strauss existentialism and problem of socrates integral

7/28/2019 Strauss Existentialism and Problem Of Socrates integral

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Two Lectures by Leo Strauss

DAVIDBOLOTINSt. John's College, Santa FeCHRISTOPHERRUELLBoston CollegeTHOMAS . PANGLEUniversity of Toronto

The following two lectures are the first of a number of lectures by the lateLeo Strauss which Interpretation has undertaken to publish. The editors ofthese lectures for Interpretation have been able to obtain copies or transcriptsfrom various sources: none of the lectures was edited by Professor Strauss forthe purposes of publication nor even left behind by him among his papers in astate that would have suggested a wish on his part that it be published post-humously. In order to underline this fact, the editors have decided to presentthe lectures as they have found them, with the bare minimum of editorialchanges.

These lectures have all been published once before, at least in part, but in amore heavily edited form intended to make them more accessible to a wideraudience (The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism: An Introduction to theThought of Leo Strauss, edited by Thomas L. Pangle [Chicago: The Universityof Chicago Press, 19891). The University of Chicago Press, which holds thecopyright on the materials and which retains the copyright on them in the ver-sion now to be published, has generously given its permission for their repub-lication in Interpretation, as has Professor Joseph Cropsey, Leo Strauss'sliterary executor.

A notice will be attached to each lecture indicating the state in which themanuscript or transcription was found; and a list will be appended to someof the lectures calling attention to divergences from the previously publishedversion.

INTERPRETATION, Spring 1995, Vol. 22, No. 3


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302 I n t e r p r e t a t i o nT h e f i r s t o f these t w o lectures, "Existentialism," was d e l i v e r e d by P r o f e s s o r

St r a u ss fourteen years earlier than the second one, " T h e problem ofSocrates."They are, however, related to one another by their common concern to understand and t o respond t o the thought ofH e i d e g g e r . Indeed, they are P r o f e s s o rS traus s 's most extensive public statements about Heidegger, at leas t so far aswe know, and we h a v e a c c o r d i n g l y chosen to present them h e r e together.


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ExistentialismLeo Strauss

According to Dr. Victor Gourevitch, whose own lecture on Existentialism isreferred to by Professor Strauss in th e text, this lecture was delivered in February, 1956, at the Hillel Foundat ion of th e University of Chicago. The lecturewas available to the editors in a copy of a typescript with addi t ions, corrections, and alterations by Professor Strauss's own hand. The original of thistypescript, with Professor Strauss's revisions, can be found in the Strauss archives at the University of Chicago. We have chosen to present the revisedversion in the text, while indicating in notes what th e revisions were. However,where Professor Strauss merely corrected a typographical mistake , or where headded a comma or made other small changes of punctuation, we have presented only the corrected version. We have also taken the liberty of correcting,without comment , a few misspellings in the typescript. We are grateful to Heinrich and Wiebke Meier fo r their most generous help in deciphering ProfessorStrauss's handwriting.A more heavily edited version of this lecture, based on a typescript that

differs, in part, from the one we used, and on a copy that gives no indication ofhaving been seen by Professor Strauss, was previously published, under th etitle "An Introduction to Heideggerian Existentialism, " in The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism: An Introduction to th e Thought of Leo Strauss (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989 [ 1989 by The University of Chicago]),pp. 2746. We have noted in an epilogue what appear to us to be the mostimportant divergences between the earlier version and th e present one.

This series of lectures a reminder of the perplexities of modem manshould help th e Jewish students in particular towards facing the perplexities ofth e modem Jew with somewhat greater clarity. Existentialism has remindedmany people that thinking is incomplete and defective if the thinking being, th etriinking individual, forgets himself as what he is. It is the old Socratic warning. Compare1 Theodorus in the Theaetetus, th e purely theoretic, purely objective man who loses himself completely in the contemplation of mathematicalobjects, who knows nothing about himself and his fellow men, in particularabout his own defects. The thinking2 man is not a pure mind, a pointer-readingobserver, for instance. The3 question what am I, or who am I cannot be answered by science, fo r this would mean that there are some self-forgetting

1995 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.interpretation, Spring 1995, Vol. 22, No. 3


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Existentialism 305radicalization of Husserl's own question and questioning. Briefly, as8 Husserlonce said to me who had been trained in9 th e Marburg neo-Kantian school , the10neo-Kantians were superior to all other German philosophical schools, but theymade the mistake of beginning with th e roof. He meant: th e primary t heme ofMarburg neo-Kantianism was the analysis of science. But science, Husserltaught, is derivative from our primary knowledge of the world of things; science is not th e perfection of man's understanding of the world, but a specificmodification of that pre-scientific understanding. The meaningful genesis ofscience out of pre-scientific understanding is a prob l em; the primary t heme isth e philosophical understanding of th e pre-scientific world and therefore in th efirst place the analysis of the sensibly perceived thing. According to HeideggerHusserl

himself5began with th e roof: th e merely sensibly perceived thing isitself derivative; there are not first sensibly perceived things and thereafter th e

same things in a state of being valued or in a state of affecting us. Our primaryunderstanding of the world is not an understanding of things as objects but ofwhat the Greeks indicated" by pragmata, things which we handle and use.12The horizon within which Husserl had analyzed th e world of pre-scientific understanding was the pure consciousness as the absolute being. Heidegger quest ioned that orientation by referring to the fact that the inner t ime belonging tothe pure consciousness cannot be understood if one abstracts from th e fact thatth is tim e is necessarily finite and even constituted by man's mortality. Thesame effect which Heidegger had in the late twent ies and early thirties in Germany , he had very soon in continental Europe as a whole. There is no longer inexistence a philosophic position apart from neo-Thomism and Marxism crudeor refined. All rational13 liberal philosophic positions have lost their significance and power. One may deplore this but I fo r one cannot bring myself toclinging to philosophic positions which have been shown to be8 inadequate. Iam14 afraid that we shall have to make a very great effort in order to find a solidbasis fo r rational liberalism. Only a great thinker could help us in our intellectual plight. But here is the great trouble, th e only great thinker in our t ime isHeidegger.

The only question of importance of course is th e question whether Heidegger's teaching is true or not. But th e very question is deceptive because it issilent about th e question of competence of who is competent to judge. P erhaps only great thinkers are really competent to judge of5 th e thought of greatthinkers . Kant16 made a distinction between philosophers and those fo r whomphilosophy is identical with the history of philosophy. He made a distinction, inother words , between th e thinker and the scholar. I know that I am only ascholar. But I know also that most people that call themselves philosophers aremostly, at best, scholars. The scholar is radically dependent on th e work of th egreat thinkers, of men who faced th e problems without being covered" by anyauthority. The scholar is cautious, methodic , not bold. He does not become lostto our sight in, to us inaccessible heights and mists as th e great thinkers do. Yet


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306 Interpretationwhile th e great thinkers are so bold they are also much more cautious than weare; they see pitfalls where we are sure of our ground. W e scholars live in acharmed circle, light-living like th e Homeric gods, protected against th e problems by th e great thinkers. The scholar becomes possible through the fact thatth e great thinkers disagree. Their disagreement creates a possibility fo r us toreason about their differences fo r wondering which of them is more likely tobe right. W e may think that the possible alternatives are exhausted by the greatthinkers of the past. W e may try to classify their doctrines and make a kind ofherbarium and think that we look over them from a vantage point. But wecannot exclude th e possibility that other great thinkers might arise in the future in 2200 in Burma the character18 of whose thought has in no way beenprovided for by our schemata. For who are we to believe tha t we have foundout th e limits of human possibilities?19 In brief, we are occupied with reasoningabout the little we understand oP what th e great thinkers have said.

The scholar faces th e fundamental problems th ro ug h th e intermediacy ofbooks. If he is a serious man th ro ug h th e intermediacy of th e great books. Thegreat thinker faces the problems directly.

I apply th is to my situation in regard to Heidegger. A famous psychologist Isaw in Europe, an old man, told me that in his view it is not yet possible toform a judgment about th e significance as well as the truth of Heidegger'swork. Because this work changed the intellectual orientation so radically21 thata long long t ime is needed in order to understand with even tolerable adequacyand in a most general way22 what this work means. The more I understand whatHeidegger is aiming at the more I see how much still escapes me. The moststupid thing I could do would be to close my eyes or to reject his work.

There is a not altogether unrespectable justification for doing so. Heideggerbecame a N azi in 1933. This was not due to a mere error of judgment on th epart of a man who lived on great heights high above the lowland23 of politics.Everyone who had read his first great book and did not overlook the wood fo rthe trees could see the kinship in temper and direction between Heidegger'sthought and th e Nazis. What was the practical, that is to say serious meaning ofthe contempt fo r reasonableness and the praise of resoluteness which permeatedthe work24 except to encourage that extremist movement? When Heidegger wasrector of th e University of Freiburg in 1933 he delivered an official speech inwhich he identified himself with the movement which then swept Germany.Heidegger has not yet dared to mention that speech in th e otherwise completelist of his writings, which appear from t ime to t ime on th e book jackets of hisrecent publications. Yet8 in 195325 he published a book, lectures given in 1935,in which he spoke of th e greatness and dignity of th e National Socialist movement. In th e preface written in 195325 he said that all mistakes had been corrected. The case of Heidegger reminds to a certain extent of the case ofNietzsche. Nietzsche, naturally, would not have sided with Hitler. Yet there isan undeniable kinship between Nietzsche's t hough t and fascism. If one rejects


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Existentialism 307as passionately as Nietzsche did26 the conservative constitutional monarchy aswell as democracy with a27 view to a new aristocracy, th e passion of th e denialswill be much more effective th an th e necessarily more subtle intimations of th echaracter of th e new nobility. To28 say nothing of

his29 blond beast. Passionatepolitical action against such things is absolutely in order but it is not sufficient.It is not even politically sufficient. Are there no dangers threatening democracynot only from without but from within as well? Is there no problem of democracy, of industrial mass democracy? The official high priests of democracy withtheir amiable reasonableness were not reasonable enough to prepare us fo r oursituation: the decline of Europe, the danger to the west , to the whole westernheritage which is at least as great and even greater than that which threatenedMediterranean civilization around 300 of the Christian era. It is childish tobelieve that th e U.N. organization is an answer even to the political problem.And30 within democracy: it suffices to mention th e name of France 31 and5 th ecommercials and5 logical positivism with their indescribable vulgarity. Theyhave indeed the merit of not sending men into concentration camps and gaschambers , but is the absence of these unspeakable evils sufficient? Nietzscheonce described th e change which had been effected in the second half of th enineteenth century in continental Europe as follows.32 The reading of th e morning prayer had been replaced by th e reading of th e morning paper: not everyday th e same thing, th e same reminder of men's absolute duty and exalteddestiny, but every day something new with no reminder of duty and exalteddestiny. Specialization, knowing more and more about less and less, practicalimpossibility of concentration upon the very few essential things upon whichman's wholeness entirely depends this33 specialization compensated by shamuniversality, by the stimulation of all kinds of interests and curiosities withouttrue passion, th e danger of universal philistinism and creeping conformism. Orle t me look fo r a moment at th e Jewish problem. The nobility of Israel isliterally beyond praise , the only bright spot for th e contemporary Jew whoknows where he comes from. And yet Is rael does not afford a solution to theJewish problem. "The Judaeo-Christian tradit ion"? This means to blur and toconceal grave differences. Cultural pluralism can only be had it seems at th eprice of blunting all edges.

It would be wholly unworthy of us as thinking beings not to listen to th ecritics of democracy even if they are enemies of democracy provided they arethinking men and especially great thinkers and not blustering fools.

As you may recall from Mr. Gourevitch's lecture, Existentialism appeals toa certain experience (anguish) as th e basic experience in th e light of whicheverything must be understood. Having this experience is one thing; regardingit as the basic experience is another thing. Its basic character is not guaranteedby th e experience itse lf . I t can only be guaranteed by argument.5 This argumentmay be invisible because it is implied in what is generally admitted in our t ime.What is generally admitted may imply, but only imply a fundamental uneasi-


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308 Interpretationness which is vaguely felt but not fa ced . G iven this context, the experience towhich Existentialism refers will appear as a revelation, as th e revelation, as theauthentic interpretation of th e fundamental uneasiness. But something more isrequired which however is equally generally admitted in our t ime : th e vaguelyfelt uneasiness must be regarded as essential to man, and not only to present5day man. Yet this vaguely felt uneasiness is distinctly a present day phenomenon. Let us assume however that this uneasiness embodies what all earlier ageshave thought, is the result of what earlier ages have thought; in that case th evaguely felt uneasiness is the mature fruit of all earlier human efforts: no returnto an older interpretation of that uneasiness is possible. Now this is a secondview generally accepted today (apart from th e fundamental uneasiness which isvaguely felt but not faced); this second element is th e belief in progress.

I have already referred to th e well known expression 'we know more andmore about less and less.' What does this mean? It means that modem sciencehas not kept th e promise which it held out from its beginning up to th e end ofthe nineteenth century: that it would reveal to us th e true character of th e universe and th e truth about man. Y ou have in th e Education of Henry Adams amemorable document of the change in th e character and in th e claim of sciencewhich made i tself felt in the general public to w ard s th e end of the last centuryand which has increased since, in momentum and sweep. You all know th eassertion that value-judgments are impermissible to th e scientist in general andto the social scientist in particular. This means certainly that while science hasincreased man's power in ways that former men never dreamt of, it is absolutely incapable to tell men how to use5 that power. Science cannot tell himwhether it is wiser to use that power wisely and beneficently or foolishly anddevilishly. From this it follows that science is unable to establish its own mean-ingfulness or to answer th e question whether and in what sense science is good.W e are then confronted with an enormous apparatus whose bulk is ever increasing, but8 which in itse lf has no meaning. If a scientist would say as Goethe'sMephisto still said that science and reason is man's highest power , he would betold that he was not talking as a scientist but was34 making a value judgmentwhich from th e point of view of science is altogether unwarranted. Someonehas spoken of a flight from scientific reason. This flight is not due to anyperversity but to science its elf. I dimly remember th e t ime when people arguedas follows: to deny the possibility of science or rational value judgments meansto admit that all values are of equal rank; and this means that respect for allvalues, universal tolerance, is th e dictate of scientific reason. But th is tim e hasgone. Today we hear that no conclusion whatever can be drawn from th e equality of all values; that science does not legitimate nor indeed forbid that weshould draw rational conclusions from scientific findings. The assumption thatwe should act rationally and the re fo re tu rn to science fo r reliable information 31this assumption is wholly outside of the purview and interest of science proper.The flight from scientific reason is35 the consequence of the flight of5 science


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Existentialism 309from5 reason from th e notion that man is a rational being who perverts hisbeing if he does not act rationally. It goes without saying that a science whichdoes not allow of value judgments has no longer any possibility of speaking ofprogress except in th e humanly irrelevant sense of scientific progress: the concept of progress has accordingly been replaced by th e concept of change. Ifscience or reason cannot answer the question of why science is good, of whysufficiently gifted and otherwise able people fulfill a duty in devoting themselves to science, science says in effect that the choice of science is not rational: one may choose with equal right pleasing and otherwise satisfying myths.Furthermore, science does no longer conceive of itself as the perfection of th ehuman understanding36; it admits that it is based on fundamental hypotheseswhich will always remain hypotheses. The whole stmcture of science does notrest on evident necessities. If this is so, th e choice of the scientific orientationis as groundless as the choice of any alternative orientation. But what else doesthis mean except that the reflective scientist discovers as th e ground of hisscience and his choice of science a8 groundless choice an abyss. For a scientific interpretation of the choice of th e scientific orientation, on the one hand,and th e choice of alternative orientations, on the other, presupposes already theacceptance of the scientific orientation. The fundamental freedom is th e onlynon-hypothetical phenomenon. Everything else rests on that fundamental freedom. We are already in the midst of Existentialism.

Someone might say that science by itself as well as poor and stupid positivism are of course helpless against the Existentialist onslaught. But do we nothave a rational philosophy which takes up th e th re ad where science and positivism drop it, and fo r which poetic, emotional Existentialism is no match?19 Ihave asked myself fo r a long t ime where do I find that rational philosophy?19 IfI disregard th e neo-Thomists , where do I find today th e philosopher who daresto say that he is in possession of th e true metaphysics and th e tme ethics whichreveal to us in a rational, universally valid way th e nature of being and th echaracter of th e good life?19 Naturally we can sit at th e feet of th e great philosophers of old, of Plato and of Aristotle. But who can dare to say that Plato'sdoctrine of ideas as he intimated it, or Aristotle's doctrine of th e nous that doesnothing but think itself and is essentially related to the eternal visible universe,is the true teaching?19 Are those like myself who are inclined to sit at th e feet ofth e old philosophers not exposed to the danger of a weak-kneed eclecticismwhich will not withstand a single blow on the part of those who are competentenough to remind them of the singleness of purpose and of inspiration thatcharacterizes every thinker who deserves to be called great?19 Considering th eprofound disagreement among th e great thinkers of th e past, is it possible toappeal to them without blunting all edges? The place of rational philosophyproper is taken more and more by what was called in th e country of its originWeltanschauungslehre, theory of comprehensive views. In this stage it is admitted that we cannot refer to the tme metaphysical and ethical teaching avail-


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310 Interpretationable in any of th e great thinkers of th e past. It is admitted that37 there are nways of answering th e fundamental questions, that there are n types of absolutepresuppositions as Collingwood called them, none of which can be said to berationally superior to any other. This means to abandon th e very idea of th etruth as a rational philosophy has always understood it . It means just as in thecase of th e social scientists38 that the choice of any of these presuppositions isgroundless; we are thus led39 again to the abyss of freedom. To say noth ing ofth e fact that any such doctrine of comprehensive views presupposes that th efundamental possibilities are available or that fundamenta l human creativity isat its end. Furthermore there is a radical disproportion between th e analyst ofcomprehensive views who does not face th e fundamental questions directly anddoes not even recognize them in their primary meaning , viz. as pointing to oneanswer only, and the great thinkers themselves. He is separated from them by adeep gulf which is created by his pretended knowledge of th e Utopian characterof original philosophy itself. How can we possibly believe that40 he is in aposition to understand th e thinkers as they want to be understood and as8 theymust have been understood if one is to order and tabulate their teachings. Weare sufficiently familiar with th e history of moral philosophy in particular inorder not to be taken in fo r one moment by th e pious hope that while there maybe profound disagreements among th e rational philosophers in all other respects, that they will happily agree regarding human conduct. There is only onepossible way out of the predicament in which the doctrine41 of comprehensiveviews finds itself and that is to find th e ground of th e variety of comprehensiveviews in th e human soul or more generally stated in the human condition.If one takes this8 indispensable step one is again already at the threshold ofExistentialism.There is another very common way of solving th e so-called value problem.

People say that we must adopt values and that it is natural fo r us to adopt th evalues of our society. Our42 values are our highest principles if th e meaning ofscience itself depends on values. Now it is impossible to overlook th e relationof th e principles5 of our society to our society5, and the dependence of th eprinciples on the society. This means generally stated that th e principles, theso-called categorial system or th e essences are rooted ultimately in th e particular, in something which exists. Existence precedes essence. For what else dopeople mean when they say, e.g. that th e Stoic natural law teaching is rooted inor relative to the decay of the Greek polis and th e emergence of th e Greekempire?19

As I said,43 sometimes people try to avoid th e difficulty indicated by sayingthat we have to adopt th e values of our society. This is altogether impossiblefo r serious men. We cannot help raising the question as to th e value of thevalues of our society. To accept the values of one's society because they are thevalues of one's society means simply to shirk one's responsibility, not to faceth e situation that everyone has to make his own choice, to mn away from one's


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Existentialism -311self. To find th e solution to our problem in th e acceptance of th e values o f oursociety, because they are the values o f ou r society means to make philistinism aduty and to make oneself oblivious to the difference between tm e individualsand w h it en e d s ep u lc h re s.

The uneasiness which today is felt but no t faced ca n be expressed by asingle word: relativism. Existentialism admits th e truth of relativism but it realizes that relativism so fa r from being a solution or even a relief, is deadly.Existentialism is the reaction of serious men to their own relativism.

Existentialism begins then with the realization that as th e ground of all objective, rational knowledge we discover an abyss. All truth, all meaning is seenin th e last analysis to have no support e xc ep t m a n' s freedom. Objectively thereis in the last analysis only meaninglessness, nothingness. This nothingness canbe experienced in anguish but this experience cannot find an objective expression: because it cannot be made in detachment. Man freely originates meaning ,he originates th e horizon, th e absolute presupposition, the ideal, th e projectwithin which understanding and life a re p o ss ib le . Man is man by virtue of sucha horizon-fonning project, of an unsupported project, of a thrown project.More precisely m an alw ays lives already within such a horizon without beingaware of its character; he takes his world as simply given; i.e. he has losthimself; but he ca n call himself back from his lostness and take th e responsibility fo r what he wa s in a lost, u n au th e nt ic w ay . M an is essentially a socialbeing: to be a human being means to be with other human beings. To be in anauthentic way means to be in an authentic way with44 others: to be true tooneself is incompatible with being false to others. Thus there would seem toexist the possibility of an existentialist ethics w hich w ou ld have to be howevera strictly formal ethics. However this may be, Heidegger never believed in th epossibility of an ethics.

To be a human being means to be in th e world. To be a ut he nt ic m e an s to beauthentic in th e world; to accept the things within th e world as merely factualand one's ow n being as merely factual; to risk oneself resolutely, despisings ha m c er ta in ti es (and all objective certainties are sham). Only if ma n is in thisway do the things in the world reveal themselves to him as they are. Theconcern with objective certainty necessarily narrows th e horizon. It leads to theconsequence that ma n erects around himself an artificial setting which concealsfrom him th e abyss of which he must be aware if he wants to be truly human.T o live dangerously means to th in k exposedly.

W e are ultimately confronted with mere facticity or contingency. But are wenot able and even compelled to raise the question of th e causes of ourselves andof th e things in the world? Indeed we cannot help raising th e questions of th eWhere45 and Whither, or o f th e Whole. But we do not know and cannot knowthe Where and Whither an d the Whole.46 Man c an n ot u n de rs ta n d himself in th elight of the whole , in the light of his origin or his end. This irredeemable47ignorance is th e basis of his lostness or th e core of th e human situation. By


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312 Interpretation

making this assertion existentialism restores Kant's notion of the unknowablething-in-i tself and o f man's ability to grasp the fact of his freedom at th e limitsof objective knowledge an d as the ground of objective knowledge. B ut in exist en ti ali sm the re is no moral law and no other world.

It becomes necessary to make as fully explicit as possible the character ofhuman existence; to raise the q ue st io n w h at is human existence; and to bring tolight the essential structures of human existence. This inquiry is called byHeidegger analytics of Existenz. Heidegger conceived of th e analytics of Exis-tenz from th e outset as th e fundamental ontology. This means he took up againPlato's and Aristotle's question what is being? What is that by virtue o f whichany being is said to be?19 Heidegger a gr ee d w it h Plato and Aristotle not only asto this, that the question of what is to be is th e fundamental question; he alsoa gr ee d w it h Plato and Aristotle as to this, that th e fundamental question mustbe primarily addressed to that being which is5 in the most emphatic or th e mostauthoritative way. Yet while according to Plato and Aristotle to be in th e highest sense m ean s to be always, Heidegger contends that to be in th e highestsense means to exist, that is to say, to be in the manner in which man is: to bein th e highest sense is constituted by mortality.

Philosophy thus becomes analytics of existence. Analytics o f existencebrings to light th e essential structures, the unchangeable character of existence.Is then the ne w Philosophy in spite of the difference of conten t, ob jective ,rational philosophy, comparable to Kant's transcendental analytics of subjectivity? Does not th e new philosophy too take on the character of absoluteknowledge, complete knowledge, final knowledge, infinite knowledge? Nothe new philosophy is necessarily based on a specific ideal of existence. Onecannot a n al yz e e x is te n ce from a neutral point of view; one must have made ac ho ic e w h ic h is no t subject to examination in order to be open to the phenomenon of existence. Man is a finite being, incapable of absolute knowledge: h isvery knowledge of his finiteness is finite. We may also say: commitment canonly be understood by an understanding which is itself committed, which is aspecific5 commitment. Or: existential philosophy is subjective truth about thesubjectivity of truth.48 To speak in general terms, rational philosophy has beenguided by th e distinction between th e objective which is true and th e subjectivewhich is opinion (o r a n e qu iv al en t of this distinction). On th e basis of existentialism what was formerly called objective reveals itself to be as49 superficialproblematic; and what was formerly called subjective reveals itself as profound assertoric, with th e understanding that there is no apodicticity.

The great achievement of Heidegger wa s the coherent exposition of th eexperience of Existenz.5 A coherent exposition based on the experience of Existenz;5 of the essential character of Existenz.5 Kierkegaard had spoken of existence within th e traditional horizon, i.e. within th e horizon of th e traditionaldistinction between es se nc e a nd existence. Heidegger tried to understand existence ou t of itself.


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Existentialism 313Yet the analytics of existence wa s exposed to serious difficulties which

eventually induced Heidegger to find a fundamentally new basis, that is to say,to break with existentialism. I shall mention now some of these difficulties.1 Heidegger demanded from philosophy that it should liberate itself completely from traditional or inherited notions w hich w ere mere survivals of fo rme r ways of thinking. He mentioned especially concepts that were of Christiantheological origin. Yet his understanding of existence wa s obviously of Christian origin (conscience, guilt, being unto death, anguish). 2)50 The fact that th eanalytics of existence was based on a specific ideal of existence made onew o nd er w h et he r th e analysis was not fundamentally arbitrary. 3 The analyticsof existence had culminated in th e assertion that there ca n be no truth and henceno to be, if there are no human beings, while there can be beings (for examplethe sun and th e earth), if there are no human beings . This is hard: that thereshould be beings without that by virtue of which beings are. 4 The highestform of knowledge was said to be fin ite knowledge of finiteness: yet how canfiniteness be seen as finiteness if it is not seen in th e light of infinity?19 Or inother words it wa s said that we cannot know th e whole ; but does this notnecessarily presuppose awareness of the whole? Professor Hocking stated thisdifficulty neatly as follows: desespoir presupposes espoir and espoir presupposes love; is then no t love rather than despair th e fundamental phenomenon?Is therefore not that which ma n ultimately loves, God, th e u ltimate g ro un d?These objections which Heidegger made to himself were fundamentally th esame objections which Hegel had made to Kant. The relation of Heidegger tohis o wn e x is te nt ia li sm is th e same as that of Hegel to Kant. The objectionsm e n ti o ne d w o ul d seem to lead to the consequence that o ne ca nn ot escap e m et aphysics, Plato an d Aristotle. This consequence is rejected by Heidegger. Thereturn to metaphysics is impossib le . But what is needed is s om e r ep et it io n ofwhat metaphysics intended on an entirely different plane. Existence cannot bethe5 clue, the clue to the understanding of that by virtue of which all5 beingsare. Existence must rather be understood in th e light o f that by virtue of whichall beings are. From this point of view th e analytics of existence appears still topartake of m o d e m subjectivism.51

I have compared the relation of Heidegger to existentialism with th e relationof Hegel to Kant. Hegel may be said to have been th e first philosopher wh owas aware that his philosophy belongs to his t ime. Heidegger's criticism ofe x is te n ti a li s m c a n therefore be expressed as follows. Existentialism claims tobe the insight into th e e s se n ti al c h ar a ct e r of man , the final insight which assuch would belong to the final time, to the fullness of t im e. And ye t existentialism den ies th e possibility of a fullness of t ime: th e historical process is unfin-ishable; ma n is and always will be a historical being. In other wordsexistentialism claims to be the understanding of the historicity of ma n and yet itdoes no t reflect about its ow n historicity, of its belonging to a specific situationof western man. It becomes therefore necessary to return from Kierkegaard's


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314 Interpretation

existing individual who has nothing but contempt fo r Hegel's understanding ofman in t e rms of universal history, to that Hegelian understanding. The situationto which existentialism belongs can be seen to be liberal democracy. Moreprecisely a liberal democracy which has become uncertain of itself or of itsfuture. Existentialism belongs to the decline of Europe or of the West.52 Thisinsight has grave consequences. Let us look back for a moment to Hegel.Hegel 's philosophy knew itself to belong to a specific time. As th e completionor perfection of philosophy it belonged to th e completion or fullness of t ime.This meant fo r Hegel that it belonged to th e post-revolutionary state, to Europeunited under Napoleon non-feudal, equality of opportunity, even free enterprise, but a strong government not dependent on th e will of the majority yetexpressive of th e general will which is the reasonable will of each, recognitionof the rights of man or of the dignity of every human being, the monarchichead of th e state guided by a first rate and highly educated civil service. Society thus constructed was the final society. History had come to its end. Precisely because history had come to its end, th e completion of philosophy hadbecome possible. The owl of Minerva commences its flight at the beginning ofdusk. The completion of history is the beginning of th e decline of Europe, ofth e west and therewith, since all other cultures have been absorbed into th ewest, the beginning of the decline of mankind. There is no future for mankind.Almost everyone rebelled against Hegel's conclusion, no one more powerfullythan M arx. He pointed out th e untenable character of the post-revolutionarysettlement and th e problem of th e working class with all its implications. Therearose th e vision of a world society which presupposed and established fo r everthe complete victory of the tow n over th e country, of th e Occident53 over th eOrient53; which would make possible th e full potentialities of each, on the basisof man having become completely collectivized. The man of th e world societywho is perfectly free and equal is so in th e last analysis because all specialization, all division of labor has been abolished; all division of labor has been seento be due ultimately to private property. The man of the world society goeshunting in th e forenoon, paints at noon , philosophizes in th e afternoon, worksin his garden after th e sun has set. He is a perfect jack of all trades. No onequestioned th e communist vision with greater energy than Nietzsche. He identified th e man of the communist world society as th e last man, that is to say, asthe extreme degradation of man. This did not mean however that Nietzscheaccepted th e non-communist society of the nineteenth century or its future. Asall continental European conservatives he saw in communism only th e consistent completion of democratic egalitarianism and of that liberalistic demand forfreedom which was not a freedom for, but only a freedom from. But in contradistinction to th e European conservatives he saw that conservatism as such isdoomed. For all merely defensive positions are doomed. All merely backwardlooking positions are doomed . The future was with democracy and with nationalism. And both were regarded by Nietzsche as incompatible with what he saw


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Existentialism -315to be th e task of the twentieth century. He saw th e twen tie th century to be th eage of world wars , leading up to planetary rule. If man were to have a future,this rule would have to be exercised by a united Europe. And the enormoustasks of such an iron age could not possibly be discharged, he thought, by weakand unstable governments dependent upon democratic public opinion. The newsituation required th e emergence of a new aristocracy. It had to be a new5nobility, a nobility formed by a new ideal. This is th e most obvious meaningand fo r this reason also the most superficial meaning of his notion of th e superman: all previous notions of human greatness would not enable man to face th einfinitely increased responsibility of th e planetary age. The invisible mlers ofthat possible future would be th e philosophers5 of th e future. It is certainly notan overstatement to say that no one has ever spoken so greatly and so nobly ofwhat a philosopher is as Nietzsche. This is not to deny that th e philosophers ofth e future as Nietzsche described them remind much more than Nietzsche himself seems to have thought, of Plato's5 philosophers. For while P lato had seenthe features in question as5 clearly as Nietzsche and perhaps more clearly thanNietzsche, he had intimated rather than stated his deepest insights. But there isone decisive difference between Nietzsche's philosophy of the future andPlato's philosophy. Nietzsche's philosopher54 of the future is an heir to th eBible. He is an heir to tha t deepening of th e soul which has been effected bythe biblical belief in a God that is holy. The philosopher of th e future as distinguished from the classical philosophers will be concerned with th e holy. Hisphilosophizing will be intrinsically religious. This does not mean tha t he believes in God, th e biblical God. H e is an atheist, but an atheist who is waitingfo r a god who has not yet shown himself. He has broken with th e biblical faithalso and especially because th e b ib lic al God as th e creator of th e world isoutside the world: compared with th e b ib lic al God as the highest good th eworld is necessarily less than perfect. In other words the biblical faith necessarily leads according to Nietzsche to other-worldliness or asceticism. The condition of the highest human excellence is that man remains or becomes fullyloyal to the earth; that there is nothing outside th e world which could be of anyconcern to us be it god or ideas or atoms of which we could be certain byknowledge or by faith. Every concern fo r such a ground of the world as isoutside of th e world , i.e. of the world in which man lives, alienates man fromhis world. Such concern is rooted in the desire to escape from th e terrifying andperplexing character of reality, to cut down reality to what a man can bear itis rooted in a desire fo r comfort.

The First World War shook Europe to its founda tions. Men lost their senseof direc tion . The faith in progress decayed. The only people who kept that faithin its original vigor were the communists. But precisely communism showed toth e non-communists th e delusion of progress. Spengler's Decline of the Westseemed to be much more credible. But one had to be inhuman to leave it atSpengler's prognosis. Is there no hope fo r Europe and therewith for mankind?


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316 InterpretationIt wa s in the spirit of such hope that Heidegger perversely welcomed 1933. Hebecame disappointed and withdrew. What did the failure of the Nazis teachhim? Nietzsche's hope for55 a united Europe ruling the planet , for55 a Europe notonly united but revitalized by this new, t ranscendent responsibility of planetaryrule had proved to be a delusion. A world society controlled either by Washington or Moscow appeared to be approaching. For Heidegger it did no t make adifference whether Washington or Moscow would be the center: "America andSoviet Russia are metaphysically the same."What is decisive fo r him is thatthis world society is to him more than a nightmare. He calls it the "night of theworld."It means indeed, as Marx had predicted, the victory of an evermoreurbanized, evermore completely technological, west over th e whole planetcomplete levelling and uniformity r eg ar dl es s w h et he r it is brought about byiron compulsion or by soapy advertisement o f the output of mass production. Itmeans unity of the human race on the lowest level, complete emptiness of life,self perpetuating r ou ti ne w i th o ut rhyme and reason; no leisure, no concentration, no elevat ion, no withdrawal, but w ork and recreation; no individuals andno peoples, but "lonely crowds."

How can there be hope? Fundamentally because there is something in ma nwhich cannot be satisfied by this world society: th e desire fo r the genuine, forthe noble , for the great. This desire has expressed itself in man's ideals, but allprevious ideals have proved to be related to societies which were not worldsocieties. The old ideals will not enable man to overcome5 th e power, to master5the power of t echnology. We may also say: a world society can be humanonly if there is a world culture, a culture genuinely uniting all m en. But therenever has been a high culture without a religious basis: the world society can behuman only if all m en are genuinely united by a world religion. But all existingr el ig io ns a re steadily undermined as far as their effective power is concerned,by the progress towards a technological world society. There forms itself anopen or concealed world alliance of the existing r eli gi on s w hi ch ar e u nit ed onlyby their common enemy (atheistic communism). Their union requires that theyconceal from themselves and from the world the fact56 that they are incompatible5 with each other that each regards th e others as indeed noble, but untrue.5This is no t very promising. On th e other hand,57 ma n cannot make or fabricate aw or ld r el ig io n. He can only prepare it by becoming receptive to it . And hebecomes receptive to it if he thinks deeply enough about himself and his situat ion.

Man's humanity is threatened with extinction by technology. Technology isthe fruit of rationalism an d rationalism is th e fruit of Greek philosophy. Greekphilosophy is th e condition of the possibility of technology and therefore at th esame t ime of the impasse5 created by technology. There is no hope beyondtechnological mass society if there are no essential limitations to Greek philosophy , th e root of technology, to say nothing of modem phi losophy. Greek philosophy wa s the attempt to understand the whole. It presupposed therefore that


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Existentialism "317the whole is intelligible, or that the grounds of th e whole are essentially intelligible: at th e disposal of man as man that they are always5 and therefore inprinciple always accessible to man.5 This view is th e condition of th e possibility of human mastery of th e whole. But that mastery leads, if its ultimateconsequences are drawn, to the ultimate degradation of man. Only by becoming58 aware of what is beyond human mastery can we have hope. Transcendingthe limits of rationalism requires th e discovery of the limits of rationalism.Rationalism is based on a specific understanding of what being means , viz. thatto be means primarily to be present , to be ready at hand and therefore that to bein the highest sense means to be always present, to be always. This basis ofrationalism proves to be a dogmatic assumption. Rationalism itself rests onnon-rational, unevident assumptions: in spite of its seemingly overwhelmingpower , rationalism is hollow: rationalism itself rests on something which itcannot master. A more adequate understanding of being is intimated by th eassertion that to be means to be elusive or to be a mystery. This is th e easternunderstanding of being. Hence there is no will to mastery in th e east. We canhope beyond technological world society, fo r a genuine5 world soc ie ty only ifwe become capable of learning from the east, especially from China. But Chinasuccumbs to western rationalism. There is needed a meeting5 of th e west and ofth e east. The west has to make its own contribution to the overcoming oft echnology. The west has first to recover within itself that which would makepossible a meeting of west and east. The west has to recover within itself itsown deepest roots which antedate its rationa li sm, which, in a way , antedate th eseparation of west and east. No genuine meeting of west and east is possible onth e level of present day thought i.e. in th e form of the meeting of the mostvocal, most glib, most superficial representatives of th e most superficial periodof both west and east. The meeting of west and east can only be a meeting ofth e deepest roots of both.

Heidegger is the only man who has an inkling of the dimensions of th eproblem of a world society.The western thinker can prepare that meeting by descending59 to th e deepest

roots of the west. Within th e west the limitations of rationalism were alwaysseen by the biblical tradit ion. (Here lies th e justification fo r the biblical elements in Heidegger's earlier thought.) But this must be rightly understood.Biblical thought is one form of Eastern60 thought . By taking the Bible as absolute, one blocks the access to other forms of eastern thought . Yet th e Bible isth e east within us, within61 western man. Not the Bible as Bible but th e Bible aseastern can help us in overcoming Greek rationalism.

The deepest root of th e west is a specific understanding of being, a specificexperience of being. The specifically western experience of being led to theconsequence that the ground of grounds was forgotten and th e primary experience of being was used only fo r th e investigation of the being s. The east hasexperienced being in a way which prevented th e investigation of beings and


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318 Interpretationtherewith the concern with th e mastery of beings. But the western experience ofbeing makes possible in principle, coherent speech about being. By openingourselves to the problem of being and to th e problematic character of the west-em understanding of being, we may gain access to th e deepest root of the east.The ground of grounds which is indicated by th e word being will be th e groundnot only of religion but even of any possible gods. From here one can begin tounderstand th e possibility of a world religion.

The meeting of east and west depends on an understanding of being. Moreprecisely it depends on an understanding of that by virtue of which beingsare esse, etre, to be, as distinguished from entia, etants, beings. Esse asHeidegger understands it may be described crudely and superficially and evenmisleadingly, but not altogether misleadingly, by saying that it is a synthesis ofPlatonic ideas and the biblical God: it is as impersonal as the Platonic ideas andas elusive as th e biblical God.

NOTES

1 . "compare" has been changed by hand by th e insertion of th e capital letter. The period at th eend of th e previous word "warning" is th e editors'correction of a comma that seems to have beenleft uncorrected in th e typescript .

2. "thinking" added by hand to replace "theoretical" which has been crossed out.3. In th e ty pe sc rip t th e previous sentence ends after th e word "observer," and th e new one

begins with th e words "For instance, the. " The punctuation and capitalization have beenchanged by hand.

4 . Continua tion of the old paragraph in th e typescript, but with a marginal indication by handfo r a new one.

5. Underlining added by hand.6. "Weber's" added by hand to replace "his" which has been crossed out.7. "to limit th e comparison to the remark"added by hand to replace "to say"which has been

crossed out.8. Word added (in th e margin or between th e lines) by hand.9. "in" added by hand to replace "the" which has been crossed out.10 . The word "that" before "the" has been crossed out.1 1 . "indicated" added by hand to replace "meant" which has been crossed out.12 . The comma after "pragmata" and th e words "things which we handle and use"have been

added by hand.13 . The word "rationalistic" has been changed to "rational" by hand by crossing out th e letters"istic.''14 . The word "I'm" has been replaced by "I am"by hand, by crossing out " 'm " and adding"am" above th e line.15 . "of added by hand to replace "about" which has been crossed out.16 . "Kant" added by hand to replace

"Heidegger" which has been crossed out.17 . In another typescript, but not one that gives any clear indication of having been seen by

Professor Strauss, this word has been changed by an unknown hand to "cowered." This othertypescript, which has been circulating among Professor Strauss's students fo r some years, is th eone from which Thomas Pangle worked in editing this lecture for The Rebirth of Classical PoliticalRationalism.

18. "character" added by hand to replace "possibility" which has b een crossed out.19 . The question mark has been added by th e editors to correct a period in th e typescript.


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Existentialism 31920 . "of added by hand to replace "about" which has been crossed out.21 . The word order here has been changed by hand. The original typed phrase is "so radically

th e intellectual orientation."22 . "and in a most general way"added by hand.23 . The typescript has th e words "low land" which have been joined into a single word by

hand.24. "which permeated th e work"added by hand.25. "1953" added by th e editors to correct "1952" in th e typescript .26 . The words "as Nietzsche does" have been replaced by "a s passionately as Nietzsche did"

by hand, by adding "passionately as"after "as" and by crossing out "does" and adding "did" aboveth e line.

27 . "a" added by hand to replace "the" which has been crossed out.28 . "to" has been changed by hand by th e insertion of th e capital letter. The period at th e end

of th e previous word "nobility" is th e editors'correction of a comma that seems to have been leftuncorrected in th e typescript.

29."his"

added by hand to replace "the" which has been crossed out.30 . "and" has been changed by hand by th e insertion of th e capital letter. The period after th eprevious word "problem" is a correction by hand of th e original comma.

31 . The dash has been inserted by hand.32 . The words "as follows" have been added by hand.33 . "this" added by hand to replace "the" which has been crossed out.34 . "was" added by hand to replace "is" which has been crossed out.35 . The word "is" has been added by hand, though not, it seems, by Professor Strauss's hand.36 . The typescript referred to in note 17 apparently has th e word "mind," confirmed as such by

an unknown hand, instead of "understanding."37 . The words "we cannot refer to th e true metaphysical and ethical teaching available in any

of th e great thinkers of th e past. It is admitted that" have been added by hand, though not byProfessor Strauss's hand.

38 . The typescript referred to in note 17 has th e word "sciences" instead of "scientists."39 . The semicolon after "groundless" and th e words "we are thus led" have been added by

hand to replace "and leads us"which has been crossed out.40. The word "him" before "that" has been crossed out.41. "doctrine" is th e reading of th e typescript referred to in note 17. It is included by th e

editors as a correction fo r th e word "doctrines," which appears in th e primary typescript.42. The word "Yet" before "our" has been crossed out and th e capital letter in "Our" has been

inserted by hand.43. "A s I said,"added by hand. A capital letter at th e beginning of "sometimes" has been

removed by the editors.44. "with" added by hand to replace "to" which has been crossed out.45. The other typescript referred to in note 17 has the word "Whence" instead of "Where."46. The other typescript referred to in note 17 has th e word "whence," in brackets, instead of

th e phrase "Where and Whither and the Whole."47. The other typescript referred to in note 17 has th e word "irremediable" instead of "irre

deemable." The editors suspect that this is th e correct reading.48. The words "about subjective truth" have been replaced by "about th e subjectivity of truth"

by hand, by adding "the" after "about," by crossing out th e final "e" in "subjective" and adding th eletters

"ity" above th e line, and by adding "of between"subjectivity" and "truth."

49. This word is enclosed in parentheses inserted by hand.50. "2)" added by hand to replace "Secondly," which has been crossed out.51. Quotation marks have been added, by an unknown hand, around th e words "modern sub

jectivism."

52 . The words "or of th e West" have been added by hand.53 . The words "Occident" and "Orient" have been inserted by hand above th e ty pe d words

"west" and "east," which have not, however, been crossed out.


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320 Interpretation54. "philosophy" has been changed by hand to "philosopher" by crossing out th e final "y" and

adding "er" above th e line.55. "for" added by hand to replace "of which has been crossed out. These changes are appar

ently not by Professor Strauss's hand.56. The words "the fact" have been added by hand.57. The words "This is not very promising. On th e other hand," have been added by hand. A

capital letter at th e beginning of "man" has been removed by th e editors.58. The word "man" before "becoming" has been crossed out.59. "dissenting" has been replaced by "descending" by hand, by crossing out the letters "is-sent"and adding "escend" above th e line.60. The capital letter at th e beginning of "Eastern" has been inserted by hand.61. The word "within" before "western" has been added by hand, but not , it seems, by Pro

fessor Strauss's hand.

EPILOGUE

There are a considerable number of divergences, most of which are apparently minor, betweenth is te xt and th e version published in The Rebirth of Classical Polit ica l Rationalism: An Introduction to th e Thought of Leo Strauss. Those divergences which appear to be most significant, apartfrom th e fact th at th e paragraph breaks are different, are th e following (page references are to th eearlier version):The title is different, and th e first sentence is missing in th e earlier version.p. 29, line 32 : Instead of "Heidegger" th e present version reads "Kant".p. 30 : Between th e first and th e second paragraphs on this page , th e present version inserts a short

paragraph.p. 30, line 5 of th e second paragraph reads differently in th e present version.p. 31, line 22 : Between "era" and "Nietzsche" th e present version inserts three sentences.p. 38, line 25 : After "that" th e present version inserts a new completion of this sentence and then

another full sentence. After this insertion, th e word "the," capitalized, begins a new sentence.p. 39, line 7 f rom bottom: The present version has a sentence worded so differently as to change

th e meaning considerably.p. 43: The one-sentence paragraph beginning with th e words "Heidegger is th e only man . . is in

th e present version placed just before th e paragraph beginning at th e bottom of th e page.p. 44, line 24 : The remainder of this paragraph, beginning with th e words "The ground of all

being," as well as th e entire subsequent paragraph, is taken from a different lecture, "Theproblem of Socrates," which Professor Strauss delivered many years la te r. Cf. page xxix of th eIntroduction.


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The problem of SocratesLeo Strauss

"The problem ofSocrates" was delivered as a lecture on April 17, 1970, onthe Annapolis campus of St. John's College. Professor Strauss's daughter,Professor Jenny Clay, of the Department of Classics at the University of Virginia , has generously made available to the editors a copy of the manuscript.Also, a tape recording of the lecture in the St. John's College library in Annapolis was available to the edi tors , as were copies of an anonymous transcription of that tape. Unfortunately, the tape is broken off after about forty-fiveminutes, with nearly half of the manuscript still unread , and the transcriptionalso ends where The tape does. Still, th e transcription, as corrected by th eeditors on the basis of the tape itself, offers a version of the first part of thelecture which differs from the manuscript in a number of places and whichsometimes appears to be superior to it . Thus, we have chosen to give the recorded version almost equal weight with the manuscript as a basis for ourpublished text. When the lecture as delivered merely contains a word or wordsthat are not in the manuscript, we have included these in brackets. In the othercases where the two authorities differ and where we have preferred the versionin the lecture as delivered, we have again included it in brackets, but in thesecases we have also included the manuscript version in a note. In the case ofthose discrepancies where we have preferred the manuscript version, we haveincluded it in the text without brackets, and we have included the oral versionin a note. All italics and paragraphs are based on the manuscript. A noteindicates where the tape is broken off, and after this point we are of coursecompelled to rely on the manuscript alone. We have preserved ProfessorStrauss's punctuation to the extent that we thought possible without sacrificingclarity. In those few cases where we have made a change on our own (apartfrom adding or subtracting a comma) , we have so indicated in a note. We havebeen compelled to substitute transliterations fo r Professor Strauss's Greekwords and phrases, all of which appear in the original Greek in the manuscript. Finally, we are grateful to Dr. Heinrich Meier for his generous help indeciphering Professor Strauss's handwriting.

A small portion of this lecture has been published previously, incorporatedwithin a different lecture and in a somewhat modified form, in The Rebirth ofClassical Political Rationalism: An Introduction to the Thought of Leo Strauss

1995 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.interpretation, Spring 1995, Vol. 22, No. 3


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322 Interpretation(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989 [ 1989 by The University ofChicago]), pp. 44-46.

[I was to ld th at the local paper has announced that I lecture tonight on "Theproblems of Socrates." This was an engaging printing error; fo r there is morethan one problem of Socrates, in th e first place, th e problem with which Socrate s was concerned. But one could say, th e problem with which Socrates wasconcerned may be of no concern to us, that it may not be relevant. Thereforeafter all there are so many things which concern us so much more obviouslyand urgently than th e problem with which Socrates was concerned. But wereceive an answer why we should be concerned with Socrates' problem bylistening to th e man from whom I took th e title of this lecture, and which, asfa r as I remember , was coined by

him.]1"The problem of

Socrates"

is the first,immediately revealing title of a section in Nietzsche's Dawn of Idols, one of hislast publications. Socrates and Plato, we hear, were decadents. More precisely,Socrates was a decadent who belonged to the lowest stratum of the commonpeople, to the riff-raff. [I quote:] "Everything is exaggerated, buffo, caricaturein him, everything is at the same t ime concealed, rich in afterthoughts, subterranean."The enigma of Socrates is the idiotic equation of reason, virtue andhappiness an equation opposed to all instincts of th e earlier Greeks, of [the]Greek health and nobility. The key is supplied by

Socrates'

discovery of dialectics, i.e. the quest fo r reasons. The earlier and2 high-class Greeks disdained toseek for, and to present, th e reasons of their conduct. To abide by authority, bythe command either of th e gods or of themselves, was fo r them simply a matterof good manners. Only those people have recourse to dialectics who have noother means fo r getting listened to and respected. It is a kind of revenge whichthe low-bom take of th e high-bom. "The dialectician leaves it to his adversaryto prove that he is not an idiot. He enrages and at th e same t im e makes helpless." Socrates fascinated because he discovered in dialectics a new form ofagon , [of contest]; he thus won over th e noble youth of Athens and amongthem above all Plato. In an age when the instincts had lost their ancient surety,and [were disintegrating]3, one needed a non-instinctual tyrant; this tyrant was4reason. Yet th e cure belongs as much to decadence as th e illness.

When speaking of the earlier Greeks, Nietzsche thinks also of the philosophers, the pre-Socratic philosophers5, especially Heraclitus. This does not meanthat he agreed with Heraclitus. One reason why he did not was that he, like allphilosophers, lacked the [so-called] "historical sense."Nietzsche's cure fo r allPlatonism and hence Socratism was at all t imes Thucydides who had the courage to face reality without illusion and to seek reason in reality, and not inideas. In Thucydides th e sophistic cul ture, i.e. the realistic culture, comes to itsfull6 expression.

The section on the problem of Socrates in th e Dawn of Idols is only a relicof Nietzsche's first publication, The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit ofMusic


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The problem of Socrates 323which he disowned to some extent later on, one reason being that he Had understood [in that early work] Greek tragedy in the light or the darkness of Wagnerian music , and he had come to see that Wagner was a decadent [of the firstorder]. In spite of this and other defects Nietzsche's first work delineates hisfuture life work with amazing clarity. [I will therefore say something aboutthat.]

Nietzsche paints Socrates as "the single turning point and vortex of so-calledworld-history."7 [Nietzsche's]8 concern was not merely theoretical; he was concerned with th e future of Germany or th e future of Europe a human fu turethat must surpass th e highest that [has ever been achieved]9 before. The peak ofman hitherto is that manner of life that found its expression in Greek tragedy,especially in Aeschylean t ragedy. The "tragic" understanding of the world wasrejected and destroyed by Socrates, who therefore is "the most questionablephenomenon of antiquity,"a man of more than human size: a demigod. Socrate s [in brief] is the first theoretical man , th e incarnation of the spirit of science,radically un-artistic and a-music. "In the person of Socrates th e belief in th ecomprehensibility of nature and in the universal healing power of knowledgehas first come to light." He is th e prototype of th e rationalist and therefore ofth e optimist , for optimism is not merely the belief that the world is the bestpossible world , but also th e belief that th e world can be made into th e best ofall imaginable worlds , or that th e evils which belong to the best possible worldcan be rendered harmless by knowledge: thinking can not only fully understandbeing but can even correct it; life can be guided by science; the living gods ofmyth can be replaced by a deus ex machina , i.e. th e forces of nature as knownand used in th e service of "higher egoism".10 Rationalism is opt imism, since itis th e belief that reason's power is unlimited and essentially beneficent or thatscience can solve all riddles and loosen all chains. Rationalism is optimism,since th e belief in causes depends on the belief in ends or since rationalismpresupposes th e belief in th e initial or final supremacy of the good. The full andultimate consequences of the change effected or represented by Socrates appearonly in the contemporary West: in the belief in universal enlightenment andtherewith in th e earthly happiness of all within a universal society, in utilitarianism, liberalism, democracy, pacifism, and socialism. Both these consequencesand the ins ight into th e essential limitations of science have shaken "Socraticculture"to its foundation: "the t ime of Socratic man has gone."There is thenhope fo r a future beyond the peak of pre-Socratic culture, fo r a philosophy ofth e future that is no longer merely theoret ical [as all philosophy hitherto was] ,but knowingly based on acts of th e will11 or on decision.

Nietzsche's attack on Socrates is an attack on reason: reason, th e celebratedl iberator from all prejudices, proves itself to be based on a prejudice, and th emost dangerous of all prejudices: the prejudice stemming from decadence . Inother words, reason, which waxes so easily and so highly indignant aboutthe demanded sacrifice of th e intellect, rests itself on the sacrifice of the intel-


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324 'Interpretationlect.12 This criticism was made by a man who stood at the o p p o s i t e pole o f allobscurantism and fundamentalism.

One would therefore misunderstand the utterances of Nietzsche on Socrateswhich I quoted or to which I referred if one did not keep in

m i n d the fact thatSocrates exerted a life-long fascination on Nietzsche. The most beautiful document of this fascination is the penultimate aphorism of Beyond Good and Evil,perhaps th e most beautiful passage in Nietzsche's [whole] work. I do not dareattempt to translate it . Nietzsche does not mention Socrates there, but [Socrates]13 is there. Nietzsche says there14 that the gods to o philosophize, thus obviously contradicting Plato's S y m p o s i u m 1 5 according to which the gods do notphilosophize, do not strive for wisdom, but ar e wise. In other words, [the]gods, as Nietzsche understands them, are not entia perfectissima [most perfectbeings]. I add only a few16 points. The serious opposition of Nietzsche to Socrates can also be expressed as follows: Nietzsche replaces eros by th e will topower a striving which has a goal beyond striving by a striving which has nosuch goal. In other words, philosophy as it was hitherto is likened to th emoon and philosophy of the future is like th e sun; th e former is contemplativeand [ s e n d s ] 1 7 only borrowed light, is dependent on creative acts outside of it,preceding it; the latter is creative because it is animated by conscious will topower. Nietzsche's Zarathustra is "a book fo r all and none"[as it says on th etitle page]; Socrates calls on some. I add one more point of no small importance. In th e Preface to Beyond Good and Evil, when taking issue with Platoand therewith with Socrates, Nietzsche says as it were in passing: "Christianityis Platonism fo r th e

The profoundest interpreter and at the same tim e the profoundest critic ofNietzsche is Heidegger. He is Nietzsche's profoundest interpreter [precisely]because he is his profoundest critic. The direction which his criticism takesmay be indicated as fo llows. In his18 Zarathustra Nietzsche had spoken of th espirit of revenge as animating all earlier philosophy; th e spirit of revenge ishowever in th e last analysis concerned with revenge on time, and therewith it is19the attempt to escape from t ime to eternity, to an eternal being . Yet Nietzschealso t aught eternal return. For Heidegger there is no longer eternity in anysense or even sempiternity in any relevant sense. Despite of this or rather because of this20, he preserved N i e t z s c h e ' s 2 1 condemnation or critique of Plato asth e originator of what came to be modem science and therewith modem technology. But through Heidegger's radical t ransformat ion of Nietzsche, Socratesalmost completely disappeared. I remember only one statement o f Heidegger'son Socrates: he calls him the p ur es t o f [all]22 W estern thinkers, while making itclear that "purest" is something very different from "greatest." Is he insufficiently aware of th e Odysseus in Socrates? [ P e r h a p s . ] 2 3 But he surely sees th econnection between Socrates' singular purity and th e fact that he did not write.To come back to Heidegger's tacit denial of eternity, that denial implies thatth ere is no way in which t hough t can transcend time, can transcend History- all


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The problem of Socrates 325thought belongs to , depends on, something more fundamental which thoughtcannot master ; all thought belongs radically to an epoch, a culture, a folk. Thisview is of course not peculiar to Heidegger; it emerged in th e 19th century andtoday has become fo r many people a truism. 24 But Heidegger has thought itthrough more radically than anyone else. Let us call this view "historicism" anddefine it as follows: historicism is a view according to which all t hough t isbased on absolute presuppositions which vary from epoch to epoch, from culture to culture, which are not questioned and cannot be questioned in the situation to which they belong and which they constitute. This view is not refutedby th e "objectivity" of science, by th e fact that science transcends, or breaksdown, all cultural barriers; fo r the science which does this is modern Westernscience, the child or stepchild of Greek science. Greek science was renderedpossible by th e Greek language, a particular language; th e Greek language[suggested]25 those insights, divinations or prejudices which make science possible. To give [a simple]26 example , science means knowledge of all beings(panta ta onto), a thought [inexpressible in original Hebrew or Arabic;]27 ^hemedieval Jewish and Arabic philosophers had to invent an artificial term tomake possible the entrance of Greek science, i.e. of science. The Greeks, andtherewith in particular Socrates and Plato, lacked th e awareness of history, th ehistorical consciousness. This is the most popular and least venomous expression of why in particular Socrates and Plato have become altogether questionable fo r both Nie tzsche and Heidegger, and so many of our contemporaries.This is the most simple explanation of why Socrates has become a problem,why there is a problem of Socrates.

29This does not mean that th e anti-Socratic position which I have tried todelineate is unproblematic.30 It would be unproblematic , if we could take fo rgranted the [so-called] historical consciousness, if the object of th e historicalconsciousness, History [with a capital H], had simply been discovered. Butperhaps History is a problematic interpretation of phenomena which could beinterpreted differently, which were interpreted differently in former t imes andespecially by Socrates and his descendants . [I will illustrate the fact startingfrom a simple example. Xenophon, a pupil of Socrates, wrote a history calledHellenica, Greek history. This work begins abruptly with the expression"Thereafter." Thus Xenophon cannot indicate what the intention of this workis.]31 From the begirrning of another work of h is (the Symposium) we infer32 thatth e Hellenica is devoted to the serious actions of gent lemen; hence the actionsof those notorious non-gentlemen, the tyrants, do not str ictly speaking belong[to history, and are appropriately treated by Xenophon in excursuses.]33 Moreimportant[ly]: the Hellenica1* also ends , as far as possible,35 with Thereafterwhat we call History is for Xenophon a sequence of Thereafters, in each ofwhich tarache [confusion] rules. Socrates is also a gentleman, but a gentlemanof a different kind; his gentlemanship consists in [raising and answering th equestion 'What is' regarding the various human things. But these 'What is'es


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326 Interpretationare unchangeable,]36 and in no way in a state o f conf us i on. As a consequence,t h e 3 7 Hellenica is only political history. The primacy o f p o l i t i c a l history is stillrecognized: a "historian" still means a political historian, [unless we add anadjective, like economic, art, and so on]38. Still, mo d e m history is, or is basedupon, philosophy o f history. Philosophy of history begins with Vico [butV i c o ' s ] 3 9 new science [as he called it] is a doctrine of natural right, i.e. a

political doctr ine. However this may be, modem history [in the fo rm in whichwe know it] deals with al l human activities an d thoughts, with the whole of[what is called] "culture." There is no "culture" in [ G r e e k ] 4 0 thought but [thereare fo r instance arts, including th e art o f moneymaking an d th e imitative arts]41an d [opinions,] doxai, especially about the highest (the gods) ; these [ o p i n i o n s ] 4 2are therefore the highest in what we w ou ld ca ll "a culture". These [ o p i n i o n s ] 4 2diffe r from nation to nation and they may undergo changes within nations.Their objects43 have the cognitive status of nomizomena , of things owing theirbeing to being held," frozen results of abortive reasonings w hich are declaredto be sacred. They are [to borrow from a Platonic simile] the ceilings of caves.What we call History would be the succession or simultaneity of caves. The[caves, the] ceilings are nomoi [by convention] which is understood in contradistinction to phusei [by nature] . In the modem centuries there emerged a newkind of natur al right [ d o c t r i n e ] 4 5 which is based on the devaluation of nature;Hobbes' state of nature is th e best known example. Nature is here only a negative standard: that from which one should move away. On th e basis of this, th elaw of reason or th e moral law [as it was called] ceased to be natural law:nature is in no way a s ta nd ar d. This is th e necessary, although no t sufficient,condition of th e historical consciousness. The historical consciousness itselfmay be characterized from [this earlier]4* point of view as follows: History, th eobject of the historical consciousness, is a sequence of nomoi , phusis beingunderstood as one nomos among many nomos has absorbed phusis. Heidegger tries to understand phusis as related, not to phuein (to grow) but to phaos-phds (light) "to grow"is fo r him above all man's being rooted in a humanpast, in a tradition, and creatively transforming that tradition.47 cf. alsoNietzsche's Jenseits aphorism 188. 48

Let me restate th e issue in somewhat different terms as fo llows. The humans pe ci es c on s is ts p hu sei o f ethne. This is due partly directly to phusis49 (differentraces, the size a nd s tr uc tu re o f th e surface of the earth) and partly to nomos(customs an d languages). Every philosopher belongs essentially to th is or tha tethnos but as [a] philosopher he must transcend it . The prospect of a miraculous abolition or overcoming of th e essential particularism fo r all men wa s heldou t in somewhat different ways by Judaism, Christianity and Islam. A non-miraculous overcoming wa s visualized in modem t imes by means of the conquest of nature an d the universal recognition of a purely50 rational nomos [law] ,so that only th e difference of languages remains [which even Stalin recognizedas important]. In reaction to this levelling, which seemed to deprive human life


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The problem of Socrates - 327of its depth, philosophers51 began to pr e f e r th e particular (the local and temporal) to any universal instead of merely accepting th e particular. To illustrate thisby what is probably52 th e best-known example: they replaced th e rights of manby th e rights of Englishmen.

According to historicism every ma n belongs essentially and completely to ahistorical world, [and he]53 cannot understand another historical world exactlyas it [understood or understands]54 itself [he necessarily understands]55 it differently than it [ u n d e r s t a n d s ] 5 6 itself. Understanding it better than it understooditself is of course altogether impossible [and only believed in by very simplisticanthropologists]. Yet Heidegger characterizes [all earlier philosophers] all earlier philosophic thought by "oblivion of Sein," of th e ground of grounds:[which means] in the decisive respect he claims to understand [the e ar li er p h il o s o p h e r s ] 5 7 better than they understood themselves.

This difficulty is n ot p ec ulia r to Heidegger. It is essential to all forms ofhistoricism. For historicism must assert that it is an insight surpassing all earlierinsights, since it claims to bring to light th e true character of a ll e ar li er insights:it puts them in their place, if one may pu t it so crudely. At th e same t ime[ h i s t o r i c i s m ] 5 8 asserts that insights are [functions of t imes or periods]59; it suggests therefore implicitly that th e absolute insight th e historicist insight belongs to th e absolute time, the absolute moment [in history]; but it m us t a vo ideven the semblance of raising such a claim fo r our time, or fo r any time; fo rthis would be t an t amount to putting an end to History, i.e. to significant t ime(cf. Hegel, Marx, N i e t z s c h e ) . 6 0 In other words: th e historical process is notrational; e ac h e po ch has its absolute presuppositions; [in the formula of Ranke](all e po ch s are equally immediate to God); but historicism has brought to lightthis very fact, i.e. th e truly absolute presupposition.

The historicist insight remains true fo r all times, for if that insight wereforgotten at some future time, this would merely mean a relapse into an oblivion in which ma n has always lived in the past. Historicism is a n e te rn al verity.

[That of course is impossible.] 61According to Heidegger there are no eternalv er it ie s: e te rn a l v er itie s w ou ld presuppose the eternity or sempiternity of th ehuman race (Sein un d Zeit 227-230; Einfuhrung in die Metaphysik 64)60.Heidegger knows that [the human race]62 is n o t e te rn al or sempiternal. Is notthis knowledge, the knowledge that th e human race had an origin," a cosmological insight, if not the b a s i s , 6 4 at least basic, fo r Heidegger?

65The ground of all beings, and especially of man , is [said to be] Sein."Sein" would be translated in th e case of every writer other than Heidegger by"being"; but for Heidegger everything depends on the radical difference between being u nd er st oo d a s verbal noun and being understood as participle, andin English th e verbal noun is undistinguishable from th e participle. I shalltherefore use th e German terms after having translated them once into Greek,Latin and French: Sein is einai, esse, etre; Seiendes is on, ens, etant. Sein isnot Seiendes; but in every understanding of Seiendes we tacitly presuppose that


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328 Interpretationw e u nd er st an d Sein . One is tempted to say in Pla tonic l anguage that Seiendes isonly by participating in Sein but in that Platonic understanding Sein would be aSeiendes.

What does Heidegger mean by Sein? One can begin [a t least I ca n begin] tounderstand it in the following manner. Sein cannot be explained by Seiendes.For instance, causality cannot be explained causally * Sein takes the place ofthe categories [surely in the Kantian sense]. This change is necessary becausethe categories, th e systems of categories, the absolute presuppositions changefrom epoch to epoch; this change is no t progress o r r atio n al th e change of th ec a te g or ie s c a n no t be explained by, or on th e basis of, on e particular system ofcategories; yet we could no t speak o f change if there [were] no t somethinglasting in th e change; that lasting which is responsible fo r [the] most fundamental change [fundamental thought] is Sein: Sein [as he puts it] "gives" or "sends"in different epochs a different understanding of Sein and therewith of "everything."

This is misleading insofar as it suggests that Sein is inferred, only inferred.But of Sein we know through experience of Sein; that experience presupposes[however] a leap; that leap wa s not made by the earlier p h il os o ph e rs a nd therefore their t hough t is characterized by oblivion o f Sein. They thought only of

an d about Seiendes. Yet they could not have thought of and about Seiendesexcept o n the basis of some awareness of Sein. But they paid no attention toit this failure wa s due, no t to any negligence of theirs, but to Sein itself.

The key to Sein is one particular manner of Sein, the Sein of man. Man isproject: everyone is what (o r rather who) he is by virtue of the exercise of hisfreedom, his choice o f a determinate ideal of existence, his project (or hisfailure to do so). But ma n is finite: the range of his fundamental choices islimited by his s it ua ti on w h ic h he has no t chosen: man is a project which isthrown somewhere (geworfener Entwurf)60. The leap through which Sein isexperienced is

primarilyth e awareness-acceptance of being thrown, of finiteness, the abandonment of every t hough t of a railing, a s up po rt . (Existence must

be understood in contradistinction to insistence.)66 Earlier philosophy and especially Greek philosophy wa s oblivious of Sein precisely because it wa s notbased on that experience. Greek philosophy was guided by an idea of Seinaccording to which Sein means to be "at hand," to be present , and thereforeSein in the highest sense to be always present, to be always. Accordingly theyand their successors understood th e soul as substance, as a thing and not asthe self which , if truly a self, if authentic [and n ot m ere drifting or shallow], [isbased on the awareness-acceptance of the]67 project as thrown. No human lifethat is not68 mere drifting or shallow is p os si bl e w it ho ut a project, without anideal o f existence and dedication to it . "Ideal of existence"[this] takes the placeof "respectable opinion of the good life"; but opinion points to knowledge,whereas "ideal of existence"implies that in this respect there is no knowledge[possible] but only what is much higher than knowledge, i.e. knowledge ofwhat is project , decision.


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The problem of Socrates 329The ground of all beings, and especially of man, is Sein this ground of

grounds is coeval with man and therefore also not eternal or sempiternal.69 Butif this is so , Sein cannot be th e complete ground of man: th e emergence ofman, in contradistinction to the essence of man, [would require]70 a grounddifferent from Sein. [In other words] Sein is not th e ground of th e That. But isnot the That, and precisely th e That, Sein? If we try to understand anythingradically, we come up against facticity, irreducible facticity. If we try to understand th e That of man, th e fact that th e human race is, by tracing it to itscauses, to its conditions, we shall find that the whole effort is directed by aspecific understanding of Sein by71 an understanding which is given or sentby Sein.72 The condition[s] of man [in this view are]73 comparable to Kant'sThing-in-itself, of which one cannot say anything and in particular not whetherit contains anything [sempiternal].74 Heidegger also replies as follows75: onecannot speak of anything being prior to man in time; fo r t ime is or happens onlywhile man is; authentic or primary t ime is and arises only in man; cosmic time,th e tim e measurable by chronometers, is secondary or derivative and can therefore not be appealed to , or made use of, in fundamental philosophic considerations. This argument reminds of the medieval argument according to which th etempora l finiteness of the world is compatible with God's eternity and un-changeability because, t ime being dependent on motion, there cannot have beent ime when there was no motion. But yet it [seems that it] is meaningful andeven indispensable to speak of "prior to th e creation of the world"nd in th ecase of Heidegger of "prior to th e emergence of man."

It seems thus that one cannot avoid the question as to what is responsible forth e emergence of man and of Sein, or of what brings them out of nothing. For:ex nihilo nihil fi t [out of nothing nothing comes into being] . This is apparentlyquestioned by Heidegger: [he says] ex nihilo omne ens qua ens fit [out ofnothing every being as being comes out]. This could remind one of th e Biblicaldoctrine of creation [out of nothing]. But Heidegger has no place for76 th eCreator-God. [This would suggest, things come into being out of nothing andthrough nothing, ex nihilo et a nihilo].77 This is [of course] not literally assertednor literally denied by Heidegger. But must it not be considered in its literalmeaning?

Kant found "nowhere even an attempt of a proof of ex nihilo nihil fit.78 Hisown proof establishes this principle as necessary but only fo r rendering possible any possible experience (in contradistinction to [what he called] th e Thing-in-itself) he gives a transcendental legitimation [of ex nihilo nihil fit. Thetranscendental deduction in its turn points to the]79 prim

strauss existentialism and problem of socrates integral

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