Canada, and the United States. Madi- son: The University of Wisconsin Press.

Norris, Pippa. 1996. "Does Television Erode Social Capital? A Reply to Putnam." PS: Political Science and Politics 29(3): 474-80.

Pool, Ithiel de Sola. 1990. Technologies Without Boundaries: On Telecommunications in a Global Age, ed. Eli M. Noan. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Postman, Neil. 1985. Amusing Ourselves to Death: Discourse in the Age of Television. New York: Penguin Books.

Potter, W. James, and Ik Chin Chang. 1990. "Television Exposure Measures and the Cul- tivation Hypothesis." Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media 34(3): 313-33.

Putnam, Robert D. 1995. "Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America." PS: Political Science and Politics 27(4): 664-83.

Robinson, John. 1981. "Television and Leisure Time: A New Scenario." Journal of Commu- nication 31(1): 120-30.




-. 1990a. "The Time Squeeze." American De- mographics 12(2): 30-33.

-. 1990b. "I Love My TV." American Demo- graphics 12(9): 24-27.

Robinson, Michael J. 1976. "Public Affairs Tele- vision and the Growth of Political Malaise: The Case of 'The Selling of the Pentagon."' American Political Science Review 70(2): 409- 32.

Schwarz, Michiel, and Michael Thompson. 1990. Divided We Stand: Redefining Politics, Tech- nology, and Social Choice. Hemel Hemp- stead: Harvester-Wheatsheaf.

Schwarz, John E., and Thomas J. Volgy. 1980. "On Television Viewing and Citizens Politi- cal Attitudes, Activity, and Knowledge: An- other Look at the Import of Media on Poli- tics." Western Political Quarterly 33(2): 153- 66.

Sigelman, Lee, and Carol Sigelman. 1974. "The Politics of Popular Culture: Campaign Cyni- cism and 'The Candidate.'"' Sociology,

and Social Research 58(3): 272-77.

Stauffer, John, Richard Frost, and William Ry-

bolt. 1983. "The Attention Factor in Recall- ing Network Television News." Journal of Communication 33(1): 29-37.

Surette, Ray. 1992. Media, Crime and Criminal Justice: Images and Realities. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Co.

Thompson, Michael, Richard Ellis, and Aaron Wildavsky. 1991. Cultural Theory. Boulder: Westview Press.

Tocqueville, Alexis de. 1990. Democracy in America. New York: Vintage Books.

AVOWj~i~ii~i;j'ii~iiii Scholarly A udio introduces a new concept in scholarly publishing: The works of leading scholars in a time-conserving, cost-effective, digital audiobook format.

William Julius Wilson When Work Disappears

W I1. L. At.jl ti.. ;)S WIL S0N

In this Scholarly Bestseller, William Julius Wilson (Geyser University Professor at Harvard University and Past President of the American Sociological Asso- ciation) examines the devastat- ing effects that the disappearance of work has on individual, family, and neighborhood life in American society. $24.95

Lester C. Thurow The Future of Capitalism

N'ev Er7 *k Tihnews Bienyell1w

TLTE FRUTURE. OF LEC2APIT4LIS_

LESI"ER O. THUROWV

This New York Times Bestseller by Lester Thurow (Lemelson Professor of Economics and Former Dean of the Sloan School of Management at MIT) identifies the many factors responsible for the enormous economic changes occurring around the globe. This provocative work helps to chart a course for survival and success in years to come. $24.95

Derek Bok The State of the Nation

........... ...... ?y........ , .~ il. jl: Il... ....< :,,; ;.+ : ?. . .sis:.~ -.:;:. : ;.: , .. AUDIO A.. ... :I i

[Seiholarly Bestmeler

DEREK BOK TM-IE STATE ONAr T NAUONrrru~ mi mlf* Q--xfor 0 Bk-Soicl

44" In this Scholarly Bestseller, Derek Bok (300"' Anniversary University Professor and President Emeritus of Harvard University) provides an elo- quent assessment of how America has fared in economic prosperity, quality of life, equality of opportunity, personal security, and societal values. $24.95

Cedric Herring African Americans and the Public Agenda

AUDIO

AFRICAN AMERI A4

PUBL IC : AGENDA The Paradoxes of Pubhc Pohcy

CEtRIC AVRRIM

This perceptive and timely Aca- demic Bestseller edited by Cedric Herring (Professor of Sociology and Public Policy and Former President of the Association of Black Sociolo- gists) examines several paradoxical issues surrounding race and public policy, including affirmative action, welfare, education, and crime policy. $24.95

IMPORANT' BOOKS FOR ACfIVEMINDS TO ORDER, CALL TOLL FREE: 888-98 AUDIO




Article Contentsp. 542p. 543p. 544p. 545p. 546p. 547p. 548p. 549p. 550p. 551p. 552

Issue Table of ContentsPS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Sep., 1998), pp. i-iv+505-730Front Matter [pp. i-iv]From the Editor [pp. 505]Symposium: "Free and Equal in Dignity and Rights": The Universal Declaration of Human RightsHuman Rights Fifty Years after the Universal Declaration [pp. 505-511]The Universal Declaration and the U. S. Constitution [pp. 512-515]Transnational Politics, International Relations Theory, and Human Rights [pp. 516-523]The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: The Role of Congress [pp. 524-529]Unfinished Business [pp. 530-534]

Young Americans' Indifference to Media Coverage of Public Affairs [pp. 535-541]Television, Individualism, and Social Capital [pp. 542-552]Searching for Government Performance: The Government Performance and Results Act [pp. 553-555]The TeacherService Learning: What's a Political Scientist Doing in Yonkers? [pp. 557-561]Citizenship Service Learning: Becoming Citizens by Assisting Immigrants [pp. 562-567]Computers and Teaching: Evolution of a Cyberclass [pp. 568-572]Internet Lite: Short Internet Assignments for American Government Courses [pp. 573-577]The World Wide Web and Active Learning in the International Relations Classroom [pp. 578-584]Evaluating Implementation of Web-Based Teaching in Political Science [pp. 585-590]

The ProfessionFinding Jobs in Political Science: 1996 Placement Candidates Report on Their Employment Search and Outcomes [pp. 591-608]So You Want to Get a Tenure-Track Job.... [pp. 609-614]Navigating the Academic Job Market Minefield [pp. 615-622]External Reviews in Tenure and Promotions Decisions: How Does the Process Work? How Should It? [pp. 623-630]Civic Education: Three Early American Political Science Association Committees and Their Relevance for Our Times [pp. 631-635]APSA Task Force on Civic Education in the 21st Century: Expanded Articulation Statement: A Call for Reactions and Contributions [pp. 636-637]

People in Political Science [pp. 639-646]In Memoriam [pp. 647-652]Association NewsMatthew Holden Jr.: Between Theory and Practice [pp. 653-657]Executive Director's Report [pp. 659-672]Research, Teaching Heightened by Congressional Experience [pp. 673-675]Walter E. Beach, Warren E. Miller, and Jewel Prestage to Receive 1998 Goodnow Awards [pp. 677-716]

AAUP and CAUT Censure List [pp. 717-718]Gazette [pp. 722-729]Back Matter [pp. 556-730]

television, individualism, and social capital

Documents