t2 b7 various letters fdr- letter from geoffrey s boehm- restoring critical national imagery...

8/14/2019 T2 B7 Various Letters Fdr- Letter From Geoffrey S Boehm- Restoring Critical National Imagery Intelligence Capabiliti

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C H A I R .Beit-Veniste

Fielding. GoreUck

RoetnerThompson

. ZelikowDIRECTOR

Date:

TO: TEAM_Z=:F R O M : Dianna Campagtia

e0yy GVhe attached c orrespondence fromis being forwarded to you for information an d consideration. A copy hasalso been sent toTeam(s) ______ for their information. Ifyouhave any questions, please c all me on 33 1 -4082. Thank you.

T E L (202) 331-4060F A X (202) 296-5 545www.9- llcommissiongov


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Fax Cover Sheet

PAGE 01/6

MANAGEMENT CONSULTANT5 5 0 UTTERBACK STORE ROADGREAT FALLS, V IRGINIA 22O66

(703) [email protected]

Date: May 17, 2004

No.of Pages (including this sheet): 8

To: Mr. Thomas H. Kean, ChairNational Commission on Terrorist AttacksUpon the United States

Fax: (202)296-5545

Subject: Restoring Critical National ImageryIntelligence Capabilities


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GEOFFREY s. BOEHMM A N A G E M E N T C O N S U L T A N T

May 17,2004

Mr. Thomas H. Kean, ChairNational Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States301 7th Street,SWRoom 5125Washington, D. C. 20407Subject: Restoring Critical National Imagery Intelligence CapabilitiesDear Mr. Kean:Since 1996, our national imagery intelligence capabilities have deteriorated to the extentthat national security is in jeopardy. As you investigate the intelligence failures of 9/11,please consider the following.Imagery is a majorand often the onlysource of intelligence about global issues of thehighest importance. The National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA, formerlynamed National Imagery and Mapping Agency [NIMA]) is the sole national organizationresponsible for analyzing world-wide imagery to derive intelligence critical to USleaders. Alarmingly, the analytical depth and breadth of that vital national capabilitywere seriously eroded by NIMA, and the problem continues under NGA. Intelligencegaps, errors, and major failures are inevitable from the existing hollow shell of dwindlingimagery analysis abilitiesand conceivably may have been partially to blame for theintelligence failures of the 9/11 catastrophe.As a management consultant to NPIC (the CIA's former National PhotographicInterpretation Center, a NIMA predecessor) and then NIMA for a combined 31years, Iwitnessed significant deterioration in our national imagery intelligence capabilitiescaused when NPIC was subsumed by NIMA under DoD in 1996. Hundreds of expertCIA imagery analysts were driven away by NIMA's inept management and stiflingbureaucracy that failed to treat imagery analysis as the top mission priority. Theseimagery expertsthe eyes, brain, heart, and soul of analysistook pride in theunsurpassed professional standards and prestige of CIA and refused to work for DoDwhere they saw a military mentality and a policy of mediocrity engulfing their highlyspecialized tradecraftThis significant loss of expert imagery analysts has had compounded negative effects:not just a serious shortfall in the number of qualified analysts butmore importantlyadecimated knowledge base essential to quality imagery analysis and too few seasoned

SSO UTTERBACK STORE ROAD GREAT FALLS. VIRGINIA 22OS6 (7O3) 43O-O37Z - MACNUT4EVRYAHOO .COM


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veterans to train and mentor junior analysts properly. (Note: I do not know towhatextent, if any, these problems might have contributed to the national intelligence failuresof 9/11. But such problems certainly couldn't have helped the situation.)Many years will be needed to rebuild these critical imagery analytical capabilities to thecomprehensive depth and highly respected status of pre-NIMA days. Reversing thecontinuing slip toward mediocrity requires hiring, training, and retaining the necessarycadre of professional imagery analysts. In my judgment, such an endeavor can succeedonly if the national imagery analysis mission is returned to the CIA whereunlike theNGAthe most-qualified recruits are attracted and where management is focused strictlyon intelligence production of the highest possible quality. And as a bonus, if the CIAwere in charge again, I believe many of the experienced CIA imageiy analysts drivenaway by NIMA/NGA may well return to that profession, which they truly love.To give you a few more specifics, I have attached a copy of the letter that I sent to theSenate and House intelligence committees last fall, briefly describing the troublingsituation at NIMA when I retired last August. The complete story, however, is muchlarger than can be depicted in a few pages. Please do not hesitate to contact me, shouldyou want amplification on any or all issues.To improve our nation's intelligence, I strongly urge you to consider recommending thatnational imagery intelligence capabilities be moved out of DoD and back into the CIAwhere they could once again thrive.Respectfully,

Geoffrey S. Boehm

Attachment: Letter to Senate and House Intelligence Committees, September 26,2003


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GEOFFREY s. BOEHMM A N A G E M E N T CONSULTANT

September 26,2003

[to all members of the HPSCI and SSCI]Subject: Intelligence Problems al NIMA are Jeopardizing National SecurityDear fmember J :As a patriot and staunch supporter of national imagery intelligence for 31 of my 35management-consulting years, I can not sit idly by while N I M A ' s imagery intelligencecapabilities deteriorate. Because the impact on our nation's security ispotentiallydisastrous, I am writing to assure that you are ful ly aware of the situation and in hopesthat you will direct corrective actions as appropriate. Please permit me to explain.The creation of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) in 1996 was aterrible mistake. This merger was based on the seriously flawed premise that imageryintelligence analysts (from NPIC and DIA) and map makers (from DMA) had much incommon. This misconception was the brainchild of Keith Hall and John Deutch, bothofwhom had only superficial understanding of either tradecraft In fact, anyone withmoderate knowledge of the two tradecrafts knows they are uniqueand have very little incommon. Forcing them together has severely harmed national imagery intelligence.Maps have always been an essential part of imagery analysis, but making imageryanalysts "integrate"with map makers where they aren't needed or wanted has done littleto improve national intelligence measurablyquite to the contrary, this "oiland water"mix has served mainly to distract and obstruct imagery analysts from doing their primaryjob of producing quality imagery-derived intelligence that is vital to national security.To exacerbate this already untenable situation, NIMA is being directed ineptly withmisguided priorities, harmful policies, and stifling bureaucracy. Rather than facilitatingimagery intelligence analysis, Agency misdirection is impeding it. Among dozens ofexamples, here is just a sampling to partially illustrate the present state of affairs: Appearance, "kissing up" to the General (NIMA Director James Clapper, retiredthree-star), political spin, and personal career advancement take precedence over the

national intelligence mission, which has slipped far below first priority. Imagery analysts are being pressured to include detailed maps in all of their graphical

intelligence productswhether appropriate or not. Such contrived "integrated"products are meant to show the wisdom of the NIMA merger, but, in fact, they are

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dishonest, misleading to customers, and insulting to imagery analysts who knowbetter. Typically, to report most imagery-derived intelligence, all but the most simpleorientation maps are superfluous, and usually pictures with annotations bestcommunicate the intelligence. Thus, Colin Powell showed only annotated picturesf r om MIMAn o m apsto make his points to the UN Security Council last February.Lower managers and staff no longer can freely express views that differ from Agencymanagers without risking their careers. Senior imagery managers who used to bevery vocal about doing what was right have been "worn down" and sense theircareers would be threatened should they persist against the Agency spin. To quote arespected office director, "We have to pick our fights," meaning only the most severeproblems are worth a battle with Agency management. (This draws an alarmingparallel with root problems at NASA, where a similar atmosphere that discourageddissenting views was identified by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.)Appointed by the General, the Director of NIMA's Analysis and ProductionDirectorate (this includes all imagery analysts) has virtually no knowledge of theintelligence or imagery analysis businesses, has bad interpersonal skills, and lacksfundamental management abilities. He does not recognize the extent of hisignorance, and he neither seeks nor accepts advice from his many imageryintelligence experts (again, a problem similar to one at NASA that was cited by theColumbia Accident Investigation Board). These inadequacies, however, do not deterhim from making major decisions that place NIMA's imagery intelligence mission atrisk. And he is ever eager to please the General, regardless of any negative impactson the intelligence mission. Many imagery analysts and their managers express notjust disrespect but contempt for him.Most NIMA imagery analysts are ill-equipped to accomplish their jobs. All imageryanalysts still do not have softcopy imagery exploitation workstations. Systems forstoring and transferring imagery data electronically are undersized for today'simagery volumes, let alone the future when the systems will be at risk of saturationand failure. Imagery analysts who were relocated to Bethesda last fall (for politicalreasons) still do not have proper secure telephones to enable important daily contactwith customers and colleagues at NSA, D1A, and the Pentagon. Agency managersblame these and other such problems on the lack of money, yet they found $9 millionto squander on a 3-D terrain model maker of dubious value. And they spent millionson an ill-conceived Hollywood-style tactical airborne analysis center that proved tohave essentially zero intelligence value during the Iraq invasion. One senior managercynically quipped that the airborne center's main value was to keep visitors out of theway of imagery analysts doing the real work.Imagery analysts are being forced to convert from film to softcopy image exploitationprematurely, regardless of risk to the intelligence mission. Softcopy potentially offersmany benefits and will eventuallybe the predominant image exploitation medium.But despite current softcopy system downtime, quality degradation, slow response,and the lack of tools to enable efficient area search and historical research (a concern


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prompting a Congressionally Directed Action questioning NTMA' s preparedness forthe future elimination of film production), Agency managers are pressuring imageryanalysts to stop using film before an adequate softcopy replacement is ready.Imagery analysts moving to Bethesda had to destroy personal film files essential tohistorical research. New imagery analysts are no longer being trained to use lighttables and film and, thus, will be ill-prepared to do basic historical research beyondthe five-year softcopy archives and won't know how to search large areas efficientlyusing film on light tables. Unfortunately, Agency managers have already made uptheir political minds about softcopy. Appearance and pleasing the General areparamountnever mind reality or risk.

NIMA's overhead is huge and not very supportive of the intelligence mission.Instead of forminga lean and mean organization modeled on the imagery intelligencebusiness, NIMA , by default, inherited the ugliest of non-mission-orientedbureaucracies from the former DMA. One of many examples is the human resourcesstaff. Before NIMA, NPIC had less than 10 officers who administered all personnelmatters effectively and efficiently for all NPIC employees. Today, NIMA has ahuman-resource staff of several hundred that provides poorer service with a staff-to-population ratio 10 times higher than NPIC's. Instead of revolving around the NIMAmissions, such support staffs typicallyoperate more for their own convenience andsustainment. In dealing with these bureaucrats, imagery analysts must compensatefor the lack of support and are distracted from their primary mission.

These and many other similar problems cumulatively create an environment in whichexperienced imagery analyststhe heart and soul of national imagery intelligenceareincreasingly no longer willingto work. Despite their intense love for imagery analysis,imagery analysts are leaving by the hundreds. Mid-level imagery analysts with 10 to 20years of experience have left in droves. Many senior imagery analysts with 20 to 30 ormore years of experience are retiring prematurely. Dozens of junior imageryanalyststhe foundation for the fu tureare leaving or simply resigning. In August, anexperienced and highly respected senior intelligence service (SIS) office director left intotal frustration. (This loss of large numbers of experienced imagery analysts isfrighteningly similar to the "brain drain" at NASA that was noted by the ColumbiaAccident Investigation Board.) NIMA's hemorrhaging of seasoned imagery veterans isdestroying our country's national imagery intelligence capabilities that were once anational treasure. If such destruction is allowed tocontinue, major imagery intelligencefailures (aptly called a "train wreck" in a student's thesis at the Joint Military IntelligenceCollege) are inevitable. And the attrition problem can not be easily or quickly fixed.Rebuilding a robust national imagery intelligence capability will take manyyearsassuming the restoration of an environment conducive to imagery analysts.On the surface, this deteriorating situation is not apparent to the average customer. TheNIMA "spin meisters" have painted a glowing picture of NIMA, touting the recentsuperb support provided to combat troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. Today's marveloussupport is rightly credited to the sweat and blood of a dwindling cadre of experienced anddedicated imagery analysts who understand the importance of their task and who are able


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to perform when their country needs t hemin spite of Agency mismanagement andimpediments. Unfortunately, such successes are hollow because they belie the true stateof national imagery intelligence capabilities today: an imagery analyst staff that is halfinexperienced journeymen, a seriously eroding knowledge base, an incomplete and out-of-date intelligence database, and denied areas that have not been looked at for yearstogive a few examples. Do not be fooled into thinking that NIMA is thriving because of afew flashy successes. In truth, NIMA's overall national imagery intelligence capability issteadily losing the analytical breadth and depth critical to national security.Just as NASA managers did not heed the foreshadowings of the Columbia catastrophe,NIMA managers pay only lip service to the attrition problem and do nothing to keepessential imagery analysts from leaving. Agency managers do not see the error in theirways and continue to create an atmosphere that is driving imagery analysts away. Agencymanagers are so bereft of a basic understanding of imagery analysis that they think thesolution to this attrition is merely hiring and training more replacementsan extremelysimplistic and flawed approach, given the three to five years required for a new trainee tobecome fully productive and the 10 to 30 years to rebuild the lost knowledge. Agencymanagers also naively think that technology is a panacea, but, in reality, it is only a pipedreamthe immaturity of automated exploitation tools makes the imagery analyst's eyesand brains irreplaceable for the foreseeable future. NIMA managers continue to spin theAgency line and focus on cute slogans and fancy toys while ignoring the unmistakableerosion of its core imagery analysis capabilitiesfiddling while Rome burns, so to speak.Like NASA, failure of NIMA is inevitable under the current management. (If I were incharge, I'd replace the General and the Director of Analysis and Production immediatelywith qualified managers who understand the imagery analysis business and who would cutattrition and focus all necessary resources toward imagery intelligence as a top priority.)I could go on and on with many additional problems because the actual situation is worsethan what I describe here. The facts are easily verifiable. Almost any senior imageryanalyst and Iheir managers could corroborate what I say and add some details of theirown. Unfortunately, given the current atmosphere that discourages dissenting views,most NIMA employees will not risk their careers by voicing anything that would upsetAgency managersunless protection from retribution is guaranteed. In addition, anumber of other people are not subject to such retributionand would be good sources:imagery analysts about to retire and recently retired, experienced imagery analysts whohave left recently, and selected contractors.I hope this letter sparks your interest and that you will try to fix the problems atNIMAbefore it's too late and we see a "NIMA Accident Investigation Board." Pleasefeel free to contact me should you want further information or clarification.Respectfully,

Geoffrey S. Boehm


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My Background. / was bom in Counci l Bluffs, Iowa,and raised on a nearby smal l farm where I learned th evirtues of hard work and honesty which have provenunwavering throughout my li fe of 60 years. I attendedgrade schoo l in a one-room country schoo lhouse,graduated from high schoo l at age 16, and was thefirst in my family to graduate from college (B. S. inMath and M. S. in Statistics from Iowa State). I wascommiss ioned a l ieutenant in the Army and proudlyserved a tour in Vietnam. I was a m a n a g e m e n tconsultant my ent ire 35-year career, serving nat ionalimagery analysts and their m anagers cont inuouslysince 1972 over 24 years at the former NPIC andnearly seven at NIMA before retiring this August. Iunderstand th e intricacies of the national imageryanalysis business, and managers have come to trustm y objective, straightforward, honest, friendly, andnon-polit ical advice.

t2 b7 various letters fdr- letter from geoffrey s boehm- restoring critical national imagery...

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