strategic vision, issue 20

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STRATEGIC VISION for Taiwan Security Volume 4, Issue 20 w April, 2015 w ISSN 2227-3646 Nuclear Proliferation Yuan Jingdong Should US Rethink Offensive Weapons? PRC Military Budget Nkosinathi S. Dlamini Cross-Strait Transparency Jonas Greher Arming Taiwan: Martin Wagener Losing Myanmar Bradley Wu

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Strategic Vision is a journal published by NCCU's Center for Security Studies and the ROC National Defense University that provides analysis and policy recommendations on issues of importance to regional security in the Asia-Pacific.

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Page 1: Strategic Vision, Issue 20

STRATEGIC VISION for Taiwan Security

Volume 4, Issue 20 w April, 2015 w ISSN 2227-3646

Nuclear ProliferationYuan Jingdong

Should US Rethink Offensive Weapons?

PRC Military Budget Nkosinathi S. Dlamini

Cross-Strait Transparency Jonas Greher

Arming Taiwan:

Martin Wagener

Losing MyanmarBradley Wu

Page 2: Strategic Vision, Issue 20

Submissions: Essays submitted for publication are not to exceed 2,000 words in length, and should conform to the following basic format for each 1200-1600 word essay: 1. Synopsis, 100-200 words; 2. Background description, 100-200 words; 3. Analysis, 800-1,000 words; 4. Policy Recommendations, 200-300 words. Book reviews should not exceed 1,200 words in length. Notes should be formatted as endnotes and should be kept to a minimum. Authors are encouraged to submit essays and reviews as attachments to emails; Microsoft Word documents are preferred. For questions of style and usage, writers should consult the Chicago Manual of Style. Authors of unsolicited manuscripts are encouraged to consult with the executive editor at [email protected] before formal submission via email. The views expressed in the articles are the personal views of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of their affiliate institutions or of Strategic Vision. Manuscripts are subject to copyediting, both mechanical and substantive, as required and according to editorial guidelines. No major alterations may be made by an author once the type has been set. Arrangements for reprints should be made with the editor. On the cover, the altered photograph of an ROC honor guard is courtesy of Tai Gray.

STRATEGIC VISION for Taiwan Security

Volume 4, Issue 20 w April, 2015

ContentsNuclear proliferation threatens global security ............................4

PRC military budget demands regional response .........................8

ROC citizens demand cross-strait transparency ......................... 14

Rethinking offensive weapons sales to Taiwan ............................ 19

Chinese policies lead to loss of Myanmar ....................................26

Yuan Jingdong

Nkosinathi S. Dlamini

Jonas Greher

Martin Wagener

Bradley Wu

Page 3: Strategic Vision, Issue 20

Dr. Fu-Kuo LiuEditor

Strategic Vision

From The Editor

The editors and staff of Strategic Vision would like to wish our readers well as the spring season blooms upon us. This year has seen a continuation in major develop-

ments in the Asia-Pacific Region. We hope that students and scholars in the academic community have the chance to keep up with these events. In support of that effort, we offer our lat-est edition of Strategic Vision.

We open our second issue of the year with an analysis of re-cent developments in global nuclear arsenals and the prospects for nuclear reduction by Dr. Jingdong Yuan of the Centre for International Security Studies at the University of Sydney. Dr. Yuan argues that the prospects for meaningful reductions in nuclear stockpiles are slim due to increased friction between Russia and the United States.

Nkosinathi S. Dlamini, currently a master’s student from Swaziland studying at the ROC National Defense University, provides an overview of PRC defense budget increases and how the region is responding to these developments. Jonas Greher, a research intern at the Center for Security Studies at the Institute of International Relations in Taipei, Taiwan, looks at the impact of Taiwan’s recent Sunflower Movement, and how the government could improve communication with the younger generation.

Dr. Martin Wagener of the Federal University of Applied Administrative Sciences in Bruehl and Munich, Germany, ar-gues that the distinction between offensive and defensive weap-ons is no longer meaningful and that Taiwan defense planners should take a broader view of weapon systems which can po-tentially contribute to Taiwan’s defense. Finally, Bradley Wu, an independent commentator and researcher on foreign affairs, and a former research consultant for the China program at the World Security Institute in the United States, offers an insight-ful analysis of why relations between the PRC and Myanmar have deteriorated.

We hope you enjoy this issue, and look forward to bringing you the finest analysis and reporting on the issues of importance to security in the Taiwan Strait and the Asia-Pacific region.

STRATEGIC VISION For Taiwan Security (ISSN 2227-3646) Volume 4, Number 20, April, 2015, published under the auspices of the Center for Security Studies and National Defense University.

All editorial correspondence should be mailed to the editor at STRATEGIC VISION, Center for Security Studies in Taiwan. No. 64, Wan Shou Road, Taipei City 11666, Tai-wan, ROC.

The editors are responsible for the selection and acceptance of articles; responsibility for opinions expressed and accuracy of facts in articles published rests solely with individual authors. The editors are not responsible for unsolicited manuscripts; unaccepted manu-scripts will be returned if accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed return envelope.

Photographs used in this publication are used courtesy of the photographers, or through a creative commons licence. All are attributed appropriately.

Any inquiries please contact the Executive Editor directly via email at:[email protected]. Or by telephone at:+866 (02) 8237-7228

Online issues and archives can be viewed at our website: www.mcsstw.org.

© Copyright 2015 by the Center for Security Studies.

EditorFu-Kuo Liu

Executive EditorAaron Jensen

Associate EditorDean Karalekas

Editorial BoardTiehlin YenRaviprasad NarayananRichard HuJames YuanLaurence Lin

Articles in this periodical do not necessarily represent the views of either the MCSS, NDU, or the editors.

Page 4: Strategic Vision, Issue 20

Global nuclear arsenals have witnessed substantive reductions over the past two decades since the end of the Cold War.

Some states have stopped pursuit of nuclear weapons programs; others have repatriated nuclear arsenals on their soil to become non-nuclear-weapon states of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); and still others have given up their nuclear arsenals voluntarily. Despite the defiance of North Korea, with three nuclear tests since 2006, and ongoing negotiations and implementation of the nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1, the world continues its crawl—if not march—toward nuclear disarmament while efforts in preventing nu-clear proliferation and safeguarding nuclear materials have not relented, at least according to the rhetoric. Granted, further progress in nuclear disarmament will require major breakthroughs in other key pillars of the nuclear disarmament project—ratification and entry into force of the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and, most critically, conditions for multilateral participation and negotiation leading to reduction of existing nuclear arsenals and a successful 2015 NPT Review Conference.

The year 2014 witnessed important milestones in the international community’s efforts to regulate global armaments, including nuclear safety and security, nuclear nonproliferation, and entry into effect of

the Arms Trade Treaty. The 2014 Nuclear Security Summit held in The Hague in late March recommits states to strengthening nuclear security and prevent-ing terrorists, criminals, and unauthorized actors from gaining access to nuclear facilities and materi-als. The Hague Summit also reaffirms the essential responsibility and central role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in nuclear security, includ-ing inspections and verification, coordination with other international organizations and states to im-prove the security of all nuclear material and radio-active sources.

On November 24, 2013, the six powers (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany, collectively known as the P5+1) that had been in negotiation with Iran about its nuclear program since 2006 reached an interim agreement, called the Joint Plan of Action, which required Iran to freeze certain aspects of its nuclear program in ex-change for relief from some international sanctions. The period of the interim deal was to be six months, during which time the parties would seek to conclude a comprehensive accord on the long-term status of Iran’s nuclear program. The interim agreement has subsequently been extended twice, with the new tar-get set for June 2015. While some progress has been made, especially where the freeze on the production and size of Iran’s enriched uranium up to 5 percent uranium-235 and key elements of its heavy-water

Dr. Yuan Jingdong is an associate professor at the Centre for International Security Studies at the University of Sydney. He can be reached for comment at [email protected].

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Strategic Vision vol. 4, no. 20 (April, 2015)

A Global Concern

Nuclear proliferation remains serious challenge to international security Yuan Jingdong

Page 5: Strategic Vision, Issue 20

reactor are concerned, differences remain over the critical issue of whether Tehran should be allowed to keep an enrichment capacity at all. The duration of the comprehensive accord, and the extent and sequencing of the lifting of sanctions, also remain issues on which the parties disagree.

Major obstacles

Signs of a slow-down, if not setback, can be observed in US-Russian implementation of strategic nuclear arms reduction. The New START Treaty, signed be-tween the United States and Russian Federation in 2010, sets an overall limit of 1,550 strategic nuclear warheads for each country. This represents a further 74-percent reduction of nuclear weapons set by the 1991 START Treaty. Both Russia and the United States have ratified the treaty. Enforcement and verifica-tion measures have been in effect, notwithstanding the recent deterioration of relations between the two over the crisis in Ukraine. However, moving beyond

the 1,550 to a lower number will likely face major ob-stacles, both in Russia and the United States. Without any further reduction between the two nuclear super-powers, it is unlikely that second-tier nuclear powers such as Britain, France, and China would be willing to participate in any multilateral nuclear disarma-ment negotiations.

The Indo-Pacific, a region where divided nations, territorial disputes, emerging rivalries, and great-power competition exists, remains without fully de-veloped security institutions and the risks of incidents escalating to military conflicts are clear and present. These characteristics further highlight the challenges the region and key powers face: the role of nuclear

Nuclear Proliferation b 5

“The Indo-Pacific Region has expe-rienced nuclear expansion rather than contraction since the end of the Cold War.”

A Russian Topal-M intercontinental ballistic missile on parade in Moscow. World leaders have done little to reduce the threat from these weapons.photo: Wikmedia Commons

Page 6: Strategic Vision, Issue 20

weapons, extended deterrence, WMD proliferation, and crisis management in the absence of confidence-building measures.

It is important to note that the Indo-Pacific Region has experienced nuclear expansion rather than con-traction since the end of the Cold War. India and Pakistan, for instance, continue to develop new sys-tems for delivering nuclear weapons and expanding fissile material production capacities for military pur-poses. China, meanwhile, is on the cusp of deploying an operational sea-based second-strike capability with the deployment of the Jin-class nuclear bal-listic missile submarines. These developments, and projected trends toward continuing nuclear mod-ernization in the region, warrant serious discussion on two critical questions. One is whether secured nuclear second-strike capabilities, as the ongoing programs in China, India, and Pakistan presumably aim at achieving, will be conducive to crisis stabil-ity and arms-race stability, or on the contrary, will undermine strategic stability in both regional and sub-regional contexts.

Second, would such developments enable and em-bolden these states to undertake risky actions, or pursue more aggressive foreign policy adventures, with the perhaps misplaced confidence that they can get away with such actions as their assured second-strike capabilities provide a degree of security. In other words, what impact will these developments have on the stability-instability paradox and extended deterrence, in particular for US allies?

Nuclear proliferation remains a serious challenge in the Indo-Pacific. One issue is how to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear weapons program two decades after the first attempt by the international commu-nity (the 1994 Agreed Framework). The past two de-cades of dealing with Pyongyang have demonstrated how differences in priorities and approaches, and the failure to address deep security concerns, have resulted in a lack of coordination of policy among

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the key players involved, and more seriously, how the current impasse poses serious security threats to the region in two critical ways. One is the risk of further proliferation as the Kim Jong Un regime seeks to transfer sensitive nuclear technologies and even materials, along with other illicit activities and

missile exports, to earn desperately needed hard cur-rency. The Iran-North Korea-Syria nuclear network of the past is a case in point, and there is no guaran-tee that Pyongyang will not try again if and when it has found suitable customers.

Secondly, North Korea continues work on growing its nuclear arsenal and improving delivery systems, according to Chinese and South Korean sources, and has made significant progress on a miniaturized nuclear warhead. These developments will have a long-term impact on the regional nuclear dynam-ic, including reconsideration of the nuclear options among US allies.

Policy implications

2015 will be a critical year for global and regional nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, crisis management and conflict prevention, and the devel-opment of mechanisms for major-power relations. While differences and disputes are inevitable and in-deed could even widen, it is not a foregone conclusion that the world will be left in a helpless and dangerous state of rising geopolitics and rivalry. There remain significant degrees of common interests among key players in pursing shared goals and, at a minimum, in preventing what analysts fear as a tragic “race to 1914.”

A critical task for the international community is the successful conclusion of a comprehensive ac-

“2015 will be a critical year for global and regional nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.”

Page 7: Strategic Vision, Issue 20

cord on the Iranian nuclear issue. This would re-quire great-power cooperation, especially between Washington and Moscow within the P-5+1 arrange-ment in its negotiations with Tehran. With the 2015 NPT Review Conference coming up soon, it is also critical that the nuclear weapons states, the United States and Russia in particular, continue with good-faith efforts in nuclear disarmament in order to meet the Action Plan set by the 2010 Review Conference.

Closer to home, the Indo-Pacific Region must grap-ple with the challenges of managing disputes and preventing conflicts on a number of fronts, from the South Asian sub-continent to the East and South China seas, the North Korean nuclear issue, and Sino-US relations. The last is the most consequen-tial: Washington and Beijing must make greater ef-forts in managing their relationship during a period of geopolitical transformation in the region. The two powers need to recognize the major differences be-tween them and develop mechanisms to manage their unique relationship. This would involve better understanding (if not acceptance) of each other’s in-

terests, objectives, and priorities through dialogue, minimizing the negative impact of disputes, and promoting and coordinating in areas where they do share common interests.

In this context, the critical Strategic and Economic Dialogue, along with the other 90-plus channels of bilateral official consultation, remains an important framework in communication. Improving military-to-military contacts, which has always been the most vulnerable to any vicissitude in bilateral political relations, has never been as important as it is now, not least to avoid direct military confrontation given the dearth of clear and reliable communication and crisis management arrangements. The two recent memoranda of understanding between the Chinese and US militaries on rules of engagement and ad-vance notice on military activities are an essential, albeit still modest, step toward crisis management and prevention. In the same vein, Beijing and Tokyo must also consider similar approaches to managing their disputes, especially near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and elsewhere in the East China Sea. n

Nuclear Proliferation b 7

A US Air Force B-52 takes off from Anderson Air Force Base in Guam. These bombers constitute an important part of the US nuclear triad.photo: US DOD

Page 8: Strategic Vision, Issue 20

The unveiling of the 2015 military budget by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and China’s rise as a major regional player

if not a world player, raise important questions for regional countries. All eyes are on the PRC now that it has transformed itself from a developing country to the second largest economy in the world. In addition to its growing economic strength, the PRC has the largest military in the world in terms of manpower. In March of 2015, the PRC released its annual mili-tary budget, which revealed an increase of more than 10 percent. China has steadily increased its military budget over the last 10 years. This spending increase reflects China’s growing power and desire to assert itself in the region and globally. According to Premier

Li Keqiang, in his report to the National People’s Congress, the principal effort will be the moderniza-tion and informatization of the armed forces.

“We will comprehensively strengthen modern lo-gistics, step up national defense research and de-velopment of new- and high-technology weapons and equipment, and develop defense-related science and technology industries. Governments at all levels must always take an active interest in and support the strengthening of our national defense and armed forces,” Li said.

According to Reuters, Lieutenant General Zhong Zhiming, a delegate to the congress, noted, “We must develop our weaponry and raise the standards of treatment for military personnel; only then will we

Nkosinathi S. Dlamini is a student from Swaziland studying at the National Defense University of the ROC. He can be reached for comment at [email protected].

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Strategic Vision vol. 4, no. 20 (April, 2015)

Rising Ambitions

China’s increasing military expenditures demand regional response Nkosinathi S. Dlamini

A pilot prepares his F-22 Raptor to participate in Red Flag Alaska. Such exercises are vital in sustaining the skill of front-line forces.photo: US DOD

Page 9: Strategic Vision, Issue 20

be able to really strengthen our strategic combat ef-fectiveness. Then no enemy will dare to bully us.”

Deducing China’s military expenditures has been a complicated issue with important regional implica-tions. Although China publishes its official defense budget and provides justifications for increases in its military spending, most observers remain skeptical about the accuracy of the official figures and cautious of its military modernization efforts. This uncertainty has shaped the responses of other Asia-Pacific nations toward China’s military modernization. Ultimately, even if the Chinese leadership views the military buildup as a natural part of the country’s ascension to great-power status, the uncertainties surrounding its military expenditures actually undermine the con-tention that China’s rise will be peaceful.

The rapid growth of China’s economy and its in-creasingly vigorous diplomatic engagement with re-gional and international institutions has given rise to much discussion of China’s “peaceful rise” to great-power status. At the same time, the Pentagon has identified China as the only potential hegemon on the horizon that stands a chance of challenging the unipolar power of the United States. These two views

of China—as a largely gentle global partner or as a military superpower-to-be—rely on different inter-pretations of one critical factor: the Chinese mili-tary budget.

Differing viewpoints

According to the Chinese government, the coun-try’s rising military budget reflects general economic growth, is devoted to non-threatening expenditures such as better pay for soldiers, and remains only a small percentage of what the United States spends every year on the military. Critics, however, argue that China vastly underreports its military expendi-tures and that the country is acquiring new power-projection capabilities that change the regional bal-ance of power.

Determining which of these pictures of China’s military spending is correct is not an easy task. In recent years, the Chinese government has published its official annual defense budget figures and pro-vided justification for the announced increases in military spending as part of its efforts to allevi-ate the fears outsiders might have about its rapid

PRC Military Spending b 9

US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter tours Pyeongtaek Naval Base during a vist to South Korea.photo: Petty Officer 2nd Class Hurt

Page 10: Strategic Vision, Issue 20

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rise. But these published figures, since they don’t match the estimates of outside observers, raise more questions than they answer. What are China’s ulti-mate geopolitical goals and rationales behind its military planning? How have other nations in the Asia-Pacific region responded to the more robust Chinese military spending? Finally, what implica-tions do the uncertainties in China’s military have for its own national goals?

The rationale behind China’s increased military spending seems to be consistent with the goals of the Chinese leadership of building “inclusive national power.” This involves creating both internal and ex-ternal power. Internally, communist policymakers want to focus on maintaining economic prosperity, domestic cohesion, and the social influence of the party. Separatist struggles in Tibet and Xinjiang prov-inces pose significant challenges to the central gov-ernment, and some of China’s military budget goes toward policing these regions. Externally, Beijing is also concerned with territorial integrity as it relates to Taiwan, but it has greater ambitions in terms of power projection, diplomatic influence, and inter-national prestige.

The Chinese leadership believes that in order to achieve its ultimate objective of engineering its coun-try’s rise to great-power status, China must first se-cure an international environment advantageous to its continual economic development. To do this, the decisionmakers in China have fabricated the peace-ful-rise doctrine. China wants to reassure the rest of the world, through its rhetoric and substantive poli-cies, that its rise would be a source of stability rather than threaten the international order. Only if other countries do not try to constrain its rise will China have the necessary space for its rapid development.

Protecting sovereignty

Yet the peaceful rise policy does not necessarily mean that China will discontinue its military buildup, as it sees no fundamental contradiction between the two policies. Chinese leaders repeatedly contend that the expansion of the military budget only serves its goals of protecting its own territorial integrity and sovereignty because its increased military budget enables it to contribute more to peacekeeping mis-sions. Finally, Chinese leaders argue that the coun-

Constant training, such as the test firing of this 40mm saluting battery, maintains the skill of US Navy sailors as they operate in the Pacific.photo: US Pacific Command

Page 11: Strategic Vision, Issue 20

try does not spend significantly more on its military than other major powers, and still spends only a small portion of the US military budget.

Despite the Chinese protestations, many other countries and observers perceive the appreciation of China’s military spending differently. Almost all analysis of China refers to the Taiwan issue as a major driving force behind its military planning. Indeed, over the past decade, Beijing has focused on shifting the military balance in the Taiwan Strait in its favor. The central goal for China is to prevent Taiwan from declaring formal independence, even if it does not seek a near-term resolution. China has indicated in the Anti-Secession Law of March 2005 that it would resort to “non-peaceful means” if “secessionist forces . . . cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China”; if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession” oc-cur; or if “possibilities for peaceful reunification” are exhausted.

This willingness to use force to deter a declaration of Taiwan independence has dictated much of the military planning in China. Chinese leaders want to be able to quickly overcome Taiwan’s will to resist an attack while also countering any possible intervention

by third parties, particularly the United States. To this end, China has built up a massive arsenal of short-range missiles, cruise missiles, and submarines in case of conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Moreover, China’s

deployment of advanced fighter aircraft starting in the late 1990s also overturned the previous domi-nance Taiwan enjoyed in the airspace over the strait. Chinese leadership argues that its military modern-ization against Taiwan is simply for the purpose of protecting its own territorial sovereignty.

Another significant reason for China to continue its military modernization efforts is its sense of urgency regarding access to markets and natural resources that feed its economic growth. This need is becom-ing an important factor in shaping China’s strategic behavior. China is extremely reliant on imports from abroad, particularly metals and fossil fuels. To secure these resources, China feels the need to defend the

PRC Military Spending b 11

US Marines and Philippine forces conduct training exercises on Palawan Island during exercise Phiblex-15.photo: US DOD

“The United States, with its mili-tary alliances and considerable firepower, remains the region’s most powerful player.”

Page 12: Strategic Vision, Issue 20

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sea lanes vital to its imports. Moreover, China has had a number of territorial

disputes on its borders and may want to supplement its military spending and modernization efforts to strengthen its claims. China has disputes over the Spratly and Paracel Island groups in the South China Sea with Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. In the East China Sea, China and Japan have disputes over ownership of potentially rich offshore oil and gas deposits. Lastly, China and India still have lingering tensions along their 4,057-kilometer shared border, especially over Arunachal Pradesh.

In all of these cases, a demonstration of force may be strategically important for China to show its re-solve. Just as with the Taiwan issue, and interests in acquiring markets and resources, China’s territorial disputes play a key part in its geopolitical thinking to increase its military spending. These specific strategic interests remain consistent with China’s overarching goal of building inclusive national power.

China’s increased military spending and moderniza-tion have significant implications for the Asia-Pacific region. First of all, the uncertainty regarding the rise

of China’s military has led to internal debates in other countries on how best to respond. These debates have dominated security thinking in the United States, Japan, Taiwan, and among ASEAN members.

Powerful player

The United States, with its military alliances and considerable firepower, remains the region’s most powerful player. Americans also have a strategic in-terest in the region, both economically and in terms of national security. Within the US policymaking community, a growing debate has emerged regard-ing how best to interpret and respond to China’s rise. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, for instance, pointed out that traditionalists believe that the stron-gest threat to American security comes from other, competing nations, such as a rising China.

The region’s other major player, Japan, faces a simi-lar debate on how best to respond to China’s growing military. Two schools of thought dominate discus-sions in Japan: those seeking cooperative engage-ment with a soft hedging approach, and those sup-porting competitive engagement with a hard hedge.

The USS Essex fires a RIM-116 surface -to-air missile during an exercise. Such training is vital to counter the growing air threats to surface vessels.photo: US Pacific Command

Page 13: Strategic Vision, Issue 20

Advocates of the first strategy believe that China gen-uinely wants a peaceful international environment for its own growth but are still cautious of its military modernization efforts and the lack of transparency in its military planning. Given the uncertainties re-garding China’s intentions, these strategists want to engage China but still keep the US-Japan security al-liance as the main focus of regional security. On the other hand, those in support of a hard hedge against China remain worried that it will be less cooperative as its relative power increases. They point to China’s military modernization as evidence of the growing threat it poses and want to ensure that Japanese and American forces in the region can still out-muscle the Chinese military.

China’s demonstration of force is particularly alarm-ing when placed in the context of territorial disputes between China and Southeast Asian countries. While ASEAN members continue to engage China eco-nomically, their security policies suggest that they are still suspicious of the growth of the Chinese military threat. A number of Southeast Asian nations have consequently pursued policies designed to main-

tain American military dominance in the region. The Philippines and Thailand have formal alliances with the United States while Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore provide military facilities and ac-cess to American forces. Some ASEAN countries—Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand—also continue to modernize their military forces, acquir-ing new fighter aircraft and submarines. Taiwan’s reaction to China’s increased military spending is particularly alarming given the island’s position at the forefront of Chinese strategic military planning.

In conclusion, China’s continued military budget increases, in combination with its territorial disputes with its neighbors, will exacerbate regional tensions and compel other countries to strengthen their own military forces. The presence of the United States in this region is very important to counter the threat which China poses to its neighbors. The United States should include the ROC in its regional alliance struc-ture to help counterbalance the threat which China poses to the island. Taiwan’s security interests and desire for international engagement should not be held hostage to the dictates of the PRC. n

PRC Military Spending b 13

US and Korean fighter pilots congratulate each other after as successful mission. Such cooperation is key to the defense of South Korea.

photo: US Pacific Command

Page 14: Strategic Vision, Issue 20

The announcement of the so-called Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) in March 2014 set events into motion that

were expected by no one. A hastily rushed push for ratification in the Legislative Yuan by Kuomintang (KMT) officials, without a prior detailed review of the agreement, led to the eruption of student-organized protests, later dubbed the “Sunflower Movement.” Their demands centered around the need for a more in-depth review of the CSSTA and the involvement of the public, as well as a monitoring mechanism for deliberations concerning China-Taiwan economic

relations. The demonstrations culminated in the oc-cupation of the Legislative Yuan.

The movement agreed to stand down from further protest after the administration promised to imple-ment an oversight mechanism. Researchers from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Chinese State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office responded by estab-lishing dialog with scholars from the United States, as well as with Taiwan-based non-governmental organi-zations (NGOs), while the Chinese media presented the occurrence as the typical chaos that comes with democracy. The Sunflower Movement confronted

Jonas Greher is a visiting researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the Institute of International Relations in Taipei, Taiwan. He can be reached for comment at [email protected]

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The Presidential Office Building in downtown Taipei, seat of executive power for the Republic of China’s democratic government.

Strategic Vision vol. 4, no. 20 (April, 2015)

Presenting Demands

Citizens of Taiwan push for greater transparency in cross-strait dealingsJonas Greher

photo: Wikmedia Commons

Page 15: Strategic Vision, Issue 20

Taiwan’s political decisionmakers and Chinese politi-cians with the challenge of a mature public demand-ing more say in their political system, which in turn puts additional pressure on cross-strait relations.

To further clarify the overall situation, one must first take a look at the circumstances leading up to the controversial agreement. The CSSTA is a follow-up to the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) between China and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. This document, signed in 2010, seeks to enhance economic cooperation by support-ing trade and promoting market liberalization of services and goods alike. If one looks at Taiwan’s trading partners, China is of utmost importance for its economy. It absorbed 27.1 percent of Taiwan’s to-tal exports in the year 2012 and is ranked as Taiwan’s No. 1 trading partner. The CSSTA further specifies the opening of a large number of business sectors for foreign investments.

In addition to the already criticized method used by the government to ratify the agreement, the content was likewise alarming for those who participated in the protests. The fear of giving China more access to

the Taiwan economy stems from the assumption that smaller businesses would be disadvantaged and that the agreement would allow China to exert immense control over Taiwan by economic means, forcing it into a state of dependency. The launch of a series of diplomatic measures by the PRC government clearly shows China’s awareness of the growing discontent in Taiwan society toward unwelcome influence from the mainland. The PRC waited till the end of the uproar to take a stand regarding the matter.

Reaching out

General Secretary Xi Jinping stated in May 2014 at a meeting with James Soong, the founder and hon-orary chairman of the pan-blue People First Party (PFP) of Taiwan, that the course of peaceful inter-action would not be altered. The Chinese govern-ment, it seems, was keen to reach out to all sectors of Taiwan, ensuring the population of the mutual benefit of cross-strait economic cooperation. This at-tempt at reaching Taiwan society at large was focused on the announcement that the postponed visit of the

Cross-Strait Relations b 15

Taiwan citizens gather in downtown Taipei to express dissent towards the government’s cross-strait policies in April of 2014.photo: Wikmedia Commons

Page 16: Strategic Vision, Issue 20

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minister of the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO), Zhang Zhijun, would take place in June 2014. The visit was emphasized as being a passive act of listening to the Taiwan public and expert opinions alike, stressing the importance of not addressing China’s stance toward Taiwan independence.

Planned stops for the TAO minister included visits with the mayors of New Taipei City, Taichung, and Kaohsiung. The meeting with Kaohsiung’s Mayor Chen Chu was presented in Taiwan’s media as a par-ticularly big success toward mutual understanding. According to reporting by the Taipei Times, Chen Chu said that the democratic values in Taiwan are its foundation, to which Zhang replied that China respects the choice of Taiwan’s political system. This comment was notably absent from the Chinese me-dia coverage of the meeting.

Also noteworthy were the multiple meetings with local officials, scholars, farmers, and selected groups of students. During Zhang’s stay, each day was marked by protest of a wide array of opposition groups, including those affiliated with the Sunflower Movement. The deliberate choice to visit citizens and

make positive statements, such as those made toward Chen Chu, were clearly meant to calm the brewing heat in Taiwan’s civil society. Making compromises in Taiwan without the fear of leaking too much informa-tion through Beijing’s state-controlled media in order to keep up the appearance of a strong, unified China.

This event marked the first visit of a Chinese pol-itician in the official role as a state representative in Taiwan, further showing the importance Beijing gives to the disaster of the CSSTA. Comments made by Zhang regarding his stay in Taiwan were clearly meant to suggest that he believes the vast majority of Taiwan’s citizens support a peaceful deepening of cross-strait economic cooperation, while only a small minority opposes. The government of the PRC sought to focus on this “hidden majority” and not on the media-hungry minority. Whether this mi-nority is truly irrelevant for China’s Taiwan strategy remains to be seen.

According to a public-opinion survey by the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University, the majority of ROC citizens surveyed in the year 2014 identify themselves as “Taiwanese only” (60.6 per-

US and South Korean forces conduct operations together during a recent exercise. Such cooperation is crucial in reassuring US allies of continued commitment.photo: US Pacific Command

Page 17: Strategic Vision, Issue 20

cent) in contrast “Taiwanese and Chinese,” which only 32.5 percent accept as their nationality. The iden-tification with the term “Chinese” has dropped to 3.5 percent. This clearly indicates a trend among Taiwan’s population for a growing identity of self-awareness as Taiwanese. This could have an important impact on the level of acceptance for increasing the Chinese influence on Taiwan’s domestic affairs, which might lead to further resistance in the future.

Growing concerns

Another alarming development, which was brought up by participants in the Sunflower Movement, is the PRC’s growing influence over Taiwan’s political sys-tem through the use of donations. Local politicians have frequently been the target of such endeavors, especially in Hualien County. Many of these instances have been reported, which has given the public a pic-ture of a corrupt leading party. A poll from the TVBS Poll Center showed that about 70 percent of all people questioned believe that the KMT is not trustworthy and constitutes the main cause of corruption in the political sphere, while the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is seen as less responsible, with 37 per-cent of the blame for corruption in government.

The CSSTA could take advantage of these prob-lems by opening up business sectors for easy access through Chinese investments. Distressing develop-ments are also taking place regarding local law en-forcement: Not only have Internet monitoring ca-pabilities been increased in the wake of the protest movement, but police officers have been reported to have used excessive force to beat down protesters on multiple occasions. Further profiling seemed to be taking place by the illegal collection of medical information from hospitals visited by participants in the protest.

The rushed attempt to pass the CSSTA without a good-faith effort to conduct the previously agreed-

upon step-by-step review left members of civil so-ciety with a feeling of having been overlooked, and therefore victims of the strategizing of the nation’s political elites. This huge gap between the political decisionmakers and society is also visible in a survey conducted by the TVBS Poll Center, which showed that only 10 percent of all those questioned were sat-

isfied with the recent performance of the governing political party. The disapproval rate for the KMT’s ac-tions lies at 75 percent in this survey. The DPP is con-ceived in a much more positive light in comparison, with a disapproval rate of 32 percent, with 43 percent approving of the opposition party’s performance.

Seeking solutions

Instead of battling the will of the people every step of the way, a solution has to be found in order to build trust in the political system once again. A commit-tee consisting of representatives of the political par-ties, economic NGOs, and grassroots organizations charged with monitoring cross-strait agreements could strengthen the bond between the two camps. Such a committee could have an observational and information-dissemination role, staying in close con-tact with the media and making political proceedings more feasible for the public to follow.

Due to its composition, such a working group would be able to offer a variety of perspectives on sensitive subject matter. It would also give political decision-makers the chance to come into contact with civil society and, at the same time, enable them to present their point of view to civic organizations. Secondly,

Cross-Strait Relations b 17

“The United States, with its mili-tary alliances and considerable firepower, remains the region’s most powerful player.”

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people have to be assured that corruption will be fought. A political donation monitoring system must be established to make sure that especially lucrative donations are made more transparent for the press and the citizens of Taiwan. In so doing, public trust could be regained and suspicions regarding corrup-tion can be faced.

One easy way to accomplish this would be for each of the nation’s political parties to establish a section on its respective website showing a breakdown of its assets. In addition, a register regarding donations should be available online to keep track of the ori-gin of large donations. The amount of these dona-tions would have to be defined in the Political Party Act. One example of this would be Germany’s Act on Political Parties, which mandates that political parties publish through their media channels the origin of any donation which exceeds the amount of 50,000 Euros.

Another pressing issue is the current public-rela-

tions strategies of the political parties in Taiwan. The Sunflower Movement, and younger voters in general, communicate primarily through social media chan-nels such as Facebook and Twitter, bypassing tradi-tional media communication. This behavior chal-lenges the current perception of public interaction between citizens and politicians.

While the KMT has established a Facebook page, its social media strategy seems to be focused on a top-down communication approach, informing in-stead of interacting, and thereby ignoring the poten-tial of social media. Therefore, an overhaul of exist-ing public-relations efforts is needed. Engaging the public through social media and discussing issues relevant to party platforms is a key trust-building measure regarding the nation’s young voters. Taiwan’s decisionmakers must understand that citizens fear for the security of Taiwan, and take these concerns into account during the democratic decisionmak-ing process. n

The USS Curtis Wilbur operates in heavy seas as it patrols the Pacific. Such patrols are vital in securing common access to sea lanes of control. photo: US Pacific Command

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For many years, China has been trying to weaken the security relationship between the United States and Taiwan. The government

in Beijing claims that American arms sales to the “renegade province” are an illegal interference in its domestic affairs and are not allowed under the US-China Communiqués of 1972, 1978, and 1982.

The US position, in contrast, follows the provi-sions of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. It states: “It is the policy of the United States ... to provide Taiwan

with arms of a defensive character.” Accordingly, US President Barack Obama in 2010 and 2011 pledged the delivery of weapons worth a combined US$12.3 billion. However, out of consideration for China, the United States has refused to sell Taiwan arms that could be categorized as offensive weapons.

This approach is outdated. Given the dramatic changes in the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait, the United States should reconsider its position. The distinction between offensive and defensive weapons

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Strategic Vision vol. 4, no. 20 (April, 2015)

Outdated Distinction

Rethinking deployment of offensive and defensive weapons in Taiwan StraitMartin Wagener

Martin Wagener is a professor at Germany’s Federal University of Applied Administrative Sciences in Bruehl and Munich. He can be reached for comment at [email protected].

The Aqua Luna Junk passes by Victoria Harbour near one of six AV-8B Harrier Attack Planes on the USS Peleliu during a recent port call in Hong Kong. photo: See-ming Lee

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systems is no longer useful in this part of East Asia—except for China, which adeptly uses this argument to weaken Taiwan’s defenses.

Historically, the distinction between offensive and defensive weapons systems in the Taiwan Strait was justified. During the 1950s and 1960s, Republic of China (ROC) President Chiang Kai-shek and the leadership around him seriously considered retak-ing the mainland, which would have required of-fensive weapons.

Furthermore, the Chinese position through to the

1990s is understandable. Then, the balance of power was more even. Frequently, it was even advantageous to the ROC, especially in terms of military technol-ogy. In 1990, Taiwan’s defense budget of US$8.55 bil-lion considerably exceeded that of China, at US$6.13 billion.

An arms race lost

After the 1990s, China’s advantage began to quickly increase as its dynamic economic development al-lowed it to invest more in its military. In 2014, China officially reported a defense budget amounting to US$129 billion. Taiwan, in contrast, could only ear-mark US$10.1 billion for military spending. Over the past years, Beijing has also modernized its armed forces considerably. Consequently, the arms race has

clearly been settled in China’s favor.Today, the distinction between offensive and defen-

sive weapons systems is outdated for three reasons. First, Taiwan has no intention to attack China; retak-ing the mainland is impossible. China could respond to any provocation with massive force.

Second, Taiwan’s armed forces are exclusively geared toward defensive scenarios. Every weapons system in their inventory serves to extend the island’s survival in case of a Chinese invasion. The goal is to hold out for as long as possible in a purely defensive position

and to hope for US assistance. While Taiwan today does have weapons of an offensive character, the ROC Armed Forces’ mission is simply to defend Taiwan.

Third and last, Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz’s argument that, in war, offense and de-fense are closely linked should be remembered. As he notes in his principal work On War, first published in 1832: “We can ... in a defensive campaign fight offensively, in a defensive battle we may use some divisions for offensive purposes.” In other words, defensive weapons systems can be used for offense, and vice versa. This continues to be the case today.

For Taiwan’s military, the offensive or defensive nature of a weapons system is of secondary impor-tance. Rather, a weapons system’s conceivable use matters: does the weapon contribute to the deterrence of China and thus the defense of Taiwan?

ROC army tanks make advances during the Han Kuang military exercises simulating an invasion by China on an island in the Taiwan Strait. photo: TC Lin

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In the coming years, the ROC Armed Forces will have an ever harder time meeting their defensive task. According to Pentagon figures, more than 1,100 Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBM) of the Chinese Second Artillery were aimed at targets on Taiwan in 2012. The ROC Ministry of National Defense puts this number at 1,400 in 2013. Moreover, accord-ing to numbers available for 2014, of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force’s 2,100 operational combat aircraft, 330 are within range of Taiwan and could conduct combat operations without refueling. Furthermore, China’s naval forces have enough sub-marines to blockade Taiwan. It is with good reasons then, that the military leadership in Taipei strikes a gloomy tone in the National Defense Report 2013: “The PRC plans to build comprehensive capabili-ties for using military force against Taiwan by 2020.”

To expand the PLA’s capabilities further, Beijing is eying weapons systems that are considered game changers. According to press reports, China and Russia signed in 2014 an agreement for the delivery of advanced S-400 surface-to-air missiles. Although the

S-400 is conceived as a defensive system, China can be expected to deploy the S-400 in Fujian province, in close proximity to Taiwan. There, the long-range mis-sile defense system would serve both defensive and offensive purposes. Reportedly, the S-400’s range is up to 400 kilometers. If war breaks out, China could directly target aircraft in flight throughout Taiwan and potentially secure immediate air superiority

without deploying fighter aircraft.Against this backdrop, John J. Mearsheimer, profes-

sor of political science at the University of Chicago, paints a bleak picture of the future in a 2014 article in The National Interest: “Not only will China be much more powerful than it is today, but it will also re-main deeply committed to making Taiwan part of

Arms Sales to Taiwan b 21

A transporter erector launcher, or TEL, of an S-400 Triumf makes an appearance during the 2009 Victory Day Anniversary Parade rehearsal in Moscow.

“The Ministry of National Defense ad-dressed innovative and asymmetric ways to strengthen major warfighting capabilities.”

photo: UMNICK

Page 22: Strategic Vision, Issue 20

China. Moreover, China will try to dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere, which means it will seek to reduce, if not eliminate, the American military presence in Asia.”

Asymmetric warfare

China’s military buildup has caused Taiwan to consider new ways in defense policy. In the 2013 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Ministry of National Defense addressed “innovative and asym-metric” ways “to strengthen major warfighting capa-bilities.” The military strategy of “asymmetric war-fare” has also been mentioned in the 2009 QDR.

This form of warfare could be realized with weap-ons systems such as the Hsiung Feng (Brave Wind) III, an Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM). It was developed by the Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST) and entered service in

2007/2008. The Hsiung Feng III’s speed exceeds Mach 2 and has a range of about 150 km. Experts as-sume that it is superior to the Russian ASCM SS-N-22 Sunburn, which China’s naval forces use. The Hsiung Feng III is deployed on frigates and patrol boats.

At the end of the day, however, fighting asymmet-rically entails much more. Taipei must become en-tirely unpredictable for Beijing in case of war, thus deterring it further. The 2009 QDR suggests that the government in Taipei is working on putting together an elite force “to strike at the enemy’s weaknesses or critical vulnerabilities, limit the enemy’s warfight-ing capabilities or movements, and allow us to attain greater freedom of movement and secure military victory.” The overarching goal here would be raising the political costs of a war for China.

To this end, the ROC Armed Forces would require weapons systems that could also target the mainland. The CSIST has already succeeded in this: The Hsiung

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graphic: Political Geography Now

Page 23: Strategic Vision, Issue 20

Feng IIE, a Land-Attack Cruise Missile (LACM), could, for example, be launched against missile de-fense positions in Fujian, should the S-400 be de-ployed there. This subsonic cruise missile has a re-ported range of 600 km, with some claiming as much as 1,000 km. It is unclear whether the Hsiung Feng IIE has already entered service. ROC President Ma Ying-jeou is said to have ordered the production of 300 LACMs in 2008. In 2015, the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London assessed that 12 Hsiung Feng IIE had been deployed.

Asymmetric tools

Media reports also mention ongoing work on the surface-to-surface missile Yun Feng (Cloud Peak). It is said to have a speed of Mach 3 and a reach of up to 1,200 km, which would allow it to strike the Three Gorges Dam in Hubei province. Upgraded variants of the Yun Feng are expected to reach up to 2,000 km. In 2004, the Pentagon speculated about such a scenario should Taiwan acquire a long-range surface-

to-surface missile. The government in Taipei has not officially confirmed the missile’s existence. Either way, it would precisely meet the requirements dictated by the logic of asymmetric warfare.

What does this mean for the administration in Washington? Of course the United States has to ad-here to its one-China policy and maintain its neutral position of non-support for Taiwan independence. At the same time, however, it cannot be denied that the balance of power in this part of East Asia contin-ues to shift dramatically. This is also partly because Taiwan has been unwilling or unable to increase its defense budget. The United States must thus con-sider new ways of strengthening Taiwan’s defensive capabilities. This should include no longer making

Arms Sales to Taiwan b 23

“A state which sees itself as too weak because of limited defensive capability could feel compelled to put everything on one card. In Taiwan’s case, this could mean acquiring nuclear weapons.”

A Hsiung Feng III missile on display at an aeronautics show in Taipei, with a background illustration of several such missiles assaulting an aircraft carrier.

photo: ROC MND

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strict distinctions between “offensive” and “defensive” weapons systems.

Given the shifting balance of power in the Taiwan Strait, it would be appropriate to supply the ROC with additional weapons systems to help offset this imbal-ance. Submarines (or submarine-related technology) would be ideal to counter a blockade or amphibious operations. The Joint Strike Fighter F-35Bs would also bolster Taiwan’s defensive capabilities. The F-35B’s short take-off and vertical-landing capability would allow it to be used after the destruction of runways by SRBMs. The United States—and also other states in Asia and Europe supporting the ROC’s efforts—would not jeopardize peace in the Taiwan Strait, but would strengthen it. Washington should also think about new ways to integrate Taipei in its policy of rebalancing to Asia.

Should the United States continue its wait-and-see position in the Taiwan Strait, Mearsheimer might end up being right. As structural realists claim, im-balances of power are dangerous. This is supported

by offense-defense theory, according to which wars become more likely as attacks become easier, and vice versa. As MIT professor Stephen Van Evera argued in International Security in 1998: “When conquest is hard, states are dissuaded from aggression by the fear that victory will prove costly or unattainable.”

The perils of imbalances

In practice, however, another development is con-ceivable: A state which sees itself as too weak because of limited defensive capability could feel compelled to put everything on one card. In Taiwan’s case, this could mean acquiring nuclear weapons. To date, the leadership in Taipei has, for good reason, decided to forgo such a move. In 1995, ROC President Lee Teng-hui last raised the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons in the future to credibly deter China. Shortly thereafter, however, he backtracked and stated that Taiwan would not build nuclear weapons.

If Beijing were to take over the “renegade province”

A US Marine Corps variant of the F-35B Lighting II Joint Strike Fighter after a vertical landing aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp. photo: Tommy Lamkin

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it would have enormous strategic consequences for the rest of Asia. By occupying Taiwan, China could not only directly threaten Japanese sea lanes of com-munication. It would also have the long-sought direct access to the western Pacific. This could put limits on US naval forces’ freedom to maneuver in East Asia, exacerbating the regional arms race.

Such a scenario would be relevant for Europe, too. Governments in London, Paris, and Berlin would have to react if a militarily weak Taiwan were to be invaded by the PRC. Would they be prepared to re-spond? If they showed solidarity with Taiwan and the United States, China could sever ties with them. That would have tremendous economic consequences.

In the worst case scenario, should the United States support Taiwan militarily in case of war, Beijing could launch a retaliatory strike against US territo-ry. Washington could then invoke NATO and would presumably ask London, Paris, and Berlin for mili-tary assistance. This may seem like a far-fetched sce-nario, but Europeans also considered the possibility

of Russian annexation of Crimea to be a thing of the past.

The outcome of a war between Beijing and Taipei would be a foregone conclusion: Taiwan does not stand a chance. Depending on the scenario, analysts assume that the island could withstand the PLA’s as-sault only several weeks. Therefore, two things are decisive to maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait: On the one hand, China must expect that Washington will help Taiwan defend itself. The ROC Armed Forces, on the other hand, must have the capabili-ties to make an invasion of the island as costly as possible. If the Chinese leadership expected a war of attrition, and even military strikes against the mainland, the price of a blockade or invasion at-tempt might seem too high.

This concept should factor in to all arms deliveries to Taiwan. In the end, they are not meant for fight-ing. Rather, they serve to influence the political cost-benefit-analysis of the Chinese leadership. As Sun Tzu advised, it is best to win without fighting. n

Analysts predict that Taiwan could withstand a PLA assault for only several weeks, necessitating a rethink of sales of offensive weapons for defensive use.photo: Tai Gray

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The Reasons for China’s loss of Myanmar present an important case study in Chinese foreign policy. While Chinese leaders are

no doubt debating the reasons behind the walls of Zhongnanhai, the rest of the region, as well as the West, should pay close attention to this develop-ment. The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) fail-ure in Myanmar offers important clues to the level of Chinese influence in other countries, and how it seeks to exercise its influence. Chinese strategists are interested in Myanmar primarily because of its key geostrategic position.

China recently finished construction of an oil pipe-line which stretches from the city of Kyaukpyu, on

the eastern coast of the Bay of Bengal, to the Chinese border. This important pipeline helps enable China to bypass the Strait of Malacca, a vulnerable chokepoint in maritime shipping. Secondly, Myanmar could po-tentially host Chinese naval vessels, should China seek to develop a blue-water navy and increase its presence in the Indian Ocean.

The PRC relationship with Myanmar includes a mix of foreign-policy victories, as well as a number of failures. Myanmar was eager to cooperate with China in strengthening the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. The failure of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), which was sheltered, trained, ad-vised and supported by the PRC from 1962 to 1979,

Bradley Wu is a an independent researcher and former consultant to the China Program at the World Security Institute. He can be reached for comment at [email protected].

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Burmese soldiers unload aid supplies from a US Air Force C-130 following Cyclone Nargis. Such efforts signal an improvement in relations with the US.

Strategic Vision vol. 4, no. 20 (April, 2015)

Losing Allies

Shortsighted Chinese policies leads to weakened relationship with MyanmarBradley Wu

photo: Sgt. Alcaraz

Page 27: Strategic Vision, Issue 20

was a failure for Beijing. The collapse of the CPB in northern Myanmar produced lingering problems in the form of insurgent groups and drug-smuggling rings. These developments, negative as they would seem, enabled China to maintain a bargaining chip with Myanmar. However, this tactic is outdated and reflects negatively on past Chinese foreign policy.

What happened in Myanmar after World War II could be summarized into five themes: the endur-ing bane of civil war buried from the forming of this federation, opportunities for the rise of military juntas caused by the unrest of repeated insurgencies, total failure of the so-called socialism of General Ne Win, support from neighboring powers to different insurgent groups including the CPB, and prelimi-nary success in the country’s tentative steps toward democratization and the endeavor to restore peace and unification supported by the West.

In addition to its sponsorship of the CPB for the purpose of expanding the sphere of communist in-fluence, China maintains a very realistic perspec-tive on other issues. This is reasonable, for national reconciliation, enduring democratization and re-

unification are all not easy for Myanmar. However, generally speaking, Myanmar, as well as the world, should move forward to better governance. China chose to support Myanmar’s military regime, which was sanctioned by the world, in exchange for geopo-litical benefit. This policy ignored the power of in-ternal developments such as the democratic student movement. But China never expected that one day the military junta would be inclined to move towards democracy and enjoy economic and military support from the West.

Growing friction

Currently, the relationship between Myanmar’s gov-ernment and the opposition parties is on a produc-tive track, and China has no influence in the matter. In conflicts between the Myanmar government and armed groups of ethnic minorities, China could play the role of mediator, but could not offer a real solu-tion. Though Naypyidaw faces difficulties in defeat-ing the armed groups completely, and must consid-er Beijing’s interests, it has become more and more

Losing Allies b 27

Mae La Refugee Camp is the largest such camp for Burmese refugees in Thailand, over 90 percent of whom are ethnic Karen that have fled the junta.photo: Mikhail Esteves

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unproductive for China to control the direction in which Myanmar moves by keeping these conflicts alive. Even enormous investments in infrastructure in Myanmar could not buy this initiative back.

For Myanmar’s government, it is much more at-tractive to move towards the democratic order than to simply rely on China and face wide-ranging eco-nomic sanctions. This change also presents a more problematic development for China. American dip-lomatic and economic power has shown that it can exert a powerful influence on China’s key allies, and undermine PRC foreign-policy objectives.

Strategic drivers

While China will likely be able to achieve its goal of constructing an oil pipeline through Myanmar, the value of this project will be somewhat diminished. A key factor in China’s desire to construct a pipeline in Myanmar is the desire to avoid having its oil im-ports blocked during a conflict or crisis. Bypassing

the Strait of Malacca would have greatly reduced this threat. However, a Myanmar government with closer relations to the West might be a less reliable partner during a crisis.

Due to the preference for democratic governance being a key factor in China’s loss of Myanmar, it is clear that the PRC’s core values can impede its for-eign policy objectives. Though China is promoting a colorful system of socialist core values at home, it regards these values as totally different from the so-called universal values espoused by the West. In ad-dition to defending itself when criticized by the West, China will continue to evade comments on similar affairs abroad. Thus, China has to rely on maintain-ing instability in northern Myanmar to maintain its influence over this country. However, this position

As Myanmar continues to reform, greater numbers of people will visit this once isolated country, and discover is natural beauty and cultural wonders.photo: Caleb Cole

“It is clear that the PRC’s core val-ues can impede its foreign policy objectives.”

Page 29: Strategic Vision, Issue 20

Burmese Defense Service personnel greet a military delegation from Thailand.

photo: Wimedia Commons

is becoming harder and harder to ar-ticulate, both at home and abroad.

Improved relations between Washington and Naypyidaw, and the increasing influence of the United States, caused a great deal of anxiety for Chinese leadership. Some Chinese ministries hope to attract sympathy among Chinese audiences by empha-sizing the barbarity of Myanmar’s mil-itary and the misery of ethnic minori-ties. The most powerful propaganda machine, led by the Global Times, which thrives on instigating nation-alist sentiment and serves the rapidly growing extreme left wing inside the ruling party, choose to recklessly hype this development as a fatal geopolitical disaster for China.

Ironically, this hype is absolutely necessary, considering the fact that Chinese society would be indifferent to overseas humanitarian crises if there are no Chinese lives involved. It has been a long-held position by the Chinese government that humanitarian crises behind foreign insurgencies are often means used by America to interfere in the affairs of developing countries. The experience of the Rohingya people in Myanmar is a case in point; since the Rakhine State where they live is far from the Chinese border, and it involves the sensitive topic of human rights, the standard at-titude of Chinese society is general disinterest. This is in contrast to the attitude they hold on similar cases in northern Myanmar. As explained by the most popular source of knowledge about the world for Chinese citizens, the Encyclopedia of Baidu; “Rohingya people immigrated into Myanmar as ac-complices for British colonists, they attempted to break up Myanmar via insurgencies on several oc-casions, their crime rate is extremely high, and their

relation with Buddhists in Myanmar is very tense.”On issues related to northern Myanmar, Chinese

officials have a different concern; strident national-istic sentiment in China might force them to take a hard line. This in turn would likely cause Myanmar’s government to move closer to America and further ruin years of Chinese strategic investment.

Rising nationalism

Nationalist sentiment among the Chinese population is a challenge for the PRC. The government just re-cently soothed domestic rage over the 2011 Mekong River massacre, in which some Chinese sailors were killed. This was brought about largely because of the death sentence given to Myanmar drug lord Naw Kham. A plot was raised by some Chinese media officials which claimed that there must have been some anti-Chinese conspiracy hidden behind this

Losing Allies b 29

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murder. Without creating controversy with Southeast Asian neighbors, how could these media spin masters provide justification to root out the specious anti-Chinese movements and portray themselves as the defenders of the people?

This is why the Chinese embassy in Myanmar quickly denied the fact that there are Chinese citi-zens trapped in northern Myanmar. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs also played down this fact even after it acknowledged that some lumbermen were detained by Myanmar authorities.

With regard to the detained Chinese lumber-men, the Chinese government is fully aware of the situation and permits them to buy timber from local insurgent groups in northern Myanmar and import the logs into China. However, the PRC does not support these smugglers when they are pursued by and hunted by Myanmar’s military. If the first half of this process could be explained

by respecting de facto situations in Myanmar and unspeakable interests of China, how could the second half be explained rationally to Chinese nationalists?

Considering the complexity and grimness of the domestic political situation in China in recent years, profiting from chaos in Myanmar by powerful inter-ests in the Chinese central and local governments has been a big problem for China. Different branches of the Chinese government are following different ap-proaches in their dealings with Myanmar.

With its flawed system of values, China cannot in-fluence the direction of Myanmar, let alone control it. So much Chinese manpower and capital is poured into developing countries where the power of the West is weak, but inner conflicts are abundant. Without a clear policy which promotes stability and true co-operation, these places will continue to be troubled waters. n

The USS O’Kane prepares to get underway for operations in the Asia-Pacific. In time, US Navy ships could be making goodwill visits to Myanmar. photo: US Pacific Command

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STRATEGIC VISION for Taiwan Security

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Page 32: Strategic Vision, Issue 20

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