strategic vision, issue 6

STRATEGIC VISION for Taiwan Security

Volume 1, Issue 6 w December, 2012 w ISSN 2227-3646

Unstable Region, International StirYang Tzong-shing

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Examining the Japanese PerspectiveBryan Harris

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Economic Powerhouses At OddsNazery Khalid

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Gaining the Upper Hand in Trilateral TiesHuang Chun-min

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America Remaining Carefully NeutralMichael Di Fabio

Special Issue: East China Sea Dispute

Submissions: Essays submitted for publication are not to exceed 2,000 words in length, and should conform to the following basic format for each 1200-1600 word essay: 1. Synopsis, 100-200 words; 2. Background description, 100-200 words; 3. Analysis, 800-1,000 words; 4. Policy Recommendations, 200-300 words. Book reviews should not exceed 1,200 words in length. Notes should be formatted as endnotes and should be kept to a minimum. Authors are encouraged to submit essays and reviews as attachments to emails; Microsoft Word documents are preferred. For questions of style and usage, writers should consult the Chicago Manual of Style. Authors of unsolicited manuscripts are encouraged to consult with the executive editor at [email protected] before formal submission via email. Manuscripts are subject to copyediting, both mechanical and substantive, as required and according to editorial guidelines. No major alterations may be made by an author once the type has been set. Arrangements for reprints should be made with the editor. Cover photograph is courtesy of the ROC Coast Guard Administration.

STRATEGIC VISION for Taiwan Security

Volume 1, Issue 6 w December, 2012

ContentsDispute affects regional, global stability.......................................................4

Yang Tzong-shing

Examining the Japanese perspective................................................................8

Bryan Harris

Dispute pits economic giants against each other....................................11

Nazery Khalid

Gaining the upper hand in Japan-China-ROC dispute........................17

Huang Chun-min

US maintaining a careful neutrality...............................................................21

Michael Di Fabio

STRATEGIC VISION For Taiwan Se-curity (ISSN 2227-3646) Volume 1, Number 6, December, 2012, pub-lished under the auspices of the Cen-ter for Security Studies and National Defense University.

All editorial correspondence should be mailed to the editor at STRATEGIC VISION, Center for Security Studies in Taiwan. No. 64, Wan Shou Road, Taipei City 11666, Taiwan, ROC.

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Any inquiries please contact the Executive Editor directly via email at:[email protected] issues and archives can be viewed at our website: www.mcsstw.org.

© Copyright 2012 by the Center for Security Studies.

EditorFu-Kuo Liu

Executive EditorDean Karalekas

Editorial BoardTiehlin YenRaviprasad NarayananMing-Hua TangFelix Wang

Articles in this periodical do not necessarily represent the views of either the MCSS, NDU, or the editors.

Dr. Fu-Kuo LiuEditor

Strategic Vision

From The Editor

We are pleased to bring you our sixth issue, which marks the end of the first year of Strategic Vision’s publication. We are extremely proud to be able to have

served our readers during 2012, and look forward to continuing this relationship in 2013.

As tension continues to mount over the delicate situation in the East China Sea, we decided to focus our analysis this month on the disputes over the Diaoyutai Islands—known as the Senkaku Islands in Japanese—which has the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan, as well as both Japan and China, at odds diplomatically.

Major Yang Tzong-shing, an instructor at the National Defense University Language Center, looks at the ripple effect caused by the dispute and how it has not only led to increased tensions in the East-Asian region, but how it has also caused a stir in the in-ternational community.

Lecturer and NGO adviser Bryan Harris offers a critique of the Japanese perspective on the dispute, and on the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands. He questions the mindset of the nations involved, which have allowed tensions to escalate to a seemingly irrational level.

We are honored to have an article contributed by Dr. Nazery Khalid, who is a research fellow with the Maritime Institute of Malaysia. Dr. Khalid looks at the region-wide implications of the dispute as it threatens to continue heating up, especially as it involves three of the region’s economic powerhouses, and of-fers a number of recommendations on how best to settle the disagreement.

ROC Army officer Huang Chun-min offers his take on the per-spective of the ROC, and the difficulties that stand in the way of Taiwan’s leaders as they attempt to gain the upper hand in the dispute, while Captain Michael Di Fabio presents the view and policy of the United States.

We hope you enjoy the variety of perspectives on this multi-faceted topic, and that this issue contributes in some small way to a final resolution to the complex dispute in the East China Sea. We sincerely wish you a Happy New Year—both Lunar and Solar—and look forward to ushering in 2013 with you together.

Over the past four decades, the sover-eignty of the Diaoyutai Islands has been a pending dispute between the Republic of

China (ROC) on Taiwan, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Japan. If we take strategic factors and potential natural resources into consideration, the dispute becomes even more complicated. The Diaoyutai Islands, known as the Senkaku Islands in Japanese, are shaping up to be not only a destabilizing factor in East-Asian regional security, but a sensitive issue internationally.

Based on the principle of occupation in interna-tional law, occupying (or exerting effective control over) a terra nullius must include a display of sover-

eignty and the intention to acquire sovereignty. The display of sovereignty must be a continuous display necessary to imply an effective occupation and con-trol over the territory by the state in question. The Japanese government emphasizes that sovereignty over the islands belongs to Japan, according to this occupation principle in international law. Using the same principle to verify the Japanese statement is probably the most detached and effective measure of verification.

So far, the Japanese government cannot offer an authoritative original document as evidence to prove that Japan had the Diaoyutai Islands as part of Japanese territory. Obviously, then, the Japanese

Major Yang Tzong-shing is an instructor at the National Defense University Language Center. He can be reached for comment at [email protected].

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photo: ROC CGA

The ROC flag flies on a Coast Guard ship protecting a flotilla of Taiwanese fishing boats displaying sovereignty over the Diaoyutai island in the background.

Strategic Vision vol. 1, no. 6 (December, 2012)

Qui Bono Terra Nullius?

Diaoyutai Islands dispute destabilizing region and causing international stir Yang Tzong-shing

occupation procedure is incomplete. Both the ROC and the PRC keep protesting these claims, and nei-ther recognizes Japanese sovereignty over the Islands.

Principle of occupation

In short, by the principle of occupation in interna-tional law, the Japanese claim does meet the criteria of effective control. Notwithstanding the ROC and PRC claims, or Japanese verification over this issue, it shows that the Diaoyutai Islands are not a terra nullius, but an occupied land. Furthermore, if we evaluate or test the Japanese claim and procedure for occupation, it does not completely fit in with in-ternational law. Frankly speaking, the Japanese gov-ernment’s behavior is more like snatching than what they call it: occupation.

Besides the ROC, China, and Japan, the United States also plays a critical role in the Diaoyutai dis-pute. After War World II, Okinawa was placed under the trusteeship of the United States; the Diaoyutai Islands were also deemed to be part of Okinawa, and were merged into its administrative district. The United States subsequently returned Okinawa

to Japan and, surprisingly, the Diaoyutai Islands were handed over as well. Though both the government and people of the ROC and China offered strong protest, the US position was that it would not sup-port any one claim by any one state, and that the parties that have a stake in this issue should resolve it through peaceful means.

In 1972, the Japanese government broke off diplo-matic relations with the ROC and recognized the PRC, subsequently signing the Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China. Based on this com-muniqué, the governments of the PRC and Japan both recognized the PRC as the sole government of China. They agreed that Taiwan is a part of China, and they renounced any claim for war reparations from World War II. The Japanese government firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration, which confirmed that the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out: to wit, that “All territories Japan has stolen from China, including Manchuria, Taiwan, and the Pescadores, shall be re-stored to the Republic of China.” When the Diaoyutai Islands dispute occurred, Deng Xiaoping, then-chair-

No-man’s Land b 5

Members of the Japan Ground Self Defense Force board a US transport in Okinawa. Together, the US-Japan alliance is a force that is second to none in Asia.

photo: Tech. Sgt. Michael Tateishi

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man of the Central Advisory Commission of the Chinese Communist Party, said that China and Japan could shelve the dispute for the time being.

Complicated dispute

In short, the reason why the Diaoyutai Islands dispute is so complicated is because it relates to the competi-tion for resources, strategic positioning, and the na-tional interests of various powers. After we have an understanding of the background, what then should the ROC’s role or strategy be in this dispute? For one thing, the ROC government must engage with other claimants only under the precondition that it do so as a state, as only states can be engaged in ter-ritorial disputes.

In 1949, the ROC government lost the Chinese Civil War and fled mainland China. In the 1970s, the ROC government—by then based in Taipei—began losing the bulk of its allies, one after another. Meanwhile, the PRC supplanted the ROC as the sole government of China, at least in the eyes of most of the world’s capitals. Strictly speaking, “Taiwan” is not a state per se. There is no “Taiwan State,” nor a “Republic

of Taiwan.” The current authority over Taiwan is the ROC, which is not dominated by any other country. We can say that Taiwan is a de facto independent state, but not de jure, because neither international law nor the preponderance of the international com-munity recognizes it as such. Either way, it highlights the importance of terminology: when we say that the ROC has a claim on the Diaoyutai Islands, this may be true, whereas the entity of Taiwan has no such claim.

Apparently, the Republic of China could not shelve the dispute over the Diaoyutai Islands. Sovereignty is key. Without sovereignty, not even fishing rights can be discussed. Furthermore, the worst scenario would be if the ROC were to shelve the dispute: would the Japanese government interpret that as acquiescence to Japanese sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands?

From a geopolitical point of view, no state in the Asia-Pacific region can be entirely absent from this dispute. When we compare the ROC’s positioning

Harry Truman (left) speaks with Winston Churchill at the Potsdam Conference in 1945, where it was decided to grant the ROC Japanese wartime gains.

photo: Henry Philler

“Without sovereignty, not even fishing rights can be discussed.”

with that of China, the United States, and Japan, we have to admit that the ROC’s plight over this dispute is difficult. For every single step, Taipei has to think twice. Until now, besides protesting and declaring that Diaoyutai sovereignty to be a diplomatic issue, President Ma Ying-jeou declared that the ROC would defend its sovereignty and fishing rights over the is-lands. But what are the facts?

Downsizing woes

Over the last decade, the ROC government has con-sistently downsized the scale of its military, reducing its armaments, defense budget, and investments. Year by year, its maintenance and preparedness criteria are being inched downward as well. We can probably write this off as an inevitability of the government prioritizing economic development, but neverthe-less, maintaining an effective defense is a long-term endeavor, and results are not easily achieved. Any state that ignores establishment or investment in its military, ruins its military, no matter if it was inten-tional or not. The outcome will be long-term damage.

When diplomatic measures end, reliable military

strength is needed for deterrence. This is not to say that the ROC should engage in an arms race with China, but it has to at least maintain a sufficient mili-tary capability to handle such disputes as the one over the Diaoyutais. Ma promised that the ROC would defend its sovereignty and fishing rights in the waters around the islands. The real question is, when D-day comes; Taiwan, are you ready?

In a poker game, you don’t show your hand until you are ready to call. In this geopolitical game being played over the Diaoyutai Islands, Taipei has shown its last card on the table: the ROC has no intention, or even the capacity, to use its military strength. It is like losing a game at the very beginning.

While this kind of honest and transparent attitude is probably smart in interpersonal issues, this is not necessarily the case in the international relations between nations. Besides the Diaoyutai Islands, the ROC has similar concerns in the South China Sea. If weakness is shown in the one case, it could precipitate a domino effect, leading to a loss of ROC sovereignty over its South China Sea holdings as well. The ROC’s real crisis is not over the Diaoyutai Islands dispute, or sovereignty. It is about attitude. n

No-man’s Land b 7

Japanese and Taiwanese vessels clash, albeit in a water fight, in the seas near the disputed islands, each side attempting to demonstrate sovereignty.

photo: ROC CGA

Anti-Japanese protesters in China demand a boycott on Japanese products in retaliation for what they perceive as Japan’s distortion of history.

The territorial squabble over the Diaoyutai Islands—known as the Senkaku Islands in Japan and the Diaoyu Islands in

China—marked a turning point in the international relations not only of northeast Asia, but Asia writ large. Coming on the back of a prolonged territo-rial standoff between the Philippines and China, as well as an increasingly acrimonious relationship be-tween Vietnam and China over similar sovereignty issues, the dispute over the inhospitable, craggy is-lets in the East China Sea set a painful precedent for Asia. While it would be difficult to argue that rela-

tions prior to the imbroglio were truly harmonious, there at least existed a semblance of civility between the nations of the region and a belief in the impor-tance and efficacy of greater economic integration and cross-cultural ties. However, the dispute over the Diaoyutai Islands—and the resulting maritime standoff and violent riots in China—signaled that politicians in Taiwan, Japan, and China were will-ing to allow nationalistic impulses to trump rational considerations and were content to see progress in regional relations regress to a pre-World War I state of affairs. Of course, while it could be argued that do-


Checks and Balances

Examining Japanese perspective on territorial dispute in the East China Sea Bryan Harris

Bryan Harris is a lecturer and NGO adviser in Taiwan, as well as a frequent commentator on the security and international relations of the Asia-Pacific region. He can be reached at [email protected].

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Photo: Mitch

photo: ROC CGA

Japanese Coast Guard vessels and Taiwanese fishing boats confront one another in the choppy seas surrounding the disputed Diaoyutai Islands.

Japanese Perspective b 9

mestic pressures played a role in the confrontation, it should not be discounted that it is the respective responsibility of each government to check and bal-ance such tendencies.

Irrationality of tensions

Given the seeming irrationality of the escalation of tensions in the East China Sea, one must question the prevalent mindset of the nations involved and the considerations that coerced them into continuing the entire furor. For no country is this more important than Japan. As an open, democratic country favored by the status quo and with existing control over the territory in question, it is confounding that Japan engaged in such vitriolic exchange. As former editor of The Economist, Bill Emmott puts it bluntly: “Are Japan’s political leaders insane?” By allowing itself to get embroiled in the whole debacle, Japan negated its position as an international player that abides by “the lofty principles of international law and practice.” To take the matter to international arbitration would have been in keeping with Japan’s principles—the

moral and legal route would have been becoming of Japan’s stature as a developed and advanced beacon of democracy. As Emmott so cogently points out, “China has been banging on … about how much it values multilateral institutions and international law. A strong, confident Japan would be prepared, when-ever necessary, to call its bluff.” Whereas Taiwan’s unique geopolitical status compels it to reiterate its claim to the islets and the Chinese government re-mains prey to its nationalist progeny, Japan had no need to choose the course of action it did. By doing so, Japan allowed, once again, the ghosts of history to be resurrected for political purposes and put itself on the back foot. One can only wonder what Japan’s politicians are thinking.

In a recent article in the Daily Telegraph, the Japanese Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Keiichi Hayashi, endeavored to set the record straight. According to Hayashi, Japan’s claim has its foundation in interna-tional law; Japan acquired the islands through the oc-cupation of terra nullius (land belonging to no one) and incorporated them into the Empire of Japan in January of 1895—months prior to the signing of the

Treaty of Shimonoseki at the end of the First Sino-Japanese War, in which the Q’ing court ceded Taiwan and other territories to Japan in perpetuity. As such, the islands were not regarded among Japan’s military acquisitions and were not required to be renounced under the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951. Hayashi posits that neither the Republic of China (ROC) nor the newly created People’s Republic of China (PRC) voiced discontent about the terms of the treaty until nearly 20 years afterward, when a UN report indi-cated the existence of potentially valuable resources in the area. However, this claim is spurious in itself and reflects a narrow consideration of historical events.

No China invited

As a compromise between the United States, which wished to invite the ROC, and the United Kingdom, which wished to invite the PRC, neither of the Chinas was invited to attend the negotiations surrounding the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. In ad-dition, the PRC twice denounced the terms of the treaty, calling it illegal. Nonetheless, at its base, the Japanese claim to the islands is rooted in a politico-legal interpretation of the relevant peace treaties and, as such, is how the Japanese government approaches the disagreement.

A more theoretical approach to the dispute puts Japan in the position of a fading regional power, jos-tling to maintain the status quo. From this perspec-tive, structural factors in the power relations of north-east Asia are forcing Japan’s hand. The perception that Japan is fading is matched in magnitude only by the perception that China is rising and, having occupied the region’s No. 1 spot and the world’s No. 2 for more than half a century, the former is seen as hesitant to accept the shift in power dynamics. John Lim of Taiwan’s Academia Sinica has written extensively on the issue, providing a prism with which to view and understand the events surrounding the disputed is-

lands. Lim attributes the increasing tensions to what he calls the “Sino-Japan Power Relations Transition Syndrome.” For Lim, the “flare-ups are a result of the unease felt in both nations due to the power shift

[between them].” Such an analysis is prescient. As power relations between Asia’s two largest economies change, China is increasingly willing to take action to protect or even expand its interests. For its part, Japan is unwilling to accept such changes and thus opts to take a hard line on protecting the islands, regard-less of how difficult such a task may prove in reality.

In addition, as Lim notes, Japan has used the dispute as a platform to not only test, but to reinforce, the US security commitment to Japan. It is a dangerous and unnecessary stance, especially considering the prevailing regional wariness surrounding China’s rise and the positive reputation that Japan enjoys in the international community.

Asia finds itself at a dangerous crossroads. If left un-checked, the escalation of tensions and the mobiliza-tion of quasi-military units can only lead to greater confrontation and potential conflict. Neither China, as a rising but fragile power, nor Japan, as a developed but economically burdened state, can thus afford to act so belligerently. History, laws and power dynamics are in continuous flux; to stubbornly maintain a claim rooted in any one of these factors is shortsighted and contrary to the globalized nature of contemporary international affairs. As such, both China and Japan would do well to take a lesson from Taiwan and con-sider the East China Sea Peace Initiative. Shelve is-sues; swallow pride: solve dispute. n


“As power relations between Asia’s two largest economies change, China is increasingly willing to take action to protect or even expand its interests.”

In a seabound protest sponsored by the pro-China Want Want Group, Taiwanese vessels sail close to Japanese Coast Guard ships near the disputed islands.

photo: ROC CGA

The dispute involving China and Japan over the Diaoyutai (aka Senkaku) Islands appears to have degenerated into a Gordian

knot that is becoming more intractable by the day.If no resolute efforts are made by the protagonists

to reduce tensions in the strategic waters of the East China Sea, it is feared that the situation could poten-tially fester into a full-blown conflict and destabilize regional security.

The disputes pit East Asia’s economic powerhouses, which have been instrumental in powering global economic growth in the past decade, against each

other. China, Japan and Taiwan are key trade partners with heavy investments in one another’s economies.

Literature on the subject suggests that most ana-lysts do not feel that the dispute will aggravate into a full-scale armed conflict. Such opinion largely hinges on their belief that the economic fate and strategic interests of the parties involved are dependent upon them maintaining good relations and in preserving peace in the region.

This belief, however, does not negate the fact that tensions in the sea are running high, and the pos-sibility of conflict there should never be dismissed.

Dr. Nazery Khalid is a research fellow with the Maritime Institute of Malaysia. He can be reached for com-ment at [email protected].

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Gordian Knot

Anxiety mounts as East-Asian economic powerhouses clash over islandsNazery Khalid


Such is the intensity of the disputes that the close trade and economic ties and interdependence among them have not prevented the disputes from festering.

The principal actors in the disputes have not shied away from taking strong measures to stake their claims and show that they mean business in safe-guarding their interests. China has dispatched gov-ernment vessels to patrol the disputed waters near the Diaoyu Islands. Japan announced the purchase of three of the disputed islands, and was planning a military exercise with the United States to simulate the retaking of a disputed island in the East China Sea (the drill was cancelled after strong protestation by China).

Water fight

Not to be left out, the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan, which also claims the Senkakus and refers to them as the Tiaoyutai Islands, allowed a huge fleet of fishing vessels to enter the waters near the islands, an act to which Japan responded by sending Coast Guard vessels to spray water at the fishermen with fire hoses. Taipei has strongly stated its position that it

will spare no effort to defend its national sovereignty and to safeguard the security of its fishermen.

This chain of action and reaction by the three main protagonists has further stoked tensions in an al-ready edgy maritime area. Quite how these acts can contribute to a peaceful solution to the disputes is anyone’s guess.

Each side is highly distrustful and suspicious of the others. Any action by one party is seen as an affront to the sensitivity and national sovereignty of the others. Under these circumstances, one would not be blamed for taking a bleak view of the prospect of the disputes in the East China Sea to be resolved harmoniously in the foreseeable future.

In international law, occupation has considerable weight in determining ownership. It appears that

“It is feared that the flurry of strong statements, provocative actions, and unrestrained shows of force and nation-alism will eventually come to a clash.”

An ROC Coast Guard ship reminds onlookers that the Diaoyutais are ROC territory. The Coast Guard was dispatched to escort the civilian protest vessels.

photo: ROC CGA

Officers man the wheelhouse of an ROC Coast Guard vessel tasked with protecting the flotilla of private fishing boats waving the flag in the disputed waters.

photo: ROC CGA

the parties to the dispute are fully aware of this. They have undertaken efforts to stake their claims by exerting their presence on the islands. This has prompted Japan to nationalize the three islands in the Diaoyutai chain; a move that was branded a “farce” by newly appointed Chinese leader Xi Jinping, who also sternly warned Japan in September 2012 to rein in its behavior and stop undermining China’s sover-eignty in the sea.

Rising power

The manner in which Beijing conducts itself in the dispute is very much informed by its rise as an eco-nomic, political and military power. During the re-cent 18th Congress of the Communist Party of China, outgoing Chinese President Hu Jintao called upon the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) to modernize and for China to become a maritime power to “safe-guard China’s maritime rights and interests.” This call, made amid the power transition and the brew-ing East China Sea dispute, was obviously meant to prompt the PLA to appear strong in China’s ongoing

maritime territorial disputes and as a demonstration of China’s resolve to stand firm on the issue.

The vociferous reaction in China must be seen in the context of the suffering inflicted by Japan’s imperialist past. Their strong reactions toward Japan in the East China Sea disputes are largely informed by the dark chapter in history during Japan’s brutal occupation and by Tokyo’s refusal to adequately apologize and atone for its wartime conduct.

As a result, demonstrations and sometimes vio-lent protests against Japan’s claims on Diaoyutai have erupted in several Chinese cities. Japanese business interests and Japanese-made cars were attacked and burned by unruly mobs ahead of the anniversary of Japan’s occupation of Manchuria in 1931. Meanwhile, Taipei believes that Japan (which ruled Taiwan from 1895 to 1945) should return the Tiaoyutai Islands to the ROC, but Tokyo instead sees the islands as terra nullius, or land that belongs to no one. Taipei sees this as an act of aggression and a violation of inter-national law.

It is feared that the flurry of strong statements, pro-vocative actions, and unrestrained shows of force and

Gordian Knot b 13

nationalism will eventually come to a clash. This fear should not be dismissed; one cannot always count on the parties involved in the dispute to exercise patience and restraint in the face of tense situations in crowded, contested waters and when nationalism runs high. In such a situation, bullets can be fired in anger and trigger the kind of full-blown naval con-flict that involved China and Vietnam in the South China Sea in the 1970s and 1980s. Any skirmishes involving the economic heavyweights of East Asia in such a strategic waterway would surely be felt by their trade and economic partners and unleash negative strategic implications that will be felt far and wide.

No one is blind to the fact that the disputes are po-litically delicate issues that will not be resolved over-night. However, taking a defeatist attitude that there is nothing anyone can do to break the impasse is not helpful in advancing the agenda of resolving disputes.

Recommendations

In this regard, the following recommendations could help relieve tensions and set the stage for a durable,

practical, and consensually acceptable solution to the dispute. Compromise and tolerance

The governments of the nations involved in the dis-putes should set aside hard-line positions and adopt an attitude of compromise and tolerance. Taking absolute, non-negotiable positions is not helpful in reducing tensions, building understanding, or seek-ing a peaceful resolution. International law

Those governments should align their claims in accordance and conformity with international law. This will help reduce the areas being disputed and add more clarity to what is being claimed, as well as to the basis of the claims. Outside parties, including world bodies like the United Nations, should ex-ert diplomatic pressure on them to bring the claims in line with international law, especially the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Seeking international arbitration, for example at the International Court of Justice, would show sincerity on the part of the parties involved in the disputes to resolve them through peaceful means and in accor-


The UN building in New York. Bodies such as the United Nations should apply the principles of international law to solving disputes like the Diaoyutais.

photo: Ashitaka San

dance with international law, and to avoid a conflict breaking out. Public sentiment

The nations involved in the disputes should mini-mize the involvement of the public in their discourse on the disputes. Once public opinion on the matter starts to build, the public will demand strong ac-

tion by their governments to protect national inter-ests. In their efforts to satisfy their respective local constituencies’ calls to act tough and not lose face, governments may run into the danger of letting na-tionalistic sentiment shape their policies and steer their responses. This will result in stoking tensions even further, and will make it difficult for diplomats to discuss the disputes in a cordial atmosphere. The

anti-Japan reaction in China over the Diaoyutai dis-agreement shows how easily national sentiment can escalate and get out of hand if governments allow unrestrained public protestations over issues that should be discussed and resolved through the dip-lomatic channels. Raise awareness

Promoting objective and more critical analyses of the developments in the East China Sea would help the public understand the situation better and open a wider vista of options to the governments of the nations involved in the disputes. This is a task that academia and the research community should take up, with the assistance of governments. Media reports only help the public to build a general understand-ing of the disputes, which in truth are very complex. The narrative by certain sections of the media that suggests that the outbreak of war in the East China Sea is inevitable must be tempered with a more sober analysis of the issue. Commentaries based on histori-cal and legal facts will help the public understand the broader context of the claims over the islands,

Gordian Knot b 15

“Members of the public who have a good understanding of the disputes will be least likely to overreact.”

In China, public sentiment is deeply anti-Japanese, as evidenced in this protest. Governments must minimize public involvement in their discourse.

photo: Mitch

instead of being waylaid by one-sided, misinformed views that can fan the flames of uncontrollable na-tionalistic sentiment. Members of the public who have a good understanding of the disputes will be least likely to overreact and partake in vociferous, violent demonstrations. In fact, they could play a useful role in demanding that their governments find a peaceful resolution. Track II dialogue

Efforts to fully explore the track II platform to pro-mote dialogue and engagement among all stakehold-ers must be taken. The objective views and inputs by academics and think-tanks may be useful in helping policymakers understand and view the issue from a broader standpoint and make them aware of the vari-ous options available to resolve the dispute. Practical cooperation

Encouraging all parties to work together on areas that present low-hanging fruit will help build confi-dence among them. Such areas include carrying out joint exploration and exploitation of resources, con-ducting marine scientific research, fighting pollution, and protecting the marine environment, as well as boosting navigation safety. By cooperating and col-laborating in these areas, the parties can focus their energies on garnering mutual benefits rather than on the issues that divide them.Explore all options

Exploring all available options to break the impasse and seek a diplomatic breakthrough to the dispute would help bring the parties involved back to the ne-gotiating table. The ROC proposal dubbed the East China Sea Peace Initiative is worth exploring. Japan has only given a lukewarm reception to the proposal, most likely owing to the fact that it does not want to see the ROC and China closing ranks over the Diaoyutai dispute.Bilateral talks

Reviving bilateral talks stalled between those in-volved in the disputes would help in finding ways

to settle them in an amicable manner. For example, the agreement reached in 2009 between Japan and Taiwan to jointly develop fishery resources in the East China Sea should be revisited. The effort was halted after the Liberal Democratic Party took over the administration in Japan.

The world is watching the actions of the protago-nists in the hope that their disputes will be resolved in a peaceful fashion.

So much international economic, strategic, and trade interests rely on peace and stability in the East China Sea and the surrounding region. The last thing a fragile global economy needs is a breakout of con-flict involving China and Japan, which would draw in the United States. At a time when the global economy is banking on East Asian economies to continue their growth tangent and help spur its recovery, it cannot afford to have economic growth in the region being derailed by the disputes.

Outlook for peace

It looks unlikely at this point that the parties will abandon their hard-line positions and reach a peace-ful settlement in the near future. When one takes into account the fact that, from a legal standpoint, only one party can have sovereignty over a territory, it would be fair to expect the claimants to reason that the best they can hope for under the present circum-stances is to maintain the status quo of ambiguity over ownership of the disputed islands. This would, at the very least, allow them to agree that there is a need to initiate dialogues to discuss the disputes.

It is hoped that the parties involved in the disputes live up to their professed commitment to finding a peaceful, diplomatic solution. They owe it to the global community to act responsibly and break away from the constraints of nationalistic interests to un-tie the Gordian knot in this sea of immense global economic and strategic importance. n


Taiwan has lost strategic positioning since replacing the marines stationed in the South China Sea with a less threatening garris-

son of Coast Guard personnel. This continued loss is reflected in the recent Diaoyutai dispute. From a political perspective, it is more serious than it seems, because the South China Sea is too far to be con-trolled by the Republic of China (ROC) military, but the Diaoyutai Islands are positioned in front of the north gate to Taiwan. Dealing with the issue between China and Japan and getting the upper hand in this trilateral relationship is the real challenge.

While the Diaoyutai issue has been a problem for many decades, relations deteriorated sharply in September after the government of Japan bought, from their private owners, some of the islets that are claimed by Japan, China, and the ROC. Too often, Japanese Coast Guard ships expelled Taiwanese fish-ing boats operating in the area of the islands. These actions caused China to launch major anti-Japanese protests in many cities. These protests, targeted at Japanese businesses, harmed the economy of Japan by contributing to a drop in car sales. Both Japan and China recalled their ambassadors.

Viewed from the perspectives of history and in-ternational law, Japan’s arguments are pretty weak. Nevertheless, national power matters on the in-ternational stage, and Taipei should be more con-cerned about a flexible strategy of national defense.

Moreover, Taipei must learn how to get balance and maximum advantage from the dispute.

Taiwan is located in the middle position of the first island chain. It was extremely important in the con-tainment policies of the Cold War, but the geopoliti-cal situation has changed; it is harder than ever to identify friend from foe. This makes the line of state security more ambiguous.

Ample natural resources

There are some similarities between the Diaoyutai and the South China Sea disputes, but there are differ-ences as well. Both, for example, involve islands that have many natural resources. The South China Sea has proven oil reserves of around 7.7 billion barrels, with an estimate of 28 billion barrels in total. Natural gas reserves are estimated to total around 266 trillion cubic feet. To China, all this petrochemical bounty would not only be a great front yield, but control over the vital sea lines of communication would be a boon as well. Who are China’s rivals here? Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Brunei. The stronger the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the easier the solution. But herein lies another story.

Sovereignty issues ruin relationships. The key point is based on the attitude of the United States. A va-riety of tangential views on security come from the economic, sovereignty, and military perspectives.

Lieutenant Colonel Huang Chun-min is an officer in the ROC Army and a commentator on the security situ-ation in the South and East China seas.

b 17


Trilateral Ties

Seeking to gain the upper hand in the trilateral Japan-ROC-China disputeHuang Chun-min

photo: ROC CGA

“The ROC has too many limitations because of its diminished presence on the international stage.”


In economic terms, the Diaoyutai Islands are rich in natural resources. Potential fishery income alone is estimated to be between US$50 million and US$500 million. Furthermore, it has been estimated that there are over 100 billion barrels of crude oil and 200 billion cubic kilometers of natural gas deposits under the wa-ters of the area. This could provide 80 years of energy use for China, and 100 years for Japan. Highly val-ued minerals are also in abundance—minerals such as manganese (320 years of use at current Japanese usage rates), cobalt (1,300 years), nickel (100 years) and a host of other mineral resources could support Japan’s high-tech manufacturing industry. That is why Japan has been claiming to be the islands’ only owner: to become a strong power.

More posessions

Meanwhile, a rising China needs more possessions to meet demand in every facet of that rise. The evalu-ation of natural gas in the East China Sea is around

7.7 billion tons. That is why China has no reason to decline anymore. Moreover, those waterways would allow warships from the PLA Navy (PLAN) to sail freely as far as the second island chain, without be-ing hemmed in by the first.

As for Taiwan, its resources come from the nearby seas. In many ways, Taipei’s options are limited: So far, the only quarrel in which the ROC is involved revolves around fishing rights, and any military ac-tion by Taipei would be risky.

On the issue of territorial sovereignty, the ROC has too many limitations because of its diminished presence on the international stage. This is in con-trast with similar regional sovereignty disputes, such

A vessel flying the flag of the Su-ao Fishing Association Taiwan sails the waters near the disputed islands with a banner demanding their fishing rights.

as the row over the Liancourt Rocks between South Korea and Japan, the Kuril Islands dispute between Japan and Russia, and various claims and counter-claims in the South China Sea between China and various other countries including Vietnam and the Philippines. The attitudes of both South Korea and Russia are stronger and more solid than that of Japan, and Tokyo may not want to risk irritating them. Even Vietnam and the Philippines are frailer in compari-son, though active in the area. Thus, a strong de-termination to defend one’s territory is absolutely necessary. It is not only force of arms, but daring. Unfortunately, this is precisely what the ROC lacks, or is unwilling to demonstrate.

A military perspective

The issue can also be examined from the military per-spective. Japan’s military spending was about US$58.9 billion in 2012. Although Japan is not an economic giant, its navy still makes it a maritime superpow-er. The combat capabilities of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force are second to none in Northeast Asia. This, plus its Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with the United States, make Japan an invincible military power in Asia.

China’s military expenditures were about US$106.4 billion in 2012—an increase of 11.2 percent over 2011. In almost every dimension, China’s military power is tougher now than it ever has been. While troop numbers have remained constant, high-tech weapons are being introduced into service, including Theater Ballistic Missiles, nuclear submarines, and the newly commissioned aircraft carrier, the Liaoning (CV-16). Nevertheless the budget still cannot fill the gap given the reality of what is needed to acheive China’s ap-parent aims, especially compared with the forces that can be fielded by the US-Japan alliance. The strength of the ROC cannot be neglected; it is not equal to these others, however.

Since 2009, PLAN ships have sailed past the first island chain and given Japan a serious shock, result-ing in Tokyo increasing the number of submarines in the Japanese fleet from 16 to 22, despite overall budget cuts and a general downsizing of forces. Obviously they are preparing to confront a challenge from the PLAN in its next force-projection phase. The US con-tainment policy against communism is longstand-ing, and no doubt factors into US consideration of

its grand strategy even now. They think the current strategy, built decades ago, is too passive and insuf-ficient. Now the United States not only aids a number of forces but has advanced forward-deployed assets, like F-22 Raptor fighter jets and Virginia-class sub-marines, to maintain US superiority in the Pacific.

Very few put much stock in the China-threat theory. Furthermore, the military power of China is not in the same class as that of the United States. China is no longer what people thought it was.

ROC President Ma Ying-jeou raised a new issue with his proposed East China Sea Peace Initiative, the major content of which is to claim that while sov-ereignty is indivisible, resources can be shared. This dramatic idea proposes a two-stage procedure. Stage one is the shelving of territorial disputes through meaningful dialogue. Stage two involves sharing re-sources through joint development.

This is caviar to the general, or gobbledygook to the public. In reality, no one will try to join this initia-tive, fearing that it would be interpreted as a conces-sion of defeat. No one knows this better than politi-cians. Just as game theory dictates, each side of the

Trilateral Ties b 19

“Just as game theory dictates, each side of the table will endeavor to avoid being caught in a prisoner’s dilemma.”

A patrol ship with the Japanese Coast Guard patrols the waters near the Diaoyutai Islands. The combat capabilities of the Japanese fleet are considerable.

photo: ROC CGA

table will endeavor to avoid being caught in a pris-oner’s dilemma. Moreover, there is no precedent for such a peace initiative, especially at the urging of a small country asking others to follow. In the words of Robert Aumann, simplistic peacemaking might actually cause war, whereas credible threats and an arms race can prevent it.

Charting the course

Given these realities, the course for the ROC govern-ment is clear: to avoid an escalation of the fishing row by allowing the Coast Guard to continue to take point in protecting Taiwanese fishermen. The blurred line of sovereignty will not be solved anytime soon, and arguments over fishing grounds are preferable to a conflict over full territorial sovereignty.

Moreover, the ROC must hold neutrality. Taipei

must avoid becoming a sacrificial offering for the other members of the trilateral relationship, while maintaining a routine and moderate demonstration of military presence to avoid projecting a lack of de-termination. The current situation might not change, and the security of Taiwan is still being protected in the waters north of the island by the US-Japan coali-tion. This should be allowed to continue.

Without a doubt, national security is fundamental. In dealing with such complex problems, Taipei should put forth its strength by shifting direct force so as to strengthen its power. There is no need to suffer a big loss for little gain. There is no cheaper defense; and its only choice is to merge the conception of mutual defense. Fishery resources will never be worth more than national security. Taiwan cannot keep itself se-cluded from the world. Only peace between Taiwan, China, and Japan is the best way. n


Earlier this year, the government of Tokyo Prefecture attempted to purchase the dis-puted Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands from their

private owner, leading to a tense diplomatic standoff between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Japan. The uninhabited islands, the continental shelf, and the nearby trough in the East China Sea have po-tential oil and natural-gas reserves, according to the US Energy Information Administration (USEIA). At stake are actually two separate issues; ownership of the islands themselves, and the limits of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) maritime border between China and Japan. Despite recent amicable Chinese-

Japanese hydrocarbon extraction joint ventures in the East China Sea, attempts to resolve the dispute diplomatically have not been fruitful.

The official US position on the dispute is to remain impartial and advise the parties to work any issues out between themselves peacefully and diplomati-cally. However, in the event any sort of shooting con-flict ensues, the United States is bound by treaty to defend its Japanese allies. This diplomatic quandary notwithstanding, should the United States be doing more to bring the Chinese and Japanese to the bar-gaining table? Furthermore, is it even necessary to resolve the issue expediently, or are the recent dis-

Captain Michael Joseph Di Fabio is an officer in the US Army and a commentator on security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. He can be reached for comment at [email protected].

b 21


Standing on the Sidelines

US remains neutral in dispute that masks deeper rift between China, Japan Michael Di Fabio

Sailors on the hangar bay of the USS George Washington watch as the JS Kurama and ROKS Munmu the Great sail in formation in the East China Sea.

photo: Denver Applehans

putes little more than a smoke screen obscuring the real issues at hand?

Natural resources

The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands consist of a chain of five uninhabited islands and three barren rocks to the northeast of Taiwan. The islands are currently under the administration of Okinawa Prefecture, which is the seat of the Japanese Ryukyu island chain. Assessments of petroleum reserves in the Diaoyu/

Senkaku continental shelf area and Xihu/Okinawa trough reveal promising potential for oil and nat-ural-gas reserves. The USEIA estimates that there are between 60 and 100 million barrels of reserves in the East China Sea. Chinese sources believe the amount of potential reserves in the Xihu/Okinawa trough to be much higher, at between 70 and 160 billion barrels.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) lists China and Japan respectively as the world’s third- and fourth-largest importers of oil (see Table 1), behind

only the United States and the European Union. China and Japan rank fifth and sixth respectively as the world’s largest consumers of natural gas (see Table 2).

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) defines an EEZ as an area within 200 nautical miles of a state’s coastline in which the state has exclusive rights to extract and profit from the natural resources contained therein. Japan and China disagree on where their EEZ maritime boundaries should fall (See Image 1). Both nations have decided

upon rather liberal interpretations of the UNCLOS definition.

The Japanese currently claim a maritime EEZ that extends from the Diaoyu/Senkaku chain and in-cludes the Xihu/Okinawa trough. However, Article 121 (3) of UNCLOS states, “Rocks which cannot sus-

tain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.” It is debatable whether this definition can be applied to the Diaoyu/Senkaku chain: the issue has not gone to the United Nations for arbitration and is therefore unlikely to be defined anytime soon.

The Chinese view is that their EEZ should extend from their coast right to the edge of the continen-

tal shelf as defined by the Xihu/Okinawa trough, despite this being rather in excess of the 200 nautical miles proscribed in the UNCLOS and within 130 nautical miles of Okinawa, an indisputably inhabited is-land. Both states, as yet, are unwilling to compromise.

The first historical mention of the islands is in Chinese documents and sea charts dating to the 15th century in which the

islets are cited as being used as navigational aids, and this is the basis for the PRC claim to sovereignty. The Japanese, however, hold that the chain remained


Careful Neutrality b 23

officially unclaimed and uninhabited by any major power until their earliest recorded survey in 1885. The Japanese found the islets to be uninhabited, with no sign of ever having been under the control of any nation.

Spoils of war

Benefiting from the period of rapid industrialization and modernization known as the Meiji Restoration, Japan roundly defeated the weak Q’ing Dynasty in the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, gaining Taiwan and the Pescadores (among other territorial concessions) in the Treaty of Shimonoseki signed in April of 1895.

The Meiji used the victory as an opportunity to begin to remake Japan in the image of the Western colonialist nations, and the Japanese cabinet used the occasion of the victory to officially incorporate the Diaoyu/Senkaku chain into their territory in 1895.

At the conclusion of World War II, under Article

2 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, Japan renounced claim to territories gained during its imperialist expansion. The Diaoyu/Senkaku chain, the Japanese argue, was not at the time included in this article of the treaty, and as such must remain

Japanese. The United States assumed control of the islands at the end of the war and retained control as such until an agreement with Tokyo in 1971 returned the islands to Japan. In the late 1960s, it was deter-mined that potential hydrocarbon reserves were pres-ent. The Japanese Ambassador to the United Nations, Kazuo Kodama, points out that it was only after the discovery of petrochemical reserves, in 1970, that

Image One: East China Sea China/Japan EEZ Dispute (USEIA 2012)

“[The Chinese] consider the 1895 incorporation of the islands to have been an illegal act by Japan to ‘seize and occupy’ territory.”

A citizen of the PRC expresses his nationalistic pride with a bilingual sign (expletive deleted by the editor) as policemen with riot gear stand ready.

photo: Michele Travierso

the governments of both the PRC and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan began to raise questions regarding ownership of the Senkaku Islands.

In late October 2012, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun explained the Chinese view of the situ-ation: They consider the 1895 incorporation of the islands to have been an illegal act by Japan to “seize and occupy” territory that was historically Chinese. Zhang likewise considers the US trusteeship of the islands during the postwar period to have been il-legal, describing the transfer of the islands back to Japanese authority as a “back-room deal.” As a result, the issue has become a rallying point for national-ist sentiment.

Nationalistic response

When the Chinese need to take the introspective eye and turn it outward, there is always Japan. Any controversy involving Japan is sure to ignite a na-tionalistic response, just as a disturbing anti-Jap-anese sentiment was whipped up purposefully by the Communist Party after the Tiananmen Square Massacre. The purpose of the state-sanctioned anti-Japanese information program was to restore a sense of patriotism and detract from the Party’s culpability in the massacre.

Just as anti-Japanese sentiment was allowed to foster after Tiananmen, so too is the government of China purposefully fanning the flames of anti-Japanese sen-timent to detract from internal politics today.

China’s political elites have recently been racked with internal corruption scandals. According to The Economist, PRC Prime Minister Wen Jiabao was re-vealed to be worth at least US$2.7 billion and charges of nepotism have arisen in a system where families benefit extravagantly from having well-placed kin. Bloomberg and the New York Times websites have been blocked in China for breaking the story. In a scandal drawing international attention, the charis-

matic (and therefore dangerous) Communist Party boss of the Chongqing region, Bo Xilai, has been stripped of his party membership, and he and his wife face a variety of corruption and murder charges.

According to Susan Shirk, an expert on China’s in-ternal politics, it may ironically be China’s enduring anti-Japanese sentiment that gives leaders in Tokyo the impetus and public support they need to begin to rebuild Japan’s military through a repeal of Article 9 of their constitution which renounces the use of force and greatly constrains their military. Shirk opined that, “China’s unfriendly attitude toward Japan is provoking the perverse result of motivating Japan to abandon its postwar pacifism.”

The PRC government is not the only one playing politics with the islands dispute. The governor of the prefecture of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara—once de-scribed in The Economist as “a crusty, China-baiting


Careful Neutrality b 25

nationalist,” was the first to stoke tensions with an April 2012 bid to purchase the islands from their private owners. In order to prevent the diplomatic backlash that would occur with a purchase headed by Ishihara, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda urged a federal purchase as a solution, hoping that this would placate China and avert any outbursts of anti-Chinese sentiment in Japan. On September 11, 2012, the Japanese government purchased the remaining three islands it did not already own for US$26 million. It has been suggested that the pur-chase was also motivated by Noda’s desire to dimin-ish the celebrity of Ishihara, whose son Nobuteru is the opposition candidate for prime minister in the next general election.

No US mediation

On September 26, 2012, the US Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell called on both parties “to undertake seri-ous, sustained and effective diplomacy” to resolve the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue. Campbell also reiterated the US position that this is a diplomatic issue for China and Japan to resolve, pointing out that “the United States has no intention [of] playing a mediating role.”

The Chinese and Japanese reactions revealed an interesting dynamic. The Japanese Ambassador to the United States, Ichiro Fujisaki, recently accused Washington of being contradictory in its position by saying, “[the US] stance cannot be neutral if it is to respond firmly in the event of use of force or provocation.” In October 2012, a veteran Chinese diplomat accused the United States of pursuing a hands-off policy in order to purposefully increase tensions between China and Japan.

He urged the United States to use its leverage with Japan and force mediation. The Chinese are appar-ently looking for assurances that Washington will keep the Japanese under control. This may stem from

Chinese fears of a resurgent Japan, but is more than likely an attempt by the Chinese to establish some sort of diplomatic precedent; in any case, China and Japan seem to be engaged in a tug of war for the future of American influence just as much as for the islands.

The current US diplomatic position on the affair is correct and commendable. Too much is at stake

diplomatically for the United States to intervene on behalf of either Japanese or Chinese interests. Depending on how the settlement is resolved, media-tion by the United States would lead to a diplomatic precedent which in turn could undermine US inter-ests in future dealings with both nations.

In reality there is nothing pressing about the situa-tion, but in both countries the disputes inflame public opinion and distract from domestic woes. Neither nation is currently in such economic dire straits as to require access to the region’s resources anytime soon. Both China and Japan must become willing to com-promise their positions on the affair if an equitable solution for eventual hydrocarbon extraction in the region is to be found, even if strict territorial issues remain unresolved.

War is the most unnecessary means by which to resolve the dispute. Too much is at stake regionally, not just for China and Japan, but for their neighbors. The United States would most likely solemnly respect its defense arrangements with Japan, leading to the possibility of a widening conflict. The global stakes are too high for China and Japan to allow the situa-tion to continue to escalate in a spat over uninhabited islands of uncertain value. n

“Both China and Japan must become willing to compromise their positions on the affair if an equitable solution ... is to be found”

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strategic vision, issue 6

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