t3 b7 comments on draft final report fdr- entire contents- emails- notes- 3 withdrawal notices- 1...

8/14/2019 T3 B7 Comments on Draft Final Report Fdr- Entire Contents- Emails- Notes- 3 Withdrawal Notices- 1 Photo Altered

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The Book Page 1 of 2

Mike HurleyFrom: Stephanie KaplanSent: Friday, July 09, 2004 6:37 PMTo: Team LeadersSubject: FW: The Book

STEPHANIE L. KAPLAN9-11 COMMISSION1(202)331-1125F (202) 296-5545www.9-11commission.govOriginal MessageFrom: Slade GortonSent: Friday, July 09, 2004 6:21 PMTo: Front OfficeSubject:The Book

Chapter 1, page 57, note 91: ???Page 57, note 94: perhaps it is in this note that we should recognize the 1974 attempted suicidehijacking I mentioned (I think to Chris) about which I was asked on a local NPR interview last week; also note thatthere are several redundant "94"s in the body of note 94.Page 62, note 141: the first sentence of the note is identical to a sentence in the text on page 25 onesentence before note 141.Page 63, note 147: no c ontent.Page 33, second paragraph: "As aconsequence": I don't believe that the inadequate notices to NORADwere a consequence of improvisation, in fact, they might have been worse if protocol had prevailed. A better lead-in would be " In the event".

Chapter 2, pages 1-8, require significant changes if Chapter 11 is modified to include the materials Iread on Wednesday. At the least, the dismissive adjectives I criticized must go and you should consider thegeneral tone of these pages.Page 3, line 15: 1924, not 1922.Page 10, line 16: "Sudan in".Page 14, line 27: "Afghanistan"Page 16, line 24: should the term be Islamic or Islamist?Page 16, Last paragraph, line 3: strike "the", insert "its".Chapter 3, page 4, line 12: strike "ceded", insert" granted".Page 21 , second full paragraph, first sentence: name the three cultures (again?).Page 34, first paragraph under 3.7: he founders created a strong executive, notoriously absent underthe Articles of Confederation but, of course, limited those pow ers.Page 35, third paragraph, last line: strike "where1, insert "in which".Next to last line: strike "all", insert "many".

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The Book Page 2 of 2

Page 36, second paragraph, line 5: "for"; spell out SSCI.Fourth paragraph, last line: strike "the", add an s.Page 37, first full paragraph, line 4: strike "had", insert "undertook".Page 38. Add a description of the systematic but totally secret oversight performed by Senator Stevensand Inouye as per my report to Chris yesterday.

More later.Slade

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WITHDRAWAL NOTICERG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Mem orial Comm issionsSERIES: Team 3, 9/11 Commission

NND PROJECT NUM BER: 52100 FOIA CASE NUM BER: 31107WITHDRAWAL DATE: 11/18/2008

BOX: 00003 FOLD ER: 0004 TAB: 1 DOC ID: 31205832COPIES: 1 PAGES: 27

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:FOLDER TITLE: Comments on Draft Final ReportDOCUMENT DATE: 07/08/2004 DO CUM ENT TYPE: Note/NotesFROM: JSGTO :SUBJECT: JSG Chapter-By-Chapter Review

This docum ent has been w ithdrawn for the following reason(s):9/11 Classified Information

9/11 Closed by Statute

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE


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WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Mem orial Com missionsSERIES: Team 3,9/11 Commission

NN D PROJECT NUM BER: 52100 FOIA CASE NUM BER: 31107WITHDRAWAL DATE: 11/18/2008

BOX: 00003 FOLDER: 0004COPIES: 1 PAGES: 56

TAB: 2 DO C ID: 31205833

_ACCESS RESTRICTEDThe item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

FOLDER TITLE: Comments on Draft Final ReportDOCUMENT DATE: 07/01/2004 DOC UM ENT TYPE: DraftFROM:TO:SUBJECT: Chapter Six - Sub ject to C lassification R eview

This document has been w ithdrawn for the following reason(s):9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE


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WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Mem orial Com missionsSERIES: Team 3,9/11 Commission

NND PROJECT NUM BER: 52100 FOIA CASE NUM BER: 31107WITHDRAWAL DATE: 11/18/2008

BOX: 00003 FOLDER: 0004 TAB: 3 DO C ID: 31205834COPIES: 1 PAGES: 8

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:FOLDE R TITLE: Comments on Draft Final ReportDOCUMENT DATE: DOCUM ENT TYPE: DraftFROM:TO:SUBJECT: Factual Errors and Mischaracterizations in the Draft Report

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):9/11 C lassified Inform ation

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE


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Mike HurleyFrom: Dan MarcusSent: Monday, July 12, 2004 9:01 AMTo: Team Leaders; Barbara GreweSubject: FW: NAMESOF CIAEMPLOYEES

Original MessageFrom: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Monday, July 12, 2004 7:46 AMTo: Dan Marcus; Stephanie Kaplan; Steve Dunne; Chris Kojm; Philip ZelikowCc: [email protected]: NAMES OF CIA EMPLOYEESCIA feels strongly that for all undercover employees instead of first name and lastinitial the cite should be to an alias. They are happy to have you choose whatever aliasyou want. Thanks.


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Mike HurleyFrom: Dan MarcusSent: Wednesday, July 07, 2004 12:14 PMTo: Team 3; Team 6S u b j e c t : FW: SELECTED SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTSON CHAPTERS 6, 8 AND 10

Original MessageFrom: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Wednesday, July 07, 2004 8:00 AMTo: Philip Zelikow; Chris Kojm; Steve Dunne; Stephanie Kaplan; Dan MarcusCc: [email protected]: SELECTED SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS ON CHAPTERS 6, 8 AND 10Justice will have significant additional substantive comments on chapters 6 and 8 (andpossibly 10), but here are a few:Chapter 6- page 8-9: we believe describing implementation of the Millennium After Action report assome proposals moved forward and others did not is misleading. We believe very littleprogress was made implementing any of the proposals and the overhwelming majority were noteven begun let alone implemented before September 11. Moreover, there were far moresignificant proposals than a centralized translation unit that were not implemented -including disrupting the al Qaeda network and terrorist presence here using immigrationviolations, minor criminal infractions and tougher visa and border controls; precisely thekinds of steps taken after September 11. The discussion minimizes the fact thatsignificant proposals in this document were not acted upon.

endnote 196 refers to possibility of a CTC briefing of the Attorney General on March 9,2001. We do not know the basis for this suggestion, but the Attorney General's calendarshows no such briefing (and we have not seen any other evidence that such a briefingoccurred). The sentence should be deleted. S\Chapter 8- page 2, fifth paragraph: as is noted for the July 5 briefing (page 5), it should notethat the May 15 briefing of the Attorney General by the CIA "only addressed threatsoutside the United States" /\sR /K-v6(v~


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27: 3d foil par... also present. By the accounts of both, President Bush asked searching questions ofDCI Tenet and often prodded him to analyze the action implications of intelligence.(175)Last par... previous administration. In response to her request that all...

28: par 3Omit "One of ... first budget."Par 4Like Berger, her predecessor, Rice saw reasons for not mov ing precipitately to a id theNorthern Alliance and the Uzbeks. Sh e recognized that Masoud could be a useful allyagainst the Taliban but recognized also his liabilitiesa reputation for brutality andinefficiency, support primarily from one ethnic minority, and involvement in narcoticstrade. Rice noted at the time ... Afghanistan.(190)[par on fly-swatting to be moved: see below. Continue as follows]Like Berger, Rice could also see strong reasons for not insisting too hard that Pak istanpress the Taliban to expel Bin Ladin. President Musharraf had a tenous hold on power inIslamabad. If he were toppled, the successor regime might be a Pakistani version of theTaliban, armed with nuclear weapons. The precarious truce between Pakistan and Indiacould collapse.The review of the Cole incident had made apparent the scarcity of readily availablemilitary options for action against Bin Ladin and al Qaeda. General Shelton and the JointChiefs had been forced by C linton and Berger to come up w ith a possible menu ofoptions other than cruise missile strikes. Though some staff work ha d been done on in-and-out helicopter or special forces operations and an air campaign against the Taliban,Shelton had alway s stressed the costs and risks of any use of military force forcounterterrorism, and he does no t seem to have volunteered to the new administrationinformation about any option other than that of firing expensive cruise missiles againstinexpensive training camp tents. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld told us that, in hisreview of existing military plans, he saw nothing that seemed appropriate for counteringan asymmetric threat like that from al Qaeda. Having been a member of the Bremer-Sonnenberg Commission on Terrorism, created by Congress in 1998, he had a m ore up-to-date understanding of the problem than did most others in the new administration, buthe was preoccupied, for the time being, he told us, with sim ply trying to start broadtransformation of a military establishment tha t, in his view, wa s still designed to fight theCold War.


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In these circumstances, Rice an d Hadley concluded that a wide-angle review of U.S.interests and policies in South Asia ought to precede any decisions on the specific actionproposals advanced by C larke.President Bush was impatient w ith this procedure. Rice an d others recalled the Presidentsaying ... mesh with one another. (193 renumbered)Hadley convened an ... confirmed. The group reviewed possibilities on the table,including Clarke's proposal for renewin g Predator missions over Afghanistan even be forethe Predator was armed with a missile of its own. Though no decisions were made on anyspecific item, H adley apparently concluded that.... (n . 194 becomes 193)

P. 29, last par "Except for a few ... organizations.'" OMIT

P. 30, first full par, last sentence ... task force was just getting organized w hen ....3d full par:Encouraged by DCI Tenet to consider w hat might be done if there were no budgetaryconstraints, the CTC had in December 2000 converted "The Plan" of 1999 in to a "BlueSky Memo." In discussing the draft authorities ....Next par, last sentence:... quickly enough. (205, now something else) R ice directed C larke and Black to developa range ....Last full par (In May ... told us.) O MIT here; poin t to come later.

P. 31First full par.... Armitage told us. "For the government," Hadley said ....3d full par.... Khalilzad, opposed giving aid ... had been suggested.(216, renumbered) [Omitsentence about Clarke)


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P. 322d par under Pakistan... to review U.S. objectives. As during the Clinton administration, Clarke pressed forignoring the wider framework in South Asia and proceeding to demand that Pakistanmove vigorously against terrorismto push the Pakistanis to do before an al Qaedaattack wh at Washington might dem and that they do after. (224, renumbered) H e had notsucceeded in getting President Clinton and Berger to disregard the danger of destabilizingthe regime in P akistan, and he had no more success w ith Rice and H adley.On August 4, President Bush did write President Musharraf ...

P. 36, 1st full par... of dispute. Clarke favored resuming Predator flights over Afgh anistan as soon asweather permitted, hoping that the Predator's cameras might locate Bin Ladin surelyenough to permit a cruise missile attack. Back in the autumn of 200, the Afgh ans hadspotted a Predator and scrambled their antiquated M iGs. The particular Predator escaped,but, since its ground speed was only 70 miles per hour, it was hard to count on havingsuch luck again. Berger had expressed doub t about the wisdom of any furtherreconnaissance flights, (repeat note 124) When Clarke revived the issue after thetransition to the new administration, the C IA and the Pentagon both opposed him.The CTC chief, Black, argued ... shared this conern.(247, renumbered) Rice and Hadley... was ready.(248, renumbered, with insertion of "After the deputies ... been made."from the preceding par.P. 38, 1 st pa rThe Principals Committee had its first meeting on al Qaeda on September 4. Thecommittee had had 33 earlier m eetings on other subjects, most of which had not involvedtrying to assess trade offs among major threatsin this case, Islamist terrorism on theone hand and a nuclear-armed Islamist state on the other.On the day of the meeting, C larke sent Rice a note. He had already notified her that hewanted to change portfolios and concentrate on cybersecurity. He told us that he wasfrustrated with an adm inistration that he considered "not serious about al Qaeda," bu tRice said that he had never indicated to her frustration except with the bureaucracieswhich they were both trying to push into line.(former note 210)Clark e's note of September 4 supp orts what Rice said, for it is almost entirely a jerem iaddirected against the principals and their departments, particularly D efense and the CIA. Itassailed them for what they had not done during the Clinton administration as well as


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since the transition, and it offered neither explicit nor implicit criticism of either PresidentBush or his staff. Th e "real question," Clarke wrote ... in order.[.]"(258 renumbered)Rice told us that she read Clark e's memo as an attack on bureaucratic inertia. We think itshould also be read as an angry admission of failure. After nine years ... could support.Ironically, moreover, C larke delivered this noteand prepared to step away fromcounterterrorismat just the m oment when the top level of the government w as ready atlast to do the things that he had argued fo r doing almost since being namedcounterterrorism coordinator in the spring of 1998.Meanwhile, another ...

P. 39, last par... by the principals. Except fo r risking Predators in reconnaissance missions, thedirective called for carrying out the recomm endations that Clarke had developed late inthe Clinton administration and presented to Rice five days after the transition. Whileexercising care no t to put President M usharraf in an untenable position, the StateDepartment was to lean hard on him to use his influence with the Taliban. The C IA wasto embark on an ambitious program o f covert action, extending aid not only to theNorthern A lliance and the Uzbeks but to other groups in Afg hanistan, including, ifpossible, dissident elements within the Taliban. T he directive w as to have a militaryannex, not yet drafted, but almost certainly to include options such as those that had beendeveloped fo r President Clinton then quietly shelved after the transition, among them,probably, a retaliatory air campaign against the Taliban in the event of a new attacktraceable to Bin Ladin. Like the program in Clarke's various memoranda, this was stillmore a menu of action than a strategy comm itting the resources necessary to achieve thegoal of eliminating the threat from al Qaeda, and it envisioned a campaign ofapproxim ately three years. But, if adopted, it wou ld have represented the strongestprogrammatic commitment thus far to that goal, and a requirement that the NationalSecurity A dviser periodically give the President a formal update on progress suggestedthat the commitment might become stronger with time.On September 9 .. . .


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Chanter 1Page 45, last paragraph:Add: It appears that at the time of our report, nearly three years after the September 11attacks, NORAD and the FAA h ave still not fully remedied these serious deficiencies.On June 9, 2004, in response to an unidentified plane flying near the U.S. Capitol with abroken transponder, the Capitol Building was evacuated and NORAD was reportedlyprepared to order the shootdown of the plane. Fortunately, this turned out to be a falsealarm. The plane was carrying the Governor of Kentucky to President Reagan's funeral.The FAA was aware at the time of the malfunctioning transponder and the nature of theflight, but had failed to communicate this information to NOR A D. hi addition, in lateMay 2004 the FAA detected an unidentified aircraft approaching New Yo rk City. TheFAA and NORAD were in communication about the situation, but there was confusionabout how to respond and even as to each agency's respective authorities. [See June 9,2004 Public Hearing Testimony.]Chapter 3Page 10 , paragraph 3:Move first two sentences of fh. 44 to text after "The wall".

Chapter 6Page 40.The way the report is now organized, the adm inistration's CT policy initiatives arecompletely divorced from the U.S. gove rnmen t's responses in the summer of threat. W eshould add several sentences at the very end of Chapter 6 tying these two chapterstogether:As discussed at greater length in Chapter 8, during the time period that the administrationwas working to develop this counterterrorism strategy, Intelligence Community officialsgrew increasingly concerned about the possibility of an imminent, large-scale attack by alQaeda against U.S. interests. At the same time, al Qaeda operatives mad e their finalpreparations for the September 11 attacks, and the news of upcoming attacks spreadthrough the camps in Afghanistan. The policy making efforts failed to keep pace withdevelopments in the real world, even though key aspects of those developments,described in detail in Chapter 8, were widely known by responsible officials within theU.S. Intelligence Community.

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Chapter 8Page 7:Paragraph 2:We had decided to reflect both the CIA e-mail and Tenet letter in accurately describingthe genesis of the PDB in the second sentence. It is inaccurate to say that the PDB wasthe "result" of the President's occasional questions.Paragraph 3:After "President told us" substitute "he had learned of for "there was only"After "it was heartening that 70 investigations were underway" add:In her testimony before the Commission on April 8, 2004, however, Dr. Rice stated that"[t]here was nothing reassuring" in the PDB and "there were some frightening things" inthe PDB. It does not appear that any action was taken by either the President or Dr. Riceto obtain additional information regarding domestic intelligence between August 7 andSeptember 11.Page 7 (right before the PDB text box)We should add a few sentences after the discussion of the PDB. We should point out thatin the several weeks after the PDB was delivered, the Intelligence Community developedsignificant additional information indicating the possibility of an attack within the U.S.This included: the detention of Moussaoui, the presence of Hazmi and Mihdhar in theU.S, and the foreign service reporting in the last paragraph on page 7. We can then notethat none of this information was relayed to President Bush prior to 9/11.Regarding the SEIB, we should change the tone of this paragraph. Even without some ofthose specifics, the document should still have raised a level of consciousness about thepossibility of the predicted attack occurring in the U.S., given the topic. We should alsoadd that the CIA's Deputy Director asserted in testimony before the Commission that theFBI information in the PDB w as omitted from the SEIB fo r several reasons. Theseincluded the fact that the SEIB was a new product fo r which they were still establishingground rules, concern about protecting ongoing investigations, and that the CIA had onlyreceived the FBI information orally and not in writing. [See McLaughlin April 14PublicHearing testimony.]Page 7: Insert after 5th paragraph:Director Tenet met with President Bush on August 18, 2001 in Crawford, Texas. Hecould not recall any discussion of a domestic threat at that meeting. DCI Tenet met withPresident Bush on additional occasions between August 18 and September 11. He

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did not recall the substance of any of those meetings, or whether the subject of a domesticthreat was raised. Fn* DCI Tenet told us on July 2, 2004, that he had not had time toreview his records to refresh his recollection regarding these meetings d espite the factthat on the Commission had asked him to do so and had repeated that requestthereafter.

Page 17:I think that this paragraph understates the importance of the Phoenix EC . Although it'sprobably accurate that a nationwid e canvass of flight schools wou ld not have turned upthe hijackers at that stage, this is not the entire story. As the Joint Inquiry found , one ofthe individuals nam ed in the EC w as an associate of Hani Hanjour. A calculation ofwhether the Phoen ix EC could have resulted in the disruption of the plot should notignore this fact. Moreover, such a canvassing may have created a greater awareness andsensitivity within the F AA and the FB I itself to the threat of attack using civil orcommercial aviation.Page 22, footnote #3:The Commission's access to PDBs was limited by restrictions imposed by the WhiteHouse. Not all PDBs were made available to the Comm ission. The Commission w asonly permitted to review those P DBs that the White House had preselected anddetermined, without input or oversight by the Commission, were relevant to theCommission's work. Over the Commission's objections, only four representatives fromthe Commission and its staff were permitted to review those select PD Bs. F inally, theCommission representatives were not able to take verbatim notes on the contents of thePDBs and review those notes with colleagues on the Com mission. The titles of the PD Bswere not to be disclosed, and only a sum mary of the PDBs' contents, which h ad beenreviewed and approved by the W hite House, was shared with the full Commission.Footnote #39Our discussion of the Yemeni "tourist" matter is too dismissive. The bottom line is stillthat the two (who were not "tourists") took photographs of federal buildings in New Y orkCity, because their friend in Indiana supposedly wanted to see what New York Citylooked like.The portion of the footno te relating to the 70 full field investigations is m isleading interms of its relevance to the 9/11 story. The way it's written now, it makes it appear thatthe investigations on the individuals in contact with the hijackers are less significantbecause they weren't included in the 70. We should add the following clarifyinglanguage:The Congressional Joint Inquiry found, and we have confirm ed, that the hijackers were incontact with a number of individu als in the U.S. who were or had been the subjects of

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FB I counterterrorism investigations. The hijackers' contacts with these individuals didnot bring them to the attention of the FBI, however.We should also note that the author of the PDB was prescient in identifying the threat ofa terrorist hijacking by al Qaeda inside the United States.

Footnote #73:Strike "the Wall"

Footnote #85:Strike "whatever he merits or demerits it" and "They"

Chapter 10Page 10:Regarding Laurie Mylroie, we should say either in the text of in footnote #83 that wehave found no credible evidence to support her theory.Page 11, footnote #1:The following new language, shown in bold, should be added to this footnote:Notes from the morning indicate that Vice President Cheney informed President Bushthat an anonymous threat had been phoned into the White House which was beingviewed as credible.The Secret Service's Intelligence Division tracked down the origin of this supposedthreat...During the afternoon of September 11 the leadership of the Secret Service was satisfiedthat the reported threat to "Angel" was unfoundedthere had been no anonymousthreat received by the White House.Indeed, Fleischer had conferred with Vice President Cheney and Karen Hughes beforethe briefing, and they had decided to let people know about the threat, all of them

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believing it was true. This version of events was repeated by others high level WhiteHouse officials, such as Condoleezza Rice and Karl Rove in the days and weeksfollowing September 11.Delete the sentence "We have not found any evidence that contradicts his account."If it were in dispute we would say so - as we do throughout this Report.

Chapter 13Page 16 on the future role of the FBI:As written, this presents the current state of the FBI's reform efforts as farther along thanI understand our staff found those efforts to be. We should add more detail on what wefound during our investigation about the status of the FBI's reform efforts. The sectionalso does not make clear that it will take the FBI years to fully implement these reforms;we make it sound like they are well on their way to success.Page 16, last paragraph:New insert:The concern with the FBI is that it has been primarily a law enforcement agency, imbuedwith the culture of law enforcement, and that this culture is different from and in someways incompatible with intelligence collection. Another concern is whether domesticintelligence collection can ever truly be a top priority in a large agency with other vitalresponsibilities that necessarily will compete for managerial attention and resources.These are reasonable concerns. The FBI has taken steps to address these concerns and toensure that counterterrorism intelligence collection is now the agency's top priority. Itremains to be seen whether these efforts will succeed; reforming a large bureaucracytakes enormous effort and considerable time, and past efforts to reform the FBI'sintelligence operations, prior to the 9/11 attacks when priorities were different, were notsuccessful. The FBI - through Director Mueller personally - has assuredtheCommission that the reforms currently underwayat the agency will address theseconcerns.P. 20. Insert new paragraph on FISA:The Patriot Act has been the subject of great controversy and public attention. ThePresident and the Attorney General have urged Congress and the public to supportmaking permanent those provisions of the Act that "sunset" in 2005 if Congress does notact. Throughout our investigation both senior government officials and fieldinvestigators consistently stated that the most important provisions of the Patriot Act arethose that remove the so-called "wall" between criminal investigations and intelligenceinvestigations. Those provisions are consistent with the decision of the FISA Court ofReview in 2002 that permitted greater sharing of information between criminal and

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intelligence investigators. Those provisions have been credited as a significantenhancement of the government's power to prevent terrorist attacks.Public perception of the Patriot Act is mixed. Much of the public unease about the actappears to arise out of Executive Branch actions since the 9/11 attacks, many of whichwere under assertions of authority from sources other than the Patriot Act. These actionsinclude the detention of hundreds of Middle Eastern men for months after the 9/11attacks without charges (under immigration authorities); the use of the material witnessstatute to hold people without charges; the indefinite and incommunicado detention oftwo U.S. citizens as "enemy combatants" in military brigs without criminal charges; theblanket closing of deportation hearings; and the grant of authority to FBI agents to enterchurches and mosques and to attend political rallies. The Supreme Court's recentdecisions rejecting Executive B ranch claims of authority with respect to unlawful enemycombatants, both foreign and U.S. citizens, demonstrate that this public unease overbroad assertions of Executive Branch power is consistent w ith important Constitutionalprinciples regarding civil liberties and separation of powers.Certain provisions of the Patriot Act have engendered substantial criticism. Theimportance to the Government's counterterrorism capabilities should be weighedcarefully against their impact on civil liberties. These include the "Roving Wiretaps"provision (Section 206) that does not require the government to confirm that the target isactually using the particular communications device that will be m onitored; the "Sneakand Peak" search warrant provision (Section 213) that, as presently written, applies toany federal crime and not just to terrorism-related activities; and, perhaps most important,the very controversial "library records" provision (Section 215) that allows a secret FISAcourt order to obtain a broad range of business and personal records if the FBI (with noeffective judicial review or oversight) deems those records "relevant" to acounterterrorism investigation.New Language onCivil Liberties - Insert at p. 21:At our first public hearing on M arch 31,2003, we noted that am ong the greatestchallenges we face is the need for balance as our government responds to the real andongoing threat of terrorist attacks. While our focus on protection of our homeland isparamount, we must be ever mindful of the collateral consequences of measures that maythreaten our vital personal and civil liberties. There is no question we must factor intothe equation of proper balance the capacity of our adversaries to exploit the protectionsafforded by our Constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion and due process of lawto advance their nefarious objectives. This balancing will be no easy taskbut it isimperative that we get it right.The importance of our G overnment recognizing the particular need to m aintain ourpersonal freedoms and civil liberties in times of unprecedented threats to the security ofour civilian population is well recognized. [Footnote: In 1995, Justice Sandra DayO'Connor w arned: "It can never be too often stated that the greatest threats to ourconstitutional freedoms come in times of crisis." Veronica School District v. Acton

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(1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In 1989, Justice Thurgood Marshall warned: "Historyteaches us that grave threats to liberty often comes in times of urgency whenconstitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure. The World War II relocation-campcases and the Red scare and McCarthy-era internal subversion cases are only the mostextreme reminders that w hen we allow fundamental freedoms to be sacrificed in thename of real or perceived exigency, we invariably come to regret it." (Skinner v. RailwayLabor E xecutives Ass 'n (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).] The recent United StatesSupreme Court decisions imposing limitations on assertions of Executive Branchauthority over unlawful enemy combatants illustrate the importance of meaningful checksand balances on exercises of governmental power. That guiding principle should informthe implementation of our recomm endations, congressional consideration of the sunsetprovisions of the Patriot Act, and future grants of governmental authority to combatterrorism.

Insert onOversight andJudicial Review - Insert at p. 21:It is unavoidable that legitimate government efforts to combat terrorism will raiseconcerns about civil liberties. Some civil liberties advocates have expressed thoseconcerns in harsh terms, criticizing the government actions since 9/11 on a number offronts. Those criticisms are a legitimate element in our national debate on the appropriateresponse to the ongoing threat of terrorist attacks, but w hen prominent governmentofficials question the motives of those concerned about civil liberties, as was done shortlyafter the 9/11 attacks, the public's trust in government suffers. It is not enough for thegovernment to say"trust us" - indeed, that admonition is anathema to our Americantradition. There is, however, a sensible m iddle ground that allows for the authoritygovernment legitimately needs as well as the safeguards that Am ericans deserve anddemand. The middle ground is transparent government authority that is subject to thechecks and balances of meaningful review by the courts and congress. Such reportingand oversight can serve as a powerful and effective guard against abuse of governmentpower. Moreover, adding judicial o r congressional scrutiny to the deliberate use ofinvestigative authorities should no t have a detrimental effect on the government's abilityto prevent terrorism. As Congress and the Executive Branch grapple with how best tomaximize security and liberty, policymakers should recognize that balancing authoritywith oversight and transparency helps ensure public support and cooperation in the waragainst terrorism.Page 17, second bullet:W e should consider recomm ending a new office in the Justice Department withresponsibility fo r ensuring compliance with privacy and civil liberties requirements.Such an office would be responsible f or, among other things: 1) receiving andinvestigating complaints on matters relating to privacy and civil liberties; 2) referring tothe Attorney General evidence of violations of in the course of the counterterrorismactivities of the FBI; and 3) ensuring compliance with the Privacy Act and otherapplicable privacy laws and regulations. Such an office would serve as an important

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counterbalance to offset the new legal authorities that the FBI now has at its disposalunder the Patriot Act and other post-9/11 enhancements to its authority.Page 18, for insertion after paragraph containing "these are major challenges."[The following proposed language is based largely on Staff Statement #12]These efforts are still underway, but during our investigation we found a significant gapbetween the announced reforms at FBI headquarters and the reality in the field. Despitethe clear message that counter-terrorism is now the FBI's top priority, the FBI's fieldoffice structure still appears to be the driving management force within the agency. Forexample, the Field Intelligence Groups are structured differently at each field office, andFBI personnel continue to be diverted from counterterrorism to work major criminalinvestigations. Moreover, some field agents we spoke with resisted the centralization ofcounterterrorism investigations at FBI headquarters, asserting that these cases should bedirected by the field offices. We also question whether the qualifications, status, and roleof most intelligence analysts in the field have changed in response to acknowledged pastdeficiencies in these areas, and there appears to be no process for evaluating andreassigning unqualified analysts. Finally, information sharing within the FBI still appearsdependent largely on personal relationships. While the FBI has made progress, we areaware that prior similar efforts at reforming the FBI's intelligence and counterterrorismcapabilities, as well as all-important efforts to upgrade the FBI's woefully inadequateinformation technology systems, have failed to effect the necessary institutional andcultural change organization-wide.

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Roemer Edits to 9/11 Commission Report

Chapter 1:p.l, first para:Add: "Others went to Arlington, Virginia to the Pentagon.""Across the Potomac River, in our nation's capital, the United States Congress was backin session.""A few blocks away at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, people would begin to line up for aWhite House tour.""A light breeze brushed through the fields outside Shanksville, Pennsylvania."p. 46, last para: Cut word "primitive" and replace with: one of the poorest and mostremote countries.Chapter 4:p. 10, para 6: Which officials told us that August 1998 reaction was something theythought about when considering future military responses? We should list them infootnotes, if we still have them!p. 12, para 3: Cut first sentence on abbreviating decision-making process. This isinterpretive, no t factual.p.13,para 1: Need to cut "actually more a set of goals" sentence; could also cut previoussentence, "Clarke called Delenda a plan..." This thing is labeled a plan at top of page.We look silly and small getting into semantics like this. Delenda is not a "set of goals."We list its goal a few sentences earlier. This is a bad way to get into the Rice againstClarke debate. Feel very strongly about this.Chapter 6:p.25, somewhere: We need to at least have a line about President Bush's publicstatements on terrorism before 9/11. W e look partisan if we do this for Clinton but notfor Bush. It's fine to add, as Rice did, that he would have given a big speech once theNSPD was done. We comment extensively on President Clinton's speeches and content.p.25, last para: Was Rice's decision to hold over Clarke, period, or hold him over just fornow? We're saying he was permanently. Is that right? If not, change this.p.26, last para: First sentence is talking about agenda Clarke was pushing "at the end ofthe previous administration. Current sentence implies Clinton did nothing on Clarke'sagenda. Clarke is pushing on the Cole, Northern Alliance, Uzbecks, Predator. These areall issues from late 2000.


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p.30, para 6: we 've lost an impo rtant line from Staff Statement 8. We should add it:Clarke and his staff regarded the new approach as essentially similar to the proposal theyhad developed in December 2000 and had put forward to the new administration inJanuary 2001." Not fair to cite Hadley and Rice talking about how great the new strategyis and not have a line from the other side.p. 36, para 2: last line makes it sound like Clarke only wanted to kill O sama withPredator once it could be armed. But he wanted to kill bin Laden with Predator from thebeginning, just w ith cruise missiles, no t missiles from Predator itself. Fix last sentence ofthe para.p. 38, para 3: After first sentence- tagged on. Leaving it a "hollow shell" that thepresident would be better off not signing. This is included in both the Pub lic Affairsbook and the staff statement (in staff statement in hearing.)p. 38, para 3: After second sentence insert: "Clarke also accused senior CIA officials oftrying to block the Predator Program." (This was included in the staff statement)p.38, para 4: Insert last sentence: "Fixing these entrenched problems w ould in factrequire the highest level of leadership and action."p.40, last para: Makes it sound like we were way too close. Proxies still no good. Thebest commander in A fghanistan had just been killed. The Taliban were awful. Pakistanisstill not helping enough. This is too rosy. Change to: After "remained unclear" add"Massoud, the best commander and best hope for internal military opposition, w as dead."A lso add "But the pieces were coming together for an integrated policy docum ent dealingwith al Qaeda, the Taliban and Pakistan."Chapter 7:Follow-up Comments on Ch. 7A s I stated last week the staff did a good job incorporating most o f my earlier com ments.I think the chapter now much better reflects the challenges faced by domestic intelligencein the future. In view of the significance of our assessment of the FBI's ability to fulfillthat function, this part of the 9/11 story is especially relevant. A lso, since we are workingwith the background of the Joint Inquiry report, I think it is particularly important for usnot to lose the detail in this part of the narrative. W hile a lot of the detail is kept in thefootnotes, as I commented earlier e-mail today, it is essential that it be included. I have afew additional comments I would like to see incorporated:

There was a press article (UPI?) a while back reporting that KSM had denied kn owingBayoumi. Is this true? If so, we should include this in a footnote somewhere.


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Footnote 14The Benomrane story is interesting. I think the staff has done great work in trying to rundown the identity of the two Saudis he assisted. It seems to me, however, that the mostsignificant part of this footnote is his ambiguous identification ofHazmi andMihdhar -even if it is unlikely that the two Saudis were them, there remains the possibility that heassisted the two hijackers in view of his connection to Thumairy and willingness to helphim with visitors. Did we interview the agent responsible fo r Benomrane? If so, whatdid he think about the ID (since we did not talk to Benomrane ourselves, we should saywhat the only person who interviewed him thinks)? Is there any other info connectingBenomrane to the two hijackers or their associates? I think when I was briefed by Dieterand his team a few weeks ago, I was told that Benomrane had relevant ties in San Diego.If we are worried about space, I'm not sure we need to spell out in such detail the processof our investigation, but simply the conclusion - namely, that we have not found info tosubstantiate the hypothesis that the two Saudis were the hijackers (in other words, I thinkwe could cut the last couple of sentences as the footnote stands now).Footnote 15Have we (or the FBI) identified the Saudi consular employee with whom Bayoum i met?If so, has that employee been interviewed by us (or the FBI)? If not, we should say thatthis consular em ployee remains uniden tified (despite the efforts of the Commission staff)- it seems to me that if this were a totally innocent encounter, either the Saudi consulateshould tell us who it was or this person should have come forward by now.Page 3. 5 th paraBayoumi didn't come forward voluntarily to the authorities, did he? If not, remove thestatement in the last sentence that he "volunteered" the information about the meeting.Page 3. 6th paraDelete the last sentence. It is evident from the rest of the text that both we and the FBIhave investigated and interviewed Bayoumi and is reflected in the footnotes.Page 4. 1st paraI am still uncom fortable with the language that we use to conclude about Bayoumi. Isuggested language in my earlier comments, and I would like to see something closer tothat language. Specifically, I think it is most important that we explicitly acknowledgethat open questions remain about his role. If I recall correctly, during the Joint Inquirythere was even a split within the FBI about Bayoum i. While agents at Headquartersthought that Bayoumi was completely innocent, agents in San Diego were far moreskeptical. There is also one important fact about Bayoumi which is left out here. In thedeclassified Joint Inqu iry report, we mentioned that Bayoum i told someone that he wasgoing up to Los Angeles to pick up visitors. This obviously is an important fact to


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consider in determining whether the initial meeting between Bayoumi and the hijackerswere accidental or by design.Page 4. 4th paraThe sentence about the stories being inconsistent (these stories attributed...") isunnecessary - the point is obvious from the text. Delete. To clarify, just start thenextparagraph with "Another inmate, however ..."Page 4. 6th paraDelete the last part of the second sentence ("despite ...") - it is unnecessary (maybeputit in a footnote) and does not seem very convincing since we state two paragraphs earlierthat Abdullah did not say when he drove the hijackers from LA to San Diego.Page?. 1 st paraThe fist part of the last sentence is too cryptic, and the second part is repetitive. What dowe mean when we say that we have not "obtained adequate insights" into the relationshipbetween Aulaqi and the hijackers? As for our efforts to interview him, that is sufficientlycovered in another footnote (footnote 36?) Delete the sentence, incorporate the firstsentence into the earlier paragraph.

Chapter 8:p. 3 Add: "However, Tenet only briefed President Bush twice in August, once onAugust 17th in Texas and on August 31st in Washington, DC. The Commission attemptedto learn more about the nature of the August 17th meeting between the President andDirector Tenet from both the CIA and White House sources. We were unable to gatherany more additional information to this important question.Chapter 10:p. 9, para 3: What's the exact wording of the memo? I thought it was tougher than "not acompelling case."Chapter 11:p.9, last para: Bush review was another chance to mobilize for major action, too.

Chapter 12:Preventing Terrorists from Obtaining Weapons of Mass Destruction


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The greatest danger of another catastrophic attack in the United States will materialize ifthe wo rld's most dangerous terrorists acquire the world's most dangerous weapons. Asearly as 1994 in Sudan, al Qaeda sought to acquire materials to make a nuclear weapon,though they ended up purchasing faulty material. Again in July of 1998, NSCcounterterrorism staff were talking worriedly about Bin Ladin associates' description oftheir leader as intent on carrying out a "Hiroshima."Moreover, it is impossible to make the case that the history-making bloodshed and impactof 9/11 has satisfied al Qaeda's thirst for spectacular attacks. Indeed, if terrorist groupsas RAND's Bruce Hoffman puts it are like sharks that need to constantly swim forwardto stay alive, al Qaeda is likely to strike again. In congressional testimony on February24, 2004, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet underscored the threat by notingthat Usama Bin Ladin had decreed the acquisition of WM D to be a "religious obligation"and warning that al Qaeda "continues to pursue its strategic goal of obtaining nuclearcapability." Bin Ladin's spokesman, Sulayman Abu Ghaith, brags that al Qaeda wan ts tokill 4 million American, including 1million children."Nor can we safely assume that thethreat of nuclear terrorism is necessarily limited to al Qaeda; Tenet testified that "morethan two dozen other terrorist groups are pursuing CBRN materials."The problem is not limited to Russia, Pakistan and North Korea; policymakers must alsofocus on other states supplied by the Soviet Un ion and the United States w ith reactorslarge enough to produce the highly enriched uranium needed for a bomb, includingUkraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ghana.Another key concern is the fact that a nuclear bomb m ight be built with a relatively smallamount of nuclear materials. According to a special D epartment of Energy Task Forceon Russia chaired by Lloyd Cutler and Senator H oward Baker, a 15-kiloton nuclearbomb-strong enough to kill 250,000 people if detonated in lower M anhattan-could bebuilt with just 20 kilograms of highly enriched uranium or 4 kilograms of plutonium.U.S. efforts must keep pace with the enormity of the threat.Both resources and coordination are needed.Therefore, material and coalition strategies targeted against radical Islamist terrorist mustbe combined w ith national and coalition strategies to present and counter the proliferationof weapons of mass destruction. What we can do is to recommend that an effectivecounter proliferation strategy is a vital and urgent part of all governments' efforts toprevent a catastrophic terrorist attack. We recommend several initiatives in this area:Strengthen C ounter Proliferation efforts- Efforts to shut down Libya's illegal nuclearprogram have been generally successful. Pakistan's illicit trade and Pakistani scientist,A.Q. Kha n's nuclear smuggling networks have revealed that the spread of nuclearweapons is a problem of global dimensions. Efforts to deal with Iran's nuclear programare still underway. Therefore, the United States should w ork with the international


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comm unity to develop laws and an international legal regime w ith universal jurisdictionto enable the capture, interdiction and prosecution by any state in the world where theydo no t disclose their activities.Expand Proliferation Security Initiative- In May of 2003 the Bush Administrationannounced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), nations w ho formed a willingpartnership to com bine national capabilities to use military, economic, and diplomatictools to interdict threatening shipments of WM D and m issile related technology.The PSI can be more operationally effective by using the existing network of intelligencesharing, interoperable equipment and joint planning structures of the N orth AtlanticTreaty Organization (NATO). The U.S. should encourage every NAT O state to sign ontothe PSI. Moreover, PS I mem bership should be open to non-NATO countries and Russiaand China should be encouraged to participate.U.S. Com mitmen t to Nuclear Security- Outside experts are deeply worried about thegovernment's comm itment and organization for securing the weapons and highlydangerous materials still scattered in Russia and other countries of the Soviet Union. Thegovernm ent's programs in this area, the Coo perative Threat Reduction P rogram (usuallyreferred to as "Nunn-Lugar" for the senators who sponsored the legislation in 1991) isnow in need of expansion, improvement, and resources. W hile the U.S. government hasrecently redoubled international com mitments to support this program, we recommendtripling current spending on Nun n-Lugar as an expensive but wise investment, especiallywhen compared to the catastrophic cost Am erica would face if such weapons found theirway to the terrorists who are ex tremely anxious to acquire them.Our report shows that al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make weapons of mass destructionfor at least ten years. There is no doubt the U.S. would be a prime target. Preventing theproliferation of these weapons warrants a maximum effort.

New Recommendation for Com missioners' Consideration

Military, intelligence, and law enforcemen t actions are attempting to address theimm ediate threat of terrorism. That fight will go on for years. But those m easures do notget at the root causes of terrorism. One of these root causes is the intolerance thatcontinues to be taught to young children in schools in the M iddle East, South Asia, andSoutheast A sia, and other troubled regions. Al Qaeda and related terrorist organizationsfind such schools and the youths whose minds are being poisoned in them fertile groundsfor recruiting new sympathizers. Terrorists are thus being produced at arate faster thanwe can attempt to bring them to justice.A longer-term strategy is needed. The U nited States and its allies must act quickly tochange the conditions and circumstances that contribute to breeding new terrorists, andthereby attempt to drain the pool of potential jihadists. E ducation that teaches tolerance,the dignity and value of each individual, and respect for different beliefs is a key elementin any global strategy to eliminate radical Islamist Terrorism.


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We recommend:That the U.S. government, with Congress and the executive branch workingclosely together, should organize an international donor's conference, andpledge a total of $250 million each year for four yearsto be matched withsimilar contributions from the European U nion, Japan, Canada, and theGulf Statesfor an International Youth Opportunity Fund. Funds will bespent directly for building and operating primary and secondary schools inMuslim states that commit to doubling their investment in public educationover the course of the next four years. This program should include fundingand training for teachers, the provision of textbooks, as well as funding forgenerators and classroom computers that can link remote studentpopulations to the broader w orld.


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. , ,

Associated Presswas cornered during the running of the bulls in Pamplona, Spain. The San Fermin festival, known for its daily bull runs andparties, was made famous in author Ernest Hemingway's 1926 novel "The Sun Also Rises."


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, C/), f

Chapter 8p. 2par 2The next week, Rice received reports on the ....Par 4The interagency . . . (CSG) discussed the ....

p. 31 st par under High Probability...... in Genoa. On June 22, the CIA .. . fewdays. ("U.S. target" was a frequently usedterm, taken, as a rule, to mean an embassy or military installation or perhaps a hotel ortourist site frequented by Americans.) . . . worldwide public warning.(15)

p. 4Go from 2d full par to the 5th:. . . continuing. (20)Disruption operations ....

p. 5Go from the top par to the first full par on p. 6. . . G-8sumrnit.(23)In addition to individual . . . Arabian Peninsula,(29) [OMIT here the next par, going to]In mid- July . . . their concerns.(33)[OMIT "The Calm before th e Storm"}

On July 27 ...


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... paid to security planning. (3 5)On August 3 ... planned attacks. (36)During August, the State Department... [from p. 7] or consulate. [I would omit thisparagraph, but, if it has to stay, this is where I would put it.]Late in August... provided.Most of the intelligence ... [from top of p. 8] ... other operation.A Threat at Home?Because our report centers on the attacks of 9/11, we have a duty to notice and includehere all the signals received during this summer of threat that might have been read asindicating that al Qaeda planned to strike within the United States. We cannot emphasizestrongly enough, however, that these signals were scattered among an overwhelmingnumber of much stronger signals pointing to possible attacks abroad. They were not quiteneedles in a haystack, but the metaphor is not wholly inappropriate.On June 12, the CIA assembled biographical information on several terrorist leaders.Regarding Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, it said that he was recruiting people to travel tothe United States to meet persons already present, to conduct terrorist attacks on BinLadin's behalf.(repeat from note 15) This, of course, could have been a significant itemof intelligence had it been followed up, but it was neither emphasized in this particularreport nor mentioned again later.On July 2, the FBI... [from p. 4] ... suspicious activities.During early July, the CSG arranged ... [from pp. 5 and 6] ... screening checkpoints.Acting FBI Director ... [from p. 6] ... any such plots.(30, renumbered)In an August 1 advisory to field offices, FB I headquarters repeated that, while themajority of threat reporting [from p. 6] be discounted.(35, renumbered)During the spring ... [from p. 7] ... of this report.Government Response ...


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Mike HurleyFrom: Philip ZelikowSent: Friday, July 09, 2004 3:09 PMTo: Front OfficeCc: Team 3; Barbara GreweSubject: FW: Question

Chapter 6 Chapter 8jgestions_ERM_070jgestions_ERM_070 In reading some of the draft report as a whole, Ernest had someconcerns about chapters 6 and 8. I'm forwarding his message suggesting what might bedone. I have not read this material.Philip

Original MessageFrom: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Friday, July 09, 2004 10:21 AMTo: Philip ZelikowSubject: Re: QuestionI decided that I should go ahead and be specific even if I thought there was only a smallchance of the changes making their way through the gamut. So, some proposed changes areattached. Someone will have to key them in.

t3 b7 comments on draft final report fdr- entire contents- emails- notes- 3 withdrawal notices- 1...

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